Rule · NBB · 14 Apr 2026 · NBB_2026_06
Institutions offering payment account services under the AML/CFT Act must treat fraud proceeds as within AML/CFT scope, identify customers and beneficial owners (driving licences unacceptable; UBO register consultation required), and refuse relationships or transactions where risk-proportionate measures cannot be applied. They must monitor rapid pass-through transfers, verify IBAN name matches, include fraud-laundering risk in risk assessments, forward complaints to AML teams without delay, and report atypical transactions to the CTIF-CFI under Article 45 et seq.
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Public
Brussels, 14 April 2026
Reference:
NBB_2026_06
Your correspondent:
Stéphane Folie
Phone: +32 2 221 31 41 stephane.folie@nbb.be
Institutions offering payment account services falling within the scope of application of the Act of 18 September 2017 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and on restriction of the use of cash.
The National Bank of Belgium analysed transactions carried out through accounts held with financial institutions involving funds derived from a large-scale case of fraud. It examined the customer and transaction due diligence applied, including suspicious activity reports submitted to the CTIF-CFI.
Dear Sir or Madam,
Further to the exercise of its supervisory powers in the area of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing (hereinafter “AML/CFT”), the National Bank of Belgium (hereinafter “the Bank”) analysed a case of investment fraud and supplemented its findings by examining the individual complaints it received.
Based on this analysis and the additional information brought to its attention, the Bank identified good practices but also shortcomings in the control procedures and systems of certain institutions.
Expectations and recommendations have thus been formulated.
A copy of this communication is being sent by email to the accredited statutory auditor(s) of your institution.
Yours faithfully,
Pierre Wunsch
Governor
Fraud is inextricably linked to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, to the extent that the proceeds from fraudulent activities must be laundered and reinjected into the economy using various techniques, some of which involve the use of payment accounts opened with financial institutions.
In recent years, the spread of fraud has been accelerated by the emergence of technologies such as generative artificial intelligence, which allow criminals to improve the quality of documents, websites and other techniques designed to deceive. Fraud is currently considered a growing and extremely significant threat. Various authorities, including the European Banking Authority1 and the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (hereinafter “the CTIF-CFI”),2 have underscored in recent publications the increasingly serious problem of the laundering of funds resulting from fraud.
There are many different types of fraud, which can be distinguished based on whether the fraudulent payments are initiated without the payer’s knowledge or as a result of manipulation (the customer is the victim of fraud orchestrated by a third party)3 or whether they are carried out by the customer directly, using the services of the financial institution for illegal purposes (“first-party fraud”).
This Communication focuses on first-party fraud, i.e. situations in which the person perpetuating the fraud (the fraudster or money mule) is a legitimate customer of the financial institution, merchant or payment service.
The National Bank of Belgium (hereinafter “the Bank”) notes that deceit, theft and the misappropriation of funds are criminal activities covered by the Act of 18 September 2017 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and on restriction of the use of cash (hereinafter the “AML/CFT Act”) and grouped under the term “fraud” for purposes of this Communication.
Further to the exercise of the Bank’s statutory powers, this Communication addresses the issue of fraud through the use of current accounts opened with financial institutions incorporated under Belgian law for the purpose of laundering the proceeds of fraud.4
Criminals resort to various methods to launder money extorted from their victims in order to conceal the unlawful origin of the funds and reinject them into the legitimate economy, particularly through financial institutions. Thus, a victim of fraud or deceit may be tricked into transferring funds to a customer’s account at a financial institution. The holder of this intermediate account, or “rebound account”, then wires the funds to one or more other accounts, often held abroad, in order to conceal the unlawful origin.
[1] See, in particular, the EBA Opinion of 29 April 2024 on new types of payment fraud and possible mitigants (EBA-Op/2024/01) and the EBA Report on money laundering and terrorist financing risks affecting the EU’s financial sector (EBA/REP/2025/22), published in July 2025.
[2] See the Vademecum on “Typologies of money laundering schemes identified by the CTIF/CFI” (2024).
[3] Such situations include phishing, a technique designed to obtain personal data without the subject’s knowledge or by posing as a trusted third party. They also cover cases of fraud relying on emotional manipulation or the promise of quick gains to convince someone to accept an offer (e.g. bogus investments or drawings, relationship scams, etc.). For more information, please see the FPS Economy’s website: Différentes formes d’arnaques | SPF Economie.
[4] Victim protection-related aspects that fall within the remit of other authorities are not discussed in this Communication.
