Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019

Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Government Bill Explanatory note General policy statement Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) are multilateral systems that provide trading, clearing, settlement, and reporting services in relation to payments, securities, deriva￾tives, and other financial transactions. FMIs include payment systems, securities settlement systems, central securities depositories, central counterparties, and trade repositories. Well-managed and operated FMIs are essential to the operation of a sound and effi￾cient financial system, and the day-to-day operation of the economy. In particular, they provide much of the underlying infrastructure that enables non-cash payments and the settlement of financial market transactions. They also reduce transaction costs by supporting the management of counterparty risks and fostering transparency. Given the key role they play, the disruption or failure of important FMIs could have significant negative impacts on the financial system, businesses, and consumers. The Financial Market Infrastructures Bill (the Bill) establishes a new regulatory regime for FMIs. It also provides certain FMIs with legal protections relating to settlement finality, netting, and the enforceability of their rules. The purposes of the Bill are to— • promote the maintenance of a sound and efficient financial system; and • avoid significant damage to the financial system that could result from prob￾lems with an FMI, an operator of an FMI, or a participant of an FMI; and • promote the confident and informed participation of businesses, investors, and consumers in the financial markets; and • promote and facilitate the development of fair, efficient, and transparent finan￾cial markets. DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION Consultation draft

The Bill will replace Parts 5B and 5C of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (the RBNZ Act). The regulator The role of the regulator under the Bill is carried out by the Reserve Bank and the Financial Markets Authority acting jointly, except in relation to payment systems, where the Reserve Bank acts as the sole regulator. Powers under the Bill will be exercised by the joint regulators and joint ministers (that is, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs), except in relation to pure payment systems, where powers will be exercised by the Reserve Bank and Minister of Finance alone. Designated and non-designated FMIs The Bill provides for different treatment of designated and non-designated FMIs. Designated FMIs will be FMIs that— • are identified as systemically important and deemed into the regime (as dis￾cussed further below); or • have opted into the regime to access the settlement finality and netting protec￾tions that are currently included in Part 5C of the RBNZ Act and that will be carried across into the new legislation. Regulation of designated FMIs under the Bill Designation process Under the Bill, joint ministers have the power to declare, on the recommendation of joint regulators, that an FMI is a designated FMI for the purposes of the Act. The joint regulators may make this recommendation on their own initiative if they are satisfied that the FMI is systemically important (taking into account prescribed mat￾ters such as the concentration of financial risks in the FMI, and the nature and scope of the FMIs activities). Alternatively, an FMI may apply to the joint regulators for a recommendation to be made, where they wish to access the legal protections for des￾ignated systems (in this case the joint regulators will assess that the FMI and its rules are sufficiently robust to justify the application of these legal protections). Standards The Bill provides joint regulators with the power to make legally binding standards that apply to designated FMIs. The matters standards may relate to are designed to allow standards to be made in relation to any of the matters covered in the CPSS￾IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. Standards may apply to all FMIs, a class of FMIs, or an individual FMI. Standards are also disallowable instru￾ments. 2 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Explanatory note Consultation draft

General monitoring and oversight Under the Bill, joint regulators also have a number of powers for monitoring and investigative purposes, including— • the power to require operators or participants to provide information: • the power to require an operator to obtain a report from an independent expert on aspects of the FMI’s business or operations: • the power to appoint an investigator to examine the financial position or oper￾ation of the FMI: • the power to seek a warrant to enter premises to obtain evidence relevant to an investigation. Oversight of rules The Bill provides that designated FMIs must provide any amendments to their rules to the joint regulators, and that rule changes for domestic designated FMIs must be approved by the joint regulators. The joint regulators also have the power to require the operator to prepare a rule change to ensure compliance with relevant standards, and where they consider the rule change is not adequate to ensure compliance, direct the operator to change the FMI’s rules. Crisis management: FMI contingency plans Under the Bill, FMIs are required to have contingency plans for how they will deal with operational or financial failure. The crisis management powers in the Bill are expected to be used only in those cases where these contingency plans are not being appropriately implemented or are inadequate to deal with the situation. The contin￾gency plans to deal with financial failure are also expected to provide for loss alloca￾tion rules amongst participants. Crisis management: direction powers The Bill provides joint regulators with the power to direct the operators of designated FMIs. The threshold for being able to issue directions includes the actual or potential insolvency of the operator, carrying on business in a manner that is prejudicial to the soundness of the financial system, or carrying on business fraudulently or recklessly. Directions may, for example, require participants to comply with the rules of the FMI, or appoint or remove the directors of an operator. Crisis management: statutory management The Bill establishes a tailored statutory management regime for FMIs, which also includes new powers such as the ability to transfer the FMI to a new operator under a new operator scheme. Regulation of non-designated FMIs under the Bill The joint regulators’ powers in respect of non-designated FMIs are limited to infor￾mation gathering and the ability to require operators of these FMIs to obtain an inde￾Explanatory note Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 3 Consultation draft

pendent report in respect of the business or operation of the FMI. This reflects the fact that these FMIs are not systemically important and do not have access to the legal protections afforded to relevant designated FMIs. These powers are intended to be used mainly for the purpose of monitoring the broader sector, and identifying whether an FMI has become systemically important (and so may need to be designated under the regime). Enforcement and penalties The Bill provides for a graduated and flexible range of remedies for breaches of legal requirements imposed by or under the Act. Specifically— • while breaches of requirements imposed directly by the Act result in criminal penalties, breaches of requirements set in standards result in civil pecuniary penalties; and • joint regulators have the ability to issue remedial notices requiring breaches to be corrected; and • joint regulators have the ability to enter into enforceable undertakings. Transitional arrangements and commencement The Bill will come into force on a date or dates specified by 1 or more Orders in Council, but no later than 3 years after the date of Royal assent. This is necessary to give effect to the intended arrangements for implementing the Bill. Using this power, the following provisions will be brought into force immediately: • powers to require information, reviews, and independent reports (Part 2): • power to designate FMIs for the purposes of the Bill (clauses 20 to 29): • power to set standards (clauses 30 to 34). A transitional period will then be used to designate relevant FMIs and issue the rele￾vant standards. At the end of this period, the provisions relating to designation notices, standards, settlement finality and the remaining provisions of the Act will come into force and Parts 5B and 5C of the RBNZ Act will be repealed. Clause by clause analysis [To come] 4 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Explanatory note Consultation draft

Hon Grant Robertson Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Government Bill Contents Page 1 Title 7 2 Commencement 7 Part 1 Preliminary provisions and regulator Subpart 1—Preliminary provisions 3 Purposes 8 4 Overview of this Act 8 5 Interpretation 10 6 Transitional, savings, and related provisions 16 7 Act binds the Crown 16 Subpart 2—The regulator 8 Who is the regulator? 16 9 Requirement to act jointly 17 10 Cases where requirement to act jointly does not apply 17 11 RBNZ and FMA working together 17 12 General provisions about regulator’s functions and Ministers’ functions 18 13 Purposes and principles for exercising powers 18 Part 2 Regulator’s powers to require information, reviews, and independent reports 14 Regulator’s power to require submission of information 19 15 Offence for failure to give information 19 16 Regulator’s power to require information to be reviewed 19 Consultation draft 1

17 Offence for failure to obtain review 20 18 Regulator’s power to require independent report 20 19 Offence for failing to give report 20 Part 3 Designated FMIs Subpart 1—Making, revoking, and amending designations Designations by Minister 20 Designation of FMIs by Minister 21 Recommendation for designation by regulator 21 Recommendations by regulator 21 22 Restrictions on recommendations 21 23 Matters to which regulator may have regard for purposes of recommendations 22 24 Matters which regulator must take into account for purposes of deciding if FMI is systemically important 22 Process for applications or recommendations on own initiative 25 Application for issue, revocation, or amendment of designation notice 23 26 Process where regulator makes recommendation on own initiative 23 General provisions relating to designation notices 27 Meaning of systemically important 23 28 Content and publication of designation notice 24 Offence 29 Offence for wrongly holding out system as designated FMI, etc 24 Subpart 2—Standards for designated FMIs 30 Regulator may issue standards for designated FMIs 25 31 Procedure for issuing standards 25 32 Publication of standards 26 33 Pecuniary penalty for contravention of standard 26 34 Subject matter of standards 26 Subpart 3—Rules of designated FMIs 35 Designated FMI’s rules 28 36 Operators must publish copy of rules of designated FMI 28 37 Offence for contravention of section 36 28 38 Time rule change comes into effect 28 39 Operator of designated FMI may apply for approval of rule change 28 40 Regulator may require change to designated FMI’s rules 29 41 Regulator’s decision to approve rule change required under section 40 29 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 2 Consultation draft

42 Regulator’s decision to not approve rule change required under section 40 29 43 Offence for contravention of section 40 or 42 30 44 Changes to rules of designated FMIs that are overseas FMIs 30 45 Offence for contravention of section 44 31 46 Publication of rule changes 31 Subpart 4—FMI contingency plans 47 Designated FMIs to have FMI contingency plans 31 48 Offence for contravention of section 47 32 49 Regulator’s power to review FMI contingency plans, etc 32 50 Regulator’s powers in relation to FMI contingency plans 32 51 Regulator’s decision on change submitted by operator 32 52 Offence for contravention of sections 49 to 51 33 Subpart 5—Validity and enforceability of settlements under designated FMIs, etc 53 Application of this subpart 33 Settlements and netting 54 Designated FMI’s rules relating to settlements, etc, are valid and enforceable 33 55 Settlements must not be reversed, etc 34 56 Netting 35 57 Underlying transactions, etc 35 58 Interrelationships with other enactments 36 Other provisions 59 Transfer of personal property in accordance with designated FMI’s rules effective 36 60 Operators to be notified of insolvency event 37 Subpart 6—Investigations, remedial notices, and voluntary undertakings Investigations 61 Regulator may appoint investigator 37 62 Investigator’s powers 37 63 Application for warrant 38 64 Offences relating to investigations 38 Remedial notices and plans 65 Regulator may require operator to take action in relation to contravention of this Act 39 66 Remedial plans 39 67 Other provisions relating to remedial notices and plans 39 68 Offence for contravention of remedial notice or failing to take steps to comply with remedial plan 40 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Consultation draft 3

Voluntary undertakings 69 Regulator may accept voluntary undertaking 40 70 Consequences of accepting undertaking 40 71 Undertakings that include payment of money 40 72 Operator may withdraw or amend undertaking 41 73 Enforcement of voluntary undertakings 41 74 Court must take into account certain matters 41 Part 4 Dealing with systemically important FMIs that are distressed, etc Subpart 1—Application and purposes 75 Application of this Part 41 76 Purposes for which powers under this Part may be exercised 42 Subpart 2—Directions to operators or participants and removal of directors 77 Application of this subpart 42 78 Directions to operator 43 79 Giving and complying with direction does not place person in contravention etc 44 80 Offences for contravention or unauthorised disclosure of direction notice 44 81 Direction to participant to comply with FMI’s rules 44 82 Offence for contravention of direction notice 45 83 Removal of director 45 84 Process if regulator proposes to exercise power to remove director 45 85 How power to remove director is exercised 45 Subpart 3—Statutory management Making FMI operator subject to statutory management 86 Power to make operator subject to statutory management 46 87 Regulator’s recommendation under section 86 46 88 Statutory management of operator whose home jurisdiction is not New Zealand 47 Conduct of statutory management: purposes, duties, and principles 89 Purposes 47 90 General duties 47 91 Principles 47 92 Other duties 48 93 Advisory committee 48 94 Terminating appointment, or resignation, of member of advisory committee 49 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 4 Consultation draft

Conduct of statutory management: application of FMI’s rules 95 Application of FMI’s rules 49 96 Statutory manager must pay calls, debts, and claims arising under FMI’s rules 50 Conduct of statutory management: new operator schemes 97 Purpose of new operator schemes 50 98 Making of new operator scheme 50 99 Consent required to make new operating scheme 51 100 Effect of new operating scheme 52 101 Registers 52 Conduct of statutory management: application of Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, etc 102 Moratorium 53 103 Power of statutory manager to sell business undertaking of operator under statutory management, etc 53 Application of other provisions of Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 104 Applicable provisions of Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 54 105 Modifications relating to power to pay creditors and compromise claims 55 106 Other modifications to Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 56 107 Offences relating to statutory management 57 Termination of statutory management or of statutory manager’s appointment 108 Termination of statutory management 58 109 Effect of termination of statutory management 58 110 Termination or resignation of statutory manager’s appointment 58 111 Appointment of new statutory manager 59 Other provisions 112 Obligations incurred by statutory manager 59 113 Statutory management does not place any person in contravention of enactment, etc 60 114 Continuation of statutory management of company restored to New Zealand register 60 115 Person who exercises powers under subpart not director of operator under statutory management 60 Subpart 4—Supplementary provisions 116 Certain rights relating to derivatives may be exercised after stay 60 117 Regulator may reduce or extend stay on exercise of rights 61 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Consultation draft 5

Part 5 Offences and pecuniary penalties Subpart 1—Offences 118 Penalties for offences 62 119 Defence for certain offences 63 120 Time for filing charging documents 64 Subpart 2—Pecuniary penalties 121 Pecuniary penalty orders 64 122 Maximum amount of penalty 65 123 Considerations for court 65 124 Defences in pecuniary penalty proceeding for operator that contravenes standard 65 125 Defence for other operator that is involved in contravention 65 126 Rules of civil procedure and civil standard of proof apply to civil liability 66 127 Court must order that recovery from pecuniary penalty be applied to regulator’s actual costs 66 Subpart 3—Supplementary provisions 128 Liability of directors 66 129 State of mind of directors, employees, or agents attributed to body corporate or other principal 67 130 Person not liable for fine and pecuniary penalty for same conduct 67 Part 6 Final provisions Subpart 1—Supplementary provisions relating to information Offences and pecuniary penalties 131 False or misleading information given for purposes of Act 67 Disclosure of information, etc 132 Disclosure of information between RBNZ and FMA 68 133 Disclosure of information by RBNZ or FMA to other persons 68 134 Offence for unauthorised disclosure 69 135 Conditions relating to disclosure of information 69 136 Restrictions on further disclosure of information 70 137 Offence for unauthorised disclosure or use 70 138 Effect of proceedings on exercise of powers to require information, etc 70 139 Decision that exercise of powers is unlawful 71 Subpart 2—Supplementary provisions relating to regulator’s powers 140 Applications and other information given to regulator 72 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 6 Consultation draft

141 Revocation or amendment of requirements imposed, or directions given, by notice 72 142 Publication requirements 72 143 Interaction with Legislation Act 2012 73 Subpart 3—Regulations 144 Power to make regulations by Order in Council 74 Subpart 4—Other final provisions 145 Directions to regulator 74 146 Limit on FMA’s powers under other enactments 75 147 Protection from liability 75 148 Conduct of directors, employees, or agents attributed to body corporate or other principal 75 149 Prohibition on indemnities or insurance for directors or employees of operators that are not New Zealand companies 76 150 Exception to prohibition 76 151 Giving of notices by regulator or investigator 77 152 Giving notices to agent 78 Subpart 5—Consequential amendments 153 Consequential amendments to Acts and instruments 78 Schedule 1 Transitional, savings, and related provisions 79 Schedule 2 Consequential amendments 80 The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 1 Title This Act is the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019. 2 Commencement (1) This Act comes into force on the date appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council, and 1 or more orders may be made bringing different provi￾sions into force on different dates and appointing different dates for different purposes. (2) To the extent that this Act is not previously brought into force under subsec￾tion (1), this Act comes into force on the third anniversary of the date of Royal assent. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill cl 2 Consultation draft 7

Part 1 Preliminary provisions and regulator Subpart 1—Preliminary provisions 3 Purposes (1) The purposes of this Act are to— (a) promote the maintenance of a sound and efficient financial system; and (b) avoid significant damage to the financial system that could result from problems with an FMI, an operator of an FMI, or a participant of an FMI; and (c) promote the confident and informed participation of businesses, invest￾ors, and consumers in the financial markets; and (d) promote and facilitate the development of fair, efficient, and transparent financial markets. (2) Those purposes are achieved by— (a) establishing a system for designating systemically important FMIs and FMIs that apply for designation; and (b) imposing regulatory requirements on designated FMIs; and (c) providing for the supervision of compliance with those requirements by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Financial Markets Authority (acting as the regulator); and (d) conferring certain powers on the regulator to gather information; and (e) conferring certain powers on the regulator to act in respect of distressed FMIs. 4 Overview of this Act General (1) This Act is about the regulation of financial market infrastructures, which, in this Act, are called FMIs. (2) The regulator of FMIs is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Financial Markets Authority. (3) This Act is divided into 6 Parts. Part 1 (4) This Part (Part 1) covers the following preliminary matters: (a) definitions of terms used in this Act, including the definition of FMI (section 5): (b) transitional, savings, and related provisions (section 6 and Schedule 1): Part 1 cl 3 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 8 Consultation draft

