Amendment to the Regulations for Financial Institutions and Businesses or Personnel Providing Virtual Asset Services to Prevent Fraudulent Criminal Harm - General Explanation

The Financial Supervisory Commission, pursuant to Articles 8 through 11 of the Fraudulent Criminal Harm Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as "this Act"), established the "Regulations for Financial Institutions and Businesses or Personnel Providing Virtual Asset Services to Prevent Fraudulent Criminal Harm" (hereinafter referred to as "these Regulations"), which were promulgated and implemented on November 29, 2024.

Partial articles of this Act were amended and promulgated on January 21, 2026. The amended Articles 8 through 11 involve provisions for financial institutions and businesses or personnel providing virtual asset services (hereinafter referred to as "virtual asset service providers") to establish cross-industry consultations, cross-institutional anti-fraud platforms, cross-industry joint defense reporting, and fund return mechanisms. To implement the intent of the legal amendments, these Regulations are hereby amended to perfect the relevant legal framework and facilitate compliance by industry participants. The current regulations consist of 70 articles; this amendment revises 52 articles and adds 3 new articles, with key points as follows:

Amended the definition of virtual asset accounts and added definitions for the anti-fraud platform and its participating institutions. (Revised Article 2)
Appropriately expanded the criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, virtual asset accounts, or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes to enable early warning for suspicious accounts or transactions. (Revised Articles 3, 6, 9, and 12)
Added the scope of consultations available to each industry and the objects of cross-industry consultations, as well as the consultation items that consulting parties must provide when receiving consultations. (Revised Articles 5, 8, 11, and 14)
Added handling measures to be taken by deposit business institutions and virtual asset service providers when a warning virtual account is a virtual account under a trust deposit account of a virtual asset service provider entrusted by a deposit business institution. (Revised Article 16)
Clarified the entities to which account holders, users, cardholders, or clients may consult if they have objections regarding control measures notified by judicial police organs for deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, and virtual asset accounts. (Revised Articles 17, 20, 23, and 26)
In accordance with cross-industry consultations available to each industry, revised the scope of consultation data and records to be preserved, extending beyond same-industry consultations. (Revised Articles 15, 18, 21, and 24)
Added matters to be followed in cross-industry joint defense mechanisms among deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, and virtual asset service providers. (Revised Articles 27, 28, 30, 33 through 35, 37, 40, 45, 46, 48, and 51)
Revised the organs authorized to notify the return of remaining funds or virtual assets, extending beyond the organ that originally reported the warning account (number); other judicial police organs may also do so. (Revised Articles 52, 54 through 56, 58 through 60, 62 through 64, 66, and 67)
Revised the documents required for victims to apply for the return of remaining funds or virtual assets, expanding the "Case Acceptance/Handling Certificate" issued by police to the "Case Acceptance/Handling Certificate or documents" issued by judicial police organs. (Revised Articles 53, 57, 61, and 65)
To protect the rights and interests of victims of fraudulent crimes and comply with practical operations for returning remaining virtual assets, added provisions allowing virtual asset service providers to sell remaining virtual assets in warning virtual asset accounts and then return the proceeds. (Revised Article 64)
Added provisions for virtual asset service providers to notify victims through relevant remittance/transfer institutions and to establish cooperation among relevant institutions to provide necessary information for the return process, facilitating the confirmation of victims and amounts for return. (Revised Article 65)
Revised the regulation requiring personnel handling remaining funds or virtual assets in warning accounts (numbers) to be dedicated, to avoid ambiguity regarding full-time personnel. (Revised Article 68)
Clarified that deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers determine whether cases involve suspected transaction disputes or complex situations, in line with practical operations. (Revised Article 69)
Regarding the establishment of the anti-fraud platform and related cooperation, added provisions on documents required for the establishing institution to apply to the Financial Supervisory Commission for approval, operations available to platform participating institutions, and the scope of collection, processing, and utilization of client information by platform establishing and participating institutions. (Revised Articles 70 through 72)

Comparison Table of Revised Articles of the Regulations for Financial Institutions and Businesses or Personnel Providing Virtual Asset Services to Prevent Fraudulent Criminal Harm

Revised Articles	Current Articles	Explanation
Chapter 1 General Provisions	Chapter 1 General Provisions	Chapter title unchanged.
Article 1 These Regulations are formulated pursuant to Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 5 of Article 8, Paragraph 3 of Article 9, Paragraph 3 of Article 10, and Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Fraudulent Criminal Harm Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as "this Act").	Article 1 These Regulations are formulated pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Article 8, Paragraph 3 of Article 9, Paragraph 3 of Article 10, and Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Fraudulent Criminal Harm Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as "this Act").	Partial articles of this Act were amended and promulgated on January 21, 2026, adding the authorization provision of Paragraph 5 of Article 8. Therefore, the authorization basis for these Regulations is revised.
Article 2 Definitions used in these Regulations are as follows:

