2026-07-03 | MPD/DIR/INT/MPC/008/117Added · Updated
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) retained the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 26.5 percent, the Standing Facilities Corridor at +50/-450 basis points, and the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) at 45.00 percent for Deposit Money Banks, 16.00 percent for Merchant Banks, and 75.00 percent for non-TSA public sector deposits. These decisions, made during the 305th meeting on May 19-20, 2026, were based on a comprehensive risk assessment, acknowledging recent marginal inflation increases as transitory and externally driven by factors like the Middle East crisis. The MPC expressed confidence in the economy's resilience, citing strong external reserves and a successfully recapitalized banking system as key buffers supporting disinflation and macroeconomic stability.
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Date: Wednesday, 20th May 2026
Ref: CBN/MPC/COM/162/305
Attention: News Editors/Gentlemen of the Press MONETARY POLICY RATE RETAINED AT 26.5 PER CENT The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) held its 305th meeting on May 19 and 20, 2026. The Committee reviewed recent developments in the global and domestic economies and assessed the near-to-medium-term outlook. Eleven (11) members of the Committee were in attendance. Decisions of the MPC The Committee’s decisions are as follows:
Considerations
In reaching its decisions, the MPC particularly noted the spillovers from the Middle East crisis, which have exerted upward pressure on energy prices, cost of transportation and other logistics. However, available evidence indicates that the impact of the crisis on the Nigerian economy has been largely muted due to the benefits of prior policy reforms. These include exchange rate stability, improvements in external reserve buffers, strengthened monetary policy transmission, well-capitalised banking system, and ongoing fiscal consolidation, which have significantly bolstered the economy’s ability to absorb external shocks. As a result, the pass-through of global commodity and energy price shocks to domestic inflation has been significantly mitigated and would have been more pronounced in the absence of these reforms. The MPC was, therefore, convinced that the essential conditions for price stability remain firmly in place. In addition, the Committee welcomed the recent sovereign rating upgrade amid prevailing external headwinds. This further underscores the strength of the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals and reinforces confidence in its reform trajectory and policy credibility. Members were, therefore, of the view that a cautious and vigilant policy stance is necessary to anchor inflation expectations and safeguard macroeconomic stability. The MPC also noted with satisfaction, the successful conclusion of the banking recapitalisation exercise, which culminated in the emergence of 33 banks with stronger financial soundness indicators, enhancing their capacity to support the economy. It urged the Bank to remain proactive and adopt necessary measures to address potential post-recapitalisation risks towards preserving financial system stability. Price and Other Domestic Developments Headline inflation (year-on-year) rose marginally for the second consecutive month to 15.69 per cent in April 2026, from 15.38 per cent in the preceding month, largely driven by an increase in the food component. Food inflation rose to 16.06 per cent in April 2026 from 14.31 per cent in March, reflecting the high cost of transportation and other logistics, as well as seasonal factors. Core inflation, however, moderated to 15.86 per cent in April 2026, from 16.21 per cent in March. Similarly, the 12-month average inflation slowed to 19.16 per cent in April 2026, from 20.05 per cent in March, marking the sixth month of consecutive decline. Month‑on‑month, headline inflation also eased to
2.13 per cent in April 2026, compared with 4.18 per cent in March 2026,
reflecting moderation in both food and core components.
Real GDP grew by 4.07 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2025, compared with
3.98 per cent in the preceding quarter, supported by expansion in industry
and agriculture sectors. The non-oil sector grew by 3.99 per cent (year-onyear) in Q4 2025 from 3.91 per cent in the preceding quarter, driven by key activities in the Services sector including information & communication, and transportation & storage activities. Growth in the oil sector also increased to
6.79 per cent in Q4 2025 from 5.84 per cent in the previous quarter, on the
back of improved refining in the downstream sector.
Gross external reserves remained robust at US$49.49 billion as of 15th May 2026 compared with US$48.35 billion at end‑March 2026, sufficient to cover 9.04 months of imports for goods and services. This strong buffer continues to reinforce investor confidence in the Nigerian economy and support exchange rate stability. Global Developments Global growth is expected to moderate in 2026 compared with 2025, reflecting the impact of heightened geopolitical tensions, energy market disruptions, and tighter financial conditions. Global inflation is anticipated to edge higher in the near term, driven by elevated energy and agricultural commodity prices, as well as supply chain disruptions. In some advanced economies, persistent core inflation is moderating the pace of disinflation. Similarly, exchange rate pressures in several emerging market economies are expected to sustain elevated price levels in the near to medium term. Consequently, most central banks have embraced a cautious, data-driven approach, broadly pausing or slowing monetary easing, to address inflationary pressures. Outlook Output growth is expected to remain resilient in 2026, despite emerging downside risks associated with the Middle East conflict. Available projections indicate a moderate increase in inflation in the near term. However, the combined effects of previous policy tightening, exchange rate stability and enhanced food supply are expected to support the return to disinflation. In the light of evolving domestic and global uncertainties, the Committee reaffirmed its commitment to a forward-looking and evidence-based policy
framework, anchored on its primary mandate of achieving price stability, while preserving the soundness and resilience of the financial system. The next meeting of the Committee is scheduled for Monday, 20th and Tuesday, 21st July 2026. Thank you. Olayemi Cardoso Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria May 20, 2026.
PERSONAL STATEMENTS BY
THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
MPC MEETING MAY 19 – 20, 2026
On prices, Global headline inflation is expected to rise to 4.4 per cent in 2026 before declining to 3.7 per cent in 2027, marking upward revisions of 0.6 and
0.3 percentage points, respectively, driven largely by energy and commodity
price pressures from the conflict. Crude oil prices surged from approximately USD73 per barrel before the conflict to as high as USD120 in mid-March, driving up energy costs, transportation, and logistics globally. Crucially, the toll on more vulnerable economies, particularly commodityimporting emerging markets and developing economies with preexisting fragilities is much more pronounced. The downward revision to growth in EMDEs is 0.3 percentage point for 2026, while the forecast for advanced economies is broadly unchanged. The IMF cautions that downside risks dominate, with the possibility of an even larger and more persistent increase in energy prices that could cut global growth to only about 2 per cent in 2026 while pushing headline inflation just above 6 per cent by 2027. Downside risks dominate the outlook: geopolitical tensions could worsen further, trade-related disputes could flare up, elevated public debt constrains fiscal space, and an erosion of central bank independence could raise inflation expectations. The impact on commodity markets, inflation expectations, and financial conditions has been immediate and severe. Central banks across the globe have adopted a cautious, data-driven approach, pausing or slowing monetary easing to address inflationary pressures. The consensus is clear: preserve price stability, safeguard central bank independence, and be prepared to act decisively when warranted. The bottom line is this: the global backdrop is fragile and uneven, requiring credible, transparent, and coordinated policies. Central banks should remain vigilant and be prepared to act clearly and decisively in line with their mandates, guarding against prolonged supply shocks destabilising inflation expectations. However, if the conflict is short-lived and inflation expectations remain well-anchored, central banks can afford to look through negative supply shocks provided the monetary policy stance is already properly calibrated. Transparent communication and strong central bank independence are critical for credibility. Priorities include rebuilding fiscal buffers, preserving central bank independence, strengthening financial stability frameworks, and advancing structural reforms to lift potential growth and bolster resilience.