(c) the application of this Act to the Crown (section 7): (d) an explanation of the regulator of FMIs (subpart 2). Part 2 (5) Part 2 gives the regulator powers to require the following: (a) the submission and review of information about FMIs (sections 14 to 17): (b) the submission and publication of independent reports about FMIs (sec￾tions 18 and 19). Part 3 (6) Part 3 is about FMIs that are designated FMIs for the purposes of this Act and covers the following matters: (a) how an FMI becomes a designated FMI (subpart 1): (b) standards applying to designated FMIs (subpart 2): (c) the rules of designated FMIs (subpart 3): (d) contingency plans of designated FMIs (subpart 4): (e) provisions to ensure that settlements effected, and certain other things done, under certain designated FMIs are valid and enforceable (subpart 5): (f) investigations, remedial notices, and voluntary undertakings for dealing with contraventions, by operators of designated FMIs, of requirements imposed by or under this Act (subpart 6). Part 4 (7) Part 4 is about designated FMIs that are systemically important and, where such an FMI becomes distressed,— (a) gives the regulator power to do the following (subpart 2): (i) give directions to an operator or a participant of the FMI: (ii) remove or appoint a director of an operator of the FMI: (b) enables an operator of the FMI to be made subject to statutory manage￾ment (subpart 3). Part 5 (8) Part 5 is about offences and pecuniary penalties under this Act and covers the following matters: (a) penalties for offences and the time for filing charging documents (sub￾part 1): (b) the process for requiring the payment of pecuniary penalties, the amounts of pecuniary penalties, and the liabilities of operators of FMIs to pecuniary penalties (subpart 2): (c) supplementary provisions relating to directors’ liabilities (subpart 3). Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 1 cl 4 Consultation draft 9

Part 6 (9) Part 6 covers the following final matters: (a) supplementary provisions relating to information (subpart 1): (b) supplementary provisions relating to the regulator’s powers (subpart 2): (c) regulations (subpart 3): (d) other final provisions (subpart 4): (e) consequential amendments of enactments (subpart 5). 5 Interpretation In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— advisory committee means the committee appointed under section 93 clearing means the process of transmitting and reconciling transactions that are intended to result in settlements, which may include 1 or more of the follow￾ing: (a) the confirming of the transactions (that is, verifying their terms with the parties or other relevant persons): (b) the netting of obligations under the transactions and the establishing of final positions for the purpose of effecting the settlements: (c) in the case of transactions involving futures or options, the daily balanc￾ing of profits and losses and the daily calculation of collateral require￾ments conduct includes an act or omission or a contravention designated FMI means an FMI that is declared to be a designated FMI under section 20 designation notice is defined in section 20(1) director, in relation to a body corporate or an unincorporated body, means— (a) a person occupying the position of director of the body by whatever name called: (b) if the body does not have directors as such, any trustee, manager, or other person who acts, in relation to the body, in the same way as, or in a way that is similar to the way in which, a director would act if the body were a company incorporated under the Companies Act 1993 disruption includes delay distressed, in relation to an FMI, means 1 or more of the following applies: (a) an operator of the FMI is insolvent or is likely to become insolvent: (b) without limiting paragraph (a), an insolvency event has occurred, or is likely to occur, for an operator: Part 1 cl 5 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 10 Consultation draft

(c) an operator has acted (or is acting) fraudulently or recklessly: (d) an operator has persistently or seriously contravened a requirement imposed by or under this Act: (e) the FMI is being operated, or activities under the FMI are otherwise being carried out, in a way that is undermining the soundness or effi￾ciency of 1 or both of the following: (i) the FMI: (ii) the whole or a significant part of the financial system: (f) there has been (or is) disruption to activities under the FMI and that dis￾ruption— (i) has caused (or is causing) problems for 1 or more of the FMI’s participants or indirect participants that threaten (directly or indi￾rectly) the stability of, or confidence in, the whole or a significant part of the financial system; or (ii) is likely to cause problems for 1 or more of the FMI’s participants or indirect participants that would threaten (directly or indirectly) the stability of, or confidence in, the whole or a significant part of the financial system: (g) there have been (or are) problems with 1 or more of the FMI’s partici￾pants or indirect participants and, because of the transactions or other interconnections (direct or indirect) under the FMI between participants or indirect participants, those problems— (i) have caused (or are causing) problems for 1 or more other partici￾pants or indirect participants that threaten (directly or indirectly) the stability of, or confidence in, the whole or a significant part of the financial system; or (ii) are likely to cause problems for 1 or more other participants or indirect participants that would threaten (directly or indirectly) the stability of, or confidence in, the whole or a significant part of the financial system document has the same meaning as in section 4(1) of the Evidence Act 2006 financial markets has the same meaning as in section 6(1) of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 financial system— (a) means the financial system in New Zealand; and (b) includes the financial markets FMA means the Financial Markets Authority established by Part 2 of the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 1 cl 5 Consultation draft 11

FMA Minister means the Minister of the Crown who, under the authority of a warrant or with the authority of the Prime Minister, is responsible for the administration of the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 FMI— (a) means a multilateral system for the clearing, settling, or recording of any of the following: (i) payments: (ii) personal property, or transactions involving personal property, within the financial system: (iii) other transactions within the financial system; and (b) includes (without limitation) a system that is commonly regarded, within financial systems that are in New Zealand or elsewhere, as a financial market infrastructure, including a financial market infrastructure of any of the following types: (i) a payment system: (ii) a central securities depository: (iii) a securities settlement system: (iv) a central counterparty: (v) a trade repository: (vi) a combination of 2 or more of the types of financial market infra￾structure listed in subparagraphs (i) to (v) FMI contingency plan, in relation to an FMI, means a plan for 1 or more of the following purposes: (a) doing 1 or more of the following in relation to activities under the FMI: (i) maintaining their continuity where events that could result in their disruption occur: (ii) mitigating, or otherwise managing, disruption to them: (iii) restoring their continuity following their disruption: (b) restoring the FMI’s financial resources following events that cause them to be depleted: (c) applying the provisions of the FMI’s rules relating to participant default or to the allocation of losses amongst operators, participants, or other persons: (d) if the FMI were to be wound down, ensuring that the winding-down is orderly function, as in a function of a person (for example, the regulator), includes a power or duty Part 1 cl 5 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 12 Consultation draft

home jurisdiction, in relation to an operator of an FMI, means the jurisdiction under whose law the operator is incorporated or otherwise established indirect participant means any person who is not bound by the FMI’s rules but participates, or has agreed to participate, in the FMI through an agency or other arrangement that the person has (directly or indirectly) with— (a) an operator of the FMI who acts on the person’s behalf in relation to the FMI; or (b) a participant of the FMI who acts on the person’s behalf in relation to the FMI insolvency event, in relation to a person (P), means— (a) an insolvency manager is appointed for P; or (b) a process that is similar to a process for which an insolvency manager may be appointed starts in relation to P in New Zealand or in the juris￾diction under whose law P is incorporated or otherwise established; or (c) P is adjudicated bankrupt under the Insolvency Act 2006 or is given, or determined to have, a similar status in New Zealand or in the jurisdiction in which P is ordinarily resident; or (d) P is admitted to the no asset procedure under subpart 4 of Part 5 of the Insolvency Act 2006 or becomes subject to a similar process in New Zealand or in the jurisdiction under whose law P is incorporated or otherwise established insolvency manager means any of the following: (a) a liquidator under Part 16 of the Companies Act 1993 or any other enact￾ment: (b) an administrator under Part 15A of the Companies Act 1993: (c) a statutory manager under any of the following: (i) Part 3 of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989: (ii) Part 5 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989: (iii) subpart 4 of Part 4 of the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010: (iv) subpart 3 of Part 4: (d) a receiver appointed in New Zealand for the whole, or substantially the whole, of the assets and undertaking of a person: (e) a receiver appointed for the whole, or substantially the whole, of the assets and undertaking of an operator or participant where the appoint￾ment is made in the jurisdiction under whose law the operator or partici￾pant is incorporated or otherwise established: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 1 cl 5 Consultation draft 13

(f) a person appointed in New Zealand, or in the jurisdiction under whose law the operator or participant is incorporated or otherwise established, who is similar to a person listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) investigator is defined in section 61(2) Minister, in relation to something that may be done in accordance with a rec￾ommendation of the regulator, means— (a) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly, if the recom￾mendation is made by the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly; or (b) the RBNZ Minister, if the recommendation is made by the RBNZ; or (c) the FMA Minister, if the recommendation is made by the FMA netting means the conversion into 1 net obligation, or the set-off, of different obligations between participants of an FMI,— (a) whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis; and (b) whether or not through the interposition of an operator of the FMI (whether by novation or otherwise); and (c) whether or not the obligations constitute mutual credits, mutual debts, or other mutual dealings; and (d) whether or not the obligations are denominated in New Zealand currency obligation includes a claim or liability operator, in relation to an FMI,— (a) means a person who is wholly or partly responsible to the FMI’s partici￾pants (or any of them) for— (i) providing or managing services under the FMI; or (ii) maintaining or administering the FMI’s rules; and (b) if the FMI is a designated FMI, includes any person who is specified as an operator in the FMI’s designation notice under section 28(1)(a) operator under statutory management is defined in section 86(4) overseas, in relation to an FMI, means none of the FMI’s operators has New Zealand as its home jurisdiction overseas standard means— (a) a standard, framework, code of practice, or requirement, issued under the law of a jurisdiction other than New Zealand; or (b) a recommended practice issued in a jurisdiction other than New Zealand; or (c) a requirement or recommended practice of an international organisation or an overseas national organisation Part 1 cl 5 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 14 Consultation draft

participant, in relation to an FMI,— (a) means any person who is bound by the FMI’s rules and participates, or has agreed to participate, in the FMI; and (b) includes, if the FMI is a designated FMI, any operator specified in the FMI’s designation notice under section 28(2)(a) participant default, in relation to an FMI, means 1 or more of the following applies to a participant of the FMI: (a) the participant is insolvent or is likely to become insolvent: (b) without limiting paragraph (a), an insolvency event has occurred, or is likely to occur, in relation to the participant: (c) the participant has failed, or is likely to fail, to meet an obligation to 1 or more of the following: (i) an operator of the FMI: (ii) another participant of the FMI: (iii) any other person who is bound by the FMI’s rules: (d) any default (however described) under the FMI’s rules has occurred in relation to the participant RBNZ means the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (see Part 1 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989) RBNZ Minister means the Minister of the Crown who, under the authority of a warrant or with the authority of the Prime Minister, is responsible for the administration of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 regulation includes supervision regulator is defined in section 8 requirement, as in a requirement imposed by or under this Act, includes (with￾out limitation) a duty or a standard issued under section 30 rules, in relation to an FMI,— (a) means the rules of the FMI— (i) that are evidenced in writing,— (A) whatever they may be called; and (B) whether contained in, or made under, a body’s constitution, an agreement, a procedure, a contract, or any other docu￾ment; and (ii) that set out (among other things) the following: (A) how the FMI is to be constituted (for example, as a set of arrangements between its participants or as a legal person with whom its participants are to interact): (B) how activities under the FMI are to be carried out: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 1 cl 5 Consultation draft 15

(C) the rights and obligations under the FMI of its operators and participants; and (b) if the FMI is a designated FMI, must be read in accordance with sec￾tion 35 settlement means— (a) the making of a payment, or the transfer of the title to, or an interest in, personal property,— (i) that is done in accordance with, or to give effect to, a settlement instruction; and (ii) that is on a gross basis or that uses netting; and (iii) that is by way of a book entry or otherwise; or (b) any other act that, in accordance with an FMI’s rules, discharges an obli￾gation to make a payment or to transfer the title to, or an interest in, per￾sonal property settlement instruction means an instruction by a participant, or to an operator, of an FMI— (a) that is made in accordance with the FMI’s rules; and (b) that results, or is intended to result, in 1 or more settlements being effec￾ted specified operator, in relation to a designated FMI, is defined in section 28(1)(c) system includes an arrangement systemically important, in relation to an FMI, is defined in section 27. 6 Transitional, savings, and related provisions The transitional, savings, and related provisions set out in Schedule 1 have effect according to their terms. 7 Act binds the Crown This Act binds the Crown. Subpart 2—The regulator 8 Who is the regulator? For the purposes of this Act, regulator means— (a) the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly (see section 9); or (b) the RBNZ acting on its own in accordance with section 10(1) or (3); or (c) the FMA acting on its own in accordance with section 10(3). Part 1 cl 6 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 16 Consultation draft

9 Requirement to act jointly (1) The RBNZ and the FMA must carry out the regulator’s functions acting jointly. (2) The requirement to act jointly is subject to section 10(1) and (3). 10 Cases where requirement to act jointly does not apply (1) If a designated FMI is a pure payment systems, the regulator’s functions must be carried out by the RBNZ. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a designated FMI is a pure payment sys￾tem if the FMI’s designation notice specifies under section 28(2)(c) that the FMI is a pure payment system. (3) The RBNZ and the FMA may, with the approval of the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly, agree that one of them is to carry out the regula￾tor’s functions under Part 4 in relation to— (a) a particular operator of an FMI, or a class of operators: (b) a particular FMI, or a class of FMIs: (c) particular circumstances, or a class of circumstances. (4) The approval must be given if the Ministers consider that the agreement is reasonable in the circumstances. (5) The publication requirements in section 142(2) apply to an agreement under subsection (3). (6) A contravention of an agreement under subsection (3) does not invalidate the exercise or performance of a power or duty of the regulator or a decision not to exercise a power of the regulator. 11 RBNZ and FMA working together (1) When acting under this Act (whether jointly in accordance with section 9(1) or on its own in accordance with section 10(1) or (3)),— (a) the RBNZ may have regard to, refer to, or rely on any information, work, or matter held or produced by the FMA in the exercise of its func￾tions under this Act or any other enactment; and (b) the FMA may have regard to, refer to, or rely on any information, work, or matter held or produced by the RBNZ in the exercise of its functions under this Act or any other enactment. (2) The RBNZ and the FMA may enter into a memorandum of understanding set￾ting out— (a) how they intend to work together for the purposes of this Act; and (b) without limiting paragraph (a), how they intend to do the following: (i) make decisions about whether an FMI’s designation notice should specify under section 28(2)(c) that the FMI is a pure payment system: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 1 cl 11 Consultation draft 17

(ii) make decisions about entering into agreements under section 10(3): (iii) give effect to subsection (1). (3) However, a memorandum of understanding does not limit subsection (1), section 10(3), or section 28(2)(c) or any other provision made by or under this Act. (4) The publication requirements in section 142(2) apply to a memorandum of understanding under subsection (2). 12 General provisions about regulator’s functions and Ministers’ functions (1) The regulator’s functions are as follows: (a) to recommend the designation of systemically important FMIs (see sub￾part 1 of Part 3): (b) to regulate designated FMIs (see subparts 2 to 4 and 6 of Part 3): (c) to deal with designated FMIs that are distressed (see Part 4): (d) the other functions of the regulator under this Act. (2) The functions of the FMA Minister and the RBNZ Minister (whether acting jointly or of their own account) are as follows: (a) on the recommendation of the regulator, to declare an FMI to be a desig￾nated FMI (see subpart 1 of Part 3, section 20 in particular): (b) to give approval to the exercise of powers of the regulator in respect of rule changes of designated FMIs (see subpart 3 of Part 3): (c) to give approval to the exercise of powers of the regulator in respect of systemically important FMIs (see subpart 2 of Part 4): (d) to provide advice and give approval for the exercise of powers in respect of an operator of an FMI that is subject to statutory management, and to appoint an advisory committee and exercise other functions in respect of that statutory management (see subpart 3 of Part 4): (e) the other functions of the Minister or Ministers under this Act. 13 Purposes and principles for exercising powers (1) The powers of the regulator, the FMA Minister, and the RBNZ Minister must be exercised for 1 or more of the purposes set out in section 3. (2) In deciding whether to exercise their powers, and in exercising them, the regu￾lator must take into account the following principles: (a) the importance of recognising that FMIs can have a key role in maintain￾ing a sound and efficient financial system: (b) the importance of recognising that primary responsibility for ensuring that an FMI is sound and efficient rests with its operators, participants, Part 1 cl 12 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 18 Consultation draft

and indirect participants and those who own or control its operators, par￾ticipants, and indirect participants: (c) the need for an FMI’s rules to provide, to the extent possible, certainty and predictability about the rights and obligations of its participants and indirect participants, especially in the event of a participant default: (d) the importance of regulating FMIs in a way that is consistent with inter￾national standards for their regulation where those standards are appro￾priate for conditions in New Zealand: (e) the need to avoid unnecessary compliance costs and unnecessary con￾straints on innovation: (f) the importance of timely, accurate, and understandable information being available to participants, indirect participants, and potential par￾ticipants or indirect participants, of an FMI to assist them in making informed decisions about their interaction, or potential interaction, with the FMI: (g) the importance of avoiding financial risk to the Crown resulting from a distressed FMI, other than financial risk associated with the Crown being a participant or indirect participant of the FMI. Part 2 Regulator’s powers to require information, reviews, and independent reports 14 Regulator’s power to require submission of information (1) The regulator may, by notice, require an operator, a participant, or an indirect participant of an FMI to give to the regulator any information relating to the FMI that the regulator reasonably requires for the purposes of, or in connection with, its functions. (2) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving the information to the regulator. 15 Offence for failure to give information (1) An operator, a participant, or indirect participant who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes a requirement under section 14 (including any applicable requirement under section 140) commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 16 Regulator’s power to require information to be reviewed (1) This section applies if— (a) information is given to the regulator under section 14 in relation to an FMI; and Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 2 cl 16 Consultation draft 19

