Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation

Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Consultation Paper CP21/4* March 2021

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
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Contents
We are asking for comments on 1 Summary 3 this Consultation Paper (CP) by 2 The wider context 11 13 April 2021. 3 High level standards 18 You can send them to us using 4 Trust and insurance risk transfers and prudential the form on our website at:
requirements 23 www.fca.org.uk/cp21-04-response-form 5 Conduct standards 30 Or in writing to: 6 Product governance 49 Terence Denness Financial Conduct Authority 7 Resolution and compensation 52 12 Endeavour Square 8 TheSeniorManagers&CertificationRegime 63 London E20 1JN 9 The Appointed Representatives regime 76 Telephone: 10 Dispute resolution 87 020 7066 1768 11 Supervision and enforcement 95 Email: 12 Authorisations 102 cp21-04@fca.org.uk
Annex 1
Costbenefitanalysis 105
Annex 2
Compatibility statement 164
Annex 3
Questions in this paper 169
Annex 4
Abbreviations used in this paper 174
Appendix 1
Draft Handbook text

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1 Summary
Why we are consulting
1.1 In January of this year, the Government legislated to bring pre-paid funeral plans
(‘funeral plans’) into our regulation.
1.2 From29 July2022activitiesinvolvingtheprovisionanddistributionofpre‑paidfuneral
plans will become fully subject to our regulation, and firms conducting these activities will need to be authorised by us.
1.3 We are consulting now on our draft rules and guidance for the funeral plans sector, and
to ask if stakeholders agree with the standards we are proposing that firms will need to meet.
1.4 In the run-up to legislation being made, Parliament debated both funeral poverty and
the varied experiences of consumers in the funeral plans sector. We are therefore particularly mindful of the presence of vulnerable consumers in this market, e.g. due to lower financial resilience or recent bereavement. That forms an important backdrop to our work and our views on how the sector should operate under our regulation.
1.5 Our proposed rules are intended to protect consumers that have, or will in future take
out, a pre-paid funeral plan product. We want to see an improvement in outcomes for consumers in this sector, with better value products, better sales practices, and better controls in place so consumers can be confident they will receive the funeral they have agreed. Our proposed rules will also set a level playing field for firms – all firms who want to carry on this business after July next year will need to meet the same standards.
1.6 As this is a regime for a newly regulated sector, large parts of this consultation paper
are concerned with the application of rules formalising basic standards that we expect of all financial services firms, and already apply to other sectors.
1.7 Many of the concepts set out in those rules will be recognisable to firms in the sector,
because they reflect good business practice, for example dealing with integrity with clients, or disclosure of contract terms. There is also some overlap with the requirements of the Funeral Planning Authority (FPA), the existing industry voluntary regulator. Many well-run firms will already be meeting these standards; or be very close to them. However, we anticipate that for a subset of firms meeting our standards will necessitate a significant change in business practices.
1.8 We are also proposing some requirements that are specific to this sector, and the risks
it can pose. In designing these we have taken into account the current structure of the industry, which is generally backed by a trust or insurance arrangement.
1.9 This consultation paper sets out the full suite of our regulation, for a sector which is not
currently regulated by us. We have sought to set out why we have made the choices we have, and in places we have set out possible alternatives in detail to allow respondents to provide us with the richest responses and evidence possible. As a result, in designing

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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation our proposals we have considered a number of key objectives for consumers. A funeral plan sold after regulation takes effect should deliver a funeral without top-up payments being required. We also want provider firms to have adequate arrangements in place to meet the contractual liabilities they have entered into, be that through insurance or trust structures, and consumers should have certainty over which funeral director is contracted to deliver their funeral. We recognise that existing contracts may have been sold on different terms to those set out in this consultation and our proposals will generally allow these contracts to continue on those terms. But firms will have to meet a range of standards in their dealings with existing customers as set out in this document, and our overarching Principles for Businesses e.g. to treat customers fairly. In relation to intermediaries, we are highly sceptical that the commission structures which are common in a subset of the industry benefit consumers, and so we propose to prohibit these. For example, we have observed that funeral directors typical receive no or minimal commission, whilst intermediaries that are focused only on selling plans may receive up to £900. We do not think these payments add value for consumers, for example the intermediaries receiving the payments are not shopping around on the customer’s behalf. But these payments do increase the cost consumers pay, or the risk that their funeral will not end up fully funded. We are seeking feedback on whether our understanding of commission in this market is right. If not, we have set out alternative ways to regulate the payments so that they are allowed but are fair to the customer. We are aware that this consultation comes at a challenging time for the sector, with the industry particularly impacted by Covid-19. However, all firms will need to be authorised by 29 July2022tobeabletocontinuecarryingoutactivitiesrelatingtofuneralplanbusiness.We urge firms and other stakeholders to engage with this consultation, as well as the authorisation process where applicable. We will also be reaching out to firms proactively. From29 July2022,theFinancialOmbudsmanService(ombudsmanservice)will become responsible for resolving consumer disputes about funeral plans. This consultation also sets out proposed changes to the compulsory and voluntary jurisdictions of the ombudsman service, and is a joint consultation with the ombudsman service on those changes. Who this applies to
1.14 Who needs to read this document:

• firmsthatsellorcarryoutfuneralplancontractsforfuneralsintheUK
• investment advisers who provide advice on funeral plan contracts
• insurancefirmswhoprovidelifeinsurancepoliciesthatbacksomefuneralplans
• trustees of trusts and discretionary investment managers which manage the
  assets of trusts that back some funeral plans
• tradebodiesrepresentingfirmsthatcarryoutorsellfuneralplancontracts,
  including those representing funeral directors
• groups representing consumer interests

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1.15 Who else is affected by this consultation:

• consumers that have a funeral plan, or are thinking of purchasing one
  The wider context of this consultation
  1.16 Funeral plans are products under which a consumer pre-arranges and pre-pays for
  their funeral with a provider, generally for a fixed cost. The funeral plan could be sold by a third-party intermediary or directly by the provider firm.
  1.17 The main benefit of the product to consumers is to allow them to arrange the details
  of, and pay for, their funerals in advance, ensuring that any specific requirements are met and that their families are saved unexpected cost and inconvenience at the time of bereavement, which can be a challenging and traumatic time for most people. We recognise there can be psychological and emotional benefits to consumers buying funeral plans and that they can provide important ‘peace of mind’, as well as potential behavioural biases driven by the challenging context in which consumers access and use these products (eg consumers may focus on a perceived need to put arrangements in place rather than the value of a plan).
  1.18 Consumers may also be protected from increases in the price of funerals in the time
  between buying the plan and their death. Sold well, these can be valuable products that support consumers and their families at a difficult time in their lives.
  1.19 We understand that there are 2 different ways in which consumers can ‘pre-pay’ for
  their funeral under a funeral plan contract. Consumers can pay:
• A set amount, either as a lump sum or in instalments. The plan provider places the
  money into a trust or buys a life insurance policy.
• Afixedmonthlyamountuntiltheydieorreachaspecifiedage(usually90).The
  provider uses these payments to buy a life insurance policy.

1.20
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Funeral plans are currently excluded from our regulation if they are either backed by insurance or a trust meeting certain conditions set out in the Regulated Activities Order (RAO). We understand that all current providers of funeral plans structure their plans to rely on the exclusions in the RAO. Estimated value of existing plans Source: FPA statistic £4bn 1,400,000 Estimated number of undrawn plans (customers) Source: FPA statistic Up to 60 2000-3000 funeral plan providers expected number of intermediaries Source: FCA estimates
1.21 The market is currently self-regulated by the FPA, which has a Code of Practice and
rules but no statutory powers. Not all funeral plan providers have decided to become members of the FPA.
1.22 There has been significant growth in the funeral plans market in the last 2 decades
since the decision was taken to broadly exclude funeral plans from the RAO. Members of the FPA (90-95% of the market in terms of existing plans) have over 1.4 million undrawn plans. In 2019, 165,200 new plans were sold.
1.23 Following concerns raised in the media and by consumer groups about the conduct
and prudential soundness of some pre-paid funeral plan providers, the Treasury consulted in 2019 on the future regulation of this market. In this consultation, the Government stated its objectives for regulation of the sector as follows:

• all pre-paid funeral plan providers to be subject to robust and enforceable conduct
  standards
• enhanced oversight of providers’ prudential soundness
• consumers to have access to appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms if things
  go wrong
  1.24 The activities that will be regulated in future cover both plan providers (‘entering
  into’ and ‘carrying out’) and third-party firms selling plans (intermediaries which are generally ‘arranging’ or ‘advising’).
  1.25 The Treasury has been clear that it intends for the FCA to regulate funeral plan providers
  both for new plans they sell after regulation comes into force and existing plans entered into prior to our regulation, in compliance with the existing exclusions in the RAO. It is partly for this reason that The Treasury has created the new regulated activity of carrying

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority out funeral plan contracts as provider. The Treasury’s intention was that we should have regulatory oversight of existing funeral plan contracts as well as new plans.
1.26 The Treasury’s consultation, and our own information gathering, have identified a
number of potential harms to consumers arising from current practices employed by some firms in this market:
a. Plans which do not meet consumers’ needs or expectations, particularly plans paid by instalment which do not guarantee to provide a funeral service b. Theuseofhigh‑pressuresalestacticsbysomefirms.Thisincludescoldcallingof potentially vulnerable consumers, which can result in consumers taking plans which are not suitable for their needs
c. Consumerspayinghighpricesinrelationtoproductbenefitsdrivenbyhighratesof
commission and fees d. Poorgovernanceandcontrolswithinfirms,includingoversightofintermediariesand potentialconflictsofinterestwhereanintermediarygetsahighcommission e. Plans going unclaimed because the consumer’s family do not know about them. The time-critical nature of funeral provision increases the risk of harm, as families cannot use plans if they discover them at a later date f. Poorfinancialmanagementoftrusts,meaningthattheremaynotbesufficient funds available to cover funeral liabilities, with unclear and potentially poor outcomes forconsumersifanyfirmsfail
1.27 Our proposed rules will set standards that ensure no firm operating as an FCA
authorised firm is permitted to operate in a way that causes these harms. Once finalised, the rules will set a level playing field for all firms in the sector and give consumers increased assurance that the products they buy will meet their needs. What we want to change Products which meet consumer needs
1.28 Consumers buy funeral plans to arrange their funeral services at a fair price. They do
not expect to see investment returns or other financial benefits from the monies they pay, but they do need products which deliver services in line with their expectations. We are introducing rules to ban the sale of products which do not provide for funeral services in all circumstances on the consumers death. Plans must be sold fairly
1.29 Underourproposedrulesfirmsmustonlyofferproductswhichareconsistentwith
consumer demands and needs. We propose to ban cold-calling, enhance pre-sale disclosure and introduce new standards on advertising. Products must represent fair value
1.30 The price of a plan must have a fair relationship to the benefits the plan provides. We
propose to ban commission payments to intermediaries and require providers to ensure that remuneration they receive from the trust or insurance provider does not negatively affect the product’s value. In addition, fees charged outside of the headline price of the plan must be a genuine reflection of the costs incurred by the firm, and not be used to drive profits.

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Improving governance standards and oversight
1.31 Firms must have proper controls in place to manage risks. In addition having one
or several named, accountable points of contact has proven to be one of the most effective ways of supervising firms. We propose to apply our Senior Managers and Certification regime, and systems and controls rules on conflicts, risk management and controls over outsourcing, albeit in a proportionate manner to reflect that many firms in this sector will be relatively small companies. For many firms, we may only approve one senior individual. Ensuring services can be delivered
1.32 A plan provider can only honour its commitments if it has access to sufficient funds
to deliver the contracted funerals. To ensure the commitment to the consumer can generally be honoured regardless of the financial health of the provider, we want to ensure firms have appropriate risk transfer arrangements in place to ensure delivery of services in line with consumer expectations. We propose that firms should continue to back plans with adequate trust or insurance arrangements, and that these need to be adequate to ensure delivery of services in line with consumer expectations. We also expect to see firms monitor pricing to ensure products are economically viable, and require firms to hold resources (capital) to protect against future risks. Backstops in place should things go wrong
1.33 We want to ensure that consumers are protected in future should a firm fail. We are not
aware of any firm failures in this market to date, but it is prudent to plan for such events in advance. We propose that firms must have arrangements in place to provide for continuity or reimbursement in the event of insolvency, and that consumers have access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (‘FSCS’) from day 1 of regulation.
1.34 In addition, consumers will also have access to the ombudsman service for complaints.
The effect of the Treasury’s legislation is that this will include those complaints relating to acts or omissions that took place before our regulation, where the relevant provider was a member of the FPA at the time the act or omission occurred. An overview of the regulatory regime proposed for the pre-paid funeral plan market Please note this is only a summary, refer to the consultation paper and draft instrument for the proposed regime in full. Products must meet customers’ demands and needs Enhanced requirements for advice Standardised product & �rm disclosure Funerals must be provided with no further payment (1 year moratorium excluded) Products o�er fair value, and have de�ned target market Ban on commission paid to intermediaries & charges must be cost re�ective Monies paid into appropriate trust arrangements or contracts of insurance Products designed to deliver funerals. Claims handled fairly funerals arranged promptly 24 hour noti�cation of extra costs Right to refer a complaint to FOS after death has occurred Trusts must be solvent, no deductions when below a solvency level of 110%, independently reviewed annually FOS access Resolution requirements (allowing for continuity of cover or refund) FSCS protection All charges must be cost-re�ective Annual statements to be provided to customers Capital requirements (scaling up with size of �rm s business) Nominated funeral director within 30 days Noti�cation to customer’s representative 30 day free cancellation Clear, fair and not misleading Cold calling banned Marketing identi�able Customer purchase – pre-sale Products designed Funeral time of need During the product term Customer purchase – post-sale Advertising

• PRIN, SYSC, SMCR, regulatory reporting

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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Other proposals We are consulting on a number of other proposals to ensure firms meet the basic standards that are in place for other FCA-regulated firms. These include:

• high-level requirements (see Chapter 3)
• other conduct standards, including disclosure to next of kin and annual statements
• data reporting
• fees
  WeproposethatthechangessetoutinthisCPwillapplyfrom29 July2022when regulation of funeral plans transfers to the FCA, unless the relevant section specifies otherwise. This means that firms which are authorised by us to undertake regulated funeral plan activity will need to be ready to comply from day 1 of our regulation. Applying the rules to contracts entered into before our regulation Our general approach proposed in this consultation is not to impose requirements on providers for their existing plans, as this would require them to amend existing contractual arrangements. However, in certain respects we do propose that our rules apply in the same way to existing plans as to new plans. We have sought to highlight in this consultation paper where we propose that our rules would apply in relation to existing plans as well as new plans sold. We anticipate that many firms in the sector will be able to adjust their business to meet regulatory standards, and continue administering existing contracts. However, we also anticipate that there will be a small number of firms that will not be able to, or will choose not to, evolve to a regulatory environment. These firms will not be able to continue to administer existing contracts and will be required to cease all activities in relation to funeral plans. Outcomes we are seeking
  1.39 Through our proposed regulatory approach, we want to see a market which works well
  for consumers, including:
• productswhichofferfairvalue,meetconsumerneedsandaresoldfairly
• wellrunfirmswithhighconductstandardsandsufficientresourcesandrisktransfer
  arrangements to ensure ongoing delivery of funeral services
• consumers have time and all the necessary information to make better informed
  decisionswhenchoosingbetweendifferentproductsandwhetherafuneralplanis right for them at all
• protections in place to ensure the fair treatment of consumers, many of whom are
  likely to be vulnerable
• clear,proportionateandsupervisablestandardsthatfirmsinthesectormustmeet

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Measuring success
1.40 We will put in place strong authorisation, supervisory and enforcement processes to
ensure firms meet the standards set out in our final rules. Our proposed reporting requirements will allow us to collect data from firms to assess changes in the market over time and identify and take appropriate action on any potential poor conduct or other sector risks.
1.41 We propose to evaluate our regime in 2026, when the industry has had time to adapt
to these changes. We will examine evidence on firms’ adaptation to the new regime, outcomes for consumers and other relevant factors to determine whether the regime is delivering good outcomes.
1.42 We would expect to see our regulation result in benefits to consumers such as
products being offered which are better matched to individual customers and their needs, an improvement in the quality of available plans, and lower prices. We discuss benefits to consumers in more detail in Annex 1: Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). Next steps
1.43 We want your feedback on our proposed rules and other issues discussed in this CP.
Please send your answers to the questions in this consultation paper (CP) by Tuesday 13 Aprilusingoneofthemethodsinthe‘Howtorespond’sectiononpage2.
1.44 We understand that Government is considering further legislative changes for funeral
plans to ensure that the FSCS would be effective for consumers if it covered funeral plans. We will consult later in 2021 on any further rule changes required should there be further legislative change affecting funeral plans.
1.45 In Chapter 7 we set out options for the repayment of funeral plan monies to
consumers in the event of firm failure. We would welcome respondent’s views on this, and we will consult on any additional resolution rules that we propose to make through a subsequent consultation paper. We will separately consider the implications for the amount of compensation payable by FSCS.
1.46 We recover our costs from the firms we regulate. Funeral plans firms will pay one-off
application fees when they apply for authorisation and periodic (annual) fees from 2022/23. We will consult on our fees proposals as part of our annual consultation on FCA fee-rates, which is due for publication early in April. We will provide feedback on the responses received in the fees policy statement, which we will publish at the beginning of July
1.47 Firms should review Chapter 12 for details of the application process, and our
dedicated webpage at https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulating-funeral-plans

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2 The wider context
The harm we are trying to reduce/prevent
2.1 When the market is functioning well, funeral plan firms can offer useful services for
consumers. Funeral plans can help consumers organise their funeral arrangements ahead of time, which brings comfort to themselves and their families and helps to protect against inflation in the cost of funeral services.
2.2 However, the Treasury’s Call for Evidence (June 2018) found significant consumer
harm in the market, including the mis-selling of products, poor disclosure and high upfront costs. Existing consumer research and our own evidence-gathering supported these findings, and found further potential harms around longer-term instalment plans and the risk of funeral plans failing to deliver the consumer’s funeral. We set out the key harms in this sector below.
2.3 While we do not believe that these behaviours are common to all firms in the sector,
under our regulation we want to see all firms meet standards which result in good outcomes for consumers.
2.4 None of the descriptions of current market practices, nor proposals represent a
commentary on the operation of the existing exclusions in Article 60 of the Regulated Activities Order. Firms using high-pressure sales tactics and misleading information, resulting in consumers buying plans which are not suitable for their needs
2.5 In common with some other financial services sectors, we have found evidence of
misleading information and high-pressure sales tactics, which result in consumers buying plans which are not suitable for their needs.
2.6 Poor sales practices, driven by skewed incentives such as commission payments, are
a key driver behind consumer harm in the funeral plans market. The Treasury’s Call for Evidence found that pressurised sales tactics, such as cold calling, meant that consumers often did not have enough time to fully assess whether the plan was right for them. A Fairer Finance survey in 2017 found that 30% of consumers felt pushed into taking out a plan, and 40% of consumers marketed to had been contacted by phone.
2.7 We have also seen examples of cold calling, emotional pressure being put on vulnerable
consumers, and lead generation websites posing as price comparison services to collect consumers details, which they then use to drive telephone-based sales.
2.8 Our review of existing product information given to consumers suggests that it is
often heavily focused on the benefits that plans provide, and does not give a balanced picture of plan limitations, costs (eg of the increased cost of paying by instalment) or risks (eg that plans may not provide the funeral service).

2.9
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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Consumers are paying higher prices for plans than they should The Treasury’s Call for Evidence found concerns around the high levels of commission in the market. This often incentivised third-party distributors to sell plans with the highest commission, rather than those that best met the consumer’s needs. Data from firms using commission-based distribution arrangements shows commission ranges from £90 to £900 (usually on a sliding scale relative to the price of the plan), with an average of £550. We know from other sectors that high upfront commission can incentivise poor practice by distributors. We have seen evidence of high commission driving up the price that the customer pays, relative to the funeral service benefits the plan provides. In particular it is common practice for providers to pay high commissions to intermediaries operating solely as a salesforce who are providing little or no benefit to consumers. This leads to consumers being charged significantly higher prices than they would otherwise be. Plan providers may also receive payments from the trust or insurance provider. These payments are generally made up-front. We have not seen any instances of consumers being informed of what proportion of the price of their funeral plan constitutes the revenue of the provider, compared to that kept in the trust or insurance for the ultimate cost of the funeral. There are also often high fees for paying through instalments which, over time, mean that consumers are paying a much higher cost than the value of their funeral. For example, paying for a plan over 60 months can add roughly 15-26% to the overall cost. Poor governance and controls within firms We have seen examples of firms lacking appropriate senior management oversight and having weak internal controls. In particular, having limited oversight of third-party intermediaries selling their plans, and lacking well thought through arrangements for dealing with a wind-down of their business should they choose, or be forced, to exit the market. Insufficient oversight of intermediaries could produce additional conduct risks and drive poor outcomes for consumers, particularly where there are financial incentives to reward firms hitting sales targets. Plans are often not redeemed as the consumer’s family does not know about them Respondents to the Treasury’s Call for Evidence were concerned around the growing number of ’orphan plans’. These occur when consumers do not tell family members or representatives about the plan or, with longer-term instalment plans, forget they had bought the plan. If the consumer’s family are unaware of the plan, they are likely to pay for a funeral when their loved one dies, instead of drawing on the plan, usually at a higher price. It is not possible to determine the scale of this problem, because firms cannot provide comprehensive data on active plans where the consumer has died. However, our data shows that 4-6% of
active plans are for consumers who are (or would be) over 90 years old. The time-critical nature of funeral provision increases the risk of harm because families who discover a plan months or years after the consumer’s death cannot benefit from it. 2.16

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If providers are made aware that a funeral has already taken place, some refund the cost of the plan less a cancellation fee. While this arrangement is preferable to families receiving no payment, funeral cost inflation means that this sum will be unlikely to cover the cost of the funeral that has already been bought by the deceased’s next of kin. The cancellation fee will further reduce the amount returned to the family. It also leaves families at risk of having to raise funding at short notice when that is not what the plan holder wanted. Some plans in the market do not deliver in line with consumers’ needs or expectations Some plans have payment term lengths of 25 or 30 years. If the consumer dies during this time, many firms will not provide the funeral unless the consumer’s estate pays the remaining balance in a lump-sum. Data provided to us shows that approximately 34% of plans sold in 2018 carry this risk, and this proportion is increasing. Longer-term products are relatively new, so most consumers are still alive and making payments. However, firms have told us that 20-32% of plans involve an early death and no delivery of a funeral without further payment. Where the consumer’s estate is unable or unwilling to pay the outstanding balance, the consumer’s payments are typically returned. The firms typically deduct a cancellation fee. In such instances, the consumer has made a payment, or series of payments, they have not benefitted from any investment gains on this money, and when they die they not only do they not get a funeral, but the cancellation fee means their next of kin gets back less than they paid in. We do not think this is a good value product for consumers, who would have likely been better off had they had, for example, simply saved the payments in a savings account. Poor financial management of firms may mean that sufficient funds may not be available to cover funeral liabilities, and consumer outcomes in these circumstances are unclear. The Treasury’s Call for Evidence found that firms providing trust-backed plans offered little publicly-available information about the financial health of the trust, its investment strategy and any ongoing withdrawals from the trust (for example, administration fees). High levels of commission appear to be the primary driver of high prices. We have also seen evidence that this can result in trusts being systematically underfunded. Some providers could withdraw ongoing administration fees from the trust, resulting in lower total trust assets being available to pay for consumers funerals. There are also few arrangements in place for what would happen if a provider had to exit the market, perhaps due to its financial failure. In some cases, firms were not including provisions in their trust deed to prescribe how the trust would be administered in these circumstances. Some firms also had insufficient assets to cover the administration costs of arranging funerals and the cost of funerals
themselves. These factors put consumers at risk of losing money or not receiving their funeral service as expected.

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Scope of future FCA regulation
2.24 The Treasury have confirmed that funeral plan providers will need to be FCA authorised
if they are carrying out either of 2 regulated activities:

• Entering into funeral plan contracts as provider – this refers to providers entering
  into funeral plan contracts with consumers.
• Carrying out (or ‘administering’) funeral plan contracts as provider – this broadly
  refers to the administration and performance of obligations under the contract, eg securing the delivery of funeral services. This regulated activity will apply to the carryingoutofbothplanssoldafterFCAregulationtakeseffecton29 July2022 and plans entered into before that date.
  2.25 Legislation defines a funeral plan provider as the person to whom one or more
  payments are made under the contract. This definition will be extended to include a person who has assumed the undertaking to provide, or secure the provision of, a funeral as a result of the novation, assignment or transfer by operation of law of an existing funeral plan contract.
  2.26 This means that where books of funeral plans are sold, the entity that buys them
  will be carrying out those funeral plan contracts as provider, and they will need to be authorised. Where our rules are applied to firms carrying out funeral plan contracts as provider, this also means that they will generally apply to the administration of plans which the firm has both entered into and acquired.
  2.27 The effect of the Treasury’s removal of the existing exclusions for trust and
  insurance-backed plans is that other specified activities will also become regulated when carried on in relation to funeral plan contracts. We think the regulated activities which are most likely to be carried on in relation to funeral plan contracts ( ‘funeral plan distribution activities’) are:
  21 Dealing in investments as agent
  Rights under a funeral plan contract are ‘relevant investments’. As such, dealing (buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting securities/ contractually based investments) will be relevant to some firms. 25(1) Arranging (bringing about) deals in investments Rights under a funeral plan contract are ‘relevant investments’. As such, arranging (bringing about) deals in funeral plan contracts will be relevant to some firms. 25(2) Making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments Rights under a funeral plan contract are ‘relevant investments’. As such, making arrangements with a view to transactions in funeral plan contracts will be relevant to some firms. 53(1) Advising on investments Rights under a funeral plan contract are ‘relevant investments’. As such, advising on funeral plan contracts (to the extent that such activities exist) will be relevant to some firms.
  2.28 Intermediaries who are involved in distributing funeral plans to customers are likely
  to be conducting one or more of these activities. This includes funeral directors and others who sell funeral plans directly (such as financial advisers and will writers),

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority but it may also include firms whose role is more limited (such as lead generators). Intermediaries will need to consider which regulated activities they might be conducting and ensure that they do so lawfully by ensuring they have the correct permission from us.
2.29 Firms should be aware of the Treasury’s view that the activities of lead generators are
likely to meet the definition of article 25(2) ‘making arrangements’ (see 3.5 & 3.6 of the Treasury’s Response to Consultation).
2.30 While the RAO gives certain exclusions from the regulated arranging activities (which
are most likely to be relevant to intermediaries), firms should be aware that these exclusions contain various conditions. A firm is unlikely to be excluded from regulation because it views itself as only making ‘introductions’ to or for funeral plan providers. Guidance on the application of the regulated arranging activities to ‘introducing’ can be found in PERG 8.33.
2.31 Intermediaries which do not require authorisation should also be aware that some
of our rules may still affect them. For example, our proposed ban on intermediary commission will generally prevent authorised providers from paying commission to firms engaged in funeral plan distribution.
2.32 As well as extending the regulated activity perimeter, the Treasury’s legislation
has the effect of widening the perimeter for financial promotions. This means that firms advertising funeral plans or related services are highly likely to be involved in communication of financial promotions. Financial promotions can only be lawfully communicated if (i) they are communicated by an authorised person; (ii) the content is approved by an authorised person; or (iii) a relevant exemption applies.
2.33 The table above is not exhaustive of all the regulated activities which may be relevant
to funeral plan contracts. For example, the regulated activity of managing investments will also be expanded to include the scenario in which the managed assets consist of rights under funeral plan contracts. However, we believe that the activities listed above are likely to be most relevant to the activities of firms currently operating in the funeral plan market. Exclusions and limits of our regulation
2.34 FCA regulation will not apply directly to the activities of funeral directors in providing
the eventual funeral service. Therefore, funeral directors will not necessarily be carrying on regulated activity, unless they are involved in distributing funeral plan contracts. Funeral directors may also need to consider how regulation affects any marketing of funeral plans which they undertake. However, regulation does apply to funeral plan providers, who are responsible for ensuring that services are delivered in line with the plan.
2.35 The legislation will include exclusions for the following plans, which are those:

• entered into by local authorities
• in which the customer and plan provider intend or expect the funeral to occur within
  one month of sale
• whichonlyprovideforfuneralsoutsidetheUK

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2.36 Members of the Designated Professional Bodies will be able to carry out funeral plan
distribution activities without FCA authorisation, if they meet the requirements of
section 327 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). We understand
that that some members of Designated Professional Bodies are currently selling funeral plans, such as solicitors.
2.37 We know that some bodies help consumers to plan for their funerals on a
‘not-for-profit’ basis (eg providers of religious services). These organisations need to consider whether the arrangements which they offer constitute funeral plan contracts for the purposes of the RAO, in particular if they are engaged in regulated funeral plan activity within scope of Article 59 of the RAO by way of business. If they do, then the relevant body will need to consider whether it needs to apply for authorisation. For more information refer to the PERG annex of the legal instrument attached to this document, and PERG 2.3 (by way of business). Our authorisations, supervision and enforcement regime
2.38 All funeral plan providers that want to continue to conduct regulated funeral plan
activities will need to apply for authorisation, as will any intermediaries selling funeral plans who do not become appointed representatives (discussed further in Chapters 9 and 12).Firmsthatarenotauthorisedorexemptfrom29 July2022willnotbepermitted to carry out regulated activities for funeral plans. This includes administering funeral plans sold before our regulation took effect. Firms which are not appropriately authorised orexemptfrom29 July2022willneedtostoptheirfuneralplanactivitiesentirely.
2.39 For an application for authorisation to be successful, a firm will need to demonstrate
that it satisfies, and will continue to satisfy, the FCA’s Threshold Conditions (COND). These Threshold Conditions (TCs) are the minimum standards a firm must meet to be authorised by the FCA.
2.40 Firms can start to apply to the FCA for authorisation from September 2021 (also referred to as
‘opening of the gateway’). Firms should ensure that they have started to prepare an application in good time before this date so they can submit it as soon as possible after the gateway opens. Firms can contact us with any queries on this process at funeralplans@fca.org.uk or via our Supervision Hub at firm.queries@fca.org.uk.
2.41 Our aim is to determine applications as soon as possible before our regulation takes
effect. However, if applications are not submitted early, we may not have enough time to analyse all the information in the application, and any extra information needed, to be able to approve the firm ready for the start of our regulation.
2.42 We expect funeral plan firms that are authorised to comply with our rules from the
startdateofourregulationon29 July2022.Wewillsupervisefirmsfromthisdateto ensure they are complying with our rules. Where necessary we will take appropriate supervisory and enforcement action.
2.43 We want to be as clear as possible with firms about what to expect from interactions
with us. Through our supervision function, we maintain continued oversight of firms and of individuals controlling firms to reduce actual and potential harm to consumers and markets. The core elements of our supervisory approach are set out in our Supervision Manual(SUP).

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2.44 As we regulate a broad range of sectors, we group firms into portfolios of firms that
share a common business model. We will create a portfolio for funeral plan firms and, focus on firms posing the greatest harm. Once we have done more work with the portfolio, we will continue to communicate our expectations, priorities and examples of good or poor practice to the sector.
2.45 Underpinningourworkaresomekeysupervisoryprinciplesandweseektoensureour
approach is proportionate and risk based. To this end, we will need to make judgments about firms’ business models, product strategy and how firm’s run their businesses, this enables us to identify and intervene earlier to prevent problems crystallising.
2.46 We discuss our approach to supervision and enforcement in more detail in Chapter 11.
Equality and diversity considerations
2.47 We have considered the equality and diversity issues that may arise from the proposals
in this Consultation Paper.
2.48 Many consumers buying funeral plans or engaging with funeral plan firms will be in
vulnerable circumstances, eg due to lower financial resilience or recent bereavement. Notwithstanding this, we do not consider that the proposals have a significantly different impact on any of the groups with protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 compared with consumers overall. We expect that all consumers, including those belonging to groups with protected characteristics, will benefit from our proposed rules, but some groups (eg older consumers) can expect a greater degree of benefit as a result of the general demographics of the consumers buying these products.
2.49 However, we will continue to consider the equality and diversity implications of the
proposals during the consultation period, and will revisit them when making the final rules. Q1: Do you agree that our proposed rules will not have a material impact on groups with protected characteristics?