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK The domestic economy continued its steady expansion, with real GDP growing by 4.07 per cent year-on-year in Q4 2025, up from 3.98 per cent in Q3 and significantly higher than the 3.76 per cent recorded in Q4 2024, only the second time in a decade, excluding the post-pandemic rebound, that quarterly growth has surpassed four per cent. The services sector remained the dominant driver, accounting for 55.92 per cent of GDP and growing by
4.15 per cent, while agriculture expanded by 4.00 per cent, industrial grew by
3.88 per cent, and oil recorded stronger growth of 6.79 per cent on improved
refining. For the full-year of 2025, real GDP grew by 3.87 per cent, up from 3.38 per cent in 2024. On price developments, headline inflation rose marginally for the second consecutive month to 15.69 per cent in April 2026 from 15.38 per cent in March, driven largely by the food component (16.06 per cent), reflecting high transportation and logistics costs as well as seasonal factors. Core inflation moderated to 15.86 per cent in April from 16.21 per cent in March. Importantly, month-on-month headline inflation eased significantly to 2.13 per cent in April from 4.18 per cent in March, while 12-month average inflation slowed to 19.16 per cent, marking the sixth consecutive month of decline. The observed inflationary pressures are predominantly driven by exogenous spillovers from the Middle East crisis, manifested through elevated energy prices and the resulting increases in transportation and logistics costs Our external position remains a strong shock absorber for the economy. Gross external reserves stood at US$49.49 billion as of 15 May 2026, sufficient to cover about nine (9) months of imports for goods and services, reinforcing investor confidence and supporting exchange rate stability. On the financial system front, the banking recapitalisation programme concluded successfully on 31 March 2026, with 33 banks meeting revised minimum capital requirements, raising N4.65 trillion in fresh capital, 72.55 per cent sourced locally. Capital adequacy ratios now exceed international Basel benchmarks. Regarding the four banks that did not meet their capital requirements and remain subject to ongoing regulatory and judicial processes, these matters are being addressed through established frameworks and pose little to no systemic risk or contagion effect on the financial system. All four institutions continue to operate normally, processing transactions and serving customers without restriction.
RATIONALE FOR DECISION & POLICY IMPLICATIONS Growth is crawling across major economies. Countries are pulling in different directions. The Middle East conflict has thrown a fresh wrench into global trade and commodity markets. Domestically, disinflation progressed well, 11 consecutive months of decline until the war hit that trajectory like a speed bump. Oil and food prices are climbing again. This uptick is external, not a failure of domestic policy. The question, therefore, is what response is warranted. Tightening would be counterproductive. Cutting further would be premature. A hold decision is the appropriate middle path, steady, patient, and confident in the buffers we have built. Those buffers are substantial and strong shock absorbers for the economy. External stability strengthened on the back of a more orderly exchange rate and Gross reserves of US$49.49 billion provide nine months of import cover. The banking system raised N4.65 trillion in fresh capital through the recapitalization program. High-frequency indicators remain aligned with a steady policy stance, with real GDP expanding by 4.07 per cent in Q4 2025, supported by broad-based growth across the services, agriculture, and industrial sectors. On the real sector side, GDP growth reflects a more balanced sectoral mix consistent with diversification and value chain deepening. On macroprudential, the CRR should remain tight to anchor system liquidity. The asymmetric corridor should stay at +50/-450 basis points to discourage passive SDF placements and direct liquidity toward productive lending. The recapitalisation program is complete, but supervisory vigilance on asset quality must continue. On operations, active OMO will remain the tool for day-to-day liquidity smoothing. Transparent FX operations, supported by clear and consistent communication, will continue to anchor expectations. Here is the crux, holding the MPR while keeping reserve requirements tight keeps borrowing costs stable, supports jobs and growth, and fortifies our buffers against domestic and global shocks. CONCLUSION The latest figures confirm continued resilience in domestic output, firm external buffers, stable exchange conditions, and a well-capitalised banking system. Headline inflation has edged up for two consecutive months, but this
uptick is transitory and externally driven by the Middle East conflict. The underlying conditions for price stability remain firmly in place. All things considered, a hold decision at this meeting is the appropriate stance. It acknowledges that the current inflationary pressures are transitory and imported, thereby requiring no preemptive tightening. It allows previous policy adjustments to continue transmitting through the economy while safeguarding the disinflation credibility this Bank has worked tirelessly to build. Coupled with tight reserve requirements and a liquidity-steering asymmetric corridor, this stance anchors system liquidity, reinforces price and financial stability, and maintains policy space to respond to evolving domestic and external shocks.
Major central banks have responded to this environment with a cautious and data‑dependent posture. In April, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank all held policy rates steady despite higher inflation readings, while among key emerging markets policy responses have varied: the Central Bank of Egypt has kept its policy rate at
19.0 percent, the South African Reserve Bank raised its policy rate by 25 basis
points to 7.0 percent in response to rising inflation risks, and the Bank of Ghana cut its rate by 150 basis points to 14.0 percent on the back of a sustained decline in inflation and an improved macroeconomic outlook. Overall, global capital flows in this setting are likely to be shaped by differences in real returns across jurisdictions, the credibility of policy frameworks, and the strong and persistent demand for US dollar assets. Domestic developments Output Despite challenging external conditions, the domestic economy has continued to show resilience. Real GDP growth increased to 4.07 percent in Q4 2025 from 3.98 percent in Q3, driven primarily by non‑oil sectors, with services underpinning a 3.99 percent expansion in non‑oil GDP, while growth in the oil sector picked up to 6.79 percent from 5.84 percent, reflecting ongoing reforms. High‑frequency indicators point to some softening ahead. The composite Purchasing Managers’ Index declined to 49.4 in April, from 53.2, suggesting a prospective moderation in business activity as the effects of the Middle East conflict filter through, even though baseline projections from the CBN and IMF still foresee growth of 4.57 and 4.40 percent in 2026, supported by domestic reforms. Inflation Headline inflation edged up in April to 15.69 percent from 15.38 percent in March, reflecting the pass‑through of higher global energy prices. Looking through the volatility associated with the current shock, near‑term inflation pressures are still expected to be contained by improved domestic refining capacity and relative stability in the foreign exchange market, which are mitigating the transmission of external cost pressures, and by the recent ceasefire announcement, which has begun to ease global oil price pressures. Monetary and financial conditions Broad money supply contracted by 2.38 percent (year‑to‑date) in April, even as net domestic assets rose on account of higher net claims on government.
On one hand, this monetary contraction could support the disinflation process; on the other, it may also signal some reallocation of credit toward the public sector, underscoring the need for continued vigilance to ensure adequate and sustainable credit to the private sector. The completion of the banking sector recapitalization, resulting in 33 better‑capitalized institutions, has strengthened the system’s capacity to intermediate and to support the authorities’ ambition for a trillion‑dollar economy. Investor demand for sovereign instruments has remained strong, particularly at the shorter end of the long‑term curve, consistent with positive real returns and improving confidence, and this has been reinforced by S&P Global’s upgrade of Nigeria’s sovereign rating from B‑ to B and by the strong performance of the equity market, where the All‑Share Index rose by 20.36 percent to 242,277.81 in April from 201,287.78 in March and 155,613.03 at end‑2025. Fiscal position Fiscal revenues remain structurally weak, but the near‑term outlook has improved. Roughly half of the approved 2026 FGN budget of ₦68.32 trillion is expected to be financed from oil and non‑oil revenues, with the implementation of the 2025 tax reforms supporting non‑oil collections and higher‑than‑budgeted oil prices. Fitch Solutions estimates an additional ₦6.80 trillion in oil receipts at current price levels, providing some upside relative to the oil price benchmark of US$64.85 per barrel. Executive Order 9 (2026), requiring NNPCL to remit oil and gas proceeds directly to the Federation Account should also improve revenue performance, reduce borrowing needs, and strengthen fiscal sustainability over time. However, delays in publishing the 2025 budget outturns and weak fiscal transparency at subnational levels continue to complicate liquidity management, inflation control, and investment planning, and timely, comprehensive fiscal data remain essential for macroeconomic policy and for shaping expectations. External sector External accounts remain a source of strength. The balance of payments recorded a surplus of US$2.67 billion in Q4 2025, down from US$4.60 billion in Q3 but still indicative of an economy that is absorbing external shocks, while the International Investment Position shows a higher net liability of US$90.15 billion in Q4 compared with US$66.38 billion, highlighting Nigeria’s net debtor position.