Deposit Account: Refers to check, demand, and time deposit accounts established at financial institutions specified in Paragraph 1, Items 1 and 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.
Electronic Payment Account: Refers to electronic payment accounts as defined in Item 4 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.
Credit Card: Refers to credit cards as defined in Item 1 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.
Credit Card Statement Number: Refers to the account number assigned by the issuing institution to cardholders for paying credit card charges.
Virtual Account: Refers to the virtual payment account assigned by deposit business institutions to payers or designated transactions, allowing payers or transactors to deposit funds into corresponding physical deposit accounts via the virtual payment account.
Virtual Asset Account: Refers to the account provided by businesses or personnel providing virtual asset services (hereinafter referred to as "virtual asset service providers") to clients for providing virtual asset services.
Warning Deposit Account: Refers to a deposit account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to deposit business institutions.
Warning Electronic Payment Account: Refers to an electronic payment account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to electronic payment institutions.
Warning Virtual Account: Refers to a virtual account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to deposit business institutions.
Warning Credit Card Statement Number: Refers to a credit card statement number listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to issuing institutions.
Warning Virtual Asset Account: Refers to a virtual asset account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to virtual asset service providers.
Deposit Business Institution: Refers to financial institutions specified in Paragraph 1, Items 1 and 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.
Electronic Payment Institution: Refers to electronic payment institutions specified in Item 1 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.
Credit Card Business Institution: Refers to credit card business institutions specified in Item 7 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.
Issuing Institution: Refers to issuing institutions specified in Item 9 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.
Anti-Fraud Platform: Refers to the system platform approved by the Financial Supervisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as "FSC") established by financial information service businesses operating financial institution fund transfer clearing or service businesses operating financial institution credit data processing and exchange, pursuant to Article 47-3 of the Bank Act, to assist financial institutions or virtual asset service providers under this Act in same-industry or cross-industry cooperation, collecting, processing, and utilizing client information within necessary scopes, and using technology to analyze and identify suspicious abnormal deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, or virtual asset accounts.
Anti-Fraud Platform Participating Institution: Refers to financial institutions or virtual asset service providers participating in the anti-fraud platform. | Article 2 Definitions used in these Regulations are as follows:
Deposit Account: Refers to check, demand, and time deposit accounts established at financial institutions specified in Paragraph 1, Items 1 and 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.
Electronic Payment Account: Refers to electronic payment accounts as defined in Item 4 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.
Credit Card: Refers to credit cards as defined in Item 1 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.
Credit Card Statement Number: Refers to the account number assigned by the issuing institution to cardholders for paying credit card charges.
Virtual Account: Refers to the virtual payment account assigned by deposit business institutions to payers or designated transactions, allowing payers or transactors to deposit funds into corresponding physical deposit accounts via the virtual payment account.
Virtual Asset Account: Refers to the account opened by virtual asset clients at businesses or personnel providing virtual asset services (hereinafter referred to as "virtual asset service providers").
Warning Deposit Account: Refers to a deposit account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to deposit business institutions.
Warning Electronic Payment Account: Refers to an electronic payment account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to electronic payment institutions.
Warning Virtual Account: Refers to a virtual account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to deposit business institutions.
Warning Credit Card Statement Number: Refers to a credit card statement number listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to issuing institutions.
Warning Virtual Asset Account: Refers to a virtual asset account listed as a warning by courts, procuratorates, or judicial police organs upon notification to virtual asset service providers.
Deposit Business Institution: Refers to financial institutions specified in Paragraph 1, Items 1 and 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.
Electronic Payment Institution: Refers to electronic payment institutions specified in Item 1 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.
Credit Card Business Institution: Refers to credit card business institutions specified in Item 7 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.
Issuing Institution: Refers to issuing institutions specified in Item 9 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures. | 1. Considering that virtual asset service providers provide virtual asset accounts to clients by applying to financial institutions, rather than opening them directly, Item 6 is textually revised for clarity.
In accordance with Chapter 6 adding the "Operations of Anti-Fraud Platform" chapter, definitions for Items 16 and 17 are added for clarity. |
| Chapter 2 Criteria for Account/Account Number Identification and Consultation Operations | Chapter 2 Criteria for Account/Account Number Identification and Consultation Operations | Chapter title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Section 1 Deposit Accounts | Section 1 Deposit Accounts | Section title unchanged. |
| Article 3 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal deposit accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows: | | |
Frequently applying to open deposit accounts or setting up designated accounts within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
The transaction functions applied for by the account holder are obviously inconsistent with the account holder's age or background.
The contact information provided by the account holder cannot be verified by reasonable means.
The deposit account is notified by financial institutions or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
The deposit account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively using electronic services or equipment of deposit business institutions within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the account holder's daily transaction habits.
The deposit account has been inactive for a long time but suddenly has abnormal transactions.
The mobile phone number retained by the account holder is the same as the mobile phone number retained by the account holder of other warning deposit accounts within the same deposit business institution, and is suspected to be used by criminals.
The virtual account linked to the deposit account has been listed as a warning virtual account multiple times within a certain period.
Non-nationals, where deposit business institutions learn that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents checked when opening the deposit account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.
Deposit business institutions learn that the account holder has been reported as a missing person.
Accounts listed by judicial police organs as suspected domestic deposit accounts involved in fraud.
Deposit accounts have transaction characteristics listed in the Bank Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Sample that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal deposit accounts or transactions identified by the competent authority or deposit business institutions as having suspicion of involvement in fraudulent crimes. | Article 3 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal deposit accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows:
Frequently applying to open deposit accounts or setting up designated accounts within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
The transaction functions applied for by the account holder are obviously inconsistent with the account holder's age or background.
The contact information provided by the account holder cannot be verified by reasonable means.
The deposit account is notified by financial institutions or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
The deposit account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively using electronic services or equipment of deposit business institutions within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the account holder's daily transaction habits.
The deposit account has been inactive for a long time but suddenly has abnormal transactions.
The contact telephone number retained by the account holder is the same as the contact telephone number retained by the account holder of other warning deposit accounts within the same deposit business institution, and is suspected to be used by criminals.
The virtual account linked to the deposit account has been listed as a warning virtual account multiple times within a certain period.
Deposit accounts have transaction characteristics listed in the Bank Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Sample that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal deposit accounts or transactions identified by the competent authority or deposit business institutions as suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes. | 1. Considering that mobile phone numbers are more identifiable than landlines in practice, Item 8 is revised.
To enable early warning and timely handling measures for suspicious abnormal deposit accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded based on suggestions from law enforcement agencies regarding the investigation of illegal cases. Items 10 through 12 are added. Current Items 10 and 11 are moved to Items 13 and 14, with textual revisions. |
| Article 4 Deposit business institutions shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the account holder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | Article 4 Deposit business institutions shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the account holder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | This article is not revised. |
| Article 5 When deposit business institutions execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, or when it is necessary to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal deposit accounts. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
If the consulted party is a deposit business institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the deposit account.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the account holder.
(3) Whether transactions in the deposit account are abnormal and whether the deposit account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an electronic payment institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the electronic payment account.
(2) Age of the user.
(3) Whether transactions in the electronic payment account are abnormal and whether the electronic payment account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an issuing institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and card issuance date of the credit card.
(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.
(3) Whether transactions in the credit card are abnormal and whether the credit card is monitored.
If the consulted party is a virtual asset service provider, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the virtual asset account of the client.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the client.
(3) Whether transactions in the virtual asset account are abnormal and whether the virtual asset account is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or for identifying suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the National Federation of Banks, Taiwan, and reported to the competent authority for record. | Article 5 When deposit business institutions execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other deposit business institutions via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal deposit accounts. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
Name and opening date of the deposit account.
Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the account holder.
Whether transactions in the deposit account are abnormal and whether the deposit account is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the National Federation of Banks, Taiwan, and reported to the competent authority for record. | 1. In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing consultations to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, and cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, Items 1, 3, and 5 are revised.
Considering that consultation items provided by each industry differ, Item 2 lists the consultation items to be provided by each industry when consulted. |
| Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts | Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts | Section title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Article 6 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows: | | |
Frequently applying to open electronic payment accounts within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
The transaction functions applied for by the user are obviously inconsistent with the user's age or background.
The contact information provided by the user cannot be verified by reasonable means.
The electronic payment account is notified by financial institutions or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
The electronic payment account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively using services or equipment of electronic payment institutions within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the user's daily transaction habits.
The electronic payment account has been inactive for a long time but suddenly has abnormal transactions.
The mobile phone number retained by the user is the same as the mobile phone number retained by the user of other warning electronic payment accounts, and is suspected to be used by criminals.
Non-nationals, where electronic payment institutions learn that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents checked when opening the electronic payment account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.
Electronic payment institutions learn that the user has been reported as a missing person.
Accounts listed by judicial police organs as suspected domestic electronic payment accounts involved in fraud.
Electronic payment accounts have transaction characteristics listed in the Electronic Payment Institution Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Sample that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions identified by the competent authority or electronic payment institutions as having suspicion of involvement in fraudulent crimes. | Article 6 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows:
Frequently applying to open electronic payment accounts within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
The transaction functions applied for by the user are obviously inconsistent with the user's age or background.
The contact information provided by the user cannot be verified by reasonable means.
The electronic payment account is notified by financial institutions or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
The electronic payment account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively using services or equipment of electronic payment institutions within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the user's daily transaction habits.
The electronic payment account has been inactive for a long time but suddenly has abnormal transactions.
The contact telephone number retained by the user is the same as the contact telephone number retained by the user of other warning electronic payment accounts, and is suspected to be used by criminals.
Electronic payment accounts have transaction characteristics listed in the Electronic Payment Institution Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Sample that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions identified by the competent authority or electronic payment institutions as suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes. | 1. Considering that mobile phone numbers are more identifiable than landlines in practice, Item 8 is revised.
To enable early warning and timely handling measures for suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded based on suggestions from law enforcement agencies regarding the investigation of illegal cases. Items 9 through 11 are added. Current Items 9 and 10 are moved to Items 12 and 13, with Item 13 textually revised. |
| Article 7 Electronic payment institutions shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the user's source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | Article 7 Electronic payment institutions shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the user's source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | This article is not revised. |
| Article 8 When electronic payment institutions execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, or when it is necessary to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
If the consulted party is a deposit business institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the deposit account.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the account holder.
(3) Whether transactions in the deposit account are abnormal and whether the deposit account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an electronic payment institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the electronic payment account.
(2) Age of the user.
(3) Whether transactions in the electronic payment account are abnormal and whether the electronic payment account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an issuing institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and card issuance date of the credit card.
(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.
(3) Whether transactions in the credit card are abnormal and whether the credit card is monitored.
If the consulted party is a virtual asset service provider, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the virtual asset account of the client.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the client.
(3) Whether transactions in the virtual asset account are abnormal and whether the virtual asset account is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or for identifying suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the National Federation of Banks, Taiwan, and reported to the competent authority for record. | Article 8 When electronic payment institutions execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other electronic payment institutions via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
Name and opening date of the electronic payment account.
Age of the user.
Whether transactions in the electronic payment account are abnormal and whether the electronic payment account is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the National Federation of Banks, Taiwan, and reported to the competent authority for record. | 1. In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing consultations to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, and cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, and in light of the establishment of the Taiwan Electronic Payment Business Association (hereinafter referred to as "Electronic Payment Association"), Items 1, 3, and 5 are revised.
Considering that consultation items provided by each industry differ, Item 2 lists the consultation items to be provided by each industry when consulted. |
| Section 3 Credit Cards | Section 3 Credit Cards | Section title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Article 9 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal credit cards or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows: | | |
Frequently applying to open credit cards within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
Credit cards are notified by financial institutions or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
Credit cards often conduct multiple small-amount transactions, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively conducting credit card transactions within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the cardholder's daily transaction habits.
Credit cards have been inactive for a long time but suddenly have abnormal transactions.
The mobile phone number retained by the cardholder is the same as the mobile phone number retained by the cardholder of other warning credit card statement numbers within the same issuing institution, and is suspected to be used by criminals.
Non-nationals, where issuing institutions learn that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents checked when opening the credit card have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.
Issuing institutions learn that the cardholder has been reported as a missing person.
Credit cards have transaction characteristics listed in the Credit Card Business Institution Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Sample that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal credit cards or transactions identified by the competent authority or issuing institutions as having suspicion of involvement in fraudulent crimes. | Article 9 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal credit cards or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows:
Frequently applying to open credit cards within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
Credit cards are notified by financial institutions or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
Credit cards often conduct multiple small-amount transactions, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively conducting credit card transactions within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the cardholder's daily transaction habits.
Credit cards have been inactive for a long time but suddenly have abnormal transactions.
The contact telephone number retained by the cardholder is the same as the contact telephone number retained by the cardholder of other warning credit card statement numbers within the same issuing institution, and is suspected to be used by criminals.
Non-nationals, where issuing institutions learn that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents checked when opening the credit card have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.
Issuing institutions learn that the cardholder has been reported as a missing person.
Credit cards have transaction characteristics listed in the Credit Card Business Institution Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Sample that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal credit cards or transactions identified by the competent authority or issuing institutions as suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes. | 1. Considering that mobile phone numbers are more identifiable than landlines in practice, Item 6 is revised.
To enable early warning and timely handling measures for suspicious abnormal credit cards or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded based on suggestions from law enforcement agencies regarding the investigation of illegal cases. Items 7 and 8 are added. Current Items 7 and 8 are moved to Items 9 and 10, with Item 10 textually revised. |
| Article 10 Issuing institutions shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the cardholder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | Article 10 Issuing institutions shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the cardholder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | This article is not revised. |
| Article 11 When issuing institutions execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes, or when it is necessary to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal credit cards. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
If the consulted party is a deposit business institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the deposit account.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the account holder.
(3) Whether transactions in the deposit account are abnormal and whether the deposit account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an electronic payment institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the electronic payment account.
(2) Age of the user.
(3) Whether transactions in the electronic payment account are abnormal and whether the electronic payment account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an issuing institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and card issuance date of the credit card.
(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.
(3) Whether transactions in the credit card are abnormal and whether the credit card is monitored.
If the consulted party is a virtual asset service provider, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the virtual asset account of the client.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the client.
(3) Whether transactions in the virtual asset account are abnormal and whether the virtual asset account is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or for identifying suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the National Federation of Banks, Taiwan, and reported to the competent authority for record. | Article 11 When issuing institutions execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other credit card business institutions via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal credit cards. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