(b) the regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that the information is inadequate or inaccurate. (2) The regulator may, by notice, require an operator, a participant, or an indirect participant of the FMI— (a) to obtain a review of the information; and (b) to give the results of the review to the regulator. (3) The review must be carried out by a suitably qualified independent person approved by the regulator. (4) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving the results of the review to the regulator. 17 Offence for failure to obtain review (1) An operator, a participant, or an indirect participant who contravenes a require￾ment under section 16 (including any applicable requirement under section 140) commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 18 Regulator’s power to require independent report (1) The regulator may, by notice, require an operator of an FMI to give to the regu￾lator a report on a matter relating to the FMI if the regulator reasonably requires the report for the purposes of, or in connection with, its functions. (2) The report must be prepared by a suitably qualified independent person approved by the regulator. (3) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving the report to the regulator. (4) The regulator may, by notice, require the operator to publish the submitted report or part of the submitted report. (5) The notice may specify any of the following: (a) the way in which the report or part of the report must be published: (b) when the report or part of the report must be published and for how long it must remain published: (c) where only part of the report is to be published, which parts must be published or which parts may be withheld from publication. 19 Offence for failing to give report (1) An operator who intentionally or recklessly contravenes a requirement under section 18 (including any applicable requirement under section 140) com￾mits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. Part 2 cl 17 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 20 Consultation draft

Part 3 Designated FMIs Subpart 1—Making, revoking, and amending designations Designations by Minister 20 Designation of FMIs by Minister (1) The Minister may, in accordance with a recommendation made by the regulator under this subpart,— (a) by notice (a designation notice) declare an FMI to be a designated FMI: (b) by notice (a further notice), revoke or amend a designation notice. (2) After receiving a recommendation made by the regulator under this subpart, the Minister must act under subsection (1) unless the Minister considers that the regulator has not adequately— (a) taken into account the matters in section 13; or (b) had regard to the matters in section 23; or (c) taken into account the matters in section 24 (in the case of a recom￾mendation that proposes that a designation notice specify that an FMI is systemically important); or (d) followed the process in section 26 (in the case of a recommendation made on the regulator’s own initiative). Recommendation for designation by regulator 21 Recommendations by regulator (1) The regulator may recommend that the Minister issue, revoke, or amend a des￾ignation notice for an FMI on receiving an application under section 25 or on its own initiative under section 26. (2) This section is subject to section 22. 22 Restrictions on recommendations (1) The regulator may only make a recommendation to issue a designation notice on receipt of an application— (a) if the regulator considers that it is appropriate for subpart 5 of Part 3 to apply to the FMI; and (b) in the case of a recommendation that proposes the designation notice specify that the FMI is systemically important, if the regulator is satis￾fied that the FMI is systemically important. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 22 Consultation draft 21

(2) The regulator may only make a recommendation to issue a designation notice on its own initiative if the regulator is satisfied that the FMI is systemically important. (3) The regulator may only make a recommendation to amend a designation notice so that it specifies that the FMI is systemically important if the regulator is satisfied that the FMI is systemically important. 23 Matters to which regulator may have regard for purposes of recommendations In deciding whether to make a recommendation, and in deciding on the terms of the recommendation, the regulator may have regard to the following matters (without limitation): (a) the purpose and scope of the FMI: (b) the FMI’s rules (including whether the rules are appropriate to support settlements that must not be reversed, repaid, recovered, or set aside (see section 55): (c) any laws or regulatory requirements in New Zealand or elsewhere that relate to activities under the FMI and the extent to which the FMI com￾plies with those laws or regulatory requirements: (d) the capability and capacity of the FMI’s operators and the FMI: (e) the financial resources of the operators of the FMI: (f) the importance of the FMI to the financial system: (g) the impact on creditors of participants or indirect participants of the FMI of specifying under section 28(2)(b) that the specified operator is an operator to whom section 103A of the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 applies. 24 Matters which regulator must take into account for purposes of deciding if FMI is systemically important In deciding whether an FMI is systemically important, the regulator must take into account the following matters: (a) the FMI’s size, including the number of participants and the number of indirect participants: (b) the types of persons who are participants and indirect participants: (c) the nature and scope of the activities under the FMI, including the way in which, and the extent to which,— (i) the FMI interconnects (directly or indirectly) with other FMIs or other activities within the financial system: (ii) participants and indirect participants transact or otherwise inter￾connect with each other (directly or indirectly) under the FMI: Part 3 cl 23 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 22 Consultation draft

(d) the way in which, and the extent to which, financial risks are concentra￾ted within the FMI: (e) were activities under the FMI to be disrupted, whether another FMI could promptly and effectively take them over. Process for applications or recommendations on own initiative 25 Application for issue, revocation, or amendment of designation notice (1) An operator of an FMI may apply to the regulator for the issue, revocation, or amendment of a designation notice for the FMI. (2) A person who will be an operator of a proposed FMI may apply to the regula￾tor for the issue of a designation notice for the FMI that will come into force once the FMI is established. (3) The regulator must consider an application that is made. (4) If the regulator decides to accept the application, the regulator must— (a) notify the applicant of the decision; and (b) make a recommendation under section 21. (5) If the regulator decides not to accept the application, the regulator must notify the applicant of the decision, and of the reasons for the decision. (6) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about applications. 26 Process where regulator makes recommendation on own initiative (1) If the regulator proposes to make a recommendation on its own initiative, the regulator must do the following: (a) notify the operator of the FMI of the proposal, and of the reasons for the proposal: (b) allow the operator to make submissions to the regulator about the pro￾posal: (c) consider any submissions that are made: (d) decide whether to go ahead with the recommendation: (e) notify the operator of the decision. (2) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about submissions. General provisions relating to designation notices 27 Meaning of systemically important (1) In this Act, an FMI is systemically important if 1 or both of the following applies: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 27 Consultation draft 23

(a) disruption to activities under the FMI could cause problems for 1 or more relevant persons that would threaten the stability of, or confidence in, the whole or a significant part of the financial system: (b) problems with 1 or more relevant persons could, because of the transac￾tions or other interconnections under the FMI between relevant persons, cause problems for 1 or more other relevant persons that would threaten the stability of, or confidence in, the whole or a significant part of the financial system. (2) In this section,— (a) relevant person means a participant or an indirect participant of the FMI: (b) threats or interconnections may be direct or indirect. 28 Content and publication of designation notice (1) A designation notice must specify the following: (a) the FMI and its operators: (b) the documents that set out the FMI’s rules (whether the documents are referred to by name or description): (c) if the notice specifies that section 103A of the Personal Property Secur￾ities Act 1999 applies to an operator as a specified operator (see sub￾section (2)(b)), which operator of the FMI is the specified operator: (d) that the FMI is systemically important if the Minister acts on a recom￾mendation by the regulator that the FMI is systemically important. (2) A designation notice may specify 1 or more of the following: (a) that a particular operator of the FMI is also a participant of the FMI: (b) that the specified operator is an operator to whom section 103A of the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 applies: (c) that the FMI is a pure payment system: (d) that the FMI is a central counterparty: (e) that subpart 5 applies to the FMI: (f) the class or classes within which the FMI falls for the purposes of any standards issued under section 30 that apply to a class or classes of FMI. (3) The publication requirements in section 142(2) apply to a designation notice. Offence 29 Offence for wrongly holding out system as designated FMI, etc (1) This section applies if a person does any of the following: (a) holds out that a system is a designated FMI when that is not the case: Part 3 cl 28 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 24 Consultation draft

(b) holds out that the person is an operator of a designated FMI when that is not the case: (c) holds out that another person is an operator of a designated FMI when that is not the case. (2) The person commits an offence if the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, what the person is holding out is not the case. (3) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. Subpart 2—Standards for designated FMIs 30 Regulator may issue standards for designated FMIs (1) The regulator may, in accordance with section 34, issue standards if the regu￾lator is satisfied that the standards are necessary or desirable for 1 or more of the purposes of this Act set out in section 3. (2) A standard may do 1 or both of the following: (a) impose requirements on operators of designated FMIs: (b) set out requirements applying to designated FMIs with which their oper￾ators must ensure compliance. (3) A standard may— (a) apply to all operators of designated FMIs, a particular operator, or a class of operators: (b) apply to all designated FMIs, a particular designated FMI, or a class of designated FMIs: (c) apply in all circumstances, particular circumstances, or a class of cir￾cumstances. 31 Procedure for issuing standards (1) Before issuing a standard (the proposed standard), the regulator must— (a) consult the persons, or representatives of the persons, that the regulator considers will be substantially affected by the issue of the proposed standard; and (b) have regard to any relevant overseas standards for the purpose of ensur￾ing that the proposed standard will not apply, to a particular operator or designated FMI, in an unreasonable way (as compared to other operators or designated FMIs) as a result of the particular operator or designated FMI— (i) being subject to a relevant overseas standard; or (ii) not being subject to a relevant overseas standard. (2) In subsection (1)(b), relevant overseas standard means an overseas stand￾ard where— Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 31 Consultation draft 25

(a) an operator or a designated FMI that is subject to the overseas standard will also be subject to the proposed standard; and (b) the overseas standard covers matters that are the same as, or similar to, those that are covered by the proposed standard. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a standard amending another standard if the regulator is satisfied that the amendment— (a) is only correcting a minor error; or (b) is otherwise of a minor nature only. 32 Publication of standards The publication requirements in section 142(2) apply to a standard. 33 Pecuniary penalty for contravention of standard (1) An operator who contravenes a standard is liable to a pecuniary penalty. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about pecuniary penalties. 34 Subject matter of standards (1) A standard may deal with, or otherwise relate to, 1 or more of the following matters: (a) the governance of operators or of designated FMIs: (b) the relationship between operators and persons who provide services to operators for the purposes of designated FMIs (including imposing requirements relating to the terms and conditions of contracts between operators and those persons): (c) how operators must provide access to services under designated FMIs, including how persons may become participants of designated FMIs: (d) requirements for capital or liquidity: (e) the management by operators of 1 or more of the following: (i) general business risk: (ii) operational risk: (iii) credit risk: (iv) liquidity risk: (v) custody and investment risk: (vi) legal risk: (vii) cybersecurity risk: (viii) risks arising out of interconnections (direct or indirect) between a designated FMI and other designated FMIs: Part 3 cl 32 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 26 Consultation draft

(ix) risks arising out of interconnections (direct or indirect) between a designated FMI and activities in the financial system that are not activities under designated FMIs: (f) FMI contingency plans, including (without limitation) 1 or more of the following matters: (i) the purposes for which designated FMIs must have FMI contin￾gency plans: (ii) the contents of those plans, for example,— (A) the scenarios the plans must cover; and (B) strategies and methods that must be included in the plans for dealing with those scenarios: (iii) the interaction of those plans with the designated FMI’s rules: (iv) the persons responsible for maintaining, activating, or implement￾ing those plans: (v) arrangements for obtaining the financial resources needed to acti￾vate and implement those plans: (vi) the reviewing or testing of those plans: (g) monitoring by operators of activities under designated FMIs: (h) rules and procedures for managing a participant defaulting on its obliga￾tions under the rules of the FMI: (i) the public disclosure of information relating to operators or designated FMIs: (j) restrictions or prohibitions on the activities that a person that is an oper￾ator of a designated FMI may carry out otherwise than in their capacity as the operator: (k) requirements relating to 1 or more standards issued by international organisations that impose requirements or provide for recommended practices in relation to FMIs. (2) A standard may specify types of provisions that must, or must not, be included in a designated FMI’s rules. (3) A standard may require operators to give to the regulator reports relating to any of the following matters: (a) disruption to activities under designated FMIs: (b) contraventions of requirements imposed by or under this Act: (c) any other matter prescribed in the regulations. (4) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about reports given to the regu￾lator. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 34 Consultation draft 27

Subpart 3—Rules of designated FMIs 35 Designated FMI’s rules In this Act, a designated FMI’s rules are the rules that are contained in docu￾ments specified in its designation notice under section 28(1)(b) (as amended by any rule change that comes into effect under this subpart). 36 Operators must publish copy of rules of designated FMI (1) The operator of a designated FMI must publish a copy of the FMI’s rules (as amended by any rule change that comes into effect under this subpart) on an Internet site that— (a) is maintained by, or on behalf of, the operator; and (b) is publicly available free of charge. (2) This section does not apply to an overseas FMI. 37 Offence for contravention of section 36 (1) An operator who intentionally or recklessly contravenes section 36 commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 38 Time rule change comes into effect (1) A change to the rules of a designated FMI may come into effect only if the rule change is approved under sections 39 to 42. (2) The rule change comes into effect at the time specified in the regulator’s notice of approval of the rule change. (3) The specified time must not be earlier than the time at which the regulator decides to approve the rule change. (4) In specifying the time, the regulator must have regard to— (a) the time requested in the application under section 39(1)(c); and (b) the nature of the rule change; and (c) the circumstances of the FMI. (5) This section and sections 39 to 42 do not apply to an overseas FMI (see section 44 instead). 39 Operator of designated FMI may apply for approval of rule change (1) An operator of a designated FMI may apply to the regulator for approval of a change to the designated FMI’s rules. The application must include— (a) a copy of the proposed rule change; and (b) a description of the rule change and the reasons for the change; and (c) the time at which the operator would like the change to come into effect. Part 3 cl 35 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 28 Consultation draft

(2) The regulator must consider the application. (3) If the regulator decides to approve the rule change, the regulator must send to the applicant a notice of approval of the rule change that— (a) states that the regulator has approved the rule change; and (b) states the time at which the rule change takes effect; and (c) states the reason for deciding on that time (if that time is different from the time requested under subsection (1)(c)); and (d) includes a description of the rule change. (4) If the regulator decides not to approve the rule change, the regulator must notify the applicant of the decision, and of the reasons for the decision. (5) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about applications. 40 Regulator may require change to designated FMI’s rules (1) This section and sections 41 and 42 apply if the regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that a change to the rules of a designated FMI— (a) is required to ensure that the rules comply with any applicable standard issued under section 30; or (b) is appropriate for the purpose of applying subpart 5 of this Part to the designated FMI. (2) The regulator may, by notice,— (a) inform an operator of the designated FMI that the regulator requires a change to the designated FMI’s rules to address the matter concerned, and of the reasons for the requirement; and (b) require the operator to apply under section 39(1) for approval of changes to the designated FMI’s rules to address the matter concerned. (3) The operator must apply within 40 working days after the date of the notice under subsection (2). (4) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about applications. 41 Regulator’s decision to approve rule change required under section 40 If the regulator decides to approve the rule change set out in the application made under section 40(3), the regulator must act under section 39(3). 42 Regulator’s decision to not approve rule change required under section 40 (1) If the regulator decides not to approve the rule change set out in the application made under section 40(3), the regulator— (a) must notify the operator of the decision, and of the reasons for the deci￾sion; and Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 42 Consultation draft 29

(b) for the purpose of addressing the matter concerned, may, by notice, require the operator to apply under section 39(1) for approval of changes to the designated FMI’s rules in terms specified in the notice. (2) The application— (a) must be made within 20 working days after the date of the notice under subsection (1)(b); and (b) must be treated as if it were an application made under section 40(3), to which section 41 or subsection (1) apply. (3) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about applications. (4) The regulator may give the notice under subsection (1)(b) only with the approval of— (a) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly, if the notice is to be given by the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly; or (b) the RBNZ Minister if the notice is to be given by the RBNZ; or (c) the FMA Minister, if the notice is to be given by the FMA. (5) The approval must be given if the Minister or Ministers consider that the regu￾lator— (a) has adequately taken into account the matters in section 13; and (b) has reasonable grounds for giving the notice under subsection (1)(b). 43 Offence for contravention of section 40 or 42 (1) An operator who intentionally or recklessly contravenes section 40 or 42 (including any applicable requirement under section 140) commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 44 Changes to rules of designated FMIs that are overseas FMIs (1) This section applies if there is a change to the rules of a designated FMI that is an overseas FMI. (2) Each operator of the designated FMI must ensure that an instrument setting out the rule change is given to the regulator before the rule change comes into effect. (3) The rule change to the rules of an overseas FMI comes into effect on the date that is specified in the instrument, whether or not that instrument is given to the regulator under subsection (2). (4) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving information to the regulator. Part 3 cl 43 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 30 Consultation draft

