Financial Action Task Force Public Statement regarding the Russian Federation

Date: 2 March 2023
To: All Registrants and Licensees
Re: Financial Action Task Force Public Statement regarding the Russian Federation The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as the global standard setting body for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing, has again expressed its concern regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In its public statement on 24 February 2023, the FATF acknowledges the United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 which demands that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. The FATF notes in its statement that the Russian Federation’s actions run counter to the FATF core principles aiming to promote security, safety and the integrity of the global financial system, and are considered to represent a “gross violation of the commitment to international cooperation and mutual respect upon which FATF Members have agreed to implement and support the FATF Standards”. In light of this, the FATF has suspended the membership of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation, however, remains accountable for its obligation to implement the FATF standards, meet its financial obligations, and will remain a member of the Global Network as an active member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering (EAG). The FATF continues to encourage all jurisdictions to remain vigilant of threats to the integrity, safety and security of the international financial system arising from the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine, and reiterates that all jurisdictions should be alert to possible emerging risks, from the circumvention of measures taken to protect the international financial system and take the necessary measures to mitigate these risks. A copy of the FATF’s public statement as well as Resolution ES-11/1 are attached hereto, and can be found at the following web address:

1. February 2023 Public Statement: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/fatf￾statement-russian-federation.html
2. Resolution ES-11/1: https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2FES￾11%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
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Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 February 2023 Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 February 2023 Publication details Language English Country Albania | Barbados | Burkina Faso | Cambodia | Cayman Islands | Democratic Republic of the Congo
| Gibraltar | Haiti | Jamaica | Jordan | Mali |
Morocco | Mozambique |
Nigeria

Panama	Philippines
Senegal	South
Africa	South
Sudan	Syria

Outcomes FATF Plenary, 22-24 February 2023 High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 24 February 2023 Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 February 2023 Paris, 24 February 2023 - Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”. The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. The FATF Standards do not envisage de￾risking, or cutting-off entire classes of customers, but call for the application of a risk-based approach. Therefore, the FATF encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis. The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist

• Cambodia
• Morocco

financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has provided some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since October 2022: Albania, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Haiti, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Sudan, Türkiye, UAE, and Uganda. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Tanzania chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued in October 2022 for those jurisdictions are included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions’ AML/CFT regimes. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Nigeria and South Africa. Since February 2020, when Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Albania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating a meaningful increase in the number of money laundering cases indicted, particularly those stemming from foreign offences where the criminal proceeds were laundered in Albania. The FATF has made the initial determination that Albania has substantially completed its action plan and appreciates Albania’s work to address its strategic deficiencies. However, the FATF has not yet decided to authorise an on-site visit to the country to verify the implementation of Albania’s AML/CFT reforms. This is because the FATF remains concerned that Albania’s apparent plans to establish a Voluntary Tax Compliance (VTC) programme do not comply with the FATF’s principles for managing the AML/CFT implications of VTC programmes or FATF’s best practices in this area. Albania should ensure that any amnesty provisions included in the VTC law do not present an opportunity for individuals or legal persons to legalise or repatriate assets of unlawful origin and that any criminal amnesty only relates to the previous incorrect or non-reporting of taxable income. Albania ALBANIA

should revise its draft VTC law and work with MONEYVAL to ensure that any VTC law passed or implemented has adequate safeguards to prevent the potential for abuse of the programme for money laundering purposes. Alternatively, it could consider abandoning the planned VTC programme altogether. Since February 2020, when Barbados made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Barbados has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by, taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and by demonstrating that ML investigations and prosecutions are in line with the country’s risk profile. Barbados should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring that accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (2) further pursuing repatriation or sharing of confiscated assets with other countries. The FATF expresses concern that Barbados failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in April 2022. The FATF strongly urges Barbados to swiftly demonstrate significant progress in completing its action plan by June 2023 or the FATF will consider next steps if there is insufficient progress. Since February 2021, when Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by increasing ML investigations and the use of international cooperation in line with its risk profile. Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its BARBADOS BURKINA FASO

action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) updating its understanding of ML/TF risks, including through the revision of the national risk assessment in line with the sectoral priorities identified in its national strategy; (2) strengthening of resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (3) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (4) increasing the diversity of suspicious transactions reporting; (5) establishing procedures for effective implementation of declaration of cross-border declaration of currencies and bearer negotiable instruments; (6) enhancing cooperation between LEAs and prosecutorial authorities combatting TF and conducting TF investigations and prosecutions in line with its risk profile; and (7) implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs. The FATF notes Burkina Faso’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Burkina Faso to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible. Since February 2021, when the Cayman Islands made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Cayman Islands has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by advancing ML prosecutions into convictions and demonstrating progress on complex ML cases with a foreign predicate. However, the Cayman Islands should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiencies, by demonstrating that they are prosecuting all types of money laundering cases in line with the jurisdiction’s risk profile and that such prosecutions are resulting in the application of dissuasive, effective, and proportionate sanctions. THE CAYMAN ISLANDS