Name and card issuance date of the credit card.
Age and occupation category of the cardholder.
Whether transactions in the credit card are abnormal and whether the credit card is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the National Federation of Banks, Taiwan, and reported to the competent authority for record. | 1. In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing consultations to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, and cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, Items 1, 3, and 5 are revised.
Considering that consultation items provided by each industry differ, Item 2 lists the consultation items to be provided by each industry when consulted. |
| Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts | Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts | Section title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Article 12 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows: | | |
Frequently applying to open virtual asset accounts within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
The transaction functions applied for by the client are obviously inconsistent with the client's age or background.
The contact information provided by the client cannot be verified by reasonable means.
Virtual asset accounts are notified by virtual asset service providers, financial institutions, government agencies, or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
Virtual asset accounts often have multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively using services or equipment of virtual asset service providers within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the client's daily transaction habits.
Virtual asset accounts have been inactive for a long time but suddenly have abnormal transactions.
The mobile phone number retained by the client is the same as the mobile phone number retained by the client of other warning virtual asset accounts within the same virtual asset service provider, and is suspected to be used by criminals.
Non-nationals, where virtual asset service providers learn that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents checked when opening the virtual asset account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.
Virtual asset service providers learn that the client has been reported as a missing person.
Accounts listed by judicial police organs as suspected domestic virtual asset accounts involved in fraud.
Virtual asset accounts have transaction characteristics listed in the self-regulatory norms of the Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorist Financing, and Anti-Fraud Industry Joint Defense Mechanism that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions identified by the competent authority or virtual asset service providers as having suspicion of involvement in fraudulent crimes. | Article 12 Criteria for identifying suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes are as follows:
Frequently applying to open virtual asset accounts within a short period, and unable to provide reasonable explanations.
The transaction functions applied for by the client are obviously inconsistent with the client's age or background.
The contact information provided by the client cannot be verified by reasonable means.
Virtual asset accounts are notified by virtual asset service providers or the public as suspected to be used by criminals.
Virtual asset accounts often have multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.
Intensively using services or equipment of virtual asset service providers within a short period, obviously inconsistent with the client's daily transaction habits.
Virtual asset accounts have been inactive for a long time but suddenly have abnormal transactions.
Virtual asset accounts have transaction characteristics listed in the self-regulatory norms of the Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorist Financing, and Anti-Fraud Industry Joint Defense Mechanism that indicate suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes.
Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions identified by the competent authority or virtual asset service providers as suspected involvement in fraudulent crimes. | To enable early warning and timely handling measures for suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded based on suggestions from law enforcement agencies regarding the investigation of illegal cases. Items 8 through 11 are added. Current Items 8 and 9 are moved to Items 12 and 13, with Items 4 and 13 textually revised. |
| Article 13 Virtual asset service providers shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the client's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | Article 13 Virtual asset service providers shall strengthen identity confirmation for suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes and may take the following continuous review measures:
Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding business relationships.
Take reasonable measures to understand the client's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.
Continuously supervise business relationships. | This article is not revised. |
| Article 14 When virtual asset service providers execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, or when it is necessary to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
If the consulted party is a deposit business institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the deposit account.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the account holder.
(3) Whether transactions in the deposit account are abnormal and whether the deposit account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an electronic payment institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the electronic payment account.
(2) Age of the user.
(3) Whether transactions in the electronic payment account are abnormal and whether the electronic payment account is monitored.
If the consulted party is an issuing institution, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and card issuance date of the credit card.
(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.
(3) Whether transactions in the credit card are abnormal and whether the credit card is monitored.
If the consulted party is a virtual asset service provider, upon request, provide:
(1) Name and opening date of the virtual asset account of the client.
(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the client.
(3) Whether transactions in the virtual asset account are abnormal and whether the virtual asset account is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or for identifying suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association and reported to the competent authority for record. | Article 14 When virtual asset service providers execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, they may consult other virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the consulted party, to obtain information on such suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts. Consulted parties shall, upon request, provide the following consultation items:
Name and opening date of the virtual asset account of the client.
Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the client.
Whether transactions in the virtual asset account are abnormal and whether the virtual asset account is monitored.
Except for the consultation items in the preceding paragraph, consulted parties may also provide other necessary information requested by consulting parties for executing control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.
Consulted parties shall provide consultation information within five business days. However, if there are practical operational difficulties, and the consulting party is notified within the aforementioned period, and both parties agree to extend the period for providing consultation information, this limitation does not apply.
Matters for consulted parties to confirm the identity of consulting parties or other consultation operation procedures for this article are formulated by the Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association and reported to the competent authority for record. | 1. In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing consultations to identify suspicious transactions involving suspected fraudulent crimes, and cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, Items 1, 3, and 5 are revised.
Considering that consultation items provided by each industry differ, Item 2 lists the consultation items to be provided by each industry when consulted. |
| Chapter 3 Preservation of Data and Transaction Records, Reporting, and Account/Account Number Control Operations | Chapter 3 Preservation of Data and Transaction Records, Reporting, and Account/Account Number Control Operations | Chapter title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Section 1 Deposit Accounts | Section 1 Deposit Accounts | Section title unchanged. |
| Article 15 When deposit business institutions execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form: | | |
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the account holder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through consultations on suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | Article 15 When deposit business institutions execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the account holder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through same-industry consultations on suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, the scope of consultation data and records to be preserved is not limited to same-industry consultations. Item 4 of Paragraph 1 is textually revised. | | Article 16 When a deposit account is identified as a suspicious abnormal deposit account involving suspected fraudulent crimes, deposit business institutions shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the account holder, and may take continuous review of the account holder's identity, suspending deposits or withdrawals, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
If a virtual account is listed as a warning, deposit business institutions shall suspend all transaction functions of the virtual account, earmark the funds in the deposit account corresponding to the virtual account, and subsequent remittances to the virtual account shall be returned directly to the deposit business institution or electronic payment institution from which the funds were remitted. If there is no corresponding outgoing account for the virtual account to return funds, deposit business institutions shall earmark the funds of the virtual account. Deposit business institutions shall immediately notify the account holder to take relevant control measures against the user of the virtual account.
If a warning virtual account is a virtual account under a trust deposit account of a virtual asset service provider entrusted by a deposit business institution, deposit business institutions shall immediately notify the virtual asset service provider. Upon receiving notification from the deposit business institution, virtual asset service providers shall inquire whether the reported fraud funds are all or partially retained in the virtual account and report the inquiry results to the receiving deposit business institution.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When deposit business institutions report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the account holder, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | Article 16 When a deposit account is identified as a suspicious abnormal deposit account involving suspected fraudulent crimes, deposit business institutions shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the account holder, and may take continuous review of the account holder's identity, suspending deposits or withdrawals, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
If a virtual account is listed as a warning, deposit business institutions shall suspend all transaction functions of the virtual account, earmark the funds in the deposit account corresponding to the virtual account, and subsequent remittances to the virtual account shall be returned directly to the deposit business institution or electronic payment institution from which the funds were remitted. If there is no corresponding outgoing account for the virtual account to return funds, deposit business institutions shall earmark the funds of the virtual account. Deposit business institutions shall immediately notify the account holder to take relevant control measures against the user of the virtual account.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When deposit business institutions report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the account holder, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | Reference is made to the letter No. Full-1-114100484 from the National Federation of Banks, Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as "Bank Association"), establishing handling methods for deposit business institutions and virtual asset service providers when a warning virtual account is a virtual account under a trust deposit account of a virtual asset service provider entrusted by a deposit business institutions. Item 3 of Paragraph 1 is added, and current Item 3 is moved to Item 4. | | Article 17 Upon receiving reports from deposit business institutions, judicial police organs shall notify deposit business institutions in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to deposit business institutions within the time limit, deposit business institutions may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to deposit business institutions within five business days after notification. If account holders have objections to control measures executed by deposit business institutions upon notification by judicial police organs, they may consult deposit business institutions, and if necessary, also consult the judicial police organs that originally notified the control measures. | Article 17 Upon receiving reports from deposit business institutions, judicial police organs shall notify deposit business institutions in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal deposit accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to deposit business institutions within the time limit, deposit business institutions may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to deposit business institutions within five business days after notification. | Considering that control measures notified by judicial police organs to deposit business institutions for deposit accounts will affect account holders, Item 3 is added to clarify consultation channels when account holders have objections. |
| Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts | Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts | Section title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Article 18 When electronic payment institutions execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form: | | |
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the user, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through consultations on suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | Article 18 When electronic payment institutions execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the user, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through same-industry consultations on suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, the scope of consultation data and records to be preserved is not limited to same-industry consultations. Item 4 of Paragraph 1 is textually revised. | | Article 19 When an electronic payment account is identified as a suspicious abnormal electronic payment account involving suspected fraudulent crimes, electronic payment institutions shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the user, and may take continuous review of the user's identity, suspending remittances (transfers) in or withdrawals, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When electronic payment institutions report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the user, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | Article 19 When an electronic payment account is identified as a suspicious abnormal electronic payment account involving suspected fraudulent crimes, electronic payment institutions shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the user, and may take continuous review of the user's identity, suspending remittances (transfers) in or withdrawals, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When electronic payment institutions report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the user, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | This article is not revised. | | Article 20 Upon receiving reports from electronic payment institutions, judicial police organs shall notify electronic payment institutions in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to electronic payment institutions within the time limit, electronic payment institutions may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to electronic payment institutions within five business days after notification. If users have objections to control measures executed by electronic payment institutions upon notification by judicial police organs, they may consult electronic payment institutions, and if necessary, also consult the judicial police organs that originally notified the control measures. | Article 20 Upon receiving reports from electronic payment institutions, judicial police organs shall notify electronic payment institutions in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal electronic payment accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to electronic payment institutions within the time limit, electronic payment institutions may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to electronic payment institutions within five business days after notification. | Considering that control measures notified by judicial police organs to electronic payment institutions for electronic payment accounts will affect users, Item 3 is added to clarify consultation channels when users have objections. |
| Section 3 Credit Cards | Section 3 Credit Cards | Section title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Article 21 When issuing institutions execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form: | | |
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the cardholder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through consultations on suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | Article 21 When issuing institutions execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the cardholder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through same-industry consultations on suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, the scope of consultation data and records to be preserved is not limited to same-industry consultations. Item 4 of Paragraph 1 is textually revised. | | Article 22 When a credit card is identified as a suspicious abnormal credit card involving suspected fraudulent crimes, issuing institutions shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the client, and may take continuous review of the cardholder's identity, controlling credit cards and suspending credit card account transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When issuing institutions report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the cardholder, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | Article 22 When a credit card is identified as a suspicious abnormal credit card involving suspected fraudulent crimes, issuing institutions shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the client, and may take continuous review of the cardholder's identity, controlling credit cards and suspending credit card account transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When issuing institutions report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the cardholder, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | This article is not revised. | | Article 23 Upon receiving reports from issuing institutions, judicial police organs shall notify issuing institutions in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to issuing institutions within the time limit, issuing institutions may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to issuing institutions within five business days after notification. If cardholders have objections to control measures executed by issuing institutions upon notification by judicial police organs, they may consult issuing institutions, and if necessary, also consult the judicial police organs that originally notified the control measures. | Article 23 Upon receiving reports from issuing institutions, judicial police organs shall notify issuing institutions in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal credit cards involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to issuing institutions within the time limit, issuing institutions may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to issuing institutions within five business days after notification. | Considering that control measures notified by judicial police organs to issuing institutions for credit cards will affect cardholders, Item 3 is added to clarify consultation channels when cardholders have objections. |
| Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts | Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts | Section title unchanged. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Article 24 When virtual asset service providers execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form: | | |
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the client, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through consultations on suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | Article 24 When virtual asset service providers execute measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:
All records obtained to confirm the identity of the client, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.
Contract document files.
All abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes.
Data and records obtained through same-industry consultations on suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.
The abnormal transaction records of suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes referred to in Item 3 of the preceding paragraph shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities. | In accordance with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act allowing cross-industry consultations between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, the scope of consultation data and records to be preserved is not limited to same-industry consultations. Item 4 of Paragraph 1 is textually revised. | | Article 25 When a virtual asset account is identified as a suspicious abnormal virtual asset account involving suspected fraudulent crimes, virtual asset service providers shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the client, and may take continuous review of the client's identity, suspending deposits or withdrawals, remitting virtual assets or funds, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When virtual asset service providers report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the client, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | Article 25 When a virtual asset account is identified as a suspicious abnormal virtual asset account involving suspected fraudulent crimes, virtual asset service providers shall take the following handling measures:
Execute control measures under the latter paragraph of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthening identity confirmation of the client, and may take continuous review of the client's identity, suspending deposits or withdrawals, remitting virtual assets or funds, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police organs.
Handling measures prescribed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws.
When virtual asset service providers report to judicial police organs in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platforms, or other feasible methods, and provide documents on suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes, identity information of the client, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method. | This article is not revised. | | Article 26 Upon receiving reports from virtual asset service providers, judicial police organs shall notify virtual asset service providers in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to virtual asset service providers within the time limit, virtual asset service providers may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to virtual asset service providers within five business days after notification. If clients have objections to control measures executed by virtual asset service providers upon notification by judicial police organs, they may consult virtual asset service providers, and if necessary, also consult the judicial police organs that originally notified the control measures. | Article 26 Upon receiving reports from virtual asset service providers, judicial police organs shall notify virtual asset service providers in writing within 20 days to execute subsequent control or解除 control on such suspicious abnormal virtual asset accounts involving suspected fraudulent crimes. If no notification is made to virtual asset service providers within the time limit, virtual asset service providers may continue control. In major emergency cases, judicial police organs may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible methods, and shall complete written document delivery to virtual asset service providers within five business days after notification. | Considering that control measures notified by judicial police organs to virtual asset service providers for virtual asset accounts will affect clients, Item 3 is added to clarify consultation channels when clients have objections. |

