2026-08-26 | Circular 2510Added · Updated
The Central Bank of Uruguay establishes new remuneration rules for reserve requirements in national and foreign currency, effective September 1, 2026. National currency reserves are remunerated at the Monetary Policy Rate (TPM), while excess balances receive TPM minus 2%. Foreign currency reserves are remunerated at the issuing authority's TPM minus 1.5% for short-term USD/Euro obligations and minus 0.5% for other obligations, with excess balances receiving TPM minus 1.5%. These changes revoke Resolution D/383/2025 and aim to reduce the cost of intermediation in national currency relative to foreign currency.
Diagonal Fabini 777 - C.P. 11100 - Tel.: (598 2) 1967 - Montevideo, Uruguay - www.bcu.gub.uy 1 It is brought to knowledge that this Central Bank adopted, on August 26, 2026, Resolution D/280/2026, which is transcribed below: Fabio Malacrida (Exp. No. 2015-50-1-0800) CIRCULAR N°2510
DIRECTORATE - RESOLUTION Montevideo, August 26, 2026. D I R E C T O R A T E VISTO: the reserve requirement regime provided for in Book XIV - Reserve Regime of the Compilation of Operations Norms. RESULTING: that through resolution D/279/2026 of August 26, 2026, resolution D/178/2026 of June 10, 2026 was revoked. CONSIDERING: I) that article 3 of the Organic Charter of the Central Bank of Uruguay (Law No. 16.696) assigns the Institution two primary purposes: first, price stability that contributes to growth and employment objectives, second, the regulation and supervision of the payments system and the financial system, promoting its solidity, solvency, efficiency and development; II) that the Uruguayan economy maintains a high and persistent degree of financial dollarization, particularly in its deposits, while the technical evidence and international experience analyzed indicate that such a situation weakens the channels of monetary policy transmission — especially the interest rate channel — and increases the cost, in terms of activity, of achieving a determined inflation objective, which affects the first of the aforementioned purposes defined by article 3 of the Organic Charter of the Central Bank of Uruguay; III) that financial dollarization can also generate specific vulnerabilities for the solidity, solvency, efficiency and development of the financial system, including: higher credit risk induced by the exchange rate with respect to debtors who receive their income in national currency, higher liquidity risk in foreign currency — considering the limited capacity of the Central Bank to provide last-resort liquidity in a currency it does not issue — and a greater exposure of the banking system's results to external financial conditions, which impacts the second of the purposes assigned to the Central Bank of Uruguay in the aforementioned article 3 of the Organic Charter; IV) that promoting greater use of the national currency in financial intermediation constitutes an appropriate and legitimate means to contribute to the fulfillment of the two purposes that the Organic Charter assigns to the governing body, by strengthening the transmission channels of monetary policy and reducing the vulnerabilities derived from dollarization; V) that letter B of article 26 of the Organic Charter empowers the Central Bank, as the governing body of the financial system, to set the minimum reserves that deposit-taking institutions must maintain, both in national and foreign currency, as well as the assets that may compose them and the other pertinent conditions, expressly incorporating reserve requirements — including their remuneration — among the monetary policy instruments linked to the purposes of article 3 and enabling their differentiated application by currency; VI) that in the present resolution, the reasons are clearly and timely explained for why the adopted measure constitutes an appropriate means for the achievement of the due purposes of general interest, through the legitimate exercise of the aforementioned discretionary powers, strictly adhering to the factual and legal premises that condition its legitimacy; VII) that specialized technical bibliography in the science of economics and comparative experience according to objective measurements of partially dollarized economies, show that sustainable de-dollarization processes improve macroeconomic stability, the development of instruments and markets in national currency, as well as regulatory and prudential measures aimed at influencing the relative incentives of intermediation by currency, among which reserve requirements and the conditions of their remuneration have been used successfully; VIII) that specialized international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund agree with the preceding grounds on the effects of reserve requirement measures, having pointed out as an example, in its Technical Assistance Handbook – Monetary