Gross external reserves stood at US$48.20 billion as of May 5, 2026 equivalent to 8.8 months of import cover, well above the commonly cited 3-month adequacy benchmark while the foreign exchange market has remained more stable and transparent, accommodating pre-election-related demand pressures; the naira appreciated slightly to ₦1,380.70/US$ in April from ₦1,386.72/US$ in March, supported by continued capital inflows. Risks and outlook Uncertainty around the global outlook is elevated and primarily tied to geopolitical developments in the Middle East and their effects on energy markets and global risk sentiment. The ultimate impact on Nigeria will depend on the duration and intensity of the conflict as well as on domestic fundamentals and policy credibility; a prolonged shock or a breakdown of the ceasefire would likely weaken both global and domestic prospects more materially. The strengthening of the US dollar, the prospect of extended policy‑rate pauses in advanced economies and sustained high oil prices are increasing competition for global capital. In this environment, economies with stronger macroeconomic fundamentals, credible and predictable policy frameworks, and attractive risk‑adjusted returns are better positioned to maintain access to external financing on reasonable terms, and Nigeria’s recent progress on reserves, ratings, and market sentiment helps but will need to be preserved. Domestically, the macroeconomic environment remains broadly favorable but not without meaningful downside risks. Prolonged geopolitical tension and elevated energy prices could put renewed pressure on inflation and activity, while the divergence between softening business sentiment, as reflected in the PMI, and a strong equity market suggests the possibility that downside risks to growth are being underpriced in financial markets. As we approach the election period, political economy considerations are likely to exert a greater influence on expectations. In this setting, policy should remain proactive, evidence‑based, and cautious, and the Bank must be prepared to counteract potential inflationary and demand‑side pressures associated with pre‑election fiscal spending. Rationale for my vote At our February meeting, underlying disinflation remained on track, and we appeared to be moving steadily toward single‑digit inflation. The conflict in the Middle East represents a significant new shock to that outlook, with risks now tilted to the upside, particularly through energy prices, even though
there is considerable uncertainty around the magnitude and duration of the shock. Nigeria will face higher energy costs, but the key questions are how high and for how long. If the conflict were to be resolved relatively soon and energy prices declined materially, there would likely be scope, over time, for a less restrictive policy stance; conversely, a larger and more persistent shock could present a sharper trade‑off between returning inflation to target and limiting the loss of output and employment. Monetary policy cannot affect the level of global energy prices, and in that sense, it is appropriate to look through the direct effect of such price changes on headline inflation. However, with direct energy effects already feeding into inflation and with the PMI pointing to the potential for sizeable indirect impacts on demand and expectations, policy must guard against a de‑anchoring of inflation expectations while avoiding an over‑reaction to a shock that may ultimately prove temporary. My baseline assumption at this juncture is that the conflict will ease and that energy prices will moderate toward year end. Under that baseline, holding the policy rate and associated parameters steady for some time is, in my judgment, the best way to maintain a sufficiently restrictive stance while we gather more information; we will learn more as additional data comes in before our next meeting in July. For these reasons, I view maintaining the current policy settings as the appropriate response to the present uncertainty. This approach keeps policy restrictive, supports the ongoing disinflation process, and preserves our flexibility to respond promptly and decisively should the outlook for inflation or activity shift in a material way.
reserve accretion, which have contributed to relative exchange rate stability. However, vulnerabilities remain, particularly to external shocks and shifts in investor sentiment. One of the positive shifts in investor sentiment was that Dangote Refinery has rapidly become one of the world’s top aviation jet fuel exporters to Africa and Europe impliedly filling gaps left by disruptions in the Middle East crisis which recently reduced Russian supplies in the global aviation market. The banking system remains sound and stable, with aggregate capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, which stood above regulatory minimums, at
13.07 and 63.77 per cent, respectfully in April 2026, However, credit
intermediation remains suboptimal, with limited transmission to key productive sectors.
3.0 My Concern
My primary consideration at this meeting is the need to preserve the current disinflation trajectory while safeguarding the current macroeconomic stability. The skewed investment of banks in favour of government securities is crowding out intermediation to the real sector. The recent uptick in inflation underscores the persistence of underlying cost pressures, which may be exacerbated by global energy price shocks and domestic structural constraints. At the same time, excess liquidity conditions, driven largely by fiscal operations continue to pose risks to both price and exchange rate stability. Against this backdrop, further easing policy at this stage could undermine recent gains, while additional tightening may unnecessarily constrain growth and credit expansion. In view of the above, maintaining the current policy stance is both appropriate and necessary. Holding policy parameters constant allows the Committee to monitor recent gains in price and exchange rate stability; assess the evolving impact of external and domestic shocks; and avoid premature policy adjustments that could destabilize market expectations. This reflects a cautious, data-dependent approach consistent with prevailing uncertainties. The outlook for the Nigerian economy remains cautiously optimistic. Inflation is expected to moderate over the medium term, supported by improved exchange rate stability, easing base effects, and ongoing reforms. However, risks remain tilted to the upside, particularly from global geopolitical developments and energy price volatility, domestic supply-side constraints, especially in food production, and fiscal pressures linked to budget implementation and forthcoming general elections. Some specific infrastructure such as Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), which successfully took off in 2024 as one facility directly lowering inflation input should be given
more attention by the government. Observed CNG infrastructure gaps continue to pose a significant barrier to its broader adoption and use across Nigeria. Inadequate refuelling outlets, certified vehicle conversion centres, and very few compression hubs continue to impede market expansion and inflation impact of this important facility. Also, the government needs to further liberalize the electricity value-chain to attract new investment. Adoption of more renewable energy sources (Solar, wind) by encouraging local adoption and usage through friendly tariff structure so that the aggregate demand on national grid is positively managed. When more fiscal attention is given to agriculture, our national social safety nets would have been strengthened towards a positive impact on inflation. Addressing these risks will require sustained policy coordination, particularly in mitigating observed structural supply bottlenecks.