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3 High level standards
3.1 The FCA Handbook sets out rules and other provisions made under powers given to us
by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). The Handbook is divided into sections which in this consultation we refer to with acronyms (eg ‘PRIN’, ‘SYSC’, ‘COND’) For more information on the Handbook, please see our Handbook Readers Guide.
3.2 The Handbook includes high-level standards that apply to all FCA regulated firms.
We propose to apply these standards to funeral plan firms (both providers and intermediaries) in addition to the specific rules set out in later chapters. They will provide funeral plan firms with a clear statement of the standards of behaviour we expect and will help address the harms identified in the market. This chapter provides more information on these standards.
3.3 The key high-level standards which are proposed to apply to funeral plan firms are:

• Principles for Businesses (PRIN). These are a general statement of the fundamental
  obligationsthatfirmsmustcomplywithatalltimes.
• Threshold Conditions. These are the minimum conditions for which we are
  responsible,whichafirmisrequiredtosatisfy,andcontinuetosatisfy,tobegiven and to retain its permissions. We provide guidance on these conditions in COND.
• Systems and Controls (SYSC). This section sets out the organisational systems,
  controlsandcompliancearrangementsthatfirmsshouldhaveinplace,and standards for how they should treat whistleblowers.
• General Provisions (GEN). This section sets out some of the standards that apply
  toallfirmsintheirinteractionswithus,includingstatutorydisclosurestatements and use of the FCA name or logo. Principles for Businesses (PRIN)
  3.4 We propose to apply PRIN to all funeral plan firms.
  3.5 PRIN sets out the fundamental obligations that FCA-regulated firms must meet at
  all times. As well as setting out our overarching expectations for firms, the Principles underpin other, more detailed rules and guidance. If a firm breaches the Principles they become liable to disciplinary sanctions.
  3.6 A number of the Principles impose requirements on firms in relation to their customers.
  For regulated funeral plan activities, the definition of customer in PRIN refers to both the customer under a funeral plan contract and the covered individual, whose funeral will be provided. No. Principle Heading Integrity Principle Content A firm must conduct its business with integrity 2 Skill, care and diligence A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence

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No. Principle Heading Principle Content
3 Management and control A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems 4 Financial prudence A firm must maintain adequate financial resources 5 Market conduct A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct 6 Consumers’ interests A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its consumers and treat them fairly 7 Communications with clients A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading 8 Conflicts of interest A firm must manage its conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its consumers and between a consumer and another client 9 Consumers: relationships of trust A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any consumer who is entitled to rely upon its judgement 10 Clients’ assets A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients’ assets when it is responsible for them 11 Relations with regulators A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the FCA appropriately anything relating to the firm Vulnerable consumers
3.7 Many consumers buying funeral plans or engaging with funeral plan firms will be in
vulnerable circumstances, eg due to low financial resillience or recent bereavement. This means that our guidance on the fair treatment of vulnerable consumers will be particularly relevant to funeral plan firms. Firms should consider the needs of vulnerable consumers and how to respond to them to deliver outcomes consistent with our Principles for Businesses. Threshold Conditions
3.8 As set out in FSMA, firms must comply with Threshold Conditions to be authorised.
To help firms understand what is required firms should refer to COND. We are not proposing to make any changes to COND specifically for funeral plan firms, other than to refer to the good repute of management and key staff within firms.
3.9 Funeral plan firms should refer to this guide to understand the impact of the Threshold
Conditions in more detail. As these are set out in FSMA we are not consulting on the Threshold Conditions themselves, but we welcome any comments on the application of COND to funeral plan firms.

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Systems and controls
3.10 We propose to apply most of our rules and guidance about systems and controls to all
funeral plan providers and intermediaries. These are set out in SYSC and explain how funeral plan providers and intermediaries should organise and manage their affairs. We are also proposing that the guidance in ‘Financial Crime: a guide for firms’ should apply to all funeral plan providers.
3.11 The rules and guidance in SYSC expand on Principle 3: ‘A firm must take reasonable
care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems’. They describe what we will expect from funeral plan providers and intermediaries in order to comply with Principle 3. Those in charge of the firm should take responsibility for how it carries on its business, including acting in a way that enables us to monitor its business properly and that it conducts its affairs responsibly.
3.12 The table below provides a summary of the key rules that will apply to funeral plan
providers and intermediaries. It is not a comprehensive list and providers should familiarise themselves with the detail of SYSC and what it requires. Sourcebook chapter SYSC 4 General organisational requirements Key provision and references Afirmmusthaverobustgovernancearrangements.(SYSC4.1.1R) Theseniorpersonnelofafirmshouldbeofsufficientlygoodreputeand sufficientlyexperiencedtoensurethesoundandprudentmanagementof thefirm.(SYSC4.2.1R,SYSC4.2.1AG) Afirmmustallocateresponsibilityforensuringthatthefirmcomplieswith the regulatory system to those who direct the business. (SYSC 4.3.1R) SYSC 5 Employees, agents and other relevant persons Afirmmustemploypersonnelwiththeskills,knowledgeandexpertise necessary for the discharge of the responsibilities allocated to them. (SYSC 5.1.1R) A management company should ensure that the performance of multiple functions by its relevant persons does not and is not likely to prevent those persons from discharging any particular functions soundly, honestly and professionally. (SYSC 5.1.6R, SYSC 5.1.7AG) SYSC 6 Compliance, internal auditandfinancialcrime Afirmmusthavepoliciesandproceduressufficienttoensurecompliance ofthefirmwiththeregulatorysystemandtocountertheriskthatthefirm mightbeusedtofurtherfinancialcrime.(SYSC6.1.1R) SYSC 7 Afirmshouldestablish,implementandmaintainadequateriskmanagement Risk assessment policiesandprocedures,includingeffectiveproceduresforriskassessment, whichidentifiestherisksrelatingtothefirm’sactivities,processesand system,andwhereappropriate,setthelevelofrisktoleratedbythefirm. (SYSC 7.1.2R, SYSC 7.1.2AG) SYSC 8 Outsourcing Afirmisresponsibleforthecomplianceofitsoutsourcedoperations. (SYSC 8.1.6R) SYSC 9 Record-keeping AfirmmustkeeporderlyrecordsofitsbusinesstoenabletheFCAtomonitor thefirm’scompliance.(SYSC9.1.1R)

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Sourcebook chapter
SYSC 10
Conflictsofinterest
Key provision and references
Afirmmusttakeappropriatestepstoidentifyandtopreventormanage conflictsofinterestbetweenthefirmandaclient,orbetweentwoclients. (SYSC 10.1.3R) Afirmmusthavearrangementstopreventtheseconflictsofinterestfrom adverselyaffectingtheinterestofitsclients.(SYSC10.1.7R) Ifthepreventativearrangementsarenotsufficienttomanagetherisksof damage,thefirmmustdisclosetheconflictsofinteresttotheclientbefore undertaking business for them. (SYSC 10.1.8R) SYSC 18 Whistleblowing TheFCAwouldregardasaseriousmatteranyevidencethatafirmhadacted to the detriment of a whistle-blower. (SYSC 18.3.9G) SYSC 19 Afirmmustnotberemuneratedinawaythatconflictswithitsdutytocomply with the customer’s best interests rule (SYSC 19F.3.2R). This is discussed further in chapter 5. SYSC 28A Afirmmustensurethatallthepersonsinitsmanagementstructureandany staffdirectlyinvolvedinregulatedfuneralplanactivitiesareofgoodrepute (SYSC 28A.2.1R).
3.13 The senior management of a funeral plan provider must ensure their staff are able
to do their jobs competently. Our proposed Training and Competence sourcebook (TC) rules require firms to assess this competence annually, and for employees to undertake at least 15 hours of training and development a year. Our proposed rules are not prescriptive about the nature of this training, and it can include both structured and unstructured learning. However, the requirements do apply broadly to all employees involved in, or managing, funeral plan activities. This includes appointed representatives of firms we directly authorise. We discuss appointed representatives in Chapter 9.
3.14 Providers will also be required to identify and prevent conflicts between internal and
external stakeholders, and to manage them properly to reduce the consumer harm these cause.
3.15 We do not expect a small funeral plan provider dealing with a low number of consumers
to have the same systems and controls as a large provider. We do expect the same outcome regardless of firm size. As SYSC 4 sets out, providers must have internal control mechanisms to ensure they implement decisions taken and procedures established at the firm, and the nature and range of the services and activities undertaken in the course of that business. General Provisions
3.16 We propose to apply our General Provisions (GEN) to funeral plan providers and
intermediaries. GEN contains rules covering the administrative duties that apply to the firms we regulate. The intention of these rules is to make sure consumers are not misled, that all firms operate on a level playing field and that firms are transparent about their regulatory status.
3.17 GEN contains:
•

• thebanonfirmsclaimingorimplyingthatwehaveendorsedtheirbusiness
  stepsfirmsshouldtakeinsituationswhentheycannotcomplywithourrulesinan emergency

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• guidance on how to interpret our Handbook of rules and guidance
• rulesonhowfirmsauthorisedbyusmustdescribetheirregulatorystatus:‘status
  disclosure’
• restrictions on using our name and our logo
• thebanontakingoutindemnityinsuranceagainsttheriskofhavingtopayfinancial
  penalties
• thebanonfirmschargingaconsumermorethanabasicratetocallitstelephone
  line where it has entered into a contract with the consumer
  3.18 Please note this is not a complete list and we expect funeral plan providers and
  intermediaries to familiarise themselves with GEN more broadly.
  Q2: Do you agree with our proposal for applying high-level standards to funeral plan firms?

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4 Trust and insurance risk transfers and prudential requirements
4.1 In this chapter, we set out our proposals for the trust and insurance related
arrangements that must be put in place by funeral plan providers, restrictions on handling of monies paid by consumers for funeral services, and our prudential requirements for funeral plan firms. These rules will be set out in our Funeral Plan:
Conduct of Business sourcebook (FPCOB).
4.2 Through these rules we are seeking to ensure that funeral plan providers are able to
deliver the funeral services sold to consumers on an ongoing basis. This will affect how much funding would be available in case of a firm failure. This is explored further in
Chapter 7.
4.3 These rules build upon Principle 4, ‘A firm must maintain adequate financial resources’.
4.4 The main harms and risks that these rules are intended to address are:

• The risk that funds are not available to provide for funeral services due to holding
  insufficientmoniesontrustorbeingavailablethroughaninsurancecontract
• Trustsbeingpoorlymanagedwithinsufficientindependentoversight
• Planprovidershavinginsufficientfinancialresourcestobeableto:
  – wind down their operations and/or transfer their back books (their previously soldplans)toanotherfirmwithoutsignificantmarketdisruption(currentlyFPA members have an agreement to work together if a member becomes insolvent to achieve this) – pay redress if complaints are made and upheld – return money if a consumer wants to cancel their plan
  4.5 We have designed these rules in a way that allows for the continuation of existing
  business models, albeit on an enhanced basis (explored further under Plan Governance below). Our product structure rules keep, and build on, the structures which form the basis of existing products. This means that funeral plan providers can maintain trust or life insurance arrangements to back the business they have written.
  4.6 Where appropriate, we are proposing additional requirements on how trusts or life
  insurance arrangements should work. These are intended to help deliver our ultimate objective of ensuring that firms have enough funds to honour the contracts they have written.
  4.7 In addition, our prudential standards seek to ensure that the funeral plan provider has
  adequate financial resources for contingencies, such as operational and compliance failures and to pay redress. They are also intended to reduce the possibility of a shortfall in available funds for the delivery of funeral services in line with consumers’ expectations. They provide a buffer against disruption if the firm ceases to trade.
  4.8 Our view is that prudential standards also help to drive the right kind of behaviour and
  ensure that firms have adequate resources to put things right when they go wrong.

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Application to existing plans
4.9 For new plans sold after our regulation takes effect the entirety of this chapter should
be considered.
4.10 For plans sold prior to this date, firms are permitted to keep existing contractual
arrangements in place.
4.11 However, firms must comply with certain standards in this chapter in relation to all
plans, including those sold before our regulation takes effect, eg around maintaining and reporting on trust solvency, and holding adequate prudential resources. Plan governance
4.12 At present funeral plan contracts are excluded from regulation where sums paid by a
consumer under the contract are applied towards a whole of life insurance contract on the consumer’s life, or held in a trust which meets certain conditions. Any funeral plan contract in which sums are managed in another way (eg retained by the provider) would not currently meet these exclusions and would already be subject to our regulation.
4.13 The effect of this exclusion has been that, to date, all funeral plan providers adopt one
of these two business models, which provide a degree of protection for consumers by ensuring transfer of risk to either the trust or the insurer. Trusts can also have the secondary benefit of producing investment returns which can cover unexpected costs.
4.14 We consider that requiring firms to back plans with a trust or insurance arrangement
helps meet our objective of ensuring firms have adequate risk transfer mechanisms in place to protect consumers. It safeguards monies paid for funeral services and allows for ongoing provision of funeral services as they fall due in line with consumer needs and expectations.
4.15 We are not aware of other current product structures in the market, or any demand
for new structures. We see potentially significant risks associated with alternatives, for example, the risk that monies won’t be properly protected. There is also the potential for significant market disruption if the market had to transition to a new structure, which may create additional risks to consumers.
4.16 We propose to require firms to back funeral plans with an adequate trust or insurance
arrangement for the primary purpose of providing funeral services and not for other primary purposes, such as generating investment returns. Trust and insurance arrangements must be sufficiently well-funded for the purposes of providing funerals as sold to consumers.
4.17 For each funeral plan contract entered into firms must either purchase a life insurance
policy that is sufficient for the purpose of providing the agreed funeral, or arrange for sums sufficient for the provision of the agreed funeral to be held on trust using actuarial assumptions. This is intended to mitigate the risk that firms only protect funds which are insufficient for the purposes of providing the agreed funeral.

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4.18 In addition, firms must have systems and controls in place to ensure that they are able
to meet our standards to have sufficient funds available to cover the agreed funeral services. This includes systems and controls concerning the adequacy of trust or insurance arrangements, and whether the firm’s pricing is likely to lead to risks of insufficient funding. Q3: Do you agree with our proposal to require firms to back funeral plan contracts with a trust or insurance arrangement going forward? Safeguarding
4.19 We propose a number of requirements around safeguarding to ensure monies are
held for the purposes of providing consumers with funeral services, and help protect consumers from the risks of disorderly wind-down or fraudulent activity.
4.20 When monies are paid to a funeral plan provider we will expect them to act as soon
as possible to either place those monies into the trust or apply them towards an insurance contract. Similarly, when the consumer dies, the firm must provide a death certificate to the trustee or insurer, and monies from the trust or insurance contract must be paid towards provision of the funeral or to the relevant funeral director as soon as practicable. We are proposing that firms also return funds as soon as reasonably practicable if a customer cancels their contract.
4.21 We propose to ban intermediaries from holding monies paid by consumers for funeral
plans. Intermediaries will need to ensure that consumers pay these monies directly to the plan provider or, on the provider’s instruction, to the insurer or trust. Firms will also need to ensure that their appointed representatives distributing plans comply with this restriction. This is intended to manage the risk of intermediary firms going into administration while in possession of monies paid by consumers. In the absence of a ban, we would have to design extensive rules to ensure intermediaries can adequately safeguard monies, which we consider disproportionate.
4.22 We have seen a number of trust deeds and funeral plan contracts which do not make
clear who the beneficiaries of the underlying trust or insurance contract are. This could be the plan provider, funeral directors or consumers.
4.23 We propose that for new trust-backed plans sold the trust arrangements must make
clear that the assets are held on trust for the benefit of planholders. In addition trust arrangements must ensure that the trust assets are kept segregated from the funeral plan provider’s assets, and that the circumstances in which a funeral plan provider can make a claim against the trust assets are limited to where funds are needed to deliver a covered individual’s funeral, provide a refund (where requested by a customer) or to discharge the firm’s contractual obligation to promptly reimburse customers, in the event that funeral plan contracts will not continue to be carried out.
4.24 These proposals, together with our proposed rules on the design of trust
arrangements (see FPCOB 3.1.9R in the draft rules) are intended to ensure that funeral services are delivered, or monies will be available to consumers for cancellations or in the event of a plan provider failing. We want to deliver clear and certain outcomes for consumers, and to address the risk that if a plan provider fails an insolvency

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority practitioner may claim trust assets for the benefit of creditors of the funeral plan provider, at the expense of planholders.
4.25 For insurance-backed plans we intend to achieve the same clear and certain
outcomes for consumers. Although we do not require consumers to be named as the policyholder of the insurance, we do propose to restrict the circumstances in which the policyholder (whether that is the funeral plan provider, a trustee or the consumer) can make a claim under the policy. As with trust-backed plans, we are proposing that a policyholder should only be able to claim under the policy where a claim is being made in order to deliver a covered individual’s funeral, provide a customer refund (where requested by a customer) or to discharge the firm’s contractual obligation to promptly reimburse customers, in the event that funeral plan contracts will not continue to be carried out. See FPCOB 3.1.8R in our draft rules. We are also proposing that the contract of insurance must be capable of delivering our resolution objectives set out in
Chapter 7.
4.26 In addition, in a situation when a funeral plan provider receives money at the point of
sale we will require the funeral plan provider to make arrangements to ensure that monies received are not, at any stage, including insolvency, assets of the funeral plan provider. We are also proposing for similar safeguarding arrangements to be put in place in circumstances where the funeral plan provider receives money pursuant to a contract of insurance prior to delivering an agreed funeral or before providing a refund that is owed to the customer. These and other proposed rules on safeguarding can be found in FPCOB 3.1.11R of the draft rules.
4.27 We would welcome views from stakeholders on whether our proposed approach will
help deliver our resolution objectives set out in Chapter 7.
Additional requirements concerning trusts
4.28 We also propose a number of rules to ensure that firms have robust trust
arrangements. These build upon the RAO’s current requirements for trust arrangements and FPA rules for member firms.
4.29 As currently, we propose that trusts must be established by written instrument, with
a majority of independent trustees, an independent fund manager, and with annual accounts prepared by a statutory auditor.
4.30 We also propose that funeral plan providers must arrange for a solvency assessment
report (SAR) to be produced on an annual basis by an actuary who is a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IoFA). This report must calculate and verify the trust’s assets and liabilities and provide information on the solvency status of the trust, meaning how far it is estimated to be able to meet future funeral costs. This applies to all plans a firm has entered into, including prior to our regulation taking effect.
4.31 Providers must send the solvency assessment report to us and make it available to
consumers free of charge on request.
4.32 Funeral plan providers who hold money on trust must be able to identify the balance of
money paid into the trust for each funeral plan contract.

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Q4: Do you agree with our proposed rules on trust arrangements?
Trust solvency
4.33 We propose that a firm can only deduct surpluses from the trust if the trust’s solvency
level is above 110% and this is signed off by the trust actuary. 110% solvency is calibrated to be, on average, equivalent to having resilience to all stress events other than a 1:200 years event. An individual firm’s circumstances may mean that the firm’s actuary considers a higher level of trust solvency is appropriate before money can be deducted from the trust.
4.34 Where a solvency assessment report reveals that a trust has fallen into deficit, funeral
plan providers would be required to draw up a remediation plan to be signed off by the trust actuary. This would set out how they plan to remedy the shortfall within the next 12 months.
4.35 If, after the remediation plan period, the trust remains below the required minimum
solvency level, the funeral plan provider must rectify the deficit. This includes by using its own financial resources to pay extra money into the trust.
4.36 In assessing trust solvency firms must consider all funeral plan contracts entered into
by the firm, including those entered into prior to our regulation taking effect, which may well have different contractual terms. An overview of the timeline regarding the requirement for �rms to arrange for independent Solvency Assessment Reports, and remediation required if a trust de�cit is identi�ed. Please note this is only a summary, refer to the consultation paper and draft instrument for the proposed regime in full. End of SAR identi�ed remediation trust solvency plan: trust level 100% or solvency level above Authorised 100% or above Plan provider providers required applicant to submit a SAR submits SAR at the gateway once every 12 SAR identi�ed Provider must prepare End of Provider must months remediation plan – to remedy remediation plan: remedy shortfall trust de�cit shortfall within 12 months, trust solvency as soon as (solvency level level remains below 100% Provider must notify the FCA if they have not (or may not be able to) fully implement their remediation plan practicable, and within 3 months Provider must notify the FCA when this has been remedied below 100%) and to begin within 30 days of SAR submission date Submit remediation plan to the FCA within 30 days of the SAR completion Submit to FCA within 7 days of completion The SAR must be made available to consumers free of charge on request
4.37 Expectations for what a trust would be able to repay in case of a firm failure are also
relevant to the solvency calculation. Please refer to Chapter 7.

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Chapter 4
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Q5: Do you agree with our proposals for trust solvency and how trust solvency should be assessed? Prudential requirements for funeral plan providers & intermediaries 4.38 General solvency requirement All firms to which our prudential rules apply will have to meet a general solvency requirement. This means that the firm must, at all times, ensure that it is able to meet its liabilities as they fall due. Firms must document in their records how they meet the general solvency requirement.
4.39 In common with our approach for other sectors, we also explain in guidance in
the proposed rules that as part of our day-to-day supervision of firms we may, in accordance with SUP 9.3, give a firm individual capital guidance, individual liquidity guidance, or both, on the amount or quality of capital or liquidity that we think a firm needs to hold to meet its general solvency requirement.
4.40 The guidance also explains that if we are unable to agree with a firm on the level of
capital or liquidity that it needs to hold to meet the general solvency requirement we may instead use our power to set these by requirement. 4.41 Core capital resources requirement To ensure that firms hold a minimum level of capital to meet their liabilities, we also propose to introduce core capital resources requirements that are proportionate to the size, risk profile and complexity of a funeral plan firm’s business activities.
4.42 Firms must hold prudential resources that are sufficient to meet their core capital
resources requirement. We have defined the eligible prudential resources to meet the requirement in our rules, in addition to certain mandatory deductions for items that must be excluded from the calculation. This is based on analysis of firm’s financial information, and is intended to protect firms against costs from contingent risks such as future redress payments.
4.43 The core capital resources requirement increases with the size of the firm’s business.
For a firm that carries on funeral plan activity other than funeral plan distribution the core prudential resources requirement is the higher of:

• £20,000 or
• 2.5%ofthefirm’sannualincomeor
• The sum of:
  – For trust-backed plans: the number of undrawn plans, multiplied by the median of the amounts that would be paid from the trust fund(s) to the plan provider if a funeral were required on the day following the end of the previous reporting period, multiplied by a funeral plan scaling factor (f = 0.5%). This calculation is not based on the accumulated value with investment returns or the pre-payment originally received, but the amount agreed for the delivery of the funeral purchased; and

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– For insurance-backed plans: the number of undrawn plans, multiplied by the medianoftheamountsthatwouldbepayabletothefirmundereachpolicy ifafuneralwererequiredonthedayfollowingtheendofthefirm’sprevious reporting period, multiplied by a funeral plan scaling factor (f = 0.5%).
4.44 For firms who only want to be authorised to administer (run off) their back books and
not take on new business, this calculation will apply but annual income may be zero so they would need to use the higher of the other calculations. For a firm that undertakes distribution activities for a pre-paid funeral plan contract as an intermediary, the core prudential resources requirement, for the period until its next accounting reference date, is the higher of:

• £10,000 or
• 2.5%ofthefirm’sannualincome
  4.45 Firms should also consider FG 20/1: Our framework on assessing adequate financial
  resources.
  Q6: Do you agree with our proposed prudential requirements on funeral plan providers and intermediaries?

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5 Conduct standards
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
This chapter sets out our proposals for applying conduct of business rules to funeral plan firms. Most of the rules will be included in a sourcebook called ‘Funeral Plan:
Conduct of Business sourcebook’ (FPCOB). The rules on product oversight and governance will be included as a new chapter in the Product Intervention and Product Governance sourcebook (PROD). The purpose of these proposals is to raise standards across the funeral plans sector, and tackle harms such as consumers buying unsuitable products and plans not performing as consumers expect. Our rules are intended to respond to the specific risks in the funeral plans sector. But we are also proposing to apply some rules in a similar way to those which currently apply to non-investment life insurance products, such as guaranteed over-50s plans (O50s plan). These rules come from the Insurance: Conduct of Business sourcebook (ICOBS), and from Chapter 4 of PROD. We propose to apply these rules to the funeral plans sector because:

• The way funeral plans are advertised suggests that they are marketed as direct
  alternativestoO50splans.Althoughtheproductsaredifferent,theyappearsimilar from a consumer’s perspective.
• The reasons that consumers buy funeral plans are likely to be very similar to their
  reasonsforpurchasinganO50splans.Assuchwethinkitwouldbebeneficialfor information disclosures and sales processes to broadly align.
• Like the insurance sector, the funeral plan market features a large number of sales
  by intermediaries. The insurance rules are designed in this way, with some rules beingspecificallyforprovidersordistributors.
• The conduct rules for life insurance business are well-established and cover most
  aspectsoffirms’servicestoconsumers.
  However, funeral plans are not insurance products, and they have some features which create a unique risk of harm to consumers. Because of this, we are proposing a number of rules to mitigate these particular harms. We set out a summary of the proposed rules which will apply to funeral plan providers and intermediaries below. Our conduct of business rules generally apply only to new funeral plan contracts sold after our regulation takes effect. However, there are some rules which will apply to existingcontractsinadditiontonewplanssoldafter29 July2022.Wediscussthisat the end of this chapter. Most pre-paid funeral plan contracts are taken out by a customer to provide their own funeral at the time of need. In some cases, a customer buys a funeral plan contract to provide for the funeral of someone else. To account for this, we will define the ‘customer’ as the individual who enters into a contract for a pre-paid funeral plan with a funeral plan provider, and who is party to the contract. If different, the individual whose funeral is to be provided will be referred to as the ‘covered individual’. We understand that most providers have provisions in place to deal with this scenario.

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5.8
5.9
5.10
Most of the conduct of business rules are about how funeral plan firms deal with the customer. There are a small number of rules where firms will need to take account of the covered individual’s circumstances as well. For example, when determining if a funeral plan meets the customer’s demands and needs, firms will need to establish whether the covered individual has already made provision for their funeral. We are proposing that the rules in FPCOB should apply to regulated funeral plan activitieswhetherornotthatactivityiscarriedonfromanestablishmentintheUK. This ensuresthatourrulesapply,forexample,tofirmswhichmayhavenon‑UK brancheswhicharrangeplansforfuneralsintheUK. We also propose a rule to make clear that where an appointed representative is engaged in funeral plan distribution activities (including on behalf of a provider as its principal), the principal firm must ensure that the appointed representative complies with the rules in FPCOB as they apply to authorised firms doing funeral plan distribution. Q7: Do you agree with the way we propose to apply our FPCOB rules? The table below summarises the conduct of business requirements. We propose that funeral plan providers must:

• Comply with the customer’s best interests rule. This means that providers will need
  to ‘act honestly, fairly and professionally’ in accordance with the best interests of their customers.
• Designproductsthatmeettheneedsofaclearlydefinedtargetmarket,ensuring
  thattheproductsofferfairvaluetoconsumers.Productsmustbedesignedsothat they deliver the expected funeral regardless of whether or not the consumer has paid all the instalments at the time of death.
• Select appropriate distribution channels to ensure plans are marketed and sold
  properly.
• Notreceiveremunerationwhichwouldconflictwiththedutytoactinthe
  customer’s best interests.
• Not remunerate or performance manage their employees in a way that would
  conflictwiththecustomer’sbestinterests.
• Not pay commission to distributors.
• Regularly review their products, and how they are distributed, and take actions to
  mitigateanyissuestheyfind.
• Produce clear product summary documents which set out the main features,
  exclusions and limitations of their plans.
• Send the customer annual statements setting out key information about their plan.
• Provide information about the plan to the customer’s representatives.
• Nominate a local funeral director to carry out the funeral.
• Make sure that the funeral is provided to a satisfactory quality in line with the plan.
• Complywiththecustomer’sbestinterestsrule.Thismeansthatfirmswillneedto
  ‘act honestly, fairly and professionally’ in accordance with the best interests of their customers. Firms must not remunerate or performance manage their employees inawaythatwouldconflictwiththisduty.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
We propose that funeral plan distributors must:

• Not receive commission or any other remuneration for their distribution services,
  other than fees paid directly to them by customers.
• Provide the customer clear information about their services.
• Provide the customer with clear information about the features, exclusions and
  limitations of the plan or plans which they distribute.
• Ensurethatanyproductstheyofferareconsistentwiththecustomer’sneeds.
  General conduct of business rules
  5.11 In many regulated sectors, we have introduced a requirement for firms to act honestly,
  fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of their customers (the customer’s best interests rule). We consider this a key statement of firms’ overarching obligation to treat customers fairly and resolve conflicts appropriately, and we propose to apply this to all funeral plan firms.
  5.12 In applying this rule, we propose that firms will need to consider the interests of both
  the customer and the covered individual where these are different. We also propose that this requirement should apply in relation to customers under plans entered into prior to regulation taking effect, as well as new plans.
  5.13 We are proposing two additional linked requirements:
• Firmswillneedtoensurethatanyremunerationtheyreceivedoesnotconflictwith
  the duty to act in the customer’s best interests. This applies to any remuneration thefirmreceives,includingpaymentsfromthetrustorinsuranceproviderbacking the plan.
• Firms will also need to ensure they do not remunerate or performance manage
  theiremployeesinawaythatwouldconflictwiththecustomer’sbestinterests. This includes remuneration or performance management that incentivises the sale of plans which may not meet the customer’s needs. Examples of the types of practices that we envisage would be prohibited by this rule include:
  – Paying higher commission or bonuses based on the price of the plans sold (ie a higher bonus for selling more expensive plans). – Bonus structures based predominantly on sales volumes or value. Marketing and communications
  5.14 We propose rules that will apply both to financial promotions for funeral plans and
  firms’ (providers and intermediaries) communications with customers. We propose that firms must communicate in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading, including ensuring that marketing materials are clearly identifiable as such. These rules will apply to all firms operating in the funeral plan market.
  5.15 We have seen a significant issue with firms operating as lead generators through
  websites which appear to be offering price comparison services. These websites suggest that they will provide the consumer with a comparison of different funeral plans. However, once the consumer has entered their details, no comparison is shown. Instead, the consumer receives a sales call. This type of practice is misleading and

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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation wouldbreachourproposedrulesonmarketing.Usingtheconsumer’sdetailsinthis way would also breach our proposed ban on cold calling (below). Q8: Do you agree with our proposed general conduct of business standards for funeral plans? Commission and other remuneration As noted above, we propose that the remuneration a firm receives, and the way it remunerates or performance manages its employees, must not conflict with the duty to act in the customer’s best interests. The definition of remuneration is very broad. It includes commission, fees, charges or other payment, including an economic benefit of any kind or any other financial advantage or incentive offered or given in respect of the funeral plan activity. All remuneration has the potential to influence firms’ conduct and to cause harm to consumers. To inform our decisions in regards to the funeral plans sector, we conducted two surveys of firms. These were done in 2019 and 2020. Data from these surveys shows that the majority (56%) of funeral plans are sold by intermediaries who are separate from the plan provider. Many of these are funeral directors who sell plans alongside their day-to-day business of delivering funerals. More than half of plans sold by intermediaries are sold by funeral directors. There are other types of intermediaries also selling funeral plans. These include vertically integrated firms, firms who sell plans alongside other relevant services (such as will writers) and also direct marketing firms. We set out further details of our market analysis in paragraph 12 of Annex 1. Commission plays a significant part in how many funeral plan intermediaries make money. Information from the sector indicates that plan providers pay intermediaries (other than funeral directors) commission for selling their plans. Based on our data collection and research, we have found that approximately 41% of sales involve the payment of commission to an intermediary, with an average of approximately £550 being paid per plan sold. This is compared to the average cost of a funeral of £4100 – £4600. These commissions are usually paid upfront in a single payment, either taken from the money the customer pays for the plan, or from the trust backing the plan. There is significant variation in commission levels, with some firms paying several hundreds of pounds more than others. Commission is usually higher for more expensive plans. Most firms have told us that they do not pay commission to funeral directors, and those that do pay significantly lower amounts (less than £100 on average). Instead, funeral directors are paid by plan providers to deliver the funeral services, and this is how they make money from plans. Other intermediaries are paid commission, and the amounts are much higher than those paid to funeral directors. We have seen other intermediaries being paid up to £900 per plan sold. We have identified 2 harms which are likely to arise due to commission
in the funeral plan sector:

• Commissioncreatesamis‑matchofincentivesbetweenfirmsandconsumers.
  Consumers want to buy fair value products that meet their needs, but commission incentivisesfirmstosellproductsthatwillgeneratethehighestcommission,and 5.21

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5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25 sothemostprofitforthem.Wehaveseenevidenceofpoorpracticeinvolving
commissions in the funeral plan sector. This includes:
– Commission being paid on a sliding scale based on the price of the plan sold, incentivising intermediaries to sell the most expensive plan available. – Thetotalcommissionbeingpaidup‑front,withlimitedabilityforfirmstoclawit back if the consumer cancels. Robust claw back arrangements incentivise good salespractices,becausefirms(andtheiremployees)arepenalisedifplansare not sold properly.

• Although disguised by the headline price of the plan, the customer pays the
  commission.Highcommissionscanleadtotwodifferentharmstoconsumers:
  – We have seen examples of funeral plan prices which include high commission butstillenablefirmstopaymoreintothetrustthanisneededtocoverthecost of the funeral. In essence, this means the amount the customer is paying for theirplanissignificantlymorethanthebenefitsitprovides. – Conversely,wehavealsoseenexamplesoffirmswhosetrustsappeartobe significantlyunderfundedpayingsomeofthehighestcommissions.This suggests that the amount of commission being extracted from the customer’s payment is creating a risk that the provider will not be able to meet its liabilities to pay for funerals when needed (i.e. the consumer’s money is going towards the commission payment, not their funeral). The most common type of intermediary selling funeral plans are funeral directors. Firms have told us that funeral directors typically do not receive commission for selling plans. Instead, they are paid when they provide the funeral services. Firms have told us that they also use a wide variety of other third-party intermediaries, such as will writers,financialplannersandmarketingcompanies(includingleadgenerators).Unlike funeral directors, these third-party intermediaries have no ongoing involvement in the provision of the funeral and are less likely to have any ongoing relationship with the consumer or their family. They are also less likely to have relevant expertise which would enable them to advise customers about important aspects of funeral provision. It is striking, therefore, that these third-party intermediaries receive the highest levels of commission and we do not think these payments represent any material value to the consumer. Although most funeral directors do not receive commission for selling plans, we consider that funeral directors may still have a mis-match of incentives where the guarantee of future income could lead them to sell plans which are not in the consumer’s best interests. It is also possible that the amount paid by plan providers to funeral directors could be higher than the cost or retail price of an equivalent at-need funeral. We are aware of some providers who pay a portion of the funeral directors’ fees immediately following the plan sale; a practice which could be akin to paying commission. Most firms have told us that intermediaries distribute plans from a single provider. We have seen no evidence of any intermediaries providing advice, comparison or broker services likely to be of benefit to consumers (they don’t ‘shop around’ on the consumer’s behalf as one might see in other sectors). These issues are particularly important in the funeral plans sector because we think that there are likely to be a higher numbers of vulnerable consumers buying funeral plans than some other financial products.

