Consultation · CMA · 10 Nov 2026
The draft Guidelines apply to every market intermediary and VASP licensed by the Authority, plus foreign branches and majority-owned subsidiaries of Kenyan-incorporated reporting institutions. They require Board-approved institutional risk assessments reviewed at least every two years, quarterly MLRO reports to the Board, CDD and EDD including on PEPs and beneficial owners, ongoing monitoring, suspicious transaction reporting, targeted financial sanctions screening with action within 24 hours of a designation, and record keeping. VASPs face additional obligations on virtual asset transfers, blockchain analytics, and custody. The Guidelines come into operation on the date of publication in the Kenya Gazette.
GAZETTE NOTICE NO.
THE CAPITAL MARKETS ACT (Cap. 485A) THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT (Cap. 59A) THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT (Cap. 59B) THE VIRTUAL ASSET SERVICE PROVIDERS ACT (No. 20 of 2025) DRAFT GUIDELINES ON THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING, TERRORISM FINANCING AND PROLIFERATION FINANCING IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 2026
1. Citation and commencement
2. Interpretation
3. Application
4. Objectives
5. Money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing in the capital markets
6. Responsibility of the Board and Management
7. Institutional risk assessment
8. Risk Based Approach and customer risk rating.
9. New products, technologies, and non-face-to-face business
10. Internal controls and compliance programme.
11. Money Laundering Reporting Officer
12. Employee screening and training
13. Independent audit
14. Prohibited accounts and relationships.
15. Group-wide programs, foreign branches, and subsidiaries.
16. When CDD shall be undertaken
17. CDD measures
18. Natural persons
19. Legal persons and beneficial ownership
20. Partnerships
21. Trusts and other legal arrangements
22. Timing of verification and failure to complete CDD
23. Nominee, omnibus and pooled accounts
24. Collective investment schemes
25. Enhanced due diligence.
26. Politically exposed persons
27. Legitimacy of source of funds
28. Existing customers
29. Simplified CDD
30. Reliance on third parties and eligible introducers
31. Wire transfers and payment transparency
32. Correspondent and similar cross-border relationships
33. Ongoing monitoring
34. Complex, unusual and large transactions.
35. Ongoing due diligence and review of customer records
36. Suspicious transaction and activity reporting
37. Reports by securities exchanges and market infrastructure
38. Cash transaction reports.
39. Registration with the Centre
40. Annual compliance report and returns to the Authority.
41. Tipping off and confidentiality
42. Record keeping
43. Customer identification
44. Customer due diligence
45. Record keeping
46. New technology and non-face-to-face transactions
47. Foreign branches and subsidiaries
48. Suspicious transactions
49. Reporting requirements
50. The role of the Capital Markets Authority
51. Continuous monitoring
52. Internal policies, compliance, and training
53. Audit
54. Tipping off
55. Reliance on Third Parties
56. Legal framework
57. Access to and maintenance of sanctions lists
58. Screening
59. Action on a confirmed match
60. False positives, delisting, and unfreezing
61. Proliferation financing risk management
62. Terrorism financing risk management
63. Combating the Financing of Terrorism
64. Combating Proliferation Financing
65. Application of this Part
66. General AML/CFT/CPF obligations of VASPs
67. Compliance officer and MLRO of a VASP
68. CDD for virtual asset business
69. Virtual asset transfers
70. Blockchain analytics and monitoring
71. Custody, freezing orders, and seizure orders
72. Role of the Authority
73. Sanctions for non – compliance
Appendix I: Indicators of potential Money Laundering activities in the capital markets Summary of key reporting and notification timelines.
IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred by Section 12B (2)(g) of the Capital Markets Act, section 36A of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, section 42A of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and section 32(2)(h) of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act the Capital Markets Authority, issues the following Guidelines—
1. These Guidelines may be cited as the Guidelines on the Prevention of Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing and Proliferation Financing in the Capital Markets, 2026. These Guidelines shall come into operation on the date of publication in the Kenya Gazette
2. In these Guidelines, unless the context otherwise requires—
“Act” means the Capital Markets Act.
“Authority” means the Capital Markets Authority
“AML/CFT/CPF” means anti-money laundering, combating the financing of terrorism and countering proliferation financing.
“Beneficial owner” means a natural person who ultimately owns or controls a customer or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted and includes any natural person who ultimately exercises effective control over a legal person or legal arrangement.
“Board” means the board of directors or equivalent governing body of a reporting institution.
“Business relationship” has the meaning assigned to it in the Regulations.
“POCAMLA” means the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009.
“CDD” means customer due diligence.
“CIS” means collective investment scheme.
“Committee" means the Counter Financing of Terrorism Inter-Ministerial Committee established under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
“Competent authority" means a public authority, other than a self-regulatory body, with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering, terrorism financing, or proliferation financing.
“Designated person” means any individual, group, undertaking or entity designated by the United Nations Security Council or a Sanctions Committee or declared a specified entity or
designated by the Cabinet Secretary or the Committee under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the TF Regulations or the PF Regulations, and includes a person acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, such a person.
“Domestic list” means the list of specified entities and designated persons compiled and published under the TF Regulations
“EDD” means enhanced due diligence.
“Financial Action Task Force” means the intergovernmental body established in 1989 by ministers of member jurisdictions, representing most major international financial centers to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures from combating money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.
“Financial Reporting Centre” means the Centre established under section 21 of the Act.
“freeze” means to prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of any funds or other assets on the basis of, and for the duration of the validity of, a designation or freezing action.
“Market intermediary” means a person approved or licensed to transact business by the Capital Markets Authority under Part IV of the Capital Markets Act.
“Money Laundering Reporting Officer” or “MLRO” means a person appointed as such under regulation 12 of the Regulations.
“PF Regulations” means the Prevention of Terrorism (Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Prevention, Suppression and Disruption of Proliferation Financing) Regulations (L.N. 189 of 2023), as amended from time to time, and any regulations replacing them.
“Politically exposed person” or “PEP” has the meaning assigned to it under regulation 26(5) of the Regulations, and includes a domestic PEP, a foreign PEP, a person entrusted with a prominent function by an international organization, and an immediate family member or close business associate of any such person.
“Prevention of Terrorism Act” means the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Cap. 59B).
“Proliferation Act” has the meaning assigned to it under section 2 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
“Proliferation Financing” means providing financial support for, or soliciting or collecting funds for, a proliferation act within the meaning of section 4B of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and includes the provision of funds or other assets or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, transshipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, ballistic, chemical, radiological or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials, including technologies and dual-use goods, in contravention of national law or international obligations, and any act prohibited under the PF Regulations;
“Regulations” means the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2023 (L.N. 153 of 2023).
“Reporting institution” has the meaning assigned to it under section 2 of POCAMLA and, for the purposes of these Guidelines, means a market intermediary or a virtual asset service provider regulated or supervised by the Authority.
“Sanctions Committee” means a committee of the United Nations Security Council established to administer a sanctions regime, including the committees established under resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011) and 1718 (2006), and any successor committee.
“Sanctions list” means the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, the domestic list and any other list of designated persons circulated by the Committee, the Centre, or the Authority.
“Secretary to the Committee” means the Director-General of the Centre, as provided under section 40D(2)(j) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
“Senior management” means an officer or employee with sufficient knowledge of the reporting institution's money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing risk exposure and sufficient seniority to take decisions affecting that exposure and need not in every case be a member of the Board.
“Specified entity” means an entity declared as such by order of the Cabinet Secretary under section 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
“Targeted financial sanctions” means asset freezing and prohibitions to prevent funds or other assets from being made available, directly, or indirectly, for the benefit of designated persons.
“Terrorism financing” has the meaning assigned to it under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and includes the offences under sections 5 and 5A of that Act.
"TF Regulations" means the Prevention of Terrorism (Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Suppression of Terrorism) Regulations, 2024 (L.N. 187 of 2024), which revoked the corresponding Regulations of 2023 (L.N. 152 of 2023), and any regulations replacing them.
“Virtual Asset” has the meaning assigned to it under section 2 of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act.
“Virtual Asset Service Provider” or “VASP” means a person licensed by the Authority under the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act to carry on any of the virtual asset services specified in the First Schedule to that Act.
“Virtual Asset Transfer” means any transaction carried out on behalf of an originator through a VASP with a view to making virtual assets available to a beneficiary, whether or not the originator and the beneficiary are the same person.
“Virtual Asset Service Providers Act” means the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act (No. 20 of 2025).
“VASP Regulation” means the Virtual Asset Service Providers Regulations, 2026 (L.N. 134 of 2026).
“Wire transfer” has the meaning assigned to it under regulation 2 of the Regulations; and
“Without delay” means within twenty-four hours of a designation by the United Nations Security Council or its relevant Sanctions Committee, or of a designation by the Committee, in accordance with regulation 2 of the TF Regulations.
“Regulations” means the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2023; and
“Terrorism financing” includes the offence specified under section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012.
(1) These Guidelines apply to every reporting institution regulated or supervised by the Authority, including—
(a)every market intermediary.
(b)every VASP licensed by the Authority to carry on a virtual asset service, including a virtual asset exchange, trading platform, broker, investment adviser, asset manager, virtual asset offering provider, tokenisation service provider, and token issuance platform; and
(c)the foreign branches and majority-owned subsidiaries of a reporting institution incorporated in Kenya, to the extent provided under paragraph 15.
(2) These Guidelines supplement, and do not replace, the obligations of a reporting institution under POCAMLA, the Regulations, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the TF Regulations, the PF Regulations, the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, the VASP Regulations and any directive or guidance issued by the Centre or the Committee. Where there is any inconsistency, the written law shall prevail.
(3)A reporting institution that is also supervised by another supervisory body for AML/CFT/CPF purposes shall comply with these Guidelines in respect of its capital markets or virtual asset business, in addition to the requirements of that other supervisory body.
The objectives of these Guidelines are to—
a) set out the minimum standards that reporting institutions shall observe to prevent the use of capital markets and the virtual asset sector for money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing.
b) give effect to the obligations of reporting institutions under POCAMLA, the Regulations, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the TF Regulations, the PF Regulations, the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, and the VASP Regulations.
c) implement, in the capital markets and the virtual asset sector, the targeted financial sanctions required by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; and
d) align the practices of reporting institutions with the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.
(1) Money laundering process is accomplished in three stages. These stages, described below, may comprise of numerous transactions by the persons engaged in money laundering that could alert an institution of criminal activity.