45 Offence for contravention of section 44 (1) An operator who contravenes section 44(2) (including any applicable requirement under section 140) commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 46 Publication of rule changes (1) This section applies to a rule change that is approved by the regulator under this subpart or that is given under section 44. (2) The notice of approval of the rule change under section 39(3) or the instru￾ment given under section 44 must be published on an Internet site that— (a) is maintained by, or on behalf of, the RBNZ; and (b) is publicly available free of charge. (3) The notice of approval of the rule change under section 39(3) or the instru￾ment given under section 44 must be published on an Internet site that— (a) is maintained by, or on behalf of, the FMA; and (b) is publicly available free of charge. (4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the rule change relates to a designated FMI that is a pure payment system. Subpart 4—FMI contingency plans 47 Designated FMIs to have FMI contingency plans (1) Each operator of a designated FMI must— (a) ensure that the designated FMI has FMI contingency plans— (i) that are comprehensive, adequate, and credible, taking into account the type of FMI concerned and the activities carried out under it; and (ii) that are capable of being activated and implemented effectively when appropriate; and (b) ensure that those plans are reviewed, and updated as appropriate,— (i) whenever there is a change to any circumstance, or the occurrence of any event, that may materially affect those plans; and (ii) in any case, at regular intervals of no less than 12 months; and (c) whenever a plan is activated, give details of the activation to the regula￾tor. (2) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving information to the regulator. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 47 Consultation draft 31

48 Offence for contravention of section 47 (1) An operator who intentionally or recklessly contravenes section 47(1) (including any applicable requirement under section 140) commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 49 Regulator’s power to review FMI contingency plans, etc (1) The regulator may,— (a) by notice, require an operator of a designated FMI to give to the regula￾tor 1 or more of the FMI contingency plans of the designated FMI; and (b) review any plan that is given to the regulator; and (c) by notice, require the operator to meet the regulator’s costs of engaging a suitably qualified person to carry out on the regulator’s behalf, or other￾wise to assist with, a review under paragraph (b). (2) The regulator may, by notice, require an operator of a designated FMI to give to the regulator details of any reviews carried out under section 47(1)(b)(i) or (ii). 50 Regulator’s powers in relation to FMI contingency plans (1) Subsection (2) applies if the regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that a change to an FMI contingency plan of a designated FMI, other than an over￾seas FMI, is required to ensure compliance with— (a) any applicable standard issued under section 30; or (b) the requirements of section 47(1)(a). (2) The regulator may, by notice,— (a) inform an operator of the designated FMI that the regulator requires a change to the FMI contingency plan to address the matter concerned, and of the reasons for the requirement; and (b) require the operator to give to the regulator for approval a change to the FMI contingency plan to address the matter concerned. (3) In this section and section 51, references to a change to an FMI contingency plan of a designated FMI include a new FMI contingency plan for a designated FMI. (4) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving information to the regulator. 51 Regulator’s decision on change submitted by operator (1) If the regulator decides to approve the change given under section 50(2)(b),— (a) the regulator must notify the operator of the decision; and Part 3 cl 48 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 32 Consultation draft

(b) the operator must ensure that the change is made promptly. (2) If the regulator decides not to approve the change given under section 50(2)(b), the regulator— (a) must notify the operator of the decision, and of the reasons for the deci￾sion; and (b) for the purpose of addressing the matter concerned, may, by notice to the operator, require a change to the FMI contingency plan in terms speci￾fied in the notice. (3) A change under subsection (2)(b)— (a) must be given to the regulator within 20 working days after the date of the notice under subsection (2)(b); and (b) must be treated as if were a change given under section 50(2)(b), to which subsections (1) and (2) apply. (4) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving information to the regulator. 52 Offence for contravention of sections 49 to 51 (1) An operator who intentionally or recklessly contravenes sections 49 to 51 (including any applicable requirement under section 140) commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. Subpart 5—Validity and enforceability of settlements under designated FMIs, etc 53 Application of this subpart This subpart applies to a designated FMI only if its designation notice specifies under section 28(2)(e) that this subpart applies to it. Settlements and netting 54 Designated FMI’s rules relating to settlements, etc, are valid and enforceable (1) To the extent that they provide for the matters listed in subsection (2), a des￾ignated FMI’s rules are valid and enforceable despite any enactment or rule of law to the contrary. (2) The matters are as follows: (a) the basis on which settlement instructions are given or received: (b) the basis on which settlement obligations are determined and calculated (either on a gross basis or by using netting): Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 54 Consultation draft 33

(c) the basis on which settlements are effected (either on a gross basis or by using netting): (d) the novation of obligations of a participant: (e) any action to be taken if there is a participant default. Compare: 1989 No 157 s 156Q 55 Settlements must not be reversed, etc (1) This section applies to a settlement that is effected in accordance with a desig￾nated FMI’s rules. (2) The settlement must not be (wholly or partly) reversed, repaid, recovered, or set aside despite any enactment or rule of law to the contrary. (3) If, before the settlement is effected, an insolvency event occurred in relation to a participant of the designated FMI (other than an operator of the FMI) who is bound to the settlement (the insolvent participant), subsection (2) applies only if— (a) the settlement is effected within 24 hours after the time at which the insolvency event occurred; or (b) any of the following persons, acting on behalf of the insolvent partici￾pant, authorised the settlement instruction that gave rise to the settlement (either individually or as part of a broader authorisation): (i) an insolvency manager appointed for the insolvent participant: (ii) a person who had the authority to authorise the settlement instruc￾tion as part of a process in relation to the insolvent participant in New Zealand or elsewhere that is similar to a process for which an insolvency manager may be appointed: (iii) the Assignee nominated under section 59 of the Insolvency Act 2006 to be the Assignee of the insolvent participant’s property or a person who has a similar role as part of a process in relation to the insolvent participant, in New Zealand or elsewhere, that is similar to bankruptcy. (4) Subsection (2) extends to any application made to a court in New Zealand by a foreign court, foreign representative, or foreign creditor to reverse, repay, recover, or set aside the settlement (wholly or partly) that relates to an insol￾vency (in any form, whether personal or corporate) that is within the jurisdic￾tion of the foreign court, foreign representative, or foreign creditor. (5) In subsection (4) and this subsection,— foreign court means a judicial or other authority competent to control or super￾vise a foreign proceeding foreign proceeding means a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency (in any form, whether personal or corporate), in which proceeding Part 3 cl 55 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 34 Consultation draft

the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganisation or liquidation foreign representative means a person, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorised in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganisation or liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as a representative of the foreign proceeding. Compare: 1989 No 157 ss 156R, 156S; 2006 No 57 Schedule 1 Article 2 56 Netting (1) This section applies to any netting that is done in accordance with a designated FMI’s rules. (2) The netting is valid and enforceable despite any enactment or rule of law to the contrary. (3) The following enactments do not apply to the netting: (a) subpart 20 of Part 15A and sections 310 to 310O of the Companies Act 1993: (b) sections 254 to 262 of the Insolvency Act 2006. (4) However, the following enactments may apply to a net amount that is payable by a participant of the designated FMI to another participant of the designated FMI and that results from the netting: (a) section 239AEG or 310(1) of the Companies Act 1993: (b) section 254(1) of the Insolvency Act 2006. Compare: 1989 No 157 ss 156T, 156U 57 Underlying transactions, etc (1) Sections 54 to 56 do not stop the following: (a) the application of any enactment or rule of law to an underlying transac￾tion: (b) a person taking a proceeding against another person for fraud or dishon￾esty if the remedy sought or obtained does not affect the application of sections 54 to 56. (2) If a person brings a proceeding under any enactment or rule of law about an underlying transaction, that person may produce evidence of a settlement before the court for the purpose of proving that— (a) a participant of a designated FMI received value by means of that settle￾ment; and (b) the value received was an element of the underlying transaction. (3) Neither section 292(4A) of the Companies Act 1993 nor section 196 of the Insolvency Act 2006 applies to the following: (a) an underlying transaction: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 57 Consultation draft 35

(b) a settlement that is effected in accordance with a designated FMI’s rules. (4) In this section,— enactment includes the following (for example): (a) sections 56, 292, 297, and 298 of the Companies Act 1993: (b) section 194 of the Insolvency Act 2006 underlying transaction— (a) means a transaction that gives rise to a settlement or a settlement obliga￾tion; but (b) does not include the following: (i) a settlement instruction: (ii) a settlement that is effected in accordance with a designated FMI’s rules: (iii) any novation of obligations of a participant of a designated FMI that is completed in accordance with the designated FMI’s rules. Compare: 1989 No 157 s 156V 58 Interrelationships with other enactments (1) The following enactments prevail over sections 54 to 56: (a) sections 122(8) and 127(4) of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989: (b) sections 42(8) and 44(4) of the Corporations (Investigation and Manage￾ment) Act 1989. (2) This subpart prevails over the Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006. Compare: 1989 No 157 s 156W Other provisions 59 Transfer of personal property in accordance with designated FMI’s rules effective (1) If the title to, or an interest in, personal property is transferred in accordance with a designated FMI’s rules, a person may not refuse to take an action on the ground that the transfer is not effective. (2) This section does not affect— (a) a right that a person has to refuse to take an action on any other ground; or (b) section 45G(3) of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964 (as it con￾tinues to apply under section 84 of the Public Finance Act 1989). (3) Section 45I of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964 (as it continues to apply under section 84 of the Public Finance Act 1989) must be read subject to this section. Part 3 cl 58 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 36 Consultation draft

(4) Except as provided in this section, this section applies despite anything to the contrary in any enactment, rule of law, constitution, deed, or agreement. Compare: 1989 No 157 s 156X 60 Operators to be notified of insolvency event (1) This section applies if an insolvency event occurs in relation to a participant of a designated FMI (the insolvent participant). (2) Each of the following participants of the designated FMI must notify each operator of the designated FMI of the insolvency event unless the operator is already aware of it: (a) the insolvent participant: (b) any other participant who is a party to settlements with the insolvent par￾ticipant under the designated FMI. (3) The notification must be given as soon as practicable after the participant con￾cerned becomes aware of the insolvency event. (4) It is sufficient compliance with the requirement of subsection (2) if the par￾ticipant concerned takes all reasonable steps to comply with it. Compare: 1989 No 157 s 156ZK Subpart 6—Investigations, remedial notices, and voluntary undertakings Investigations 61 Regulator may appoint investigator (1) This section applies if the regulator has reasonable grounds to suspect that an operator of a designated FMI— (a) has contravened (or is contravening), or is likely to contravene, a requirement imposed by or under this Act; or (b) has committed (or is committing), or is likely to commit, an offence under this Act. (2) The regulator may appoint a person (an investigator) to investigate the matter concerned if satisfied that the appointment is reasonably necessary for the pur￾pose of determining what action (if any) should be taken. (3) The investigator must be an employee of the regulator or any other person that the regulator is satisfied is suitably qualified. 62 Investigator’s powers (1) For the purposes of an investigation, an investigator may,— (a) by notice, require any person to do 1 or more of the following within the period, and in the way, specified in the notice: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 62 Consultation draft 37

(i) submit to the investigator any information relating to the operator or the designated FMI: (ii) produce for inspection by the investigator any documents relating to the operator or the designated FMI that are in the custody or under the control of the person: (iii) if necessary, reproduce in usable form any information recorded or stored on those documents: (b) take copies of documents produced for inspection under paragraph (a): (c) enter and search any place, vehicle, or thing if— (i) the occupier of the place consents or the person in charge of the vehicle or thing consents; or (ii) the investigator obtains a warrant under section 63. (2) An investigator who exercises powers under this section must, if requested, produce the instrument of the investigator’s appointment. (3) Part 4 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 applies to an investigator’s powers under subsection (1)(c). 63 Application for warrant (1) An investigator may apply to an issuing officer for a warrant in accordance with subpart 3 of Part 4 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. (2) The issuing officer may issue a warrant to the investigator if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to— (a) suspect that a person— (i) has contravened (or is contravening), or is likely to contravene, a requirement imposed by or under this Act; or (ii) has committed (or is committing), or is likely to commit, an offence under this Act; and (b) believe that the search will find evidential material in or on or part of the place, vehicle, or thing. 64 Offences relating to investigations (1) A person who intentionally or recklessly contravenes a requirement imposed under section 62(1)(a) commits an offence. (2) A person who hinders, obstructs, or delays an investigator in carrying out an investigation commits an offence if the person— (a) intends to hinder, obstruct, or delay the investigator; or (b) is reckless as to whether the person hinders, obstructs, or delays the investigator. (3) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. Part 3 cl 63 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 38 Consultation draft

Remedial notices and plans 65 Regulator may require operator to take action in relation to contravention of this Act (1) This section applies if the regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that an operator of a designated FMI has contravened (or is contravening), or is likely to contravene, a requirement imposed by or under this Act. (2) The regulator may, by notice (a remedial notice), require the operator— (a) to take specified actions within a specified period— (i) to address the cause, or to remedy or mitigate the consequences of, the contravention; or (ii) to ensure that the contravention does not occur or recur; or (b) to give to the regulator a plan (a remedial plan). (3) The remedial plan must set out the following: (a) actions that the operator will take— (i) to address the cause, or to remedy or mitigate the consequences of, the contravention; or (ii) to ensure that the contravention does not occur or recur: (b) an appropriate timetable for taking the proposed actions to ensure that they are taken as soon as practicable: (c) steps that the operator will take to keep the plan current: (d) any other matters required by the remedial notice. 66 Remedial plans (1) If the regulator is satisfied with a remedial plan,— (a) the regulator may notify the operator that the regulator is satisfied; and (b) the operator must take all practicable steps to comply with the plan after receiving that notice. (2) If the regulator is not satisfied with a remedial plan, the regulator may— (a) notify the operator that the regulator is not satisfied, and of the reasons why the regulator is not satisfied; and (b) issue a remedial notice under section 65(2)(a). 67 Other provisions relating to remedial notices and plans (1) Neither a remedial notice nor a remedial plan may require the operator to pay compensation. (2) A remedial notice must set out the reasons for which it is given. (3) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about remedial plans given to the regulator. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 3 cl 67 Consultation draft 39

68 Offence for contravention of remedial notice or failing to take steps to comply with remedial plan (1) An operator who intentionally or recklessly contravenes a remedial notice (including any applicable requirement under section 140) or section 66(1)(b) commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. Voluntary undertakings 69 Regulator may accept voluntary undertaking (1) The regulator may accept a written undertaking from an operator of a designa￾ted FMI about a matter in relation to which the regulator is performing or exer￾cising any of its functions under this Act. (2) An undertaking may include (without limitation) an undertaking from the oper￾ator to— (a) pay compensation to any person; or (b) take specified action to address the cause, or to remedy or mitigate the consequences of, a contravention (or likely contravention) of a require￾ment imposed by or under this Act, or to ensure that the contravention does not occur or recur; or (c) pay an amount to the regulator in lieu of a pecuniary penalty. (3) Section 46 of the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 does not apply to the FMA when performing or exercising any of its functions under this Act. 70 Consequences of accepting undertaking (1) If the regulator accepts an undertaking,— (a) no criminal proceedings may be brought or continued against the oper￾ator, or any other person, in relation to a contravention to which the undertaking relates: (b) no application under section 121 may be made or continued against the operator, or any other person, in relation to the contravention. (2) Subsection (1) stops applying if the undertaking is withdrawn. 71 Undertakings that include payment of money (1) If the undertaking includes the payment of an amount in lieu of a pecuniary penalty,— (a) the amount must be paid into a Crown Bank Account (after deducting the regulator’s costs incurred in connection with the matter); and (b) the regulator must give notice of the payment, including— (i) a statement of the amount to be paid; and (ii) a brief description of the contravention. Part 3 cl 68 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 40 Consultation draft

(2) The publication requirements in section 142(2) apply to the notice. 72 Operator may withdraw or amend undertaking The operator may withdraw or amend the undertaking only with the regulator’s consent. 73 Enforcement of voluntary undertakings (1) The regulator may apply to the High Court for an order under this section if the regulator— (a) has accepted an undertaking under section 69; and (b) is satisfied that the operator has contravened the undertaking. (2) The court may make an order directing the operator to do 1 or more of the fol￾lowing: (a) comply with the undertaking: (b) pay to the Crown an amount representing (wholly or partly) any finan￾cial benefit that the operator has received because of the contravention of the undertaking: (c) pay compensation to any person. (3) The order may include consequential directions. 74 Court must take into account certain matters The court must, before making the order, take into account the following: (a) the nature and extent of the contravention of the undertaking: (b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage incurred by any person as a result of the contravention: (c) the circumstances in which the contravention occurred (including whether it was intentional, inadvertent, or caused by negligence): (d) any other matters the court considers relevant. Part 4 Dealing with systemically important FMIs that are distressed, etc Subpart 1—Application and purposes 75 Application of this Part This Part applies to an FMI only if— (a) it is a designated FMI; and (b) its designation notice specifies that it is systemically important. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 75 Consultation draft 41

