Enforcement · NBB · 30 Aug 2016
BANK X is required to pay a fine of €250,000 for failing to identify a client as a Politically Exposed Person (PEP) and for inadequate anti-money laundering controls, including insufficient first- and second-line monitoring and untimely reporting to the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CFI). The settlement addresses failures to apply enhanced due diligence, verify the source of funds, and investigate alerts generated by the automated monitoring system regarding cash deposits and international transfers. The penalty is published non-nominatively on the NBB website, with funds collected for the Treasury.
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Amicable settlement proposed by the NBB Board of Directors and accepted by BANK X This amicable settlement, reached taking into account the auditor's report dated 18 August 2016, was proposed by the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Belgium to BANK X on 30 August 2016, and was accepted by the latter on 16 September 2016.
Having regard to Articles 36/9 and 36/10 of the Act of 22 February 1998 establishing the organic statute (hereinafter "the Act of 22 February 1998") of the National Bank of Belgium (hereinafter the "NBB"); Having regard to the decision of the NBB Board of Directors of 29 April 2014, applying Article 36/9, §1, first paragraph of the Act of 22 February 1998, to order the auditor to conduct an investigation in the interest and against BANK X regarding serious indications of violation of the provisions of the Act of 11 January 1993 preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing (hereinafter, "the Act of 11 January 1993") following certain banking transactions carried out by one of its clients; Having regard to the investigative acts performed by the auditor; Having regard to the fact that BANK X had the opportunity to, in accordance with Article 36/9, § 2 of the Act of 22 February 1998, formulate its comments on the preliminary factual findings communicated to it by letter of 10 June 2016; Having regard to the content of the comments that BANK X submitted to the auditor on 18 July 2016; Having regard to the auditor's report dated 18 August 2016 which was submitted to the Board of Directors; Having regard to Article 36/10, § 3 of the Act of 22 February 1998 which allows the Board of Directors to propose an amicable settlement and, if its proposal is accepted, to publish it in a non-nominative manner on the NBB website; Having regard to the fact that the final report of the auditor together with the proposal for amicable settlement was submitted to BANK X.
Having regard to Article 12, § 3, paragraph 6, 1° of the Act of 11 January 1993 on the basis of which credit institutions must establish appropriate and suitable procedures to determine whether a client is a politically prominent person (hereinafter "PEP") and, depending on the risk sensitivity, apply enhanced customer due diligence measures in situations that, by their nature, may contain a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing;
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Having regard to Article 44, paragraph 3 of the Act of 11 January 1993 on the basis of which credit institutions had a transitional period of one year after the entry into force of the legislative amendment of 18 January 2010, i.e., until 4 February 2011, to take appropriate and suitable measures in light of the risk to identify politically prominent persons among their clients existing on 5 February 2010 and to apply the specific measures referred to in Article 12, § 3, paragraph 6 of the Act of 11 January 1993; Having regard to Article 30 of the CBFA Regulation of 23 February 2010 concerning the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (hereinafter, "the Regulation of 23 February 2010") on the basis of which credit institutions are obliged, within a time limit determined according to the risk, to verify and, if necessary, update the data constituting the risk profile of clients with whom they have a business relationship, when they have indications that these data are no longer up-to-date, in order to fulfill their ongoing vigilance obligation; Having regard to Articles 12, § 3, paragraph, 6, 4° and 14, §§ 1 and 2 of the Act of 11 January 1993 on the basis of which credit institutions must exercise enhanced vigilance regarding their business relationships with PEPs and ensure careful investigation of transactions carried out by PEPs and, if necessary, the origin of the funds in light of the knowledge they have of their client and their profile, and with particular attention, investigate transactions that, by the nature of the transactions or by their unusual character considering among other things the activities of the client, the accompanying circumstances of the transactions, or the status of the person involved, they consider particularly susceptible to money laundering or terrorist financing, and must draw up a written report on this investigation; Having regard to Articles 31, paragraph 2 and 32 of the Regulation of 23 February 2010 on the basis of which the vigilance that credit institutions must exercise regarding the transactions of their clients must be expressed at two levels, namely first-line and second-line supervision. Based on these provisions, credit institutions must organize appropriate first-line supervision, i.e., supervision by employees of the credit institution who are in direct contact with clients, whereby these employees, based on appropriate criteria made available by the credit institutions, detect atypical transactions, devote specific attention to them, and draw up a written report which they submit to the anti-money laundering officer of the institution; credit institutions must supplement this first-line supervision with second-line supervision, which uses an automated monitoring system that must meet certain specific requirements and which must provide written reports on the detected atypical transactions to be submitted to the anti-money laundering officer; Having regard to Articles 23 and 24 of
the Act of 11 January 1993 on the basis of which credit institutions, when they know or suspect that a transaction to be carried out is related to money laundering or terrorist financing, must report this to the CFI before carrying out the transaction or, insofar as reporting before the execution of the transaction is not possible, immediately after the execution of the transaction;
Considering that the investigation in the interest and against has led to the following findings:
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Furthermore, the detection of Mr. A as a PEP and his registration as such in BANK X's systems on 30 October 2013 did not immediately result in Mr. A being placed in an increased risk category. As stated above, the latter only occurred on 24 May 2014.
3. From the foregoing, it must be concluded that BANK X did not do enough following the entry into force of the legislative amendment of 18 January 2010 to introduce appropriate and suitable procedures in light of the risk to determine whether a client or his ultimate beneficiary is a politically prominent person. The latter is required, however, to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures depending on the risk sensitivity in situations that, by their nature, may contain a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, such as business relationships with PEPs. Credit institutions had a transitional period of one year after the entry into force of the legislative amendment of 18 January 2010, i.e., until 4 February 2011, to take “appropriate and suitable measures” in light of the risk to identify politically prominent persons among their clients existing on 5 February 2010 and to apply the specific measures referred to in Article 12, § 3, paragraph 6 of the Act of 11 January 1993. BANK X did not set up a concrete project to meet its obligations under this transitional regulation, but included the execution of its obligations in this regard in the execution of its vigilance obligation. This, however, did not result in BANK X identifying Mr. A as a PEP in its systems by 4 February 2011.
The fact that the obligation to determine whether a client belongs to one of the categories listed in Article 12, § 3, first paragraph, of the Act of 11 January 1993 entails an obligation of effort and not an obligation of result does not detract from this. BANK X did not meet this obligation of effort given the following elements:
Having regard to the statements of BANK X recorded during the investigation and which confirm the factual elements described; Considering that BANK X provided full cooperation in the course of the investigation and acknowledged the factual elements described above; Considering that an amicable settlement allows for a quick and definitive resolution of the procedure instituted against BANK X; Considering that the amount of the amicable settlement must be proportional to the nature of the facts; For these reasons, the Board of Directors of the NBB proposes to BANK X, as an amicable settlement within the meaning of Art. 36/10, § 3 of the Act of 22 February 1998, the payment of the sum of € 250,000;
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In accordance with Art. 36/10, § 3 of the Act of 22 February 1998, the amicable settlement is published in a non-nominative manner on the NBB website, and the amounts paid in the context of this amicable settlement are collected for the benefit of the Treasury by the General Administration of Collection and Recovery of the FPS Finance.
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“Having regard to Articles 36/9 and 36/10 of the Act of 22 February 1998 establishing the organic statute (hereinafter "the Act of 22 February 1998") of the National Bank of Belgium”
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