After receiving a report from a Virtual Asset Service Provider, the judicial police authority shall, within twenty days, notify the Virtual Asset Service Provider via official document to handle subsequent control or release of control regarding the suspected abnormal virtual asset account involved in fraud. If the notification is not made to the Virtual Asset Service Provider within the time limit, the Virtual Asset Service Provider may continue to control the account.

In cases of major emergencies, the judicial police authority may first notify the Virtual Asset Service Provider via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible means, and shall complete the official document delivery to the Virtual Asset Service Provider within five business days after the notification.

If a customer has doubts regarding the control measures taken by the Virtual Asset Service Provider based on the judicial police authority's notification, the customer may inquire with the Virtual Asset Service Provider, and if necessary, may also inquire with the judicial police authority that originally notified the control measures.

Chapter 4 Joint Prevention Reporting Mechanism and Freezing Operations
Chapter 4 Joint Prevention Reporting Mechanism and Freezing Operations
The chapter title remains unchanged.

Section 1 Deposit Accounts
Section 1 Deposit Accounts
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 27 If a deposit account is reported as a warning deposit account, the deposit institution, in addition to confirming the source of the report and setting the warning account, shall immediately inquire about the relevant transactions of the account. If it is found that the reported fraud funds have been transferred to other deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, or virtual asset accounts, the data of the transferred funds shall be reported to the receiving deposit institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider.

The receiving deposit institution, upon receiving the report from the previous receiving institution or virtual asset service provider, shall immediately inquire about the transactions of the receiving account. If the funds have been transferred out, the data of the transferred funds shall be continuously reported to the next receiving deposit institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider.

If the deposit institution belonging to the trust deposit account linked to the virtual asset account finds that the reported fraud funds have been transferred into the virtual account under the trust deposit account, it shall immediately notify the virtual asset service provider to inquire whether the reported fraud funds remain entirely or partially in the virtual account.

The virtual asset service provider shall reply to the deposit institution belonging to the trust deposit account with the inquiry results.

The deposit institution shall reply to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning with the inquiry results.

If the receiving deposit institution finds that the reported fraud funds have been withdrawn, it shall reply to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning deposit account.

The judicial police authority that originally reported the warning deposit account, after verifying the data from the preceding paragraph, if it believes that the receiving accounts or virtual asset accounts also need to be listed as warnings, shall notify the relevant deposit institutions, electronic payment institutions, or virtual asset service providers to list the accounts or virtual asset accounts as warnings.

