Decision on the Request to Suspend the Execution of CNPF Decision No. 39/3 Regarding the Thematic Control of OCN EASY CREDIT SRL

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
NATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET COMMISSION
77 Stefan cel Mare si Sfant Blvd., Chisinau, MD 2012, tel: (373 22) 859 401, www.cnpf.md, e-mail: office@cnpf.md DECISION 15 September 2026 No. 47/3 Regarding the request for suspension of the execution of Decision No. 39/3 of the National Financial Market Commission dated 10.08.2026 concerning the results of the thematic control carried out within OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL

On 07.09.2026, within the National Financial Market Commission (CNPF/supervisory authority), the Preliminary Request contesting CNPF Decision No. 39/3 dated 10.08.2026 was registered (No. 7984), submitted by OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL (participant/creditor), requesting:

"1. Admission of this preliminary request;
2. Annulment of CNPF Decision No. 39/3 of 10.08.2026 concerning the results of the thematic control carried out within OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL;
3. Ordering the suspension of the execution of CNPF Decision No. 39/3 of 10.08.2026 for the period of examination of this preliminary request." (Preliminary Request).

In this case, in order to ensure a full, objective, and transparent investigation that offers the real possibility of analyzing the participant's claim, the participant is informed that the examination of the factual and legal circumstances relevant to the case, in the preliminary order, is carried out by distinguished executors within the CNPF.

In fact, on 10.08.2026, the CNPF adopted Decision No. 39/3 concerning the results of the thematic control carried out within OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL (Decision No. 39/3/2026/Contested Decision/administrative act), which was communicated to the participant in accordance with the legislation and published on the official website of the CNPF.

Disagreeing with Decision No. 39/3/2026, the creditor submitted a Preliminary Request, requesting the annulment of the contested decision, as well as the suspension of its execution.

Regarding the request for suspension of the execution of the contested Decision, it should be noted that, in accordance with Art. 172 para. (1) and para. (3) of the Administrative Code, "(1) If an unfavorable individual administrative act is contested with a preliminary request, the public authority, ex officio or at the request of the affected person, may suspend its execution until the completion of the preliminary procedure. [...] (3) The suspension of the execution of an unfavorable individual administrative act is decided by the public authority competent to resolve the preliminary request. The decision on the suspension of execution is taken within 5 working days from the moment of registration, unless the law provides otherwise.".

Under the circumstances that the object of the Preliminary Request constitutes the annulment and suspension of a decision adopted by the CNPF, whose activity is regulated by Law No. 192/1998 on the National Financial Market Commission (Law No. 192/1998/framework law), the provisions of the framework law become applicable, which contain special norms regarding the grounds and conditions for the suspension of the execution of an individual administrative act of the CNPF.

Moreover, this approach is also justified by the legal norms contained in Art. 2 para. (2) of the Administrative Code and Art. 5 para. (3) of Law No. 100/2017 on normative acts, which explicitly determine that "Certain aspects concerning administrative activity regarding specific fields of activity may be regulated by special legislative norms derogating from the provisions of this Code only if such regulation is absolutely necessary and does not contradict the principles of this Code." and "[...] Special legal norms are exclusively applicable to certain categories of social relations or strictly determined subjects. In case of divergence between a general norm and a special norm, contained in normative acts of the same level, the special norm applies.".

In this sense, a priori, it should be noted that Art. 23 para. (1-2) of Law No. 192/1998, by way of exception, establishes that, "(1-2) By derogation from Art. 171 para. (4) of Administrative Code No. 116/2018, the submission of a request for suspension of the execution of an act of the National Commission does not automatically suspend the effects of the contested act until the resolution of the request for suspension.".

