2013-01-22
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The National Bank of Belgium proposes an amicable settlement requiring BANK X to pay a fine of EUR 250,000 due to failures in its anti-money laundering controls regarding clustered transactions by client Y NV between January 2009 and April 2010. The settlement addresses BANK X's failure to report suspicious activities through first-line monitoring and automated alerts, which were only analyzed after judicial inquiries began in May 2010. This agreement resolves the administrative procedure initiated by the NBB based on serious indications of non-compliance with vigilance and reporting obligations.
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Amicable settlement proposed by the Board of Directors of the NBB and accepted by BANK X This amicable settlement, reached taking into account the Auditor's report dated 10 January 2013, was proposed by the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Belgium (hereinafter "the NBB") to BANK X on 22 January 2013, and was accepted by the latter on 8 February 2013.
Having regard to Articles 36/9 and 36/10 of the Act of 22 February 1998 laying down the organic statute (hereinafter "the Act of 22 February 1998") of the National Bank of Belgium (hereinafter "the NBB"); Having regard to the decision of the Board of Directors of the NBB of 19 July 2011, whereby it was established that there are serious indications of the existence of a practice on the part of BANK X that may give rise to the imposition of an administrative monetary penalty within the meaning of Article 40 of the Act of 11 January 1993 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing. The serious indications related to BANK X's compliance with its duty of vigilance regarding certain banking transactions carried out by one of its customers, as well as its obligation to file a report with the Financial Information Processing Unit (CFI) if it knows or suspects that transactions relate to money laundering or terrorist financing; Having regard to the decision of the Board of Directors of the NBB of 19 July 2011 to instruct the Auditor, pursuant to Article 36/9, §1, first paragraph of the Act of 22 February 1998, to conduct an investigation in favor of and against the aforementioned serious indications; Having regard to the fact that the aforementioned Act of 11 January 1993 and its implementing provisions have been amended several times since the facts in question occurred, thereby focusing the investigation on compliance with the Act of 11 January 1993 as applicable at the time of the relevant facts, as well as compliance with the CBFA Regulation of 27 July 2004 concerning the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, taking into account the fact that subsequent amendments did not relax the obligations existing for credit institutions at the time of the facts; Having regard to Articles 4, § 2 and 8 of the Act of 11 January 1993 as applicable at the time of the investigated facts, which respectively determine that institutions subject to the scope of the Act must display constant vigilance regarding business relationships and ensure careful examination of executed transactions in light of their knowledge of their client and their profile, and must particularly examine transactions that they consider particularly susceptible to money laundering or terrorist financing due to the nature of the transactions or their unusual character given among other things the accompanying circumstances, and draw up a written report on this examination. Having regard to Articles 36, 37 and 38 of the CBFA Regulation of 27 July 2004 concerning the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. Under Article 36, credit institutions must organize appropriate first-line supervision, i.e., supervision by employees of the company who are in direct contact with clients, whereby these employees identify atypical transactions based on appropriate criteria made available by the institution, pay
specific attention to them, and draw up a written report which they submit to the anti-money laundering officer of the institution. In accordance with Article 37, credit institutions must supplement this first-line supervision with second-line supervision, which uses an automated supervision system that must meet certain specific requirements and which must deliver written reports on identified atypical transactions to the anti-money laundering officer. In accordance with Article 38
2/3 credit institutions must deploy the necessary resources and develop appropriate procedures to, under the responsibility of the anti-money laundering officer, proceed as soon as possible to the analysis of the written reports resulting from first- and second-line supervision, in order to determine whether the relevant facts should be reported to the CFI.
Having regard to Articles 12 and 13 of the Act of 11 January 1993 as applicable at the time of the investigated facts, pursuant to which institutions subject to the scope of the Act must bring to the attention of the CFI when they know or suspect that a transaction to be executed relates to money laundering or terrorist financing, before executing the transaction or, insofar as reporting before the execution of the transaction is not possible, immediately after the execution of the transaction; Having regard to Article 36/10, § 3 of the Act of 22 February 1998, which allows the Board of Directors to propose an amicable settlement and, if its proposal is accepted, to publish it in a non-nominative manner on the NBB website; Having regard to the fact that BANK X effectively had the opportunity to review the findings of the Auditor's report before formulating its final comments via its lawyer in the latter's letter of 16 November 2012; Having regard to the fact that the definitive report of the Auditor together with the proposal for an amicable settlement was sent to BANK X;
Considering that the investigation conducted in favor of and against has led to the following findings:
The investigated facts relate to transactions carried out during the period from January 2009 to April 2010 inclusive on account number 1 held by Y NV at BANK X. During the aforementioned period, significant amounts were transferred multiple times to this account, after which Y NV repeatedly performed large cash withdrawals from this account. In total, a number of 'clustered transactions' took place on account 1 during the aforementioned period, i.e., the succession of one or more incoming transfers for significant amounts followed by one or more cash withdrawals for a large amount. The cash withdrawals were made at various local agencies and offices of BANK X. The withdrawals were always carried out by Ms. x, who had power of attorney on the aforementioned account but who had no longer exercised a mandate within the company Y NV since 2007. In a number of cases, a cash withdrawal for a large amount was shortly followed by a cash withdrawal for a smaller amount, which was then deposited into another account of Y NV at BANK X (account 2). The aforementioned transactions on the accounts of Y NV at BANK X, i.e., the large incoming transfers to account 1 followed by cash withdrawals for large amounts, apart from the subsequent cash deposits of smaller amounts to account 2, exhibited an unusual character in terms of characteristics and accompanying circumstances. The investigation revealed that the first-line staff of BANK X did not take initiatives to draw up a written report on this matter and to report the transactions to the bank's central anti-money laundering unit. Regarding second-line supervision, it was found that the transactions of Y NV between mid-March 2009 and end-April 2010 gave rise to some 'alerts' in the bank's automated control system, but that no further action was taken on these alerts during the period in which they were generated. The alerts were not analyzed by the central anti-money laundering unit and did not give rise to any written report on the basis of which the bank could assess whether a report to the Financial Information Processing Unit ('CFI') was required. The alerts only gave rise to some analysis when the bank's compliance function opened an internal investigation into the aforementioned transactions, after the bank had received questions from judicial authorities on 10 May 2010 regarding these transactions. Based on this investigation, the bank ultimately filed a report with the CFI on 9 August 2010.
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Having regard to the statements of BANK X recorded during the course of the investigation, which confirm the described factual elements; Considering that BANK X has provided full cooperation in the course of the investigation and in particular that BANK X, aware of the shortcomings in its internal organization in this regard, has already started measures to remedy the recurrence of the identified shortcomings; Considering that the amount of the amicable settlement must be proportionate to the nature of the facts; For these reasons, the Board of Directors of the NBB proposes to BANK X, as an amicable settlement within the meaning of Art. 36/10, § 3 of the Act of 22 February 1998, the payment of the sum of EUR 250,000; If this proposal is accepted, this allows for a definitive resolution of the procedure instituted against BANK X. Pursuant to Art. 36/10, § 3 of the Act of 22 February 1998, the amicable settlement will be published in a non-nominative manner on the website of the NBB. The amounts to be paid under this settlement will be collected for the benefit of the Treasury by the Administration of the Cadastre, Registration and Domains. Done in Brussels, in three copies, on 22 January 2013. The Governor, Luc COENE
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Source: National Bank of Belgium — original document · Summary generated with machine assistance and reviewed before publication; the authoritative text is the regulator's original document. How RegAlert works
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