One, referring to the Bank Association's Letter No. 1141000484, clarifying the joint prevention mechanism operation between deposit institutions and virtual asset service providers when fraud funds are transferred into the virtual account under the trust deposit account of the virtual asset service provider, Article 3 is added.

Two, in accordance with the amendment of Article 10, Paragraph 1 of this Act, to establish a cross-industry joint prevention mechanism among deposit institutions, electronic payment institutions, and virtual asset service providers, Articles 1, 2, and 5 are amended.

Three, referring to the Bank Association's Letter No. 1141000484, the judicial police authority "reports" warnings, and after the concerned institutions handle and verify, they "reply" to the judicial police authority to transmit joint prevention information. Therefore, the term "report" is amended to "reply" to distinguish them, and Article 4 is textually amended.

Original Articles 3 and 4 are moved to Articles 4 and 5.

Article 28 When a fraud victim personally visits any deposit institution during its business hours to report having been defrauded, the deposit institution shall confirm the citizen's identity, remittance or transfer information, and understand the reason for the fraud, then ask the citizen to fill out an affidavit and dial 165.

The deposit institution shall, based on the affidavit and remittance or transfer information from the preceding paragraph, report to the receiving deposit institution or electronic payment institution. The receiving deposit institution, upon receiving the report from the previous deposit institution or electronic payment institution, shall apply the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

When a fraud victim personally visits the deposit institution to report having been defrauded as per the first paragraph, the police authority shall dispatch personnel to the deposit institution within two hours. After completing the citizen's case report, if necessary, the deposit account shall be reported as a warning.

The deposit institution, upon receiving the notification from the police authority in the preceding paragraph, shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

Article 29 The joint prevention reporting content of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the warning deposit account reporting authority.

The joint prevention reporting content, reporting forms, affidavit formats, or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the National Federation of the Bank Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 30 Upon receiving a report from the previous deposit institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider, the deposit institution shall freeze the reported receiving amount; if the account balance is less than the reported receiving amount, the current balance of the account shall be frozen. The total amount of funds or virtual assets frozen by each deposit institution, electronic payment institution, and virtual asset service provider for the same reporting case shall not exceed the amount reported by the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning or the amount of fraud funds or virtual assets stated in the fraud victim's affidavit.

The deposit institution shall report the freezing results to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning.

The judicial police authority that originally reported the warning, upon receiving the reply from the preceding paragraph, shall verify as soon as possible and, within forty-eight hours from the time of freezing, notify the deposit institution whether the reported frozen funds' deposit account should be marked as a warning or the freezing should be lifted.

If the deposit institution does not receive a notification within the time limit of the preceding paragraph stating that the reported frozen funds' deposit account should be listed as a warning, the freezing shall be lifted directly.

If the deposit institution, after careful verification, determines that the reported frozen funds' deposit account has no illegal or abnormal circumstances, it may lift the freezing in advance.

The deposit institution shall continuously monitor the deposit account receiving the frozen funds. If it determines that the account is an abnormal deposit account suspected of involving fraud crimes, it may handle it according to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act.

In accordance with the amendment of Article 10, Paragraph 1 of this Act, to establish a cross-industry joint prevention mechanism among deposit institutions, electronic payment institutions, and virtual asset service providers, the originally reported warning may not necessarily be a deposit account, but could also be an electronic payment account or virtual asset account; also referring to the Bank Association's Letter No. 1141000484, the judicial police authority "reports" warnings, and after the concerned institutions handle and verify, they "reply" to the judicial police authority to transmit joint prevention information. Therefore, the term "report" is amended to "reply" to distinguish them, and Articles 1, 2, and 3 are amended.

Article 31 If the funds in a deposit account have already been subject to seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar dispositions under other laws, and subsequently receives a notification to freeze the fraud funds in the deposit account, the deposit institution shall still freeze the fraud funds, but such funds shall be handled first according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 32 Deposit institutions should, as much as possible, set up a 24-hour joint prevention reporting dedicated window to conduct joint prevention reporting mechanism operations.

When a deposit institution sets up the reporting window mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately notify Financial Information Services Co., Ltd.; the same applies when the window changes.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 33 If the account holder of the frozen funds has doubts about the freezing of their funds, the account holder shall handle the matter with the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning, and the deposit institution shall provide assistance when necessary.

When deposit institutions handle joint prevention operations, if it is later verified that no fraud exists, but the customer's rights are damaged due to the deposit institution's joint prevention reporting, or bills are returned due to funds being frozen, the deposit institution shall assist in applying to the Taiwan Clearing House to cancel the returned bill records or assist in other remedial measures.

Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts
Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 34 If an electronic payment account is reported as a warning electronic payment account, the electronic payment institution, in addition to confirming the source of the report and setting the warning account, shall immediately inquire about the relevant transactions of the account. If it is found that the reported fraud funds have been transferred to other deposit accounts or electronic payment accounts, the data of the transferred funds shall be reported to the receiving deposit institution or electronic payment institution.

The receiving electronic payment institution, upon receiving the report from the previous receiving institution, shall immediately inquire about the transactions of the receiving account. If the funds have been transferred out, the data of the transferred funds shall be continuously reported to the next receiving deposit institution or electronic payment institution. If the funds have not been transferred out, it shall report to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning electronic payment account.

The judicial police authority that originally reported the warning electronic payment account, after verifying the data from the preceding paragraph, if it believes that the receiving accounts also need to be listed as warning electronic payment accounts, shall notify the relevant electronic payment institutions to list the accounts as warnings.

One, in accordance with the amendment of Article 10, Paragraph 1 of this Act, to establish a cross-industry joint prevention mechanism among deposit institutions, electronic payment institutions, and virtual asset service providers, also referring to the Deposit Account Chapter's Bank Association Letter No. 1141000484, the judicial police authority "reports" warnings, and after the concerned institutions handle and verify, they "reply" to the judicial police authority to transmit joint prevention information. Therefore, the term "report" is amended to "reply" to distinguish them, and Articles 1, 2, and 3 are amended.

Two, currently, although virtual asset accounts cannot yet be linked to electronic payment accounts, or virtual assets cannot be transferred out to electronic payment accounts in legal tender form, considering future virtual asset business development trends, relevant joint prevention reporting operational methods are retained. When relevant business is launched in the future, these provisions will apply, conforming to the purpose of Article 10, Paragraph 1 of this Act and future practical cross-industry joint prevention needs.

Article 35 When a fraud victim personally visits any electronic payment institution to report having been defrauded, the electronic payment institution shall confirm the citizen's identity, electronic payment account transaction proof, and understand the reason for the fraud, then ask the citizen to fill out an affidavit and dial 165.

If a fraud victim contacts the electronic payment institution's customer service to report having been defrauded, the electronic payment institution shall refer the citizen to dial 165.

The electronic payment institution shall, based on the affidavit and electronic payment account transaction proof from the preceding paragraph, report to the receiving deposit institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider. The receiving electronic payment institution, upon receiving the report from the previous deposit institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider, shall apply the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

If a fraud victim personally visits the electronic payment institution to report having been defrauded, the police authority shall dispatch personnel to the electronic payment institution within two hours. After completing the citizen's case report, if necessary, the electronic payment account shall be reported as a warning.

The electronic payment institution, upon receiving the notification from the police authority in the preceding paragraph, shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

Article 36 The joint prevention reporting content of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the warning electronic payment account reporting authority.

The joint prevention reporting content, reporting forms, affidavit formats, or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the Bank Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

In accordance with the establishment of the Electronic Payment Association by electronic payment institutions, Article 2 is amended.

Article 37 Upon receiving a report from the previous deposit institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider, the electronic payment institution shall freeze the reported receiving amount; if the account balance is less than the reported receiving amount, the current balance of the account shall be frozen. The total amount of funds or virtual assets frozen by each electronic payment institution, deposit institution, and virtual asset service provider for the same reporting case shall not exceed the amount reported by the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning or the amount of fraud funds or virtual assets stated in the fraud victim's affidavit.

The electronic payment institution shall reply to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning with the freezing results.

The judicial police authority that originally reported the warning, upon receiving the reply from the preceding paragraph, shall verify as soon as possible and, within forty-eight hours from the time of freezing, notify the electronic payment institution whether the reported frozen funds' electronic payment account should be marked as a warning or the freezing should be lifted.

If the electronic payment institution does not receive a notification within the time limit of the preceding paragraph stating that the reported frozen funds' electronic payment account should be listed as a warning, the freezing shall be lifted directly.

If the electronic payment institution, after careful verification, determines that the reported frozen funds' electronic payment account has no illegal or abnormal circumstances, it may lift the freezing in advance.

The electronic payment institution shall continuously monitor the electronic payment account receiving the frozen funds. If it determines that the account is an abnormal electronic payment account suspected of involving fraud crimes, it may handle it according to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act.