4.0 Conclusion
The Nigerian economy continues to show signs of stabilization, but the recovery remains vulnerable to both domestic and external shocks. In this context, I support the decision to hold all policy parameters constant in order to consolidate macroeconomic stability, preserve policy credibility, and allow time for clearer signals to emerge. Going forward, sustained vigilance and close coordination with fiscal authorities remain critical to anchoring inflation expectations and supporting durable economic recovery.
remains constructive. However, leading indicators are flashing caution: the composite PMI contracted in April 2026, with both industry and services declining owing to weakening demand and rising energy costs. Headline inflation ticked higher, driven by food prices, reflecting supply-side constraints including insecurity in producing areas and logistics bottlenecks, though core inflation eased on relative FX stability. Critically, month-on-month inflation momentum has softened, suggesting that prior tightening is transmitting. However, it is premature to read this as a durable trend, and the structural drivers of price pressure remain intact. Crude oil production continues to fall short of the 2026 budget benchmark, creating a persistent fiscal revenue gap. Monetary and financial conditions remain firm, though with pockets of stress warranting vigilance. System liquidity declined following sustained OMO sterilisation, consistent with the Bank's tight stance. Strong over-subscription in Treasury bills and long-term sovereign instruments reflects sustained investors’ appetite for yield and interest rate risk aversion, a signal that markets have priced in eventual rate reductions. The naira has strengthened modestly, external reserves remain adequate, and net foreign portfolio inflows were positive. These gains are directly contingent on maintaining a credible policy stance. Separately, rising utilisation of the Standing Lending Facility alongside declining Standing Deposit Facility placements warrants careful monitoring as a possible indicator of selective liquidity stress among individual institutions. The Committee must, therefore, remain alert, as any premature move in that direction could trigger significant market repricing. The balance of risks remains tilted to the upside. Domestically, disinflation could be interrupted by renewed food price shocks, energy cost passthrough, or pre-election liquidity pressures. Externally, capital flows remain sensitive to global yields and risk sentiment, and a premature easing signal could weaken FX market confidence and revive exchange-rate pass-through pressures. Fiscal pressures, particularly rising public debt and potential election-related expenditure, also represent upside risks to inflation that monetary policy must remain alert to. In summary, holding all policy levers at current settings is the most appropriate course at this juncture. Retaining the MPR, corridor, and CRR preserves policy credibility, anchors inflation expectations, protects the external sector, and supports the conditions necessary for a credible and orderly transition to an inflation targeting framework. The month-on-month disinflation signals are encouraging, but year-on-year inflation has risen, structural supply constraints persist, and the global environment offers limited room for accommodation. Going forward, I favour a firmly data-dependent
approach, with any future adjustment contingent on durable disinflation, sustained exchange-rate stability, and continued resilience in capital flows.
transitory. Rather, prolonged geopolitical instability could embed these price pressures more persistently. Any easing at this juncture risks sending the wrong signal about our commitment to price stability and could allow inflation expectations to become unanchored. External Sector Vulnerabilities More troubling is the deterioration in our external position. Gross external reserves declined to $49.49 billion as of May 15, 2026, from $50.45 billion in mid-February, a reduction of approximately $1 billion in three months. While the current level still provides robust import cover of 9.04 months, the directional trend is concerning, particularly given that we had just celebrated reaching a 13-year high. This decline reflects weaker net capital flows amid heightened global uncertainty. The Middle East crisis has triggered risk-off sentiment in global markets, reducing appetite for emerging market assets. Moreover, portfolio investors are reassessing positions as major central banks, particularly the US Federal Reserve, maintain restrictive monetary stances longer than previously anticipated, keeping alternative safe-haven yields attractive. The reserve drawdown, though manageable at present, limits our policy space. Strong reserves have been a critical pillar supporting exchange rate stability, which in turn has anchored inflation expectations and reduced imported inflation. Any sustained erosion of this buffer could undermine the very foundations of our recent macroeconomic gains. Geopolitical Risk Assessment The escalation of the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran represents the most significant near-term risk to our outlook. Beyond the direct impact on energy markets, which affects Nigeria both as an oil exporter benefiting from higher prices and as an economy vulnerable to elevated fuel and transportation costs, the broader implications are substantial. Potential disruption to global trade routes, particularly if the Strait of Hormuz becomes contested, would affect shipping costs and supply chains. Amplified risk aversion is already driving capital away from emerging markets toward safe havens. Increased volatility in currency and commodity markets complicates monetary policy transmission, while possible secondary sanctions or financial system disruptions could affect international payment flows. While Nigeria's prior policy reforms, including exchange rate flexibility, improved monetary policy transmission, and fiscal consolidation, have significantly enhanced our shock absorption capacity, we are not immune to
sustained global turbulence. The benefits of these reforms are evident in the relatively muted impact thus far, but continued vigilance is essential. Positive Developments Despite these headwinds, several positive developments warrant acknowledgment. Real GDP grew by 4.07 percent in Q4 2025, with the oil sector expanding by 6.79 percent supported by improved refining capacity in the downstream sector. The successful conclusion of the banking recapitalization exercise has produced 33 well-capitalized banks with enhanced capacity to support economic activity. The recent sovereign credit rating upgrade validates the strength of our reform trajectory and reinforces confidence in our policy credibility. These fundamentals provide confidence that Nigeria's economy is sufficiently resilient to weather current external shocks. The MPC's assessment that the macroeconomic environment remains robust enough to support a return to disinflation is well-founded, provided we maintain policy discipline. Outlook and Risks The near-term outlook is clouded by significant uncertainty. While I share the Committee's confidence that disinflation will resume once external shocks subside, the path and timing remain unclear. Much depends on the trajectory of the Middle East conflict, global central bank policy responses, and domestic factors including weather conditions affecting the upcoming harvest and the pace of Executive Order 9 implementation. Sustained elevation of energy prices could feed through to broader price pressures. Prolonged capital outflow pressures may test our exchange rate stability. Fiscal slippage ahead of elections could undermine macroeconomic discipline. Post-recapitalization banking sector adjustments require monitoring to preserve financial stability. Each of these risks requires close attention in the coming months. The decision to hold all policy parameters steady reflects prudent risk management amid genuine uncertainty. Retaining tight liquidity conditions, particularly through the asymmetric corridor and elevated CRR on non-TSA deposits, ensures that our overall policy stance remains sufficiently restrictive to anchor expectations while we assess whether the inflation uptick proves temporary or more persistent. Conclusion Our recent macroeconomic achievements provide a solid foundation, but they are not irreversible. The dramatic reduction in inflation, strengthened
external position, and banking sector resilience must be actively preserved through continued vigilance and policy discipline. As external headwinds intensify, maintaining a steady, credible policy stance anchored in our price stability mandate becomes even more critical. This approach balances support for economic recovery with unwavering commitment to safeguarding the macroeconomic stability that underpins sustainable development.
increases, it can anchor expectations, limit spillovers and prevent secondround pass-through into core inflation, wages, transport costs and broader price-setting behaviour. Second, weak monetary policy transmission remains a concern. The persistence of an inverted yield curve, together with the Overnight Policy Rate trading close to the floor of the standing facility corridor, suggests that excess liquidity continues to weaken the alignment between the policy rate, market rates and inflation expectations. Third, the policy stance must remain alert to fiscal-driven liquidity injections, particularly as election-related activity intensifies. Addressing these concerns requires tighter liquidity management through scaled-up open-market operations, appropriate use of the Standing Deposit Facility and firm enforcement of reserve requirements where necessary. Draining excess liquidity would help align short-term rates with the policy stance, strengthen transmission and reinforce the Bank’s anti-inflation posture. This should be complemented by orderly foreign exchange market management and stronger policy communication. Clear guidance on the policy reaction function would help contain exchange-rate pass-through, anchor inflation expectations, discourage speculative positioning and preserve investor confidence. Although headline inflation remains elevated at 15.69 per cent, recent month-on-month data suggest some moderation from previous highs. Accordingly, the most balanced policy option is to hold the MPR at 26.50 per cent while retaining a tight anti-inflation posture, intensifying liquidity sterilisation and strengthening coordination with fiscal authorities. This approach preserves credibility, supports price and exchange-rate stability, and allows the Bank to respond flexibly should inflationary or financial stability risks intensify. Inflation Trends and Dynamics Data published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), benchmarked to the 2024 base year, indicate that headline inflation remained elevated in April 2026, increasing to 15.69 per cent from 15.38 per cent in March and
15.06 per cent in February. The persistence of elevated inflationary pressure
was primarily attributable to sustained food-price dynamics, alongside intensifying core inflation and imported food inflation, which collectively reinforced broad-based price pressures within the inflation basket. Other key underlying components of headline inflation also have shown mixed outcomes, for example, food inflation increased to 15.06% from 14.31%, reflecting supply pressures and domestic production conditions. Core inflation, however, declined to 15.86% from 16.21%, demonstrating that monetary tightening is softening demand-side pressures and that the Bank’s policy stance at curbing underlying inflation is gaining traction.