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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation

• Data provided to us shows that funeral directors make more than half of funeral
  plan sales. Firms have told us that it is very common for a plan to be sold following a bereavement, where the family initially contact the funeral director to buy an at-need funeral. Consumers arranging funerals for a loved one are clearly more likely than normal to be susceptible to suggestions that they buy a plan for themselves.
• We consider that a key motivation for their customers buying plans is to protect
  theirlovedonesfromthefinancialstrainofarrangingandpayingfortheirfuneral. Thisisreflectedinthefactthatagreatdealoffuneralplanmarketingfocuseson theincreasingcostofat‑needfunerals,andthebenefitsofprotectinglovedones fromfinancialandemotionalburden.Suchmotivationsindicateapotentiallackof abilitytowithstandfinancialshocks. We consider these vulnerabilities are likely to increase the risk of harm to consumers. The mis-matched incentives caused by commission are more likely to lead to vulnerable consumers buying an unsuitable plan, or feeling pressured to buy a plan at all. To protect consumers from the harms identified, we propose a ban on commission paid to intermediaries, including to firms outside our regulation and to appointed representatives of the provider. Our proposed rules will mean distributors must not be remunerated for their activities through any means other than fees paid directly to them by funeral plan consumers (advice/arrangement fees) which need to be clearly disclosed. In addition, these fees must be consistent with the duty to act in the customer’s best interests. Some intermediaries (such as will writers) are already charging fees for their services. We consider it likely that they would be able to continue distributing funeral plans on this basis. We know that some distributors (particularly funeral directors) are part of the same group of companies as the funeral plan provider. Our proposed rules will apply to these distributors as well. Firms will need to ensure that the level of payment made to the group’s in-house funeral director is in line with the cost that would be charged were the plan provider not part of the same group, and that any advisor/arrangement charges paid by the customer reflect charges as they would be if another funeral director were conducting the funeral. Our rules will not prohibit the early payment of a proportion of the funeral director’s fees. However, firms will need to ensure that this does not become a way of avoiding the intention of the proposed commission ban; for example, by increasing the overall amount paid to the funeral director without reference to factors such as a general increase in costs or the price of at-need funerals. The proposed ban will apply to remuneration paid in connection with funeral plan distribution activities carried out once our regulation applies. Firms will be permitted to receive remuneration after this date that is due to them for activities carried out before our rules applied. We have considered whether these harms can be tackled through alternative approaches, and have concluded that a ban is the most effective option:
• We considered mandating full commission disclosure. This would improve
  transparency and enable consumers to make a judgement about whether the proposed arrangements were meeting their needs. However, we decided not toadoptthisapproachasitisunclearwhetherconsumerswouldbesufficiently engagedorfeelconfidentenoughtochallengefirmsontheircommissionlevels.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
(particularly if, for example, they are in the midst of arranging a funeral for a loved one). Commission disclosure is required in some other sectors we regulate, but we recognise that there are limits to the level of protection that disclosure can deliver. In Annex 1 we note additional evidence suggesting disclosure may not fully reduce the harms we are seeking to address.

• Weconsideredmanagingtherisksbyrequiringfirmstoassesswhethertheir
  remunerationwasofferingfairvaluetoconsumers,andtoamendtheirpractices if they were not providing fair value. This is the approach we take in some other sectors such as insurance. However, on balance, we consider that this is not sufficientlyrobusttotackletheparticularharmsthatintermediarycommission creates in the funeral plan sector. This is because it would continue to permit the payment of commission to increase the price of plans to consumers. This approach wouldalsonotreflectourconclusionthatintermediariesareprovidinglittleorno benefittoconsumers;unlikeintheinsurancesectorwheremanyintermediaries provideadvisingorbrokingserviceswhichbenefitconsumers.
• We also considered an approach similar to the rules on inducements that derive
  from the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II), and in particular the rules in COBS 2.3A. In summary, this is essentially a restriction on the payment or acceptance of fees and commissions and on the provision or receipt of non‑monetarybenefitsinrelationtoinvestmentbusinesscarriedonforaclient. Such‘inducements’areonlypermittedifthefirmcanshowthattheydonotimpair compliancewiththefirm’sdutytoactinthebestinterestsoftheclient,aredesigned to enhance the quality of service to the client and are properly disclosed. However, we do not currently consider this to be the best approach. As set out above, our view is that commission in the funeral plan sector is unlikely ever to enhance the quality ofserviceandwouldconflictwiththedutytoactinthecustomer’sbestinterests; meaning that the conditions for making and receiving payments would likely be redundant. Adopting this approach would increase the complexity of the rules, makingthemmoredifficulttocomplywithand supervise, without delivering more benefitthantheproposedban.
  5.32 We think a commission ban is justified because of the potential harm to consumers
  which can result from commission payments, as described above and in paragraphs 126-134 of Annex 1). We consider that customers’ best interests would be best served by a sector that did not feature commission-based distribution structures. By prohibiting intermediaries from receiving commission from funeral plan providers we directly address the following harms:
• Thecurrentmismatchofincentivesbetweenfirmsandconsumers.Weconsider
  that this is particularly important, given the increased likelihood of vulnerable customers being impacted.
• The impact that high commissions have on prices.
  5.33 However, we recognise that such a proposal has the potential to have a significant
  impact on the business models of some firms. We therefore welcome firms’ views and, in particular, responses from providers which pay, and intermediaries which receive, commissions to enable us to understand how commission models might add value to consumers and how the risks that we have identified can be appropriately managed. At present, we consider that commission payments are leading to consumers paying for a service which is not of benefit, and which is risking them paying either an excessive price for their plan or their being insufficient funds to cover their funeral.

5.34
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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation We welcome feedback on this point and have asked a number of questions below. In particular we welcome feedback from the industry about the way that current commission levels impact prices and consumer outcomes within the sector. In the event that respondents are able to demonstrate that an outright ban on commission is not required then we are minded to pursue an approach based on the MiFID II rules (described above). Q9: Do you agree with our proposed ban on intermediaries receiving remuneration other than advice or arrangement fees from the customer? Q10: Do you agree with our assessment that commissions are leading to mis‑matched incentives and conflicts of interests between firms and customers in the funeral plan market? If you disagree, it would be helpful to explain why by reference to current commission structures and practices you are aware of in the market and, in particular, why you do not consider these to risk creating mis‑matched incentives and conflicts of interests. Q11: Do you agree with our assessment that commissions are leading to customers paying prices which are too high relative to the benefits the funeral plan provides? Q12: Do you agree with our assessment that intermediaries receiving commission are providing little or no benefit to customers? If you disagree, it would be helpful to explain why by reference to current commission structures and intermediary services you are aware of in the market and, in particular, how you think they provide benefit to customers. Q13: Do you have any comments on the alternative approaches to tackling the harms caused by commission? In particular, do you have any comments on the alternative option we would be minded to follow if we conclude that a ban is not required? Even where there is no initial commission payment, firms must consider whether remuneration they receive in the longer term could influence their conduct. For example, a funeral director who receives no commission may still be incentivised to sell a more expensive plan on the basis that they will make more money in the future when they provide the funeral services. Most funeral plan providers receive remuneration from the trust or insurance firm backing the plan. We have not seen evidence to suggest that the payments which providers receive in relation to the provision of their services are particularly high or creating a significant risk of harm. However, we propose that the remuneration arrangements of funeral plan providers must not conflict with the duty to act in the customer’s best interests. Some of the factors firms will need to consider are the impact their remuneration has on prices, and whether it risks incentivising them to enter into plans with customers whose best interests would be served by alternative

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority arrangements. Firms should also note that their remuneration will be subject to our proposed product governance rules; in particular, those relating to fair value. Q14: Do you agree that with our proposals for remuneration of plan providers? Pre-contract disclosures
5.37 It is important that consumers are given clear information before they decide whether
to purchase a funeral plan. We are proposing a number of requirements to ensure that consumers are given the information they need. Information about the firm and its services
5.38 We propose that both funeral plan providers and intermediaries should be required to
set out clearly the scope of the services they offer, as well as key information about their firm. This information should be provided to the customer early in the sales process, to enable them to understand who they are dealing with and what services they are being offered. The information covers:

• thefirm’sdetails,regulatorystatus,andcomplaintsprocess
• whetherthefirmprovidesadvice
• the fees that customers may need to pay
  5.39 In line with the customer’s best interests rule, it is important that firms consider how
  they make information meaningful to consumers. Firms should make sure that the information is provided at an appropriate time and through the right channels. Our work on Smarter Consumer Communications has shown that different people engage with information in different ways, and that information alone is not always enough to empower consumers to make informed choices. Firms’ communication is vital to help consumers make decisions but it is only effective when consumers pay attention to the information, have the capacity to interpret it, and are willing to incorporate it in their decision-making process. Information about the product
  5.40 We propose that firms should be required to provide consumers with appropriate and
  timely information about the product, to enable the consumer to make an informed purchase decision. Our analysis of the current market suggests that, whilst the information about the product benefits is generally plentiful, this is not the case with information about a product’s limitations and exclusions. Often these are contained only within the products terms and conditions, which can be complex and difficult for consumers to understand. Firms will need to ensure the disclosures are communicated clearly, and provide fair and objective information, bearing in mind that their consumers may well be vulnerable.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Main disclosure requirements throughout the customer journey This graphic sets out the main information disclosures that funeral plan providers and intermediaries would be required to make at di�erent stages of a contract being taken out. In general, a funeral plan provider would be responsible for producing the documents. Pre-contract Funeral Plan summary Firms would need to provide a two page funeral plan summary setting out important product information, to help customers make an informed decision. This would need to be provided by the intermediary, or the provider if there is no intermediary. Other pre-contract disclosure Additional, more detailed information would also need to be provided – such as terms and conditions and clear price information. Post-contract Disclosure to customer’s representative Firms would be required to contact the customer's representative within 5 business days of the date of conclusion of the contract, unless the customer expressly opted out, to ensure they are aware of the plan and the procedure for making a claim at the time of need. This would need to be provided by the funeral plan provider. Nomination of a funeral director Firms would be required to nominate a funeral director to a funeral plan contract within 30 days of the plan purchase and notify the customer. Ongoing disclosure Annual Statement An annual statement would need to be provided to the customer to ensure they can keep the arrangements under review, to remind them of how they can make changes and to include information about their payments. This would need to be provided by the funeral plan provider.
5.41 We propose that important information should be provided to the customer and their
nominated representative in two short standalone documents. The key points the document will need to cover are:

• An explanation of the services and products the plan provides
• An explanation of any services and products which are not fully covered by the plan
  (such as where the plan only provides an allowance towards a burial plot)
• An explanation of services and products commonly related to funerals but which
  are not covered by the plan (such as catering costs)
• If applicable, information on what will happen if the consumer dies before the plan is
  fully paid
• If applicable, information on what happens if the consumer misses a payment
• Whether changes can be made to the plan, and the costs involved
• An explanation of the consumer’s right to cancel the plan
• Detailsofthefirm’scomplaintspolicy,andtheFSCS

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
5.42 We propose that plan providers will be responsible for producing these documents.
Depending on how the plan is being sold, they will need to be provided to the consumer by either the intermediary or the provider in good time before the consumer purchases a plan. Information about the price
5.43 We propose that firms should be required to disclose clear information about the price
of the plan. The price of a funeral plan will vary significantly depending on the different services included in the funeral, and firms may not always be able to disclose the price in a standardised document for consumers. Therefore, where this is not possible, we expect firms to signpost to where consumers can get a quote tailored to their specific needs. Where plans are sold on instalments firms will need to ensure they:

• Clearly state if paying through instalments will mean the overall cost of the plan will
  be higher than paying in one lump-sum
• Do not present prices in a way that suggests the total amount paid by instalments is
  the same as the up-front price (unless that is true). An example of a disclosure which would breach this requirement is “Our plan costs £X,XXX or £XX.XX per month’. Means of providing information
  5.44 We propose that this information should be provided to the consumer in writing. Firms
  will be able to use electronic communications (such as email or a secure consumer web-portal) as long as the consumer is given the option of having the documents on paper as an alternative. If the consumer selects to receive paper documents, these must be provided free of charge.
  5.45 We appreciate that sending documents on paper is more expensive than electronic
  communications and has more environmental consequences. Firms may use electronic communications as their default option, as long as the consumer is given a clear and prominent way to select paper documents. For example, a firm could pre-tick the box indicating electronic documents as long as the tick box for paper documents was the same size and given the same prominence. Distance communications
  5.46 In common with other sectors which we regulate, we are proposing to apply specific
  disclosure rules to firms which are relevant to firms engaged in distance marketing and e-commerce activity. Q15: Do you agree with our proposals for pre-contract disclosures? Plans paid through instalments
  5.47 It has been widely stated that the primary purpose of consumers purchasing plans is
  to remove the burden of arranging and paying for their funeral from their bereaved loved ones at what is inevitably a difficult time. However, currently over 30% of plans being sold risk not meeting this expectation because the consumer dies before the full instalments are paid.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
5.48 We have concerns around plans sold with instalment payments. Whilst some may
provide the funeral regardless of whether the plan is ‘fully-paid’, there are many that do not. This leaves families needing to make alternative arrangements at a time of acute distress and vulnerability, and they may face high cancellation fees if they are unable to make up the shortfall in payments.
5.49 We do not consider that plans which fail to provide the expected funeral are delivering good
outcomes for consumers; nor do we consider the return of payments to be an acceptable outcome. Customers purchase funeral plans with the intention of providing for their funeral. Merely returning the customer’s payments does not meet this intention.
5.50 We therefore propose to prohibit the sale of plans on instalments, unless they will provide
the expected funeral following the consumer’s death without any further payments being required, and regardless of whether or not the consumer has paid all their instalments. We also propose to prohibit firms from seeking further money from the consumer’s estate following their death. The proposed rules will allow firms to impose a moratorium period covering death up to 12 months from the sale of the plan, in which the funeral would not need to be provided except in the case of accidental death. In that situation, all of the payments made would be required to be returned in full.
5.51 Firms will need to ensure that they have sufficient financial resources to meet this
requirement. We do not propose to prescribe how firms do this. Two options available to firms are to purchase supplementary insurance or increase the money held in trusts or insurance policies backing the plans. We acknowledge that this proposal may result in some price increases, although we consider that it will also improve the quality of plans available in the market. Firms should consider how they can meet our proposed requirements to ensure delivery of funerals whilst complying with the proposed prudential rules (e.g. the requirement to maintain trust solvency).
5.52 The proposed rules would apply to new plan sales only. However, we encourage
firms to consider whether their existing plans are delivering the good outcomes to consumers we set out above, and whether changes would be beneficial to consumers.
5.53 We accept that any changes to existing plans could impact the financial position of
trusts. When making product changes, firms should ensure they have full assessed the financial impact and are complying with our rules in that respect. Q16: Do you agree with our proposals for plans sold through instalments? Sales standards
5.54 One of the harms that have been identified in the funeral plans market is the way that
plans are sold. We are concerned that consumers may be purchasing plans which are not appropriate for their requirements. Whilst improving the information consumers receive about plans is part of this, relying solely on disclosure means that all the responsibility is placed on the consumer. As in other sectors, we consider that firms should have some responsibility for ensuring that the consumer is offered appropriate products. We propose a range of rules to improve the standard of sales practices in the sector and reduce the harm to consumers from purchasing inappropriate products.

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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation We are proposing rules for both advised and non-advised sales. Currently there is no distinction made between these in the funeral plans sector, although our expectation is that the majority of firms will operate on a non-advised basis once they are authorised. If firms wish to provide advice, they will need to ensure that they have the correct permission to allow this. There is always a risk with telephone and face-to-face sales that they can inadvertently slip into giving advice. Not only would this mean the firm would need to comply with the standards for advised sales, but without the appropriate permission, it may be a breach of relevant provisions of FSMA. Either may make the firm liable to enforcement action, or to legal action by the customer. Firms will need to put in place robust oversight and monitoring processes to ensure this does not happen. Cold calling We are proposing to ban cold calling by all firms involved in funeral plans. Firms will only be able to contact customers (or potential customers) for the purposes of interactive marketing (e.g. by phone or in person) where they already have an established client relationship with them. Examples of existing relationships include where the consumer already has a product with the firm. Our proposed cold calling rules would not apply to the scenario in which a potential customer had initiated the relevant dialogue and made an express request to be contacted. As well as the direct prohibition on cold calling for all funeral plan firms, we are also proposing a rule in PROD which will require plan providers to take reasonable steps to ensure that they are not using an intermediary to distribute their products through cold calls. Standards for non-advised sales Broadly, we propose to apply the ICOBS standards for non-advised sales of funeral plans. This means that firms will need to:

• Ask the customer questions to identify both their demands and their needs
• Conduct an assessment of those demands and needs
• Limit the products they propose to the customer to only those products which
  theyassessasbeingconsistentwiththosedemandsandneeds.Ifthefirmdoes not have any products which are consistent with the customer’s needs, they cannotoffertheconsumeranything
• Clearlystatetothecustomerthedemandsandneedstheyhaveidentified
  The purpose of the demands and needs assessment is to assist the consumer in making an informed decision, and to reduce the risk of the them purchasing an inappropriate product. Firms should therefore identify demands and needs early on in the sales process and take this into account when designing their consumer journeys. We recognise the need to retain a clear distinction between advised and non-advised sales. In relation to non-advised retail sales, we do not expect firms to carry out a detailed investigation of the customer’s circumstances. However, they should ask questions which will obtain key information about the customer’s circumstances (such as age, general health, and basic financial circumstances) as well about what the consumer is seeking to purchase. Firms should then consider these circumstances in relation to the key features, exclusions and limitations of the plans they offer.

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5.61 Firms should consider whether the customer has alternative means of funeral
provision available to them. For plans paid through instalments or ongoing monthly payments, firms should consider the length of the payment term and any moratorium period under which a funeral will not be provided. Whilst we would not expect firms to conduct detailed medical screenings, they should consider whether some basic enquiries about the customer’s health may be appropriate. Standards for advised sales
5.62 We are proposing different rules for firms who give advice. Firms who go beyond
providing information, and who recommend products to customers, will need to consider whether they are providing advice. Giving advice carries an additional responsibility, because customers are entitled to rely on the firm’s judgement. In order to give advice on funeral plans, firms will need to consider whether they need permission to carry out the regulated activity of advising. The rules that will apply depend on what permissions the firm has:

• Firms which provide personal recommendations in relation to funeral plan contracts
  will need to ensure that that the product they recommend is the one that best meets the customer’s needs. This will need to be based on a fair and personal analysis of the funeral plans market. Firms must also provide a personalised explanation why the proposed product best meets the customer’s demands and needs.
• Firms whose only regulated activity is advising, will need to ensure that the advice
  they give is suitable. This includes considering all the customer’s requirements and ensuringthatthefuneralplanstheyofferaresuitableforthecustomer’sneeds.If they provide personal recommendations, then they will also need to comply with the rules set out above. Q17: Do you agree with our proposed sales standards? Cancellation rights and fees
  5.63 Cancellation rights are key to ensuring that consumers have time to reflect on their
  purchase. It is also important that consumers are not unfairly penalised for changing their mind, or where their circumstances change. Cooling‑off period
  5.64 Subject to what we propose below in relation to instalment plans, we propose that all
  funeral plans should have a 30-day period following purchase in which the customer can cancel their plan without any penalty. If customers choose to cancel their plan within this period they must receive a full refund of all money paid.
  5.65 To ensure that customers are able to freely exercise their right to cancel, we propose
  that providers will be required to accept notification of cancellation through any contact channel by which they sell their plans. We expect that this will largely require providers to allow consumer to cancel by telephone, in writing or electronically. Where providers sell through intermediaries (particularly funeral directors), they will need to ensure that the intermediary is able to receive the notification.

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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Cancellation of plans paid by instalments Our main proposals concerning plans sold through instalments are set out in paragraphs 5.47 to 5.52. In line with those proposals, if a customer cancels their plan or dies within the moratorium period (the period of a time after the plan is sold within which if the consumer dies they will not receive a funeral limited at 12 months) we propose that a firm be required to return all their payments to them without any cancellation fee, unless it is agreed that the customer’s estate will pay the remaining instalments and the provider will deliver the funeral. Firms will need to ensure that the cancellation terms are clearly and prominently disclosed to the customer before the plan is purchased. We also propose that firms should be required to act fairly if the customer misses an instalment payment. This includes:

• Clearly informing the customer of the consequences of failing to bring their
  payments back up to date (after two missed payments)
• Allowing the customer at least 14 days after their second missed payment to bring
  their payments back up to date
• Not charging any form of late payment or administration fee
• Only cancelling the plan if the customer fails to bring their payments up to date
  more than 14 days after their second missed payment
• Ifthefirmexercisesitsrighttocanceltheplanfollowingasecondmissedpayment
  withinthemoratoriumperiod,thefirmswillberequiredtoreturnthecustomer’s payments in full. We recognise that funeral plans are sometimes backed by insurance policies which are paid on an ongoing monthly basis. In these cases, our proposals are likely to impact both the funeral plan contract and the insurance contract:
• Plan providers will need to ensure that the insurance contracts allow for the return
  of all payments, if the customer dies during the moratorium period. We understand thisiscurrentmarketpractice,andsoisunlikelytocauseanydifficulties.
• It is likely plan providers will need to ensure that the insurance company takes
  the same approach to missed payments as they do, to ensure that the insurance contract remains in place so long as the funeral plan contract does. Fees generally We are proposing that all fees should be reflective solely of the costs the firm incurs and must not include a profit. In this context, fees refers to sums charged in addition to the price of the funeral plan. For example, if a firm charges an administration fee for making changes to a plan, this fee must be a genuine reflection of the administrative cost the firm incurs in dealing with the change. We are aware that many firms charge an instalment fee if the consumer chooses to pay over a period longer than 12 months. This fee is intended to reflect the loss of investment return that the firm (or the underlying trust) suffers due to not having the full plan payment available to invest, and the risk the firm takes on if the funeral provision is guaranteed. We are not proposing to prevent firms charging such fees, as we consider that firms should be able to make provision for the reduced investment returns which are an important component of the trust’s ability to fund funerals. However, firms must ensure their fees do not result in customers who pay by

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority instalments being systemically more profitable than those who make a single, up-front payment. We are proposing to apply our rules on instalment fees to both trust-backed and insurance-backed funeral plans. This is because we understand there are some insurance-backed plans which involve the customer paying an instalment fee. Q18: Do you agree with our proposed approach to cancellation rights and other fees? Q19: Do you have any comments on whether our proposals are likely to impact the relationship between funeral plan contracts and underlying insurance contracts? Post-contract actions
5.72 We are proposing three rules which are intended to mitigate harms particular to the
funeral plan sector.
Nomination of a funeral director
5.73 It is very important that the consumer and their family know which funeral director
will be conducting the funeral. In their work on the at-need funeral market, the CMA identified that “it was the proximity to the deceased’s ‘home area’ that largely defined decision-making.” Arranging a funeral that was local to where the deceased had lived for a large proportion of their life was important, even if family members had subsequently moved away. We consider this is likely to be a very important factor in a consumer’s decision about their funeral plan as well.
5.74 Where a funeral director is not nominated until the consumer’s death, this increases
the risk that there will be no local director willing to conduct the services at a price the provider will pay. It also increases the risk of a delay whilst a suitable funeral director is found.
5.75 We propose that funeral plan providers will be required to nominate a funeral director
within a reasonable distance of the customer’s home to carry out the funeral. This nomination must be within 30 days of the plan being purchased and must be notified to the customer. The plan provider must put in place contractual arrangements to ensure that the funeral director will deliver the funeral as set out in the plan, without any additional payment from the customer or their estate. Providers will need to regularly review their arrangements with funeral directors to ensure that funerals will be delivered. We propose guidance that this should be done at least every twelve months.
5.76 In general, we would not expect the nominated funeral director to change during the
plan. However, we acknowledge that this may sometimes be necessary:

• Where the nominated funeral director becomes unable to provide the funeral (for
  example,duetoinsolvency)theplanprovidermustnominateadifferentfuneral director within a reasonable distance of the customer’s home, and notify the customer. The plan provider must not make any additional charge to the customer.
• Where the customer wishes to change the funeral director (for example, because
  they have moved to a new home) the provider may charge a fee solely to cover its costs in moving the plan to another funeral director.

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Q20: Do you agree with our proposal to require plan providers to nominate a funeral director within 30 days of the plan being purchased? Post-contract disclosure to the consumer’s representative
5.77 An analysis based on the survey of funeral plan providers we conducted indicates
that 4-5% of plans go unclaimed. There is a particular risk in relation to funeral plans because there is usually a very short period of time between the consumer dying and funeralarrangementsbeingmade.Unlikewithalifeinsurancepolicy,iftheconsumer’s family subsequently discover a funeral plan having already paid for the funeral, the plan is worthless.
5.78 We propose that plan providers should send a letter to the customer’s representative
within five business days of the plan being taken out. The purpose of this is to ensure that the customer representative is aware of the plan, what it covers and (most crucially) the procedure for making a claim following the consumer’s death.
5.79 As the customer’s representative is likely be an eligible complainant, the letter will also
include details of the plan provider’s complaints process.
5.80 Although sending this letter should be the default option, the customer should
be able to opt out of having this letter sent to their representative. For example, in circumstances where the customer is not the ‘covered individual’ it may be that there is no need for any other representatives to be made aware of the plan. Q21: Do you agree with our proposal to require plan providers to send a letter to the customer’s representative once a plan has been purchased? Ongoing annual disclosure
5.81 By their nature, funeral plans are long term products. It is likely that consumers’
circumstances will change during the term of the plan. We think it is important that consumers are given the opportunity to keep their plan arrangements under review, and to make changes if they are necessary.
5.82 We propose to require providers to send customers an annual letter setting out
important information about their plan. This will include information about the plan features, the customer’s payments, cancellation terms, and the complaints process. The letter will also include a prominent warning that the customer should read the details and consider whether the plan continues to meet their requirements. Q22: Do you agree with our proposal to require plan providers to send an annual letter to consumers? Plan redemption
5.83 We propose that firms should be required to handle the redemption of a funeral plan
fairly and promptly. This is likely to be distressing situation for the consumer’s family

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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation and friends, and it is important that the funeral is arranged in a timely manner in line with what the plan provides. Providers may use in-house funeral directors or can separately contract with independent funeral directors to provide the funeral services. However, our proposed rules are clear that the provider retains full responsibility for ensuring delivery of the plan even where certain services have been subcontracted. Our systems and controls rules prohibit firms from outsourcing their regulatory responsibilities to other firms. We propose that providers will be required to regularly review their arrangements with funeral directors to ensure that the funeral directors remain in a position to provide the services in time. We are not proposing to be prescriptive about how often firms conduct these reviews, although firms should note our intention is to avoid a scenario in which a commercial dispute between the provider and funeral director impacts the delivery of funeral services. Such disputes should not impact the customer or their family and friends. In addition, we propose rules that:

• Require providers to ensure that funerals are delivered to a satisfactory quality and
  standard and in line with the agreed plan services
• Prohibit plan providers from requesting further money from the customer’s estate,
  either before or after the funeral has taken place unless this is permitted under the terms of the funeral plan contract
• Require providers to ensure the nominated funeral director does not ask for
  additional payment from the customer’s estate, other than for products/services which are outside the scope of the plan Providers should be aware that the customer’s representative may be eligible to pursue complaints about the provision of plan services through the Financial Ombudsman Service. Given the importance of timely provision of the funeral, we expect plan providers to ensure that complaints and disputes do not delay the funeral. Q23: Do you agree with our proposed rules for plan redemption? Application of rules to existing plans
  5.87 As noted above, most of the rules we are proposing will only apply to funeral plans
  whicharedistributedorenteredintoonorafter29 July2022.However,thereare some rules which we are proposing to apply to all funeral plans which are unredeemed, regardless of when they were entered in to. These are:
• The general principles including the requirement to act honestly, fairly and
  professionally in the customer’s best interests
• Therequirementsconcerningcustomercommunicationsandfinancialpromotions
• The requirements relating to post-contractual changes
• The requirement to provide the customer with an annual statement
• The rules on handling plan redemptions
  5.88 For existing contracts, firms will need to consider whether the customer’s
  representative is likely to have sufficient information to enable them to make use of

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority the plan when the time comes. If the firm has the nominated representative’s details, and consent from the customer to communicate with them, they must provide the nominated representative’s disclosure to them within good time of our rules coming into force.
5.89 We are also proposing guidance that a firm should consider whether its funeral
arrangements for existing unredeemed plans would meet the purpose of our requirements, and what steps it might make regarding these arrangements. This includes making notifications to existing customers (and their nominated representatives) regarding the appointed funeral director. We do not anticipate this process to be unduly burdensome on the firm. Q24: Do you agree with our proposals for rules to apply to plans entered into before 29 July 2022?

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Chapter 6 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Product governance
6.1 In this chapter we set out our proposed rules on product oversight and governance in
relation to funeral plans. These proposals are designed to ensure firms’ behaviour is focused on delivering fair value products which meet the needs of consumers, and that firms have strong governance and oversight arrangements in place to support this. Background
6.2 Across a range of sectors the FCA has long been concerned with how firms design
and distribute their products. The Responsibilities of Providers and Distributors for the Fair Treatment of Customers (RPPD) guidance was introduced in 2007 to set out our expectations of firms under the Principles for Businesses and other detailed rules. This included guidance on the respective responsibilities of providers and distributors under the Principles during the product life cycle or while the service is provided. This guidance applied to all sectors regulated by the FCA.
6.3 For some sectors we regulate – for example as a result of implementing MiFID II and
IDD – there are now more detailed rules in the Product Intervention and Product Governance sourcebook (PROD) instead of RPPD. This includes products such as whole of life insurance plans which may be considered as alternatives to funeral plans. Product governance requirements for funeral plans
6.4 We propose to apply product governance requirements to all firms in the funeral
plan sector based on the product governance requirements for insurance products in PROD 4; taking into account proposed changes to those rules in FCA CP20/19. By product governance we mean the systems and controls firms will need to have in place for the design, approval, marketing and ongoing management of products throughout their lifecycle.
6.5 The requirements will depend on firms’ roles in relation to funeral plans. In PROD, firms
are categorised as either:

• Manufacturers (see glossary, PROD 1.7.3G and PROD 1.7.4R) – those responsible
  for creating, developing, designing funeral plans, and/or entering into or carrying out a funeral plan contract as a provider.
• Distributors (see glossary) – those who advise on or propose funeral plan contracts,
  which they do not manufacture.
  6.6 The product governance rules will generally apply at the product level rather than to
  individual funeral plan contracts. They will apply to both new and existing products (thatis,productsdesignedpriorto29 July2022).However,therearesomedifferences in how the rules apply to existing products which are not subject to significant adaptations or changes.

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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Manufacturer requirements In summary, we propose that manufacturers are required to:

• Maintain, operate and review a product approval process applying to:
  – funeralplanproductsmanufacturedpriorto29 July2022thatremainavailable for distribution/marketing from the date the rules will apply – Theapprovalofallnewproducts,orsignificantadaptiontoexistingproducts, before they are marketed/made available for distribution.
• Specifyasufficientlygranular,definedtargetmarketforeachproduct,including
  identifying groups of consumers for whom the product is generally not compatible.
• Design products to be compatible with the needs, interests, characteristics
  and objectives of the target market. This should include ensuring that plans are designedtodeliverfuneralsandaresufficientlyfundedtoachievethisoutcome.
• Ensure that products provide fair value to consumers. Products which do not
  provide fair value cannot be approved for marketing or distribution.
• Select distribution channels that are consistent with the target market and take
  steps to ensure that the product is distributed to the target market. This includes providingsufficientinformationtothedistributortoenablethemtosetupan appropriate distribution strategy.
• Review all products at least once every twelve months to ensure they are
  continuing to meet the needs of customers in the target market, are delivering fair value to them, and to ensure that the distribution strategy remains appropriate. This must be done considering all relevant information including performance data.
• We propose that the rules should apply to existing products as well as new
  products.Whereproductsdonotmeettherequirements,firmswillneedtotake remedial action to improve the quality of the product or amend the distribution strategy,orceaseofferingthemfordistribution. We are proposing requirements that will apply to products manufactured prior to 29 July2022aswellasproductsnewlymanufacturedorsignificantlyadaptedafter that time. Where these existing funeral plan products do not meet the requirements, firms should not be offering them for distribution once PROD applies. If necessary, firms may need to take remedial action which could include making changes to their products. We have also proposed that funeral plan providers will need to have adequate product governance requirements in place to ensure that legacy funeral plans deliver the intended benefits. Q25: Do you agree with our proposed product oversight and governance requirements for funeral plan manufacturers? Distributor requirements In summary, we are proposing rules to ensure that distributors have adequate product distribution arrangements in place for any funeral plan products they distribute. Our proposals will require distributors to:
• Fullyunderstandthemanufacturer’sidentifiedtargetmarket
• Set up a distribution strategy which ensure that plans are only distributed to
  consumers within that target market
• Ensurethattheiractionsdonotadverselyimpactthevalueofferedbytheproduct

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Chapter 6 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation

• Reportanyidentifiedissueswiththeproducttothemanufacturer,inordertoassist
  with their ongoing product reviews
• Provide manufacturers with information on their distribution process, in order to
  assist with the manufacturer’s product reviews.
  6.11 Although the PROD requirements for distributors are concerned with the systems and
  controls around the firm’s distribution arrangements generally, rather than the sale of each individual funeral plan contract, there is a clear relationship between PROD and the sales standards set out in Chapter 5. For example, distributors are required to ensure that plans offered are consistent with the customer’s demands and needs. This will not be the case if the customer is outside of the identified target market. Where a firm has established robust product distribution arrangements that properly consider the intended target market and how the involvement of the firm contributes to delivering fair value, this will reduce the risk of mis-selling. Q26: Do you agree with our proposed product oversight and governance requirements for funeral plan distributors? Fair value
  6.12 Our proposed PROD rules will require funeral plan manufacturers to ensure that their
  plans are intended to provide fair value. Although this is primarily a responsibility of the manufacturer, distributors will also need to consider the effects their distribution arrangements could have the product’s value.
  6.13 Firms will need to consider the relationship between the total price to the customer
  and the quality of the product (and any other services provided) when identifying whether a funeral plan product offers fair value. This will include considering all elements that go into determining the total price of the funeral plan product, including the costs that will be incurred in providing the plan and the cost of delivering the funeral plan contract. Some other factors which firms should consider are:
• Thebenefitstheproductisintendedtoprovidetotheconsumers
• Thedifferencebetweenthecostofdeliveringthefuneralplancontractobligations
  and the price paid by the customer
• Anydifferencesbetweenthepriceoftheplanandthepriceofanequivalent
  ‘at-need’ funeral
• Whether the distribution arrangements (including remuneration) or any parties
  involved could adversely impact the value of the product.
  6.14 Where firms identify that products are not providing fair value to consumers, they must
  make changes to ensure the product provides fair value, or cease offering it for sale.
  6.15 Responsibility for compliance with the PROD requirements, including ensuring plans
  are fair value, sits with the firm’s governing body (normally its Board of Directors). This body should have effective control and oversight over the process and be responsible for product governance. Q27: Do you agree with our proposed rules on fair value for funeral plans?