(a) Placement – A person engaged in money laundering introduces his or her illegal profits into the financial system.
(b)Layering – In this phase, the person engaged in money laundering engages in a series of conversions or movements of the funds to distance them from their source. The funds might be channeled through the purchase and sales of investment instruments.
(c) Integration – This is the provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally derived wealth. If the layering process has succeeded, an integration scheme places the laundered proceeds back into the legitimate economy in such a way that they re-enter the financial system appearing as normal business funds.
(2) The three basic steps may occur as separate and distinct phases. Alternatively, they may occur simultaneously, or, more commonly, they may overlap. How the basic steps are used depends on the available laundering mechanisms and the requirements of the criminal organizations.
(3) Money laundering in the capital markets can take place in all the three stages, as capital markets are no longer predominantly cash based, they are more likely to be used in the layering stage rather than placement stage of money laundering. However, where the transactions are in cash, there is still the risk of capital markets being used at the placement stage. Capital markets offer a vast array of opportunities for transforming money into a diverse range of assets. For liquid assets, they allow a high frequency of transactions which aid the layering process. Hence, capital markets are particularly attractive to persons engaged in money laundering for layering their illicit proceeds for eventual integration into the general economy.
(4) The capital markets are global in nature and with the increasing developments in technology, payment systems, and other direct gateways into the markets, the speed and the relative anonymity of these avenues make them an option for persons engaged in money laundering.
(5) The capital markets have an additional distinguishing money laundering risk factor in that not only can it be used to launder illicit funds that result from illegal activity outside of the financial markets but it can also be used to generate illicit funds from the market itself, for example, in cases of insider trading. Factors presenting higher risk might include –
a) ability to pool underlying customers’ funds, collective investment schemes, real estate investment trusts, mutual funds, among others.
b) liquid securities with high volumes so that ease of detection is much less than illiquid securities where volumes are lower and therefore irregularities are easier to detect.
c) options contracts which are executed through an exchange are risky due to the relative ease of access by persons engaged in money laundering via brokers, the global nature of exchanges, the volume of transactions conducted on an exchange which present monitoring challenges and the ability to rapidly enter and exit the markets.
d) derivatives contracts, in which persons may take large positions, provide illicit funds to cover margin calls and exit the market rapidly.
e) virtual assets, owing to their speed, global reach, pseudonymity, and capacity for peer-to-peer transfer, including through unhosted wallets, decentralized platforms, cross-chain bridges, and anonymity-enhancing technologies.
(6) Persons engaged in money laundering can buy or sell futures via brokers, thus layering transactions on Exchanges. This is done through taking large positions and providing illicit funds to cover margin calls. They can also realize profits or losses at any time since exiting the market is as simple as entering into the reverse transaction thus recouping outstanding margin deposits and bringing the funds back into the broader financial system with seeming legitimacy. The distribution channel for products may alter the risk profile of a customer and may include online sales, postal or telephone channels where a non-face-to-face account opening approach is used. Business sold through intermediaries may also increase risk as the business relationship between the customer and a market intermediary may become indirect.
(7) Terrorists or terrorist organizations require financial support in order to achieve their aims. There is often a need for them to obscure or disguise links between them and their funding sources. It follows then that terrorist groups shall similarly find ways to launder funds, regardless of whether the funds are from a legitimate or illegitimate source, in order to be able to use them without attracting the attention of the authorities.
(1) The Board of directors of a reporting institution shall be responsible for the reporting institutions’ compliance with Capital Markets Act, POCAMLA, the Regulations, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the TF Regulations, the PF Regulations, the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, the VASP Regulations and these Guidelines.
(2)Without prejudice to subparagraph (1), the Board shall -
a) approve the reporting institution's money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing risk assessment and its AML/CFT/CPF policies, controls, and procedures, as required by regulation 7(3) of the Regulations.
b) approve the reporting institution's risk appetite in respect of money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing.
c) ensure that the compliance function and the MLRO have adequate resources, authority, independence, and unrestricted access to information and to the Board.
d) receive and consider, at least once every quarter, a report from the MLRO on the operation and effectiveness of the reporting institution's AML/CFT/CPF controls, including statistics on suspicious transaction reports, sanctions screening alerts and remediation of supervisory findings.
e) ensure timely remediation of deficiencies identified by the independent audit function, the Authority, the Centre, or any other competent authority; and promote a culture of compliance throughout the reporting institution.
(3) Senior management shall be responsible for implementing the Board-approved policies, controls and procedures and for ensuring that business is not conducted, and services are not provided, where there is good reason to suppose that a transaction is associated with money laundering, terrorism financing or proliferation financing.
(4) A reporting institution shall co-operate fully with the Authority, the Centre, the Committee, law enforcement agencies, and other competent authorities, and shall provide information requested by them within the time specified.
(1) Every reporting institution shall, in accordance with Regulation 7 of the Regulations, undertake and document a risk assessment to identify, assess, understand, monitor, manage and mitigate the money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing risks to which it is exposed.
(2) The risk assessment shall consider all relevant risk factors, including—
(a) customers, including beneficial owners and the nature of their business.
(b) countries or geographical areas in which customers are based or with which they transact.
(c) products and services, including virtual asset products.
(d) transactions; and
(e) delivery channels, including non-face-to-face, digital and agent channels.
(3) In undertaking the risk assessment, a reporting institution shall take into account—
(a) the findings of Kenya's National Risk Assessment on money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing, and of any national virtual asset risk assessment.
(b) any sectoral risk assessment, guidance or typologies issued by the Authority or the Centre.
(c) the public statements and lists of jurisdictions issued by the FATF and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group; and
(d) its own experience, including the outcome of suspicious transaction reporting and supervisory findings.
(4) A reporting institution shall, as part of its risk assessment, specifically assess its proliferation financing risk, being the risk of a potential breach, non-implementation, or evasion of the Targeted Financial Sanctions obligations under the PF Regulations.
(5) A reporting institution shall keep its risk assessment up to date and shall review it—
(a) at least once every two years, in accordance with Regulation 7(5) of the Regulations; and
(b) whenever there is a material change, including entry into new markets, the introduction of new products, services, technologies or delivery channels, a change in the national risk assessment, or a significant change in its customer base.
(6) A reporting institution shall have appropriate mechanisms to provide its risk assessment to the Authority and the Centre upon request and shall submit its current Board-approved risk assessment to the Authority together with the annual compliance report under paragraph 41.
(1) A reporting institution shall apply a risk-based approach under which—
(a) enhanced measures are applied where higher risks are identified; and
(b) simplified measures may be applied only where lower risks have been identified in accordance with paragraph 22.
(2) A reporting institution shall adopt a holistic approach to the risk-based approach and shall not assess risks in isolation from one another.
(3) A reporting institution shall assign a money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing risk rating to every customer at the start of the business relationship and shall review the rating periodically and upon any trigger event.
(4) In determining the risk rating of a customer, a reporting institution shall consider, among other factors—
(a) country or geographic risk, including whether the customer is resident in, or connected with—
(i) a jurisdiction identified by the FATF as subject to a call for action or to increased monitoring.
(ii) a higher-risk country identified under section 45A of POCAMLA.
(iii) a jurisdiction subject to sanctions, embargoes or similar measures issued by the United Nations.
(iv) a jurisdiction with significant levels of corruption or organized crime; or
(v) a jurisdiction believed to provide funding or support for terrorist activities or to have designated terrorist organizations operating within it, or a jurisdiction bordering or with close trade links to a jurisdiction subject to proliferationrelated sanctions.
(b) customer risk, including whether the customer—
(i) is a PEP or is connected with a PEP.
(ii) uses complex corporate structures, trusts, or nominee arrangements without a legitimate commercial rationale.
(iii) requests numbered accounts or undue secrecy.
(iv) is engaged in a cash-intensive business, dealing in precious stones and metals, real estate, arms or dual-use goods, shipping or freight forwarding, or money or value transfer services.
(v) is a non-profit or public benefit organization operating in or remitting to highrisk areas.
(vi) has a source of wealth or source of funds that cannot be easily verified; or
(vii) is a retail customer whose activity is inconsistent with the customer's profile.
(c) product, service, and transaction risk, including omnibus and nominee accounts, margin and derivatives trading, private placements, unlisted securities, crossborder transfers, and virtual assets; and
(d) delivery channel risk, including non-face-to-face onboarding, introduced business and the use of agents.
(5) Examples of customers who may present lower risk include a customer with a regular income from a known legitimate source which supports the activity being undertaken, a public company listed on a securities exchange and subject to adequate disclosure requirements, a public entity, and a reporting institution supervised by the Authority or another supervisory body in Kenya.
(6) A reporting institution shall keep records of its customer risk assessments for a minimum of seven years so as to demonstrate to the Authority and the Centre how it assesses customer risk and that the extent of CDD and ongoing monitoring is appropriate to that risk.
(1) A reporting institution incorporated in Kenya shall implement group-wide AML/CFT/CPF programmes which shall apply to all its branches and majority-owned subsidiaries, including—
(a) policies and procedures for sharing information required for CDD and money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing risk management.
(b) the provision, at group level, of customer, account and transaction information from branches and subsidiaries when necessary for AML/CFT/CPF purposes; and
(c) adequate safeguards on the confidentiality and use of information exchanged, including safeguards to prevent tipping off.
(2) A reporting institution shall ensure that its foreign branches and majority-owned subsidiaries apply AML/CFT/CPF measures consistent with POCAMLA and the Regulations to the extent permitted by the laws of the host country, and where the requirements of the host country are less strict, shall ensure that the stricter Kenyan requirements are applied.
(3) Where the host country does not permit the proper implementation of measures consistent with Kenyan law, the reporting institution shall apply appropriate additional measures to manage the risks and shall inform the Centre and the Authority in writing.
(1) A market intermediary shall obtain satisfactory evidence of the identity and legal existence of the persons applying to do business with it. The evidence shall be verified by reliable documents or other verifiable and independent means. A market intermediary shall not engage in any business transactions with a client who fails to provide evidence of their identity. A market intermediary shall not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names of their clients.
(2) A collective investment scheme manager shall verify the identity of a customer using reliable and independent sources. The collective investment scheme manager shall retain copies of all reference documents used in identity verification and the identification information.
(3) A market intermediary shall implement and maintain appropriate guidelines for its agents and employees to assist them in learning and establishing essential facts about their customers’ backgrounds. A market intermediary shall keep records of enforcement of these guidelines for not less than seven years from the date of any action taken against the employee or agent.
