Consultation · BOE · 18 Nov 2026
This consultation paper proposes amendments to the Prudential Regulation Authority's (PRA) Statement of Policy (SoP4/16) on the implementation of the Other Systemically Important Institution (O-SII) buffer. The proposals clarify that the PRA could use its supervisory discretion to lower O-SII buffer rates for relevant O-SIIs, including to zero, in the event of a shock, particularly when prospective losses could cause firms to restrict lending more than warranted. It also outlines an indicative period following release during which no increase in rates would be expected, and details a typical multi-year rebuild approach, generally allowing firms 12 months to meet each announced rate increase. The PRA invites responses to these proposals by 18 February 2027.
Consultation paper 16/26
Published on 18 November 2026
1.1 Capital buffers are intended to be used in periods of stress. They allow banks to absorb losses while continuing to lend to creditworthy households and businesses. However, concerns about market stigma, supervisory reactions and automatic distribution restrictions can make banks reluctant to use buffers. This may lead banks to restrict lending by more than economic conditions warrant, amplifying shocks and affecting their safety and soundness.
1.2 In July 2026, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) set out work to improve buffer usability in Financial Stability in Focus: The bank capital framework and the PRA statement on enhancing the usability and releasability of capital buffers. Their long-term objective is to pursue international reform towards a simpler capital framework centred on a releasable buffer. As an earlier domestic step, the PRA announced that it would clarify how it could use its existing powers to release Other Systemically Important Institution (O-SII) buffers in systemic stress and subsequently rebuild them. The O-SII buffer is the UK’s capital buffer for certain domestic systemically important banks and building societies that provide significant lending to UK households and non-financial companies.
1.3 This consultation paper (CP) proposes targeted amendments to the PRA’s statement of policy (SoP) on its approach to implementing the O-SII buffer. These would clarify that the PRA could lower rates, including to zero, where prospective losses could cause firms to restrict lending to defend capital positions by more than warranted by the economic outlook and release of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) alone would be insufficient to absorb those losses. This CP also explains the proposed release and rebuild approach.
1.4 Release would lower the capital threshold at which automatic distribution restrictions apply, reducing incentives for banks to make defensive cuts to lending. The additional detail provided in the SoP and the explanation in this CP about release and rebuilding should give firms confidence to use released capital to absorb losses and support lending while preserving normal-times resilience.
1.5 The proposals would not change normal-times O-SII buffer calibration, the FPC’s framework, the PRA’s annual rate-setting process or the scope of firms subject to the buffer.
1.6 The PRA does not expect the proposals to impose costs on firms. They would not introduce new reporting or systems requirements or require action by firms in normal times.
2.1 This CP sets out the PRA’s proposed amendments to SoP4/16 – The PRA’s approach to the implementation of the O-SII buffer. The amendments clarify the circumstances in which the PRA could use its existing supervisory discretion to set lower O-SII buffer rates in the event of a shock. The proposed amendments are set out in Appendix 1.
2.2 The PRA judges that clarifying its approach would give firms greater predictability about how the O-SII buffer could be used in the event of a shock. This should support firms’ willingness to continue to lend to creditworthy households and businesses, reducing incentives for actions that could amplify shocks.
2.3 The PRA proposes to:
include a new paragraph 4.7 in SoP4/16 clarifying that the PRA could use its supervisory discretion to lower O-SII buffer rates for firms, including to zero, in the event of a shock;
provide an indicative period following release during which no increase in O-SII buffer rates would be expected; and
include illustrative scenarios showing how release and rebuild decisions could operate in different circumstances.
2.4 The proposals would apply to relevant O-SIIs – certain domestically important firms that are within the scope of the O-SII buffer. Under the current framework, these are ring-fenced banks, UK deposit takers which hold more than £35 billion in core deposits and do not have material trading activities, or large building societies. The proposals would not change the scope of the O-SII designation process or the scope of firms eligible for an O-SII buffer.
2.5 Capital buffers enable banks to absorb losses in stress while continuing to provide financial services to the real economy. But banks may be reluctant to use regulatory buffers because doing so can trigger automatic restrictions on distributions and may be interpreted negatively by investors, analysts or rating agencies. Firms may also be uncertain about supervisory responses and about how quickly they would be expected to restore their capital positions. These factors may lead firms to maintain capital above their regulatory requirements and buffers, or to restrict lending in stress to avoid entering them.
2.6 This issue may be particularly important for firms subject to the O-SII buffer. These firms are systemically important as they provide a material share of credit and other important services to the UK economy. Defensive action by them could therefore have a significant effect on aggregate credit supply and amplify an adverse shock.