In accordance with the amendment of Article 10, Paragraph 1 of this Act, to establish a cross-industry joint prevention mechanism among deposit institutions, electronic payment institutions, and virtual asset service providers, the originally reported warning may not necessarily be an electronic payment account, but could also be a deposit account or virtual asset account; also referring to the Deposit Account Chapter's Bank Association Letter No. 1141000484, the judicial police authority "reports" warnings, and after the concerned institutions handle and verify, they "reply" to the judicial police authority to transmit joint prevention information. Therefore, the term "report" is amended to "reply" to distinguish them, and Articles 1, 2, and 3 are amended.

Article 38 If the funds in an electronic payment account have already been subject to seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar dispositions under other laws, and subsequently receives a notification to freeze the fraud funds in the electronic payment account, the electronic payment institution shall still freeze the fraud funds, but such funds shall be handled first according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 39 Electronic payment institutions should, as much as possible, set up a 24-hour joint prevention reporting dedicated window to conduct joint prevention reporting mechanism operations.

When an electronic payment institution sets up the reporting window mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately notify Financial Information Services Co., Ltd.; the same applies when the window changes.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 40 If the user of the frozen electronic payment account has doubts about the freezing of their funds, the user shall handle the matter with the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning electronic payment account, and the electronic payment institution shall provide assistance when necessary.

Section 3 Credit Cards
Section 3 Credit Cards
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 41 If a credit card billing number is reported as a warning credit card billing number, the card-issuing institution shall immediately suspend all transaction functions of the credit card and close the payment functions of automated payment channels. However, this does not apply if the card-issuing institution confirms that the payment is made by the cardholder.

If the card-issuing institution finds that the reported fraud funds have been transferred to the cardholder's other deposit accounts or electronic payment accounts, it shall report the data of the transferred funds to the receiving deposit institution or electronic payment institution and reply to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning credit card billing number.

Referring to the Deposit Account Chapter's Bank Association Letter No. 1141000484, the judicial police authority "reports" warnings, and after the concerned institutions handle and verify, they "reply" to the judicial police authority to transmit joint prevention information. Therefore, the term "report" is amended to "reply" to distinguish them, and Article 2 is textually amended.

Article 42 When a fraud victim reports to the card-issuing institution having been defrauded, the card-issuing institution shall refer the citizen to dial 165.

If a fraud victim personally visits the card-issuing institution during its business hours to report having been defrauded, the card-issuing institution shall confirm the citizen's identity, remittance or transfer information, and understand the reason for the fraud, and dial 165.

The police authority shall dispatch personnel to the card-issuing institution within two hours. After completing the citizen's case report, if necessary, the credit card billing number shall be reported as a warning.

The card-issuing institution, upon receiving the notification from the police authority in the preceding paragraph, shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 43 The joint prevention reporting content of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the warning credit card billing number reporting authority.

The joint prevention reporting format or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the Bank Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 44 Card-issuing institutions should, as much as possible, set up a 24-hour joint prevention reporting dedicated window to conduct joint prevention reporting mechanism operations.

When a card-issuing institution sets up the reporting window mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately notify Financial Information Services Co., Ltd.; the same applies when the window changes.

This article remains unchanged.

Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts
Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 45 If a virtual asset account is reported as a warning virtual asset account, the virtual asset service provider, in addition to confirming the source of the report and setting the warning virtual asset account, shall immediately inquire about the relevant transactions of the account. If it is found that the reported fraud virtual assets have been transferred to other virtual asset service providers, the data of the transferred virtual assets shall be reported to the virtual asset service provider of the receiving account.

The virtual asset service provider of the receiving account, upon receiving the report from the previous virtual asset service provider, shall immediately inquire about the transactions of the receiving account. If the virtual assets have been transferred out, the data of the transferred virtual assets shall be continuously reported to the next receiving virtual asset service provider.

If the virtual asset service provider of the receiving account finds that the reported fraud virtual assets have been withdrawn or transferred to overseas virtual asset accounts, it shall report to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning virtual asset account.

The judicial police authority that originally reported the warning virtual asset account, after verifying the data from the preceding paragraph, if it believes that the virtual asset accounts receiving the virtual assets also need to be listed as warning virtual asset accounts, shall notify the relevant virtual asset service providers to list the accounts as warnings.

To prevent fraud crimes, virtual asset service providers may, to prevent fraud crimes (e.g., reported fraud amounts exceed specified amounts or situations are urgent), report information regarding the warning virtual asset account to the deposit institution belonging to the trust deposit account linked to the warning virtual asset account, or to the deposit institution or electronic payment institution belonging to the linked deposit account or electronic payment account. The deposit institution or electronic payment institution may, based on the information provided by the virtual asset service provider, execute control measures under the latter part of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act.

Two, referring to the Deposit Account Chapter's Bank Association Letter No. 1141000484, the judicial police authority "reports" warnings, and after the concerned institutions handle and verify, they "reply" to the judicial police authority to transmit joint prevention information. Therefore, the term "report" is amended to "reply" to distinguish them, and Article 3 is textually amended.

Three, to strengthen the immediacy and effectiveness of joint prevention operations, it is clarified that virtual asset service providers may, to prevent fraud crimes (e.g., reported fraud amounts exceed specified amounts or situations are urgent), report information regarding the warning virtual asset account to the deposit institution belonging to the trust deposit account linked to the warning virtual asset account, or to the deposit institution or electronic payment institution belonging to the linked deposit account or electronic payment account. The deposit institution or electronic payment institution may, based on the information provided by the virtual asset service provider, execute control measures under the latter part of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act, so Article 5 is added.

Article 46 When a fraud victim personally visits any virtual asset service provider during its business hours to report having been defrauded, the virtual asset service provider shall confirm the citizen's identity, transfer, remittance, or transfer information of virtual assets or funds, and understand the reason for the fraud, then ask the citizen to fill out an affidavit and dial 165.

If a fraud victim contacts the virtual asset service provider's customer service to report having been defrauded, the virtual asset service provider shall refer the citizen to dial 165.

The virtual asset service provider shall, based on the affidavit and transfer, remittance, or transfer information of virtual assets or funds from the preceding paragraph, report to the virtual asset service provider of the receiving account. The virtual asset service provider of the receiving account, upon receiving the report from the previous virtual asset service provider, deposit institution, or electronic payment institution, shall apply the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

When a fraud victim personally visits the virtual asset service provider to report having been defrauded as per the first paragraph, the police authority shall dispatch personnel to the virtual asset service provider within two hours. After completing the citizen's case report, if necessary, the virtual asset account shall be reported as a warning.

The virtual asset service provider, upon receiving the notification from the police authority in the preceding paragraph, shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

Article 47 The joint prevention reporting content of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the warning virtual asset account reporting authority.

The joint prevention reporting content, reporting forms, affidavit formats, or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the Virtual Currency Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 48 Upon receiving a report from the previous virtual asset service provider, deposit institution, or electronic payment institution, the virtual asset service provider shall freeze the reported received virtual assets or funds; if the account's remaining virtual assets or funds are less than the reported received amount, the current virtual assets or funds in the account shall be frozen. The total amount of virtual assets or funds frozen by each virtual asset service provider, deposit institution, and electronic payment institution for the same reporting case shall not exceed the amount reported by the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning or the amount of fraud virtual assets or funds stated in the fraud victim's affidavit.

The virtual asset service provider shall report the freezing results to the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning.

The judicial police authority that originally reported the warning, upon receiving the reply from the preceding paragraph, shall verify as soon as possible and, within forty-eight hours from the time of freezing, notify the virtual asset service provider whether the reported frozen virtual assets or funds' virtual asset account should be marked as a warning or the freezing should be lifted.

If the virtual asset service provider does not receive a notification within the time limit of the preceding paragraph stating that the reported frozen virtual assets or funds' virtual asset account should be listed as a warning, the freezing shall be lifted directly.

If the virtual asset service provider, after careful verification, determines that the reported frozen virtual assets or funds' virtual asset account has no illegal or abnormal circumstances, it may lift the freezing in advance.

The virtual asset service provider shall continuously monitor the account receiving the frozen virtual assets or funds. If it determines that the account is an abnormal virtual asset account suspected of involving fraud crimes, it may handle it according to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act.

In accordance with the amendment of Article 10, Paragraph 1 of this Act, to establish a cross-industry joint prevention mechanism among deposit institutions, electronic payment institutions, and virtual asset service providers, the originally reported warning may not necessarily be a virtual asset account, but could also be a deposit account or electronic payment account; also referring to the Deposit Account Chapter's Bank Association Letter No. 1141000484, the judicial police authority "reports" warnings, and after the concerned institutions handle and verify, they "reply" to the judicial police authority to transmit joint prevention information. Therefore, the term "report" is amended to "reply" to distinguish them, and Articles 1, 2, and 3 are amended.

Article 49 If the virtual assets or funds in a virtual asset account have already been subject to seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar dispositions under other laws, and subsequently receives a notification to freeze the fraud virtual assets or funds in the virtual asset account, the virtual asset service provider shall still freeze the fraud virtual assets or funds, but such virtual assets or funds shall be handled first according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 50 Virtual asset service providers should, as much as possible, set up a 24-hour joint prevention reporting dedicated window to conduct joint prevention reporting mechanism operations.