Month-on-month, headline inflation decelerated 2.13% in April 2026 from 4.18% in March 2026, driven largely by food prices which contracted further to 3.63% from 4.17% over the same period. Similarly, core inflation decreased to 1.60% in April 2026 from 4.24% in March 2026. Real output growth was 4.07% in Q4 2025, up from 3.76% posted in Q3 suggesting improved output conditions strengthening economic fundamentals, particularly in non-oil sector growth. Exchange rate pressures have remained contained, with relative stability in the foreign exchange market indicative of improved market liquidity, reduced speculative positioning, and the presence of adequate external buffers. Sustaining sufficient foreign exchange market depth and liquidity will be critical to enhancing the market’s resilience and capacity to absorb potential external and domestic shocks. Outlook The near-term outlook for Nigeria’s economy for the rest of 2026 is one of cautious optimism, tempered by structural challenges and emerging risks. Economic activity is expected to expand moderately, supported by resilience in services, agriculture and industry, while inflation may moderate in the short term if exchange-rate stability, easing imported inflation and favourable base effects are sustained. The main risks to this outlook are persistent structural price pressures, excess liquidity that weakens policy transmission and election-related fiscal injections ahead of the 2027 elections. These risks require a careful balance between sustaining disinflation, preserving external stability and avoiding unnecessary constraints on the recovery. Overall, Nigeria’s financial system remains sound, supported by the recent recapitalization exercise and prudential ratios that are broadly within regulatory thresholds. This provides room for the Committee to maintain a cautious hold while relying on liquidity sterilisation, fiscal coordination and clear communication to sustain confidence and reinforce macroeconomic stability.
Domestic
Nigeria’s economy continued to improve with real GDP growing by 4.07 per cent in Q4 2025, up from 3.98 per cent in the preceding quarter, supported by expansion in the industry and agriculture sectors. The non-oil sector grew by 3.99 per cent (year-on-year) in Q4 2025, driven by key services activities including information & communication, and transportation & storage. Oil sector growth also improved, rising to 6.79 per cent in Q4 2025 from 5.84 per cent in Q3 2025, reflecting improved refining activities in the downstream sector. On prices, headline inflation (year-on-year) rose marginally for the second consecutive month to 15.69 per cent in April 2026, from 15.38 per cent in March 2026, largely driven by an increase in the food component. Food inflation rose to 16.06 per cent in April 2026 from 14.31 per cent in March, reflecting the high cost of transportation and logistics as well as seasonal factors. Core inflation, however, moderated to 15.86 per cent in April 2026, from 16.21 per cent in March, suggesting that underlying demand-side pressures remain contained. Importantly, the 12-month average inflation slowed to 19.16 per cent in April 2026 from 20.05 per cent in March, marking the sixth consecutive month of decline, underscoring that the broader disinflation trend remains intact. On a month-on-month basis, headline inflation also eased significantly to 2.13 per cent in April 2026, from 4.18 per cent in March. Nigeria’s external sector has maintained its robust performance. Gross external reserves stood at US$49.49 billion as of May 15, 2026, compared with US$48.35 billion at end-March 2026, sufficient to cover 9.04 months of imports for goods and services. This strong reserve buffer continues to reinforce investor confidence and support exchange rate stability. The recent sovereign credit rating upgrade, achieved despite prevailing external headwinds, further underscores the strength of Nigeria’s macroeconomic fundamentals and affirms the credibility of the ongoing reform programme. The successful conclusion of the banking sector recapitalisation exercise is another landmark achievement, resulting in the emergence of 33 banks with stronger financial soundness indicators. This significantly enhances the banking system’s capacity to support broader economic activity and absorb potential shocks. However, post-recapitalisation risks require continued proactive monitoring to preserve financial system stability. Notwithstanding these positive developments, the medium-term sustainability of macroeconomic gains requires complementary action on the structural and fiscal fronts. When rural farmers continue to grapple with high input costs and inadequate rural infrastructure, the durability of food inflation moderation remains fragile. Macroeconomic stability must be accompanied
by decisive fiscal action to unlock private sector-led growth, particularly for small and medium enterprises. MAJOR ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS Nature of the Inflationary Uptick The marginal rise in headline inflation over the past two months is largely attributable to external shocks, specifically, the spillover effects of the Middle East crisis on energy prices, transportation costs, and logistics. Available evidence indicates that the pass-through to domestic inflation has been significantly mitigated by prior policy reforms, including exchange rate stability, strengthened monetary policy transmission mechanism, and improved external reserve buffers. Core inflation has continued to moderate, affirming the continuous containment of the domestic demand-side pressures. The 12-month average inflation trajectory and the easing of monthon-month inflation further reinforce the view that this uptick is transitory and does not warrant a policy response that could prematurely tighten domestic financial conditions. Resilience of Nigeria’s External Position With gross external reserves of US$49.49 billion as of May 15, 2026, providing over nine months of import cover, Nigeria’s external buffers remain robust. The incremental improvement in reserves from US$48.35 billion at end-March underscores the durability of foreign exchange inflows. Exchange rate stability has been maintained, and the recent sovereign rating upgrade reinforces international confidence in Nigeria’s policy trajectory. These external sector strengths provide an important cushion against global shocks and reduce the risk of imported inflationary pressures being amplified. Growth Momentum and the Imperative of Productive Employment Nigeria’s GDP growth trajectory has been improving, with Q4 2025 growth of
4.07 per cent exceeding the prior quarter’s 3.98 per cent. Both the oil and
non-oil sectors are contributing to this expansion. However, the pace of growth remains insufficient to meet the Federal Government’s ambitious US$1.0 trillion economy target under the Renewed Hope Agenda, or to generate the productive employment needed to address youth unemployment at the scale required. Maintaining policy stability at this
juncture is critical to consolidating the growth momentum and providing the confidence needed for medium-term investment decisions. Banking Sector Strength and Transmission Readiness The completion of the banking sector recapitalisation exercise, culminating in 33 banks with enhanced financial soundness indicators, would significantly strengthen monetary policy transmission mechanism. The sector is wellpositioned to support productive credit extension as macroeconomic conditions evolve. This resilience also reduces the risk that any future policy adjustments would cause systemic instability, giving the Committee the space to be patient and deliberate. Global and Domestic Risks: Real but Manageable The prevailing global risks, including geopolitical tensions, energy price volatility, and the cautious stance of major central banks, are real and warrant vigilance. However, Nigeria’s improved macroeconomic buffers mean that these risks, while not trivial, are not sufficiently acute to justify a change in the policy stance at this meeting. Domestically, the primary risks remain fiscal slippage and election-cycle spending pressures, which are best managed through coordinated fiscal discipline rather than reactive monetary tightening. MY VOTE ❖ MPR: Retained at 26.5 per cent; ❖ Standing Facilities Corridor: Retained at +50/−450 basis points around the MPR; ❖ Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR): Retained at 45.00 per cent for Deposit Money Banks; 16.00 per cent for Merchant Banks; and 75.00 per cent for non-TSA public sector deposits; and POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Looking ahead, I recommend the following:
I. Credit Transmission and Lending Rate Pass-Through: The CBN should
closely monitor the extent to which banking sector improvements and the current policy stance are being transmitted into affordable lending rates for households and businesses. Structural impediments in the credit transmission mechanism, including high risk premiums and limited credit bureau penetration, require targeted macroprudential intervention.