2.7 The FPC and PRC’s roles in relation to the O-SII buffer are set out in legislation. The FPC maintains and reviews the O-SII buffer framework, while the PRA identifies O-SIIs and applies that framework to set rates for eligible firms annually.
2.8 In July 2026, the FPC set out a long-term vision for improving the capital buffer framework. It intends to work with the PRA and international authorities towards a simpler framework centred on a single buffer that is releasable in stress and can be used without automatic restrictions on distributions. The PRA’s proposals for the O-SII buffer are an earlier domestic step towards that objective.
2.9 The PRA proposes that the amended SoP would take effect on publication of the final policy. No changes to PRA rules, new reporting or action by firms in normal times would be required.
2.10 If the PRA released O-SII buffers in the event of a shock, it would communicate the revised rates, the date from which they applied and an indicative period during which no increase would be expected. This would enable firms to apply the lower rates in their capital planning and use the released capital to absorb losses and continue lending to creditworthy households and businesses. When the PRA subsequently decided that rebuilding should begin, it would communicate the applicable rates and implementation period.
2.11 The PRA invites responses to the proposals set out in this consultation by Thursday 18 February 2027. See ‘Responding to the consultation’ for details on how to respond and for information on how the PRA handles your personal data.
3.1 As set out in the July 2026 Financial Stability in Focus (FSiF), firms and other external stakeholders have highlighted uncertainty around supervisory responses as one factor that can impede buffer usability. In these proposals, the PRA clarifies how it could use its existing discretion to promote the use of the O-SII buffer in stress.
3.2 The PRA proposes to amend SoP4/16, adding a new paragraph 4.7, to clarify that it could exercise its existing supervisory judgment to lower O-SII buffer rates for firms, including to zero, in the event of a shock. The PRA also proposes to include illustrative scenarios for releasing and rebuilding the buffer as an annex to the SoP. The proposed amendments are set out in Appendix 1.
3.3 The proposals would not change the methodology used to calculate O-SII buffer rates in normal times. The FPC would continue to maintain and review the framework and its calibration methodology. The PRA would continue to identify O-SIIs and set rates for eligible firms by applying that framework while retaining its existing supervisory discretion to set a different rate in exceptional circumstances.
3.4 The purpose of the proposed amendment is to clarify that an economic shock is an exceptional circumstance and therefore the PRA could use its existing supervisory discretion to release the O-SII buffer in the event of a shock. A lower rate would reduce the level of capital at which automatic restrictions on distributions apply, reducing firms’ incentives to restrict lending to creditworthy households and businesses solely to protect their capital positions.
3.5. The PRA expects to lower O-SII buffer rates for firms, if it anticipates that they faced the prospect of losses that could otherwise lead them to restrict lending to defend capital positions by more than was warranted by the economic outlook, and that the release by the FPC of the countercyclical capital buffer alone would be insufficient to absorb those losses. The PRA would make this judgement in engagement with the FPC, considering factors such as the nature of the shock, financial-system conditions, market functioning, actual and expected losses, firms’ capital positions, and the risk of defensive lending cuts or other actions to protect capital.
3.6 These factors would inform an overall judgement and not constitute a mechanical test. The PRA and FPC would engage closely and take account of each other’s actions, while deciding in line with their respective responsibilities. A CCyB release would not automatically lead to an O-SII buffer release.
3.7 The proposed SoP annex (Appendix 1) provides three illustrative release scenarios, building on the scenarios set out in the FPC’s CCyB policy statement. The scenarios would not bind either authority’s response to a future stress.
3.8 The proposed SoP annex sets out illustrative scenarios where:
a large external shock could warrant O-SII buffer release where CCyB release alone was insufficient;
an escalating or multi-stage stress could lead the PRA to leave O-SII buffers unchanged initially and reconsider their release if the stress intensified; and
release would be unlikely, as there was a mild economic downturn, CCyB release was sufficient, or the market or non-bank stress did not threaten affected firms’ ability to continue supplying credit.
3.9 At release, the PRA would provide an indicative period during which no increase in O-SII buffer rates would be expected, taking account of the nature and expected duration of the stress and relevant FPC actions, including any UK CCyB indicative period. This would give firms confidence to use released capital rather than rebuild it immediately.
3.10 The period would not create an automatic rebuild timetable and could be extended if conditions did not support rebuilding, including where impairments emerged with a lag.