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7 Resolution and compensation
7.1
7.2
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7.6
As detailed in Chapter 2, we are concerned about risks to consumers that would arise if authorised funeral plan firms were to become insolvent and in particular if authorised funeral plan providers were to enter into insolvency and therefore no longer able to carry out funeral plan contracts. In this section, we set out our proposals in relation to both resolution arrangements that firms are required to have in place to mitigate harm from firm failure, and the framework to allow the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) to compensate customers of failed firms which are not able to meet liabilities against them. We are not aware of any firm failures in this sector but it is prudent and customary for regulated firms to have in place contingency plans to deal with the scenario of their failure. Our resolution and compensation proposals in this consultation cover:

• Resolutionarrangementsthatfirmsarerequiredtohaveinplacetoprotect
  customersonfirmfailure(ieintheeventthatthefirmentersintoinsolvency proceedings).
• The introduction of FSCS protection for certain funeral plan activities in relation to
  firmsthatbecomeinsolvent,andforactsoromissions arising, from the date the FCA takes on regulation of the funeral plan activity. Resolution scenarios are inevitably complex, and situation-specific. In an ideal orderly failure scenario, there is a minimal impact on the end consumer. In this sector, the impact on the consumer will depend on whether the funeral can be delivered independently of the success of the provider, and/or whether the consumer is put in a position where they can access a replacement plan. Whether that is financially possible will be directly linked to the amounts held in trust/insured by the provider firm. Where funds are inadequate, liabilities may fall to the FSCS, and it is desirable to design the trust/insurance requirements in a manner that minimises costs to the industry levy payers that fund the FSCS. Clearly such requirements need to be carefully calibrated. In light of this, we are still considering the following aspects of our regulatory regime in relation to resolution and compensation:
• Precise options for the repayment of funeral plan monies to consumers in
  theeventoffirmfailureiffuneralplanscannotcontinuetobecarriedoutby anotherproviderthatassumestheresponsibilitiesofthefailedfirm,alongwith consequences for trust or insurance adequacy
• Implications of the above for the amount of compensation payable by FSCS
• Possible further rule changes in light of any future legislative changes that are
  introduced in relation to FSCS and funeral plans In the event that further rule changes are required in relation to any of the above, the changes will be consulted on in a future consultation paper. 7.7

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Mitigating the harm from firm failures
7.8 The Treasury’s Call for Evidence noted that some providers may hold insufficient
assets to meet liabilities, and we have observed that it is not always clear how funeral plan contracts will be administered in the event of firm failure. This could result in the risk of consumers losing money or not receiving funeral services.
7.9 We think a good outcome for a consumer in these circumstances would be for their
funeral plans to continue to be carried out by another provider that assumes the responsibilities of the failed firm. This would allow consumers to receive a funeral that is the same, or similar to, the one originally agreed. In the interim, insolvency practitioners can step into the shoes of the firm and work with trustees or insurers to continue to meet obligations under the plan, as appropriate.
7.10 However, it may not always be possible, or desirable, for another funeral plan provider
to take on carrying out the contracts in the longer term. We think that consumers should receive a prompt reimbursement if the firm is not able or intending to provide contracted funeral services, or is not and will not attempt to transfer the contract. If the reimbursement amount is adequate, the consumer can then choose to make alternative arrangements, supported by the reimbursement received.
7.11 Although we have not put forward rules for consultation on the amount or funding
of this reimbursement, we describe some initial considerations below. We will issue a further consultation to clarify our proposals on this, along with associated costs and benefits. We seek views on what amount should be considered adequate, an amount equal to an equivalent funeral plan purchased on a retail basis, or an amount linked to the monies paid by the consumer and applied towards a contract of insurance or paid into a trust. We are also interested in the likely differential between these amounts (as set out in question 31).
7.12 We also propose to protect consumers through the FSCS, which could provide
compensation in the event that funeral plan firms fail which are not able to meet their liabilities. However, our overall aim is for firms to make arrangements to ensure customers are protected in the event of firm failure, therefore mitigating potential calls on the FSCS. Resolution arrangements for consultation
7.13 To help achieve these good consumer outcomes, in this consultation we propose
to require firms to make arrangements in respect of new plans that they enter into to ensure that, in the event of their failure, there is a reasonable likelihood that the relevant funeral plan contracts will continue to be carried out by another firm which has the appropriate permission. Firms must also have arrangements to ensure that, in the event that funeral plan contracts will not continue to be carried out, consumers receive a prompt reimbursement. The contracts the firm has with trustees or insurers must make appropriate provision for and not frustrate these outcomes. Firms should also consider whether arrangements in respect of existing plans would meet these requirements, and what changes it could make to bring them into line.
7.14 Firms may also consider entering into arrangements with another firm that has the
appropriate permissions and can take over its obligations. However, we do not require this, and contractual and other arrangements should not limit a transfer only to a

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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation particular firm. Insolvency practitioners can work with trustees or insurers to meet the firm’s obligations up until the point of transfer. New funeral plan contracts must also provide consumers with the right to a prompt reimbursement in the event of failure where neither the firm nor another provider will continue to carry out the plans. This mandatory contract term will ensure that each consumer will have a claim in insolvency proceedings that the insolvency practitioner appointed to the firm would have to take into account under general insolvency law. As part of entering into any new contracts with consumers, firms must obtain pre-consent from consumers for the potential future transfer of their plan on the same terms, and trustees or insurers should not unreasonably withhold consent to transfer to another provider. To facilitate transfers and reimbursements, we also propose that firms maintain a central record containing pertinent information and documents relating to each new funeral plan contract under which it has any undischarged obligations. This would identify the contracts that could be transferred, the payment obligations of the firm, the details of the customer, covered individual (if different) and nominated representative, and the amount paid by consumers that has been applied towards an insurance contract or paid into a trust. Trust assets and monies payable under an insurance policy should be safeguarded such that they cannot be claimed by general creditors in the event of insolvency. If a plan provider fails, claims by insolvency practitioners should only be for delivery of consumers’ funerals or repaying consumers. Please refer to the discussion in
Chapter 4 for more detail on how our product structure proposals help to achieve
these objectives.
If a plan provider fails where trust arrangements are being used, our proposals allow an insolvency practitioner to claim against the assets of the trust, in priority to other claims against those assets, to meet the costs properly attributable to causing the firm to continue providing or arranging funerals under existing funeral plan contracts, or effecting a transfer of those contracts to a new provider. For both new contracts and those entered into prior to FCA authorisation we propose that firms have a resolution manual in place to assist in resolving their business should they fail. We propose to require firms to disclose, at the point of sale, information to the consumer and their nominated representative on the arrangements in place and risks associated with their insolvency, as well as availability of access to the FSCS. Funeral plan providers will also need to notify the FCA in respect of events that relate to insolvency. Q28: Do you agree with our proposed resolution rules? Reimbursement – request for views ahead of future consultation We would expect consumers to be able to receive a prompt reimbursement if, in the event of failure, the firm is not attempting to transfer its obligations for carrying out the contract to another provider with appropriate permissions or is not able to continue to meet these obligations itself. Our reimbursement proposals aim not to 7.22

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority interfere with attempts by firms to transfer their obligations, which can provide a good outcome for consumers if they receive a similar funeral to that originally agreed.
7.23 As noted above we have not put forward rules for consultation on the reimbursement
amount or funding in this consultation document, but will issue a further consultation to set out our proposals for this later in the year. However, we discuss some of our initial considerations below, and welcome any evidence that can be provided to inform our proposals in this area.
7.24 In determining an appropriate reimbursement amount, currently referred to in the
legal instrument as the ‘funeral plan customer balance’, we have a number of desired outcomes in mind. First, we consider that consumers should, ideally, be put in a position to be able to purchase a replacement plan of a similar specification on a retail basis. Second, we are keen to minimise potential calls on and costs to FSCS levy payers. Third, while we consider that the reimbursement costs should be met as far as possible by firms, so that costs are not externalised to consumers or the FSCS, we are also mindful of the potential commercial implications, including prudentially. This includes how firms put themselves in a position to be able to cover such costs in the event that they arise, and what can be considered an adequate trust or insurance arrangement. Finally, we consider that the ability for consumers to receive a reasonable reimbursement should not be affected by whether their funeral plan contract is backed by monies held in a trust or by a whole of life insurance contract.
7.25 These outcomes, and their trade-offs, lead us to two main options. The first option
is for firms to reimburse consumers such that they are able (or close to being able) to purchase a replacement plan. This would provide benefits, but would impose costs on firms. An alternative, second option, would be for consumers to receive a lesser reimbursement from firms. We consider that this should, in general, at least be the amount that they have paid that has been applied towards a contract of insurance or paid into a trust. This option would have less of a commercial impact for firms, but clearly carries trade-offs in terms of consumer protection. Clearly, there are also other options that fall between reimbursing on a replacement plan basis (option 1) and an amount linked to monies paid in by the consumer (option 2).
7.26 For trust-backed plans, in current arrangements we have observed differences in the
reimbursement amounts that funeral plan providers make available to consumers. Our initial analysis has led us to consider that an appropriate reimbursement should at least include sums paid by the consumer under the funeral plan contract that have been paid into a trust, plus a pro-rated share of the remainder of the trust assets should there be any. In other words, consumers should receive a share of the investment returns made, protecting them to some degree from inflation in the cost of funerals if they then need to buy a replacement plan from another provider. We welcome evidence of the costs and benefits of reimbursing on this basis versus current practice.
7.27 We are also aware that such reimbursement may not fully cover the expected cost to
consumers of replacing their plans on a retail basis. We would therefore welcome any evidence on the potential extent of this gap, and the capacity, cost and commercial implications for firms to cover this.
7.28 Options for reimbursement with insurance-backed plans also vary. For example, some
firms indicate that they are able to make payments on the back of policy cancellation/ surrender, while others indicate that they could pay a lump sum to the consumer’s

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7.29
7.30
7.31 estate on death. The type of insurance-product can affect the availability and amount of
reimbursement, including provisions and fees relating to policy cancellation/surrender. We consider that for insurance-backed plans, consumers should, in general, receive at least what they paid in, to help to support the costs associated with finding alternative arrangements. However, we would also like to explore the costs, benefits and commercial feasibility of reimbursing consumers such that they can purchase a replacement plan of a similar specification on a retail basis. We welcome any evidence that can be provided on this. Separately, we consider that consumers should not be exposed to excessive surrender charges. We also see merit to payments being made promptly once it is clear that neither the firm nor another provider will continue to carry out the plans. This will enable consumers, rather than their estate, to arrange alternative funeral service cover. We welcome thoughts on the outcomes and options outlined above. In particular, we welcome responses and evidence on the amount of reimbursement, and capacity and options for firms regarding funding this eg from the trust or insurance policy (eg amount payable on cancellation/surrender); from firm’s own resources; from separate insurance, or from a combination of funding sources. It should be noted that any reimbursement proposals are likely to only apply to contracts entered into after authorisation, although firms should consider what changes they could make to bring arrangements for pre-existing contracts more into line with any requirements made subsequently. We will consult in a subsequent consultation paper on any additional rules that we propose in this area, as well as associated costs and benefits. This includes any consequential changes that might be needed to the existing proposals, such as the structure and prudential rules set out in chapter 4. Q29: Do you have any views on reimbursement and what amount should be considered adequate noting option 1 (to reimburse an amount equal to the retail cost of an equivalent replacement plan), option 2 (an amount linked to monies paid by the consumer), and other options that sit between these eg sums paid by the consumer that have been paid into a trust plus a pro-rated share of the remainder of the trust assets? Q30: Do you have any views on how these reimbursement options could be funded? In particular, how could funeral plan arrangements be structured in such a way as to ensure that the funeral plan provider’s obligations could be met at all times? Q31: Do you have any views and evidence on the costs and benefits of these options, including relating to consumer protection and commercial impact on firms? We also welcome any evidence on the likely differential between the amounts relating to options 1 and 2, and between these amounts and the amount available from trust and insurance arrangements.

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Access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) – proposals for consultation
7.32 In this section, we set out proposals for protection for funeral plans business under the
FSCS.
7.33 FSCSistheUK’sstatutorycompensationschemeoflastresort.Inthefinancialyear
2019/20, FSCS paid out £527 million to over 258,000 consumers of failed financial services firms. FSCS’s protection covers deposits, insurance provision and distribution, investment business, home finance advice and debt management and it plays a critical role in protecting consumers and ensuring they can have confidence in the financial services market. Firms from across the financial services industry pay levies to fund both the FSCS’s operating costs and the compensation it pays out.
7.34 UndertheFinancialServicesandMarketsAct2000(FinancialServicesCompensation
Scheme) Order 2013, the FCA and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) are each responsible for making rules in relation to the FSCS. In particular, the FCA and the PRA have responsibility for making rules concerning compensation made by the FSCS and the levies which fund the FSCS. The PRA is responsible for rules relating to claims in connection with deposits, insurance provision and dormant accounts; the FCA is responsible for claims in connection with all other relevant types of financial services activities that are protected under the FSCS. The scope of FCA’s responsibilities includes setting the framework in relation to potential FSCS protection in relation to funeral plans business. Should funeral plan activities be covered by the FSCS?
7.35 Considering the potential harms that exist in the market (as set out in Chapter 2), we
consider it is appropriate that FSCS protection for funeral plans is introduced upon commencement of FCA’s regulation of the sector. In particular, there is the risk that a customer of a funeral plan provider or distributor – who may be elderly or vulnerable – could suffer financial harm if the firm they dealt with went out of business and owed the consumer money.
7.36 Examples of harms which could occur relevant to FSCS protection include:

• Uponthefailureofafuneralplanprovider,thereareinsufficientfunds(inwholeorin
  part) or arrangements in place to satisfy the provider’s obligations under the funeral
  plan contract. This could include obligations arising at the time of a consumer’s death resulting in the funeral having to be funded at the time of need by the deceased’s relatives or estate, rather than by the funeral plan as expected.
• Following the failure of a funeral plan distributor which is not able to meet claims against it,
  consumerssufferfinanciallossduetothenegligentadviceoractionsofthefirm.
  7.37 To address these potential harms, we consider that FSCS should be able to consider claims for
  compensation in relation to funeral plan business conducted from the point that our regulation of the funeral plan sector commences. We propose that protection will apply where the firm is declared “in default”1 by FSCS and where the act or omission giving rise to the claim for which compensation is to be paid occurs following the commencement of regulation. FSCS would therefore, for example, not pay compensation in relation to claims that arose before the date of regulation but could however consider claims against a failed provider in relation to funeral plans which commenced pre-regulation, as long as the liability arises after that date. 1 The status of being in default following a determination made under COMP 6.3.1 R.

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7.38 We consider FSCS protection for funeral plans is necessary and that – considering the
harms identified – not having protection is not a viable option. Q32: Do you agree with the proposal to introduce FSCS protection for certain funeral plan activities in relation to firms that are declared “in default” by FSCS, and for acts or omission arising, from the date FCA takes on regulation of the funeral plan activity? Proposed scope of FSCS cover for funeral plan activities
7.39 FSCS pays compensation where all the qualifying conditions are satisfied. These include
that the claimant is an eligible claimant (i.e. a person who is eligible to bring a claim for compensation) and that the claim is a protected type of claim (i.e. covered by the FSCS).
7.40 We propose to introduce FSCS protection for certain claims for funeral plan activity by
adding a new category of protected claim into our Compensation Sourcebook (COMP) for funeral plan activity. This would cover claims relating to the following regulated activities carried on in relation to a funeral plan contract:
a. dealing in investments as agent (article 21 RAO); b. arranging (bringing about) deals in investments (article 25(1) RAO);
c. making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments (article 25(2) RAO);
d. managing investments (article 37 RAO); e. safeguarding and administering investments (article 40 RAO); f. sending dematerialised instructions (article 45(1) RAO); g. causing dematerialised instructions to be sent (article 45(2) RAO); h. advising on investments (article 53(1) RAO);
i. entering as provider into a funeral plan contract (article 59(1) RAO);
j. carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider (article 59(1A) RAO); and k. agreeing to carry on a regulated activity in a) to j) (article 64 RAO).
7.41 We only propose to provide protection for consumers of funeral plan contracts sold by
providersanddistributorswhichoperatefromaUKestablishment.
Q33: Do you agree with the scope of proposed FSCS coverage?
How should loss be quantified and what compensation limit will apply?
7.42 UndertherulessetoutinCOMPinconnectionwithcertainexistingcategoriesofclaim
(such as protected investment business), FSCS is required to pay compensation to the extent that the FSCS considers that the payment of compensation is essential in order to provide the claimant with fair compensation. FSCS has discretion on how to quantify the compensation due for individual claims, which it will quantify under its own quantification policies. We propose to introduce similar rules for funeral plan claims.
7.43 We also propose to allow FSCS to pay compensation direct to a third-party in certain
circumstances, if considered appropriate by FSCS (as is permitted under the COMP rules for certain other categories of claim). For example, where the consumer dies around the time of the failure of their plan provider, FSCS may make payment to a funeral director to cover the cost of a funeral in certain circumstances, rather than pay cash compensation to the claimant’s estate.

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7.44 It is proposed that the compensation limit for funeral plan claims should be £85,000. This
aligns with the current compensation limits applicable to deposit, home finance, debt management and certain investment claims. This helps to maintain consistency across compensation limits for different types of FSCS claim, making it easier for consumers to understand the level of FSCS protection that they may be entitled to. However, as the average cost of a funeral plan is typically between £2,500 to £5,0002 , we consider that it is very unlikely that funeral plan claims will exceed this limit in any event.
7.45 As explained at paragraph 7.31, we are seeking further views on options for firms
repaying consumers in the event of firm failure. Once our proposals have been finalised in relation to reimbursements there may be implications for FSCS’s rules relating to the quantification of loss. In so far as further rule changes are required these will be subject to a further consultation. Q34: Do you agree with the proposed approach to FSCS quantification, the payment of compensation and the compensation limit? How should FSCS coverage of funeral plans be funded?
7.46 FSCS costs (including compensation costs and management expenses) are
apportioned to different funding classes so that, as far as possible, firms are paying for the cost of the failure of firms carrying out similar business. A firm’s compensation costs levy or management expenses levy3 for a funding class is calculated with reference to the size of its annual eligible income (i.e. the firm’s income for the previous financial year in relation to a firm, class and category under the FEES rules) and the amount of FSCS compensation that its individual funding class will have to pay.
7.47 FSCS funding arrangements are currently split into three PRA classes and six FCA
classes, each with a levy limit, representing the maximum aggregate amount of compensation costs and specific costs that may be allocated to a particular class or category in one financial year:
PRA classes
Class Levy Limit

1. Deposits £1,500m
2. Life Insurance Provision £690m
3. General Insurance Provision £600m
   2 HM Treasury, Regulation of pre-paid funeral plans: consultation of a policy proposal, June 2019 3 The FSCS is funded by the collection of two levies from the financial services industry. The first is a management expenses levy. This encompasses ‘base costs’, such as fixed running costs, and ‘specific costs’, such as claims handling costs and other expenses related to paying claims. The second is a compensation costs levy which covers actual or expected compensation payments. Compensation costs and specific costs can vary significantly from year to year, depending on the number of firms that fail and the extent of any liabilities that they leave behind.

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FCA classes
Class Levy Limit

1. General Insurance Distribution £410m (including provider contribution of £100m) *
2. Life Distribution and Investment Intermediation £330m (including provider contribution of £90m) *
3. Investment Provision £200m
4. Home Finance Intermediation £55m (including provider contribution of £15m) *
5. Debt Management £20m
6. Deposit Acceptors £105m (only if the retail pool is triggered)
   *Since1 April2019,productprovidersarerequiredtocontributeapproximately25%oftheleviesfallingto the FCA intermediation classes.
   7.48 Firms undertaking the activity of “entering as provider into a funeral plan contract”
   are currently required to contribute to the FCA funding class relating to contributions from the Life Insurance Provision class to the Investment Intermediation Claims class. However, as there are currently no firms with permission to enter into a funeral plan as provider, no levies have been imposed under this provision to date. We now propose to introduce a new combined funding class for funeral plan claims, which will cover both funeral plan provision and distribution activities. This class, which we propose will contribute to the management expenses levy (including base costs and specific costs) and the compensation costs levy (including contributions to the retail pool if required), will be funded by FCA regulated funeral plan providers and distributors based on the total amount of relevant business conducted. The annual income (tariff base) will be based on the firm’s net income in relation to funeral plan business, including commission and fees.
   7.49 We have proposed a new funeral plans funding class because, based on our current
   understanding of the sector, we do not consider that funeral plan business directly aligns with the activities covered under other existing funding classes. Although funeral plans may be backed by a trust or insurance policy, which may potentially be provided by an authorised firm, there does not otherwise appear to be a clear connection between the activities of funeral plan providers and distributors and the members of other funding classes to justify allocating funeral plans to any of those funding classes.
   7.50 The rationale for having a combined funeral plans funding class made up of both
   funeral plan providers and distributors is that contributing firms will be involved in vertically aligned business in connection with funeral plans, recognising that funeral plan providers and distributors benefit from each other’s business and have a mutual interest in ensuring appropriate protection is in place. Combining the two types of firm into one class also aids the sustainability of the class allowing the costs to be shared by a larger pool of firms.
   7.51 We also aim to ensure that the class is affordable and sustainable, so that we have
   comfort that the costs can be borne by the levy payers which will meet the costs falling to the class. In the case of funeral plan firms, as there is no history of failures or compensation liabilities arising, we are not able to quantify or speculate as to what liabilities are likely to fall to the class in the future. Furthermore, we currently have limited information about which firms will ultimately become authorised, or the finances of those firms, from which to conduct a full analysis of what level of costs will be affordable.

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7.52 Accordingly, we propose that the initial threshold for the new funeral plan funding class
will be £5 million. This would represent the maximum amount of FSCS compensation and specific costs the firms contributing to the new funeral plan class (i.e. funeral plan firms) are required to cover before the retail pool is required to contribute (in the event that the levy limit for a funding class is reached, costs above the limit will be shared across other funding classes which contribute to the ‘retail pool’). This is set at a relatively modest level (in contrast, the limit for Debt Management is £20 million and Home Finance intermediation is £55 million) and reflects the uncertainty as to what costs could fall to the class and the firms’ ability to meet those costs. In the absence of comprehensive data to enable us to model the ability of firms to meet these costs, our expectation is that funeral plan firms should be able to meet the costs up to the class threshold.
7.53 Given the uncertainty, it is proposed that, at least one year after regulation
commences, a review is carried out to consider whether the funding class limit for this funding class should be revised, in light of the better information that would then be available in relation to the potential liabilities which could arise and the ability of firms which fund the class to meet costs.
7.54 Our Cost Benefit Analysis at Annex 1 includes further information about the costs and
benefits of introducing FSCS protection for funeral plans. This includes, at paragraph 201 of the Cost Benefit Analysis, an illustration of the potential compensation costs which could fall to funeral plan firms based on the initial funding class limit of £5 million. Q35: Do you agree with the proposal to introduce a new funeral plan activity FSCS funding class as set out above? If not, please set out an alternative funding approach with justification. Q36: Do you agree that an initial class limit of £5 million for the new funeral plan activity FSCS funding class would be appropriate, on the basis that this limit will be reviewed at least one year after regulation commences? Ongoing consideration by Government in relation to FSCS and funeral plans
7.55 The Government is considering whether further legislative changes are required to
ensure that the compensation scheme would operate effectively for consumers if it were extended to include funeral plans. Any changes would likely relate to the FCA’s rule-making powers and the duties of insolvency practitioners, and would seek to enhance the FSCS’s ability to effectively compensate consumers and seek recoveries in certain scenarios. The FCA would need to consult separately on further rules in light of any future legislative changes that may be introduced.

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Draft rules in relation to FSCS for consultation
7.56 We have drafted the amendments we need to make to COMP and FEES to give
effect to the proposals in relation to FSCS. The draft amendments proposed are in
Appendix 1.
Q37: Do you have any other comments on the proposals in relation to FSCS?

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Chapter 8
8.1
8.2
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation 8 The Senior Managers & Certification Regime The rules we have explored in this CP so far largely focused on the firms. In this
chapter, we set out requirements that are designed to encourage greater individual
accountability and set a new standard of personal conduct. The chapter describes the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR), and sets out our proposals for applying it to funeral plan firms. It describes the SM&CR for firms that only do funeral plan business. Firms that provide other financial services and are already authorised, should be familiar with the SM&CR rules. We present below a summary of the SM&CR rules. The requirements of this regime span multiple sourcebooks, and SYSC 23.3.3 provides a list of the rules that apply and where they can be found in the Handbook. Firms should consult these rules and relevant guides, for example, our guide for FCA solo-regulated firms. What is the Senior Managers & Certification Regime?
8.3 The SM&CR is a set of rules and guidance that sets standards relating to
professionalism, conduct and governance and holding senior members of a firm to account. The aim of SM&CR is to reduce harm to consumers and strengthen market integrity by making individuals more accountable for their conduct and competence. These rules also mean that, if an individual or a firm have broken our rules, it is easier for the firm and for the FCA to hold them to account.
8.4 In general, the SM&CR rules aim to ensure:

• people take responsibility for their actions
• there is good conduct at all levels
• it’s easy to understand who does what
  8.5 There are three key parts to the SM&CR:
• the Senior Managers Regime – rules that relate to individuals in certain senior
  roles,toensurethattheyarefitandpropertoperformtheseroles,andthatcertain prescribed responsibilities are allocated to these senior managers
• theCertificationRegime–rulesthatrequirefirmstoensurethatindividualswho
  performcertainfunctionswithinthefirm(andarenot‘SeniorManagers’),arefitand proper to do their jobs
• the Conduct Rules – these are high-level standards of behaviour that apply to
  almostallemployeeswhodoregulatedactivitieswithinfinancialservicesfirms Each of these parts are explained in more detail below.
  8.6 The SM&CR applies to almost every firm the FCA regulates, but there are differences
  in the requirements for firms, depending on the size and complexity of the firm and

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority the potential harm to consumers arising from its business. Firms can be classified as Limited Scope, Core or Enhanced.
8.7 In most cases, the Certification Regime and the Conduct Rules apply in the same way
to all types of firms4
. For the Senior Managers Regime for solo-regulated firms there is a distinction in the rules that apply depending on whether a firm is classified as Limited Scope, Core or Enhanced. There are additional requirements for a small number (fewer than 1%) of solo-regulated firms whose size, complexity and potential impact on consumers warrant more attention – these additions are called the ‘enhanced regime’. Some firms, that we consider pose smaller risks of harm, are classed as Limited Scope and have fewer SMR requirements. The firms falling into these categories are defined in our rules. What are our key proposals?
8.8 We are proposing to treat funeral plan firms (that have no other regulatory
permissions) as Core SM&CR firms, except for intermediaries whose primary business is not funeral plan intermediation and who only have permission to carry on funeral plan mediation activity, which we propose would be Limited Scope. We propose that sole traders, would be Limited Scope SM&CR firms as well, as per the existing exemption in the SM&CR rules.
8.9 The following elements would apply to all funeral plan firms, both Core and Limited
Scope firms:

• the Senior Managers Regime – these rules relate to individuals in certain senior
  roles (‘Senior Managers’). The main elements are:
  – firms need to identify ‘Senior Management Functions’. These are roles, held by themostseniorpeopleinafirm,thathavethegreatestpotentialtocauseharm or impact upon market integrity, and assign them to Senior Managers – Senior Managers must be approved by us before carrying out their role – firmsmustassesswhethertheSeniorManagersarefitandproperbefore approval, and on an ongoing basis – all Senior Managers need to have a Statement of Responsibilities – thefirmneedstoallocatePrescribedResponsibilities(explainedbelow)toits most appropriate Senior Managers
• Certification Regime – these rules apply to individuals whose job meets the
  definitionofbeinga‘CertificationFunction’.Underthecertificationregime:
  – firmswouldneedtomakesurethatthoseperformingCertifiedFunctionsarefit and proper to do their job – these individuals would not need our approval (unlike Senior Managers) – individualsperformingCertificationFunctionswillappearontheFCARegister
• Conduct Rules – these high-level standards of behaviour (‘Conduct Rules’) would
  applytoalmostallemployeeswhodoregulatedorfinancialactivitiesinafuneral planfirm.AdditionalConductRulesapplytoSeniorManagers 4 There are some exceptions to this, for e.g. for benchmark administrators, but for most firms these will apply in the same way.

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8.10 Limited Scope SM&CR firms would be subject to the same elements of the regime as
Core firms, but would need to identify fewer Senior Management Functions.
8.11 If a funeral plan firm is already performing other regulated activities and has been
authorised by the FCA for these, its classification as a Core or Enhanced firm would not change (unless a Core firm subsequently meets the threshold of being an “Enhanced” firm). If a funeral plan firm is already authorised and regulated by the FCA and is classed as Limited Scope, it would now be classed as a Core Firm.
8.12 As with our regime for other firms, we propose to allow funeral plan firms to opt-up into
the Enhanced tier of the SM&CR.
Senior Managers Regime
Senior Management Functions
8.13 Some senior roles are classed as ‘Senior Management Functions’ (SMFs). These
are roles, held by the most senior people in a firm, that have the greatest potential to cause harm or impact upon market integrity. The SMFs are listed and defined in
Chapter 10C of the Supervision Manual.
8.14 We require firms to identify which individuals within the firm are undertaking specific
SMFs, and ensure that the FCA knows who a firm’s most senior decision makers are and that they are fit and proper to do their role. Approval of individuals performing Senior Management Functions
8.15 People performing SMFs need to be approved by the FCA before starting their role.
8.16 Funeral plan firms becoming regulated would therefore need to identify who their
Senior Managers are and have them approved by the FCA. As part of the firm’s application, applications (a Form A and a Statement of Responsibilities (“SOR”)) for all those individuals that will hold a SMF will need to be submitted at the same time. These forms request information about each individual, and firms will need to demonstrate the individual’s fitness and propriety (including undertaking a criminal records check) and competence to perform the role.
8.17 Once approved, firms need to assess all their Senior Managers at least once a year, to
make sure they remain ‘fit and proper’ to do their jobs. We describe our rules around fitness and propriety below.
8.18 If a firm subsequently wants to appoint new Senior Managers, they cannot start their
jobs until approved by the FCA.
Roles classed as Senior Management Functions for Core firms
8.19 We propose that SMFs in funeral plan firms are consistent with those in other Core
SM&CR firms in different markets. This means that the following roles are classed as SMFs:

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8.20
8.21
8.22
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26

• SMF 1 – Chief Executive Function
  This is the person(s) with responsibility, under the immediate authority of the governing body, for the conduct of the whole of the business (or relevant activities).
• SMF3 – Executive Director
  Adirectorofafirm,otherthanaNon‑ExecutiveDirector.
• SMF27 – Partner
  Apartnerinafirm,otherthanalimitedpartnerinapartnershipregisteredunderthe Limited Partnership Act 1907.
• SMF9 – Chair
  The person with responsibility for chairing, and overseeing the performance of the roleof,thegoverningbodyofthefirm. The roles detailed above are known as ‘governing functions’. But the SM&CR does not require firms to change their governance structure or hire new people to fill these roles. Core funeral plan firms are required to have a compliance Oversight function in SYSC 6 of our Handbook. We propose that they are required to have the following corresponding SMF:
• SMF16 – Compliance Oversight
  Thisisthepersonresponsibleforthecompliancefunctioninthefirmandreporting to the governing body on this. Funeral plan firms are not required to have a Money Laundering Reporting Officer, and SMF17 – Money Laundering Reporting Officer – will not apply to them. It is possible for one individual to hold more than one SMF. Any person in the firm who performs one or more of these roles, would need to be approved by the FCA, and be assessed by the firm on an on-going basis (see paragraph 8.17 above). Roles classed as Senior Management Functions for Limited Scope firms We propose that Limited Scope funeral plan firms would be required to allocate the SMF29 – Limited Scope Function to a Senior Manager. This is similar to how this function applies to Limited Scope firms in other markets. We propose that Limited Scope funeral plan firms will not be required to have the SMF16 – Compliance Oversight function. As is the case for Core firms, they will also not be required to have an MLRO or SMF17. Statement of Responsibilities Every Senior Manager in a firm will need to have a ‘Statement of Responsibilities’. The Statement of Responsibilities is a single document that clearly sets out the Senior Manager’s role and what they are responsible for. It’s an important document for the firm, the individual and the FCA, as it helps everyone understand who is accountable for what, at the most senior level.