76 Purposes for which powers under this Part may be exercised (1) The regulator’s powers under this Part are exercisable for 1 or more of the fol￾lowing purposes: (a) maintaining the continuity of activities under systemically important FMIs, including the following: (i) mitigating, or otherwise managing, disruption to activities: (ii) restoring the continuity of activities following disruption to them: (iii) moving activities from one FMI to another FMI following disrup￾tion to them or a threat of disruption to them: (b) otherwise avoiding threats to the stability of, or confidence in, the finan￾cial system as described in section 27(1)(a) and (b) and, if threats arise,— (i) removing, mitigating, or otherwise managing the threats: (ii) restoring, mitigating, or otherwise managing any resulting loss of stability of, or confidence in, the financial system: (c) without limiting paragraphs (a) and (b), ensuring that the winding￾down of any systemically important FMI is orderly: (d) in the case of a systemically important overseas FMI, furthering the objective of any of the following: (i) any process or action related to an insolvency event that is being carried out (or has been carried out) in relation to any operator of the FMI in its home jurisdiction: (ii) any other judicial or regulatory process or action that is being car￾ried out (or has been carried out) in relation to any operator of the FMI in its home jurisdiction. (2) This section does not affect the requirement of section 13(1) that the regula￾tor’s powers be exercised for 1 or more of the purposes of this Act. Subpart 2—Directions to operators or participants and removal of directors 77 Application of this subpart (1) This subpart applies if the regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that— (a) an FMI is distressed; or (b) it is appropriate for the regulator to exercise any of its powers under this subpart in relation to an operator of an overseas FMI for the purpose of furthering the objective of any process or action referred to in section 76(1)(d). (2) The regulator must not exercise a power under this subpart in relation to an operator or a participant of the FMI unless the regulator has reasonable grounds Part 4 cl 76 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 42 Consultation draft

to believe that any FMI contingency plans or rules of the FMI, of which the regulator is aware,— (a) are inapplicable to, or insufficient for addressing, the matter that the exercise of the power is intended to address; or (b) have not been implemented appropriately, or at all, for addressing that matter. (3) Before exercising a power under this subpart, the regulator must consider whether it would be more appropriate to exercise its powers under sections 65 and 66. (4) The regulator may exercise a power under this subpart only with the approval of— (a) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly, if the power is exercised by the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly; or (b) the RBNZ Minister, if the power is exercised by the RBNZ; or (c) the FMA Minister, if the power is exercised by the FMA. (5) The approval must be given if the Minister or Ministers consider that the regu￾lator— (a) has adequately taken into account the matters in section 13; and (b) has reasonable grounds for exercising the power. 78 Directions to operator (1) The regulator may, by notice (a direction notice), direct an operator of the FMI to take specified action in accordance with the direction. (2) A direction may (without limitation) require the operator to do 1 or more of the following in accordance with the direction: (a) consult the regulator: (b) ensure that a specified person does not take part in activities, or the man￾agement of activities, under the FMI except with the permission of the regulator and only so far as that permission extends: (c) take action to remedy, or mitigate the consequences of, any of the fol￾lowing: (i) any fraudulent or reckless act of the operator: (ii) any contravention of a requirement imposed by or under this Act that has been committed by the operator: (d) act, or not act, under any FMI contingency plan of the FMI: (e) otherwise carry out, or stop carrying out, any activities. (3) A direction may not require the operator to pay compensation. (4) A direction notice may not require the operator to act, or not act, if that would result in the operator breaching the rules of the FMI. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 78 Consultation draft 43

(5) A direction notice must state the reasons for which it is given. 79 Giving and complying with direction does not place person in contravention etc (1) The giving of a direction notice to an operator of an FMI, and anything that the operator does, or does not do, in compliance with the direction notice, does not of itself— (a) place any person in contravention of an enactment, an instrument, a con￾fidence, a trust, or any other rule of law or equity, or make any person liable for a civil wrong; or (b) entitle any person— (i) to require the payment or performance of a liability or an obliga￾tion not otherwise arising for payment or performance; or (ii) to exercise a right not otherwise becoming exercisable; or (iii) to deny a liability or an obligation that the person is not otherwise entitled to deny; or (c) invalidate or discharge an instrument or any provision of an instrument. (2) However, this section is subject to section 116 (which allows the rights referred to in subsection (1)(b) to be exercised after a stay). (3) In this section, instrument includes an agreement or any other document. 80 Offences for contravention or unauthorised disclosure of direction notice (1) An operator who intentionally or recklessly contravenes a direction notice commits an offence. (2) A person who discloses that a direction notice has been given commits an offence. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the disclosure— (a) is to any professional or financial advisor of the operator to whom the direction notice is given; or (b) is necessary or appropriate for the purpose of complying with the direc￾tion notice; or (c) is made by, or with the consent of, the regulator. (4) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 81 Direction to participant to comply with FMI’s rules (1) The regulator may, by notice (a direction notice), direct a participant of the FMI to comply with the FMI’s rules in accordance with the direction. (2) The direction notice must state the reasons for which it is given. Part 4 cl 79 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 44 Consultation draft

82 Offence for contravention of direction notice (1) A participant who intentionally or recklessly contravenes a direction notice commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 83 Removal of director (1) The regulator may do 1 or both of the following in relation to an operator of an FMI whose home jurisdiction is New Zealand: (a) remove a director of the operator: (b) appoint a person (with that person’s agreement) as a director of the oper￾ator. (2) This section and sections 84 and 85 have effect despite any enactment, rule of law, or the terms of the constitution of the operator. 84 Process if regulator proposes to exercise power to remove director (1) The regulator must do the following if it proposes to exercise a power under section 83: (a) notify each relevant person of the proposal, and of the reasons for the proposal: (b) allow each relevant person to make submissions to the regulator about the proposal: (c) consider any submissions that are made: (d) decide whether to go ahead with the proposal. (2) In this section, each of the following is a relevant person: (a) in relation to the power under section 83(1)(a), the director and the operator: (b) in relation to the power under section 83(1)(b), the operator. (3) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about submissions. 85 How power to remove director is exercised (1) A power under section 83(1) must be exercised by giving notice to— (a) the director or the person to be appointed (as the case may be); and (b) if applicable, the Registrar of Companies. (2) A notice given under subsection (1)(b) is sufficient compliance with section 159 of the Companies Act 1993 if the notice is accompanied by the form of consent and certificate required under section 152 of that Act. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 85 Consultation draft 45

Subpart 3—Statutory management Making FMI operator subject to statutory management 86 Power to make operator subject to statutory management (1) The Governor-General may, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister given in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator,— (a) declare that an operator of an FMI is subject to statutory management; and (b) appoint 1 or more persons as statutory manager or statutory managers of the operator for a specified period. (2) The order must specify the date on which, and the time at which, it comes into force. (3) If the order appoints 2 or more persons as statutory managers,— (a) the order must state whether the powers of a statutory manager are to be exercised by those persons acting jointly or may be exercised individu￾ally; and (b) references in this Act to a statutory manager include references to the statutory managers. (4) In this Act, operator under statutory management means an operator declared by an order to be subject to statutory management. 87 Regulator’s recommendation under section 86 (1) The regulator may make a recommendation under section 86 in relation to an operator of an FMI only if the regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that— (a) the FMI is distressed; or (b) the operator has contravened a direction given to the operator under sec￾tion 78; or (c) if the FMI is an overseas FMI, it is appropriate for the regulator to make the recommendation for the purpose of furthering the objective of any process or action referred to in section 76(1)(d). (2) The regulator must not make the recommendation unless the regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that any FMI contingency plans or rules of the FMI, of which the regulator is aware,— (a) are inapplicable to, or insufficient for addressing, the matter that is inten￾ded to be addressed by making the operator subject to statutory manage￾ment; or (b) have not been implemented appropriately, or at all, for addressing that matter. Part 4 cl 86 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 46 Consultation draft

(3) The definition of distressed in section 5 applies for the purposes of this sec￾tion with the deletion of paragraph (d). 88 Statutory management of operator whose home jurisdiction is not New Zealand If the home jurisdiction of an operator under statutory management is not New Zealand, this subpart applies only to the operator’s property, rights, assets, and liabilities relating to its New Zealand business or, if the operator has business undertakings unrelated to the FMI, that part of its New Zealand business that relates to the FMI. Conduct of statutory management: purposes, duties, and principles 89 Purposes The purposes of a statutory management are those listed in section 76. 90 General duties (1) A statutory manager must,— (a) as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable,— (i) identify the problems relating to the FMI, or to the operator under statutory management, that need to be dealt with if the purposes of the statutory management are to be achieved; and (ii) deal with those problems to achieve those purposes; and (b) where consistent with the purposes of the statutory management, con￾duct the statutory management in the way that best protects the interests of the FMI’s participants and indirect participants and of the creditors of the operator under statutory management. (2) The statutory manager may, under subsection (1)(b), make 1 or more schemes under section 98 if they consider that it is not reasonably practicable for the purposes of the statutory management to be achieved without the oper￾ator under statutory management being replaced (wholly or partly) as an oper￾ator of the FMI. 91 Principles A statutory manager must, in conducting the statutory management, have regard to— (a) the following principles: (i) the importance of minimising costs and uncertainty for the FMI’s participants and indirect participants and the creditors of the oper￾ator under statutory management: (ii) the importance of ensuring that any losses arising from the prob￾lems referred to in section 90(1)(a) are allocated fairly and effi￾Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 91 Consultation draft 47

ciently as between the operator under statutory management, its owners, its creditors, and the FMI’s participants and indirect par￾ticipants: (iii) the importance of consulting the FMI’s participants and indirect participants whenever reasonably practicable: (b) the advice of the regulator: (c) the advice of any advisory committee. 92 Other duties (1) A statutory manager must do the following in relation to the conduct of the statutory management: (a) consult the regulator as and when required by the regulator: (b) comply with any directions given to the statutory manager by the regula￾tor. (2) The regulator may require a statutory manager to give to the regulator, or to other persons specified by the regulator, reports about— (a) the conduct of the statutory management; or (b) otherwise the state of the affairs or business of the operator under statu￾tory management. (3) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving reports to the regulator or another person. (4) A statutory manager must provide any information that an advisory committee reasonably requires about— (a) the conduct of the statutory management; or (b) otherwise the state of the affairs or business of the operator under statu￾tory management. (5) See also section 96, which requires the statutory manager to pay calls, debts, or claims that arise under the FMI’s rules. 93 Advisory committee (1) The Minister may, in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator, by notice to a statutory manager (the appointment notice), appoint an advisory committee. (2) The role of the advisory committee is as follows: (a) to advise the statutory manager on the conduct of the statutory manage￾ment: (b) to do any other things specified by the Minister, from time to time, by notice to the committee. (3) The appointment notice must specify the members of the advisory committee and the periods of their appointments. Part 4 cl 92 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 48 Consultation draft

(4) The Minister may, in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator, by notice to the statutory manager, revoke or modify the appointment notice (including for the purpose of adding a new member to the advisory committee or extending the period of a member’s appointment). (5) The publication requirements in section 142(2) apply to the appointment notice and any notice under subsection (2)(b) or (4). 94 Terminating appointment, or resignation, of member of advisory committee (1) The Minister may, in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator, ter￾minate the appointment of a member of the advisory committee. (2) The regulator may make a recommendation only if satisfied of 1 or more of the following: (a) the member is unable to perform the role of the office: (b) the member is bankrupt: (c) there has been neglect of duty, or other misconduct, by the member. (3) A member may resign from the advisory committee by notice to— (a) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister, if the member was appointed by those Ministers acting jointly; or (b) the RBNZ Minister, if the member was appointed by the RBNZ Minis￾ter; or (c) the FMA Minister, if the member was appointed by the FMA Minister. Conduct of statutory management: application of FMI’s rules 95 Application of FMI’s rules (1) The FMI’s rules continue to apply, and activities may continue to be carried out in accordance with those rules, while an operator is subject to statutory man￾agement. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the following may be cleared, settled, or recorded in accordance with the rules: (a) payments: (b) personal property, or transactions involving personal property, within the financial system: (c) other transactions within the financial system. (3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), the statutory manager may decide that a provision of the rules is not to apply— (a) generally; or (b) in relation to a particular transaction, circumstance, or other matter; or Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 95 Consultation draft 49

(c) in relation to a particular description of transaction, circumstance, or other matter. (4) Before making a decision under subsection (3), the statutory manager must— (a) consult the regulator; and (b) be satisfied that making the decision is for 1 or more of the purposes set out in section 76. (5) The statutory manager is not required to consult with the FMI’s participants about that decision, but the statutory manager must,— (a) if reasonably practicable, give reasonable notice to the FMI’s partici￾pants of the proposed decision and the reasons for that decision before the decision is made; or (b) give notice to the FMI’s participants of the decision and the reasons for the decision as soon as practicable after the decision is made. 96 Statutory manager must pay calls, debts, and claims arising under FMI’s rules (1) The statutory manager must continue to pay creditors of the operator under statutory management who have calls, debts, or claims arising under the FMI’s rules (subject to any loss allocation rules that apply under the FMI’s rules). (2) This section applies subject to a decision made under section 95(3). (3) See section 105, which relates to other calls, debts, and claims. Conduct of statutory management: new operator schemes 97 Purpose of new operator schemes The powers of a statutory manager under sections 98, 99, and 100 are exer￾cisable for the purpose of replacing (wholly or partly) the operator under statu￾tory management as an operator of the FMI. 98 Making of new operator scheme (1) A statutory manager may make a scheme (a new operator scheme) that trans￾fers the following to a person (the new operator): (a) property, rights, powers, and privileges of the operator under statutory management: (b) obligations and liabilities of the operator under statutory management. (2) A new operator scheme may set out the things to be transferred in 1 or more of the following ways: (a) by specifying or describing them in particular: Part 4 cl 96 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 50 Consultation draft

(b) by identifying them generally by reference to, or by reference to a speci￾fied part of, the business undertaking of the operator under statutory management: (c) by specifying the way in which they are to be determined. (3) A new operator scheme may make incidental, supplemental, consequential, or transitional provisions in connection with the transfers provided for by the scheme. (4) A new operator scheme may include 1 or more of the following types of provi￾sions in relation to a transfer: (a) provision for the new operator to be treated as the same person in law as the operator under statutory management for specified purposes: (b) provision for instruments made, transactions effected, or other things done by or in relation to the operator under statutory management to be treated as made, effected, or done by or in relation to the new operator: (c) provision for references in instruments to the operator under statutory management, or to an employee or office holder of the operator under statutory management, to have effect with the modifications specified in the scheme: (d) if the transfer relates to contracts of employment with the operator under statutory management, provision that the transfer does not terminate any of those contracts and that periods of employment with the operator under statutory management are to count for all purposes as periods of employment with the new operator: (e) provision for proceedings commenced by or against the operator under statutory management to be continued by or against the new operator: (f) provision for a conviction, ruling, order, or judgment in favour of, or against, the operator under statutory management to be enforced by, or against, the new operator. (5) Subsection (4) does not limit subsection (3). 99 Consent required to make new operating scheme (1) A new operator scheme may be made only with— (a) the consent of the new operator; and (b) the consent of the regulator. (2) The consent of the regulator may be given only with the approval of— (a) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly, if the consent is to be given by the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly; or (b) the RBNZ Minister, if the consent is to be given by the RBNZ; or (c) the FMA Minister, if the consent is to be given by the FMA. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 99 Consultation draft 51

(3) The approval must be given if the Minister or Ministers consider that the regu￾lator— (a) has adequately taken into account the matters in section 13; and (b) has reasonable grounds for giving the consent. (4) The provisions of any enactment (apart from subsection (1)), or of any instrument, that would otherwise require a consent for anything effected by a new operator scheme do not apply. (5) In subsection (4), consent includes licence, permission, clearance, or other authority. 100 Effect of new operating scheme (1) A new operator scheme takes effect at the date and time specified in the con￾sent of the regulator under section 99(1)(b). (2) The provisions of a new operating scheme made and consented to in accord￾ance with sections 98 and 99 are valid and enforceable despite anything to the contrary in any enactment, instrument, or other rule of law or equity. (3) Unless the rules of the FMI specify otherwise, the making, implementation, and operation of a new operating scheme does not of itself— (a) place any person in contravention of any enactment, instrument, or other rule of law or equity, or make any person liable for a civil wrong; or (b) entitle any person— (i) to require the payment or performance of a liability or an obliga￾tion not otherwise arising for payment or performance; or (ii) to exercise a right not otherwise becoming exercisable; or (iii) to deny a liability or an obligation that the person is not otherwise entitled to deny; or (c) invalidate or discharge an instrument or any provision of an instrument. (4) In subsection (3), instrument includes an agreement or any other document. 101 Registers (1) The Registrar-General of Land or any other person charged with keeping records or registers is not required to change the name of the operator under statutory management to the new operator in the records or registers, or in a document, just because of a transfer effected by a new operator scheme. (2) If the new operator presents an instrument that meets the following require￾ments to a Registrar or another person, the presentation of that instrument is, in the absence of proof to the contrary, sufficient evidence that the property has been transferred to the new operator: (a) the instrument is executed, or purported to be executed, by the new oper￾ator: Part 4 cl 100 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 52 Consultation draft