Subsequently, according to the imperative provisions of Art. 23 para. (3) of Law No. 192/1998, "(3) The suspension of the execution of the acts of the National Commission, other than those provided for in para. (1-1), may be ordered by the National Commission, at the request of the recipient of the individual administrative act or of a third party whose rights are affected by the individual administrative act, submitted within the preliminary procedure, or by the court only at the request of the plaintiff, submitted simultaneously with the filing of the action, and only in the case where the following conditions are cumulatively met: a) the reasons invoked by the plaintiff in support of the action are relevant and well-founded and there is a prima facie case against the legality of the contested act; b) the plaintiff presents arguments with a factual basis that the circumstances of the dispute require the urgent ordering of the suspension of the execution of the contested administrative act to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff's interests; c) the damage that could be caused to the plaintiff exceeds the public interest pursued by the issuance of the contested administrative act.".

In this sense, the CNPF notes that the suspension of the execution of the contested administrative act constitutes an exceptional measure, of a temporary and preventive nature, expressly provided for by law, which can be ordered only in situations where the conditions established in Art. 23 para. (3) of Law No. 192/1998 are cumulatively met.

In this context, it should be noted that, although Art. 23 para. (3) of Law No. 192/1998 uses the term "plaintiff" in the part setting out the conditions that must be met to order suspension, that norm explicitly establishes, in the introductory clause, the application of the norm also by the CNPF, at the request of the recipient of the individual administrative act, submitted within the preliminary procedure.

Therefore, in examining the request for suspension formulated by OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL, the CNPF must verify the cumulative fulfillment of the conditions provided in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. a) – c) of the framework law.

Having analyzed the arguments formulated by the participant in support of the request for suspension of the execution of the contested Decision, the supervisory authority finds that the cumulative conditions provided by Art. 23 para. (3) of Law No. 192/1998 are not met, for the following reasons:

1. With regard to the condition indicated in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. a) of Law No. 192/1998, according to which "a) the reasons invoked by the plaintiff in support of the action are relevant and well-founded and there is a prima facie case against the legality of the contested act", it should be noted that its examination at the stage of resolving the request for suspension does not require an exhaustive verification of the legality of the contested Decision.
   Thus, the existence of a prima facie case against legality should be assessed by reference to those factual and legal circumstances that, being clear and evident, are capable of generating serious and reasonable doubt about the legality of the act, without the need for an in-depth analysis of the substance of the legal relationship. This approach also results from the case law of the Centru Court of Appeal (Decision of the CAC dated 02.10.2025, case no. 2-25060846-02-3r-21072025), which held that, at the stage of examining the request for suspension, an evaluation on the merits of the arguments regarding the state of facts is not required, in situations where such an evaluation would presuppose a detailed assessment of the legality of the administrative act, especially when the legal relationship is complex and presupposes the correlated interpretation of several norms and the full clarification of the factual circumstances. At the same time, the court held that the administrative act enjoys the presumption of legality and produces immediate legal effects, and the existence of a prima facie case cannot be deduced from the mere statements of the applicant. Therefore, the fact that OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL formulated, in the Preliminary Request, a significant number of criticisms regarding the legality of Decision No. 39/3/2026 is not sufficient, by itself, to demonstrate the fulfillment of the condition provided in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. a) of Law No. 192/1998, as these must be subject to examination at the stage of the merits. Moreover, from the content of the Preliminary Request it results that the arguments invoked by the creditor essentially concern the method of determining the total cost of the loan, the manner of applying in time the provisions of Art. 15 and Art. 15¹ of Law No. 202/2013 on consumer credit contracts (Law No. 202/2013), the method and formula of calculation used by the CNPF, the legal qualification of notifications transmitted to consumers, the inclusion of certain contracts in the findings made, the effects of some final and irrevocable court decisions, as well as the assessment of certain data and documents presented during the control. These claims, by their nature, presuppose a detailed examination of the control materials and the individual legal relationships taken into account in the adoption of the contested Decision. Therefore, the circumstance that the aforementioned claims are susceptible of constituting the object of analysis during the resolution of the preliminary request does not mean that they demonstrate, at the stage of examining the suspension, the existence of obvious illegality or serious and reasonable doubt about the legality of the act.