II. Post-Recapitalisation Risk Management: Given the successful
completion of the banking sector recapitalisation exercise, the CBN should proactively identify and address emerging postrecapitalisation risks, including potential shifts in risk appetite, credit concentration, and governance challenges in newly merged or enlarged institutions, to preserve financial system stability.
III. Fiscal Coordination: Close coordination between monetary and
fiscal authorities remains essential. Increased fiscal releases associated with electoral cycles could generate demand-side inflationary pressures that undermine current price stability gains. The CBN should maintain active engagement with fiscal authorities to promote a responsible and counter-cyclical spending framework.
IV. Food Inflation and Agricultural Supply Chains: The drivers of food
inflation, including high transportation costs, insecurity in farming communities, and inadequate rural infrastructure, require urgent and coordinated intervention beyond the mandate of monetary policy. A deliberate policy framework to increase the supply of affordable inputs (fertilizer, seeds, and pesticides) and to improve rural road networks and security would materially reduce structural food price pressures and enhance the durability of overall disinflation.
V. Exchange Rate and External Sector Management: The CBN should
continue to manage exchange rate stability prudently, leveraging the current reserve buffer to absorb any short-term volatility arising from global energy market disruptions, while sustaining the policies that have attracted remittance inflows and export earnings.
is forecast to decline from 4.4% in 2025 to 3.9% in 2026, before recovering to 4.2% in 2027. Global inflation is projected to rise to 4.4% in 2026 (up from 4.1% in 2025) before receding to 3.7% in 2027. Inflation remains above target in many jurisdictions due to sticky services-sector prices, trade fragmentation, and energy supply shocks. In April 2026, advanced economy inflation accelerated to 3.8% in the United States, 3.3% in the United Kingdom, and 3.0% in the Euro Area. A similar upward trend was observed across most EMDEs, driven by supply chain disruptions and rising energy costs. EMDE inflation is projected to reach 5.8% by year-end 2026, compared to 5.2% in 2025. While nations like China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya maintained relatively low inflation, price growth remained in the double digits for Egypt and Nigeria. The Nigerian economy continues to exhibit resilience amid global energy market disruptions. Domestic growth has strengthened, surpassing Kenya's performance and converging with Ghana’s growth rate of 5.8%, driven by improvements across agriculture, industry, and services, alongside a relatively stable exchange rate. However, persistent structural deficits in infrastructure, high energy costs, and security concerns continue to cap expansion potential. Crucially, the full potential of oil revenue remains unrealized. Average crude oil production stands at approximately 1.49 million barrels per day (mbpd), falling significantly short of the 2026 budget benchmark of 1.84 mbpd. This production shortfall represents the widest gap among key fiscal assumptions, materially limiting the federal government's revenue-generating capacity. Nigeria's reliance on imported petroleum products amid elevated global oil prices has driven up domestic transportation and distribution costs. Consequently, year-on-year headline and food inflation rose to 15.69% and 16.06%, respectively, in April 2026. These cost-push pressures are fuelling upward wage demands, risking entrenched inflation expectations. Although broad money supply contracted by 1.44% in April 2026 relative to December 2025 reflecting the impact of earlier monetary tightening, domestic prices remain elevated due to persistent supply-side bottlenecks and imported shocks. The softening of effective demand is evident in the Nigerian Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which contracted significantly to 49.40 points in April 2026 from 55.7 points in January 2026, signalling a slowdown in the industry and services sectors as inflation erodes household purchasing power.
In contrast, banking system liquidity remained robust, with average daily liquidity increasing to ₦5.38 trillion in May 2026 from ₦4.72 trillion in April 2026. Interbank rates remained stable within the standing facilities corridor, indicating orderly money market conditions. Rationale for the Vote Since the last meeting in February 2026, the Nigerian economy has continued to demonstrate resilience and improved performance, with key economic indicators reflecting enhanced stability and increasing confidence among businesses and investors. Our sustained monetary policy reforms, coupled with improved oil revenues and continued expansion of the non-oil sectors, are expected to support positive economic growth and strengthen the economy's resilience. Headline inflation (year-on-year) increased slightly to 15.69 per cent in April
2026. Nevertheless, this outcome reflects the moderating impact of our earlier
monetary policy reforms, without which inflationary pressures could have been more pronounced. These reforms have helped to stabilize the exchange rate, improve liquidity conditions in the financial system, and bolster investor confidence in the country's macroeconomic fundamentals. Another notable achievement has been the enhanced stability of the foreign exchange market. Nigeria’s transparent and market-oriented exchange rate framework has fostered a more predictable and balanced foreign exchange environment. As of 15 May 2026, the naira traded at ₦1,371.04 per US dollar in the official market, representing an appreciation of more than ₦15 relative to the average exchange rate recorded in January 2026. This development reflects improved market confidence and the effectiveness of ongoing policy measures aimed at strengthening macroeconomic stability. As of 15 May 2026, external reserves stood at US$49.49 billion, compared with US$30.26 billion in January 2026, marking the highest level in eleven years and providing import cover of approximately 9.68 months of goods and services. Policy Implications and Outlook I have consistently maintained that inflationary pressures in Nigeria are predominantly structural, driven primarily by food price dynamics and exchange rate pass-through effects. Consequently, the Committee's previous decision to hold the policy stance was appropriate, effectively reinforcing exchange rate stability and anchoring inflation expectations. With the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 26.5% and headline inflation at 15.69%, Nigeria’s real policy rate stands at approximately 10.81%. This real rate is comparable to Ghana’s real rate of roughly 11.3% (derived from a
14.0% policy rate and 3.7% inflation) and significantly higher than those observed in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Domestic monetary conditions therefore remain firmly restrictive, with Nigeria maintaining the highest nominal policy rate among its regional peers. The outlook for the Nigerian economy remains cautiously optimistic. Over the medium term, economic growth is expected to be supported by elevated crude oil prices, enhanced fiscal revenues, relative exchange rate stability, and resilient non-oil sector activity. Nevertheless, significant headwinds persist. The domestic trajectory remains vulnerable to inflationary pressures, global geopolitical friction, exchange rate risks, fiscal vulnerabilities, and deep-seated structural constraints. To mitigate these risks, sustained and deliberate policy coordination across monetary, fiscal, and structural reform areas is imperative. Such alignment will be essential to fortify macroeconomic stability, bolster investor confidence, foster inclusive growth, and insulate the economy against external shocks. Conclusion Our policy priorities must remain focused on the attainment of long-term price stability. This requires targeted interventions to increase domestic energy production, improve crude oil output, strengthen non-oil revenue mobilization, and enhance critical infrastructure development. Furthermore, we must sustain structural reforms that catalyze private sector investment and drive productivity growth. Externally, maintaining robust foreign exchange buffers and reinforcing investor confidence remain imperative to safeguarding external sector stability. In conclusion, I fully support the Committee’s consensus at this meeting. The decision to hold the current policy parameters is highly appropriate given the prevailing macroeconomic outlook. The overall monetary policy stance remains sufficiently restrictive to safeguard macroeconomic stability, absorb ongoing structural shocks, and firmly anchor medium-term inflation expectations. Accordingly, I vote to:
Keep the Monetary Policy Rate unchanged at 26.5 percent Retain the Standing Facility Corridor around the MPR at +50/-450 basis points Maintain the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) for commercial banks at 45 percent, and merchant banks at 16 percent Keep the Liquidity Ratio at 30.00 percent.