(b) the instrument relates to property held by the operator under statutory management immediately before the new operator scheme took effect: (c) the instrument is accompanied by a certificate by the new operator that the property was transferred to the new operator under this section. (3) In this section, instrument includes the following: (a) an instrument made under an enactment: (b) the FMI’s rules: (c) an agreement or any other document. Conduct of statutory management: application of Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, etc 102 Moratorium (1) Section 42 of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (moratorium) applies with any necessary modifications in relation to a statutory management under this subpart as if it were a statutory management under that Act. (2) Section 42(1)(a), (b), and (d) to (h) of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by subsection (1), does not do any of the following: (a) affect the application of section 95 of this Act: (b) affect the application of subpart 5 of Part 3 of this Act to settlements effected, or other things done, in accordance with the FMI’s rules: (c) prevent a person from taking any action specified in section 42(1)(a), (b), or (d) to (h) in relation to an obligation arising under the FMI’s rules (including any settlement effected in accordance with those rules). (3) See also sections 116 and 117, which provide for certain rights relating to derivatives to be exercised after a stay despite this section. 103 Power of statutory manager to sell business undertaking of operator under statutory management, etc (1) Section 50(1) and (2) of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (power of statutory manager to sell business undertaking of corporation) applies with any necessary modifications in relation to a statutory management under this subpart as if it were a statutory management under that Act. (2) A statutory manager may do the following only with the consent of the regula￾tor: (a) sell or otherwise dispose of the whole or any part of the business under￾taking of the operator under statutory management under section 50(1) of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by subsection (1): Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 103 Consultation draft 53

(b) sell or otherwise dispose of any shares of a body corporate formed and registered under section 50(2)(a) of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by subsection (1): (c) sell or otherwise dispose of the whole or any part of the business under￾taking of a body corporate formed and registered under section 50(2)(a) of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by subsection (1). (3) The consent of the regulator may be given only with the approval of— (a) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly, if the consent is to be given by the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly; or (b) the RBNZ Minister, if the consent is to be given by the RBNZ; or (c) the FMA Minister, if the consent is to be given by the FMA. (4) The approval must be given if the Minister or Ministers consider that the regu￾lator— (a) has adequately taken into account the matters in section 13; and (b) has reasonable grounds for giving the consent. (5) The provisions of any enactment (apart from this Act), or of any agreement, that require a consent for a sale or other disposition referred to in subsection (2) do not apply. (6) In subsection (5), consent includes licence, permission, clearance, or other authority. (7) If a body corporate is formed and registered under section 50(2)(a) of the Cor￾porations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by subsec￾tion (1),— (a) the body corporate is subject to statutory management under this subpart as if it had been declared to be so by an order under section 86; and (b) the body corporate has the same statutory manager as the operator under statutory management; and (c) this subpart applies (with any necessary modifications) as if the body corporate were an operator under statutory management. Application of other provisions of Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 104 Applicable provisions of Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 The following provisions of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 apply with any necessary modifications in relation to a statutory man￾agement under this subpart as if it were a statutory management under that Act: Part 4 cl 104 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 54 Consultation draft

(a) section 43(1) and (4) (prohibition against removal of assets from New Zealand): (b) section 44 (statutory manager may suspend payment of money owing), subject to section 106(1): (c) section 45 (management of corporation to vest in statutory manager): (d) section 46 (powers of statutory manager): (e) section 47 (statutory manager may carry on business of corporation), subject to section 106(2): (f) section 48 (statutory manager may pay creditors and compromise claims), subject to section 105: (g) section 49 (termination of contract of agency or service): (h) section 51 (sale of property or assets subject to a security): (i) section 52 (liquidation of corporations), subject to section 106(3): (j) section 53 (liabilities included in the sale of a business): (k) section 54 (power to trace property improperly disposed of): (l) section 55 (application of certain provisions of Companies Act 1993): (m) section 58 (statutory manager may apply to court for directions): (n) section 59 (court may confer additional powers on statutory manager): (o) section 61 (prior winding up, liquidation, or receivership to cease): (p) section 64 (corporation not entitled to be consulted about exercise of powers): (q) section 65 (expenses of statutory management): (r) section 66 (advances to statutory managers and members of advisory committees): (s) section 67 (duty to deliver books and property to statutory manager): (t) section 69 (duty to report offences), subject to section 106(4): (u) sections 71 and 71A (application of other Acts): (v) section 72 (proof of transactions). 105 Modifications relating to power to pay creditors and compromise claims (1) Section 48 of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by section 104(f), and this section do not apply to any call, debt, or claim arising under the FMI’s rules (see instead section 96). (2) In exercising a power under section 48 of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (as applied by section 104(f)) and otherwise in exer￾cising a power in the conduct of the statutory management, the statutory man￾ager must take into account the desirability of consistency in the treatment of Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 105 Consultation draft 55

all creditors with the same ranking except to the extent (if any) approved by the regulator. (3) See section 76, which sets out the purposes for which the regulator may exer￾cise its approval power. (4) If the regulator gives approval,— (a) the regulator must provide a report, setting out the reasons for giving the approval (including why giving the approval is appropriate), to— (i) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister, if the approval is given by the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly; or (ii) the RBNZ Minister, if the approval is given by the RBNZ; or (iii) the FMA Minister, if the approval is given by the FMA; and (b) the Minister who receives a report (or, in the case of a report provided to the Ministers under paragraph (a)(i), one of those Ministers) must present a copy of that report to the House of Representatives as soon as practicable after receiving it. (5) An approval— (a) may relate to a particular call, debt, or claim, or to a class of calls, debts, or claims; and (b) may apply to a particular operator of an FMI under statutory manage￾ment or to statutory managements under this subpart generally. (6) Noting in this section prevents the statutory manager from making any pay￾ment in the ordinary course of business of the operator under statutory manage￾ment. 106 Other modifications to Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (1) Section 44 of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by section 104(b), does not apply to any deposit held, or to any debt or other obligation arising, under the FMI’s rules. (2) The power under section 47 of the Corporations (Investigation and Manage￾ment) Act 1989, as applied by section 104(e), includes (without limitation) the power to activate and implement any FMI contingency plans of the FMI. (3) Section 52 of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by section 104(i), applies with the following modifications: (a) the statutory manager’s power to make a recommendation under section 52(2) of that Act may be exercised only with the approval of the regula￾tor: (b) in section 52(2) and (3) of that Act, references to the Minister are to— Part 4 cl 106 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 56 Consultation draft

(i) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly, if the approval referred to in paragraph (a) is given by the RBNZ and the FMA acting jointly; or (ii) the RBNZ Minister, if the approval is given by the RBNZ; or (iii) the FMA Minister, if the approval is given by the FMA. (4) Section 69 of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by section 104(t), applies with the following modifications: (a) the reference to a person being guilty of an offence includes a person being liable to a pecuniary penalty under this Act: (b) in relation to an offence, or to a liability to a pecuniary penalty, under this Act, the duty to report the matter to the Solicitor-General includes a duty also to report the matter to the regulator. 107 Offences relating to statutory management (1) A person who contravenes section 43(1) of the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by section 104(a), commits an offence if the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the operator is subject to statutory management. (2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the issue of an injunction, or the making of any order, to prevent property or assets being removed from New Zealand. (3) A person commits an offence if the person,— (a) with intent to defeat the purposes of this Act, or the Corporations (Inves￾tigation and Management) Act 1989 as applied by this Act,— (i) destroys, alters, or conceals any document relating to an operator under statutory management; or (ii) sends or attempts to send out of New Zealand any document relat￾ing to an operator under statutory management; or (b) fails or refuses to answer, to the best of the person’s knowledge and abil￾ity, any question that the person is asked by a statutory manager about— (i) any document relating to the operator under statutory manage￾ment; or (ii) any property; or (c) intentionally or recklessly gives a false answer to any question referred to in paragraph (b). (4) If, in a proceeding under subsection (3)(a), it is proved that the person destroyed, altered, or concealed any document relating to an operator under statutory management, or sent or attempted to send out of New Zealand any such document, the onus is on the person to prove that the person did not do so with intent to defeat the purposes of this Act or the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 as applied by this Act. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 107 Consultation draft 57

(5) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. Termination of statutory management or of statutory manager’s appointment 108 Termination of statutory management (1) The Governor-General may, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister given in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator, declare that an operator under statutory management is to cease to be subject to statutory man￾agement. (2) The order must specify the date on which, and the time at which, it comes into force. (3) An operator under statutory management ceases to be subject to statutory man￾agement if the operator is put into liquidation on the application of the statutory manager. 109 Effect of termination of statutory management (1) If an order is made under section 108(1), or an operator under statutory man￾agement is put into liquidation as referred to in section 108(3), the following happens at the specified time: (a) the operator under statutory management ceases to be subject to statu￾tory management: (b) the appointment of the statutory manager terminates: (c) the appointment of a person as a member of an advisory committee ter￾minates. (2) In subsection (1), specified time means, as the case requires,— (a) the date and time specified in the order; or (b) the date and time of the liquidator’s appointment. 110 Termination or resignation of statutory manager’s appointment (1) The Minister may, in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator, ter￾minate the appointment of a statutory manager by notice to the statutory man￾ager. (2) The regulator may make a recommendation only if satisfied of 1 or both of the following: (a) the statutory manager is unable to perform the role of the office: (b) the statutory manager is bankrupt. (3) The Minister may terminate the appointment of a statutory manager by notice to the statutory manager if satisfied that there has been neglect of duty, or other misconduct, by the statutory manager. (4) A statutory manager— (a) may resign by notice to the Minister; but Part 4 cl 108 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 58 Consultation draft

(b) if the statutory manager does so, must continue in office until a replace￾ment is appointed under section 111(2). (5) In subsections (3) and (4), Minister means— (a) the RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister acting jointly; or (b) the RBNZ Minister if the FMI is a pure payment system. 111 Appointment of new statutory manager (1) Subsection (2) applies if— (a) the period of a statutory manager’s appointment expires; or (b) the appointment of a statutory manager is terminated under section 110(1) or (3); or (c) a statutory manager dies or resigns. (2) The Minister may, in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator, by notice (the appointment notice), appoint 1 or more persons to replace the stat￾utory manager for a specified period. (3) If, following the appointment notice, 2 or more persons will be statutory man￾agers,— (a) the notice must state whether the powers of a statutory manager are to be exercised by those persons acting jointly or may be exercised individu￾ally; and (b) references in this subpart to a statutory manager include references to the statutory managers. (4) The publication requirements in section 142(2) apply to the appointment notice. Other provisions 112 Obligations incurred by statutory manager (1) This section applies if a statutory manager, in the course of the statutory man￾ager’s duties, incurs obligations. (2) The obligations are incurred on behalf of the operator under statutory manage￾ment, and the statutory manager does not incur personal liability for the obliga￾tions. (3) In the winding up or liquidation of the operator under statutory management, all amounts required to meet the obligations must be paid in priority to all other debts, except costs, charges, and fees payable out of the property of the oper￾ator under statutory management in accordance with section 65 of the Corpor￾ations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by section 104(q). Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 112 Consultation draft 59

113 Statutory management does not place any person in contravention of enactment, etc (1) Unless the rules of the FMI specify otherwise, the making of an order under section 86 in relation to an operator of an FMI does not of itself— (a) place any person in contravention of any enactment, instrument, or other rule of law or equity, or make any person liable for a civil wrong; or (b) entitle any person— (i) to require the payment or performance of a liability or an obliga￾tion not otherwise arising for payment or performance; or (ii) to exercise a right not otherwise becoming exercisable; or (iii) to deny a liability or an obligation that the person is not otherwise entitled to deny; or (c) invalidate or discharge an instrument or any provision of an instrument. (2) This section does not apply to a right to which section 116 applies. (3) In subsection (1), instrument includes an agreement or any other document. 114 Continuation of statutory management of company restored to New Zealand register (1) This section applies if a company— (a) is removed from the New Zealand register under section 317 of the Companies Act 1993 while subject to statutory management under this subpart; but (b) is then restored to the New Zealand register under section 328 of the Companies Act 1993. (2) The company continues to be subject to statutory management from when it is restored. 115 Person who exercises powers under subpart not director of operator under statutory management Neither the regulator nor any other person is a director of an operator under statutory management just because the regulator or other person exercises a power under this subpart in relation to the operator. Subpart 4—Supplementary provisions 116 Certain rights relating to derivatives may be exercised after stay (1) This section applies to a right if— (a) the right becomes exercisable because— Part 4 cl 113 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 60 Consultation draft

(i) a direction notice under section 78 is given or an operator of an FMI does, or does not do, anything in compliance with the direc￾tion notice; or (ii) an order under section 86 in relation to an operator of an FMI is made; and (b) the right entitles a person to do 1 or more of the things specified in sec￾tion 79(1)(b) or 113(1)(b) in relation to a derivative; and (c) the FMI’s designation notice specifies under section 28(2)(d) that the FMI is a central counterparty. (2) Nothing in section 79 of this Act or section 42 of the Corporations (Investi￾gation and Management) Act 1989, as applied by section 102, limits or pre￾vents the exercise of the right if the right is exercised after— (a) the default time; or (b) an earlier or a later time specified by the regulator in a notice issued under section 117. (3) In this section and section 117,— default time means,— (a) in the case of subsection (1)(a)(i), the close of the day after the date on which the direction notice under section 78 is given: (b) in the case of subsection (1)(a)(ii), the close of the day after the date on which the order under section 86 comes into force derivative means a derivative within the meaning of section 8(4) of the Finan￾cial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (but disregarding any declaration under subpart 3 of Part 9 of that Act). 117 Regulator may reduce or extend stay on exercise of rights (1) This section applies for the purposes of section 116 in respect of an operator of an FMI (A) if— (a) a direction notice under section 78 has been given to A; or (b) A is in statutory management. (2) The regulator may, before the default time, issue a notice that states that the rights referred to in section 116 may only be exercised on and after a time specified in the notice. (3) The time that is specified may be— (a) before the default time; or (b) after the default time if the regulator is satisfied of all of the matters set out in subsection (4). (4) The matters referred to in subsection (3)(b) are that— (a) A is able to meet all of its liabilities under the rules of the FMI; and Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 4 cl 117 Consultation draft 61

(b) either— (i) A complies with the minimum capital requirements (if any) set by a standard issued under section 30; or (ii) there are satisfactory arrangements in place to ensure that A meets all of its liabilities referred to in paragraph (a) as and when those liabilities become due and payable and those arrangements will remain in place until A complies with the requirements referred to in subparagraph (i) or the relevant event ends, whichever occurs first. (5) In subsection (4)(b)(ii), the relevant event ends,— (a) in the case of section 116(1)(a)(i), when the direction notice is fully complied with or is revoked (b) in the case of section 116(1)(a)(ii), when the statutory management is terminated. (6) The notice may relate to all rights referred to in section 116 or to a class or classes of those rights. Part 5 Offences and pecuniary penalties Subpart 1—Offences 118 Penalties for offences (1) This section sets out penalties for which a person is liable on conviction for an offence under this Act. (2) If the person who is convicted is a body corporate, the person is liable as fol￾lows: (a) for a level 1 offence, to a fine not exceeding $200,000: (b) for a level 2 offence or a level 3 offence, to a fine not exceeding $500,000: (c) for a level 4 offence, to a fine not exceeding $1,000,000: (d) for a level 5 offence, to a fine not exceeding $2,000,000. (3) If the person who is convicted is an individual, the person is liable as follows: (a) for a level 1 offence, to a fine not exceeding $20,000: (b) for a level 2 offence, to a fine not exceeding $50,000: (c) for a level 3 offence, to— (i) imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months; or (ii) a fine not exceeding $50,000; or (iii) both: Part 5 cl 118 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 62 Consultation draft

(d) for a level 4 offence, to— (i) imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months; or (ii) a fine not exceeding $100,000; or (iii) both: (e) for a level 5 offence, to— (i) imprisonment for a term not exceeding 18 months; or (ii) a fine not exceeding $200,000; or (iii) both. (4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3),— (a) the following are level 1 offences: (i) an offence under section 17(1): (ii) an offence under section 37(1): (iii) an offence under section 45(1): (b) the following are level 2 offences: (i) an offence under section 15(1): (ii) an offence under section 80(2): (iii) an offence under section 137(1): (c) the following are level 3 offences: (i) an offence under section 19(1): (ii) an offence under section 43(1): (iii) an offence under section 52(1): (iv) an offence under section 134(1): (d) the following are level 4 offences: (i) an offence under section 48(1): (ii) an offence under section 64(1) or (2): (iii) an offence under section 68(1): (iv) an offence under section 131(2) or (4): (e) the following are level 5 offences: (i) an offence under section 29(2): (ii) an offence under section 80(1): (iii) an offence under section 82(1): (iv) an offence under section 107(1) or (3). 119 Defence for certain offences (1) This section applies to offences under the following: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 5 cl 119 Consultation draft 63