8.27
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Chapter 8
8.28
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Funeral plan firms will need to submit a Senior Manager’s Statement of Responsibilities to us when applying for a Senior Manager to be approved. After we have approved a Senior Manager, the firm will need to:

• update and resubmit the ‘Statement of Responsibilities’ whenever there is a
  significantchangetoaseniormanager’sresponsibilities,and
• assess,atleastonceayear,thatalltheirseniormanagersare‘fitandproper’to
  carry out their jobs
  Forms
  Firms will need to use different forms in relation to the SM&CR. Forms are needed, for example, to have senior managers approved to perform a specified SMF, to make notification to us of changes (such as changes in personal information), and notify us of significant changes in responsibilities of a Senior Manager.
  Annex 3 of the Senior Managers and Certification Regime: Guide for FCA
  solo-regulated firms, provides a list of the relevant regulatory forms. Firms should use our Connect system to complete and submit the relevant forms. Duty of responsibility and Prescribed Responsibilities Senior Managers have a ‘duty of responsibility’. This means that if a firm breaks one of our rules, we can hold the responsible senior manager accountable if they did not take ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent or stop the breach. Our approach to Enforcement is detailed in Chapter 11. The burden of proof lies with us to show that the senior manager did not take steps to avoid the breach. The FCA has defined a list of responsibilities that must be allocated to appropriate Senior Managers. We call these Prescribed Responsibilities. We prescribe these responsibilities to make sure a Senior Manager is accountable for key conduct and prudential risks and potential harms. In addition to these, firms would still identify other responsibilities Senior Managers hold and set these out clearly on their Statement of Responsibilities. In most cases, a Prescribed Responsibility should be allocated to a single individual, but they can be divided or shared in limited circumstances, for example, in a job share (see SYSC 24.3). Core firms must decide which Senior Managers should be responsible for the following Prescribed Responsibilities. These are explained in more detail in SYSC 24 of our Handbook. Limited Scope funeral plan providers do not need to allocate any Prescribed Responsibilities. Handbook PR Ref. (a) Description PerformancebythefirmofitsobligationsundertheSMR,includingimplementationand oversight (b) PerformancebythefirmofitsobligationsundertheCertificationRegime (b-1) Performancebythefirmofitsobligationsinrespectofnotificationsandtrainingofthe Conduct Rules (d) Responsibilityforthefirm’spoliciesandproceduresforcounteringtheriskthatthefirm mightbeusedtofurtherfinancialcrime

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8.34 There are also specific Conduct Rules that apply to Senior Managers. We explain these
below.
Overseas Senior Managers
8.35 There is no territorial limitation on the Senior Managers Regime. This means that it will
applytoanyonewhoperformsaSeniorManagerrole,whethertheyarebasedintheUK or overseas. Certification Regime
8.36 We consider that some risks of harm in funeral plan firms are similar to those of
firms in other markets we regulate, and that these can be mitigated by applying the Certification Regime. We propose to apply the Certification Regime to funeral plan firms, as it applies to all other regulated firms. What is the Certification Regime?
8.37 The ‘Certification Regime’ applies to people who perform certain roles, known as
‘Certification Functions’. These are not SMFs (but in certain circumstances, individuals who perform ‘Certification Functions’ can also be Senior Managers. E.g. in smaller firms where someone is both a Senior Manager and a Certification employee). They are people who are involved in aspects of a firm’s business that involve, or might involve, a risk of significant harm to the firm or its consumers. These roles are detailed in SYSC 27.8.
8.38 The Certification Regime is a set of rules that require firms to make sure that these
key people are fit and proper to do their jobs. It also means that Senior Managers must have appropriate systems of management and governance to oversee them. An appropriate Senior Manager at the firm should be allocated a Prescribed Responsibility for ensuring that the firm has checked and ensured that only people who are fit and proper to do a certain role have been certified as such.
8.39 We set out the Certification Functions in SYSC 27.7.3 in our Handbook. Firms would
need to read SYSC 27.7 in our Handbook and decide whether any individuals in their firm should be classed as Certified Staff, because their job match the description of one or more of the functions.
8.40 The relevant Certification Functions include:

• theSignificantManagementFunction
• anyonewhosupervisesormanagesaCertificationFunction(directlyorindirectly),
  but who is not a Senior Manager
  8.41 An individual working at a firm can perform more than one Certification Function.
  In such cases, the firm would need to ensure that the individual is fit and proper to perform each of the functions. It is also possible to hold both an SMF and Certification Functions where both rules apply.

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8.42 The same list of Certification Functions applies to all firms in scope of SM&CR.
However, the functions only apply where the firm has people in these roles. This means that it is possible that in very small firms, there would be no Certified Staff. For example, if a sole trader has no employees, then the Certification Regime won’t apply to them. Certifying that people performing Certification Functions are fit and proper
8.43 Funeral plan firms would need to make sure that anyone doing a Certification Function
has been certified.
8.44 Certifying someone means assessing whether the person is fit and proper to do a
particular role. Firms need to do this assessment either at the point of recruitment or before a person performs a Certification Function if they are already employed.
8.45 If the firm considers the person to be fit and proper for the role, it would need to issue
them with a certificate. The firm would need to re-assess whether the person is fit and proper to perform the role at least once a year, and if the person is continuing to perform the function must renew the certificate.
8.46 As described above, it is possible for a person to hold more than one SMF, and it is also
possible for an individual to hold both an SMF and Certification Function where both rules apply.
8.47 The certificate needs to state:

• thatthefirmissatisfiedthatthepersonisafitandproperpersontoperformthe
  functionthecertificatesetsout,and
• whataspectofthefirm’saffairsthepersonwillbeinvolvedinaspartofperforming
  their function
  8.48 We describe the ‘fit and proper’ assessment in more detail later in this chapter.
  8.49 If a firm does a ‘fit and proper’ assessment on an employee, and then decides not to
  issue a certificate, the employee must cease to perform the Certification Function. The firm must notify the person, in writing, of:
• thedecisionnottoreissuethecertificate
• whatsteps(ifany)thefirmproposestotakeaboutthepersonasaresultofthe
  decision, and
• the reasons for proposing these steps
  Territorial limitation of the Certification Regime
  8.50 ForUKfirms,theCertificationRegimeislimitedtopeopleperformingaCertification
  FunctionwhoareeitherbasedintheUKor,ifbasedoutsidetheUK,aredealingwith (i.e.havecontactwith)UKconsumers.Wecallthisthe‘territoriallimitation’.Thismeans thatifapersonbasedoverseasdoesnotdealwithUKconsumers,butwouldotherwise have been carrying out one of the functions listed in our rules, the Certification Regime may not apply to them. There are exceptions to this, for example where a firm has other permissions, including those relating to making investments.

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Fit and proper requirements
8.51 A key feature of the SM&CR is to ensure that firms take responsibility for their
staff being ‘fit and proper’ to do their jobs. We propose applying the fit and proper requirements to funeral plan firms. These apply to all other regulated firms subject to the SM&CR.
8.52 Firms would need to ensure that anyone performing a SMF or a ‘Certification Function’
is fit and proper to do so. Firms would also need to assess people in these roles on an ongoing basis, and at least once a year.
8.53 When making these ‘fit and proper’ assessments, firms must have regard to any
general rules that we have about the qualifications, training, competence and personal characteristics required of an individual for that role.
8.54 Guidance in our Handbook5
sets out the factors that firms should look at when assessing people as fit and proper. This includes factors like a person’s honesty, integrity and reputation; their competence and capability; and their financial soundness. Evidence requirements
8.55 As part of the fit and proper requirements under the SM&CR, we require firms to
collect certain evidence when assessing candidates for Senior Manager roles and Certification Functions. This evidence includes criminal record checks and references from previous employers. Criminal record checks for Senior Managers
8.56 As with other firms in the SM&CR, we propose requiring funeral plan firms to undertake
a criminal record check as part of each Senior Manager’s application for approval.
8.57 The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS)6
, and the equivalent agencies in Scotland and Northern Ireland, run these criminal record checks. Funeral plan firms would have to register with the DBS. Smaller funeral plan firms may need to use an umbrella organisation to carry out checks on their behalf.
8.58 We also propose that, where a candidate has spent a considerable amount of time
workingorlivingoutsidetheUK,funeralplanfirmsshouldconsiderundertakingan equivalent check with the appropriate overseas regulatory body where available.
8.59 We do not propose requiring firms to undertake criminal record checks for
Certification Functions, but funeral plan firms may choose to conduct these checks for other staff where they are legally allowed to do so – this is for the funeral plan firms to decide. 5 ‘FIT’ - The Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons and specified significant-harm functions 6 The DBS is a non-departmental public body of the Home Office

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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Regulatory references for Senior Managers and Certification Functions Firms are also required to request a reference from Senior Manager and Certification Function candidates’ past employers – known as ‘regulatory references’. These references would help firms to make better informed decisions about candidates. The proposed rules require firms to:

• request a reference from all previous employers in the past six years for people
  applyingforSeniorManagerandCertificationroles
• shareinformationbetweenfirmsinastandardtemplate
• disclose certain information going back six years, including details of any
  disciplinaryactiontakenduetobreachesoftheConductRulesandanyfindings thatthepersonwasnotfitandproper
• discloseanyotherinformationrelevanttoassessingwhetheracandidateisfit
  and proper, such as the number of complaints which have been upheld. This information must cover the previous six years – unless it relates to serious misconduct,whichhasnotimelimit–andfirmswouldneedtousetheirjudgement when considering what is relevant, on a case-by-case basis
• retainrecordsofalldisciplinaryandfitandproperfindingsgoingbacksixyears
• notenterintoarrangementsthatconflictwiththeirdisclosureobligations,suchas
  non-disclosure agreements
  Firms would also need to update their regulatory references where new, significant information comes to light. A firm’s compliance with the regulatory referencing requirements would also need to be consistent with its common law duties and other relevant legislation, such as those about the rehabilitation of offenders and spent convictions. Directory of Certified and Assessed Persons in the Financial Services Register The FCA publishes and maintains a directory of ‘certified and assessed persons’ on the Financial Services Register, so consumers and professionals can check the details of key individuals working in financial services. Firms must submit details about the following individuals to us:
• allCertifiedstaff
• directors who are not performing Senior Manager Functions (SMFs) – both
  executive and non-executive
• other individuals who are sole traders or Appointed Representatives (ARs), or
  employees of ARs, where they are undertaking business with clients and require a qualificationtodoso(seeTC App 1.1) We then publish the names (and any previous names) of those individuals, along with details of their roles and activities undertaken. For consumer-facing roles requiring a qualification, we also publish details of consumer engagement methods, workplace location (where relevant) and memberships of professional bodies.

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8.67 Once published, firms need to keep their information up to date, and confirm annually
that their data is accurate if they don’t otherwise make any changes to it. Conduct Rules
8.68 We propose to apply our conduct rules in COCON to funeral plan providers and
intermediaries. These are rules that relate to the conduct of certain persons working in funeral plans firms.
8.69 A key part of the SM&CR is the application of conduct rules to a broad range of staff. This
set of enforceable rules set basic standards of good personal conduct, against which we can hold people to account. They can be found in the COCON chapter of our Handbook. This is aimed at creating and maintaining high standards of individual behaviour in regulated firms, and individual accountability and awareness of conduct issues.
8.70 We propose to apply the Conduct Rules to funeral plan firms. These apply to all other
regulated firms subject to the SM&CR.
Key conduct rules
8.71 There are two tiers of Conduct Rules that apply to all firms. The first is a general set of
rules that applies to most employees and directors in a firm. The second tier consists of rules that only apply to Senior Managers. There is also one Senior Manager rule, SC4, that applies to all non-executive and executive directors as well as to Senior Managers.
8.72 The table below sets out the key conduct rules that would apply.
1.
First Tier – Individual Conduct Rules
You must act with integrity
2. You must act with due care, skill and diligence
3. You must be open and cooperative with the FCA, the PRA and other regulators
4. You must pay due regard to the interests of consumers and treat them fairly
5. You must observe proper standards of market conduct
SC1.
Second Tier – Senior Manager Conduct Rules
Youmusttakereasonablestepstoensurethatthebusinessofthefirmforwhichyouare responsibleiscontrolledeffectively SC2. Youmusttakereasonablestepstoensurethatthebusinessofthefirmforwhichyouare responsible complies with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system SC3. You must take reasonable steps to ensure that any delegation of your responsibilities is to an appropriate person and that you oversee the discharge of the delegated responsibility effectively SC4. You must disclose appropriately any information of which the FCA or PRA would reasonably expect notice

8.73
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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Firms would need to:

• train individuals who are subject to the Conduct Rules on how the rules apply to
  them
• notify us if:
  – an individual has breached a Conduct Rule; and – they have taken disciplinary action (i.e. a formal written warning, suspension, dismissal or reduction/recovery of their remuneration) as a result Who do the conduct rules apply to? As in other firms that are subject to the SM&CR, we propose to apply the Conduct Rules to:
• all Senior Managers
• allCertifiedPersons
• all directors, whether executive or non-executive, who are not Senior Managers
  (these individuals would be subject to the individual Conduct Rules and SC4 – the Senior Manager Conduct Rule to ‘disclose appropriately any information of which the FCA or PRA would reasonably expect notice’), and
• all other employees, except people who are listed in paragraph 8.76 below
  The Conduct Rules would apply to the majority of employees working in firms. This is important, as it ensures firms and the FCA can hold people accountable to ensure we are able to protect consumers and ensure market integrity. There are some roles however, that we consider it would not be proportionate to apply the Conduct Rules. These are:
• receptionists
• switchboard operators
• postroomstaff
• reprographics/printroomstaff
• property/facilities management
• events management
• security guards
• invoice processing
• audio-visual technicians
• vendingmachinestaff
• medicalstaff
• archive records management
• drivers
• CorporateSocialResponsibilitystaff
• data controllers and processors under the Data Protection Act
• cleaners
• cateringstaff
• personal assistants and secretaries
• Information Technology Support (ie helpdesk)
• Human Resources administrators/processors
  8.77 People in these roles may also deal with sensitive information and activities, but they are
  subject to other rules and laws governing their behaviour, such as laws relating to fraud or insider trading. Due to the nature of these roles, we consider those other rules sufficient.

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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Breaching conduct rules and reporting breaches We provide guidance and examples of when we would consider someone to have breached a Conduct Rule in COCON 4. When deciding whether to report misconduct, firms should also consider the nature of the behaviour and where the behaviour occurred. For example, if the misconduct relates to the firm’s regulated activities, or an activity carried out in connection with a regulated activity would most likely be considered a breach of the rules. In cases in which an incident clearly has nothing to do with the provision of a regulated activity (directly or indirectly) but happened in the workplace, it could still be considered a Conduct Rule breach, for example in the case of sexual harassment in the workplace. If the activity was unrelated to the regulated activity and happened outside of the workplace, it could be a fitness and propriety issue for certification or approval but might not be a Conduct Rule breach. For Senior Managers, we propose that firms notify us of Conduct Rule breaches within seven business days of the firm becoming aware of the matter. For other individuals, we propose the notification is made every year. A firm has wider reporting obligations about its Senior Managers. If a firm becomes aware of information which would reasonably be material to the assessment of the fitness and propriety of one of its Senior Managers, it must notify the FCA. When will the SM&CR rules apply?
8.83 The new SM&CR rules would apply to firms once they become authorised.
8.84 By the time of Commencement, firms would need to have:

• submitted Form A applications for all individuals who will perform a Senior
  Management Function at least 3 months prior to Commencement, to ensure their Senior Managers have received approval by the time the regime commences
• identifiedindividualswhowouldbesubjecttotheCertificationRegimeandConduct
  Rules and provided training
• havecertifiedallCertifiedPersonsasfitandproperandissuedthemacertificate
• submitted information about Directory Persons to the Register
• be ready to comply with all other regime requirements
  Q38: Do you agree with our proposal to apply the SM&CR to funeral plan providers? Q39: Do you agree with our proposals to treat funeral plan firms (that have no other regulatory permissions) as Core firms, except for intermediaries whose primary business is not funeral plan intermediation and who only have permission to carry on funeral plan mediation activity, which we propose would be Limited Scope?

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Q40: Do you agree with our proposed fit and proper requirements, including criminal record checks and regulatory references? Q41: Do you agree with our proposed approach to applying the Conduct Rules to funeral plan firms?

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9 The Appointed Representatives regime
Background and summary of our proposals
9.1 This chapter describes the Appointed Representative (AR) regime, and sets out our
proposals for applying it to funeral plan firms.
9.2 The Treasury is extending the use of Appointed Representatives to funeral plan firms
through amendments made to FSMA. We believe that some providers will choose to have appointed representatives, and that firms such as funeral directors may choose to become appointed representatives. We want to ensure that there is appropriate oversight of the ARs by the firms appointing them.
9.3 We are proposing to apply to funeral plan firms our existing general rules and guidance
in relation to ARs (but not the rules which specifically relate to the implementation of specificEU‑derivedregimes).
9.4 We are also proposing an additional requirement for funeral plan principal firms, to
notify us of significant changes in relation to their ARs.
9.5 We are not consulting on the AR rules generally, which are already in place and apply
to firms in other financial markets. We are only consulting on the proposal that these rules be applied to funeral plan firms and on the proposed extension to the regime in relation to notifications, as we set out below.
9.6 The rules in relation to ARs are set out in detail in SUP12 of our Handbook. The main
purpose of these rules is to place responsibility on a firm for seeking to ensure that:

1. itsARsarefitandpropertodealwithclientsinitsname;
2. clientsdealingwithitsARsareaffordedthesamelevelofprotectionasiftheyhad
   dealtwiththefirmitself.
   9.7 We also explain in this chapter how the Approved Persons Regime applies to ARs.
   9.8 We provide below a summary of these rules, to help firms navigate them. Firms should
   consult the relevant Handbook sections for further detail.
   What is the Appointed Representatives regime?
   9.9 An AR is an organisation or person that acts on behalf of a firm the FCA directly
   authorises. The AR is not authorised by the FCA directly, but if certain conditions are met it can carry out regulated activities, such as:

• ithasawrittencontractwiththeauthorisedfirm,and

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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation

• theauthorisedfirmtakesregulatoryresponsibilityfortheARanditsactionsand
  ensures that it complies with our rules. We explain what this means in practice below. The regime is established by section 39 of the FSMA and the Appointed Representatives Regulations 2001. The FCA’s rules, and guidance on FSMA requirements,aresetoutinSUP12(theAppointedRepresentativeschapterofour Handbook). The AR regime allows unauthorised persons to carry on certain regulated activities under the responsibility of a principal firm which has permission for those activities. For certain types of firm, becoming an appointed representative of a principal firm may represent an appropriate alternative to seeking authorisation. The AR regime aims to ensure that ARs are adequately overseen by the firms which appoint them. Any regulated activities which are carried on by the AR under an AR arrangement are the responsibility of the principal firm. The principal must therefore satisfy itself that any proposed AR is suitable to act for it. The FCA regulates firms and takes action against them where they fail to meet the expected standard. As we detail below we can also take action against principal firms for actions and omissions of their ARs. Applying the AR regime to the funeral plans market To ensure that adequate oversight arrangements of ARs exist in the funeral plan market, we are proposing to extend our rules and guidance in relation to ARs to funeral plan firms. We also want to ensure that we have clear information on those firms which wish to engage ARs in relation to funeral plan activity. This will allow us to ensure that we are able to properly oversee the arrangements that firms have in place to monitor and control the activities of their ARs as part of our Supervision work. To this end, are proposing to require funeral plan firms who want to appoint ARs to notify us of any significant changes they are planning in relation to ARs, before the appointment is made. We consider that this is particularly important in the funeral plans sector, since firms operating in this market will be regulated by the FCA for the first time, and there may be numerous firms who decide to become ARs. What can an Appointed Representative do?
  9.17 An AR can only carry on certain prescribed regulated activities and these must be
  activities which either fall within the principal’s scope of permission or which are excluded from being regulated activities when carried on by the principal. We’ve detailedthefulllistofactivitiesARscandoinSUP12.2.7G.
  9.18 For funeral plans it will not be possible for appointed representatives to engage in the
  regulated activities of entering into, or carrying out, contracts. ARs will, however, be able to a engage in funeral plan distribution activities.

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9.19 An AR can represent more than one principal, if it chooses to, except in relation to
certainactivitieslistedunderSUP12.5.6AR(Prohibitionofmultipleprincipalsfor certain activities and subject to the terms of its agreement with its principal). Appointing an AR Ensuring that the AR is fit and proper and that it complies with our rules
9.20 Firms that wish to appoint an AR need to ensure that the AR is fit and proper, and that
the AR is not already regulated by the FCA or is a Limited Permission Consumer Credit company (LPCC).
9.21 The authorised principal must ensure that it has the resources necessary to ensure the
AR complies with our rules in relation to the activities for which the firm has accepted responsibility. We explain the checks they should undertake (before appointing an AR and on an ongoing basis) below. Entering into a contract with the AR
9.22 To appoint an organisation or a person as an AR, the authorised firm must have
entered into a contract with them.
9.23 The Appointed Representatives Regulations set out what must be included in the
contract. This includes permitting or requiring the AR to carry out a certain regulated activity, complying with the requirement set out in the AR Regulations, and if the contract does not prohibit the representative from acting for persons other than his principal, it must contain provision allowing the principal to prohibit him from doing so, or to restrict the extent to which he can do so. The principal firm must accept responsibility, in writing, for the authorised activities of the person in carrying on the whole, or part, of the business specified in the contract. We provide guidance on this in SUP12.5.
9.24 If an AR chooses to represent more than one principal, it must have a separate AR
agreement with each authorised firm. There should also be in place a “multiple principal agreement” between all the authorised firms to ensure that the interests of clients are protected, including introducing the concept of a lead principal so it is clear whoaclientcancomplainto.WeexplainthisinSUP12.4.5(Multipleprincipals). Our supervision of AR arrangements
9.25 Our Review of principal firms in the investment management sector identified
concerns about the way in which AR arrangements were being employed, which was leading to harm to consumers. Recent years have seen the growth of principals in the sector describing themselves as ‘Regulatory Host’ firms. These are networks which allow small businesses, which would otherwise require authorisation, to operate as ARs under the regulatory umbrella of the principal without necessarily having any relationship with that principal in terms of selling its products or services.
9.26 Our Review found that some ARs operating under ‘regulatory hosts’ were conducting
activities outside their principal’s core areas of expertise. Some principals were overseeing a wide variety of business models operated by their ARs without putting

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority in place sufficient resources to do so, including enough appropriately skilled and experienced people. This often led to weaknesses in the principal firms’ ability to oversee the AR, including having appropriate control and risk management frameworks. This in turn led to poor conduct resulting in harms to consumers.
9.27 To avoid such a situation arising in the funeral plan market, we are proposing to require
principal firms to notify us if they are planning to diversify the scope of business of their ARs for which they accept responsibility either to include regulated funeral plan activity, or beyond such activity, for the first time.”. This notification will allow us to assess, if needed, whether the principal firm has the appropriate oversight arrangements in place, including adequate processes and controls to oversee their ARs. We provide more detail of this proposal below. What are the responsibilities of the principal firm? Principal firms are responsible for the AR’s acts and omissions
9.28 A principal firm accepts responsibility for the activities of its AR under the principal-AR
agreement. An act or omission of the AR, in carrying on the business the principal has accepted responsibility for, is treated as an act or omission of the principal firm itself. Regardless of any supplementary commercial arrangements with the AR, the principal firm has full responsibility (including for any liabilities that might arise) for ensuring that the AR complies with our rules: a breach by the AR is a breach by the principal firm. For example, if we find misconduct within an AR, we contact the principal firm during any regulatory intervention. Principal firms must effectively oversee and govern the ARs
9.29 Firms wishing to be principal firms and use AR arrangements would have to make sure
they are able to effectively oversee and control any ARs. This includes having in place appropriate governance arrangements, effective risk frameworks, internal controls and adequate resources.
9.30 A principal firm is referred to as a ‘network’ if it appoints five or more Appointed
Representatives (not counting introducer Appointed Representatives) or if it appoints fewer than five Appointed Representatives (again, not counting Introducer Appointed Representatives) which have, between them, 26 or more representatives. Networks will have to show that they have appropriate systems and controls to effectively monitor and govern their ARs. As the size and / or complexity of the network’s activity increases, the network needs to ensure its ability to identify and manage any risks and to adequately oversee and govern the AR.
9.31 When firms apply to us for authorisation, they need to detail such arrangements (or
intended arrangements). We will assess the arrangements of the firm applying to become a principal firm, and if we consider that it does not have the right resources to effectively supervise their ARs, we will not approve its application. As we explain below, we propose that principal firms must also notify us of any significant changes in relation to ARs, so that we can assess whether it has the proper arrangements in place.

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9.32 Principal firms are also responsible for submitting applications and notifications to
the FCA relating to Approved Persons. Details on this can be found in paragraph 9.63 onwards below. Recruiting an AR
9.33 Principal firms have to conduct checks on prospective ARs, to make sure that:

• theprincipalfirmwillcontinuetomeetourThresholdConditionsafterappointing
  theAR(seeChapter12).AppointinganARbringsrisktoaprincipalfirm;principal firmsshouldevaluatethatriskbeforeappointment
• the prospective AR is solvent
• theprospectiveARissuitabletoactforthefirm.Thereshouldbenocloselinksor
  conflictsofinterestthatcouldpreventitbeingeffectivelysupervised7
• theprospectiveARisfitandpropertoactonbehalfoftheprincipalfirm.Weprovide
  guidanceontheinformationprincipalfirmsshouldobtainandverifyinSUP12
  Annex 2. It includes investigating the AR’s professional reputation, such as whether
  the AR has ever been publicly censored by the FCA
• thecontrollers,directors,partners,proprietorsandmanagersoftheARarefitand
  properandofgoodfinancialstanding
• theyhaveidentifiedwhichindividualsattheARperformacontrolledfunction
  under the Approved Persons Regime and have applied for those individuals to be approved by the FCA (explained further below)
  9.34 Before appointing an AR, principal firms must also check that they have adequate:
• controls over the regulated activity they will be allowing the AR to undertake
  on their behalf. These include appropriate governance arrangements and risk management frameworks
• resources to monitor whether the AR is complying with our rules and, if it isn’t the
  ability to enforce compliance
  9.35 Principal firms are responsible for recording how they completed these checks and
  verified the information. They must also retain those records for future inspection. We may ask, for example, how a principal firm verified the financial information disclosed by the prospective AR or the competence of the staff in the AR.
  9.36 An important area to consider before taking on an AR is the relationships the AR has
  with other directly authorised firms. If an AR works for more than one authorised firm, a Multiple Principal Arrangement needs to be in place. The Multiple Principal Agreement must contain all the provisions which are necessary or desirable to set out the relationship between the principals of that AR, and to protect the interests of clients.FurtherdetailsonmultipleprincipalscanbefoundinSUP12.4.5BRonwards.
  9.37 If a principal firm proposes to appoint an AR, but not to prohibit its appointment by
  any other principal firms, the principal firm should check whether the AR is already appointed by one or more other principal firms. This includes checking the Financial Services Register. 7 We explain what we mean by ‘close links’ in COND 2.3

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Monitoring ARs
9.38 If at any time a principal firm has grounds to believe that the conditions in paragraphs
9.33 and 9.34 are not satisfied, or are likely not to be satisfied, the principal firm must:

• take immediate steps to rectify the matter; or
• terminate its contract with the AR, and notify the FCA of this.
  9.39 In addition to the controls and monitoring described above, we normally expect
  principal firms to check their AR’s financial position at least once a year. An appropriately experienced person (for example, a financial accountant) should carry out these checks, and consider factors such as whether the type of accounts obtained is appropriate to the type of AR; whether the accounts have been prepared on a timely basis; investigate fully any unusual items; and critically review the accounts to ensure that the AR is financially stable.
  9.40 Principal firms should be able to demonstrate that they have rigorous management
  information to allow close and continuous supervision and monitoring of ARs. Monitoring key performance indicators and discussing these at regular intervals with ARs helps spot trends and enables principals to take appropriate action. For example, information on sales and complaints can help principal firms determine if there are any conduct of business issues they need to address.
  9.41 Principal firms must be able to demonstrate that their checks on ARs include the
  suitability of the advice given to consumers and whether ARs are treating consumers fairly. Any remedial action that is required should be clearly documented with a clear audit trail for future reference. Principal firms must also check the suitability of the AR on an ongoing basis. Terminating a relationship with an AR
  9.42 If a contract with an AR is terminated, or if it is amended in a way which no longer meets
  the requirements contained or referred to in the contract between the principal firm andtheAR(seeSUP12.8.1RandSUP12.5),aprincipalfirmmusttakeallreasonable steps to ensure that:
• iftheterminationisbytheprincipalfirm,theARisnotifiedinwritingandinformed
  that it will no longer be able to conduct regulated activities through an arrangement with the principal
• consumersaretreatedfairly;anyobligationstoconsumersshouldbefulfilled
• where appropriate, clients are informed of any relevant changes
• alltheotherprincipalfirmsoftheARarenotified.

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Record keeping
9.43 Principal firms have to keep the following records and provide these if requested.
Records should be retained for at least three years from the date of termination or the amendment of the contract, and include:

• the AR’s name
• a copy of the original contract and any amendments
• the date and reason for terminating or amending its contract with the AR
• any multiple principal arrangements
• thefinancialpositionofthebusinessitcarriesoninitscapacityastheprincipals’AR
• anyindividualswhoareApprovedPersonsorrequireaqualification(asexplained
  above)
  9.44 The principal firm should have full access to the AR’s records in respect of the
  informationdetailedinSUP12.9.3.
  Q42: Do you agree with our proposal above to extend the rules and guidance for ARs to funeral plan firms? The Approved Persons Regime
  9.45 The FCA has rules in place that aim to reduce harm to consumers and strengthen
  market integrity by setting out the roles requiring FCA approval, so that we can ensure candidates are fit and proper to hold important roles within firms.
  9.46 Senior managers at ARs, who perform controlled functions, are subject to the
  Approved Persons Regime (APR). We propose to apply the APR to ARs of funeral plan firms.
  9.47 The APR rules are detailed in SUP10A of the FCA Handbook8
  , and we provide detail on some of the main rules below.
  9.48 An ‘approved person’ is an individual who we approve to do one or more activities that
  are called ‘controlled functions’. This person has to know and meet our regulatory requirements, as well as understand how we apply them.
  9.49 When a principal firm appoints an AR, it is the principal firm’s responsibility to identify
  which individuals within the AR are performing a ‘controlled function’, and ensure that the APR rules are followed. 8 Most firms, including principal firms, are subject to the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (see chapter 8, for details on the regime and how it applies to firms). ARs are not subject to the SMCR but are subject to the APR.

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9.50 Controlled functions at ARs are detailed in the table below. All persons performing
these ‘controlled functions’ must be approved by us (details below):
Controlled functions
CF1 Director function Described in SUP 10A.6.7R and SUP 10A.6.8R CF2 Non-executive director function Described in SUP 10A.6.12R and SUP 10A.6.13R CF3 Chief executive Described in SUP 10A.6.17R CF4 Partner Described in SUP 10A.6.23R to SUP 10A.6.27R CF5 Director of unincorporated association function Described in SUP 10A.6.29 Governing functions Consumer-dealing function CF30 Consumer function Described in SUP 10A.10.7 FCA approval for persons performing controlled functions at ARs
9.51 Anyone performing a controlled function at an AR has to be approved by the FCA.
9.52 The principal firm has to assess that the individual is fit and proper to be an ‘Approved
Person’ and submit a Form A to us to approve the individual9 .
9.53 We only approve people who we are satisfied are fit and proper to perform the
controlled function they apply for. The FCA has given guidance on the Fit and Proper test for Employees and Senior Personnel in FIT. Requirements of Approved Persons
9.54 Approved Persons have to understand, and meet, our regulatory requirements, as well
as understand how we apply them. They must:

• meet and abide by the rules of our fitandpropertest
• comply with the Statements of Principle (detailed below) and with the provisions
  of the Code of Practice for Approved Persons. These explain the behaviours we expect of people we approve
  9.55 The Principle firm also needs to report anything that could affect the ongoing
  suitability of the AR to us, via Form D.
  9.56 Approved Persons are subject to rules of conduct. These are called Statements of
  Principle under the APR (see details below), supported by guidance called the Code of Practice for Approved Persons. The relevant forms relating to FCA-Approved Persons aredetailedinSUP10A.12.2G.
  9.57 An Approved Person is subject to the following Statements of Principle (see details in
  APER 2: The Statements of Principle for Approved Persons). Statements of Principle 1 to 4 apply to all Approved Persons. A person performing an accountable higher management function is also subject to the additional requirements set out in Statements of Principle 5 to 7 in performing that accountable function. 9 This applies differently to IARs and LPCCs

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Statement of Principle 1: An Approved Person must act with integrity in carrying out his accountable functions. Statement of Principle 2: An approved person must act with due skill, care and diligence in carrying out his accountable functions. Statement of Principle 3: An Approved Person must observe proper standards of market conduct in carrying out his accountable functions. Statement of Principle 4: An Approved Person must deal with the FCA, the PRA and other regulators in an open and cooperative way and must disclose appropriately any information of which the FCA or the PRA would reasonably expect notice. Statement of Principle 5: An Approved Person performing an accountable higher management function must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which they are responsible in their accountable function is organised so that it can be controlled effectively. Statement of Principle 6: An Approved Person performing an accountable higher management function must exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm for which they are responsible in their accountable function. Statement of Principle 7: An Approved Person performing an accountable higher management function must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which they are responsible in their accountable function complies with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system. Non-compliance
9.58 We may take disciplinary action against Approved Persons who:

• act in a way that is inconsistent with the rules for controlled functions
• knowinglyworktogethertobreachtheirfirm’srules
  9.59 Our actions include financial penalties, suspensions of approval, imposing restriction
  and issuing a public statement about the misconduct.
  Reporting changes in relation to Approved Persons
  9.60 Changes made to an Approved Person’s role or responsibilities should be reported
  to us. These include, ceasing to perform a controlled function, moving roles within a firm, and changestoanApprovedPerson’spersonaldetails.SeeSUP10A.14for additional details.
  9.61 The principal firm is also responsible for reporting information which would reasonably
  be material to the assessment of an FCA Approved Person’s, or a FCA candidate’s, fitness and propriety.
  9.62 We can take enforcement action against both the principal firm and the Approved
  Persons if the person performs an FCA controlled function without approval, and if we suspect they are involved in misconduct. Q43: Do you agree with our proposal above to apply the existing Approved Persons Regime to funeral plan firms?