When a virtual asset service provider sets up the reporting window mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately notify the Virtual Currency Association of the Republic of China; the same applies when the window changes.

This article remains unchanged.

Article 51 If the customer of the virtual asset account receiving the frozen virtual assets or funds has doubts about the freezing of their virtual assets or funds, the customer shall handle the matter with the judicial police authority that originally reported the warning virtual asset account, and the virtual asset service provider shall provide assistance when necessary.

Chapter 5 Return of Remaining Funds or Virtual Assets
Chapter 5 Return of Remaining Funds or Virtual Assets
The chapter title remains unchanged.

Section 1 Deposit Accounts
Section 1 Deposit Accounts
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 52 If a deposit account is suspected of involving fraud crimes and is reported as a warning deposit account, and there are funds remitted (transferred) by the victim into the account that have not been withdrawn, upon the judicial police authority notifying the deposit institution in writing to return the remaining funds in the warning deposit account to the victim, and copying the account holder, the deposit institution may, upon receiving the written notification, proceed with the return.

In accordance with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Act, the authority that may notify the return of remaining funds is not limited to the original notifying authority; other judicial police authorities may also do so, so Article 1 is textually amended.

Article 53 When the deposit institution handles the matter according to the preceding article, it shall notify the victim through the remitting (transferring) deposit institution or electronic payment institution. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the deposit institution shall, based on the remittance (transfer) time sequence, verify the unwithdrawn portion of each transaction, calculating backwards from the last amount to the point where the account balance reaches zero, and return the remaining funds in the warning deposit account:

Identity documents.
Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet or documents issued by the judicial police authority.
An affidavit stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the deposit institution, the victim bears all legal responsibilities.

Considering practical situations where victims report to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, but that bureau's criminal investigation does not have a statutory case acceptance (handling) proof sheet for victims to check, but rather the case acceptance (handling) unit provides letters or other documents for verification, Article 2 is textually amended.

Article 54 If the deposit institution, when handling the return of remaining funds in warning deposit accounts according to the preceding two articles, encounters any of the following circumstances, it may directly close the account and transfer the remaining funds to other payables, to be handled when legally eligible persons apply for payment:

The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making operational costs unjustified.
More than three months have passed since receiving the judicial police authority's notification to return funds, and the victim still cannot be contacted.
The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the deposit institution directly closes the account according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning to be lifted or the warning period to expire before lifting the warning effect on the account holder.

To clarify the meaning and in accordance with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Act, the authority that may notify the return of remaining funds is not limited to the original notifying authority; other judicial police authorities may also do so, so Article 1, Paragraph 2 is textually amended.

Article 55 If the funds in a deposit account have already been subject to seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar dispositions under other laws, and subsequently receives the notification from the judicial police authority of Article 52 to the deposit institution to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled first according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts
Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 56 If an electronic payment account is suspected of involving fraud crimes and is reported as a warning electronic payment account, and there are funds remitted (transferred) by the victim into the account that have not been withdrawn, upon the judicial police authority notifying the electronic payment institution in writing to return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account to the victim, and copying the user, the electronic payment institution may, upon receiving the written notification, proceed with the return.

Article 57 When the electronic payment institution handles the matter according to the preceding article, it shall notify the victim through the remitting (transferring) electronic payment institution or deposit institution. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the electronic payment institution shall, based on the remittance (transfer) time sequence, verify the unwithdrawn portion of each transaction, calculating backwards from the last amount to the point where the account balance reaches zero, and return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account:

Identity documents.
Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet or documents issued by the judicial police authority.
An affidavit stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the electronic payment institution, the victim bears all legal responsibilities.

Article 58 If the electronic payment institution, when handling the return of remaining funds in warning electronic payment accounts according to the preceding two articles, encounters any of the following circumstances, it may directly close the account and transfer the remaining funds to other payables, to be handled when legally eligible persons apply for payment:

The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making operational costs unjustified.
More than three months have passed since receiving the judicial police authority's notification to return funds, and the victim still cannot be contacted.
The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the electronic payment institution directly closes the account according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning to be lifted or the warning period to expire before lifting the warning effect on the account user.

Article 59 If the funds in an electronic payment account have already been subject to seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar dispositions under other laws, and subsequently receives the notification from the judicial police authority of Article 56 to the electronic payment institution to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled first according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Section 3 Credit Cards
Section 3 Credit Cards
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 60 If a credit card billing number is suspected of involving fraud crimes and is reported as a warning credit card billing number, and there are funds remitted (transferred) by the victim into the account, upon the judicial police authority notifying the credit card business institution in writing to return the remaining funds in the warning credit card billing number to the victim, and copying the cardholder, the credit card business institution may, upon receiving the written notification, proceed with the return.

Article 61 When the credit card business institution handles the matter according to the preceding article, if the funds were remitted (transferred) through a deposit institution or electronic payment institution, it may notify the victim through the remitting (transferring) deposit institution or electronic payment institution. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the credit card business institution shall, based on the remittance (transfer) time sequence, verify each transaction, and return the remaining funds in the warning credit card billing number:

Identity documents.
Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet or documents issued by the judicial police authority.
An affidavit stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the credit card business institution, the victim bears all legal responsibilities.

Article 62 If the credit card business institution, when handling the return of remaining funds in warning credit card billing numbers according to the preceding two articles, encounters any of the following circumstances, it may directly transfer the account's remaining funds to other payables, to be handled when legally eligible persons apply for payment:

The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making operational costs unjustified.
More than three months have passed since receiving the judicial police authority's notification to return funds, and the victim still cannot be contacted.
The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the credit card business institution directly transfers the account's remaining funds to other payables according to the preceding paragraph, the credit card business institution must still wait for the warning to be lifted or the warning period to expire before lifting the warning effect on the credit card.

Article 63 If the funds in a credit card billing number have already been subject to seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar dispositions under other laws, and subsequently receives the notification from the judicial police authority of Article 60 to the credit card business institution to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled first according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts
Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 64 If a virtual asset account is suspected of involving fraud crimes and is reported as a warning virtual asset account, and there are virtual assets or funds delivered or remitted (transferred) by the victim into the account that have not been withdrawn or transferred, upon the judicial police authority notifying the virtual asset service provider in writing to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the warning virtual asset account to the victim, and copying the account holder, the virtual asset service provider may, upon receiving the written notification, proceed with the return.

In accordance with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Act, the authority that may notify the return of remaining virtual assets or funds is not limited to the original notifying authority; other judicial police authorities may also do so, so Article 1 is textually amended.

Police agencies notify virtual asset service providers in writing to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in flagged virtual asset accounts to victims, and copy the customers of the flagged virtual asset accounts. Upon receipt of the written notice, virtual asset service providers may proceed with the return.

When virtual asset service providers return the remaining virtual assets in flagged virtual asset accounts in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they may first sell the remaining virtual assets in the flagged virtual asset accounts through the virtual asset service providers, and then return the proceeds from the sale to the victims.

Agencies notify virtual asset service providers in writing to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in flagged virtual asset accounts to victims, and copy the customers of the flagged virtual asset accounts. Upon receipt of the written notice, virtual asset service providers may proceed with the return.

Text corrected.

Considering that some victims of fraud crimes do not have virtual asset accounts and cannot receive fraud funds that have been converted into virtual assets, and since the value of virtual assets fluctuates with the market, to facilitate the determination of the total value of remaining funds and virtual assets in flagged virtual asset accounts for the execution of subsequent item-by-item return procedures, it is specified that virtual asset service providers may sell the remaining virtual assets in flagged virtual asset accounts before returning them, to comply with practical return operations. Therefore, a second paragraph is added.

Article 65 When virtual asset service providers handle matters in accordance with the preceding article, they shall notify victims through the virtual asset service providers, deposit-taking institutions, or electronic payment institutions from which the virtual assets were remitted/transferred. Victims shall submit the following documents, and the virtual asset service providers shall determine, item by item in the order of remittance/transfer, the portion that has not yet been withdrawn or transferred. Starting from the last transaction amount, they shall calculate backwards until the amount of virtual assets or funds in the account reaches zero, and return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the flagged virtual asset accounts:

Identity documents.
Case acceptance/handling certificate or documents issued by judicial police agencies.

Article 65 When virtual asset service providers handle matters in accordance with the preceding article, they shall notify victims through the virtual asset service providers from which the virtual assets were remitted/transferred. Victims shall submit the following documents, and the virtual asset service providers shall determine, item by item in the order of remittance/transfer, the portion that has not yet been withdrawn or transferred. Starting from the last transaction amount, they shall calculate backwards until the amount of virtual assets or funds in the account reaches zero, and return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the flagged virtual asset accounts:

Identity documents.
Case acceptance/handling certificate issued by the police.
A sworn statement assuming all legal responsibilities if the application is false and causes losses to the virtual asset service provider.