(1) A market intermediary shall conduct ongoing due diligence and scrutiny of customers’ identity and their investment objectives. This shall be done throughout the course of the business relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the market intermediary’s knowledge of the customer, its business, and its risk profile.
(2) For customers that require additional caution to be exercised when transacting with them, such customer’s activities shall be monitored on a regular basis for suspicious transactions. Where a customer fails to comply with the due diligence requirements, the market intermediary shall not commence business relations, or, where there is an existing business relationship, the market intermediary shall terminate such relationship and consider lodging a suspicious transaction report with Financial Reporting Centre. A market intermediary, when handling new account applications, shall identify if the applicant is a domestic or foreign politically exposed person and if so, the market intermediary shall take appropriate adequate control measures and conduct periodic reviews.
(3) A market intermediary shall adopt risk-based approach where they employ enhanced customer due diligence process for higher risk categories of customers, business relationships, or transactions.
(4) A market intermediary shall perform such customer due diligence measures as may be appropriate to its existing customers having regard to own assessment of materiality and risk.
(5) Where the market intermediary obtains information or documents from the customer or a third party, it should take reasonable steps to assure itself that such information or documents are reliable and where appropriate, reasonably up to date at the time they are provided to the market intermediary.
(6) On face-to-face transactions verification, a market intermediary may, where due to a perception of increased risk, additional documentation is required, request a reference letter from a current employer, professional or members’ organization, bank statements, a lease for a rental house or business premises or seek further independent verification of a passport or a national identity card submitted.
(7) For prospective customers who are not normally resident in Kenya, but who wish to open an account with a market intermediary in Kenya, it is important that verification procedures similar to those for Kenyan resident customers be carried out and the same information obtained. More importantly, the copy of passport, national identity card, or documentary evidence of his or her address shall be certified by—
(a) the embassy, consulate, or High Commission of the country of issue,
(b) Commissioner of oaths or Notary Public, or
(c) senior officer of the market intermediary whose full name and title shall appear on the face of the copy. The senior officer shall stamp, date and sign with the words “originals sighted by me.”
(8) A market intermediary may independently verify identity with a reputable institution authorized to carry out this role in the applicant’s country of residence. For prospective non-resident customers who wish to open investment accounts by post, independent verification of identity should therefore be sought from a reputable institution authorized to carry out this role in the applicant’s country of residence. Verification details requested should cover and may include but not be limited to the true name or names used, current permanent address and verification of signature.
(9) Because of the possible difficulties of identifying beneficial ownership, and the complexity of their organizations and structures, corporate and legal entities are the most likely vehicles for money laundering, particularly when fronted by a legitimate trading company. The following measures should be taken—
(a) Particular care should be taken to verify the legal existence of the applicant and to ensure that any person purporting to act on behalf of the applicant is fully authorized. The principal requirement is to look behind the corporate entity to identify those who have ultimate control over the business and the company’s assets, with particular attention paid to any shareholders or others who inject a significant proportion of the capital or financial support. Enquiries should be made to confirm that the company exists for a legitimate
trading or economic purpose and that it is not merely a “shell company’’ where the controlling principals cannot be identified.
(b)The CDD measures for legal persons should include reasonable actions to understand whether the customer is acting as an agent or a beneficial owner, as well as the business nature and the purpose of trade.
(c) Before a business relationship is established, measures should be taken by way of a company search or other commercial enquiries to ensure that the applicant company has not been, or is not in the process of being, dissolved, struck off, wound-up or terminated.
(d)As with personal accounts or facilities, the “know your customer” principle is an ongoing process. If changes to the company structure or ownership occur subsequently or if suspicions are aroused by a change in the nature of the business transacted or the profile of payments through a company account, further checks should be made to ascertain the reason for the changes.
(e) In addition, enquiries should be made from time to time to establish whether there have been any changes to directors or shareholders or to the original nature of the business or activity. Such changes could be significant in relation to potential money laundering activity even though authorized signatories have not changed.
In identifying a partnership, a reporting institution shall obtain the particulars set out in regulation 17 of the Regulations, including the partnership deed, the registration number and address, the particulars of every partner, the person exercising executive control, each person authorized to act for the partnership, and un-audited financial statements, and shall obtain a mandate from the partnership authorizing the opening of the account and conferring authority on those who will operate it.
(1) In identifying a trust or other legal arrangement, a reporting institution shall obtain the particulars set out in regulation 18 of the Regulations, including the trust deed, the registration details, the particulars of the trustees and of any management company, and the full names of the founder and beneficiaries.
(2) A reporting institution shall identify and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owners of a trust, being the settlor, the trustees, the protector, if any, the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries, and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust, including through a chain of control or ownership, and for other legal arrangements, the persons in equivalent or similar positions.
(3) A reporting institution shall require a trustee to disclose his or her status as trustee when forming a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction, in accordance with regulation 18(3) of the Regulations.
(4) Where the beneficiaries are designated by characteristics or by class, the reporting institution shall obtain sufficient information to be able to establish the identity of a beneficiary at the time of payout or when the beneficiary intends to exercise vested rights.
(5) Where several trustees are involved, the identity of every trustee shall be verified.
Where a person purports to act on behalf of a customer, a reporting institution shall verify that the person is authorized to do so and shall identify and verify the identity of that person, in accordance with regulation 23 of the Regulations.
(1) A reporting institution shall verify the identity of the customer and beneficial owner before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or conducting a transaction for an occasional customer.
(2) A reporting institution may complete verification after the establishment of the business relationship only where—
(a) this occurs as soon as reasonably practicable.
(b) this is essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business; and
(c) the money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing risks are effectively managed, including through limits on the number, type or number of transactions, and a restriction on the withdrawal or transfer of funds or assets, until verification is complete.
(3) Delayed verification shall not be permitted for any customer rated high risk, any PEP, or any customer with a potential match to a sanctions list.
(4) Where a customer fails to provide evidence of identity or the other information required for CDD, the reporting institution shall, in accordance with regulation 25(2) of the Regulations—
(a) not open the account, commence the business relationship, or perform the transaction.
(b) where a business relationship has commenced, discontinue any transaction and terminate the business relationship; and
(c) file a suspicious transaction report with the Centre.
(5) Where a reporting institution forms a suspicion of money laundering, terrorism financing or proliferation financing and reasonably believes that performing the CDD process will tip off the customer, it shall not pursue the CDD process and shall instead file a suspicious transaction report with the Centre.
(1) Where a nominee opens an account on behalf of another person whose identity has not previously been verified by the reporting institution, the identity of the nominee and of any other person who will have control of the account shall be verified, and the reporting institution shall take reasonable measures to identify and verify the underlying beneficial owner.
(2) Where a reporting institution opens a nominee or omnibus account for a customer that is a reporting institution supervised by the Authority or another supervisory body in Kenya, it may, on the basis of a documented risk assessment, apply simplified CDD measures and need not identify the underlying clients, provided that the customer undertakes to provide the CDD information on the underlying clients without delay upon request.
(3) Where a reporting institution opens a nominee or omnibus account for a foreign financial institution, it shall apply measures equivalent to those for correspondent relationships under paragraph 33 and, where the risks are higher, EDD.
(4) Where a customer is a manager of a portfolio of assets operating the account in that capacity, the underlying investors are beneficial owners. Where the reporting institution is unable to perform CDD on the underlying investors, it shall evaluate the risks of each case, determine, and document the appropriate CDD measures, and make the evaluation available to the Authority upon request.
(1) A CIS manager shall perform CDD on unit holders when they subscribe to or participate in the CIS, and on any entity with which it negotiates the establishment of a CIS.
(2) A CIS manager shall verify the identity of investors using reliable and independent sources and shall retain copies of all documents used in identity verification.
(3) A CIS manager shall not accept a subscription, or effect a redemption or transfer, where the investor or the source or destination of funds has not been verified, and redemption proceeds shall be paid only to an account in the name of the verified investor, save in exceptional and documented circumstances approved by senior management.
(4) Where a CIS is the customer of another reporting institution, that reporting institution shall determine the CDD measures to be applied on the basis of the risk presented, taking into account whether the CIS and its manager are regulated by the Authority or by a regulator in an equivalent jurisdiction.
(1) A reporting institution shall apply EDD where the money laundering, terrorism financing or proliferation financing risks are higher, including in respect of—
(a) customers rated high risk under paragraph 8.
(b) PEPs, in accordance with paragraph 27.
(c) business relationships and transactions with natural or legal persons, including financial institutions, from higher-risk countries referred to in section 45A of POCAMLA and countries identified by the FATF as subject to a call for action.
(d) complex, unusually large, or unusual patterns of transactions that have no apparent economic or lawful purpose.
(e) correspondent and similar cross-border relationships; and
(f) any other situation identified as higher risk in the national, sectoral, or institutional risk assessment.
(2) EDD measures shall include, in accordance with regulation 20 of the Regulations—
(a) obtaining further information to establish the customer's identity, including on the beneficial owners.
(b) applying extra measures to verify the documents supplied.
(c) obtaining information on the purpose of the account and the intended level and nature of trading activity.
(d) establishing the source of funds and, where appropriate, the source of wealth.
(e) obtaining senior management approval for establishing or continuing the business relationship; and
(f) conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring, including by increasing the number and timing of controls and selecting patterns of transactions that need further examination.
(3) In respect of countries for which the FATF calls for countermeasures, or as directed by the Cabinet Secretary under section 45A of POCAMLA, a reporting institution shall apply the countermeasures specified, which may include limiting or terminating business relationships or transactions with persons from those countries.
(4) A reporting institution shall also re-examine a business relationship, and apply EDD where appropriate, where—
(a) there is a transaction that is significant having regard to the manner in which the account is ordinarily operated.
(b) there is a material change in the way the business relationship is conducted.
(c) the reporting institution becomes aware that it lacks adequate identification information; or
(d) there is a change in the ownership or control of the customer or in the persons authorized to act on its behalf.
(1) A reporting institution shall put in place risk management systems to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP, both at onboarding and on an ongoing basis.
(2) In relation to a foreign PEP, a reporting institution shall, in addition to performing CDD, in accordance with regulation 26(1) of the Regulations—
(a) obtain senior management approval before establishing, or continuing, the business relationship.
(b) take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds of the customer and beneficial owner identified as a PEP; and
(c) conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.