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Notification requirements in relation to ARs
9.63 We require principals to notify us when they appoint an AR and when the relationship is
terminated. We provide the Appointed Representative appointment form in Connect for firms to submit the following details:

• thenameoftheprincipalfirm’snewAR
• anytradingnameunderwhichtheprincipalfirm’snewARcarriesonaregulated
  activity in that capacity
• a description of the regulated activities which the AR is permitted or required to
  carryonandforwhichtheprincipalfirmhasacceptedresponsibility
• anyrestrictionsimposedontheregulatedactivitiesforwhichtheprincipalfirmhas
  accepted responsibility
  9.64 Principals are also responsible for submitting the following applications and
  notifications to us relating to Approved Persons. Principals should use Connect to make notifications and submit forms. Form Name Form A (Long) – Application to perform controlled functions Purpose For appointed representatives only, an application for an individual to perform a controlled function Form A (Short) – Application to perform 10 controlled functions Form C – Notice of ceasing to perform controlled functions An application to cancel an individual approval Form D – Changes to personal information/ application details and conduct breaches/ disciplinary action related to conduct UsedtonotifytheFCAofissuesinfitnessandpropriety, disciplinary action taken and changes to personal information Form E – Internal transfer of a person performing a controlled function An application for an individual to change the approved function being performed Notifying the FCA of significant changes relating to ARs
  9.65 Firms already need to tell us about significant changes to their business, such as
  proposed restructuring, reorganisation or business expansion, that could have a significant impact on the firm’s risk profile or resources11.
  9.66 We propose to make a rule to require funeral plan principal firms to notify us of their
  intention to make significant changes in relation to ARs. This is in addition to the requirement detailed above to notify us of appointing an AR and providing their details, which is aimed at providing the FCA data on ARs operating in the market.
  9.67 We propose that the notification in relation to ARs would need to be made before the
  appointment of the ARs. This will ensure that, if needed, the FCA can check whether the appropriate oversight arrangements have been put into place. 10 There are two types of Form A; a Long Form A and a Short Form A. The key difference is that the Long Form A requires detailed information about the fitness and propriety of the candidate. If you are using Connect to complete a Form A it will ask you some initial questions to determine the sections you need to complete. 11 For example, Principle 11 states that ‘a firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the FCA appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect notice’.

9.68
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Chapter 9
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation We propose to require principal firms to make a notification in relation to ARs in the following instances:

• First appointing an AR–Ifatthepointofauthorisation,theprincipalfirmdidnot
  declare its intention to appoint ARs, and at a later date decides to do so, it would be required to notify the FCA of its intention to appoint an AR to carry on regulated funeralplanactivityforthefirsttime.SuchnotificationwillallowtheFCAtodecide whether it needs to request information about the arrangements that the principal has in place to oversee its ARs.
• SignificantincreasesinthenumberofARsaprincipalfirmintendstohave – Large
  increasesinthenumberofARsaprincipalfirmplanstohave,mayrequirethe principalfirmtoadjustitsoversightarrangements.Weproposethattheprincipal firmwouldberequiredtonotifyusofitsintentiontoappointARswhenthenumber of ARs it intends to have will increase as follows:
  – From fewer than 25 to 25 or more;
  – From fewer than 50 to 50 or more;
  – From fewer 75 to 75 or more;
  – From fewer 100 to 100 or more;
  – From fewer 200 to 200 or more;
  – From fewer 500 to 500 or more; and
• WhenaprincipalfirmintendstodiversifytheactivitiesofitsARs – as detailed
  above, the AR regime is intended to enable unauthorised persons to carry on certainregulatedactivitiesforandonbehalfoftheprincipalfirm.Wherefirms intend to diversify the scope of business of ARs for which they accept responsibility, weproposetorequirefirmstonotifyus.Thisproposalwouldapplywherefirms which might already have ARs propose to permit an AR to carry on funeral plan businessforthefirsttime.ItwouldalsoapplywhereafirmwithARsundertaking funeral plan business proposes to accept responsibility for non-funeral plan-related businessforthefirsttime. Q44: Do you agree with our proposal to require funeral plan principal firms to notify us of changes in relation to their ARs as detailed above?

10.1
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10.2
10.3
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation 10 Dispute resolution This chapter sets out the rules in our ‘Dispute resolution: Complaints’ sourcebook (DISP) which we propose to apply to all funeral plan providers and intermediaries (for example appointed representatives) that will fall within the regulatory perimeter once FCA regulation starts. The rules in DISP cover how firms should handle complaints and when complaints must be referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service (ombudsman service). This chapter also includes a discussion about the changes that are necessary to DISP in order for it to apply to those firms that will fall within our regulatory perimeter. The FCA is responsible for setting the rules for the complaints under the ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ (CJ) of the ombudsman service. Having robust, fair procedures for dealing with complaints will help to reduce harms in the funeral plan sector. The ombudsman service also has its own voluntary jurisdiction (VJ) which covers some types of complaint not covered by the CJ and which financial service firms may choose to participate in and which it oversees. In addition to mirroring our proposed changes to the CJ in the VJ, the ombudsman service is also consulting on a proposal for the VJ to be available to firms who offer funeral plans sold where the funeral is to take place outsideoftheUK,andwillthereforenotbecoveredbytheCJ.Assuch,thispartofthe consultation is issued jointly by the FCA and the ombudsman service. The ombudsman service is an independent third party set up by Parliament to resolve complaints between consumers and businesses that provide financial services and claims management services in a fair and impartial way. Having the ombudsman service consider complaints helps to build eligible complainants’ trust that they will get a fair outcome when they complain. What are our key proposals?
10.4 We propose to:

• bring funeral plan providers and intermediaries within the CJ of the ombudsman
  servicewheretheplanprovidesforafuneraltotakeplaceintheUK
• apply our complaint handling requirements in DISP to ensure that complaints are
  dealt with promptly, consistently and fairly
• enable the ombudsman service to deal with complaints about certain acts or
  omissions of funeral plan providers that occurred before FCA regulation comes into force if the funeral plan provider was a member of the FPA at the time the act or omission being complained about occurred.
• givefuneralplanproviderssellingplansforafuneraltotakeplaceoutsideoftheUK,
  the opportunity to join the VJ so that a greater range of consumers have access to a dispute resolution service.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Chapter 10 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
The Financial Ombudsman Service
10.5 The ombudsman service has a statutory duty to resolve disputes ‘quickly and with
minimum formality’, offering an alternative to the Courts. Its decisions are based on what, in its opinion, is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case.
10.6 The ombudsman service is free for complainants. When the ombudsman service
decides to uphold a complaint, it can order the firm to make a monetary award to the complainant for an amount it considers gives fair compensation for the loss or damage suffered. The ombudsman service can also direct the firm to take such steps in relation to the complaint that it considers ‘ just and appropriate’.
10.7 The ombudsman service has a statutory award limit of £160,000 for complaints about
actsoromissionsthatoccurredbefore1 April2019orupto£355,000forcomplaints aboutactsoromissionsonorafter1 April2019(whicharereferredtotheombudsman serviceonorafter1 April2020).On1 Aprileachyear,forcomplaintsreferredtothe ombudsmanserviceonorafterthisdateuptoandincluding31 Marchinthefollowing year, the limits referred to above are adjusted by applying the percentage increase in CPI between January 2019 and January of that year and rounding down to the nearest £5,000. Awards of redress up to the relevant statutory award limit are binding on firms if they are accepted by the complainant. While the ombudsman service can recommend that a firm pay an amount of redress in excess of the statutory award limit, this is not binding on a firm and it is up to a firm whether or not it pays a higher amount. Compulsory jurisdiction of the ombudsman service and complaint handling rules
10.8 We propose to apply our complaint handling rules and guidance in DISP to all funeral
plan providers and intermediaries we authorise. We expect most intermediaries to apply to become appointed representatives. The CJ covers complaints about the activities of a firm, including its appointed representatives. However, intermediaries may become authorised in their own right and if they do, they will, as funeral plan providers, fall within the CJ of the ombudsman service.
10.9 DISP Chapter 1 contains rules and guidance on how firms should deal promptly and
fairly with complaints. The table below summarises the key sections of DISP 1 that we propose applying to funeral plan providers and intermediaries, in line with the other firms we regulate. DISP 1.2 Firms must publish information about internal procedures for Consumer awareness rules handling complaints about the ombudsman service Sourcebook chapter Summary of chapter DISP 1.3 Complaints handling rules Firms must have procedures in place to reasonably and promptly handlecomplaintsandfirmsmustensurethatcomplaintscanbe made free of charge The procedures should recognise that complaints require resolution. The procedures should ensure that lessons are learned from complaints. Firms must take steps to address any recurring or systemic problems. Afirmmustappointanindividualatthefirmtohaveresponsibilityfor oversightofthefirm’scompliancewithDISP.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Chapter 10 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Sourcebook chapter
DISP 1.4
Complaints resolution rules
Summary of chapter
Complaints must be investigated competently, diligently and impartially. They must be assessed fairly, consistently and promptly and resolved at the earliest possible opportunity. Redress must be offeredwhereappropriate,andaclearexplanationmustbegiven about the assessment of the complaint. DISP 1.5 When a complaint has been resolved by close of the third business Complaints resolved by close day following receipt of the complaint a ‘summary resolution of the third business day communication’ must be sent to the complainant. This must refer to the availability of the ombudsman service and indicate whether the firmagreestowaiveanyrelevanttimelimit. DISP 1.6 Complaints time limit rules Afirmmustsendapromptwrittenacknowledgementofthe complaintandkeepthecomplainantinformedthereafter.Thefirm must, by the end of eight weeks after receiving the complaint:

• senda‘finalresponse’whichoffersredressofremedialaction
  where appropriate or clearly explains why the complaint has been rejected, or
• sendawrittenresponsewhichexplainswhythefirmhasbeen
  unabletoprovideafinalresponseandwhenitexpectstoprovide one, and
• in either case, send information about referral rights to the
  ombudsmanservicetogetherwithanexplanatoryleaflet.
  DISP 1.7
  Complaints forwarding rules
  Ifafirmconsidersanotherfirmissolelyorjointlyresponsibleforthe matterbeingcomplainedabout,afirmshouldforwardthecomplaint to the responsible party, if known. DISP 1.8 Complaints time barring rules Afirmmayrejectacomplaintreceivedoutsidetherelevanttimelimits butitmustexplainitsdecisiontodosoinafinalresponseletter.The time limits are generally 6 years after the event or, if later, 3 years from the date when the complainant became aware (or ought reasonably to have become aware) of the cause for complaint. DISP 1.9 Complaints record rules Afirmmustretainrecordsofcomplaintsfor3yearsfromthedatethe complaint was received. DISP 1.10 Complaints reporting rules AfirmmustsubmitareportofcomplaintstotheFCAannually.
  10.10 The above table is not an exhaustive of all the DISP rules that we propose applying
  to funeral plan providers and their intermediaries; the table contains a list of the key obligations that we propose applying to funeral plan providers and their intermediaries. Firms should familiarise themselves with DISP more generally, including DISP 2:
  Jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Service and DISP 3: Complaints handling procedures of the Financial Ombudsman Service. Q45: Do you agree with our approach to apply our complaint handling rules and guidance in DISP, including the compulsory jurisdiction of the ombudsman service, to all authorised funeral plan providers and which will also apply to intermediaries (e.g. appointed representatives)? Complaints about acts or omissions that took place before FCA regulation starts
  10.11 The Treasury’s legislation allows the ombudsman service to deal with complaints
  against authorised firms about acts or omissions that occurred before FCA regulation comes into force, as long as the firm was a member of the FPA at the time the act or

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10.12
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10.14
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10.16
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Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation omission occurred (and even if it ceased to be a member of the FPA subsequently). It also allows the ombudsman service to deal with complaints about a provider that does not become authorised, but which was a member of the FPA at the time the act or omission being complained about occurred (even if the firm ceased to be a member of the FPA subsequently). To facilitate the above we propose to include transitional arrangements in DISP that will allow a consumer to complain to the ombudsman service about an act or an omission by a provider that occurred before FCA regulation comes into force. Such a complaint will be possible if the firm being complained about was a member of the FPA at the time of the act or omission that is subject of the complaint, even if it ceased to be a member of the FPA subsequently (and even if it has not subsequently become authorised). In our draft rules we refer to this type of complaint as a “relevant transitional funeral plan complaint”. As set out in paragraph 4.35 of The Treasury’s consultation on the regulation of pre-paid funeral plans, any complaint referred to the FPA but not determined before the introduction of FCA regulation, will be resolved by the FPA rather than transferred to the ombudsman service for determination. The ombudsman will not be able to consider complaints which have previously been referred to the FPA. If a consumer complains about a provider about an act or omission that occurred before FCA regulation starts but where the provider was not a member of the FPA at the time of the act or omission, the ombudsman service will not be able to consider the complaint. In such cases the consumer might still be able to use the complaint schemes provided by the National Association of Funeral Directors (NAFD) or the Society of Allied and Independent Funeral Directors (SAIF), if the firm is a member of either association. It is unlikely a consumer would be able to use the complaints schemes for NAFD or SAIF and then have the same complaint considered by the ombudsman service, even if it was eligible to be considered by the ombudsman service. This is because the ombudsman is able to dismiss a complaint without considering the merits if the ombudsman considers that the subject matter of the complaint has been dealt with, or is being dealt with, by a comparable ADR entity. Q46: Do you think there are any gaps in ombudsman service coverage in the scenarios discussed above or are there any other issues you have identified? If so, please provide details. Eligible complainants Due the nature of the product we expect that complaints will arise following the death of the person the funeral is to be provided for. We want to ensure that a complaint about the plan can still be made to the ombudsman service in circumstances where that person has died. For a complaint to be dealt with by the ombudsman service it must be made by an ‘eligible complainant’ as defined in DISP
2.7. DISP 2.7.2R makes clear that a complaint may also be brought on behalf of an ‘eligible complainant’ (or a deceased person who would have been an ‘eligible complainant’) by a person authorised by the ‘eligible

10.18
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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation complainant’ or authorised by law. It is immaterial whether the person authorised to act on behalf of an eligible complainant is himself an eligible complainant. On the basis of these existing rules, we are satisfied that it will be possible for a complaint to be made to the ombudsman service in circumstances where the person who purchased the plan has died. We expect the usual scenario will be that a person has bought a funeral plan for themselves and, when they die, a complaint can be brought to the ombudsman service on their behalf by their personal representative, subject to certain evidence such as a grant of probate or letters of administration being provided where they are required by the ombudsman service. However, where a person has bought a funeral plan for another person (the covered individual), under the current rules, only the person who bought the funeral plan would be eligible to complain to the ombudsman service, not the covered individual. As the person who bought the plan will be able to complain, we do not think we need to amend the existing rules to also allow a complaint about the same plan to be brought by the covered individual (or their estate). As such, we do not propose to make any changes to existing complainant eligibility rules. Q47: Do you agree with our assessment that it is not necessary to make any changes to the rules on eligible complainants? Redress As part of existing rules within DISP 3.7, where a complaint is determined in favour of the complainant, the ombudsman can order the firm pays redress in one or more of the following ways:

1. a money award against the respondent
2. an interest award against the respondent
3. a costs award against the respondent
4. a direction to the respondent
   We propose to enable the ombudsman service to be able to make all the above awards if a funeral plan related complaint is upheld. We currently think these types of outcomes cover all the different types of awards an ombudsman would need to make in order to resolve a funeral plan related complaint. Q48: Do you agree that this covers all likely forms of redress? If you consider further categories are needed please provide details in your response. Voluntary jurisdiction of the ombudsman service While we make the rules which state that the complaints in respect of which jurisdiction of the ombudsman service is compulsory, the ombudsman service has its own VJ which financial service firms and claims management providers may choose to participate in. For the purposed of the RAO, the definition of a funeral plan contract applies only to a funeralthatistobeprovidedintheUK.Thismeansthatwhereaplanispurchasedfor thefuneraltobeprovidedoutsidetheUK,theconsumerwillnothaveaccesstothe ombudsman service under the CJ.

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Chapter 10
10.23
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10.25
10.26
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10.28
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation The VJ has a different territorial scope to that of the CJ (see DISP 2.6.1 for the territorial scope of the CJ and DISP 2.6.4 for the territorial scope of the VJ). In particular, while the CJ will only cover the activities of funeral plan providers and intermediarieswhicharecarriedonfromanestablishmentintheUK,theVJwillalso cover complaints about activities of VJ participants which are carried on from an establishment in the EEA or Gibraltar (subject to the other conditions in DISP 2.6.4). In addition to the above, given that customers will not have access to the ombudsman service under the CJ where a plan is purchased for a funeral to be provided outside theUK,theombudsmanserviceconsidersitisappropriatetoexpandthescopeofthe VJ to cover activities in relation to plans where the funeral is to be provided outside theUK.Inanycase,itwillbeforindividualfuneralplanprovidersandintermediariesto determine whether they wish to apply to become VJ participants. Q49: Do you agree with the ombudsman service’s proposal to expand the scope of the voluntary jurisdiction in this manner? Ombudsman service general levy and case fee In this section, we explain how the ombudsman service is funded and how we propose the funding arrangements will apply to funeral plan providers and intermediaries. The fees and levy rules that apply to firms currently covered by the ombudsman service are contained in Chapter 5 of the FEES manual in the FCA Handbook. The key rules are summarised in the table below, along with how we propose to apply them to funeral plan providers and intermediaries. The powers to make rules on funding the ombudsman service are shared between the FCA and the ombudsman service. The FCA makes rules on the amount of the ombudsman service annual budget that will be raised by way of the CJ general levy. The ombudsman service makes rules on the payment of fees (‘case fees’) by firms in relation to cases referred to the ombudsman service (currently £650), including the number of cases that are handled each year without a fee being charged (currently 25), as well as the fee rules on the payment of the annual levy in relation to VJ participants. Funeral plan providers and intermediaries will begin to pay the CJ general levy and case fees from 2022/23. The FCA will be consulting on the tariff rate in its 2022/23 fees & levies consultation.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Chapter 10 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Sourcebook
Chapter Key Rules Proposal
Fees 5.3 and Fees 5 Businesses that are covered We propose to create a new Funeral plan
Annex 1R by the ombudsman service
are required to pay a general levy to fund its operating costs. provider and intermediary industry block. We propose that the tariff base will be based on annual income subject to a minimum fee. Industry blocks are based on a broad grouping of permissions. This keeps the structure simple. We considered setting up separate industry blocksfordifferentFuneralplanproviderand Intermediarypermissions,orforfirmswhich limit their activity to a single permission, but concludedthatthiswouldhavelimitedbenefits and could unnecessarily complicate the structure. Thetariffbaseisintendedtobeanobjective, transparent and simple measure that can be consistently applied across the fee block to ensure a fair distribution of cost recovery. The mostcommontariffmeasureisincome.Our experienceisthatmostfirmssupportincome as a fair indicator of size and therefore market impact, and it can be reported consistently and easily from annual accounts. The amount to be raised from each industry block will be based on the budgeted costs and numbersofombudsmanservicestaffrequired to deal with the volume of complaints which the ombudsman service expects to receive about thefirmsineachindustryblock. FEES 5.7 Payment The general levy will be Funeral plan providers and Intermediaries of the general levy collectedonorafter1 April each year. The FCA consults on the amount of the general levy that will be collected from Funeral plan providers and Intermediaries in the industry block on an annual basis (as well as all the other industry blocks). firms must pay the general levy annually on or before the later of 1 April and 30 calendar days after the date when the invoice is issued by the FCA. FEES 5.8 and Afirmwhichbecomes If a funeral plan firm ceases to be authorised 5.5B.24R Joining subject to the ombudsman or wishes to close its business part way and leaving service part way through through a financial year it will remain liable to the Financial afinancialyearmustpaya pay case fees in respect of cases within the Ombudsman rateable proportion of the jurisdiction of the ombudsman service and a Service generallevyasspecifiedin the formula set out in FEES 4.2.7ER. rateable portion of the general levy. FEES 5.4 Afirmmustprovidethe Funeral plan providers and intermediaries are Information FCAeachyear(or,ifthefirm required to provide the FCA with information requirements has become subject to the ombudsman service part waythroughthefinancial year, by the date requested by the FCA) with a statement of the total amount of relevant business which it conducted. annually to enable the FCA to calculate fees. Failure to provide may lead to financial penalties.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Chapter 10 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Sourcebook
Chapter
FEES 5.5 and FEES
5 Annex 3R Case fees
Key Rules
Businesses covered by the Financial Ombudsman Service (who are not part of the group charging arrangements) currently pay £650 per case after the permitted 25 free cases per year. The case fee rules set out penalties for late payment of case fees and enable the Financial Ombudsman Service to refund, reduce or waive case fees in certain circumstances. Proposal It is likely that similar rules will apply to funeral planfirms.TheFinancialOmbudsmanService expects to consult on its proposals for funeral planfirmsaspartoftheannualplanandbudget consultationinthe2022/2023financialyear. How is the Financial Ombudsman Service funded?
10.29 The ombudsman service is free for consumers to use. The businesses it covers pay a
combination of:

• case fees – which are usually invoiced and collected by the ombudsman service
  once cases have been resolved.
• annual fees (levies) which are collected by the FCA for the CJ and by the
  ombudsman service for the VJ.
  10.30 In each of the ombudsman service’s jurisdictions, the annual budget reflects the total
  expected to be raised by levies, plus the total expected to be raised by case fees for the relevant financial year. Voluntary jurisdiction (VJ)
  10.31 As part of this consultation the ombudsman service is consulting on a proposal for
  theVJtobeavailablewherethefuneralistotakeplaceoutsideoftheUK.ForFuneral plan providers and intermediaries that decide to join the voluntary jurisdiction (VJ), the industry blocks and tariff rates for firms in the VJ are set out in FEES 5 Annex 2R. If the ombudsman service decides to make its VJ available it expects to consult on the rates for Funeral providers and intermediaries that join the VJ as part of its annual plan and budget consultation for 2022/23. Q50: Do you have any comments on the proposals in the above
  table on the application of our FEES rules and guidance to
  Funeral plan providers and intermediaries, in particular the proposal to create a new funeral plan provider and intermediary industry block with the tariff base based on annual income subject to a minimum fee?

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
11 Supervision and enforcement
Supervision and reporting
11.1 This section sets out the rules we propose to help us supervise funeral plan firms. This
includes firms’ obligations to report key information, events and changes to us both on a regular and one-off basis.
11.2 InlinewiththeSupervisoryapproachsetoutinourSupervisionmanual(SUP),wewill
adopt a proactive approach built on analysing available data to identify poor conduct, weak financial resilience and areas of operation of funeral plan firms that could result in harm to consumers and markets. Where we see indicators of systematic harm, we will move quickly and we have a range of supervisory tools to intervene and stop the harm occurring. We then work to ensure that the firm addresses the cause of the harm to prevent a recurrence. Supervising the sector effectively will help to address the harms identified in this market.
11.3 We propose:

• applyingtherelevantsectionsofourSupervisionmanual(SUP)tofuneralplan
  firms.
• requiringfuneralplanfirmstonotifyusofsignificantchangesintheirbusiness.
• requiring funeral plan providers to report important data about their business to
  us every three months in respect of sales activity, every 6 months for prudential information and annually in respect of complaints.
• requiring funeral plan intermediaries to report important data about their business
  6 monthly, for prudential information, and annually in respect of complaints.
  11.4 ThetablebelowsummarisesthekeysectionsofSUPthatweproposeapplyingto
  funeral plan firms in line with the other firms that we regulate. It then goes on to give more detail on the main proposals. SUP chapter SUP1A The FCA’s approach to supervision Key rule and references SetsouttherelationshipbetweentheFCAandauthorisedfirms,the‘three pillar’ supervision model and the supervision tools we can use. SUP2 Information gathering by the FCA or PRA on its own initiative The FCA can gather information in multiple ways: through meetings with firms,visits,informationrequestsormysteryshopping.SUP2alsoexplains the limitations of the FCA’s powers when accessing protected items or thosesubjecttospecificconfidentiality. Afirmmusttakereasonablestepstoensurethatoutsourcedsuppliersare open and co-operative with the FCA’s information gathering work. SUP5 Reports by skilled persons The FCA may appoint or require the appointment of a skilled person toprovideitwithareport.Ifafirmappointsaskilledperson,theymust require that person to co-operate with the FCA and waive any duty of confidentiality.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
SUP chapter
SUP6
Applications to vary and cancel Part 4A permission and to impose, vary or cancel requirements Key rule and references Explains:

• Howafirmmightapplytovary or cancel its permissions;
• Howafirmcanapplytohaveanewrequirementimposedonitortovary
  or cancel a requirement;
• How the FCA will assess such applications.
  SUP7
  Individual requirements
  TheFCAcanvaryafirm’spermissiontocarryoutaregulatedactivityand the FCA can set individual requirements and limitations on its own initiative. SUP8 Waiverandmodification of rules TheFCAcanwaiveormodifyrulesforfirms,iftheyhaveappliedforor consentedtothosechanges.Thisexplainstheprocedurefirmsandthe FCA must follow to do this. SUP9 Individual guidance TheFCAcangiveindividualguidancetoafirm.Thischaptersetsoutthe procedureforfirmstoobtainsuchguidance. SUP15 NotificationstotheFCA Firms must notify the FCA either orally, in writing, or using a form (dependingonthenotification)aboutsignificantchangesinbusiness. SUP16 Reporting requirements Setsouttheinformationafirmshouldreporttousonaregularbasis. Q51: Do you agree with our proposed application of the existing SUP rules to funeral plan firms? Notification of significant changes in business
  11.5 We propose applying our notification requirements to funeral plan firms. This means
  that firms will have to notify the FCA when there is a significant change in their business. The table below sets out each notification requirement. Sup provision number Notification reason Notification method/timing 15.3.1R Matters having a serious regulatory impact e.g. failure to satisfy a Threshold Condition or any matter affectingthefirm’sabilitytoprovide adequate provision of services which could result in serious detriment to the consumer. UsingtheNotificationForm,orif appropriate, telephone, as soon as the funeral planfirmisawarethateventhasor may have occurred or that it might occur in the future. 15.3.8G Anythingrelatingtothefirmofwhich Orally or in writing within a time (Principle 11) the FCA would reasonably expect notice, such as business restructuring orasignificantfailureinsystemsor controls. period depending on the event, but before making any internal or external commitments. 15.3.11R Significantbreachofaruleor requirements in or under the Act. UsingtheNotificationFormassoonas thefirmisaware,orhasinformationwhich reasonably suggests, that such an event has, may have or might occur. 15.3.15R Civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedingsbroughtagainstfirm. Immediately. 15.3.17R Asignificanteventinvolvingfraud, errors or other irregularities. Immediately. 15.3.21R Event related to insolvency, bankruptcy and winding up. Immediately.

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Sup provision number
15.3.32R
Notification reason
Significantinfringementofany applicable competition law.
Notification method/timing
Immediately on awareness or information reasonably suggesting infringement using NotificationForm. 15.5.1R￾15.5.6R Change in name, address and telephone number. Reasonable advance notice using NotificationForm.
11.6 All the data that should be included in notifications can be given in the formats set out
inSUP15Annex4andusingthemethodssetoutinSUP15Annex4.Allregulatory reporting (ie that reporting which is required regularly and are not driven by a specific event occurring) will need to be sent to us via the appropriate online system. Q52: Do you agree with the notification requirements and guidance we are introducing into SUP 15? Ongoing reporting requirements
11.7 In addition to the overarching obligations of Principle 11, we are proposing a set of
specific data reporting obligations for funeral plan providers and intermediaries, which we set out in the table below. The information we request through this will help us understand and monitor the sector. We are interested to understand how these metrics compare to metrics firms use for their own purposes. Data Conduct data (FP001) Information required Includes number of funeral plan sales, details of topfiveAppointed Representatives or Authorised Intermediaries or unregulated introducers, number offuneralplansfulfilled and cancelled, fees and charges and remuneration paid to firm’semployees. Handbook location of requirement SUP16with guidance in the accompanying Annexes. See link below Frequency Quarterly Submission Within 15 business days after the quarter end. Funeral Plan Includes the number DISP 1.10 and Annually Within 30 business -Complaints of complaints, reason DISP 1 Annex 1B daysofthefirm’s Data for complaint and any redress paid to consumers. ARD.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Data
Prudential
Data (FP003a and FP003b)
Information required
Includesfinancial statement information, profitandlossaccount information, a Solvency Assessment Report for trust backed funeral plans, prudential resource requirement information, annual report and accounts and revenue data information about Funeral Plan sales conducted by Appointed Representatives. Handbook location of requirement SUP16with guidance in the accompanying Annexes. See link below. Frequency 6 Monthly Submission Within 80 business days of a calendar half year. Standing Data Basicfirmdetails,such asthefirm’spostaland website addresses and contact details. SUP16.10.4R An annual check and update the FCA if the information is incorrect. Within 60 business daysofthefirm’s ARD. Data from Authorised Intermediaries We propose that Intermediaries will be required to submit reporting data to the FCA. This will include Complaints, Prudential and Standing Data as above, but not Conduct data.
11.8 We are also consulting on Guidance Notes to help firms complete these reporting
requirements. The proposed reporting templates and instructions on how to complete them are available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/funeral-plan￾providers-quarterly-conduct-return.pdf and https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/ consultation/funeral-plan-providers-intermediaries-prudential-half-yearly-return.pdf Timing and method for collecting data
11.9 We propose that the regular reporting requirements for funeral plan firms will be
completed quarterly, half-annually and annually, depending on the type of information required (as set out in table 11.7 above). In addition, standing data requirements should be updated when changes occur and checked at least once a year.
11.10 We propose that the regular reporting requirements for funeral plan firms will be
completed electronically using RegData, our data collection platform. We have a resource page containing user guides and explainer videos to guide firms through every aspect of the new system. Further information about RegData is available at https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regdata Administration fee
11.11 As for all the firms we regulate, we propose to apply a late submission administration
fee of £250 for the reporting requirements covered in this chapter. We may also take enforcement action against a firm if the information it provides is incomplete or inaccurate.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Q53: Do you have any comments on the reporting requirements set out in this CP? Q54: Do you agree with the proposal for the FCA to impose an administration fee on funeral plan firms for late submission? Our approach to enforcement
11.12 This section explains why and how we enforce our rules. It outlines our powers,
processes and the enforcement action we can take.
11.13 Our enforcement work is intended to ensure there are real and meaningful
consequences for firms and individuals who do not follow our rules and who cause actual or potential harm to consumers, many of whom may be in vulnerable circumstances. Our enforcement staff work closely with our authorisation and supervision functions, as well as with other regulators and law enforcement agencies to detect misconduct and unauthorised business.
11.14 FSMA sets out our enforcement powers, so we are not consulting on them. But we
will apply the same approach to funeral plan firms when carrying out enforcement investigations, using sanctions and decision-making, as we do with all other regulated firms. Our proposals Opening an investigation We intend to:

• applyourEnforcementGuide(EG)tofuneralplansfirms
• applyourDecisionProcedureandPenaltiesManual(DEPP)tofuneralplansfirms
  11.15 We will open an investigation if we suspect there has been serious misconduct. When
  we open an investigation, we do not assume there has been serious misconduct or that anyone involved in the investigation is guilty of misconduct. The purpose of the investigation is to get a clear understanding of the facts so that we can make a decision about whether, and if so, what kind of action may be needed.
  11.16 We have investigation powers which enable us to compel firms and individuals to give
  us information. These powers are set out in FSMA, and include the ability to:
• requirefirmsandindividualstogiveusinformationanddocuments
• get a search warrant to search and seize documents
• require individuals to give information in an interview
  11.17 You can find more information about these powers in Chapter 3 of EG (see ‘More
  information about our enforcement’ below).