Operations and Domestic Market Development: Reserve Requirements, that when reserve requirements pursue macroprudential objectives aimed at discouraging certain sources of financing, higher requirements are necessary and moderating the remuneration of such liabilities, in order to discourage their use and strengthen the resilience of the financial system; IX) that the economic impact of the reserve requirement regime depends jointly on the required rate and the remuneration applied to mandatory reserves, so that both dimensions determine the effective cost of intermediation in each currency and must be considered integrally when configuring the regime and when evaluating the relative incentives it generates and in this sense, the evaluation of the current regime shows the appropriateness of recalibrating jointly those relative incentives, to reduce the cost of intermediation in national currency and increase, comparatively, the corresponding cost for intermediation in foreign currency; X) that the modification of the remuneration of reserves was timely informed by the Central Bank of Uruguay to the banking system in december 2025, on which occasion a gradual implementation schedule R.N°:D-280-2026 Expediente N°: 2015-50-1-00800 D-280-2026.pdf Folio n° 504 CIRCULAR N°2510
DIRECTORATE - RESOLUTION was established, composed of three stages, with the present measure corresponding to the second of them and in view of the prevailing conditions and with the purpose of facilitating the adaptation of banking institutions, the entry into force of this second stage, originally scheduled for June 1, 2026, was deferred by three months, setting its implementation for September 1, 2026; XI) that this scheme of advance information and gradual application allowed the affected institutions to know with sufficient advance notice the orientation and the schedule of the measure, to allow their adaptation to the new reserve scheme, adopting in a timely and gradual manner the necessary measures. ATTENTIVE: to the above, to what is provided by articles 3, 12 letter E) and 27 letter B) of Law No. 16.696 of March 30, 1995 and amendments (Organic Charter of the Central Bank of Uruguay), to what was informed by the Financial Policy and Payments System Management on August 26, 2026 and other antecedents that appear in file No. 2015-50-1-0800, IT IS RESOLVED:
DIRECTORATE - RESOLUTION TPM: Monetary Policy Rate defined by the Monetary Policy Committee in force on the first business day of the corresponding month. 3) Establish that the remuneration of reserves in foreign currency, to be constituted from September 1, 2026, shall be fixed according to the following rule: a) Mandatory minimum reserve on foreign currency obligations, denominated in US dollars or euros, with residents, on sight, with notice and for contractual terms less than 30 days: REm/e = TPM - 1.5%. b) Mandatory minimum reserve for the rest of the obligations not contemplated in the previous letter: REm/e = TPM - 0.5%. In both cases, the result of REm/e shall never be less than zero. Where: REm/e: remuneration of reserves in foreign currency. TPM: Monetary Policy Rate of the issuing authority of the currency, in force on the first day of each month that is remunerated. In case of existence of a monetary policy rate band, the ceiling of the band shall be taken. In the case of non-existence of the target monetary policy rate, the one-day reference market rate shall be taken. 4) Establish that the remuneration of excess balances of reserve requirements in foreign currency of the demand deposit accounts referred to in articles 1 and 2 of Book I of the Compilation of Norms of Payments System, shall be fixed, from September 1 of 2026, according to the following detail: RCCm/e = TPM – 1.5% The result of RCCm/e shall never be less than zero. Where: RCCm/e: remuneration of excess balances of foreign currency demand deposit accounts. TPM: Monetary Policy Rate of the issuing authority of the currency, in force on the first business day of the month that is remunerated. In case of existence of a monetary policy rate band, the ceiling of the band shall be taken. In the case of non-existence of a target monetary policy rate, the one-day reference market rate shall be taken. R.N°:D-280-2026 Expediente N°: 2015-50-1-00800 D-280-2026.pdf Folio n° 506 CIRCULAR N°2510
DIRECTORATE - RESOLUTION 5) Repeal what is provided by resolution D/383/2025 of November 26, 2025. 6) Entrust the communication of what is provided by means of circular, to the Financial Policy and Payments System Management. (Today's Session – Minutes No. 3847) (File No. 2015-50-1-0800) Viviana Pérez General Secretary Ds Publishable Resolution R.N°:D-280-2026 Signatory: Viviana Perez Benech Date: 26/08/2026 19:22:45 Expediente N°: 2015-50-1-00800 D-280-2026.pdf Folio n° 507 CIRCULAR N°2510
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