(3) In relation to a domestic PEP or a person entrusted with a prominent function by an international organization, a reporting institution shall take reasonable measures to determine whether the customer or beneficial owner is such a person and, where the business relationship is assessed as higher risk, apply the measures in subparagraph (2).
(4) The requirements of this paragraph apply to immediate family members and close business associates of a PEP.
(5) Where a customer ceases to hold a prominent public function, the reporting institution shall continue to apply the measures under this paragraph until it is satisfied, on a risksensitive basis, that the person no longer presents a heightened risk, and shall document the basis of that decision.
(6) Where an existing customer or beneficial owner is found to be, or becomes, a PEP, senior management approval shall be obtained to continue the business relationship.
(1) A reporting institution shall, in accordance with regulation 37 of the Regulations, use the following information as the minimum standard for determining the legitimacy of funds and transactions—
(a) for large, frequent, or unusual cash deposits or withdrawals, a written statement from the customer confirming that the nature of the customer's business normally and reasonably generates substantial amounts of cash.
(b) for multiple or nominee accounts, or similar or related transactions, a written statement from the customer confirming the reason for and need for such accounts or transactions.
(c) for large, frequent, or unusual transfers or payments, appropriate documentation as to the identity of the recipient or sender and the reason for the transfer or payment.
(d) for large or unusual investments or requests for advice or services, a written statement from the customer confirming that the investments or services are bona fide and consistent with the customer's reasonable and normal business activities; and
(e) for large or unusual foreign transactions, written confirmation from the customer of the nature, reason, and details of the transactions sufficient to determine their legitimacy.
(2) A reporting institution shall not accept payment from, or make payment to, a third party in respect of a customer's account, except in documented circumstances where the third party has been identified and verified and the reasons for the payment are established and recorded.
(3) A reporting institution shall, in accordance with regulation 37(2) of the Regulations, set policies on the maximum cash transaction amounts that non-customers may undertake with it, in accordance with such directions as the Authority may issue.
A reporting institution shall apply CDD requirements to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk and shall conduct due diligence on existing relationships at appropriate times, taking into account whether and when CDD was previously undertaken and the adequacy of the data obtained, in accordance with regulation 14(6) of the Regulations.
(1) A reporting institution may apply simplified CDD measures only where lower risks have been identified through an adequate analysis of risk by the country or the reporting institution, and where the simplified measures are commensurate with the lower risk factors, in accordance with regulation 21 of the Regulations.
(2) Simplified measures may include verifying identity after establishment of the business relationship within the limits of paragraph 23, reducing the frequency of customer identification updates, or reducing the degree of ongoing monitoring on the basis of a reasonable monetary threshold.
(3) Simplified CDD shall not be applied where there is a suspicion of money laundering, terrorism financing, or proliferation financing, or where specific higher-risk scenarios apply, and shall not in any case exempt a customer from sanctions screening.
(1) A market intermediary shall establish policies and procedures to address any specific risks associated with the use of new technology and non-face-to-face business relations or transactions, and these shall be documented and be easily accessible to the employees of the market intermediary.
(2) On non-face-to-face transactions verification, a market intermediary shall, adopt procedures which are more robust as those for face-to-face verification to confirm the identity of the client and to provide for reasonable steps to avoid single or multiple fictitious applications or substitution (impersonation) or fraud for the purposes of money laundering. The procedures adopted shall-
(a) ensure that a person bearing the name of the applicant exists and lives or is resident at the address provided; and
(b) ensure that the applicant is actually that person.
(3) Stringent measures and procedures shall be undertaken while using new technologies and non-face-to-face business transactions.
(4) A market intermediary should take one or more of the following measures to mitigate the heightened risk associated with not being able to have face-to-face contact when establishing business relations:
(a) telephone contact with the customer at a residential or business number that can be verified independently.
(b) confirmation of the customer’s address through an exchange of correspondence or other appropriate method.
(c)subject to the customer’s consent, telephone confirmation of the customer’s employment status with the customer’s employer’s personnel department at a listed business number of the employer.
(d) confirmation of the customer’s salary or any other source of income details by requiring the presentation of recent bank statements from a bank.
(e) certification of identification documents by magistrates, commissioners of oaths or notaries public presented by the customer; or
(f) any other reliable verification checks adopted by the market intermediary for non-face to-face business.
(5) A market intermediary may use the following as a means of verification—
(a)recent utility bill, personal identification number issued by the Kenya Revenue Authority, bank reference; or
(b) computerized system, for internal or external application database checks, to check for any inconsistencies in the information provided.
(6) A market intermediary shall use the following types of information as minimum acceptable standard for determining the legitimacy of funds and transactions-
(a) for multiple or nominee accounts, or similar or related transactions, a written statement from the client confirming the reason and the need for multiple or nominee accounts, or similar or related transactions.
(b)for large or unusual transfers or payments of funds, appropriate documentation as to the identity of the recipient or sender of the transferred or paid funds, and the reason underlying the transfer or payment.
(c) for large or unusual investments, a written statement from the client confirming that the investments are bona fide and consistent with the goals and objectives of the client’s reasonable and normal business activities.
(d)for large and unusual foreign transactions, a written confirmation from the client indicating the nature, reason, and appropriate details of the foreign transactions sufficient to determine the legitimacy of such transactions.
A market intermediary that is incorporated in Kenya shall develop a group policy on anti-money laundering; countering financing of terrorism and countering proliferation financing and this policy shall apply to all its branches and subsidiaries where applicable outside Kenya. If the host country does not permit the proper implementation of anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism measures consistent with the measures set out under the Act and Regulations made thereunder, the Reporting institution shall apply appropriate additional measures to manage the money laundering and terrorism financing risks and inform the Centre and their supervisory body.
(1) Where the form or amount of any transaction appears unusual in relation to the customer, or if the economic purpose or legality of the transaction is not immediately clear, a market intermediary shall clarify the economic background and purpose of the transaction or business relationship. Special attention shall be given to complex and unusual patterns of transactions. Appendix I provides indicators of potential money laundering activities in the capital markets.
(2) If a market intermediary becomes aware of suspicious activities or transactions which indicate possible money laundering, terrorism financing, proliferation financing activities, the market intermediary shall report the same to the Financial Reporting Centre immediately or in any case within seven days of the date of the transaction or occurrence of the activity that is considered suspicious.
(3) A market intermediary shall disclose sufficient information which indicates the nature of and reason for the suspicion, and where the market intermediary has additional supporting documents, the documents shall also be availed.
(4) A market intermediary shall establish robust reporting mechanisms for suspicious transactions.
(5) A market intermediary shall keep a record of all transactions referred to the Financial Reporting Centre together with all internal findings and analysis done in relation to them.
A reporting institution shall report to the Financial Reporting Centre all cash transactions carried out by it, equivalent to or exceeding USD 15,000 or its equivalent in any other currency whether or not the transaction appears to be suspicious in accordance with Regulation 40 of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti Money Laundering Regulations, 2023.
(1) The Authority shall undertake its reporting obligations in accordance with Regulation 39 of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti Money Laundering Regulations, 2023.
(2) The Authority shall take into account a market intermediary’s compliance with the Act and the Regulations and these Guidelines, as well as measures put in place to ensure continued compliance, in determining the suitability of the market intermediary and persons managing or controlling the market intermediary for the maintenance of a license or an approval by the Authority.
(1) A market intermediary shall monitor on an ongoing basis, its business relationships with its customers.
(2) A market intermediary shall, during the course of business relations, observe the conduct of the customer’s account and scrutinize transactions undertaken to ensure that the transactions are consistent with the market intermediary’s knowledge of the customer, its business and risk profile and where appropriate, the source of funds.
(3) A market intermediary shall periodically review the adequacy of customer identification information and ensure that the information is kept up to date, particularly for the high-risk category of customers.
(4) The extent of monitoring should be linked to the risk profile of the customer which has been determined through the risk assessment. To be most effective, resources should be targeted towards business relationships presenting a higher risk of money laundering. Financial institutions shall take additional measures when monitoring business relationships that pose a higher risk. High risk relationships, for example those involving politically exposed persons, non-face-to-face customers, will require more frequent and intensive monitoring. In monitoring high-risk situations, relevant considerations may include -
(a) whether adequate procedures or management information systems are in place to provide relevant staff (e.g. Compliance Officer, Money Laundering Reporting Officer, front line staff, relationship managers, Account Opening Personnel and Operation Managers) with timely information that might include, as a result of EDD or other additional measures undertaken, any information on any connected accounts or relationships; and
(b) how to monitor the sources of funds, wealth, and income for higher risk customers and how any changes in circumstances will be recorded.
(1) A reporting institution shall, in accordance with Regulation 11 of the Regulations, formulate, adopt and implement internal control policies, measures and procedures to combat money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing which are commensurate with the risks identified and the size and nature of its business.
(2) The internal controls shall include, at a minimum—
(a) compliance management arrangements, including the appointment of an MLRO at management level.
(b) screening procedures to ensure high standards of integrity when hiring employees.
(c) an ongoing employee training programme.
(d) an independent audit function to test the system.
(e) programmes for assessing money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing risks.
(f) a control policy that covers timing, degree of control, areas to be controlled, responsibilities and follow-up.
(g) monitoring programmes for complex, unusual or large transactions and suspicious activities.
(h) EDD procedures for high-risk persons, business relationships, and transactions, and for persons established in jurisdictions that do not have adequate AML/CFT/CPF systems.
(i) sanctions screening systems and procedures that enable the reporting institution to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay in accordance with Part V.
(j) a manual of AML/CFT/CPF compliance procedures, which shall be accessible to all relevant employees.
(k) whistle-blowing arrangements that allow employees to raise concerns about AML/CFT/CPF breaches confidentially; and
(l) clear allocation of management responsibility for compliance with POCAMLA, the Regulations and the internal rules.
(3) A reporting institution shall review its AML/CFT/CPF policies, controls, and procedures at least once every two years, and whenever its risk assessment is updated, to ensure their continued effectiveness
(1) Every reporting institution shall appoint an MLRO in accordance with regulation 12 of the Regulations.
(2) The MLRO shall—
(a) be of management level.
(b) have relevant and necessary competence, authority, and independence.
(c) have timely and unrestricted access to customer identification data, transaction records, and other relevant information; and
(d) report directly to the Board or a committee of the Board on AML/CFT/CPF matters.