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11.18
11.19
11.20
11.21
11.22
11.23
When we have completed our investigation, we will determine whether there has been misconduct on the part of a firm and/or individuals. Based on this, we will then consider the appropriate response. We can use a range of measures to best address a firm’s or individual’s wrongdoing. Examples of our powers include the ability to:

• censurefirmsandindividualsthroughpublicstatements
• imposefinancialpenalties
• apply to the Court for an injunction to stop certain conduct or to freeze assets
• seek an order requiring redress or restitution where the misconduct has caused
  harm to consumers
• prosecute12firmsandindividualswhocarryoutregulatedactivitieswithout
  authorisation
• withdrawafirm’sauthorisation,preventingitfromoperatinginfinancialservices
  How we make decisions and impose penalties
  DEPP13 sets out our policy and decision-making procedure for giving statutory notices. These are warning notices, decision notices and supervisory notices, and they set out our reasons for proposing and deciding to take action. DEPP also sets out the framework we use to decide whether to impose a financial penalty and how we calculate the amount of penalty. There is no upper cap on the amount of the penalty we can impose. DEPP also sets out our policy on suspensions, restrictions and prohibitions (such as banning someone from holding any role in financial services). There is more information on these topics in Chapter 6 and 6A of DEPP. Resolving and contesting cases The FCA resolves many enforcement cases by settlement and we explain the settlement process in Chapter 5 of DEPP. In addition, we have a process in which a firm can contest some aspects of our case but still be able to get some discount on the amount of our proposed penalty. This involves the firm entering into a ‘focused resolution agreement’; this is explained further in Chapter 5 of DEPP. Generally, decisions on resolution will be taken by the Executive Directors in the FCA (‘settlement decision makers’), and our Regulatory Decisions Committee (the RDC) will decide any contested issues. The RDC is a committee of the FCA’s Board, but is separate from our executive management structure. Apart from the Chairman, the members of the RDC are not employed by the FCA and none of them will have been involved in the enforcement investigation. If the firm or individual disagrees with the RDC’s decision they can refer acasetotheUpperTribunal(TaxandChanceryChamber),andthatTribunal(whichis entirely independent from us) will consider it afresh. We give more information about the RDC in Chapter 3 of DEPP. 12 The FCA is empowered to bring criminal prosecutions in England in Wales. However, in Scotland, the FCA’s role is limited to being a “specialist reporting agency”, with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) being the responsible body for taking forward the prosecution of crime. 13 https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DEPP/

11.24
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Chapter 11
11.25
11.26
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation More information about our enforcement Our Enforcement Guide14 – This sets out our approach to enforcement and how we use our powers of investigation, gather information and conduct an investigation. It also sets out our approach to imposing financial penalties and other disciplinary sanctions, varying or cancelling a firm’s permissions, imposing prohibition orders on individuals, seeking injunctions, and redress. It explains how we will use our powers under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 against unfair terms and consumer notices, and how we will use our powers under other consumer protection legislation. Explaining our approach to enforcement – in March 2018 we published our ‘Approach to Enforcement’ document.15 This explains how we address harm and add public value through our statutory powers to investigate, take relevant civil, criminal and/or disciplinary action. It also explains how this approach aligns with our Mission.16 We have also published a short enforcement information guide.17 It includes a flowchart that shows the process of a typical FCA enforcement case where we take action under FSMA for a breach of our Principles for Businesses and our Handbook rules. It sets out the options to contest or resolve a case, the opportunities to make representations, and who the decision-makers are. Q55: Do you have any comments on our proposal to apply the same approach to enforcement investigations and actions to funeral Plan firms as we do to other regulated firms, as set out in EG? Q56: Do you have any comments on our proposal to follow the same procedures for decision-making and imposing penalties in relation to funeral plan firms and individuals set out in DEPP? 14 https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/EG/ 15 https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/corporate-documents/our-approach-enforcement 16 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/our-mission-2017.pdf 17 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/enforcement-information-guide.pdf

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Chapter 12 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
12 Authorisations
It is important that all Funeral Plan firms are aware of what they need to do and by when. The key elements are:

• All funeral plan providers that wish to continue doing so, will need to apply to the
  FCA
• Firms that sell funeral plans (and do not provide or administer them) can apply
  for direct FCA authorisation as an intermediary or become an Appointed Representative(AR)ofaprincipalfirm.Theprincipalisresponsiblefortheconduct oftheAR.ThePrincipalfirmisrequiredtonotifytheFCAinadvanceiftheyintend to appoint ARs
• The authorisations gateway for applications (explained in point 12.3) is planned to
  openinSeptember2021andfirmsneedtoensuretheyareauthorisedbeforethe regulationtakeseffecton29July2022
• Applications for authorisation and supporting documentation should be submitted
  as soon as possible after we open the applications gateway. If not submitted as soonaspossiblefirmsmaynothavesufficienttimetodemonstratetheymeetthe ThresholdConditionsbeforetherulestakeeffecton29July2022
• Firms currently trading that submit their applications after 1 November 2021, may
  incur a late application fee. Note: paying a late application fee does not guarantee that an application will be approved or determined before July 2022
• Whensubmittinganapplication,allfirmsneedtodemonstratehowtheymeet
  the minimum standards, known as Threshold Conditions, both at the time of authorisation and on an ongoing basis. These are the minimum standards that all FCAregulatedfirmsmustmeet,tobeabletoundertaketheregulatedactivities they want to carry on
• Iffuneralplanfirms,particularlythosewhoprovideoradministerfuneralplans,do
  not intend to be authorised, they should take appropriate steps to ensure they cease regulated activities and wind down/sell their book prior to 29 July 2022. Conductingregulatedactivitieswithoutauthorisationisacriminaloffenceand doing so may result in prosecution
• Funeral plan providers that are currently trading should let the FCA know if they do
  not intend to apply for authorisation
• ARnotificationsshouldbesubmittedaftertheprincipalfirmisauthorised
  12.1 This chapter sets out information regarding our proposed approach to the
  authorisation of funeral plan firms.
  12.2 Our aim is to determine applications as soon as possible, in recognition that if
  firms are to continue their activities uninterrupted after the start date of FCA regulation, applications must be approved ready for this date. However, approval is not guaranteed. It is dependent on firms submitting good quality applications at the start of the authorisations gateway window and demonstrating they meet the FCA’s minimum standards required for authorisation. The FCA’s minimum standards are set out in its Threshold Conditions which can be found in the COND chapter of the FCA’s Handbook.

CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Chapter 12 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
12.3 Authorisations gateway is an assessment process firms go through in order to become
FCA authorised. Firms should ensure that they have started work to prepare their business for FCA regulation and their application for authorisation in good time, so that it can be submitted as soon as possible after the gateway opens. This is important because, in our experience, it takes time for a firm new to statutory regulation to adapt to the new regulatory standards and prepare an application, and this is particularly so in the case of firms that are large and/or the business model is complex.
12.4 A delay in submitting an application may not allow sufficient time for the firm to
demonstrate that it meets the TCs to enable the FCA to make a decision to authorise the firm ready for the start of regulation. If a firm has not obtained authorisation bythetimeFCAregulationcomesintoforceon29 July2022,thefirmwillhaveto cease funeral plan activities. This means that funeral plan providers not authorised by this date will have to stop servicing existing plans and stop selling new ones, and if necessary will have to sell or wind down their books prior to this date.
12.5 Those firms that undertake to administer funeral plans and have not obtained
authorisationbythe29 July,willalsohavetostopservicingthoseplans,andifnecessary, winddownitsadministrationoffuneralplansactivitybeforethe29 July2022.
12.6 We expect that the majority of funeral plan firms that apply for authorisation will
submit their applications electronically to the FCA. We are proposing to create a tailored application form to make it simpler for firms to provide the information we need to assess their applications. We will make this form available as early as possible prior to the gateway opening in September 2021. We are consulting on the draft application form that is included in this CP and can be found at https://www.fca.org.uk/ publication/forms/funeral-plan-authorisation-form.pdf.
12.7 The application form is important as the information supplied, and documents
submitted with it, form the basis on which the FCA makes its assessment of the firm’s readiness for authorisation and will contribute to a decision whether or not to authorise the firm. It is important that firms make sure they provide all the information requested to help avoid delays in progressing the application.
12.8 A key piece of information that will be reviewed as part of the FCA’s assessment of an
application is the firm’s business plan. Its purpose is to provide the FCA with detailed information about such aspects as what business the firm proposes to carry out, the key regulatory, operational and other risks involved, how the firm will mitigate these risks and comply with its regulatory obligations on an ongoing basis. The implementation of FCA regulation will naturally have an impact on businesses and their plans. Business plans will need to explain how the firm has considered this impact, what changes have been made to adjust to this and demonstrate how the firm remains viable.
12.9 For provider firms, a key area of focus for the FCA will be the financial positions of both
the firm and any trusts underpinning its funeral plans. If firms are to be authorised, they will need to demonstrate they are solvent and financially viable. To assist the FCA in its assessment of this area, in addition to balance sheet, profit and loss, and cash flow statements, a range of supporting information is to be provided, including a report of the solvency position of each trust and an Asset Adequacy Report, both conducted in the last 12 months. It will be important for firms to take steps as soon as possible to ensure they are able to provide in their application up to date reports on solvency and asset adequacy.

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Chapter 12 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
12.10 Another important aspect we will be looking at are the arrangements the firm has put
into place for its resolution, in the event the firm fails. Firms must have appropriate resolution arrangements in place to appropriately safeguard the interests of customers. We will assess carefully how firms have considered their resolution arrangements and taken appropriate steps to bring them into line with our proposed requirements.
12.11 How firms control and oversee the sales of pre-paid funeral plans will also form a key
part of the FCA’s assessment. In particular, the FCA will look at those firms wishing
to operate a network of agents, known as appointed representatives (“AR”). We will want to see that these AR networks are well controlled and deliver good outcomes for customers. If you get approved to act as a principal firm, you will also need to submit notification and the appropriate controlled function application forms for each agent you propose to make an appointed representative. You will be able to do this once you are authorised.
12.12 As set out in Chapter 8, we intend for the Senior Managers and Certification Regime
(‘SM&CR’) to apply to funeral planfirms.UndertheSM&CR,thosewhoholdsenior manager positions within the firm will need to be individually approved by the FCA, as
part of the application for authorisation, and will be accountable for their actions in
their capacity as a Senior Manager. These applications should be made at the same time as the firm’s application for authorisation. Individuals applying for Senior Manager Functions (‘SMF’) will need to demonstrate they have relevant skills and knowledge to conduct their role. It is also important that they disclose all relevant information as part of their application.
12.13 Once authorised, if a firm wishes to carry out additional regulated activities that
it doesn’t have the necessary permission for, it will need to submit a Variation of Permission application. Similarly, if a firm ceases to carry out a regulated activity, it should apply to vary its permissions to remove this particular activity.
12.14 Additionally, if the ownership (control) of a firm is to change, the FCA must be notified
via a Change in Control application. The FCA can object to a change or increase in control on various grounds, including the reputation, knowledge, skills and experience of the proposed controller who will direct or have influence over the firm, if it is deemed unsuitable.
12.15 We recognise that many firms will be new to regulation and will provide information
to support firms and individuals with understanding the changes necessary to obtain authorisation. However the gateway assessment process is not an open-ended process. Firms need to be prepared to engage substantively with the process from the moment their application is submitted having a clear vision of how their business will function post authorisation and have commensurate controls in place. Firms will need to demonstrate they are ready, willing and organised to commence regulated activities. We will reach out to firms during and post the consultation to answer questions and explain our standards processes, to support their preparations for authorisation.
12.16 In our experience it is likely that some firms will not be able to meet the conditions
for authorisation. Firms should consider if they are in that position and, if so, make the necessary changes before the application gateway opens, or not apply for authorisation. Firms that apply but are not able to demonstrate they meet Threshold Conditions will be formally refused authorisation.

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Annex 1
Cost benefit analysis
Introduction

1. FSMA, as amended by the Financial Services Act 2012, requires us to publish a cost
   benefit analysis (CBA) of our proposed rules. Specifically, section 138I requires us to publish a CBA of proposed rules, defined as ‘an analysis of the costs, together with an analysis of the benefits that will arise if the proposed rules are made’ and ‘an estimate of those costs and of those benefits.’ Section 138I also provides that if, in our opinion, the costs or benefits cannot reasonably be estimated or it is not reasonably practicable to produce an estimate, the cost benefit analysis need not estimate them; in that case, the CBA must include a statement of our opinion and an explanation of it.
2. Our CBA presents estimates of the significant impacts of our proposal. We provide
   monetary values for the impacts where we believe it is reasonably practicable to do so. For others, we provide an analysis of outcomes in other dimensions. Our proposals are based on carefully weighing up these multiple dimensions and reaching a judgement about the appropriate level of consumer protection. Problem and rationale for intervention The harm
3. Chapter 2 of the consultation paper sets out the harms we have seen in the funeral
   plans market:

• Firms using high pressure sales tactics and misleading information, and
  commissions which may be incentivising poor sales practice, resulting in consumers purchasing plans which are not suitable for their needs
• Consumersarepayingpriceswhicharehighrelativetothebenefitstheyprovide.
  This is potentially driven by a disconnect between the cost of providing the funeral and the price of the plan. This could be as a result of commission paid to intermediarieswhichprovideslittleornobenefittoconsumers
• Poorgovernanceandcontrolswithinfirms,withalackofoversighttodeterpoor
  practices
• Some plans in the market do not deliver in line with consumers’ needs or
  expectations and plans are often not redeemed as the consumer’s family is not aware of them
• Poorfinancialmanagementoffirms,ortheextractionoflargecommissionsfrom
  themoneypaidbycustomers,meansthatsufficientfundsmaynotbeavailableto cover funeral liabilities. This leads to the risk that consumers may not receive their funeral

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Drivers of harm
4. We consider that the harm in the prepaid funeral plan market is a result of a number of
market failures. These are:

• Complexityanddifficultyofaccessinginformationforconsumers(alsoknownas
  ‘asymmetric information’)
• Mismatches between the interests and incentives offirmsandconsumers,asit
  maybeintheinterestsoffirmstosellasmanyplansaspossible,regardlessof whether or not they meet the consumer’s needs. This is particularly likely to occur where plans are sold by third-party intermediaries who have no further involvement with (or responsibility to) the consumer once the plan is sold. This can lead to poor andmisleadingsalespracticesbyfirms
• Behaviouraldistortionswhichaffecthowconsumersmakedecisions
• Presence of externalities
  Complexity and difficulty accessing product information

5. Information asymmetry between consumers and firms may reduce consumers’ ability
   to assess whether their purchase is appropriate. Although funeral plans are purchased for the single purpose of providing a funeral, a range of factors mean they are relatively complex products.

• In its Provisional Decision ReporttheCMAidentifiedfourteendifferentaspectsof
  astandardfuneralservice;mostofwhichneedtobepre‑specifiedinafuneralplan (suchastypeofcoffin,andnumberofvehicles)
• Of the services covered, funeral plans cover some costs in full (such as the funeral
  director’sfee)butusuallyonlyofferacontributiontowardsothercosts(suchasthe burialplot,thecostofwhichvariessignificantlyacrosstheUK)
• Mostfuneralplansoffermultipledifferentpaymentoptions,whichtheconsumer
  needs to consider. Some options carry the risk that, where the plan is not fully paid for at the time of death, the consumer’s family may be required to make a significantpaymentbeforethefuneralisprovided.Somemayalsoleadtothe consumerpayingsignificantlymorethantheheadlinepriceoftheplan
• All funeral plans are currently backed by a trust or insurance policy independent
  of the provider. While this structure is designed to facilitate the operation of the product,consumersmayfinditdifficulttocompareproductsintermsoftheirability to deliver services.
• Funeral plans can include a number of additional charges. In those cases where the
  plan concludes with the return of the consumer’s payments rather than a funeral, firmswilltypicallydeductacancellationfee.Commissionandadministrationfees may also be removed from upfront payments

6. Paragraph 34 below sets out the market research we have undertaken. Our research
   has indicated that any pre-contract information is generally focused on the plan benefits, and rarely gives equal prominence to information about limits and exclusions, nor to the risk that the consumer’s family may need to make additional payments. Full plan terms and conditions are often hard to locate on providers’ websites, and sometimes are not available at all.
7. Additionally, there are no genuine comparison services operating in this market, nor
   any intermediaries selling plans representing the whole of the market. This makes it difficult for consumers to effectively compare between providers and shop around, weakening demand-side pressure. Consequently, there is a significant risk that consumers will not obtain the product that best meets their needs.

CP21/4
Annex 1
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation The Fairer Finance report cites evidence that a substantial proportion (42%) of consumers believe that all of their funeral costs would be covered by the plan, even though no funeral plan currently covers all the costs typically associated with a funeral. A further 21% of consumers did not know whether all their funeral costs would be covered. Specifically related to longer term instalment plans, our survey of funeral plan firms, conducted in August 2019, found that some firms have sold plans with long instalment periods where up to a third of the plans do not result in a funeral being provided. Mismatches between consumers’ interests and firms’ incentives Consumers’ interests may not align with firms’ interests, particularly where the firm is incentivised to make a short-term profit on the sale of the plan, whereas the consumer is looking at the longer-term provision of their funeral. This can incentivise plan sales irrespective of whether they meet the consumer’s needs and/or may lead to high prices. Our firm surveys identified four distribution channels and commission arrangements:

1. direct to consumer, 2) through an independent funeral director, 3) through an
   independent third-party and 4) through a vertically integrated intermediary (see figure 1). We use the term ‘intermediary’ to cover all firms who distribute funeral plans but do not enter into the plans themselves.
   Figure 1: distribution channels and commission arrangements
   Channel 1 Channel 2 Channel 3 Channel 4
   Product manufacturer
   Intermediary/ distributor
   Consumer
   ˜ ˜
   ˜ ˜
   ˜
   Plan provider Plan provider
   Director
   Independent Funeral
   Customer Customer
   ˜
   ˜
   ˜
   ˜ Plan provider Plan provider
   (vertically integrated)
   Other independent
   3rd party
   Intermediary
   (vertically integrated)
   Customer Customer
   33% Share of total sales 28% 28% 10%
   Key
   Commission ˘ow Product ˘ow
   Source: FCA analysis of information gathered from a combination of: i) FPA statistics; ii) Firm surveys in 2019 and 2020; iii) Firm meetings; & iv) other intelligence. As such the information and conclusions reached should be treated as best estimates under uncertainty. Based on these distribution channels and commission arrangements, as well as the nature of the product itself, we have identified a number of specific features that generate a mismatch in interests and appear to exacerbate the risk of harm in the market:

• Third party intermediaries have no further involvement with (or responsibility to)
  the consumer once the plan is sold. They will typically receive commission for eachsaletheymake.Dataprovidedbyfirmsinbothour2019and2020surveys

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
shows the average third party commission to be approximately £550. We have seen evidence that high up-front commissions of up to £900 are being paid to intermediaries.Theseratesaretypicallyonaslidingscale,withfirmsreceiving higher commission for selling more expensive plans. Information we have received fromfirmsindicatestherearerelativelyweakarrangementsinplacetoclawback commission where the product has been sold incorrectly or the consumer cancels theplan.Thesefactorsmeanthatfirmsareincentivisedtosellmoreexpensive plans regardless of whether they meet the consumer’s needs, and there is limited disincentivetotheminusingpoorsalestacticstomaximisetheirprofits.

• Even though funeral directors typically do not receive commission for selling plans,
  they may still be incentivised to sell in a way that isn’t aligned with the consumer’s interests on the basis that they are guaranteed to receive the income from providing the funeral at a later date. Funeral directors deliver funerals and are paid as part of that service for doing so. The amount they are paid may increase with inflation.However,thereisariskthatiffuneraldirectorsarepaidhigherpricesto deliver funeral plan funerals than they would otherwise receive from delivering comparableat‑needfunerals.Thisdifferenceinpricewouldbeakintoaformof commission and could incentivise them to sell plans which do not meet customers’ needs.
• There is evidence of high-pressure sales tactics such as persistent contact, which
  can cause consumers to feel distressed. Fairer Finance cites survey evidence that 30% of people contacted about funeral plans felt they were being pushed to take outtheplan.Consumers’willingnesstoshoparoundmaybeinfluencedbysales practices.
• Theconsumerisalwaysdeceasedatthepointwheretheplanisfulfilled.Thiscan
  be many years after the plan was purchased. Family members are likely to be less aware than the consumer of the plan features, or any assurances given at the point of sale. This reduces the likelihood of the provider receiving complaints over the use of poor or misleading sales tactics and therefore their incentive to ensure suitability. Behavioural distortions which affect how consumers make decisions

13. Behavioural biases can prevent consumers from choosing the best course of action.
    These biases may be particularly prevalent among people purchasing a funeral plan given the emotive nature of the purchase. Our understanding from industry engagement is that it is common for consumers to contact funeral directors about arranging a funeral for a loved one who recently died, and to then purchase a funeral plan for themselves as a result of this (an ‘at need’ funeral).
14. Biases that may affect consumers’ decisions about the purchase of a funeral plan
    include:

• Reference dependence and loss aversion: Consumers’ decisions may vary
  depending on how an alternative scenario is presented. For example, a decision not to purchase a plan may be framed by the seller as a potential loss if the alternative is a situation where the consumer has to pay higher prices in the future.
• Framing, salience and limited attention: Consumers typically focus their attention
  on a few points (e.g. the price) to the detriment of other important information (e.g. plan exclusions or cancellation fees). This may also drive how providers or intermediaries present information, which may exacerbate the excessive focus on particular aspects of a product. This is a particular issue in the funeral plan market, because an inappropriate focus on the monthly price may lead to consumers purchasing plans which are longer in duration but have lower monthly prices. This

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15.
16.
17.
18. creates the risk that the consumer does not complete payments for their plan
before they die and increase the likelihood that their relatives will be required to make additional payments before the funeral is provided.

• Regret aversion and emotions: Consumers can worry that not making a purchase
  now may lead to regret later in life. This may put pressure on a consumer to make a quick purchase decision. There are two key drivers of this emotion in this market:
  – Aswithotherfinancialproducts,salesconductbyfirmsmayleadtoconsumers feeling pressured into making a purchase. Fairer Finance cites several examples ofsalespeopleemphasisingthatanofferistemporaryandhastobetakenup now, creating higher regret aversion. – Consumerchoicesmayalsobeinfluencedbythestrongemotionsbrought about by the nature of funeral plan products. Our review of the current marketing of funeral plans shows a strong focus on the idea of protecting loved ones. Consumers may fear being a burden on their relatives after their death if they do not purchase a plan in good time before they might die.
• Social influence: The perceived trustworthiness of a salesperson may distort
  judgement and become a substitute for a reasoned judgement. This may be a particular factor with regards to the sale of funeral plans to elderly vulnerable consumers. The combination of behavioural biases and asymmetric information, especially if targeted through firms’ sales practices, reduces a consumer’s ability to assess the value of funeral plans, and to compare products and charges across different funeral plan providers. As well as directly impacting a consumer’s ability to choose a suitable product, these factors indirectly hinder effective competition in the market for funeral plans. They contribute to the harms around consumers purchasing unsuitable products and paying higher prices than they otherwise would do in an effective market. Presence of externalities A negative externality occurs when the social cost of producing a good or service is higher than the private cost. If firms are not subject to the full cost of their actions, that good or service may be over-produced relative to the socially optimal level. In the case of funeral plans, externalities may exist in the form of firms operating in a riskier manner than is optimal. Firms may be incentivised to focus on short term profits at the cost of not sufficiently investing in the stability of their business. For instance, firms may use more aggressive investment strategies to increase profits and put a lower proportion of the revenue from plans into trusts. We have seen examples of firms incentivising high sales volumes through the use of high commissions, to the detriment of their trust’s solvency. Such an approach comes with an increased risk of trust insolvency and therefore firm failure. If such a failure occurs the owners, who have limited liability, would incur private costs in terms of lost future profits. However, the failure also generates a negative externality in the form of additional social costs for:
• Consumersofthefailedfirmwhodonotreceiveafuneraland/orsomeoralloftheir
  money back
• Otherfirmswhomustpayforcompensationtotheaffectedconsumers(indirectly,
  through the FSCS levy) or who lose business due to consumers’ damaged confidenceandlackofparticipationinthemarket.

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19. We are not aware of any plan providers having gone out of business. However, in the
context of the other harms we have identified, this is not surprising. We are concerned that there are some practices in the sector that might increase the probability of a failure and the potential impact of failure on plan holders; especially once our regulation is brought in.
20. These concerns particularly apply to trust-based models. We are concerned about
the opacity of trusts’ performance and solvency positions. The limited information we have seen suggests that some plan providers may be meeting current costs of funerals through unsustainable sales growth, and some trusts may not have sufficient resources to meet their future liabilities. Some firms have failed to respond to our requests for information regarding the financial position of their trusts. Overview of our proposed intervention
21. We propose to apply rules to providers and intermediaries in the funeral plan market
which are similar to those for over-50s insurance products in the Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS). Alongside this we have identified a number of areas where we consider that there is justification to apply additional rules, specific to the funeral plans market. How we intend to address consumers buying unsuitable products or without awareness of product features
22. To address this harm, we propose to:

• Improve consumer awareness of plan features by enhancing disclosure at the point
  of sale, and with an annual statement
• Improve awareness of plan features for the consumer’s family by providing them
  with important information shortly after the sale
• Requirefirmstoacthonestly,fairly,andprofessionally,aswellasrequiringfinancial
  communications and promotions to be clear, fair, and not misleading, and clearly identifiableasmarketingmaterial
• Prohibitremunerationandperformancemanagementofemployeesthatconflicts
  with the customer’s best interests and may incentivise poor sales practices
• Improvesalesstandardsbyrequiringfirmstoensurethattheplantheyareoffering
  isconsistentwiththeconsumer’sdemandsandneeds.Wherefirmsareoffering advice,theywillneedtoensurethisissuitableandthattheplanbeingofferedisthe one that best meets the consumer’s needs
• Prohibit commission payments to intermediaries, with the aim of removing
  incentives to use poor sales practices. Intermediaries will be permitted to charge separate advice or arrangement fees, which would need to be clearly disclosed

23. All of these proposals will interact with our proposals to apply our Product Governance
    sourcebook (PROD), which would mean plan providers must consider a range of factors when designing a product and ensure that the product is appropriate for its intended target market. They will also need to select distribution channels which ensure their plans are only sold to those within the defined target market
24. We consider that these requirements, taken together, would also lead to an
    improvement in the quality and prices of plans on the market, as well as fewer

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25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation unexpected costs or exclusions at point of claim. The mechanisms through which we expect this to occur are set out in the causal chain and in the benefits section. How we intend to address high prices and improve the quality of plans To address this harm directly, in addition to the indirect effect of the measures above, we propose to require plan providers to implement a comprehensive product design and approval process. The key points are:

• Plans will need to be designed and regularly reviewed to ensure that they are
  consistentwiththeneeds,objectivesandcharacteristicsofadefinedtarget market. This includes ensuring that the price of the plan provides fair value; that thereisareasonablerelationshipbetweentheprice,andthequalityandbenefits provided by the plan
• Firms must not manufacture plans that risk not providing a funeral if the consumer
  dies without completing their instalment payments
• Providerswillneedtoensurethattheirownremunerationdoesnotconflictwith
  their duty to act in the customer’s best interests
• Providers will need to select distribution channels which ensure their plans are only
  sold to consumers in the target market
• Providers will be prevented from paying a commission to intermediaries. This will
  reduce the impact of commission on prices, and prevent customers indirectly paying for an intermediary service that provides them with little or no value The rules will also impose requirements on plan distributors. The key points are:
• Distributors will need to ensure they understand the plan’s target market and
  distribute the product accordingly.
• Intermediaries will be prohibited from receiving a commission or other payment for
  distributing funeral plans, other than directly from the consumer. This will ensure that commission does not lead to a high price that lacks a fair relationship to the cost of the funeral and the quality of the services provided. In addition, we propose to ban the sale of plans with an instalment period unless they provide a guarantee that the funeral will be provided without further contribution from the consumer’s estate. We also propose to ban cancellation fees in situations where they would amount to a payment for no beneficial service, and a requirement that all other fees be reflective of costs. Currently, while the majority of providers distribute plans through multiple channels (e.g. direct and through intermediaries), most intermediaries sell plans from only a single provider. This is likely to lead to inflation of commission, as providers compete to be able to place business through that intermediary. How we intend to address the risk of firms having insufficient funds to meet their liabilities Our proposed rules will require firms to have sufficient money within the trust or insurance arrangements backing their plans to meeting 100% of their liabilities. Firms will be prevented from withdrawing money from trusts (other than for funerals) unless the trust solvency level is at a minimum of 110%.

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30.
31.
32.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation The prudential rules aim to ensure that firms hold sufficient high-quality capital to continue operating their business and meet their liabilities and other contingencies. In addition, our resolution requirements and the introduction of FSCS protection help ensure that consumers are protected in the event of firm failures. The mechanisms through which we expect this to occur are set out in the causal chain and in the benefits section. How we expect our rules to reduce harm in the Funeral Plan market The causal chains in this section set out how the proposed regime will reduce the harms identified. These harms are explained in detail in the Consultation Paper.
Figure 2: Expected impact of our proposed rules concerning distribution commission and
remuneration
New rules on employee remuneration and ban commission payments Harm reduced Consumers purchase products that better suit their needs Lower prices of funeral plans Improved psychological well being Employees incentives better align with customers’ interests Firms change their distribution strategies and negotiate alternative renumeration structure Customers are o˜ered products better matched to their needs Providers are incentivised to o˜er and distribute competitively priced funeral plans Increased competition over funeral plans

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Figure 3: Expected impact of our rules concerning sales standards, cancellation and disclosure
Customers are more easily able to shop around and compare plans Firms required to identify customers’ needs and assess them against available products Customers have a better understanding of available products and costs Increased competition on price and quality Customers make informed decisions about products Enhanced disclosure, new sales standards for advised and non-advised sales and 30 days cancellation period Firms present customers with plans that meet their needs Harm reduced Lower prices of funeral Plans Higher quality funeral plans available Improved psychological well being Consumers purchase products that better suit their needs
Figure 4: Expected impact of our proposed rules concerning other communications
Harm reduced Improvement in the quality of available plans Improved psychological well being Product more likely to be used by friends and family No more nuisance calls Customer’s family have better awareness of plan features Requirement to alert the customer’s family of plan features Ban cold calling

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Figure 5: Expected impact of our proposed rules concerning funeral plan design
Harm reduced Consumers purchase products that better meet their needs Improved psychological well being Improvement in the price and quality of available plans Products designed to meet the needs of, and deliver value to, the target market Fewer unsuitable or poor performing products are available on the market Firms put product approval processes in place Ban on plans which risk not providing funerals Ban some cancellation fees and restrict other fees
Figure 6: Expected impact of rules prudential requirements, resolution and compensation rules
Harm reduced
Improved consumer conÿdence in the market
Customers are more likely to receive the service, a reimbursement or appropriate compensation New prudential rules New resolution rules New compensation rules (FSCS protection) Firms hold su°cient capital to meet regulatory requirements Trust and insurance arrangements su°cient to meet liabilities For new plans, ÿrms ensure that customer’s contracts are likely to be carried out by another provider, or consumers are reimbursed FSCS can protect customers following the failure of a funeral plan provider or distributor Reduced risk of disorderly ÿrm failure FSCS can pay compensation to consumers (or their estate or a relevant third party) to cover losses su˛ered Firms manage prudential risk

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Our analytical approach
33. This CBA looks at the following elements to understand the potential impact of our
proposed approach to regulating funeral plan providers and intermediaries:

• thelikelycoststofirms
• the elements of our proposals that may increase costs to consumers
• thelikelybenefitstoconsumers

34. We have produced the analysis in this Annex based on evidence from the following
    sources:

• A survey undertaken in July 2019. This covered 31 funeral plan providers and 300
  intermediaries (our ‘funeral plan survey’). We received 19 responses from plan providers, and 50 responses from intermediaries, although response rates to individualquestionsvariedsignificantly.Based on sales volumes, we estimate the survey covered approximately 75% of the market. Where this did not provide us withsufficientdatatogenerateanestimateofcosts,forsometypesoffirm,we supplemented this with other data and market intelligence
• Toassessthepotentialcostsandbenefitsofourproposalsonlongterm
  instalment plans, in June 2020 we undertook a survey of 11 funeral plan providers about their use of long-term instalment plans. We received 11 responses, although response rates to individual questions varied. We estimate this survey covered approximately 35% of the market
• Views and insight gathered as part of our engagement with industry in between
  July and November 2020
• Data from other sources, including the Treasury’s consultation, and reports
  published by consumer groups (‘the Fairer Finance report’) and providers of funeral plans (‘the Dignity report’)
• Our experience and wider knowledge of the costs associated with regulation,
  including using our Standardised Cost Model Baseline and key assumptions

35. This CBA considers the impacts of our proposals for the regulation of funeral plan
    providers and intermediaries.
36. The Funeral Planning Authority (FPA) is the current industry-established regulator of
    funeral plan providers. It publishes Rules and a Code of Practice for member providers. The FPA does not regulate intermediaries.
37. The FPA published a revised set of rules in January 2020. The new FPA rules cover
    cancellation periods, improved disclosure of costs during a sales process, and producing a document summarising those costs. By the time the FCA takes over regulation of funeral plans, these rules will be over two years old. Whilst the FPA is not a statutory regulator, and it is possible for firms to operate outside its scope, just over 60% of providers are members. However, it is estimated that around 95% of funeral plans are sold by FPA members, indicating that providers who are not members are likely to be small firms. Therefore, in our baseline we assume the January 2020 rules are already embedded into the conduct of the largest provider firms. We assume that the non-FPA regulated providers who represent 5% of the market as well as intermediaries will incur additional costs. We assume that the FPA regulated providers

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38.
39.
40.
41.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation incur additional costs only where our proposed rules intend to deliver different outcomes to the FPA 2020 Code. There is no current comprehensive register of plan providers or intermediaries in the funeral plan market. We have therefore estimated the current size of the market from available data, including the CMA market study on funerals and our engagement with the industry. We estimate that there are 48 providers and 2,348 intermediaries expected to be engaging in regulated activities and in scope of our proposals. Some providers may choose not to apply. Of the intermediaries, based on responses to the survey, we expect that approximately three quarters of these will choose to become Appointed Representatives (ARs) rather than be directly regulated. Of those that responded to the funeral plan survey, no plan providers and only 4% of intermediaries said they would not seek FCA authorisation or AR status. For the purposes of this CBA we have assumed that all firms who apply will be successful in their applications and will continue to take on new business. We are expecting a significant number of plan providers to become principal firms to ARs. For the purposes of this CBA, we considered whether the costs are likely to be borne by the AR directly or by the principal firm and have allocated the costs accordingly. We anticipate that firms of different sizes will incur different costs. We have therefore developed the following assumptions of plan providers of different sizes that will remain in the regulated market based on responses to our survey and wider market intelligence, including from the CMA’s work on funeral plans. We have used these assumptions when calculating the compliance costs to firms. We have not separated intermediaries by size as the low number of responses to questions about cost would not enable us to generate estimates if we split the sample, although we recognise that there will be some variation.
Table 1: Assumptions of number of firms by size and type used for our estimates
Firm type
Provider – large
Estimated number
Provider – medium 6
Provider – small 40
Intermediary (authorised) 610
Appointed Representatives 1,738
42. All of the large and medium providers in our survey were members of the FPA. Though
the FPA’s members together sell 95% of funeral plans, the information we have received indicates that 70-80% of plans are sold by the three largest providers.
43. In our CBA:

• Unlessstatedotherwise,allreferencesto‘average’arethemeanaverage
• All price estimates are in nominal terms
• Whenestimatingnetpresentvalueofcostsandbenefitsweusea3.5%discount
  rate as per The Treasury’s Green Book
• Weassumethatallfirmswillfullycomplywiththerulesweimplement

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44. Unlessotherwisestated,ourestimatesofcostarebasedontheaveragecosts
estimated by respondents to our funeral plan survey. An average is created for each firm size and type, and multiplied by the anticipated number of firms in that category shown in Table 1. Adding these estimates together provides us with an estimate of market-wide costs.
45. It is important to note that our per-firm estimates set out in this CBA have been
generated purely to increase the robustness of industry-level estimates. Per-firm cost estimates correspond to the mean cost, and do not capture the potentially wide range of costs that a particular firm may incur. For the avoidance of doubt, individual funeral plan providers or intermediaries may in practice bear costs greater or lesser than the per-firm averages used to estimate overall costs to the industry. This will depend, among other things, on the firm’s individual size, makeup, and current practices. Firms should consider our proposals in relation to their specific operation and provide feedback on this basis, supported by evidence where they believe costs differ.
46. We received responses regarding costs from a small proportion of the estimated
number of intermediary firms. Our estimates of the total costs to the market are based upon those responses that we received.
47. The CBA does not include an assessment of the direct impacts of the Government’s
decision to amend the Regulated Activities Order to remove the exemption for funeral plans. The Treasury has produced its own impact assessment (IA) for this. This includes the application of the Threshold Conditions which will be relevant to firms seeking authorisation as a result of amendments to the RAO.
48. Similarly, where there are further requirements under separate whistle-blowing
legislation (the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998), we have not included these impacts in the CBA.
49. We have also not included in this CBA our proposed application of The Fees Manual
(FEES).Undersection138IofFSMA,theFCAisexemptfromtherequirementtocarry out and publish a cost benefit analysis for such proposals.
50. Most of our proposed conduct rules will only apply to plans distributed or entered
intofrom29 July2022onwards.Wehaveassessedtheirimpactonthatbasis.Where rules are proposed to apply to existing funeral plans, we have accounted for this in our analysis.
51. In the last 12 months the coronavirus situation has had an unprecedented impact
onUKpublichealth,theglobalmacroeconomyandspecificfinancialmarkets.How long such conditions will continue, and their effects, are currently highly uncertain. However, such effects will likely have lasting impacts for the Funeral Plans market in terms of sales, operations and plan drawdown. This has implications for our CBA, which has been produced during 2020 and early 2021 and draws in part on data collected in
2019. Principally, it significantly increases the uncertainty around the counterfactual
against which we have assessed the impact of our policies. For example:

• ThelatestdatafromtheFPAshowsthatplansalesbyFPAmembersforthefirst
  halfof2020were74,600,whichissignificantlylessthanhalfofthesalesforevery preceding year back to 2013. For context, there were 165,200 sales in 2019, 177,000 sales in 2018 and 207,700 sales in 2017. Approximately 5% of all sales in themarketaremadebynon‑FPAmembers.TheFPAfigureshavebeenadjusted

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toreflectthis.Forexample,for2019theadjustedtotalsalesfigureis173,895.We usecomparablefigureswhereverpossible.Thedatafromthe2019surveycovered theyear2018,soweuse2018salesfigures.TotalsalesusedthroughoutthisCBA varies according to the date of the corresponding survey year.

