Minutes from the Monetary Policy Meeting of 16 June 2026

Monetary Policy Minutes June 2026

Postal address: 103 37 Stockholm, Visit address: Brunkebergstorg 11 Telephone: 08-787 00 00, Web: riksbank.se MONETARY POLICY MINUTES Executive Board No. 4 DATE: 2026-06-16 MEETING TIME: 09:00 Monetary Policy Minutes for Meeting No. 20 of 2026 HANDLING CLASS: OPEN PRESENT: Erik Thedéen, Chairman Aino Bunge Per Jansson Anna Seim Göran Hjelm

Bo Broman, Chairman, Riksdag Committee on Financial Markets Tomas Eneroth, Vice Chairman, Riksdag Committee on Financial Markets

Björn Andersson Lena Arfalk Charlotta Edler Mattias Erlandsson Caroline Flodberg Susanna Grufman Peter Gustafsson Ellen Kockum Anders Kvist Henrik Lundvall David Lööv Stefania Mammos Åsa Olli Segendorf Emma Sandberg Olof Sandstedt Anna Sjulander Viking Waldén Anne-Catherine Worth

Joel Birging (§1-3a) Maria Johansson (§1-3a) It was noted that David Lööv, Stefania Mammos, and Viking Waldén would draft the monetary policy minutes.

3 §3 Monetary Policy Assessment §3a The Economic Development Market Development Since the Last Monetary Policy Meeting Joel Birging, Senior Market Economist at the Markets Department, began by outlining the development in financial markets since the previous monetary policy meeting in May. Since the monetary policy meeting in May, financial markets have generally been characterized by two major themes: the situation in the Middle East, with a particular focus on when oil transport through the Strait of Hormuz can normalize, and the ongoing expansion of AI. The oil price has fallen, and the price of the first futures contract for Brent crude is now around 83 USD per barrel. According to information about the statement of intent between the USA and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is to remain open while further negotiations take place. Many details remain, but pricing on energy markets indicates that investors expect oil transport via the Strait of Hormuz to normalize. The commodity price index has also fallen and is noted at the lowest levels since the war in the Middle East broke out. The interest rate market has also been influenced by news about developments in the Middle East, and government bond yields have fallen clearly in the last week. Even if oil transport via the Strait of Hormuz normalizes, market pricing still suggests that several policy rates will be raised in the coming months. It can be noted that the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) are examples of G10 central banks that have already implemented policy rate hikes. Swap rates indicate that a hike from the Federal Reserve is currently only anticipated towards the end of 2026. The US dollar has strengthened since the start of the war, and an important question for investors now is whether the trend of a weaker dollar that began the year will resume. During the same period, stock indices have risen to new record highs, and investor sentiment can be described as good. AI remains a major theme, and companies that are suppliers to the expansion of AI infrastructure, such as semiconductor manufacturers, have benefited from the ongoing development. Overall, listed companies' capital investments are at historically high levels, and there are no clear signs yet that the trend is slowing down; rather, the opposite is true. Expectations among analysts and in market pricing indicate that the Riksbank will keep the policy rate unchanged at the June meeting. For all of 2026, market pricing still suggests that the Riksbank will raise the policy rate by

4 at least 25 basis points. Regarding the development of the krona, it has weakened since the monetary policy meeting in May but has strengthened recently, partly due to an expectation of an end to the war in the Middle East. Financial Stability – Current Situation and Risks Olof Sandstedt, Head of the Financial Stability Department, presented the situation in the financial system. The risks to financial stability in Sweden have been elevated for some time, linked to the uncertain international situation, not least due to the unpredictable trade and foreign policy of the US administration, as well as the war in the Middle East. Although the recent moves by both parties in the war have contributed to cautious optimism, not least in financial markets, uncertainty remains regarding the meaning and anchoring of the statement of intent. The Swedish financial system has shown resilience, and important funding markets and infrastructure have functioned well. At the same time, the continued risk picture depends largely on how peace negotiations develop and how long-lasting the effects of previous supply disruptions prove to be. Despite the uncertain international situation, risk premiums on several financial assets have decreased and are at historically low levels. Several large global companies have also, supported by the prevailing high valuations, chosen to raise new capital on various funding markets to strengthen their ability to meet expectations for future profit growth. After a longer period of high asset valuations, this, in combination with negative events or changed expectations, could contribute to sharp corrections in asset prices, with rising risk premiums and increased volatility in financial markets as a result. In a tightly interconnected global financial system, such reactions can be amplified by existing vulnerabilities, such as high and growing public debts in several large economies and risks associated with the expanding non-bank sector. This can challenge the resilience of the financial system, both globally and in Sweden. Sweden is well prepared for a deteriorated economic situation. Sweden's stable public finances provide better conditions for handling such a situation compared to many other countries. The Swedish financial system as a whole is also assessed to have good conditions to withstand and handle disturbances. The large Swedish banks are profitable and have good margins down to the requirements for capital and liquidity, and thus conditions to maintain lending to the real economy even during disturbances. The large banks also continue to have good access to US dollars, and limited exposures to both the Middle East and energy-intensive companies in Sweden. However, threats related to cyberattacks have increased against the backdrop of the uncertain security political situation. This