(3) An internal auditor or a chief executive shall not be appointed as MLRO, except where the chief executive is a sole proprietor.
(4) A reporting institution shall notify the Centre and the Authority, in writing, of the appointment or removal of its MLRO within fourteen days of the appointment or removal and shall state the reasons for any removal.
(5) A reporting institution shall designate an alternate MLRO of suitable seniority to act in the absence of the MLRO and shall notify the Authority of that designation.
(6) All employees of a reporting institution shall report to the MLRO any suspicious activity relating to money laundering, terrorism financing, or proliferation financing, and the MLRO shall perform the functions set out in regulation 12(6) and (7) of the Regulations
(1) A reporting institution shall, in accordance with regulation 43 of the Regulations, maintain an independent and adequately resourced audit function to test compliance with POCAMLA, the Regulations, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the TF Regulations, the PF Regulations and these Guidelines, and the effectiveness of its AML/CFT/CPF policies, controls and procedures.
(2) The independent audit shall be conducted at least once every year, or at such greater frequency as is commensurate with the reporting institution's risk profile, by internal audit or a qualified external party that is independent of the compliance function.
(3) The audit report shall be submitted to the Board or its audit committee and shall be availed to the Authority upon request.
(1) A reporting institution shall monitor the business or account activity and transactions of its customers on a continuous basis, in accordance with regulations 34 and 35 of the Regulations, to ensure that transactions are consistent with its knowledge of the customer, the customer's business and risk profile and, where necessary, the source of funds.
(2) The extent of monitoring shall be linked to the risk profile of the customer. Higher-risk relationships, including those involving PEPs, non-face-to-face customers and virtual assets, shall be subject to more frequent and intensive monitoring.
(3) A reporting institution shall have management information systems that provide the MLRO, compliance staff, relationship managers, and other relevant staff with timely information, including on connected accounts and relationships, to enable effective monitoring.
(4) A reporting institution that, having regard to the volume and complexity of its business, cannot effectively monitor transactions manually shall implement an automated transaction monitoring system calibrated to its risk assessment.
(1) A reporting institution, its directors, officers and employees shall not disclose to the customer or to any unauthorised person that a suspicious transaction report or related information is being, or has been, submitted to the Centre, or that an investigation is being or may be carried out, in accordance with regulation 41 of the Regulations.
(2) Preliminary enquiries of a customer to verify identity or to ascertain the source of funds or the nature of a transaction do not of themselves constitute tipping off, unless the person making the enquiry knows or suspects that an investigation is underway or that the enquiries are likely to prejudice an investigation.
(3) Where a report has been made and further enquiries are necessary, great care shall be taken to ensure that the customer does not become aware that the matter has been brought to the attention of the authorities.
(4) A person who, in good faith, reports a suspicion or provides information to the Centre in accordance with POCAMLA, or makes a disclosure under section 41 or 42 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, is protected from civil and criminal liability as provided under those Acts.
(1) A securities, derivatives or commodities exchange, central depository and clearing house shall maintain surveillance systems and mechanisms designed to detect activity which may constitute market manipulation, insider dealing or other market abuse, being predicate offences to money laundering, and activity which may indicate money laundering, terrorism financing or proliferation financing.
(2) Where the surveillance staff of an institution referred to in subparagraph (1) detect such activity, the institution shall—
(a) itself report the activity to the Centre as a suspicious transaction or activity in accordance with paragraph xx on suspicious trading.
(b) notify the Authority of the activity, for the Authority's market surveillance and enforcement functions; and
(c) where further information is required from the market intermediary through which the trade was executed, request that information in a manner that does not disclose that a report has been or may be made to the Centre.
(1) Where a reporting institution becomes aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, of suspicious activities or transactions, including attempted transactions, which indicate possible money laundering, terrorism financing or proliferation financing, it shall report to the Centre within two days after the suspicion arose, in accordance with section 44 of POCAMLA and regulation 38 of the Regulations, and shall make any disclosure required under section 42 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
(2) The obligation to report applies regardless of the amount of the transaction and whether or not the transaction has been completed.
(3) The report shall disclose sufficient information indicating the nature of and reason for the suspicion and shall be accompanied by any additional supporting documentation available to the reporting institution.
(4) Reports shall be submitted through the electronic reporting system of the Centre or in such other manner and format as the Centre may specify.
(5) A reporting institution shall establish clear internal reporting lines under which employees report suspicions to the MLRO without delay, and the MLRO shall consider each internal report, document the decision whether or not to report to the Centre and the reasons for that decision, and report to the Centre where there is sufficient basis.
(6) A reporting institution shall keep a record of all reports made to the Centre together with all internal reports, findings and analysis relating to them.
(7) A reporting institution shall respond to any request for additional information from the Centre within the period specified by the Centre.
(8) The filing of a suspicious transaction report shall not of itself require the termination of the business relationship. Where the reporting institution decides to terminate the relationship, it shall do so in a manner that does not tip off the customer.
Every reporting institution shall register with the FRC in accordance with section 47A of POCAMLA and regulation 5 of the Regulations and shall notify the Centre in writing of any change to its registered particulars within ninety days of the change.
(1) Every reporting institution shall, by the 31st of January of each year, submit to the Centre the annual compliance report required under regulation 44 of the Regulations, and shall submit a copy of the report to the Authority within the same period.
(2) A reporting institution shall submit to the Authority such AML/CFT/CPF returns, statistics and information, at such intervals and in such form, as the Authority may specify under section 12B of the Capital Markets Act.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph requires a reporting institution to disclose to the Authority the contents of a suspicious transaction report, save as permitted by law
(1) A reporting institution shall, in accordance with section 46 of POCAMLA and regulation 42 of the Regulations, keep records of—
(a) all transactions, both domestic and international, sufficient to permit the reconstruction of individual transactions so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for the prosecution of criminal activity.
(b) all records obtained through CDD, including copies of identification documents, account files, and business correspondence.
(c) the results of any analysis undertaken, including enquiries into the background and purpose of complex, unusual, or large transactions.
(d) risk assessments, sanctions screening results and the resolution of potential matches.
(e) suspicious transaction reports, internal reports and the MLRO's decisions; and
(f) training records.
(2) Records shall be kept for a minimum of seven years from the date the relevant transaction was completed or the business relationship was terminated, whichever is later, or for such longer period as the Authority, the Centre or another competent authority may require in respect of a matter under investigation.
(3) Records may be kept in original form or in electronic form, provided that they can be retrieved and made available swiftly to the Authority, the Centre and other competent authorities upon appropriate authority.
(4) A VASP shall, in addition, maintain records of its client and own transactions, including the transaction metadata required under regulation 22 of the VASP Regulations, at its principal place of business in Kenya and, where required by the Authority, provide the Authority with online or automated real-time read-only access to those records, in accordance with section 44 of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act and paragraph 58.
(5) Records shall be kept in accordance with the Data Protection Act (Cap. 411C), save that data protection requirements shall not be relied upon to refuse access to records required by the Authority, the Centre, or any other competent authority under the law.
(1) A market intermediary may rely upon a third party to perform any part of the CDD measures specified in Part IV of the Regulations, subject to the criteria set out in Regulation 28. However, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that CDD requirements are met remains with the market intermediary.
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, reliance on third parties does not apply to—
(a) outsourcing or agency relationships, where the agent is acting under a contractual arrangement with the market intermediary to carry out its CDD function. In such a situation the outsource or agent is to be regarded as synonymous with the market intermediary; and
(b) business relationships, accounts, or transactions between market intermediaries for their clients.
(3) The reliance on third parties often occurs through introductions made by another member of the same financial services group, or in some jurisdictions from another market intermediary or third party.
(4) Categories of third-party intermediaries which may be relied upon include—
(a) domestic intermediaries: market intermediaries may rely upon other domestic intermediaries, subject to such intermediaries also being reporting institutions under the Act and who are able to satisfy the market intermediary that they have adequate procedures in place to prevent money laundering.
(b) a market intermediary may only rely upon an overseas intermediary carrying on business or practicing in an equivalent jurisdiction where the intermediary—
(i) falls into one of the following categories of businesses or professions which are subject to that jurisdiction’s anti-money laundering reporting obligations—
(aa) an institution that carries on a business similar to that carried on by the market intermediary.
(bb) a notary public.
(cc) an auditor, a chartered or certified accountant, or a tax advisor; and (dd) a registered trust company carrying on trust business.
(ii) is required under the law of the jurisdiction concerned to be registered or licensed or is regulated under the law of that jurisdiction.
(iii) has measures in place to ensure compliance with anti-money laundering requirements.
(iv) is supervised for compliance with those requirements by an authority in that jurisdiction which performs functions similar to the Capital Markets Authority, the Retirement Benefits Authority, the Central Bank of Kenya, the Insurance Regulatory Authority, or the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority.
(5) Compliance with the requirements set out above for both domestic and overseas intermediaries shall require the market intermediary—
(a) to review the intermediary’s AML policies and procedures; and
(b)to make enquiries concerning the intermediary’s stature and regulatory track record and the extent to which any group’s AML standards are applied and audited.
(c) after carrying out the actions set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) to satisfy itself that the anti-money laundering legal framework applicable to the proposed third party is comparable to that applicable in Kenya and that the third party’s legal framework is satisfactorily applied and observed by the third party.
(1) A reporting institution shall implement targeted financial sanctions in accordance with the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the TF Regulations, the PF Regulations, and the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, including—
(a) on terrorism and terrorism financing—
(i) resolution 1267 (1999), resolution 1989 (2011), resolution 2253 (2015) and their successor resolutions, including resolution 2734 (2024), in respect of ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as implemented under Part II of the TF Regulations.
(ii) resolution 1988 (2011) and its successor resolutions, in respect of the Taliban and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as implemented under Part II of the TF Regulations.
(iii) resolution 1373 (2001) and its successor resolutions, in respect of persons designated by the Committee on its own motion or at the request of another country and entered in the domestic list, as implemented under Part III of the TF Regulations.
(iv) resolution 2713 (2023) and its successor resolutions, including resolution 2762 (2024), in respect of Al-Shabaab, and any other sanctions regime circulated by the Committee; and
(v) resolutions 2178 (2014), 2396 (2017) and 2462 (2019), on foreign terrorist fighters and the criminalization and prevention of terrorism financing; and
(b) on proliferation financing—
(i) resolution 1718 (2006) and its successor resolutions, including resolutions 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in respect of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(ii) resolution 2231 (2015) and any measures in respect of the Islamic Republic of Iran which are in force under that resolution or reapplied under it, including measures under resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010), as circulated by the Committee; and
(iii) any other resolution imposing targeted financial sanctions related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing.