PHILIP IKEAZOR – 305th MPC Meeting Statement Most central banks view the current inflation episode, linked to ongoing geopolitical tensions, as predominantly supply‑driven. In my view, this warrants caution in adjusting policy rates, as the current policy response has yet to fully crystallise. To maintain policy focus, ensure underlying inflation pressures remain durably contained, and avoid weakening the anchoring of domestic inflation expectations, I therefore voted to retain:
(1) The MPR at 26.50 per cent.
(2) The Standing Facility corridor around the MPR at +50/-450 basis points. (3) The CRR for Commercial Banks at 45.0 per cent. (4) The CRR for Merchant Banks at 16.0 per cent. (5) The CRR for non-TSA public sector at 75.0 per cent. Global and Domestic Developments Geopolitical tensions continue to dampen global and domestic growth, with the 2027 outlook remaining weak unless coordinated international action helps ease their impact. Energy‑supply disruptions and higher oil prices slowed global activity in early 2026, leading major institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and OECD, to cut their 2026–2027 growth forecasts to an average of 2.83 per cent. Net‑importing and vulnerable developing economies are expected to face the greatest strain, alongside declining remittances in countries reliant on workers in crisis‑affected regions. Global growth is projected to reach 2.9 per cent in 2026 and 3.0 per cent in 2027, assuming energy markets stabilise from mid‑2026. However, the IMF projection shows that if disruptions persist, growth could decline to 2.0 per cent in 2026, with inflation rising to 6.0 per cent. Domestically, the economy remains resilient, with growth rising to 4.07 per cent in Q4‑2025 and a positive 2026 outlook averaging 4.55 per cent,
according to the CBN, Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning (MBEP), and IMF projections. This performance is supported by higher oil prices, improved oil production, strong non‑oil sector activity, better FX market conditions, and ongoing reforms. Inflation rose for the second consecutive month to 15.69 per cent in April, up from 15.38 per cent in March (year‑on‑year), driven largely by food inflation. However, on a month‑on‑month basis, inflation declined by 2.05 percentage points, reflecting reductions in both core and food inflation, most notably a 3.0‑percentage‑point drop in core inflation, while inflation remains largely a rural phenomenon. The Federal Government’s fiscal space improved significantly in January 2026, with revenue rising by 48.09 per cent year‑on‑year, driven largely by a
59.49 per cent increase in independent revenue. At the same time,
expenditure declined by 0.81 per cent compared with January 2025, resulting in a 14.95 per cent year‑on‑year reduction in the fiscal deficit. Overall, the global and domestic outlook remains mixed and uncertain, with outcomes dependent on global supply‑shock dynamics and the effectiveness of domestic policy adjustments in mitigating geopolitical and geoeconomic risks. My Considerations Inflationary pressures persisted in Q1 2026, with year‑on‑year inflation averaging 15.2 per cent, though this is 2.0 and 11.9 percentage points lower than the averages recorded in the last and third quarters of 2025. The moderation reflects declines in food inflation and a notable easing in imported inflation, supported by greater stability in the foreign exchange market. Imported food inflation fell sharply to 7.10 per cent in Q1 2026 from
28.86 per cent a year earlier. Rural imported inflation averaged 9.33 per cent,
3.39 percentage points higher than in urban areas, likely due to last‑mile
logistics costs associated with long‑distance transport and extended supply chains. These dynamics, shaped by both supply and demand factors, warrant caution in adjusting interest rates. While easing could support domestic activity, inflation has not moderated sufficiently. Given the trade‑off between inflation and output, and with some forecasts indicating that real output is not fully constrained by the current stance, I have chosen to prioritise price stability at this time. Broad money declined by 2.38 per cent, but this masks important underlying pressures. Currency in Circulation (CIC) increased slightly to ₦5.75 trillion, a development that requires vigilance ahead of the election cycle due to potential liquidity injections. Net Domestic Assets rose by 5.07 per cent, driven by higher net claims on government, signalling possible fiscal pressures that may affect liquidity and inflation. Meanwhile, Net Foreign Assets fell sharply
by 25.53 per cent, reflecting reduced foreign asset holdings and creating a potential policy dilemma between supporting the currency and stimulating domestic activity. Although the naira has appreciated across market segments, foreign‑exchange outflows continue to outpace inflows. Given these mixed signals and the uncertainty surrounding monetary transmission, maintaining the current policy rate best supports financial and macroeconomic stability while we lookout for clearer trends to emerge. The introduction of the Nigeria Overnight Financing Rate (NOFR) as the new operational target marks important progress toward a more modern and effective monetary policy framework. However, adjusting policy rates before the NOFR fully stabilises in the money market could create distortions and weaken transmission. In my view, allowing the new framework time to settle will help preserve policy credibility and ensure that monetary policy operates with maximum effectiveness. To conclude, recent developments have underscored how geopolitical tensions, sanctions, and trade disruptions increasingly shape domestic macroeconomic outcomes. These forces are no longer isolated shocks but structural features of the global economy, requiring us, like many central banks, to align our policy stance with evolving geoeconomic realities. This includes positioning rates to manage external shocks, safeguard against second‑round inflation effects, and take advantage of potential capital inflows from crisis regions, while maintaining overall macroeconomic stability. In this context, maintaining the policy rate aligns with the global trend of holding rates while geopolitical tensions continue to unfold. A steady stance allows us to better assess geoeconomic spillovers and sustain a positive interest‑rate environment that attracts capital, supports output growth, ensures adequate FX liquidity, and strengthens the balance of payments. While I remain committed to balancing price stability with real sector performance, the MPC must continue to monitor how evolving geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics feed into our transmission channels, while supporting fiscal authorities in managing the broader macro‑fiscal implications.
For the fiscal sector, of much concern is the rise in borrowing costs, due to higher interest rates, constituting a key fiscal risk. It significantly increases the cost of domestic debt servicing, constraining fiscal space and potentially crowding out priority spending. A hold will therefore moderate fiscal pressure, promote debt sustainability and growth. As such, as the government's ongoing reforms complement monetary policy, I believe that maintaining the current stance allows time to assess the transmission of prior rate hikes, especially as fiscal consolidation measures begin to take effect. In summary, my voting decision is guided by prevailing global and domestic economic conditions and the identified risks to the macroeconomic outlook. Clearly, they necessitate a measured balance that will preserve the purchasing power of the naira while containing fiscal and external-sector vulnerabilities that may arise. The global, domestic and economic outlook contexts of my voting decision are further highlighted as follows:
3. Global Context:
The current global economic environment presents new layers of external shocks affecting both advanced and emerging market economies. These shocks are not only reshaping outlooks but also necessitating a significant shift in economic policy priorities. The uncertainty surrounding the US trade policy continues to weigh on cross‑border investment and productivity, inhibiting medium‑term growth prospects. More importantly, the US-Iran conflict in the Middle East, which has become a dominant global issue since the last MPC meeting, has introduced downside risks to global economic stability. The conflict has disrupted energy supply chains, necessitating downward revisions to growth and inflation forecasts. Global growth is now projected at
3.1 per cent in 2026, from a pre‑crisis projection of 3.5 per cent and from 3.4
per cent in 2025 (IMF WEO, April 2026).