The Bank reminds financial institutions that it is unacceptable to consider transactions performed as a result of fraud (particularly incoming transfers) in order to conceal the origin of funds as falling outside the scope of the anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing (hereinafter “AML/CFT”) obligations imposed by the AML/CFT Act.
The Bank further points out that it is not the responsibility of financial institutions to determine the precise nature of criminal activity underlying the facts or transactions giving rise to a suspicion of money laundering. The obligations of the AML/CFT Act apply even when the activities generating the funds or assets to be laundered are carried out on the territory of another EU Member State or a non-EEA country. Criminals use various strategies in this regard, such as setting up or taking control of existing companies, false identities or money mules, i.e. legitimate customers who, in return for payment, use or give access to their bank or payment account for money laundering purposes.
The Bank has become aware of a large-scale case of investment fraud, in the framework of which foreign investors were tricked into believing that they were investing with Belgian credit institutions when in fact the identity of these institutions had been stolen.5 Criminals approached the targets via specialised websites, posing as financial intermediaries and claiming to be partners of credit institutions operating in Belgium. The victims were swayed by the professionalism of the people who contacted them and the high quality of the documents presented to them (fake brochures, letters and emails, use of the identity of actual employees of the institutions). The perpetrators presented them with attractive investment proposals that outperformed industry standards (term deposits with lucrative returns). They were also led to believe that these alleged financial intermediaries had opened a term account in their name, where they could deposit funds. These accounts were in fact rebound accounts, opened with Belgian financial institutions in the name of money mules. The funds deposited by the defrauded parties in these accounts were quickly transferred to foreign accounts.
The Bank questioned the financial institutions used to perpetrate fraud and examined their customer and transaction due diligence, including any suspicious activity reports submitted to the CTIF-CFI.
Financial institutions are generally well aware of the statutory requirements relating to customer identification. A risk-based approach is applied, and the information referred to in Article 26 §2 of the AML/CFT Act is collected for customers presenting a “standard” level of risk, it being understood that additional information may be requested when entering into a relationship with a customer presenting a “high” degree of risk. The Bank notes that this is an obligation to achieve a specific result which cannot be deferred and that failure to fulfil this obligation must result in refusal to enter into a business relationship or to execute the proposed transaction.
With regard to the method behind the large-scale case of fraud, the Bank noted that the rebound accounts used were held by both natural and legal persons. Some accountholders had only recently entered into a business relationship with the institution, while others had been customers for several years.
In addition to a visual check of the identity document presented when establishing a face-to-face business relationship, the Bank expects institutions to take measures to verify the authenticity of the document (particularly if it has been reported as lost or stolen). The automated reading and storage of the information contained in an electronic identity card ensures instant access to the main items of information required to identify a natural person.
[5] See also the CTIF-CFI’s Annual Report (2024), p. 23.
The Bank noted, in the context of another investigation, that:
o electronic identity cards were not systematically read;
o the validity/authenticity of eIDs was not systematically verified using the Checkdoc database (https://www.checkdoc.be/);
o the procedures in place did not stop the onboarding process or transaction when the eID was indicated by Checkdoc as being lost or stolen.
The Bank encourages the implementation of the abovementioned measures, including the eID card reading at physical branches. Checkdoc may be used systematically and the establishment of blocking procedures within institutions upon the occurrence of a hit is considered appropriate.
When onboarding is based on another type of identity document (such as a foreign passport6), the risk that this document may not be authentic should be taken into account, although the security features of passports mitigate this risk. The Bank reminds institutions that a driving licence is not considered an acceptable form of identification.
The Bank would also like to draw attention to the fact that cases of attempted onboarding at a branch relatively far from the declared place of residence (or with which there appears to be no other geographical link) have been reported. This factor should be considered a warning sign that customer-facing branch staff should be trained to recognise.
Onboarding a legal entity and its beneficial owners will necessarily entail the application of identification and identity verification measures. In situations involving standard risk, the Bank recommends that the identification data of companies and legal persons incorporated under Belgian law be verified using documents generally accepted under Belgian law as proof of their legal existence, such as the latest consolidated or updated articles of association filed with the registry of the business court or published in the annexes to Moniteur belge. The correct and complete identification of all persons qualifying as beneficial owners is also required. The consultation of the UBO register is necessary.
Consultation of the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises as well as verification of the accuracy of the NACE codes used for the declared activity, is considered desirable.
Identify natural persons, including legal representatives, agents and beneficial owners of legal persons, through the reading of an electronic identity card.