With regard to the errors invoked concerning certain contracts, including the 13 contracts, about which it is claimed that they would have been affected by a double accounting of commissions and the 3 contracts, allegedly erroneously included in Annex No. 3, it should be noted that such claims, even if they are to be examined within the preliminary procedure, are not, by their nature, capable of automatically demonstrating the illegality in the entirety of the contested Decision. Any potential existence of a point discrepancy should be assessed in relation to its nature, impact on the findings, and relevance to the adopted solution, as this does not equate, by itself, to the existence of a prima facie case against the legality of the entire administrative act. Regarding the 129 contracts, regarding which the creditor invokes the existence of final and irrevocable court decisions, it should be noted that the existence of a court decision, pronounced in a civil dispute, does not lead, by itself, to the deprivation of effect of an administrative act, issued by the supervisory authority, as long as it has not been annulled or suspended under the conditions of the law. Under the circumstances exposed, it should be noted that the existence of divergences regarding the state of facts, the interpretation or application of legal norms, or the soundness of the administrative act does not equate to the existence of concrete and plausible appearances of illegality. To meet this condition, the reasons invoked by the participant must present, upon preliminary examination, a sufficient degree of relevance and soundness, such that they indicate, in a real manner, the improbability of the contested Decision. Moreover, aspects whose establishment requires the administration and assessment of evidence, verification of factual circumstances, or a legal analysis specific to the examination of the merits cannot be automatically valued as proof of a prima facie case. Otherwise, the legal condition regarding the existence of a prima facie case would lack autonomy and would be reduced to the simple existence of a challenge against the administrative act, whereas the legislator did not condition the suspension of execution on the simple fact of contesting the act, but on the existence of relevant and well-founded reasons that outline, already at the preliminary level, a real appearance of illegality. Therefore, the claim that the arguments formulated in the Preliminary Request demonstrate, by themselves, the existence of a prima facie case against the legality of Decision No. 39/3/2026 cannot be upheld. Consequently, the condition provided in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. a) of Law No. 192/1998 is not met.

2. With regard to the condition provided in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. b) of Law No. 192/1998, according to which "the plaintiff presents arguments with a factual basis that the circumstances of the dispute require the urgent ordering of the suspension of the execution of the contested administrative act to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff's interests", it is established the need to identify a serious and irreparable prejudice to prove the fulfillment of that condition.
   In this sense, it should be noted that demonstrating the existence of patrimonial or operational consequences, as a result of the execution of the administrative act, is not sufficient. The participant must demonstrate, concretely and verifiably, the serious, imminent, and irreparable nature of the prejudice, as well as the direct link between its occurrence and the execution of the administrative act.

The same interpretation results from the case law of the Centru Court of Appeal, mentioned above, according to which the invoked prejudice must be based on concrete, current, and verifiable circumstances, and the mere possibility of the occurrence of future consequences is not sufficient. Furthermore, the court emphasized the need to demonstrate the direct link between the execution of the act and the invoked prejudice, as well as the impossibility or real difficulty of repairing it. In this case, OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL invokes, first of all, the fact that the execution of the measures ordered by the contested Decision would generate, in its opinion, a financial impact of approximately 31.5 mil. MDL, assessed by the creditor as disproportionate prejudice. This argument is not sufficient to meet the condition provided in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. b) of the framework law. Thus, the alleged amount of patrimonial consequences is not equivalent, by itself, to the irreparable nature of the prejudice. To constitute grounds for suspension, the creditor had to demonstrate not only the value of the sums involved, but also that their execution causes an infringement that cannot be removed by subsequent legal or patrimonial means. Moreover, the request for suspension does not demonstrate that the performance of patrimonial actions in execution of the contested Decision would generate, with certainty, the impossibility of restoring the previous situation in the event that the contested Decision is subsequently annulled. Regarding the argument according to which the notifications transmitted to consumers would produce irreversible effects, it should be noted that the participant starts from the premise that, by transmitting the notifications, the creditor's renunciation of certain sums would become definitive, and, in the event of annulment of the contested Decision, the creditor would no longer be able to recover those sums. The alleged irreversibility of the measure cannot be deduced exclusively from this statement of the creditor, as, to demonstrate irreparable prejudice, it was necessary to present objective circumstances from which it would result that, regardless of the solution on the merits, the consequences of the execution could no longer be removed effectively. Moreover, the mere invocation of patrimonial consequences resulting from the execution of the contested Decision is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a serious and irreparable prejudice that would justify the exceptional measure of suspension. In this case, the contested Decision seeks to return the state of facts to the legal track, including in light of the consequences produced by the violation. Such a consequence, by itself, does not present an irreparable character, as it is susceptible to monetary evaluation and repair, in the hypothesis that, as a result of the examination of the merits, the administrative act is subsequently annulled or modified, whereas the serious and
irreparable nature of the prejudice is not presumed from the patrimonial nature of the obligation nor from its amount, but must result from concrete factual circumstances, proven by the participant. Furthermore, the suspension of execution cannot be based exclusively on the patrimonial interest of the participant, ignoring the nature and purpose of the measure ordered by the contested Decision, namely the restoration of the situation in conformity with the law and the protection of the interests of consumers affected by the violation of the law.