(a) section 17(1) (requirement to obtain and give results of review of information): (b) section 45(1) (requirement for changes to rules of overseas designated FMI to be submitted to regulator): (c) section 80(2) (disclosure of direction notice): (d) section 137(1) (unauthorised disclosure or use of information). (2) It is a defence for the person (A) who is charged with the offence to prove that both of the following apply: (a) the contravention was due to— (i) the conduct of another person, other than a director, an employee, or an agent of A; or (ii) an accident or some other cause beyond the control of A and A’s directors, employees, and agents; and (b) A took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the contravention. 120 Time for filing charging documents Despite anything to the contrary in section 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, the limitation period for an offence under this Act ends on the date that is 5 years after the date on which the offence was committed. Subpart 2—Pecuniary penalties 121 Pecuniary penalty orders (1) The High Court may, on the regulator’s application, order an operator of an FMI (A) to pay a pecuniary penalty to the Crown if the court is satisfied that A has— (a) contravened a standard issued under section 30 (a standard); or (b) been involved in a contravention of a standard by another operator of an FMI. (2) In this subpart,— (a) A’s conduct means the conduct of A for which A is liable to the pecuni￾ary penalty: (b) an operator of an FMI is involved in a contravention of a standard if the operator— (i) has aided, abetted, counselled, or procured the contravention; or (ii) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; or (iii) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or Part 5 cl 120 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 64 Consultation draft

(iv) has conspired with others to effect the contravention. 122 Maximum amount of penalty The maximum amount of the pecuniary penalty is as follows: (a) in the case of a body corporate, $750,000: (b) in the case of an individual, $75,000. 123 Considerations for court In determining whether to make an order, and the amount of any pecuniary penalty to be paid, the court must have regard to the following matters: (a) the extent to which A’s conduct undermines the purposes of this Act: (b) any loss or damage caused by A’s conduct: (c) whether A has taken steps to avoid or mitigate any adverse effects aris￾ing from A’s conduct: (d) whether A’s conduct was intentional or reckless: (e) the circumstances surrounding A’s conduct: (f) whether A has previously engaged in similar conduct: (g) any other matters the court considers relevant. 124 Defences in pecuniary penalty proceeding for operator that contravenes standard (1) This section applies to a proceeding under this subpart against A for a contra￾vention of a standard. (2) It is a defence for A to prove that the contravention was due to reasonable reli￾ance on information provided by another person, other than a director, an employee, or an agent of A. (3) It is also a defence for A to prove that— (a) the contravention was due to— (i) the conduct of another person, other than a director, an employee, or an agent of A; or (ii) an accident or some other cause beyond the control of A and A’s directors, employees, and agents; and (b) A took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the contravention. (4) A’s conduct must still be treated as contravening a standard even if the conduct does not lead to any liability under this subpart because of the availability of a defence. 125 Defence for other operator that is involved in contravention (1) This section applies if— Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 5 cl 125 Consultation draft 65

(a) an operator of an FMI (B) has contravened a standard; and (b) another operator of the FMI (C) is involved in the contravention. (2) In any proceeding under this subpart against C for involvement in the contra￾vention of the standard, it is a defence if C proves that— (a) C’s involvement in the contravention was due to reasonable reliance on information supplied by another person, other than a director, an employee, or an agent of C; or (b) C took all reasonable and proper steps to ensure that B complied with the standard. 126 Rules of civil procedure and civil standard of proof apply to civil liability A proceeding under this subpart is a civil proceeding and the usual rules of court and rules of evidence and procedure for a civil proceeding apply (includ￾ing the standard of proof). 127 Court must order that recovery from pecuniary penalty be applied to regulator’s actual costs If the court orders A to pay a pecuniary penalty, the court must also order that the penalty be applied first to pay the regulator’s actual costs in making and continuing the regulator’s application for an order. Subpart 3—Supplementary provisions 128 Liability of directors (1) This section applies if— (a) a body corporate (D) or an unincorporated body (D) commits an offence under this Act or is liable to a pecuniary penalty; and (b) D’s conduct occurred with the authority, permission, or consent of a director of D; and (c) the director— (i) knew, or could reasonably be expected to have known, D’s con￾duct was to occur or was occurring; and (ii) failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or stop D’s conduct. (2) The director also commits the offence or is liable to a pecuniary penalty. (3) The director may be convicted of the offence, or ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty, even if D is not convicted of the offence or ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty. (4) In this section, D’s conduct means the conduct of D that constitutes the offence or for which D is liable to the pecuniary penalty. Part 5 cl 126 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 66 Consultation draft

129 State of mind of directors, employees, or agents attributed to body corporate or other principal (1) Subsection (2) applies if, in a proceeding under this Act it is necessary to establish the state of mind of a body corporate. (2) It is sufficient to show that a director, an employee, or an agent of the body cor￾porate, acting within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the director, employee, or agent, had that state of mind. (3) Subsection (4) applies if, in a proceeding under this Act, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of a person who is not a body corporate. (4) It is sufficient to show that an employee or agent of the person, acting within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the employee or agent, had that state of mind. (5) In this section, state of mind, in relation to a person, includes the knowledge, intention, opinion, belief, or purpose of the person and the person’s reasons for that knowledge, intention, opinion, belief, or purpose. 130 Person not liable for fine and pecuniary penalty for same conduct A person must not, for the same conduct,— (a) be convicted of an offence under this Act; and (b) be ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty under this Act. Part 6 Final provisions Subpart 1—Supplementary provisions relating to information Offences and pecuniary penalties 131 False or misleading information given for purposes of Act (1) This section applies if a person, in an application or any other information given under this Act, or otherwise for the purposes of this Act,— (a) gives to the regulator, or an investigator, information that is false or mis￾leading in a material particular; or (b) makes to the regulator, or to an investigator, a declaration or representa￾tion that is false or misleading in a material particular. (2) The person commits an offence if the person gives the information, or makes the declaration or representation, knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the information, or the declaration or representation, is false or misleading in a material particular. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 6 cl 131 Consultation draft 67

(3) If the person subsequently becomes aware that the information, or the declar￾ation or representation, is false or misleading in a material particular, the per￾son must, within 7 days,— (a) notify the regulator or investigator; and (b) correct the information, or the declaration or representation, as appropri￾ate. (4) If the person intentionally or recklessly contravenes subsection (3), the per￾son commits an offence. (5) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. Disclosure of information, etc 132 Disclosure of information between RBNZ and FMA (1) The RBNZ and the FMA may, for the purposes of, or in connection with, the regulator’s functions, disclose to the other any specified information that it holds. (2) Subsection (1) overrides any duty as to secrecy or any other restriction on the disclosure of information, whether imposed by an enactment or otherwise. (3) In this section, specified information means information that— (a) is given to the RBNZ or the FMA under this Act; or (b) is otherwise obtained or generated by the RBNZ or the FMA for the pur￾poses of, or in connection with, the regulator’s functions; or (c) is otherwise obtained or held by the RBNZ or the FMA in the exercise of their functions under any other enactment. Compare: 1989 No 157 s 156ZM 133 Disclosure of information by RBNZ or FMA to other persons (1) Neither the RBNZ nor the FMA may disclose any information provided to either or both of them under this Act unless 1 or more of the following apply: (a) the information is available to the public under an enactment or is other￾wise publicly available information: (b) the information is in a statistical or summary form: (c) the disclosure is for the purposes of, or in connection with, a person’s functions under this Act or the functions of the RBNZ or the FMA under any other enactment: (d) the disclosure is to a central bank, authority, or body in any jurisdiction having functions that correspond with, or are similar to, the regulator’s functions under this Act, and the RBNZ or the FMA is satisfied that the information will be used by that central bank, authority, or body for the purposes of, or in connection with, those corresponding or similar func￾tions: Part 6 cl 132 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 68 Consultation draft

(e) the disclosure is to a person who the RBNZ or the FMA is satisfied has a proper interest in receiving the information: (f) the disclosure is with the consent of the person to whom the information relates or of the person to whom the information is confidential: (g) in the case of the FMA, the disclosure is to— (i) a law enforcement or regulatory agency under subpart 2 of the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011; or (ii) an overseas regulator under subpart 2 of that Act or otherwise for the purpose of assisting the FMA to co-operate with an overseas regulator (within the meaning of that Act). (2) Neither the RBNZ nor the FMA may disclose information under subsection (1)(d) or (e) unless satisfied that satisfactory provision exists to protect the confidentiality of the information (in particular, information that is personal information as defined in section 2(1) of the Privacy Act 1993). (3) A director, an officer, a member, or an employee of the RBNZ or the FMA must not disclose any information given to either or both of the RBNZ and the FMA under this Act except for the purposes of, or in connection with, a per￾son’s functions under this Act or the functions of the RBNZ or the FMA under any other enactment. (4) Nothing in any enactment requires the RBNZ or the FMA or any person to whom information is disclosed under this section to make that information available to any other person, other than an obligation in— (a) this Act: (b) the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011: (c) the Official Information Act 1982. (5) Section 59 of the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 does not apply to information provided or disclosed to the FMA under this Act. 134 Offence for unauthorised disclosure (1) A director, an officer, a member, or an employee of the RBNZ or the FMA who intentionally or recklessly discloses information in contravention of section 133 commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 135 Conditions relating to disclosure of information (1) The regulator may, by written notice to a person to whom any information or document is disclosed under section 133(1)(c), (e), or (f)), impose any con￾ditions in relation to the disclosure or use of the information by the person. (2) The regulator must, in considering what conditions to impose, have regard to whether conditions are necessary or desirable in order to protect the privacy of any individual. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 6 cl 135 Consultation draft 69

(3) Conditions imposed may include, without limitation, conditions relating to— (a) maintaining the confidentiality of anything provided (in particular, infor￾mation that is personal information within the meaning of the Privacy Act 1993): (b) the storing of, the use of, or access to anything provided: (c) the copying, returning, or disposing of copies of documents provided. 136 Restrictions on further disclosure of information (1) If information is disclosed to a person under section 133(1)(c), the person may disclose or use the information only— (a) for the purposes of, or in connection with, functions referred to in sec￾tion 133(1)(c); and (b) in accordance with any conditions imposed by the RBNZ or the FMA. (2) If information is disclosed to a person under section 133(1)(e), the person may disclose or use the information only if the disclosure or use— (a) is authorised by the RBNZ or the FMA and is in accordance with any conditions imposed by the RBNZ or the FMA; or (b) is for the purposes of, or in connection with, functions of a person under any enactment. (3) If information is disclosed to a person under section 133(1)(f), the person may disclose or use the information only in accordance with the conditions of the consent (if any). 137 Offence for unauthorised disclosure or use (1) A person who discloses or uses information in contravention of section 136 commits an offence. (2) See Part 5 for further provisions about offences. 138 Effect of proceedings on exercise of powers to require information, etc (1) This section applies if a person commences a proceeding in any court in respect of the exercise of any powers under Part 2 or section 62 (the infor￾mation powers). (2) Until a final decision in relation to the proceeding is given,— (a) the information powers may be, or may continue to be, exercised as if the proceeding had not been commenced; and (b) no person is excused from performing the person’s duties under Part 2 or section 62 because of the proceeding. (3) However, an interim order may be made by the High Court overriding the effect of subsection (2) if the court is satisfied that— Part 6 cl 136 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 70 Consultation draft

(a) the applicant has established a prima facie case that the exercise of the information powers is unlawful; and (b) the applicant would suffer substantial harm from the exercise of the information powers or the performance of any duties referred to in sub￾section (2)(b); and (c) if those powers or duties are exercised or performed before a final deci￾sion is given in the proceeding, none of the remedies listed in subsec￾tion (4), or any combination of those remedies, could subsequently pro￾vide an adequate remedy for that harm; and (d) the terms of the order do not— (i) hinder or restrict the carrying out of any functions of a person under Part 4; or (ii) unduly hinder or restrict the carrying out of any other functions of a person under this Act. (4) The remedies are as follows: (a) any remedy that the High Court may grant in making a final decision in the proceeding (for example, a declaration): (b) any damages that the applicant may be able to claim in a concurrent or subsequent proceeding: (c) any opportunity that the applicant may have, as defendant in a proceed￾ing, to challenge the admissibility of any evidence obtained as a result of the exercise of the information powers or the performance of any duty referred to in subsection (2)(b). 139 Decision that exercise of powers is unlawful (1) This section applies if the final decision in a proceeding referred to in section 138 is that the exercise of the information powers is unlawful to any extent. (2) The regulator or investigator must ensure that, immediately after the decision of the court is given,— (a) any information obtained as a result of the unlawful exercise of the information powers, and any record of the information, is destroyed; and (b) any documents, or extracts from documents, obtained as a result of the unlawful exercise of the information powers are returned to the person who had possession of them, or under whose control they were, and any copies of those documents or extracts are destroyed; and (c) any information derived from or based on such information, documents, or extracts is destroyed. (3) However, the court may order that any information, record, or copy of any document or extract from a document may, instead of being destroyed, be Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 6 cl 139 Consultation draft 71

retained by the regulator or investigator, subject to any terms or conditions that the court imposes. (4) No information, and no documents or extracts from documents, obtained as a result of the unlawful exercise of the information powers, and no record of any such information or documents,— (a) are admissible as evidence in any civil proceedings unless the court hear￾ing the proceedings in which the evidence is sought to be adduced is satisfied that there was no unfairness in obtaining the evidence: (b) are admissible as evidence in any criminal proceedings if the evidence is excluded under section 30 of the Evidence Act 2006: (c) may otherwise be used in connection with the carrying out of any func￾tion of a person under this Act or any other enactment unless the court that decided that the exercise of the information powers was unlawful is satisfied that there was no unfairness in obtaining the information or document. Subpart 2—Supplementary provisions relating to regulator’s powers 140 Applications and other information given to regulator (1) An application made, or any other information given, to the regulator, or to be made or given to another person in accordance with a requirement of the regu￾lator, must be made or given in the way required by the regulator. (2) The regulator’s requirements may include (without limitation) requirements about 1 or more of the following: (a) the form in which the application or information must be made or given: (b) the information that must be given with the application or information: (c) the way in which that information must be verified. (3) Information to be given to the regulator or other person must be given within the period determined by the regulator. 141 Revocation or amendment of requirements imposed, or directions given, by notice A power of the regulator to impose a requirement on, or to give a direction to, a person by notice includes the power to revoke or amend the requirement or direction by a subsequent notice, and the provisions of this Act relating to the exercise of the power apply with any appropriate modifications. 142 Publication requirements (1) Subsection (2) sets out the publication requirements that apply to the instru￾ments referred to in sections 10(5), 11(4), 28(3), 32, 71(2), 93(5), and 111(4). (2) The publication requirements are as follows: Part 6 cl 140 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 72 Consultation draft

(a) notice must be given in the Gazette that the instrument has been made: (b) the instrument must be published on an Internet site that— (i) is maintained by, or on behalf of, the RBNZ; and (ii) is publicly available free of charge: (c) the instrument must be published on an Internet site that— (i) is maintained by, or on behalf of, the FMA; and (ii) is publicly available free of charge: (d) hard copies of the instrument must be made available as follows: (i) for inspection by members of the public free of charge: (ii) for purchase by members of the public at a reasonable price. (3) Subsection (2)(c) does not apply if the instrument relates only to a pure pay￾ment system. (4) If an instrument to which the publication requirements apply is amended, the publication requirements apply to the instrument as amended. (5) The following policies of the regulator must also be published in accordance with subsection (2)(b) and (c): (a) any policies for determining whether an FMI should be declared to be a designated FMI under section 20: (b) any policies relating to the carrying out of the regulator’s functions in relation to designated FMIs. (6) A contravention of this section does not invalidate an instrument or a policy. 143 Interaction with Legislation Act 2012 (1) A standard issued under section 30— (a) is a disallowable instrument for the purposes of the Legislation Act 2012; and (b) must be presented to the House of Representatives under section 41 of that Act. (2) Any other instrument that is made under this Act and that is not an Order in Council— (a) is neither a legislative instrument nor a disallowable instrument for the purposes of the Legislation Act 2012; and (b) does not have to be presented to the House of Representatives under sec￾tion 41 of that Act. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 6 cl 143 Consultation draft 73