(2) The Committee, established under section 40D of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, is responsible for the implementation of targeted financial sanctions in Kenya under section 40E of that Act and regulation 4 of the TF Regulations. The Director-General of the Centre is the Secretary to the Committee, and reports and returns to the Committee under this Part shall be submitted through the Secretary.
(3) The Authority supervises and enforces the implementation of targeted financial sanctions, and of preventive measures to combat terrorism financing and proliferation financing, by reporting institutions under section 42A of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and section 12B of the Capital Markets Act.
(4) The obligations under this Part apply to all funds or other assets and economic resources, including securities, units, derivatives positions, cash balances, virtual assets, and any income accruing to them, held by or on behalf of a customer.
(5) The obligations to freeze and not to make funds or other assets available apply to all natural and legal persons in Kenya. Under regulation 6 of the TF Regulations, a designation or the circulation of a sanctions list is itself the authority to freeze, and the obligation does not depend on a court order, a request from the Authority or the filing of a report.
(6) Where a resolution of the United Nations Security Council or a Sanctions Committee is amended, replaced, or supplemented, the reporting institution shall apply the amended designations without delay upon their publication or circulation.
(1) A reporting institution, its directors and employees shall have regard to the following obligations and offences under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which apply to them in addition to their obligations under these Guidelines—
(a) section 5, which makes it an offence to collect or provide property, funds or services intending, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that they will be used for a terrorist act, by a terrorist group or by a terrorist, whether or not a terrorist act occurs.
(b) section 5A, which makes it an offence to finance the travel of an individual to another State for terrorism purposes or terrorist training.
(c) sections 4A and 4B, which make it an offence to engage in a proliferation act or to provide financial support for, or solicit or collect funds for, a proliferation act.
(d) sections 7 and 8, which make it an offence to facilitate the retention or control of terrorist property, including by transfer to a nominee, or knowingly to deal in, or provide financial or other services in respect of, property owned or controlled by or on behalf of a terrorist group.
(e) section 30G, which prohibits any person in Kenya from making funds or other assets, economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of designated persons, entities owned or controlled by them, or persons acting on their behalf, unless licensed, authorized or otherwise notified under the relevant resolution.
(f) section 42(2) and (3), which require a financial institution that has reasonable grounds to believe that it holds property or an account owned or controlled by or on behalf of a terrorist group or specified entity, or that a transaction is intended to facilitate a terrorist act, to disclose the particulars to the Centre; and
(g) section 45, under which the Cabinet Secretary may, by order published in the Gazette, prohibit all persons in Kenya from making funds available to a named person.
(2) A reporting institution shall monitor the Kenya Gazette for orders declaring specified entities under section 3, and orders under section 45, of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and shall treat such entities and persons as designated persons for the purposes of this Part.
(3) A disclosure under section 42 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall be made through the reporting channels specified by the Centre and may be combined with the suspicious transaction report under paragraph xx xx.
(1) A reporting institution shall subscribe to and monitor, on a daily basis, the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, the domestic list compiled under regulation 20 of the TF Regulations, the Kenya Gazette and any designations circulated by the Committee through its Secretary under regulation 5 of the TF Regulations and shall not wait to receive circulation from the Authority before acting on a published designation.
(2) A reporting institution shall maintain an up-to-date, readily accessible database of the names and particulars of designated persons, which shall be accessible to relevant employees at the head office, branches, and subsidiaries.
(3) A reporting institution shall, in accordance with regulation 36 of the TF Regulations and regulation 9 of the PF Regulations, regularly review the sanctions lists and monitor transactions in relation to designated persons on an ongoing basis.
(4) A reporting institution may consolidate its database with other recognized lists of designated persons issued by other jurisdictions or international bodies but shall ensure that the obligations under this Part are applied to the United Nations and domestic lists.
(5) A reporting institution shall, in accordance with regulation 34 of the TF Regulations, adopt internal rules for its employees and agents for implementing the obligations under this Part.
(1) A reporting institution shall screen against the sanctions lists—
(a) every prospective customer, beneficial owner, director, authorized signatory, and person acting on behalf of a customer, before establishing a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction.
(b) its entire existing customer base, including beneficial owners, without delay upon any new designation or amendment to a sanction list.
(c) the parties to, and beneficiaries of, transactions and transfers, including counterparties to virtual asset transfers and the wallet addresses associated with designated persons, where available.
(d) issuers, offerors, promoters and sponsors of securities, CISs, and virtual asset offerings with which it deals; and
(e) its own directors, significant shareholders, employees, agents, and service providers.
(2) A reporting institution shall use screening systems that are capable of detecting variations of names, including aliases, transliterations, and partial matches, and shall calibrate and periodically test those systems.
(3) Where there is a potential match, the reporting institution shall take reasonable and appropriate measures, including making further enquiries from the customer or counterparty without tipping off, to determine whether it is a true match or a false positive, and shall document the outcome.
(4) Pending determination of a potential match, the reporting institution shall not carry out the transaction or release the funds or other assets.
(1) Where a reporting institution confirms that a customer, beneficial owner or other person referred to in paragraph 47 is a designated person, it shall, without delay and without prior notice to the designated person, in accordance with regulations 7, 8 and 15 of the TF Regulations and the corresponding provisions of the PF Regulations—
(a) freeze all funds or other assets that are owned or controlled by the designated person, and not only those that can be tied to a particular terrorist act, plot or threat, including funds or other assets that are wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the designated person, funds or other assets derived or generated from them, and the funds or other assets of persons acting on behalf of or at the direction of the designated person.
(b) block any transaction and reject any prospective customer or transaction which has not commenced.
(c) refrain from making any funds or other assets, economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, wholly or jointly, to or for the benefit of the designated person, in accordance with section 30G of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and regulation 31 of the TF Regulations.
(d) within twenty-four hours of the freezing or other action, file a report with the Committee, through the Secretary to the Committee and in the manner specified by the Committee, specifying the funds or other assets frozen and the actions taken, including any attempted transactions, in accordance with regulations 9 and 15(2) of the TF Regulations or regulation 8(2) of the PF Regulations, as the case may be.
(e) within twenty-four hours of the freezing, submit a return to the Committee and the Centre, in the format specified by the Centre, stating the account number, the name of the account holder, the time of freezing of all subject accounts, the balance at the time of freezing, any related accounts and their balances, and the grounds on which the related accounts were identified, in accordance with regulation 35 of the TF Regulations.
(f) file a suspicious transaction report with the Centre under section 44 of POCAMLA and make any disclosure required under section 42 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act; and
(g) notify the Authority in writing within twenty-four hours of the freezing action.
(2) A reporting institution shall notify the Committee and the Centre, within twenty-four hours of any attempted dealing with funds or other assets that have been frozen, in accordance with regulation 35(3) of the TF Regulations.
(3) Frozen funds or other assets may be credited with interest or other earnings, and with payments due under contracts or obligations that arose before the designation, provided that such amounts are themselves frozen, in accordance with the TF Regulations and the PF Regulations.
(4) A reporting institution that obtains information on a breach of the TF Regulations shall, within forty-eight hours, inform the Committee or report the breach to the nearest police station in accordance with regulation 26 of the TF Regulations, and shall report a breach of the PF Regulations to the Committee or the Centre within forty-eight hours under regulation 24 of the PF Regulations, and in either case shall notify the Authority.
(5) A reporting institution shall not, directly or indirectly, facilitate any transaction relating to the supply, sale, transfer, carriage or delivery of weapons or related materials to or for a designated person, in accordance with regulations 29 and 30 of the TF Regulations and the corresponding provisions of the PF Regulations.
(6) In accordance with regulation 32 of the TF Regulations, no proceedings shall lie against a reporting institution in respect of freezing, or otherwise implementing a designation, in good faith.
(1) A reporting institution shall not release frozen funds or other assets except upon the written authorization or direction of the Committee and shall then release them only to the extent so authorized.
(2) Without limiting subparagraph (1)—
(a) requests by a designated person for access to frozen funds to cover basic expenses, reasonable legal fees, routine holding or maintenance charges or extraordinary expenses are determined by the Committee and, for persons on a United Nations list, the relevant Sanctions Committee, under regulations 11 and 23 of the TF Regulations and the corresponding provisions of the PF Regulations.
(b) claims by a third party to a bona fide interest in frozen funds are determined by the Committee under regulation 12 of the TF Regulations and regulation 11 of the PF Regulations; and
(c) a reporting institution may refer a customer seeking access or claiming an interest to the Secretary to the Committee for guidance on the applicable procedure.
(1) Where a person claims that funds or other assets were frozen in error because of a same or similar name, the reporting institution shall inform the person of the procedure for applying to the Committee under regulation 24 of the TF Regulations or regulation 16 of the PF Regulations and shall not unfreeze the funds or other assets until the Committee communicates its decision. Upon approval, the reporting institution shall unfreeze the funds or other assets immediately.
(2) Where a person is delisted by a Sanctions Committee, or deleted from the domestic list, the reporting institution shall unfreeze the funds or other assets without delay upon notification by the Committee under regulations 13 and 22 of the TF Regulations or the corresponding provisions of the PF Regulations and shall notify the Centre and the Authority accordingly.
(3) A reporting institution shall have procedures for making information on delisting, unfreezing and access procedures available to affected customers, including the addresses of the United Nations Office of the Ombudsperson and the Focal Point for De-listing set out in the Schedule to the TF Regulations.
(1) In addition to implementing targeted financial sanctions, a reporting institution shall take measures to mitigate its proliferation financing risk, including—
(a) identifying customers and transactions with links to jurisdictions subject to proliferation-related sanctions or to jurisdictions known to be used to evade such sanctions.
(b) identifying customers engaged in the manufacture, trade or transport of dual-use goods, military goods, shipping, ship management, ship registration, or related services.
(c) identifying front and shell companies and complex ownership structures that may be used to conceal the involvement of designated persons; and
(d) applying EDD where proliferation financing risk is identified.
(2) A reporting institution shall treat indicators of sanctions evasion or of a proliferation act as grounds for suspicion and shall report them to the Centre in accordance with paragraph 37.