At the same time, the reputational risk invoked by the creditor is formulated in general terms. The participant claims that notifying consumers about the collection of undue sums could affect the relationship with them, with financiers, or with contractual partners.
In this sense, it should be noted that the mere invocation of possible reputational damage does not demonstrate the existence of certain, serious, and irreparable prejudice. To be upheld, this circumstance, the creditor had to present objective and quantifiable elements, which would allow establishing both the concrete nature of the prejudice, as well as its intensity and irreversibility. Nor can the argument regarding the lack of a mechanism for claiming the sums be retained as sufficient demonstration of irreparable prejudice. In the Preliminary Request, the creditor claims that neither Law No. 202/2013 nor the contested Decision provides a method by which the returned sums could be claimed later, as well as the fact that their recovery would require individual procedures directed against consumers. This circumstance, however, does not demonstrate that the prejudice is irreparable. The potential need to use certain legal procedures to enforce a patrimonial claim cannot be assimilated, by itself, to the impossibility of repairing the prejudice. In addition, the claim that potential individual actions could involve costs that are not economically justified represents a hypothetical assessment of future disputes and does not constitute a current and certain circumstance that would impose the urgent suspension of the administrative act. Consequently, the arguments presented by OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL describe, at most, patrimonial and operational consequences that could result from the execution of the administrative act, but do not demonstrate their serious and irreparable nature, within the meaning of Art. 23 para. (3) lit. b) of Law No. 192/1998. Therefore, the condition provided in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. b) of the framework law is not met.

3. With regard to the condition provided in Art. 23 para. (3) lit. c) of Law No. 192/1998, in accordance with which "the damage that could be caused to the plaintiff exceeds the public interest pursued by the issuance of the contested administrative act", it should be noted that this presupposes a comparative assessment of the private interest invoked by the participant and the public interest pursued by the adoption of the contested Decision. Therefore, it is not sufficient that the execution of Decision No. 39/3/2026 produces certain unfavorable consequences for the participant, but it is necessary that the prejudice thus produced be of such intensity that it prevails over the public interest, protected by this administrative act.
   In this case, the Centru Court of Appeal held, in the aforementioned decision, that the mere dissatisfaction of the recipient of the administrative act or the economic inconveniences inherent in its execution are not sufficient to demonstrate the exceeding of the public interest. To prevail over it, the negative consequences must be demonstrated by objective and quantifiable data, from which the certain and significant nature of these consequences results. In this case, OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL claims that the public interest pursued by the contested Decision would already have been achieved, as consumers would have been informed prior to the initiation of the control regarding the maximum sum that they will

The payment will not exceed the disbursed value. Consequently, according to the creditor, the suspension of execution would not expose consumers to any risk.

First of all, this argument cannot be upheld, because the public interest pursued through a supervisory act is not exhausted by merely informing consumers, and, where applicable, such information constitutes an element of the compliance process, but it is not equivalent to the full execution of measures ordered by the supervisory authority.

The contested Decision does not aim exclusively at transmitting information to consumers, but at ensuring the effective respect of the legal framework applicable to lending relationships and eliminating the consequences identified during the inspection.

Therefore, the fact that the creditor claims to have previously taken certain measures does not lead to the conclusion that the public interest pursued through the administrative act has become moot.