The FATF expresses concern that the Cayman Islands failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in May 2022. The FATF strongly urges the Cayman Islands to swiftly demonstrate significant progress in completing its action plan by June 2023 or the FATF will consider next steps if there is insufficient progress. (Statement from October 2022) In October 2022, the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in October 2020, the DRC has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions including making confiscation of proceeds of crime a policy priority. The DRC will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) finalising the NRA on ML and TF and adopting an AML/CFT national strategy; (2) designating supervisory authorities for all DNFBP sectors, and developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (3) adequately resourcing the FIU, and build its capacity to conduct operational and strategic analysis; (4) strengthening the capabilities of authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; and (5) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS. Since June 2022, when Gibraltar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Gibraltar has taken steps to do so, including by demonstrating that the supervisors for trust and company service providers, lawyers, gaming businesses, real estate agents, and other non￾bank entities are now using a range of effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches, specifically by taking more enforcement actions, imposing financial penalties, and publishing the results of cases, where appropriate. Gibraltar should continue to work on THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO GIBRALTAR

implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by showing that it is able to pursue more final confiscation judgments commensurate with the risk and context of Gibraltar. In June 2021, Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Haiti to advance its commitments in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) facilitating information sharing with relevant foreign counterparts; (3) addressing the technical deficiencies in its legal and regulatory framework that impede the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (4) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (5) ensuring a better use of financial intelligence and other relevant information by competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its ML offence and demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti’s risk profile; (7) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (8) addressing the technical deficiencies in its TF offence and targeted financial sanctions regime; and (9) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. HAITI

Since February 2020, when Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Jamaica has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by introducing its Charities regulations and bringing the microcredit sector under AML/CFT supervision. Jamaica should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) including all DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and ensuring adequate, risk-based supervision in all sectors; and (2) ensuring that BO definition is in line with the FATF Standards, taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis to competent authorities. The FATF again expresses concern that Jamaica failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2022. The FATF strongly urges Jamaica to swiftly demonstrate significant progress in completing its action plan by June 2023 or the FATF will consider next steps, which could include calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Jamaica. Since October 2021, when Jordan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Jordan has taken positive steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by conducting inspections of reporting entities including FIs and DNFBPs, pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions for predicate offences in line with its risk profile, and conducting outreach on TFS obligations. Jordan should continue to work on implementing its action plan to JAMAICA JORDAN

address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing and disseminating the ML/TF risk assessments of legal persons and virtual assets; (2) applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) implementing a sanctions mechanism for violations of the transparency obligations related to legal persons and arrangements; (4) applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in ML cases; and (5) demonstrating that TFS deficiencies are rectified. In October 2021, Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Mali has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by conducting AML/CFT trainings for FIs and DNFBPs and enhancing the FIU and LEAs cooperation mechanisms on the use of financial intelligence. Mali should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing the national strategic AML/CFT action plan in line with the NRA; (2) developing and starting to implement a risk based approach for the AML/CFT supervision of all FIs and higher risk DNFBPs and demonstrating effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (3) conducting a comprehensive assessment of ML/TF risks associated with all types of legal persons; (4) increasing the capacity of the FIU and the LEAs and enhancing their cooperation on the use of financial intelligence; (5) conducting parallel financial investigation; (6) strengthening the capacities of relevant authorities responsible for investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) strengthening the legal framework and procedures to implement TFS related to TF and PF; and (8) MALI

implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. (Statement from October 2022) In October 2022, Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in April 2021, Mozambique has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions to improve its system including by finalising its NRA and strengthening its asset confiscation efforts. Mozambique will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) ensuring cooperation and coordination amongst relevant authorities to implement risk￾based AML/CFT strategies and policies; (2) conducting training for all LEAs on mutual legal assistance to enhance the gathering of evidence or seizure/confiscation of proceeds of crime; (3) providing adequate financial and human resources to supervisors, developing and implementing a risk￾based supervision plan; (4) providing adequate resources to the authorities to commence the collection of adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information of legal persons; (5) increasing the human resources of the FIU as well as increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities; (6) demonstrating LEAs capability to effectively investigate ML/TF cases using financial intelligence; (7) conducting a comprehensive TF Risk Assessment and begin implementing a comprehensive national CFT strategy; (8) increasing awareness on TF and PF-related TFS; and (9) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the MOZAMBIQUE

FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan. In February 2023, Nigeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in August 2021, Nigeria has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions to improve its system including by improving its AML/CFT legislative framework, updating its assessment of inherent ML/TF/PF risks and strengthened its implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Nigeria will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) completing its residual ML/TF risk assessment and updating its national AML/CFT strategy to ensure alignment with other national strategies relevant to high-risk predicate offences; (2) enhancing formal and informal international cooperation in line with ML/TF risks; (3) improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; (4) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date BO information on legal persons and applying sanctions for breaches of BO obligations; (5) demonstrating an increase in the dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU and its use by LEAs; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with ML risks; (7) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and apply appropriate sanctions and maintaining comprehensive data on frozen, seized, confiscated, and disposed assets; (8) demonstrating sustained NIGERIA

increase in investigations and prosecutions of different types of TF activities in line with risk and enhancing interagency cooperation on TF investigations; and (9) conducting risk-based and targeted outreach to NPOs at risk of TF abuse and implementing risk-based monitoring for the subset of NPOs at risk of TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. Since June 2019, when Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Panama has taken important steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes. However, Panama should continue to take action to fully address remaining measures in its action plan as all timelines have already expired in January 2021. Panama should therefore continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, by ensuring adequate verification, of up-to-date beneficial ownership information by obliged entities and timely access by competent authorities. The FATF again expresses concern that Panama failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2021. The FATF strongly urges Panama to swiftly complete its action plan by June 2023 or the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Panama. PANAMA PHILIPPINES

In June 2021, the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. The Philippines should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to￾date; (4) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (5) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; and (6) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF by demonstrating that DNFBPs understand their obligations. The FATF notes the Philippines’ continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages the Philippines to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible. Since February 2021, when Senegal made a high￾level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Senegal has established a database to collect SENEGAL

statistics and data on ML/TF investigations and prosecutions and enhanced the framework for coordination and conduct of TF investigations. Senegal should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving compliance by detecting AML/CFT violations and imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against non￾compliant DNFBPs; (2) updating and maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information on legal persons and arrangements and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (3) enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in combatting TF in line with the 2019 TF National Strategy; and (4) implementing an effective TFS regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs. The FATF notes Senegal’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF urges Senegal to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible. In February 2023, South Africa made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2021, South Africa has made significant progress on many of the MER’s recommended actions to improve its system including by developing national AML/CFT policies to address higher risks and newly amending the legal SOUTH AFRICA

framework for TF and TFS, among others. South Africa will work to implement its FATF action plan by:
(1) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound MLA requests that help facilitate ML/TF investigations and confiscations of different types of assets in line with its risk profile; (2) improving risk￾based supervision of DNFBPs and demonstrating that all AML/CFT supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective sanctions for noncompliance; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to￾date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to BO obligations; (4) demonstrating a sustained increase in law enforcement agencies’ requests for financial intelligence from the FIC for its ML/TF investigations; (5) demonstrate a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile; (6) enhancing its identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of a wider range of predicate crimes, in line with its risk profile; (7) updating its TF Risk Assessment to inform the implementation of a comprehensive national counter financing of terrorism strategy; and (8) ensuring the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions and demonstrating an effective mechanism to identify individuals and entities that meet the criteria for domestic designation. In June 2021, South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen SOUTH SUDAN

the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) conducting a comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (2) becoming a party to and fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (3) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (5) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (6) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (7) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse. The FATF notes South Sudan’s limited progress across its action plan. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to demonstrate its strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts. Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and SYRIA

MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. (Statement from October 2022) In October 2022, Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in April 2021, Tanzania has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions to improve its system including by developing legal framework for TF and TFS and disseminating FIU strategic analysis. Tanzania will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) improving risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, including by conducting inspections on a risk-sensitive basis and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for non￾compliance; (2) demonstrating authorities’ capability to effectively conduct a range of investigations and prosecutions of ML in line with the country’s risk profile; (3) demonstrating that LEAs are taking measures to identify, trace, seize, and confiscate TANZANIA

proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (4) conducting a comprehensive TF Risk Assessment and begin implementing a comprehensive national CFT strategy as well as demonstrating capability to conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions in line with the country’s risk profile; (5) increasing awareness of the private sector and competent authorities on TF and PF-related TFS; and (6) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan. Since October 2021, when Türkiye made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Türkiye has taken further steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by issuing regulations regarding politically exposed persons and guidance to the private sector on detecting terrorist financing, as well as increasing the FIU’s proactive dissemination of financial intelligence. Türkiye should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing on-site inspections by supervisors across all sectors, commensurate with risk; (2) enhancing the use of financial intelligence to support ML investigations; (3) undertaking more complex ML investigations and prosecutions; (4) using statistics on confiscation and terrorist financing to update risk assessments and inform policy; (5) conducting more financial investigations in terrorism cases, prioritising TF investigations and prosecutions related to UN￾designated groups, and ensuring TF investigations are extended to identify financing and support TÜRKIYE

networks; (6) concerning targeted financial sanctions, pursuing outgoing requests to third￾countries related to UN-designated groups, in line with Türkiye’s risk profile; and (7) fully implementing a risk-based approach for the supervision of non￾profit organisations to prevent their abuse for terrorist financing, including by taking steps to ensure that audits conducted are risk-based, that supervision does not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity such as fundraising, and that sanctions applied are proportionate to any violations. The FATF continues to monitor that Türkiye’s oversight of the NPO sector is in line with the risk-based approach as set out in the FATF Standards. Since February 2020, when Uganda made a high￾level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Uganda demonstrated progress, including demonstrating LEAs and judicial authorities apply the ML offence consistent with the identified risks, and establishing and implementing policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. Uganda should continue to work to implement its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) developing and implementing risk￾based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (2) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information for legal entities; and (3) addressing the technical deficiencies in the legal framework to implement PF￾related targeted financial sanctions. The FATF continues to monitor Uganda’s oversight of the NPO UGANDA

sector to encourage the application of the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and mitigate unintended consequences. The FATF expresses concern that Uganda failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in May
2022. The FATF strongly urges Uganda to swiftly
demonstrate significant progress in completing its action plan by June 2023 or the FATF will consider next steps if there is insufficient progress. Since February 2022, when the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the UAE demonstrated significant progress, including by demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound MLA requests to help facilitate the investigation of TF, ML, and high-risk predicates, showing greater use of financial intelligence to pursue high-risk ML threats, and combating UN sanctions evasion, including by demonstrating a better understanding among the private sector. The UAE should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing and maintaining a shared understanding of the ML/TF risks between the different DNFBP sectors and institutions; (2) showing an increase in the number and quality of STRs filed by FIs and DNFBPs; (3) ensuring a more granular understanding of the risk of abuse of legal persons and, where applicable, legal arrangements, for ML/TF; and (4) demonstrating a sustained increase in effective investigations and prosecutions UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

of different types of ML cases consistent with UAE’s risk profile. Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. YEMEN JURISDICTIONS NO LONGER SUBJECT

The FATF welcomes Cambodia’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Cambodia has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2019 related to improvements in the legal framework for international cooperation and preventive measures, risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, improving the quality and quantity of FIU disseminations, increasing and improving investigation and prosecution of ML and asset confiscation and establishing and implementing a legal framework for PF TFS. Cambodia is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. Cambodia should continue to work with APG to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system. The FATF welcomes Morocco’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Morocco strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the TO INCREASED MONITORING BY THE FATF CAMBODIA MOROCCO

commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2021 related to improving its international cooperation mechanisms, strengthening AML/CFT supervision, strengthening transparency of legal persons by ensuring timely access to accurate beneficial ownership information, strengthening the capacities of the FIU, enhancing capacities to conduct ML investigation and confiscate the proceeds of crime and improving effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions regime. Morocco is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. Morocco should continue to work with MENAFATF to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system. Discover The FATF ↙ Countries ↙ Publications ↙ Calendars ↙ Private Sector ↙