(1) A reporting institution shall have regard to the risk that funds or other assets, including those of a legitimate origin, may be used to support terrorist acts, terrorist groups or individual terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters and the financing of travel for terrorism purposes, and shall be alert to transactions involving small and frequent transfers, crowdfunding, non-profit or public benefit organizations, and links to conflict zones.
(2) A reporting institution shall not apply measures to non-profit or public benefit organizations that unduly disrupt or discourage their legitimate activities and shall apply a risk-based approach consistent with the guidance of the Public Benefit Organizations Authority and the Centre.
(1) This Part applies to every VASP licensed by the Authority, in addition to all other provisions of these Guidelines and to the VASP Regulations.
(2) In accordance with regulation 4(2) of the VASP Regulations, a person is deemed to offer virtual asset services in or from Kenya where it actively solicits or targets consumers in Kenya, or derives an economic benefit or income from Kenya, whether or not it has a physical presence in Kenya.
(3) In these Guidelines, references to accounts, transactions, transfers and funds or other assets include, in relation to a VASP, virtual asset accounts and wallets, virtual asset transfers and virtual assets.
(1) A VASP shall comply with the full range of AML/CFT/CPF preventive measures, including targeted financial sanctions obligations, in accordance with section 24(e) of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act.
(2) A VASP shall not undertake mixer or tumbler services or anonymity-enhancing services, in accordance with section 21(1)(a) of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, and shall not list, trade, transfer or provide custody of any virtual asset that has the effect or intention of concealing the identity of the originator, the beneficiary or the transaction history.
(3) A VASP shall, in accordance with regulation 112 of the VASP Regulations, have appropriate measures to identify, deter and prevent market abuse, financial crime, money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing on and through its distributed ledger technology platform or systems, shall report market abuse to the Authority, and shall report suspicious transactions and activities to the Centre in accordance with paragraph 37.
(4) A VASP shall have a comprehensive risk management framework in accordance with regulation 40 of the VASP Regulations, which shall include its money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing risk assessment under paragraph 7.
(5) A VASP shall have procedures and protection measures that allow its employees to disclose information on market abuse, financial crime, money laundering, terrorism financing or proliferation financing to the Authority and other competent authorities, in accordance with regulation 23 of the VASP Regulations.
(1) A VASP shall appoint both a compliance officer under regulation 39 of the VASP Regulations and an MLRO under regulation 12 of the Regulations and paragraph 11.
(2) The same person may hold both roles only where the VASP satisfies the Authority that the person meets the requirements of both regulations, is of management level, is not involved in any function that is subject to compliance monitoring and has sufficient time and resources to perform both roles effectively.
(1) A VASP shall perform CDD before onboarding a customer, in accordance with regulation 32 of the VASP Regulations, POCAMLA, the Regulations and Part III, and shall apply CDD to occasional transactions, including virtual asset transfers and conversions between virtual assets and fiat currency, regardless of value.
(2) In addition to the information required under Part III, a VASP shall obtain and record, where relevant, the customer's Internet Protocol addresses with time stamps, device identifiers and the wallet addresses used by the customer.
(3) A VASP shall be alert to the use of virtual private networks, anonymizing browsers, and other tools to conceal location, and to attempts by persons located in high-risk or sanctioned jurisdictions to access its services.
(4) A virtual asset exchange or token issuance platform shall, before admitting any virtual asset to trading, carry out and record the due diligence required under regulation 33 of the VASP Regulations, including a legal and compliance assessment of AML/CFT/CPF safeguards and of the risks associated with the virtual asset and its issuer, and shall continuously monitor each admitted virtual asset to determine whether it should continue to trade.
(5) A VASP that offers a virtual asset for sale shall conduct due diligence on the virtual asset and its issuer in accordance with section 24(r) of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act.
(6) A virtual asset offering provider, promoter, tokenization service provider, or token issuance platform shall conduct CDD on, and screen against the sanctions lists, every issuer, promoter, and subscriber, and shall establish the source of funds of the issuer and of significant subscribers.
(1) A VASP that originates a virtual asset transfer shall obtain, hold, and submit to the beneficiary VASP or other obliged entity, immediately and securely, the following information—
(a) the name of the originator.
(b) the originator's account number or wallet address used to process the transfer, or, where there is no account, a unique transaction reference number that permits traceability of the transaction.
(c) the originator's address, national identity number, passport number, customer identification number or date and place of birth.
(d) the name of the beneficiary; and
(e) the beneficiary's account number or wallet address used to process the transfer, or a unique transaction reference number.
(2) A beneficiary VASP shall obtain and hold the required originator information and the required and accurate beneficiary information and shall have risk-based policies and procedures for determining when to execute, reject, return or suspend a virtual asset transfer lacking the required information, and the appropriate follow-up action, including filing a suspicious transaction report.
(3) A VASP shall conduct due diligence on a counterparty VASP before transmitting required information to it, to determine whether the counterparty is licensed or registered and supervised for AML/CFT/CPF purposes and whether it can protect the confidentiality of the information.
(4) Where a virtual asset transfer is to or from a wallet that is not hosted by a VASP or other obliged entity, the VASP shall obtain the required originator and beneficiary information from its customer, take risk-based measures to establish that the customer owns or controls the wallet, and apply enhanced monitoring to such transfers.
(5) A VASP shall screen the originator, the beneficiary and the wallet addresses involved in a virtual asset transfer against the sanctions lists and shall not carry out a transfer to or from a designated person.
(1) A VASP shall, in accordance with section 44 of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act and regulation 22 of the VASP Regulations, record the activity and transactions effected on or through its distributed ledger technology platform, including technical and contextual metadata such as wallet addresses, network or chain identifiers and interaction logs, and shall keep those records, together with the information obtained under paragraph 57, for at least seven years.
(2) A VASP shall use systems which provide an accurate and fully accessible audit trail of all transactions and shall submit the monthly reports required under regulation 26 of the VASP Regulations to the Authority by the tenth day of the following month.
(3) A VASP shall provide records to the Authority, the Centre and other competent authorities in a timely manner upon request and, where required by the Authority, provide online or automated real-time read-only access to its records.
(1) A VASP shall use blockchain analytics or equivalent tools, commensurate with the nature, size and complexity of its business, to monitor virtual asset transfers and to identify exposure to illicit sources, including darknet markets, ransomware, fraud, scams, mixers, sanctioned wallet addresses and high-risk platforms.
(2) A VASP shall freeze, and report in accordance with Part V, any virtual assets identified as owned or controlled by a designated person.
(1) A VASP that provides custody of virtual assets shall maintain systems that enable it to freeze, segregate and restrict the movement of virtual assets held on behalf of any customer, so as to comply without delay with targeted financial sanctions and with any freezing order, seizure order or direction of a competent authority.
(2) A VASP served with a freezing order shall, in accordance with regulation 136 of the VASP Regulations—
(a) immediately freeze the specified virtual assets and prevent any withdrawal, transfer, or conversion.
(b) preserve all records relating to the frozen assets, including customer information, transaction logs, wallet addresses, and keys.
(c) ensure that any custodian, sub-custodian, exchange partner, or infrastructure provider engaged by it complies with the order to the extent that it controls the assets; and
(d) provide the documents, records, data, and technical information required in the order.
(3) A VASP served with a seizure order shall immediately surrender control of the specified virtual assets and comply with regulation 137 of the VASP Regulations.
(4) A VASP shall maintain systems and procedures to enable timely and effective responses to requests from competent authorities, in accordance with regulation 135 of the VASP Regulations. Failure to comply with a freezing or seizure order is an offence under regulation 141 of the VASP Regulations.
(1) In considering an application for approval of a change in ownership of a VASP, the Authority shall consider the source of funds of the acquirer and whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering, terrorism financing or proliferation financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or that the risk of it could increase, in accordance with regulation 29 of the VASP Regulations.
(2) A VASP shall screen its significant shareholders and beneficial owners against the sanctions lists and shall notify the Authority without delay of any match.
(3) A VASP that outsources any function under regulation 113 of the VASP Regulations remains responsible for compliance with these Guidelines and shall ensure that the service provider applies the VASP's AML/CFT/CPF policies and gives the Authority and the Centre access to relevant information.
(1) The Authority shall, pursuant to section 12B of the Capital Markets Act, section 36A of POCAMLA, section 42A of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and section 32 of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, regulate, supervise and enforce compliance by reporting institutions with AML/CFT/CPF requirements, including targeted financial sanctions, and may for that purpose—
(a) vet proposed significant shareholders, beneficial owners, directors, and senior officers of reporting institutions.
(b) conduct risk-based onsite inspections and offsite surveillance, including jointly with the Central Bank of Kenya in respect of VASPs under regulations 38(4) and 148 of the VASP Regulations.
(c) undertake consolidated supervision of a reporting institution and its group.
(d) compel the production of any document or information.
(e) issue directions requiring a reporting institution to cease any act or omission in contravention of the law or these Guidelines, or to take remedial action.
(f) provide feedback, guidance, and typologies to assist reporting institutions in detecting and reporting suspicious activity; and
(g) co-operate and share information with the Centre, the Committee, the Virtual Assets Services Coordination Forum established under regulation 145 of the VASP Regulations, and other domestic and foreign competent authorities.
(2) The Authority shall report to the Centre any suspicious transaction or activity which it encounters in the course of its duties, in accordance with regulation 39 of the Regulations.
(3) The Authority shall circulate designations and amendments to the sanctions lists to reporting institutions without delay and shall monitor compliance with targeted financial sanctions obligations.
The Authority shall, in accordance with regulation 47 of the Regulations, take into account a reporting institution's compliance with POCAMLA, the Regulations, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the TF Regulations, the PF Regulations, the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, the VASP Regulations and these Guidelines, and any involvement of its directors, beneficial owners or senior officers in non-compliance, in determining the suitability of the reporting institution and of the persons managing or controlling it for the grant or continuation of a licence or approval.
(1) A reporting institution, director or employee that contravenes these Guidelines shall be liable to the sanctions and financial penalties provided under section 25A of the Capital Markets Act, including a public reprimand, suspension, restriction or revocation of licence, financial penalties, disqualification and recovery of any benefit accrued from the breach.
(2) In respect of a breach of the TF Regulations, the Authority may, as a supervisory body, impose the administrative sanctions provided under regulation 33(2) of the TF Regulations, namely a warning, an administrative penalty of not less than one hundred thousand shillings and not more than three million shillings for each violation, a ban from working in the sector, constraining or suspending the board, management or owners responsible, suspension or restriction of the activity, or cancellation of the licence, and may impose the corresponding administrative sanctions under the PF Regulations.