3.11 By the end of the indicative period, the PRA would assess whether firms could rebuild their O-SII buffers while continuing to lend to creditworthy households and businesses. The timing and pace of rebuild would reflect the strength and expected path of the recovery, credit conditions, firms’ realised and expected losses, profitability, capital generation and positions, buffer use, the risk of further stress and relevant FPC decisions, including on the UK CCyB.
3.12 Rebuilding the O-SII buffer would typically take place over a multi-year period. The PRA would seek to avoid a pace or combination of increases that placed unnecessary pressure on firms to restrict lending or raise external capital during the recovery. At the same time, it would take account of the benefits of restoring firms’ structural resilience so that they were able to absorb future shocks.
3.13 When the PRA increases the O-SII buffer rates in stages as part of the rebuild, firms would have 12 months, in general, before each announced rate in each stage must be met. The PRA may set a shorter implementation period in exceptional circumstances.
3.14 The proposed SoP annex illustrates three rebuild paths. The first is a relatively faster, typically multi-year rebuild where recovery and capital generation were strong and losses and buffer use limited. The second is a gradual rebuild during a moderate recovery. The third is a longer period, or extension of the indicative period, where recovery was weak, losses material or uncertainty persistent.
3.15 The scenarios and qualitative chart in the proposed SoP annex are illustrative, not exhaustive or binding. The PRA would keep the timing and pace of rebuilding under review as conditions changed.
3.16 The O-SII buffer is mirrored in the UK’s leverage ratio framework as part of the additional leverage ratio buffer (ALRB), which is calibrated in reference to the O-SII buffer. Hence, a reduction in the O-SII buffer would automatically flow through to the ALRB.
3.17 The PRA’s existing Pillar 2 and leverage ratio methodologies set out the related group add-ons. If the O-SII buffer were released, the PRA would consider corresponding changes to any PRA buffer group risk add-on and leverage ratio group add-on, where applicable, to reflect release at group level in both frameworks.
3.18 In future Bank Capital Stress Tests, the FPC and PRA intend O-SII hurdle rates to reflect prevailing O-SII buffer rates, so that stress testing would not require firms to rebuild a released buffer faster than intended by the FPC and PRC.
4.1 The proposals support the PRA’s primary safety and soundness objective by improving buffer usability. Greater clarity about how the O-SII buffer could be released and subsequently rebuilt should reduce uncertainty about regulatory expectations in stress and give firms greater confidence to use released capital, rather than taking defensive actions to protect their capital positions. Helping firms maintain lending during a shock should reduce adverse effects on UK financial stability, without changing normal-times resilience.
4.2 The PRA has assessed whether the proposals in this CP facilitate its secondary objectives related to effective competition, the international competitiveness of the UK economy and its growth in the medium to long term. The proposals are intended to improve capital buffer usability in the event of a shock and support the continued provision of credit to creditworthy households and businesses by firms subject to the O-SII buffer. This should mitigate the risk of a pro-cyclical reduction in credit supply and support economic growth during periods of stress. The proposals should also provide greater clarity and predictability about how the PRA could release and subsequently rebuild the O-SII buffer, thereby increasing firms’ confidence that released capital can be used to absorb losses and support lending.
4.3 The PRA has also considered the implications of the proposals for competition. The proposals apply only to firms subject to the O-SII buffer and could therefore affect the relative position of those firms compared with firms that are not subject to the buffer in the event of a shock. However, the PRA considers that any such effects are likely to be limited. The proposals would not change the methodology used to identify O-SIIs, the normal-times calibration of the O-SII buffer, or the firms to which the framework applies. Rather, they clarify how the PRA could use existing powers in exceptional circumstances.
4.4 By helping firms subject to the O-SII buffer to continue lending and providing financial services during periods of stress, the proposals may also support the international competitiveness of UK domestic systemically important firms. The PRA considers the proposals to be consistent with the principles-based Basel framework for domestic systemically important banks. That framework allows for an appropriate degree of national discretion, and the proposals would not alter the methodology for identifying systemically important firms. By clarifying how the buffer could be temporarily released and subsequently rebuilt, the proposals would also support the Basel framework’s broader objective that capital buffers should be usable in stress to absorb losses while supporting the provision of key financial services.
4.5 In developing these proposals, the PRA has had regard to its framework of regulatory principles. The regulatory principles that the PRA considers are most material to the proposals include:
4.6 Sustainable economic growth: The proposals support sustainable economic growth by improving capital-buffer usability in the event of a shock. Releasing the O-SII buffer would help banks continue lending to creditworthy households and businesses, reducing incentives to restrict lending defensively and supporting the flow of credit to the real economy during an economic shock.