When virtual asset service providers handle the return of remaining virtual assets or funds in flagged virtual asset accounts, other virtual asset service providers, deposit-taking institutions, and electronic payment institutions shall cooperate to provide information necessary for the return operation within the necessary scope, including remittance account information, remittance time, remittance amount, virtual asset account information, and other information sufficient to confirm the return order and amount.

The fields, format, timing of provision, notification methods, and operational procedures for the data in the preceding paragraph shall be formulated by the Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association in consultation with the Taipei Bankers Association and the Taiwan Electronic Payment Business Association, and reported to the competent authority for the record.

In cases of fraud involving virtual assets, victims' funds are first remitted/transferred to head accounts at deposit-taking institutions, and then transferred to virtual asset accounts with the same name. Since virtual asset service providers cannot obtain upstream remittance/transfer information, they cannot calculate or contact the victims and amounts to be returned for flagged virtual asset account balances, hindering the execution of related return procedures. Therefore, it is specified that victims be notified through deposit-taking institutions or electronic payment institutions from which the funds were remitted/transferred. In practice, some victims report to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, but this bureau does not uniformly issue case acceptance/handling certificates for criminal investigations. Instead, the handling unit provides letters or other documents for victims to use as evidence. Therefore, the first paragraph is amended.
Given that the flow of fraud funds often involves fiat currency collection and payment accounts at deposit-taking institutions, financial institutions providing virtual account services, and virtual asset service providers, each institution holds different data such as victims' remittance records, virtual account correspondence information, and virtual asset transaction records. To facilitate the return of remaining funds or virtual assets in fraud cases, a cooperation mechanism among relevant institutions is established. It is specified that relevant institutions shall cooperate to provide information necessary for the return operation within the necessary scope to facilitate the confirmation of return order and amount. The Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association is authorized to formulate relevant specifications regarding data fields, formats, and operational procedures in consultation with the Bankers Association and the Electronic Payment Business Association, to improve the efficiency of return operations while兼顾ing personal data protection and confidentiality obligations. Therefore, the second and third paragraphs are added.

Article 66 When virtual asset service providers handle the return of remaining virtual assets or funds in flagged virtual asset accounts in accordance with the preceding two articles, if any of the following circumstances exist, they may directly close the account and transfer the remaining virtual assets or funds to other payables for virtual assets or other payables, to be handled when legally entitled persons apply for payment:

The remaining virtual assets or funds are below a certain amount, making the return operation cost-ineffective.
More than three months have passed since receiving the notice from the judicial police agency to return the assets, and the victim still cannot be contacted.
The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the virtual assets or funds.

After a virtual asset service provider directly closes an account in accordance with the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the flag notification to be lifted or the flag period to expire before lifting the flag effect on the customer of the flagged virtual asset account.

The remaining virtual assets or funds are below a certain amount, making the return operation cost-ineffective.
More than three months have passed since the flag notification, and the original notifying agency has not notified the handling of the return of virtual assets or funds, or the victim cannot be contacted.
The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the virtual assets or funds.

To clarify the meaning and in coordination with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Act, the agencies authorized to notify the return of remaining virtual assets or funds are not limited to the original notifying agency; other judicial police agencies may also do so. Therefore, minor textual corrections are made to the second paragraph of the first item.

Article 67 If the virtual assets or funds in a virtual asset account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions in accordance with other laws, and the virtual asset service provider subsequently receives a notice from the judicial police agency under Article 64 to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in that account, such virtual assets or funds shall be handled in priority according to the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Article 67 If the virtual assets or funds in a virtual asset account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions in accordance with other laws, and the virtual asset service provider subsequently receives a notice from the original notifying agency under Article 64 to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in that account, such virtual assets or funds shall be handled in priority according to the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

In coordination with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Act, the agencies authorized to notify the return of remaining virtual assets or funds are not limited to the original notifying agency; other judicial police agencies may also do so. Therefore, minor textual corrections are made.

Section 5: Supervisory Directors and Circumstances Where Return Is Impossible
Section 5: Dedicated Supervisory Directors and Circumstances Where Return Is Impossible
Section title adjusted.

Article 68 Deposit-taking institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, and virtual asset service providers shall designate a deputy general manager or a supervisor of equivalent rank to supervise the handling of remaining funds or virtual assets in flagged deposit accounts, flagged electronic payment accounts, flagged credit card write-off numbers, or flagged virtual asset accounts.

Article 68 Deposit-taking institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, and virtual asset service providers shall designate a deputy general manager or a supervisor of equivalent rank to be specifically responsible for supervising the handling of remaining funds or virtual assets in flagged deposit accounts, flagged electronic payment accounts, flagged credit card write-off numbers, or flagged virtual asset accounts.

To avoid ambiguity regarding whether the personnel supervising the handling of remaining funds or virtual assets in flagged deposit accounts, flagged electronic payment accounts, flagged credit card write-off numbers, or flagged virtual asset accounts at deposit-taking institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, and virtual asset service providers must be dedicated, minor textual corrections are made.

Article 69 Cases determined by deposit-taking institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers to be suspected transaction disputes or complex cases, which are not suitable for the return of remaining funds or virtual assets under these Regulations, shall be handled through judicial procedures.

Article 69 Cases involving suspected transaction disputes or complex cases are not subject to the return of remaining funds or virtual assets under these Regulations and shall be handled through judicial procedures.

In practice, whether a case is a suspected transaction dispute or a complex case is determined by deposit-taking institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers. To clarify the meaning, minor textual corrections are made.

Chapter 6: Operations of the Fraud Prevention Platform

This chapter is newly added.
In coordination with the addition of Paragraphs 4 and 5 to Article 8 of this Act, which regulate the documents to be attached and other matters to be complied with for the application and approval of the fraud prevention platform, the original Chapter 6 (Supplementary Provisions) is moved to Chapter 7.

Article 70 To establish a fraud prevention platform, the institution establishing the platform shall submit the following documents to the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) for approval:

Operational Plan: Stating the purpose of establishing the fraud prevention platform, participating institutions, operational structure and workflow, risk and benefit assessment, and scheduled implementation timeline.
Explanation of the scope and necessity of customer information collected, processed, and utilized by participating institutions in the fraud prevention platform.
Agreement, template, or explanation of the rights and obligations relationships among the various parties in the fraud prevention platform.
Explanation of the information system and security control operations of the fraud prevention platform.
Other documents required by the FSC.

Before the amendment and promulgation of these Regulations on July 20, 2026, fraud prevention platforms already established after being reported to the FSC are deemed to have obtained the FSC's approval.

This article is newly added.
To facilitate the establishment of the fraud prevention platform and related cooperation, Paragraph 1 specifies that the institution establishing the platform shall apply to the FSC for approval with the required documents.
Before the amendment and promulgation of these Regulations, fraud prevention platforms already established and operating after being reported to and acknowledged by the FSC, such as the "Financial Anti-Fraud Joint Defense Platform" established by Financial Information Service Corporation and the "Financial Industry Inter-bank Fraud Case Reporting System" established by the Financial Union Credit Center, are deemed to have obtained approval after the amendment and implementation of these Regulations, without the need to re-apply. Therefore, Paragraph 2 is added. The original Article 70, in coordination with the addition of relevant articles in this chapter, is moved to Article 73.

Article 71 Participating institutions in the fraud prevention platform may use the services provided by the fraud prevention platform to handle the following operations:

Analysis or identification of abnormal deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, or virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes as prescribed by these Regulations.
Related operations such as inquiries, notifications, and account control as prescribed by these Regulations.

Article 71 Participating institutions in the fraud prevention platform may use the services provided by the fraud prevention platform to handle the operations prescribed by these Regulations.

This article is newly added.
It specifies the operations that participating institutions in the fraud prevention platform may use the platform's services to handle.

Article 72 The institution establishing the fraud prevention platform and participating institutions may, through the fraud prevention platform, collect, process, and utilize customer information of participating institutions within the necessary scope to execute fraud prevention measures prescribed by this Act and these Regulations.

This article is newly added.
To balance personal information protection and the need for fraud prevention, it is specified that the institution establishing and participating institutions in the fraud prevention platform may collect, process, and utilize the scope of customer information of participating institutions (such as flagged account information provided by judicial police agencies).

Chapter 7: Supplementary Provisions
Chapter 6: Supplementary Provisions
Chapter number changed.

Article 73 These Regulations shall take effect on the date of promulgation.

Article 70 These Regulations shall take effect on the date of promulgation.

Article number changed.

Amendment to the Regulations for Financial Institutions and Businesses or Personnel Providing Virtual Asset Services to Prevent Fraudulent Criminal Harm

Amendment to the Regulations for Financial Institutions and Businesses or Personnel Providing Virtual Asset Services to Prevent Fraudulent Criminal Harm - General Explanation

Comparison Table of Revised Articles of the Regulations for Financial Institutions and Businesses or Personnel Providing Virtual Asset Services to Prevent Fraudulent Criminal Harm

Lineage: In force