Global inflation is also projected at 4.4 per cent in 2026, from the pre-US-Iran crisis projection of 3.8 per cent and from 4.1 per cent in 2025. The geopolitical conflict has driven up energy and food prices, re‑igniting global price pressures. Oil prices, at currently above US$100 per barrel, also reflect the impact of the ongoing supply shock. The feedback loop from the rise in global energy prices is manifesting as a slowdown in disinflation momentum in several economies, and expectations of a higher trend in the monetary policy rate path. The highlighted global developments have direct and indirect consequences for oil-dependent economies like Nigeria, particularly through imported inflation and tightening global financial conditions.
4. Domestic Context:
The domestic economy has been resilient, supported by recent improvements in Nigeria’s macroeconomic fundamentals. Real GDP grew by
4.07 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2025, compared with 3.98 per cent in
the preceding quarter. Fourth-quarter growth was led by the industry and agriculture sectors. However, the year-on-year headline inflation has risen for two consecutive months since the geopolitical tensions, reaching 15.69 per cent in April 2026 from 15.38 per cent in March 2026. In the external sector, the naira-to-US dollar exchange rate has remained largely stable despite the recent rally in the dollar. Stronger investor confidence has limited volatility in capital outflows. Gross External Reserves (GER) maintained an upward trend from December 2025 through March 2026 but recorded a marginal decline in April 2026. GER stood at US$49.49 billion as of May 15, 2026 (CBN, May 2026) and continues to provide adequate and sustainable import cover for goods and services. The operations of the local oil refineries, such as Dangote, and the foreign exchange market stability have softened the impact of the geopolitical tensions on the exchange rate and external reserves. It is cheering to note that the growth in the monetary base in April 2026 has a limited impact on short-term inflation, as it was largely driven by reserve holdings. Finally, the Nigerian financial market has also been resilient and well-positioned to support the government in raising domestic capital. The recent bank recapitalisation exercise will further improve market stability.
5. Economic Outlook Context
The Middle East conflict remains a major risk to the inflation outlook, though the risk is minimal given the positive impact of the macroeconomic reforms. A re-escalation may, however, continue to spill into transport and food costs. In my opinion, the current exchange rate stability is expected to mute secondround effects. The Dangote refinery also has a net positive effect on the Nigerian economy and will continue to help mitigate current price pressures. The fiscal authority is not oblivious to the need to maintain a fiscal and monetary policy mix that supports macroeconomic stability. In this regard, the government will continue to mobilise revenue to improve fiscal space, while deploying technology to block leakages. The tax reform is already yielding results, with tax revenue currently constituting a major source (well above oil contribution) to the FAAC allocation. This, in my opinion, will support the preservation of real-sector recovery, while anchoring expectations and maintaining credible policy frameworks. Lastly, as the Committee stands ready to adjust the policy parameters, the fiscal sector will continue to extend requisite support to ensure harmonised fiscal data are available for effective data-driven decisions.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, the above highlighted global and domestic factors collectively underpin my voting decision. I believe maintaining the policy parameters, status quo, aligns with the prevailing global monetary policy trends. Moreover, the current domestic conditions, despite being supported by relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals, warrant a cautious approach to ensuring a return to a sustained disinflation path without undermining economic growth. Accordingly, and in line with the objectives of the Monetary Policy Committee and the statutory mandate of the Central Bank of Nigeria, I reaffirm my decision to keep all policy parameters unchanged.
10. OLAYEMI CARDOSO
Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and Chairman, Monetary Policy Committee The three months since the last Monetary Policy Committee meeting in February 2026 have been eventful in ways that neither markets nor policymakers had fully anticipated. We eased policy in February against a backdrop of sustained disinflation, exchange rate stability, and strong external reserves. Those foundations remain intact. However, the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East in March introduced a significant external shock that has interrupted the disinflation trend and clouded the near-term outlook, warranting a deliberate and carefully calibrated policy response. The appropriate approach is not to react reflexively, but to properly characterise the shock for what it is, a transitory supply-side disruption, while remaining vigilant to any signs of second-round effects in core prices. The critical task before this Committee, therefore, is to determine what has genuinely changed and which elements are likely to be temporary or more persistent. The question we must continually ask is what second-round effects may emerge and what the appropriate policy response would be. The answer depends heavily on the duration and severity of the Middle East crisis, a situation that is too early to assess with confidence. What we can say, based on the evidence before us today, is that the impact on Nigeria thus far has been contained and appears transitory rather than structural. That said, the inflation data released ahead of this meeting suggests an interruption in the trajectory. Headline inflation ticked up to 15.69 per cent year-on-year in April 2026, from 15.38 per cent in March, with food inflation
rising to 16.06 per cent, reflecting elevated energy, transport and farm input costs. Encouragingly, month-on-month headline inflation moderated to 2.13 per cent from 4.18 per cent. Core inflation eased to 15.86 per cent from 16.21 per cent, helped by a moderation in services price pressures. The picture is therefore mixed: the annual headline figure ticked up, but the broader trend measures continue to moderate: a sign that second-round effects remain muted. The global environment remains fragile, and risks to the outlook are unambiguously tilted to the downside. Oil prices have risen above US$100 per barrel and are likely to remain elevated for some time, given the damage done to production infrastructure and the considerable time required to restore it. Global growth has weakened modestly, with projections revised down to 3.1 per cent in 2026 from a pre-conflict pace of 3.4 per cent. In response, major central banks have held rates constant, while peer emerging market central banks have taken a similarly cautious, data-dependent approach. The emerging consensus among central bankers has been to look through the first-round effects of the supply shock, provided inflation expectations remain anchored. We find ourselves in a similar analytical position. Domestically, several pressure points deserve this Committee's continued attention. Rising fuel prices are already pushing up production, transportation, and logistics costs, with the risk of a second-round passthrough to broader prices and a de-anchoring of inflation expectations if this is not carefully managed. We must also handle the fiscal-liquidity channel with care: oil prices above the budget benchmark will generate a revenue windfall and larger FAAC allocations, while pre-election spending at the subnational level could add further liquidity. We have to actively sterilise these injections, otherwise they risk amplifying the very pressures we are working to contain. The external sector continues to anchor stability. The naira has traded within a tight band and appreciated by double digits year-on-year against the dollar, while reserves remain robust at US$49.54 billion as of 14 May 2026, over nine months of import cover. The composite Purchasing Managers' Index averaged 53.0 points over February to April, firmly in expansionary territory, a sign the February easing supported the real economy without stoking excess demand. Having weighed these developments, I am of the view that a hold across all policy parameters is the appropriate decision at this meeting. The shock driving the inflation reversal is supply-side in nature, not the result of loose monetary conditions or an unanchored exchange rate. To raise the policy rate at this point would be to apply the wrong instrument to the wrong diagnosis, while easing on the other hand would be premature and carry a credibility cost.
I want to be explicit, however, that a hold is not a passive decision, and it should not be read as complacency. It reflects our data-driven, orthodox monetary policy approach, which calls for looking through transitory supply shocks precisely to avoid over-tightening into a temporary disruption and unnecessarily harming growth. Finally, equally important as today's decision is the forward guidance we provide about the path ahead. Our policy decisions remain anchored in a clear analytical framework, which we are committed to applying consistently and communicating transparently. Future policy actions will be determined by the data and the balance of risks as they evolve. In assessing those risks, we will look in particular for a sustained return of core month-on-month inflation to a clear disinflationary trajectory, alongside evidence that the pass-through from the oil shock has largely run its course, with no second-round pressures taking hold. We are not there yet. The data for May and June will therefore be critical. Any signs of broadening price pressures or a de-anchoring of inflation expectations will be met with a firm and decisive response by the Committee. Accordingly, I vote as follows:
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