4.7 Transparency: The proposals improve transparency by providing greater clarity on how the PRA could use its existing powers to release and rebuild the O-SII buffer in the event of a shock, including the factors it may consider when determining whether release is appropriate and the approach it may take to rebuilding the buffer. This should improve firms’ understanding of how the framework would operate in stress.
4.8 A regulatory environment that facilitates growth through supporting competition and innovation: The proposals support competitiveness by reducing incentives for firms to restrict lending defensively and support the continued provision of credit to households and businesses during an economic shock.
4.9 Accountability: The proposals will be subject to public consultation before any final policy decisions are taken. The PRA will consider consultation responses before publishing its final policy.
4.10 The main expected benefit of the proposals is greater clarity and transparency for firms about how the PRA could use its existing discretion to release and subsequently rebuild the O-SII buffer in the event of a shock. This should give firms greater predictability about how the framework could operate in stress and greater confidence that released capital could be used to absorb losses and support lending rather than having to be rebuilt immediately. By reducing uncertainty, the proposals should also support the wider benefits of improved buffer usability described earlier in this CP.
4.11 The PRA does not expect the proposals to impose costs on firms. They clarify how the PRA could exercise powers it already has and do not change normal-times O-SII buffer rates, the annual rate-setting process or the scope of firms subject to the framework. They would not introduce new reporting requirements, require changes to firms’ systems or require firms to take any action in normal times. If the buffer were released in the event of a shock, the resulting reduction in capital requirements would temporarily reduce firms’ structural resilience. However, capital buffers are intended to be used in stress to absorb losses while allowing firms to continue providing important financial services. Release would therefore make the O-SII buffer usable as intended. In deciding whether release was appropriate, the PRA would weigh those benefits against the risks associated with lower requirements, including the possibility of further shocks.
4.12 The PRA also does not expect the proposals to give rise to material implementation costs for the PRA, as they would be implemented through amendments to the existing SoP and delivered using existing processes and resources. Any future decision to release or rebuild the O-SII buffer would be an exercise of the PRA’s existing supervisory discretion in response to the circumstances at the time.
4.13 The CBA Panel was not consulted as the PRA is not proposing changes to rules and the proposals are below the CBA Panel materiality threshold.
5.1 No statutory panels were consulted about the proposals in this CP.
5.2 The PRA considers that the impact of the proposed changes on mutuals is expected to be no different from the impact on other firms. The proposals apply equally to all firms within the scope of the O-SII buffer framework and do not alter the scope of that framework.
5.3 In developing its proposals, the PRA has had due regard to the equality objectives under s.149 of the Equality Act 2010. The PRA considers that the proposals do not give rise to equality and diversity implications.
5.4 In developing the proposals, the PRA has had regard to the FSMA regulatory principles and the aspects of the Government’s economic policy as set out in the HMT recommendation letter from November 2024. The PRA has set out its views on the ‘have regards’ it considers significant from paragraph 4.5.
5.5 The PRA has had regard to other factors as required. Where analysis has not been provided against a ‘have regard’ in this document, it is because the PRA considers that ‘have regard’ not to be a significant factor for the proposals.
6.1 By responding to the consultation, you share personal data with the Bank of England (including the PRA), which may include your name, contact details (including, if provided, details of the organisation you work for), and opinions or details offered in the response itself. For more information about how the PRA handles responses to PRA consultations see PRA consultations and discussion papers – your personal data. You have several rights under data protection laws in relation to data held about you. For further information on exercising these rights, including how to contact our Data Protection Officer, view our full privacy notice.
6.2 The PRA invites responses to the proposals set out in this consultation by Thursday 18 February 2027.
6.3 Please indicate in your response if you believe any of the proposals in this CP are likely to impact persons who share protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, and if so, please explain which groups and what the impact on such groups might be.
6.4 The PRA will publish a general summary of responses to this consultation and is required to include respondents’ names if consent is given. When responding, please clearly indicate whether or not you consent to the PRA publishing your name, and/or the name of your organisation, as a respondent to this CP. Please make it clear if you are responding as an individual or on behalf of an organisation. Consent can be withheld or withdrawn at any time. If you wish to withdraw your consent to the PRA publishing your name, please contact the PRA using the contact details set out below. If you do not give consent to the PRA publishing your name, the PRA may still collect, record and store your response in accordance with the information provided above.
6.5 Please address any comments or enquiries to CP16_26@bankofengland.co.uk.
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