Define internal procedures the other supporting documents to be collected to identify natural persons.
Keep all supporting documents up to date and take steps to ensure their validity and authenticity.
Determine which supporting documents are to be collected to identify legal persons.
Consult the relevant data in the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises.
Check internal databases for any links between customers with the same identification data (e.g. representatives, beneficial owners, residential or registered office address, etc.).
[6] the other documents included in the annexes to the Royal Decree of 8 October 1981 on access to the territory, residence, settlement and removal of foreign nationals
Collecting information on the customer’s income/turnover and the purpose of the business relationship is essential in order to establish the customer’s profile. The declared income and financial situation are key to gaining a proper understanding of the customer (“know thy customer”). For customers that present a standard degree of risk, self-reporting of income is acceptable, if necessary on the basis of income brackets. When the risk appears higher, however, supporting documents should be collected (pay slips, tax assessment notices, annual accounts, etc.). The use of information from open banking may also prove useful. This data should enable institutions to quickly detect changes in the customer’s transactional activity.
Knowledge of the nature of customers’ professional activities is essential as it can help to explain (or disprove) certain characteristics of future transactional activity.
It should be noted that the prohibition on establishing or maintaining a business relationship with a customer or carrying out a transaction requested by a customer applies as soon as the financial institution finds itself unable to implement measures proportionate to the risk, as required by the AML/CFT Act.
As a good practice, the Bank considers desirable that financial institutions collect at least the following information with a view to acquiring the required knowledge of the use to be made by the customer of the account:
o the purpose or reason for opening the (main or secondary) account;
o the nature of the proposed transactions and estimated maximum amount per transaction; or
o the geographical corridors to be used.
Based on the customer’s risk profile, collecting information on compliance with tax and social security obligations, for example by consulting filed annual accounts, obtaining a tax assessment notice or requesting proof of quarterly VAT payments, provides reassurance as to the legality of a legal entity’s activity or, at the very least, limits the risk of dealing with a shell or fictitious company.
It has been found that fraudulent transactions often occur shortly after a change of representative or involve a newly formed company. Consequently, when assessing a corporate customer’s risk profile, financial institutions should take into account warning criteria related to the date of establishment or a change of management.
Financial institutions are also requested to pay particular attention to information regarding the administrative striking-off of a legal entity7 for clear non-compliance with statutory obligations (e.g., a prolonged period of inactivity, failure to update the information on file with the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises or failure to update the register of beneficial owners). This is a red flag, as the transactional activity of an entity that has been stricken off should be nonexistent or at least very low.
Based on the knowledge it has acquired of the nature of the business relationship, the institution should be able to quickly identify, using appropriate scenarios, atypical events or transactions such as:
o a sharp increase in transaction volumes;
o the commencement of or a sudden increase in transactions involving foreign countries; or
o swift transfers of funds abroad, coupled with a low average account balance.
[7] Administrative striking-off, which can take place relatively quickly but does not result in the winding-up of the legal entity, should not be confused with judicial striking-off, which can currently only take place at the end of legal proceedings and results in the winding-up of the legal entity.
o Collect detailed information on the purpose or reason for opening the (main or secondary) account.
o Identify the nature of transactions and the estimated maximum amount per transaction.
o Identify the geographical corridors to be used.
o Obtain information on compliance with tax and social security obligations in order to ensure the substance of the declared activity.
o Develop scenarios to detect substantial changes in transactional activity, such as the sudden emergence of links with foreign counterparties or high-speed transfers coupled with a low average balance.
o Conduct a prior review of transactions exceeding the limits justified by the (known or presumed) activity of the customer.
As indicated above, the Bank analysed certain transactions relating to a large-scale case of investment fraud involving Belgian credit institutions.
The following conclusions can be drawn:
o Although the amounts involved were often modest in relation to the daily transaction volume, a number of atypical transactions and customers were identified by the financial institutions concerned. Enhanced due diligence of customers considered as high risk during onboarding enabled the detection of atypical account movements and a rapid response by the institution.
o It appears that the more limited transaction volume of certain institutions made it possible to detect the pattern of transactions associated with rebound accounts more quickly.