5 underscores the need for strengthened operational preparedness among all central actors in the financial system. The Current Monetary Policy Preparation – New Data and Projections Peter Gustafsson, Advisor at the Monetary Policy Department, presented the current assessment of macroeconomic development and the proposal for a monetary policy decision that the Monetary Policy Department believes gathers a majority of the Executive Board at today's meeting. The basis for today's interest rate decision was discussed with the Executive Board on June 2, 3, and 5. The draft monetary policy report was discussed and tabled at the Executive Board meeting on June 9. At the monetary policy meeting in May, the Riksbank left the policy rate unchanged at 1.75 percent. The risk of higher inflation in the wake of the war in the Middle East was assessed to have increased somewhat, but a starting position with inflation below the target and a weak economy was assessed to provide some room to wait for a clearer picture of the war's effects and related supply disruptions. Against the backdrop of developments in the Middle East, central questions in the preparation have continued to concern the war's consequences for global and Swedish inflation and economic prospects. But they have also concerned how the impact of the outside world should be weighed against more domestic economic conditions and how monetary policy should be designed when development is particularly difficult to predict. Alternative scenarios have again been given significant weight in the preparation of the monetary policy decision. Despite the news about the statement of intent between the USA and Iran, the prospects for development in the Middle East remain uncertain. The oil price is still high, prices on other commodities have risen, and Swedish business is experiencing higher cost pressure. The Riksbank's assumptions about the effects of supply disruptions on inflation and economic prospects in the main scenario are very uncertain, and the monetary policy report therefore discusses scenarios that could lead to different monetary policy than in the main scenario. The global financial conditions are approximately the same as at the Riksbank's monetary policy decision in May. All higher stock valuations, especially for AI-related companies, have been counteracted by a rising interest rate environment. The ECB raised the policy rate in June, and the market expects rising inflation and further policy rate hikes from the ECB. In Sweden, the economic situation is still somewhat weaker than normal, and inflation is below the target. However, inflationary pressure has increased somewhat, but long-term inflation expectations are well anchored near the target. Although the war's effects are assessed to dampen growth somewhat, rising purchasing power among households contributes to strengthening the economy in the future. The starting position continues to provide some room to wait for a clearer picture of development and its effects on the Swedish economy. At the same time, events in the Middle East have contributed to an increased risk of too high inflation, which has led to the probability of a rate hike later this year being assessed as higher than in the March forecast. Against the backdrop of the uncertainty that characterizes both development and the effects of supply disruptions, monetary policy may in the future need to be adjusted to protect the inflation target. The war's effects also risk interacting with other underlying vulnerabilities in the global economy, such as high public debts and highly valued stock markets. This can in the long run more clearly change the conditions for monetary policy. The proposal for monetary policy that the Monetary Policy Department believes gathers a majority in the Executive Board at today's meeting is described in Protocol Appendix A. The proposal means that the policy rate is left unchanged at 1.75 percent at today's meeting. The forecast for the policy rate has simultaneously been adjusted upwards somewhat compared to the monetary policy report in March. §3b The Economic Situation and Monetary Policy Deputy Governor Göran Hjelm I support the proposal to leave the policy rate unchanged at 1.75 percent as well as the draft monetary policy report. I would like to begin by thanking the departments that, among other things, assisted with pedagogical presentation, innovative data analysis, and illuminated questions that have been particularly current during this preparation. Like at the previous two monetary policy meetings, the war in the Middle East dominates my considerations. I divide my comments into three areas; follow-up of indicators linked to the analysis framework I have described previously, assessment of the risk picture, and appropriate monetary policy. The war in the Middle East has been ongoing with varying intensity for just over three and a half months. The two core issues are still how large the direct and indirect effects on inflation can be expected to be, and at what size of these effects there is a risk of secondary effects. To analyze these questions, I follow three areas especially: the credibility of the inflation target, indicators of the extent of the disruptions, and situation-specific factors. Regarding credibility, it still looks good. Short-term inflation expectations are at the target. Furthermore, I interpret statements from labor market parties as indicating that the inflation target is the starting point for future collective bargaining, even if supply disruptions from the war mean that inflation temporarily exceeds