United Nations A/RES/ES-11/1
General Assembly Distr.: General
18 March 2022
22-04067 (E) 210322
2204067
Eleventh emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136) Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 March 2022 [without reference to a Main Committee (A/ES-11/L.1 and A/ES-11/L.1/Add.1)] ES-11/1. Aggression against Ukraine The General Assembly, Reaffirming the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among nations, Recalling the obligation of all States under Article 2 of the Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, Recalling also the obligation under Article 2 (2) of the Charter, that all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter, Taking note of Security Council resolution 2623 (2022) of 27 February 2022, in which the Council called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in document S/Agenda/8979, Recalling General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, entitled “Uniting for peace”, and taking into account that the lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council at its 8979th meeting has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling also its resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, in which it approved the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United

A/RES/ES-11/1 Aggression against Ukraine 2/4 22-04067 Nations, and reaffirming the principles contained therein that the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force, and that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State or country or at its political independence is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter, Recalling further its resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which defines aggression as the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter, Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace founded upon freedom, equality, justice and respect for human rights and of developing friendly relations among nations irrespective of their political, economic and social systems or the levels of their development, Recalling the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, and the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) of 5 December 1994, Condemning the 24 February 2022 declaration by the Russian Federation of a “special military operation” in Ukraine, Reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal, Expressing grave concern at reports of attacks on civilian facilities such as residences, schools and hospitals, and of civilian casualties, including women, older persons, persons with disabilities, and children, Recognizing that the military operations of the Russian Federation inside the sovereign territory of Ukraine are on a scale that the international community has not seen in Europe in decades and that urgent action is needed to save this generation from the scourge of war, Endorsing the Secretary-General’s statement of 24 February 2022 in which he recalled that the use of force by one country against another is the repudiation of the principles that every country has committed to uphold and that the present military offensive of the Russian Federation is against the Charter, Condemning the decision of the Russian Federation to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces, Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and around Ukraine, with an increasing number of internally displaced persons and refugees in need of humanitarian assistance, Expressing concern also about the potential impact of the conflict on increased food insecurity globally, as Ukraine and the region are one of the world’s most important areas for grain and agricultural exports, when millions of people are facing famine or the immediate risk of famine or are experiencing severe food insecurity in
several regions of the world, as well as on energy security, Welcoming the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international and regional organizations to support de-escalation of the situation with respect to Ukraine, and encouraging continued dialogue,

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1. Reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and
   territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters;
2. Deplores in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation
   against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter;
3. Demands that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force
   against Ukraine and to refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any Member State;
4. Also demands that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and
   unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;
   5.  Deplores the 21 February 2022 decision by the Russian Federation related
   to the status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter;
5. Demands that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally
   reverse the decision related to the status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine;
6. Calls upon the Russian Federation to abide by the principles set forth in
   the Charter and the Declaration on Friendly Relations;1
7. Calls upon the parties to abide by the Minsk agreements and to work
   constructively in relevant international frameworks, including in the Normandy format and Trilateral Contact Group, towards their full implementation;
8. Demands all parties to allow safe and unfettered passage to destinations
   outside of Ukraine and to facilitate the rapid, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance for those in need in Ukraine, to protect civilians, including humanitarian personnel and persons in vulnerable situations, including women, older persons, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, migrants and children, and to respect human rights;
9. Deplores the involvement of Belarus in this unlawful use of force against
   Ukraine, and calls upon it to abide by its international obligations;
10. Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law and violations
    and abuses of human rights, and calls upon all parties to respect strictly the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 2 and Additional Protocol I thereto of 1977, 3 as applicable, and to respect international human rights law, and in this regard further demands that all parties ensure respect for and the protection of all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities;
11. Demands that all parties fully comply with their obligations under
    international humanitarian law to spare the civilian population, and civilian objects, refraining from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and respecting and protecting humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations; __________________ 1 Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex. 2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, Nos. 970–973. 3 Ibid., vol. 1125, No. 17512.

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13. Requests the Emergency Relief Coordinator to provide, 30 days after the
adoption of the present resolution, a report on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine and on the humanitarian response;
14. Urges the immediate peaceful resolution of the conflict between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine through political dialogue, negotiations, mediation and other peaceful means;
15. Welcomes and urges the continued efforts by the Secretary-General,
Member States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international and regional organizations to support the de-escalation of the current situation, as well as the efforts of the United Nations, including of the United Nations Crisis Coordinator for Ukraine, and humanitarian organizations to respond to the humanitarian and refugee crisis that the aggression by the Russian Federation has created;
16. Decides to adjourn the eleventh emergency special session of the General
Assembly temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States. 1st plenary meeting 2 March 2022