Secondly, the statement that the execution of the contested Decision could determine the return of sums to consumers who would not be entitled to receive them represents a premise dependent on the validity of the grounds of illegality invoked in the Preliminary Request. Moreover, at the stage of examining the suspension, the NFMC is not called upon to definitively establish whether the measures ordered by the contested Decision are correct for each contractual relationship.

Accepting the creditor's argument would presuppose anticipating the solution on the merits of the Preliminary Request, as it would require the prior determination that the measures ordered by the NFMC are wrong and that certain persons are not entitled to benefit from the results obtained following the execution of the contested Decision.

Such a conclusion would exceed the legal framework of the examination of the suspension request.

Thirdly, the public interest relevant for the application of Article 23(3)(c) of the framework law is not confused with the immediate interest of a specific consumer or creditor. This includes the general interest regarding the compliance of supervised entities with the regulatory framework, the effective execution of measures ordered by the supervisory authority, and the protection of consumers within lending relationships.

Moreover, admitting the suspension solely on the ground that the participant contests the validity of the compliance measures would substantially reduce the efficiency of the supervision mechanism, as any administrative act susceptible to producing financial consequences could be temporarily deprived of effect by simply invoking financial losses.

Furthermore, according to Article 23(4) of Law No. 192/1998, until proof to the contrary, the existence of the public interest for the immediate and uninterrupted execution of NFMC acts is presumed.

Therefore, the burden of demonstrating that the private interest invoked by the creditor prevails over the public interest lies with the participant.

In this case, the creditor did not present objective grounds demonstrating that the alleged damage, including that evaluated by them at approximately 31.5 million MDL, prevails over the public interest pursued through the execution of the contested Decision.

Simple reference to the financial amount claimed is not sufficient, as Article 23(3)(c) of the framework law does not establish a purely mathematical test, where private interest automatically prevails when the sum claimed as damage is significant. It is necessary to demonstrate the certain, serious, and disproportionate nature of the consequences and that these justify the temporary annulment of the public interest protected by the administrative act.

In this instance, such demonstration was not made; therefore, the condition provided for in Article 23(3)(c) of Law No. 192/1998 cannot be upheld.

From the above, it results that the arguments presented by OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL do not demonstrate the cumulative fulfillment of the conditions provided for in Article 23(3)(a)-(c) of Law No. 192/1998, which is an imperative requirement for the suspension measure to be ordered. The failure to meet even one of the conditions excludes the possibility of suspending the execution of the administrative act, and in this case, the fulfillment of none of the three conditions is demonstrated.

In this regard, the Centru Court of Appeal held that the existence of conditions for the suspension of execution is not presumed, the burden of proof lying with the person requesting the measure, and the mere exercise of the procedural right to request suspension, in the absence of objective evidence and convincing legal arguments regarding its necessity and urgency, is not sufficient to order such a measure.

Consequently, the request of OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL regarding the suspension of execution of Decision No. 39/3/2026 must be rejected as unfounded.

Based on the considerations set out above, pursuant to Article 18(3), Article 20(1), (6), Article 22(3), and Article 23(3) and (4) of Law No. 192/1998 on the National Financial Market Commission, the Administrative Code, and the Regulation on the organization and functioning of the National Financial Market Commission (NFMC Decision No. 57/11/2022),

The National Financial Market Commission DECIDES:

1. The request for suspension of execution of the Decision of the National Financial Market Commission No. 39/3 of 10.08.2026 regarding the results of the thematic inspection conducted within OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL, submitted by OCN "EASY CREDIT" SRL through the Preliminary Request, registered at the NFMC under No. 7984 on 07.09.2026, is rejected as unfounded.

2. This Decision may be contested with an administrative litigation action, submitted to the Chișinău Court, Râșcani section (MD-2068, Chișinău, Kiev 3 street), together with the individual administrative act adopted upon completion of the preliminary procedure.

3. This Decision enters into force on the date of adoption, is communicated to the recipient in accordance with legislation, and is published on the official website of the NFMC (www.cnpf.md).

Dumitru BUDIANSCHI,
PRESIDENT