7 the target. In addition, price plans within the service sector, which have not yet been affected by clearly increased costs, are virtually unchanged. Taken together, I therefore assess that the risk of secondary effects via wage and price formation is currently insignificant. Regarding the assessment of how extensive the disruptions from the war are, there is a lot of new data to consider, both regarding indicators and official statistics. Since the meeting in May, another one and a half months have passed with elevated oil prices. I assess, however, that the oil market has so far been more resilient than several experts have predicted. Increased oil production in, among others, the USA, China's significant reduction in its oil imports, and reduced stocks in other countries are important explanatory factors for this. The term and price development for other affected commodities has been mixed; the commodity price index has, however, continued to rise at approximately the same rapid pace as began in 2025. Taken together, the international price development has contributed to the import price index in producer prices in Sweden rising by almost 10 percent during March and April, which can be compared with an increase of approximately 40 percent from the summer of 2021 and one year forward. The increase of 10 percent during March and April is disturbingly large. At the same time, a difference now compared to 2021–2022 is that the increase is clearly dominated by fuels. This index can therefore be expected to fall back if the statement of intent to be formally signed on Friday between the USA and Iran, as well as a subsequent peace agreement, are considered credible. Furthermore, there are worrying signs for global supply chains; the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index rose in April to almost two standard deviations above its historical average and remained at the high level in May.1 In December 2021, the index was more than twice as high compared to today. The most important difference, however, is that then this index was on average approximately three standard deviations above its historical average for almost a year and a half, from February 2021 to July 2022. This, as is well known, led to very high inflation, which is why the development of this index in the coming months will be important to follow. Regarding qualitative measures, there are also worrying signs, although the picture is somewhat mixed. Price plans in the Institute of Economic Research's Business Confidence Survey show the largest increase for trade, followed by manufacturing industry, while price plans in the service sector, as I mentioned above, are virtually unchanged. Companies' price plans have also risen in the Riksbank's business survey, but at the same time, most companies state that they plan normal price changes both regarding size and frequency. My overall assessment is that available data suggests that the disruptions so far can, using the terminology I have used previously, be considered somewhere between small and medium-sized.2 Since we have high credibility in the starting position, I therefore believe that whether monetary policy needs to act depends on situation-specific factors, in this situation primarily the starting position for underlying inflation and resource utilization, as well as expectations about fiscal policy and wage formation.3 Both underlying inflation and resource utilization are lower than normal in the starting position, although differences compared to normal levels should not be exaggerated. This starting position contributes to the possibility for monetary policy to wait for more information regarding the likely effects of the disruptions on the economy. Regarding fiscal policy, the fiscal framework means that it needs to be tightened both in 2027 and 2028. The framework also states that if supply-driven inflation becomes a problem, fiscal policy should not make it more difficult for monetary policy, a principle that fiscal policy followed when inflation was high. Regarding wage formation, I see, as I mentioned above, no significant risks. Taken together, the starting position for inflation and resource utilization, as well as reasonable assumptions about fiscal policy and wage formation, means that the risk that supply disruptions of the current size will lead to a broad and lasting increase in inflation is limited. I now move on to discuss the risk picture. During the monetary policy preparation, I considered a limited hike in the interest rate path to be reasonable. This is still the case, although the aforementioned statement of intent between the USA and Iran means that the risk picture needs to be nuanced somewhat. A certain revision of the interest rate path is justified, in my opinion, because after nearly four months of war, we inevitably approach a time – or chokepoint – where, among other things, reduced oil inventory levels can more abruptly mean sharp price increases, although opinions among experts differ exactly when this can happen. If an escalation of the war were to occur in this situation and assessed to involve a substantial delay until there is lasting peace, significantly larger effects on oil prices and other commodity prices would be risked. Although the risk of such a scenario is small, its potential effects would be large, which is why, in expectation terms, there is a risk of too high inflation relative to the main scenario. If such a scenario materializes, the rate would of course need to be raised significantly more than the interest rate path indicates. With the statement of intent to be signed on Friday, this risk has reasonably decreased in the near term. The parties, however, have several difficult issues to resolve during the next 60 days, and the risk of setbacks and a resumed conflict is relatively large. This takes me to what I assess to be appropriate monetary policy under current circumstances. I fundamentally believe that the interest rate path laid out in the March