Subpart 3—Regulations 144 Power to make regulations by Order in Council (1) The Governor-General may, by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister given in accordance with a recommendation of the regulator, make regulations for 1 or more of the following purposes: (a) prescribing forms: (b) requiring the payment to the regulator of fees and charges— (i) by operators in connection with the carrying out by the regulator of any function under this Act: (ii) on an application or a request to the regulator to carry out any function under this Act: (c) prescribing the amounts of the fees and charges or the way in which the amounts are to be calculated: (d) authorising the regulator to require payment of any costs incurred by the regulator in connection with those applications or requests: (e) providing for any other matters contemplated by this Act, necessary for its administration, or necessary for giving it full effect. (2) Any Order in Council may authorise the regulator to refund or waive, in whole or in part and on any conditions as may be prescribed, payment of any fee, charge, or cost payable in relation to any person or class of persons. (3) The regulator may refuse to carry out a function until a fee, charge, or cost is paid. (4) Any fee, charge, or cost payable to the regulator is recoverable by the regulator in any court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to the regulator. Subpart 4—Other final provisions 145 Directions to regulator (1) The RBNZ Minister and the FMA Minister, acting jointly, may direct the regu￾lator to have regard to a Government policy that relates to the regulator’s func￾tions under this Act, and the regulator must have regard to the direction. (2) The RBNZ Minister may on the Minister’s own initiative direct the RBNZ to have regard to a Government policy that relates to the RBNZ’s functions under this Act as they apply to designated FMIs that are pure payment systems, and RBNZ must have regard to that direction. (3) The Ministers must consult the regulator before giving a direction. (4) A direction must— (a) be set out in a written statement signed by— (i) both Ministers (in the case of a direction under subsection (1)): Part 6 cl 144 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 74 Consultation draft

(ii) the RBNZ Minister (in the case of a direction under subsection (2)); and (b) as soon as practicable after it is given, be— (i) presented to the House of Representatives; and (ii) published in the Gazette. (5) The Ministers may not give a direction that requires particular conduct by the regulator, or any director, officer, or employee of the regulator, or the bringing about of a particular result in relation to a particular person. (6) The power of the Ministers to give a direction includes the power to revoke or amend the direction by a subsequent direction, and the provisions of this sec￾tion relating to the exercise of the power apply with any appropriate modifica￾tions. 146 Limit on FMA’s powers under other enactments For the purposes of this Act, the FMA may exercise its powers under Part 3 of the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 in relation to the RBNZ, only if, and to the extent that, the RBNZ is an operator or a participant of an FMI. Compare: 1989 No 157 s 156L 147 Protection from liability (1) None of the following persons is personally liable for an act or omission by that person in good faith in the carrying out, or the purported carrying out, of a function of a person under this Act: (a) the RBNZ: (b) a director, an officer, or an employee of the RBNZ: (c) an investigator: (d) a statutory manager: (e) a member of an advisory committee. (2) See also section 22 of the Financial Markets Authority Act 2011, which pro￾vides protections from liability for the FMA and its members and employees. 148 Conduct of directors, employees, or agents attributed to body corporate or other principal (1) Conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate by any of the following must be treated, for the purposes of this Act, as having also been engaged in by the body corporate: (a) a director, an employee, or an agent of the body corporate, if acting within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the director, employee, or agent: (b) any other person, if acting at the direction, or with the consent or agree￾ment (expressed or implied), of a director, an employee, or an agent of Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 6 cl 148 Consultation draft 75

the body corporate given within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the director, employee, or agent. (2) Conduct engaged in on behalf of a person (P) who is not a body corporate by any of the following must be treated, for the purposes of this Act, as having also been engaged in by P: (a) an employee or agent of P, if acting within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the employee or agent: (b) any other person, if acting at the direction, or with the consent or agree￾ment (expressed or implied), of— (i) P; or (ii) an employee or agent of P given within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the employee or agent. 149 Prohibition on indemnities or insurance for directors or employees of operators that are not New Zealand companies (1) This section applies to the following: (a) an operator of a designated FMI, if section 162 of the Companies Act 1993 does not apply to the operator: (b) a body corporate that is related to an operator of a designated FMI (as determined in accordance with section 12(2) of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013), if section 162 of the Companies Act 1993 does not apply to the related body corporate. (2) An operator, or a related body corporate, must not indemnify, or directly or indirectly effect insurance for, a director or an employee of the operator for— (a) liability, in connection with any matter regulated by this Act, for any conduct in the person’s capacity as a director or an employee; or (b) costs incurred by the director or employee in defending or settling any claim or proceeding relating to that liability. (3) An indemnity given in contravention of this section is void. 150 Exception to prohibition (1) Section 149(2) does not prohibit an operator, or a related body corporate, from doing any of the following if expressly authorised by its constitution: (a) indemnifying a director or an employee for any costs incurred in defend￾ing or settling a proceeding if— (i) judgment is given in favour of the director or employee or the director or employee is acquitted; or (ii) the proceeding is discontinued: (b) subject to subsection (2), indemnifying a director or an employee for— Part 6 cl 149 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 76 Consultation draft

(i) any liability covered by section 149(2)(a) to a person other than the operator; or (ii) costs incurred in defending or settling any claim or proceeding relating to any liability covered by section 149(2)(a) to a person other than the operator: (c) with the prior approval of its board of directors, effecting insurance for a director or an employee in relation to— (i) any liability covered by section 149(2)(a) that is not criminal liability: (ii) costs incurred in defending or settling any claim or proceeding relating to any liability covered by section 149(2)(a) that is not criminal liability: (iii) costs incurred in defending any criminal proceedings relating to any liability covered by section 149(2)(a) in which the director or employee is acquitted. (2) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply to the following: (a) criminal liability: (b) liability arising out of a failure to act in good faith. (3) The directors who vote in favour of authorising insurance as referred to in sub￾section (1)(c) must sign a certificate stating that, in their opinion, the cost of effecting the insurance is fair to the operator or related body corporate (as the case may be). (4) The insured director or employee is personally liable to the operator or related body corporate for the cost of effecting the insurance if— (a) subsection (3) is not complied with; or (b) reasonable grounds did not exist for the opinion set out in the certificate given under subsection (3). (5) However, subsection (4) does not apply to the extent that the insurance is fair to the operator or related body corporate at the time the insurance is effected. 151 Giving of notices by regulator or investigator (1) The regulator or an investigator may give notice to another person as follows: (a) an individual,— (i) by delivering it, or having it delivered, to the individual: (ii) by sending it by post addressed to the individual at the individu￾al’s usual or last known place of residence or business: (iii) by sending it by email to the individual’s email address provided to the regulator or investigator for the purpose: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Part 6 cl 151 Consultation draft 77

(b) a company, as provided for in section 387(1) or 388 of the Companies Act 1993: (c) an overseas company, as provided for in section 389(1) or 390 of the Companies Act 1993: (d) any other body corporate, as provided for in section 387(1) or 388 of the Companies Act 1993, as if the body corporate were a company. (2) Unless otherwise shown, the following provisions apply: (a) notice given by post to an individual is treated as given at the time it would be delivered in the ordinary course of the post: (b) notice given by email to an individual is treated as given on the second working day after the day on which it is sent. (3) If notice is given by post to an individual, it is sufficient for the purpose of showing that delivery occurred to show that the letter was properly addressed and posted. (4) Section 392 of the Companies Act 1993 applies for the purposes of subsec￾tion (1)(b) to (d). (5) For the purposes of this section, company and overseas company are defined in section 2(1) of the Companies Act 1993. 152 Giving notices to agent (1) If an individual is absent from New Zealand, notice may be given to the indi￾vidual’s agent in accordance with section 151(1). (2) Subsections (3) and (4) apply to an operator of a designated FMI if— (a) the operator’s home jurisdiction is not New Zealand; and (b) the operator is not registered under Part 18 of the Companies Act 1993. (3) The operator must— (a) have an agent in New Zealand for the purposes of this section; and (b) give details of the agent to the regulator. (4) Notice may be given to the agent in accordance with section 151(1). (5) See section 140 for supplementary provisions about giving information to the regulator. Subpart 5—Consequential amendments 153 Consequential amendments to Acts and instruments (1) Amend the Acts specified in Part 1 of Schedule 2 as set out in that Part. (2) Amend the instrument specified in Part 2 of Schedule 2 as set out in that Part. (3) Revoke the instruments specified in Part 3 of Schedule 2. Part 6 cl 152 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 78 Consultation draft

Schedule 1 Transitional, savings, and related provisions s 6 Part 1 Provisions relating to this Act as enacted 1 Definitions In this Part,— RBNZ Act 1989 means the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 repeal date means the date on which the repeal of Parts 5B and 5C of the RBNZ Act 1989 comes into force (see section 153(1) and Part 1 of Schedule 2). 2 Continuation of provisions of Part 5C of RBNZ Act 1989 relating to settlements, etc (1) Section 156Q of the RBNZ Act 1989 continues to apply to any of the following that occur before the repeal date: (a) the giving or receiving of a settlement instruction: (b) the determination or calculation of a settlement obligation: (c) the effecting of a settlement: (d) any action falling within section 156Q(2)(d). (2) Sections 156R and 156S of the RBNZ Act 1989 continue to apply to settle￾ments that are effected before the repeal date. (3) Sections 156T and 156U of the RBNZ Act 1989 continue to apply to any net￾ting that is done before the repeal date. (4) Sections 156V and 156W of the RBNZ Act 1989 continue to apply in conse￾quence of subclauses (1) to (3). (5) Section 156X of the RBNZ Act 1989 continues to apply to transfers of prop￾erty made before the repeal date. 3 Supplementary provisions relating to information (1) For the purposes of section 132, specified information includes any infor￾mation that is obtained by the RBNZ or the FMA before the repeal date for the purposes of the administration of Part 5C of the RBNZ Act 1989, whether under section 156Z(4), 156ZI(2), or 156ZL of that Act or otherwise. (2) Sections 156G to 156I and 156ZN to 156ZQ of the RBNZ Act 1989 continue to apply in relation to information or data supplied before the repeal date in accordance with section 156C, 156Y(3)(b), or 156ZL of that Act. Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Schedule 1 Consultation draft 79

Schedule 2 Consequential amendments s 153 Part 1 Consequential amendments to Acts Anti–Money Laundering and Countering Financial of Terrorism Act 2009 (2009 No 35) In section 137(2), after “Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989,”, insert “the Finan￾cial Market Infrastructures Act 2019,”. In section 137(3), after “Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989,”, insert “the Finan￾cial Market Infrastructures Act 2019,”. In section 137(4), after “Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013,”, insert “the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019,”. In section 137(5), after “Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013,”, insert “the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019,”. Companies Act 1993 (1993 No 105) In section 2(1), replace the definition of designated settlement system with: designated FMI means a designated FMI (as defined in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019) to which subpart 5 of Part 3 of that Act applies In section 2(1), insert in its appropriate alphabetical order: rules, in relation to a designated FMI, is to be read in accordance with section 35 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 In section 85(1A) and (2), replace “settlement system” with “FMI”. In section 95(2), replace “settlement system” with “FMI”. Replace section 269(2)(b)(iii) with: (iii) a settlement instruction or a settlement under the rules of a desig￾nated FMI. Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (1989 No 11) In section 8(1), insert in their appropriate alphabetical order: designated FMI means a designated FMI within the meaning of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 operator means an operator within the meaning of the Financial Market Infra￾structures Act 2019 Schedule 2 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 80 Consultation draft

Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (1989 No 11)—continued In section 8(2)(a) to (c), replace “or registered bank” with “, registered bank, or oper￾ator of a designated FMI”. After section 38(5), insert: (6) The FMA must consult the Reserve Bank of New Zealand before making a rec￾ommendation under this section that would lead to an operator of a designated FMI being subject to statutory management. (7) In subsection (6), designated FMI, operator, and systemically important have the meanings given in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019. In section 42(8), replace “settlement system that is declared to be a designated settle￾ment system under Part 5C of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989” with “designated FMI to which subpart 5 of Part 3 of the Financial Market Infrastruc￾tures Act 2019 applies”. In section 42(8)(b)(i), replace “settlement system” with “FMI”. Replace section 42(9) with: (9) In subsection (8) and this subsection,— (a) designated FMI, netting, and participant have the meanings given in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019; and (b) netted balance means any amount calculated in accordance with the rules of a designated FMI as the net debit payable by, or on behalf of, a participant of the designated FMI to, or on behalf of, another participant of that designated FMI for all or any claims or obligations to which those rules apply; and (c) rules is to be read in accordance with section 35 of the Financial Mar￾ket Infrastructures Act 2019. Financial Advisers Act 2008 (2008 No 91) Replace section 77C(1)(c) with: (c) an operator of a designated FMI providing a relevant service by the receipt, holding, payment, or transfer of money or property in accord￾ance with the designated FMI’s rules: After section 77C(2), insert: (2A) In subsection (1)(c),— designated FMI and operator have the meanings given in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 rules is to be read in accordance with section 35 of that Act. Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 (2011 No 5) In Schedule 1, Part 2, insert in its appropriate alphabetical order: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Schedule 2 Consultation draft 81

Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 (2011 No 5)—continued Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 In Schedule 1, Part 2, repeal the item relating to Part 5C of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989. Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (2013 No 69) Replace section 238(1)(h) with: (h) A is an operator of a designated FMI and is acting in the ordinary course of that business. After section 238(3), insert: (4) In subsection (1)(h), designated FMI and operator have the meanings given in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019. In section 338(4), replace “settlement system (within the meaning of section 156M(1) of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989)” with “FMI (as defined in section 4 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019)”. Replace section 389(1)(b) with: (b) acts as an operator of a designated FMI: After section 389(1), insert: (1A) In subsection (1)(b), designated FMI and operator have the meanings given in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019. Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (1999 No 126) In the cross-heading above section 103A, replace “settlement system” with “FMI”. In the heading to section 103A, replace “settlement system” with “FMI”. In section 103A(1), (3), and (4), replace “settlement system” with “FMI” in each place. In section 103A(1)(a)(ii), replace “the operator’s interest” with “the participant’s interest”. Replace section 103A(6) and (7) with: (6) In this section,— (a) designated FMI means a designated FMI (as defined in section 4 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019)— (i) to which subpart 5 of Part 3 of that Act applies; and (ii) whose designation notice specifies under section 28(2)(b) of that Act that the specified operator is an operator to whom this section applies; and (b) operator means an operator of a designated FMI who is (and at the time in question remains) the specified operator in relation to the designated FMI; and Schedule 2 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 82 Consultation draft

Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (1999 No 126)—continued (c) rules is to be read in accordance with section 35 of the Financial Mar￾ket Infrastructures Act 2019; and (d) other terms used that are defined in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 have the meanings given in that section. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (1989 No 157) In section 2(1), repeal the definitions of designated settlement system, operator, participant, payment system, settlement system, and specified operator. In section 41(1)(d), replace “2013.” with “2013; and”. After section 41(1)(d), insert: (e) the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019. After section 51(5)(c), insert: (d) the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019. After section 51(9)(c), insert: (d) the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019. In section 68B(1), delete “and Parts 5B and 5C”. In section 122(8), replace “a designated settlement system” with “a designated FMI to which subpart 5 of Part 3 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 applies”. In section 122(8)(b)(i), replace “settlement system” with “FMI”. Replace section 122(9) with: (9) In subsection (8) and this subsection,— (a) designated FMI, netting, and participant have the meanings given in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019; and (b) netted balance means any amount calculated in accordance with the rules of a designated FMI as the net debit payable by, or on behalf of, a participant of the designated FMI to, or on behalf of, another participant of that designated FMI for all or any claims or obligations to which those rules apply; and (c) rules is to be read in accordance with section 35 of the Financial Mar￾ket Infrastructures Act 2019. Repeal Parts 5B and 5C. Repeal section 159(1)(c) and (d). After section 159(1)(ea), insert: (eb) the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019: Replace section 162AB(1)(a) and (b) with: Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Schedule 2 Consultation draft 83

Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 (1989 No 157)—continued (a) assess the expected regulatory impacts of any policy that it intends to adopt under any of the following: (i) Part 5: (ii) the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010: (iii) the Non-bank Deposit Takers Act 2013: (iv) the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019; and (b) assess the regulatory impacts of the policies adopted under the enact￾ments listed in paragraph (a)(i) to (iv) at intervals appropriate to the nature of the policy being assessed; and Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (2012 No 24) In the Schedule, after the item relating to the Films, Videos, and Publications Classifi￾cation Act 1993, insert: Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 sections 62(3) and 63 Investigator of designated FMI may exercise search powers All Part 2 Consequential amendments to instrument Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014 (LI 2014/326) In regulation 238(1), definition of hedging counterparty, replace paragraph (c) with: (c) an operator of a designated FMI: Replace regulation 238(2) with: (2) Regulations 239 to 250 do not apply to a person to the extent that the person is acting as— (a) an operator of a designated FMI; or (b) an operator of a clearing house of a licensed market. (3) In this regulation,— designated FMI has the meaning given in section 5 of the Financial Market Infrastructures Act 2019 operator, in relation to a designated FMI, has the meaning given in that sec￾tion. Part 3 Consequential revocations of instruments Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Designated Settlement Systems) Order 2004 (SR 2004/376) Schedule 2 Financial Market Infrastructures Bill 84 Consultation draft

Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Designated Settlement System—NZCDC) Order 2010 (SR 2010/277) Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Designated Settlement System—NZClear) Order 2012 (SR 2012/258) Financial Market Infrastructures Bill Schedule 2 Consultation draft 85