The analysis of transactions executed in connection with the abovementioned case of fraud revealed the following:
o Scenarios designed to detect unusual flows on a recently opened account, such as a change in the size of transactions or transfers to/from abroad, proved effective and enabled certain institutions to respond to requests to recall an incoming transaction or to block debit transactions for the accounts concerned.
o It is necessary to strengthen monitoring scenarios for transactions that involve the crediting of funds to a customer’s account and the rapid transfer of these funds to other accounts. Most alerts and AML/CFT analyses related to debit transactions, without taking into account the origin of the funds that had been credited to the rebound account.
o Transactions on accounts held by legal entities tend to be detected later due to the higher detection thresholds applied to these business relationships.
o The rapid reactivation of dormant accounts is not always properly captured by existing systems.
o Determine during onboarding the types of transactions expected, whether domestic or cross-border, as well as the categories of counterparties (employees, suppliers, government).
o Apply detection scenarios focusing on the absence of transactional activity with payment accounts managed by the tax and social security authorities (e.g. 679 accounts, accounts used by the tax and VAT administrations, or the NSSO, etc.), so as to identify companies that do not comply with their statutory obligations or that use an account exclusively for pass-through purposes.
o Systematically verify that the name of the transferee matches that of the account holder (IBAN name check).
The risk of laundering the proceeds of fraud must be included in the risk assessment performed for the products and services offered to customers. Mitigants must then be developed based on a risk-based approach. That being said, laundering the proceeds of fraud involves the use of products similar to those offered by retail banks to a very large customer base, which makes it particularly difficult to detect atypical facts or transactions.
Financial institutions generally have both an anti-fraud team and an anti-money laundering (AML) team, which report to the chief compliance officer.
While complementary, the anti-fraud and AML departments are usually distinct units. Each carries out its tasks using specific monitoring tools. The main task of the anti-fraud department is to prevent and investigate fraud committed by third parties affecting the institution’s customers (e.g. identity theft or the theft of bank details in order to make unauthorised payments). For its part, the AML department ensures compliance with and implementation of the preventive obligations of the AML/CFT Act, including those relating to the use of financial services for unlawful purposes.
The Bank has noted that, in a number of instances, the detection systems put in place by institutions quickly generated one or more alerts of suspected fraud involving certain accounts. These alerts were then processed to ensure that the accountholder was not a victim of fraud and were therefore analysed from this perspective. Only later, during subsequent transactional activity, did it become clear that the alerts related to first-party fraud.
They were then forwarded by the anti-fraud team to the AML team, thereby allowing the accounts to be frozen and the suspicious activity to be reported to the CTIF-CFI. In some cases, the funds were returned to the defrauded parties.
A request for the return of funds or a complaint from a counterparty constitutes information that must be forwarded without delay to the AML team.
The Bank encourages financial institutions to strengthen intradepartmental information sharing and cooperation, in particular by establishing procedures for the sharing of information and the joint handling of certain complaints or alerts, especially in cases of complex or cross-border fraud. Clear procedures on information sharing should be established to facilitate the identification of new forms of fraud. It is essential to raise awareness and train analysts to understand the issues involved in these types of activities.
The Bank has noted that some institutions, after having identified the organised pattern of money laundering linked to the abovementioned large-scale case of fraud, conducted a lookback analysis of suspicious account activity and transactions meeting the relevant criteria over a given period. This is a good practice which should certainly be encouraged.
The correct application of strong customer authentication measures can mitigate the risk of unauthorised access to customer assets and accounts. However, as mentioned above, in many cases, customers are tricked into revealing their credentials or transferring funds. It is therefore essential to raise customer awareness of the methods used by fraudsters. Some financial institutions have introduced new features (e.g. caller ID). This is undoubtedly a positive development in terms of consumer protection and the fight against fraud. It is also important to ensure that customers are aware of transaction limit settings.
It is strongly recommended to inform the Bank, the FSMA and the FPS Economy when such a practice is detected, so as to ensure, in particular, the provision of information to and the protection of consumers.
Analyses of atypical facts and transactions potentially indicating laundering of the proceeds of fraud must be reported to the CTIF-CFI in accordance with Article 45 et seq. of the AML/CFT Act.
It is helpful for the suspicious activity report to mention if the rebound account still has a positive balance so that the CTIF-CFI and the judicial authorities can take the necessary steps to block the transaction or seize the funds.
The relevance of suspicious activity reports is reinforced by the inclusion of information that helps to identify, insofar as possible, the participants in the criminal organisation concerned and its possible ramifications (e.g. the presence of agents, beneficial owners, counterparties or head offices shared with other companies), where applicable by means of a follow-up suspicious activity report. The Bank reminds institutions that suspicious activity reports should be made in accordance with the procedures and guidelines issued by the CTIF-CFI, particularly in the case of urgent reports or those involving money mules.
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