forecast is still reasonable if development is assessed to become approximately as in the main scenario, given that the risk picture becomes more balanced. The interest rate path from March would, like the interest rate path in the main scenario now in June, stabilize underlying inflation near 2 percent from the turn of the year and onwards when base effects of individual months are disregarded. Underlying inflation is in the current forecast a few tenths higher during 2027 compared to the March forecast, but this is due to somewhat larger indirect effects from supply disruptions, which I believe monetary policy, for reasons I have described in various contexts, should not act upon. Furthermore, the development of resource utilization in the main scenario is also like the March forecast, albeit somewhat weaker. The probability that the main scenario will occur has increased, while the probability of the risk scenario I described above has decreased due to the expected statement of intent between the USA and Iran. This means less risk of too high inflation and thus less need for a revised interest rate path, although a certain revision can still be justified given the complexity of the conflict. I believe that monetary policy should only in exceptional cases take into account events that may occur, i.e., not make forecasts on new disruptions. As has emerged, I think it was justified this time; it remains to be seen if the risk picture is more balanced at the next monetary policy decision. I would like to conclude by reminding that there is still a risk that a variant of the first alternative scenario in the report becomes reality during the autumn. In the scenario, the conflict develops as in the main scenario where term prices fall back, i.e., not unlike the development that an upcoming statement of intent and an upcoming peace agreement between the USA and Iran can entail. The difference, however, is that in the alternative scenario, the indirect effects from existing disruptions are assumed to become significantly larger, which, together with a weakened krona, risks the emergence of secondary effects, and the Riksbank therefore raises the rate. However, in my opinion, it is required that the indirect effects are assessed to become just significantly larger than in the main scenario for rate hikes to become necessary, since monetary policy, if circumstances allow, should look through temporarily elevated inflation when it, as in the scenario, is clearly supply-driven. First Deputy Governor Aino Bunge I support both the proposal to leave the policy rate unchanged at 1.75 percent at this meeting, and the forecasts and assessments made in the draft monetary policy report. Let me begin by commenting on the war in the Middle East that has been ongoing for nearly four months. Now there are hopes for peace and a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, but many questions remain, not least regarding access to nuclear technology. The war and its impact on the world economy have, at this monetary policy meeting, just as in March, made it extra difficult to make forecasts on growth and inflation, both abroad and in Sweden. The preparation for today's meeting and the monetary policy report have therefore placed special emphasis on the alternative scenarios and the potential need to adjust monetary policy based on how the future develops, which I think is important. There is now hope for peace, but it is too early to raise the alarm. The supply disruptions have an impact on the inflation picture going forward even if the war ends immediately, and it will take time for oil and gas production in the region to normalize. Our alternative scenarios illustrate well the great uncertainty that exists regarding the indirect effects of supply disruptions (see also the analysis box "The Effects of the War in the Middle East on Swedish Inflation" in the report draft). It is difficult to know how much of the effects we see on producer prices globally will make their way into consumer prices in Sweden. Our own business survey does suggest that price plans point upwards, but not on any changed pricing behavior, in the sense that companies generally plan to change prices more often or more (see the fact box "Riksbank's Business Survey May 2026" in the report draft). There is thus a significant difference compared to how companies reasoned at the beginning of 2022.4 The war in the Middle East has dominated the discussion for the past few months and is the main reason for a somewhat upwardly adjusted interest rate path. I believe that the potential effects of supply disruptions on inflation are well described in the report draft, and the reasoning holds up even after the developments of the last few days. If anything, the future prospects become a bit more optimistic around whether the effects of the supply disruption we have seen really will be as limited as the forecast shows. But great uncertainty still exists. In addition to this, I would like to describe my thoughts on three other things: our target variable, a somewhat more positive view of economic recovery, and the significance of the exchange rate for inflation going forward. Something that has given us a bit more patience to wait for further information regarding the effects of the war in the Middle East has been that inflation in Sweden in the starting position is strikingly low. This is a significant difference compared to several other countries and regions, not least the euro area and the USA. The latest inflation outcome for May did reflect a certain reversal of the very low outcome for April, but it was still below our forecast from March and also quite a bit below the target of two percent. We also see that long-term inflation expectations are still well anchored in line with the inflation target. In the report draft, we simultaneously describe how the temporary fiscal measures, such as halved VAT on food, reduced tax on fuels, and halved prices

4 See, for example, the Riksbank's