(3) The sanctions under subparagraphs (1) and (2) are without prejudice to—
(a) the monetary, civil, and administrative sanctions which the Authority may impose under section 12B(2)(f) of the Capital Markets Act.
(b) the administrative and criminal sanctions applicable to VASPs and their directors, officers, and employees under sections 33, 39 and 40 of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act and regulations 142 and 143 of the VASP Regulations.
(c) the penalties under regulation 48 of the Regulations and under POCAMLA; and
(d) the criminal penalties under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, including sections 4B, 5, 5A, 30G, 30H and 42(5), and under regulation 33(1) of the TF Regulations and the PF Regulations.
(4) In determining the appropriate sanction, the Authority shall have regard to the nature, gravity and duration of the contravention, whether it was deliberate or negligent, the compliance history of the reporting institution, the benefit gained or loss avoided, the extent of co-operation and remediation, and the need for sanctions to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
(1) The Guidelines on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in the Capital Markets, 2015 (Gazette Notice No. 1421) are revoked.
(2) Despite the revocation under subparagraph (1), any inspection, investigation, or enforcement proceedings commenced under the revoked Guidelines shall be continued and concluded as if commenced under these Guidelines.
(3) A reporting institution shall, within 12 months of the commencement of these Guidelines, review and align its risk assessment, policies, procedures, systems, and controls with these Guidelines, and shall confirm completion to the Authority in writing.
a) Transactions do not have apparent economic rationale.
b) Transactions appear to be undertaken in a structured, sequential manner in order to avoid transaction monitoring/reporting thresholds.
c) A concentration ratio of transactions relating to a particular and/or higher risk jurisdiction that is notably higher than what is to be expected considering its normal patterns of trading of a customer.
d) Frequent trades resulting in losses for which the customer appears to have no concern.
e) Sudden spike in transaction volumes, which deviates from previous transactional activity absent any commercial rationale or related corporate action event.
f) Mirror trades or transactions involving securities used for currency conversion for illegitimate or no apparent business purposes.
g) A pattern of securities transactions indicating the customer is using securities trades to engage in currency conversion. Examples of securities that can be used in this manner include dual-currency bonds, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and foreign ordinary shares traded in the Over-the-Counter Market (OTC).
h) Securities transactions are unwound before maturity, absent volatile market conditions or other logical or apparent reason.
i) Trading or journaling in the same security or securities between numerous accounts controlled by the same people (e.g., potential wash sales and/or directed trading).
j) Two or more unrelated accounts at the securities firm trade an illiquid or low-priced security suddenly and simultaneously.
k) Purchase of a security does not correspond to the customer’s investment profile or history of transactions (e.g., the customer may never have invested in equity securities or may have never invested in a given industry) and there is no reasonable business explanation for the change.
l) Transactions that suggest the customer is acting on behalf of third parties with no apparent business or lawful purpose.
m) Funds deposited for purchase of a long-term investment followed shortly by a customer request to liquidate the position and transfer the proceeds out of the account.
a) Intermediaries whose transaction volume is inconsistent with past transaction volume absent any commercial rationale or related corporate action event.
b) A transaction pattern indicating a value of transactions just beneath any applicable reporting threshold.
c) Unclear or complex distribution channels that might limit the ability of the investment fund or asset management company to monitor the transactions (e.g., use of a large number of sub-distributors for distributions in third countries)
X`
a) Making a large purchase or sale of a security, or option on a security, shortly before news or a significant announcement is issued that affects the price of the security, which may be suggestive of potential insider trading or market manipulation.
b) A request is made to execute and/or clear a buy order and sell order for the same security or similar or correlated securities (and/or on behalf of the same beneficial owner), in close chronology.
c) Accumulation of stock in small increments throughout the trading day to increase price
d) Engaging in prearranged or other non-competitive securities trading, including wash or cross trades of illiquid or low-priced securities
e) Marking the closing price of a security.
f) Front-running suspected with regard to other pending customer orders.
a) Customer has no discernible reason for using the securities provider’s services or the firm’s location (e.g., customer lacks ties to the local community or has gone out of the way to use the firm).
b) Customer’s legal or mailing address is associated with other, apparently unrelated accounts.
c) Locations of address of the customer, bank or financial institution seem unconnected to the customer, and little or no explanation can be given by the customer for the disparate addresses.
d) Customer is a trust, shell company, or private investment company that is reluctant to provide information on controlling parties and underlying beneficiaries.
e) Customer is a legal person having issued bearer securities for a large part of its capital.
f) Customer is publicly known to have criminal, civil, or regulatory proceedings against it for corruption, misuse of public funds, other financial crimes, or regulatory noncompliance, or is known to associate with such persons. Sources for this information include news items or Internet searches.
g) Customer’s background is questionable or differs from expectations based on business activities.
h) Customer has been rejected or has had its relationship terminated as a customer by other financial services firms.
i) Customer’s account information reflects liquid and total net worth that does not support substantial account activity.
j) Customer maintains multiple accounts or maintains accounts in the names of family members or corporate entities with no apparent business or other purpose.
k) Non-profit or charitable organizations engage in financial transactions for which there appears to be no logical economic purpose or in which there appears to be no link between the stated activity or the organization and the other parties in the transaction.
l) Customer is reluctant to provide information in relation to its identity and/or transactions.
m) Customer is reluctant to provide information needed to file reports to proceed with the transaction or requests an inordinate amount of secrecy around a transaction.
n) Customer exhibits unusual concern with the firm’s compliance with government reporting requirements, the firm’s systems, or the firm’s AML/CFT policies and controls.
o) Customer tries to persuade an employee not to file required reports or not to maintain the firm’s required records.
p) Law enforcement or regulators have issued subpoenas and/or freeze letters regarding a customer and/or account at the securities firm.
q) Customer wishes to engage in transactions that lack business sense or apparent investment strategy or are inconsistent with the customer’s stated business strategy.
r) Customer does not exhibit a concern with the cost of transactions or fees (e.g., surrender fees, higher than necessary commissions) or of investment losses.
a) Customer opens a new account and delivers in shares electronically representing a large block of thinly traded or low-priced securities.
b) Customer has a pattern of delivering in shares electronically, immediately selling the shares and then wiring or otherwise transferring out the proceeds of the resale(s)
c) A sudden spike in investor demand for, coupled with a rising price in, a thinly traded or low-priced security.
d) The lack of a restrictive legend on shares deposited seems inconsistent with the date the customer acquired the securities, the nature of the transaction in which the securities were acquired, the history of the stock, and/or the volume of shares trading.
e) Customer with limited or no other assets at the firm receives an electronic transfer or journal transfer of large amounts of low-priced, non-exchange listed securities.
f) Customer’s explanation of how the customer acquired the securities does not make sense or changes.
g) Customer delivers in shares electronically and requests to journal the shares into multiple accounts that do not appear to be related, or to sell or otherwise transfer ownership of the shares.
a) The securities account is used for payments or outgoing wire transfers with little or no securities activities (i.e., account appears to be used as a depository account or a conduit for transfers with no reasonable business explanation for such)
b) Funds are transferred to financial or depository institutions other than those from where the funds were initially received, specifically when different countries are involved.
c) Customer “structures” deposits, withdrawals, or purchase of monetary instruments below a certain amount to avoid reporting or recordkeeping requirements.
d) Customer engages in excessive journal entries of funds or securities between related or unrelated accounts without any apparent business purpose.
e) Payment by third party check or money transfer from a source that has no apparent connection to the customer.
f) Customer uses a personal/individual account for business purposes.
g) Payment to a third party to which the customer has no apparent connection.
h) Frequent transactions involving round or whole dollar amounts.
i) The customer requests that certain payments be routed through correspondent accounts held by the financial intermediary instead of its own accounts.
j) Funds transferred into an account that are subsequently transferred out of the account in the same or nearly the same amounts, especially when origin and destination locations are high-risk jurisdictions.
k) A dormant account suddenly becomes active without a plausible explanation (e.g., large amounts are suddenly wired out).
l) Many small, incoming wire transfers or deposits made using checks and money orders that are almost immediately withdrawn or wired out in a manner inconsistent with the customer’s business or history. This may be an indicator of, for example, a Ponzi scheme.
m) Wire transfer activity, when viewed over a period of time, reveal suspicious or unusual patterns.
n) Transfers of funds or securities are made to the same person from different individuals or to different persons from the same individual with no reasonable explanation.
o) Unusually large aggregate wire transfers or high volume or frequency of transactions is made with no logical or apparent reason.
p) Customer transfers/receives funds to/from persons involved in criminal or suspicious activities (as per the information available).
q) In/out transactions for substantial amounts on a short-term basis
r) Receipt of unexplained amounts, followed, shortly thereafter, by a request to return amounts.
s) Frequent transfers of securities’ ownership.
t) The usage of brokerage accounts as long term depository accounts for funds.
a) The employee appears to be enjoying a lavish lifestyle that is inconsistent with his or her salary or position.
b) The employee is reluctant to take annual leave.
c) The employee is subject to intense job related demands, such as sales or production goals that may make him more willing to engage in or overlook behavior that poses AML risks.
d) The employee inputs a high level of activity into one customer account even though the customer’s account is relatively unimportant to the organization.
e) The employee is known to be experiencing a difficult personal situation, financial or other.
f) The employee has the authority to arrange and process customer affairs without supervision or involvement of colleagues.
g) The management or reporting structure of the market intermediary allows an employee to have a large amount of autonomy without direct control over his or her activities.
h) The employee is located in a different country to his or her direct line of management, and supervision is only carried out remotely.
i) A management culture within the market intermediary focuses on financial reward over compliance with regulatory requirements.
j) The employee’s supporting documentation for customers’ accounts or orders is incomplete or missing.
k) Business is experiencing a period of high staff turnover or is going through significant structural changes.
CAPITAL MARKETS AUTHORITY
DRAFT GUIDELINES ON THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING, TERRORISM FINANCING AND PROLIFERATION FINANCING IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 2026
STAKEHOLDERS COMMENT MATRIX
INSTITUTION…………………………………………………………DATE……………………………….
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Provide text on exact wording of the provision in the proposed clause or clauses.
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The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“The Guidelines on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in the Capital Markets, 2015 (Gazette Notice No. 1421) are revoked.”
“section 32(2)(h) of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act”
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