• Atthesametime,planredemptionswereat67,300forthefirsthalfof2020.Ifthis
  is replicated in the second half, it would mean that 2020 had almost 30,000 more redemptions than any other year. Data from the CMA18 implies that approximately 99,000funeralswerepre‑paidthroughfuneralplansin2018.Weusethisfigurein the rest of the CBA.
• Ithasnotbeenreasonablypracticabletoestimatecertainbenefitsandcosts
  relatingtochangesinfirmrevenueorprofits.Wherethisisthecaseitismadeclear throughout this document and further explanations are provided where relevant. In many cases it is due to the uncertainty of the counterfactual generated by the impact of Covid-19. Any estimates provided make use of best available information from the sources outlined above. Summary of costs and benefits

52. The total costs we estimate to the funeral plans sector are set out in table 2. Where we
    have been unable to provide a single estimate, we have provided a range to reflect our estimates of the highest and lowest costs which may result from our proposals.
53. Our rules will address market failures and make the funeral plan sector work better for
    consumers. We expect to see improvements in sales standards and product quality. We expect consumers to gain from funeral plans being better designed and targeted to ensure that they meet the needs of consumers and are priced in a way that offers fair value, primarily by ensuring that they are provided with the agreed funeral services.
54. In addition, we expect the following benefits:

• anendtonuisancecalls,becauseourproposalswillprohibitfirmsfrommaking
  unsolicited contact with consumers
• reduced risks of disorderly funeral plan provider failure that would result in plan
  holders being unable to recover funds
• anincreaseinthepsychologicalbenefitsthatafuneralplancanprovidetoboth
  consumersandtheirfamily/friends,throughgreaterconfidencethattheplanwill provide the expected service, and a reduction in cases where the consumer’s estateisrequiredtodealwithpracticalorfinancialissuesrelatingtothefuneral

55. Due to the practical challenges associated with monetising and quantifying these
    benefits (particularly those relating to psychological and wellbeing factors), we consider it not reasonably practicable to produce monetary estimates for the benefits of a number of our proposals and provide an explanation as to why that is the case.
56. We have produced a breakeven analysis to provide an indication of the overall scale of the
    anticipated benefits. This estimates the benefits which will need to be realised for the proposed package to be net beneficial given the compliance costs incurred by firms. The breakeven analysis excludes the costs for policies whose benefits are a direct transfer from firms to consumers. We estimate total one off costs of £40m – £41.5m and total ongoing 18 See paragraph 2.16 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fdb557e8fa8f54d5733f5a1/Funerals_-_Final_report.pdf

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annual costs of £16.8m – £25.3m (see table 2 for detailed breakdown). Most of the benefits are unquantified (except for about £820k-£4m benefits related to conduct rules) but we estimate that for our intervention to be net beneficial in monetary terms, the average existing plan holder would need to realise between £52 and £66 in benefits (or 1.1% – 1.6% of the average plan price) and the average new consumer would need to realise between £62 and £95 in benefits (or 1.4% – 2.3% of the average plan price). Costs to firms
57. In line with our analytical approach, baseline and assumptions set out above, we have
assessed the following costs shown in table 2 below. Rows shown in italics indicate that we expect some or all of the costs to be a direct transfer from firms to consumers:
Table 2: Detailed total costs of the proposed package of interventions
Familiarisation costs
One‑off costs
£1.8m
Ongoing costs
None
High-level standards £1.2m – £1.4m £8.7m – £12m Principles for Businesses Notquantified Notquantified Systems and Control £1.2m – £1.4m £8.7m – £12m General Provisions Minimalsignificance Minimalsignificance Conduct Rules £4.9m – £6m £1.4m – £5.1m Customer’s best interest rule Notquantified Notquantified Consumer communications and marketing £100k – £1.3m Minimalsignificance Ongoing post-contractual disclosure £434k £0-£173k Pre-contract disclosure £434k Minimalsignificance Informationaboutfirmsandservices £3.1m Minimalsignificance Disclosure to the consumer’s representative £434k £0 – £173k Sales standards £266k £1.2m Nomination of a funeral director Minimalsignificance Minimalsignificance Cancellation rights £7k Not quantified Fees Minimal significance £124k – £249k Remuneration of intermediaries £117K Notquantified Handling plan redemptions Minimalsignificance Minimalsignificance Prohibition on some instalment plans Minimal significance £212k – £3.5m19 Product governance £502k £1.2m Implementation Costs £502k £1.2m Product changes Notquantified Notquantified Senior Managers and Certification Regime £14.9m – £15.1 £4.6m – £6.1m SC&MR £7.7m – £7.8m £2.2m – £3.1m 19 We estimate a potential consumer benefit of £1.69m - £2m, based on the deceased person’s estate no longer being required to make up any outstanding instalment payments. The cost to firms will depend on how firms opt to comply with our proposed rules

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Approved persons regime
One‑off costs
£7.2m – £7.3m
Ongoing costs
£2.4m – £3m
Prudential rules £15.2m £718k
Rules on use of trust or insurance model Minimalsignificance Minimalsignificance Prudential requirements £15.2m £718k Other handbook rules £1.5m £153k – £237k Resolution £1.3m £153k–£237kquantified FSCS £150k Notquantified Dispute resolution Notquantified £394 Supervision and reporting Notquantified Notquantified Total £40m – £41.5m £16.8m – £25.3m Familiarisation costs
58. We expect firms affected by our intervention will read relevant changes put forward as
part of the proposals in this consultation paper and will familiarise themselves with the
detailed requirements of the proposed rules and guidance.
59. We have estimated the costs of this to firms based on assumptions on the time
required to read the 180 pages-long consultation paper. We assume that there are 300 words per page and reading speed is 100 words per minute. This means that the document would take 3.5 hours to read. We convert this into a monetary value by applying an estimate of the cost of time to firms, as set out in Table 3.
60. Table 3 outlines the total familiarisation costs by firm size as well as the main
assumptions used to estimate these costs. In total, we estimate that the one-off industry cost of familiarisation would be £775k.
Table 3: Familiarisation cost staff numbers and hourly salaries assumptions
Firm category
Large-sized funeral plan providers
Number of staff required to read the consultation paper Hourly staff salary (£) Total familiarisation costs £8k Medium-sized funeral plan providers 5 63 £7k Small-sized funeral plan providers, intermediaries and ARs 2 45 £760k Sources: FCA approach to CBA
61. Following familiarisation with the proposals put forward, we expect firms to conduct a
legal review of the proposals and a gap analysis to check their current practices against expectations.
62. We have estimated this cost to firms based on assumptions on the time required to
read the 177 pages-long legal text, taking 8.1 hours to read.
63. Table 4 outlines the total legal review costs by firm size as well as the main assumptions
used to estimate these costs. In total, the one-off industry cost of the legal review is estimated to be £1.1m.

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Table 4: Legal review cost staff numbers and hourly salaries assumptions
Firm category
Large funeral plan providers
Number of legal staff required to conduct the review Hours per team member required to read 50 pages of legal text 2.5 Hourly staff salary (£) Total legal review cost £4k Medium funeral plan providers 2 2.5 69 £7k Small funeral plan providers, intermediaries and ARs 1 2.5 55 £1.1m Source: FCA approach to CBA High-level standards
64. In taking on the regulation of funeral plan providers and intermediaries, we are
proposing to apply our high-level standards. For example, the Principles for Businesses (PRIN), the Systems and Control requirements (SYSC), and the General Provisions (GEN) will apply to funeral plan providers and intermediaries.
65. These high-level standards provide funeral plan providers and intermediaries with a
clear statement of the standards of behaviour we expect of FCA-regulated firms. Principles for Businesses
66. Our Principles for Businesses (known as PRIN) are a general statement of the
fundamental obligations that FCA-regulated funeral plan providers and intermediaries must comply with at all times.
67. We consider that most of the requirements in PRIN are in line with the FPA Principles of
Business introduced in January 2020. FPA member firms should therefore already be meeting these standards.
68. We recognise that funeral plan providers and intermediaries that are not members
of the FPA may not be currently meeting these standards, and so may incur costs of complying with PRIN.
69. We do not consider it reasonably practicable to estimate the costs and benefits of
complying with the Principles generally. This is because:

• AsthePrinciplesarehigh‑levelstatementsofrequirementsonfirmsfromwhich
  most other rules stem, we do not consider it reasonably practicable to estimate the costs of complying with PRIN alone, as these costs are inextricably linked to the costs of complying with the more detailed rules.
• ComplyingwithPRINmayinsomecasesrequirefirmstotakedifferentactionswith
  regardstodifferentconsumers.Itisnotpossibletoprovideanestimateofthese costs ex ante.

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70.
71.
72.
73.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Systems and Controls Our high-level rules on systems and controls (known as SYSC) set out how firms should organise and manage their affairs. The main requirements of SYSC are:

• Having in place appropriate measures to manage the wide range of risks to the
  firm’sbusiness(e.g.financial,operation,regulatory)
• Ensuringpropercompliance,internalauditandfinancialcrimecontrols
• Managingconflictsofinterest
• Having proper controls over outsourced providers and others (such as appointed
  representatives)
  An important part of SYSC is that firms ensure their employees have the appropriate knowledge and competence to perform their roles. We also propose to require firms to assess that their staff members are of good repute, and that they provide a minimum of 15 hours of training and development per year. This is consistent with our requirements on insurance firms and other regulated sectors. The FPA already has high-level requirements that firms must have:
• Adequate organisational and risk management systems
• Propermanagementofconflictsofinterest
  However, these requirements are not as detailed as the rules in SYSC. Furthermore, they do not cover areas such as due diligence over outsourcing partners and appointed representatives. As such, we believe there will be some additional costs in reviewing the SYSC requirements and setting up the necessary processes. Our estimated costs are set out in table 5 below.
  Table 5: SYSC set-up cost to Firms
  Firm category
  Large-sized funeral plan providers
  Full time equivalent time required to set up procedures – per firm 5 days Wage cost per hour (£) Total costs £4k Medium-sized funeral plan providers 5 days 63 £14k Small-sized funeral plan providers and intermediaries 1 day 45 £806k Market-wide costs £824k Source: FCA approach to CBA, CP18/15

74. We asked firms to provide estimates of the costs they would incur in meeting our
    requirements for staff knowledge and competence; including the requirement to provide 15 hours of training and development per year. Most providers responded to these questions. However, most intermediaries who responded to our survey were unable to tell us whether they expected to incur additional training costs or not, although some indicated clearly whether they would or would not. We have, therefore, assumed a range of possible market-wide costs, based on responses to our 2019 survey. The lower estimate is based solely on those intermediaries who told us they would incur costs (863 firms). The upper estimate is based on all intermediaries whose survey responses indicated they may incur costs (1,869 firms). The figures for intermediaries include appointed representatives.

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Table 6: Training Costs
Firm category
Large-sized funeral plan providers
One‑Off Costs by firm type (total £)
£85k
Ongoing Costs by firm type (total £)
£120k
Medium-sized funeral plan providers £4k £190k Small-sized funeral plan providers £98k £1.1m Intermediaries £192k-£416k £548k-£1,187k Market-wide Costs £379k – £603k £2.0m – £2.6m Source: FCA approach to CBA
75. We also asked firms about whether they currently conduct checks on their staff,
and the costs incurred. Just under 57% of firms do not currently do so and we have reflected this in the market-wide cost estimate at Table 7. Some intermediaries provided us with estimates of the total costs they would incur, whereas others told us the cost per staff member. As we do not know exactly how many staff members these firms have, we have provided a range of costs, based on responses to our 2019 survey. The lower estimate assumes that firms have 10 employees. The high estimate assumes they have 50.
Table 7: Costs of the good repute requirements
Firm category
Large-sized funeral plan providers
Ongoing Costs by firm type (total £)
£20k
Medium-sized funeral plan providers £143k
Small-sized funeral plan providers £505k
Intermediaries £6m – £8.6m
Market-wide Costs £6.7m – £9.3m
Source: FCA approach to CBA
76. These costs will be offset to some extent by the benefits that firms will receive from
having a better trained workforce. However, it is not reasonably practicable to more broadly estimate the benefits for the same reasons as outlined in the Principles
section above.
77. Aspects of SYSC that relate to the Senior Manager and Certification Regime are
considered in a separate section.
General Provisions
78. Our General Provisions (known as GEN) contain rules that mainly cover the
administrative duties that apply to all the firms we regulate. These rules aim to make sure consumers are not misled, that all firms operate on a level playing field, and that firms are transparent about their regulatory status.
79. They also ban firms from taking out indemnity insurance to cover any financial
penalties they pay for not complying with our rules. This will be a new requirement for funeral plan providers and intermediaries. However, as there is currently no statutory regulator of the funeral plans sector, no firm has any reason to hold such insurance. As such, we do not consider that complying with this requirement will have any costs for firms beyond familiarisation, which are already captured above.

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80. We also propose that funeral plan providers and intermediaries provide a basic rate
telephone line for consumers in relation to contracts entered in to with the provider or intermediary. This is a general requirement for all other FCA-authorised firms. To our knowledge there are no providers or intermediaries that currently use premium rate telephone lines, so we do not expect there to be any costs for firms beyond familiarisation, which are already captured above. Conduct rules
81. In the areas where we are introducing notable extra requirements compared to the
FPA’s standards, we discuss the costs and benefits from our interventions below. The customer’s best interests rule
82. We propose to require firms to act honestly, fairly and professionally in their customer’s
best interests. We have similar rules in several other sectors that we regulate. As with the Principles, we do not consider it is reasonably practicable to provide a general estimate of costs. This is because:

• Costs are inextricably linked to the costs of complying with the more detailed rules.
• Acting in the customer’s best interests may depend on particular circumstances
  andmayinsomecasesrequirefirmstotakedifferentactionswithregardsto differentcustomers,forwhichageneralestimateofcostscannotbegivenex ante. Customer communications and marketing

83. We propose to require that all communications be clear, fair and not misleading. We
    also propose that any adverts must be identifiable as such (rather than, for example, an advertorial). Most firms told us they would not incur costs of doing this, either because they currently comply with these requirements or because they would update their marketing ‘naturally’ over time. We note that the FPA has similar requirements in relation to marketing being clear, fair and not misleading.
84. Only a small number of intermediaries told us that they would be impacted by this
    proposal. However, approximately half of respondents did not reply to the questions we asked about it, and only two provided us with estimates of the cost the proposal would have. Because of the very limited responses we received, we cannot provide a single figure for the total cost firms will incur. If the only intermediaries who incur costs are the proportion who specifically told us they would, then we estimate the costs across the market to be £100k. However, if we include the proportion of firms who did not answer our questions, we estimate the costs across the industry would be £1.3m. The figures for intermediaries include appointed representatives. Pre-contract disclosure Product information disclosure
85. We propose to require funeral plan providers to produce a short summary document
    before entering into an agreement with the consumer. Where an intermediary sells a plan, they will need to provide this document to the customer during the sales process. The current FPA standards already require providers to issue a plan summary document, although these standards are not as prescriptive and detailed as the rules we are proposing. As such, we have assumed that all providers will incur additional

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86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation costs in developing this new product information document. Based on the information in our survey, we expect these to be one-off costs of £40,000 for large providers, £30,000 for medium-sized providers, and £4,400 for smaller providers. This gives a total one-off cost of £434k across the industry. Firms are already required to provide product disclosure documents to customers, so we do not expect there to be any additional ongoing costs. In our survey, only one intermediary indicated that providing a new disclosure document to customers would involve additional costs, which they estimated would be £1,000. As such, we consider that any costs will be of minimal significance. The information must be given either in paper or through an electronic durable medium20; with the customer able to opt for paper copies free of charge. Most firms have told us that they already provide paper copies as a matter of course, and none indicated that there would be any additional cost for meeting this requirement. As we have found that a number of customers are unclear about what their plan does and, crucially, does not cover, it is possible that improving the information disclosure could lead to a reduction in sales. This is because customers may better understand the limitations of the plan being offered, and could decide that there are other products available which are more suitable for them. The literature on disclosure remedies point at large variations in terms of impact on consumer behaviour. Both positive, neutral and negative effects have been found on consumer engagement as a result of disclosure interventions in financial services and other markets. Estimating the impact of our proposals would require specific and detailed information related to our intervention and the affected population. As such we do not consider it is reasonably practicable to estimate the impact that better information disclosure will have on customers’ decision-making in this instance. Information about the firm and its services We are proposing that both providers and intermediaries will need to disclose important information about their firm and the scope of the services they provide. This includes information about whether they provide advice, their complaints process and, for intermediaries, whether they represent a limited number of providers or the whole market. Firms will also be required to make some disclosures concerning their remuneration. We expect the majority of firms to do this through a standardised disclosure document (similar to an initial disclosure document for investment business). Given the standardised nature and typical length of such documents, we consider the one-off costs to plan providers to be broadly the same as the costs of producing the product disclosure document; i.e. £434k across the industry. We only expect minimal, if any, ongoing costs as a result of this proposal. Firms already provide documents
to their customers; this proposal is to standardise and enhance the content of the documents, rather than increase them. The obligations will also apply to intermediaries, who will need to produce their own disclosure documents. We have assumed their costs will be similar to those of a small plan provider, so have used the average cost indicated by small firms (£4,400) as a proxy for intermediaries’ costs in our calculations. We have not included the expected 20 any instrument which enables the recipient to store information addressed personally to the recipient in a way accessible for future reference and for a period of time adequate for the purposes of the information and which allows the unchanged reproduction of the information stored.

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1,738 appointed representatives in the figures, because we expect their disclosure documents will be developed by their principal. On that basis, we expect the one-off cost to all intermediaries to be £2.7m. In practice, this could turn out to be a significant overestimate because:

• We anticipate that plan providers will develop standardised documents on behalf
  of many of the intermediaries they use, reducing the need for each intermediary to individually develop their own documents.
• Some intermediaries are already authorised for other business activities, and so are
  already complying with similar requirements.

92. We have not assumed any ongoing costs, because firms already have these costs in
    providing the documents required by the FPA rules. Our 2019 survey did not indicate that intermediaries were likely to incur ongoing costs in making these disclosures. Disclosure to the customer’s representative and ongoing post-contractual disclosure
93. We are proposing to require plan providers to write to the customer’s nominated
    representative within 5 days of the plan being purchased. The letter will contain key information about the plan and, most importantly, what to do when the customer dies. We are also proposing to require funeral plan firms to provide each customer with an annual statement setting out certain key information about their plan. For each proposal, we expect the costs of setting up these letters to be broadly the same as developing the standardised document, meaning one-off costs of £434k. On that basis, we estimate the total one-off costs across the industry to be £868k. In practice, we expect these figures to be overestimates because most firms will benefit from efficiency savings of makingmultipleITanddocumentchangesthroughasingle project.
94. In addition, there will be ongoing costs of distributing the letters. Firms will be able
    to do this either electronically or on paper; although this must be driven by the customer’s choice. We expect the typical cost of sending these letters by post to be £1 per letter, with a negligible cost to sending them electronically. Based on the average yearly number of new plans sold from 2018-2020 as indicated by the FPA (172,400), the disclosure to the customer’s representative will lead to ongoing costs of £0 to £173k and the post-contractual disclosure (annual statements) to ongoing costs of £0 to £173k per year. We expect the actual cost to be towards the lower end of this range, because firms are likely to send more documents electronically. Sales standards
95. We propose to require providers and intermediaries to assess whether a plan meets
    the demands and needs of a customer. If firms are giving a personal recommendation, they will need to ensure this is suitable and that the product recommended best meets the customer’s needs. Where firms do not already do this, this would involve a one-off cost to amend the sales process and an ongoing cost to apply the process.
96. To comply with these requirements, firms may need to amend their sales processes
    and enhance the level of compliance monitoring they have in place. We expect the costs to be higher where a firm is providing advice. We cannot fully account for this difference in our estimates, because there is currently no distinction in the market between advised and non-advised sales; meaning we do not know how many firms will be giving regulated advice.

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97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Based on the responses we received to our survey, we have produced estimates of the costs that firms will incur in complying with these requirements. There is a risk of ‘double counting’ if the costs of amending the sales process generally are accounted for elsewhere, for example in the cost of complying with PROD or our disclosure requirements. However, to avoid underestimating the costs we have included all costs reported by firms unless they specifically stated that the cost had been counted elsewhere. A significant number of respondents indicated that they could not estimate their costs, so our estimates involve a degree of uncertainty. Firms told us they would incur average one-off costs of £7,250 and average ongoing costs of £58,833. The figures were lower for small providers: £5,750 and £14,500 respectively. Based on this, we estimate the total one-off costs of amending the sales process to assess whether a plan meets the demands and needs of a consumer to be £266k for providers. On an ongoing basis, we estimate these costs as £1.2m for providers. Only one intermediary gave us estimated figures for their costs in our survey. As such, we cannot provide a reasonable estimate for the costs to intermediaries. However, where they are required to amend their sales processes, we expect they would incur similar costs per firm as small plan providers. We also propose to prohibit cold calls unless the recipient of the call has an existing relationship which would lead them to envisage receiving calls. We note that the FPA has banned unsolicited telephone calls, so we do not expect there to be significant additional costs from complying with our rules. We do not believe it is reasonably practicable to estimate costs for the 5% of non-FPA members for two reasons. First, we do not know how many non-FPA funeral plan providers use cold-calling to sell their plans. Second, of those that do use cold-calling, we do not know what percentage of their total sales is done via cold-calling. These requirements are also likely to lead to costs from reduced sales of products. Currently, there is no requirement to ensure products meet customer needs, and no enhanced requirements when giving advice. Some firms may no longer be able to sell as many plans as they do currently. We do not consider it is reasonably practicable to establish the impact on sales volumes, as we would need to know the extent to which current funeral plan sales are being mis-sold under the rules proposed here. This would require us to conduct a detailed review of current sales practices; most likely including significant observation of plans being sold. Requirement to nominate a funeral director We propose to require plan providers to, shortly after the plan is taken out, nominate a funeral director who will carry out the funeral, and put in place contractual agreements to ensure the funeral is delivered. FPA-member firms are already required to
identify the director that will carry out the funeral within four weeks of the plan being purchased. While for other firms this may be a new requirement, the primary effect of this will be to move the point at which a funeral director is attached to a particular plan forward in time, rather than require firms to carry out activity that they would not have otherwise. We therefore consider that any costs of this requirement will be of minimal significance. Cancellation rights We propose to require funeral plan providers to offer a 30-day free cancellation period for a plan. This is in line with current FPA standards, but higher than the requirements 102.

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103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation of the previous FPA standards. To comply with this, firms may need to amend marketing material or terms and conditions, and make changes to their systems to prevent cancellation charges being levied between 14 and 30 days. There may also be some staff training costs to ensure staff are aware of this change. We therefore consider that non-FPA member plan providers may incur one-off costs in meeting this requirement. Based on survey responses we estimate that this will be an average of £2,914 for the 5% of providers in the market who are non-FPA members; giving a total cost of £7k. It is possible that some firms may have additional, ongoing, costs due to being unable to retain any of the customer’s money where they cancel on days 15-30. In practice, we do not consider these costs to be of more than minimal significance. This is because most providers already provide a 30-day cancellation period, and providers also told us that they have very few cancellations during this period. Fees Currently, the vast majority of the funeral plan market charge fees in certain circumstances. The main two types of fees we have seen are cancellation fees and instalment fees; although we have seen a small number of providers levying fees for other types of administration activities (such as making changes to the plan). Our proposals are:

• To prohibit cancellation fees in cases where a planholder dies or cancels during any
  moratorium period under which no funeral is provided
• Tolimitallotherfeestoreflectthecostthefirmincurs(whichcanincludelossof
  investmentprofit,inthecaseofinstalmentfees) In relation to cancellation fees, firms have told us that they charge between £100 and £1,024. The average across the firms we surveyed was £331 per plan. These fees are payable if the customer cancels the plan, but also where the customer dies during the instalment period and their estate opts to have the money returned rather than make up the shortfall. Providers have told us that the large majority of cancellations happen within the 30-day cooling off period. We do not know how many cancellations occur after this period, but within 12 months of the sale. From the survey we can estimate around 37,000 cancellations a year across the whole market. We have assumed that only 1-2% of cancellations (375-750) will be impacted by the prohibition on cancellation fees. This gives a cost to firms of between £125k – £249k as a result of no longer charging cancellation fees. We expect the cost to be towards the lower end of this estimate, as most firms have told us that they have very low rates of cancellation and of plans resulting in money being returned after the customer’s death. The costs will be a direct transfer to consumers. We consider this transfer a direct benefit to consumers as we think that there is no justification for these fees. As our rules on cancellation fees will lead to a loss of revenue for some firms, it is possible that they may seek to recover this through other means (for example, by increasing plan prices). Whether firms decide to do this will be based on a range of factors, such as their financial position and the impact that a price increase would have on their competitive position in the market. It is not reasonably practicable for us to quantify this effect robustly due to the dynamic nature of firms’ responses to our new rules.

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108. We do not consider that limiting other fees to reflect the cost the firm incurs is likely to
have significant costs to the industry. This is because:

• Firmshavestatedthattheirinstalmentfeesreflectcostsintheformoflower
  investmentreturns,sothisshouldnotresultinsignificantchangestothecurrent fees.
• We have not seen evidence of other fees being charged.

109. Firms may incur some limited costs in re-assessing their instalment fees, and in
     changing product literature to reflect the new fee regime. However, we consider that the additional one-off costs will be of minimal significance to those already being incurred by firms. Remuneration of intermediaries
110. We are proposing that intermediaries will no longer be able to receive commission
     or other types of payments from plan providers. Intermediaries must only be remunerated for funeral plan distribution through fees that are paid to them directly by the customer. These fees would be for advising or arranging services and would need to be paid separately from the price of the funeral plan as well as being clearly disclosed to the customer.
111. The rules will also apply to intermediaries who are part of the same group as funeral
     plan providers (“vertically integrated firms”). In particular, where a vertically integrated firm’s funeral director both sells the plan and delivers the funeral, firms will need to ensure the amount paid for the funeral services is not higher than it would be if the plan was sold by a different firm. This is to prevent firms avoiding the proposed rules by inflating the amount paid for the funeral. Implementation costs
112. We anticipate that providers will need to redesign their distribution arrangements.
     Based on our firm survey, we assume that all providers use intermediaries as one of theirdistributionchannels.UsingourStandardisedCostModel,weestimatethatthis remedy will require a “small change project” to implement and be a one-off cost of £117k. Table 8 sets out the assumptions behind this estimate.
     Table 8: Costs of implementing the rules on remuneration
     Firm category One‑off cost by firm type
     Large funeral plan providers £37K
     Medium funeral plan providers £41K
     Small funeral plan providers £40K
     Market-wide Costs £117K
     Source: FCA approach to CBA
113. We do not consider it reasonably practicable to estimate the implementation costs for
     intermediaries because it is hard to predict how intermediaries will respond to these regulations. We expect some to exit the funeral plans market (as discussed below). 114. Impacts on funeral plan providers Based on the data from our 2019 survey, we estimate that 56% of plans are currently sold by intermediaries who are not part of vertically integrated firms. These plans are

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
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split almost evenly between sales by independent funeral directors and sales by other intermediaries (‘third party intermediaries’), as shown in figure 7.
Figure 7 – Sales by distribution channel
Direct Independent funeral director
Third party intermediary In-house funeral director
115. The impact of our proposals on these firms is likely to vary depending on the extent
to which they rely on these commission-based sales, and whether they have other distribution channels available. Not all firms sell through intermediaries, and not all pay commission to sell their plans:

• 10 of the 17 providers in our survey paid commission for less than 15% of their
  sales, with 5 providers paying no commission at all. However, 4 of those providers rely heavily on distribution through vertically integrated funeral directors.
• 3 of the 17 providers paid commission for more than 75% of sales.

116. However, every firm we are aware of that uses third party intermediaries pays
     commission. Based on the data reported to us in our 2019 survey and the sales figures for 2018 published by the FPA, we estimate that 41% of sales (just over 60,000 per year) involve commission payments.
117. Although commission arrangements vary between providers, firms have told us that
     most do not pay commission to funeral directors, because the funeral director is remunerated through the ultimate provision of the funeral service. We are only aware of a very small number of firms who pay commission to funeral directors, and these range from £85 to £270, which is significantly lower than the average of £550 paid to third party intermediaries.
118. We expect our proposals to impact funeral plan providers in a number of ways:

• Providers who distribute through independent funeral directors are the least likely
  to be impacted. However, they may need to make some amendments to how they remunerate those funeral directors. We understand that the vast majority of funeral directors only distribute plans from a single provider. Our proposals could lead to increased competition between plan providers seeking to obtain funeral directors as distributors. While this could increase the costs that providers incur, it is also likelytoleadtoincreasedcompetitionbetweenfuneralproviderstoofferthebest plans for funeral directors to sell to their customers.

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119.
120.
121.
122.

• Verticallyintegratedfirmshavegreaterflexibilityonthestructureoftheirpayments
  andthedistributionofcoststodifferententitieswithintheirgroup.However,our ruleswillpreventthesefirmsfromadoptingpracticeswhichincorporateintothe payment for funeral services something which would otherwise be a commission to the funeral director selling the plan. We have not seen evidence to suggest that this practice is widespread, so we cannot assess the extent of the impact of our proposals. However, it is likely that some payment and cost structures within those firmswillneedtobeamended,whichcouldresultinlossofincome.
• The prohibition on commission is likely to impact the number of distributors active
  inthemarket,astheywillloseasignificantincentivetosellfuneralplans.Thisis likely to reduce the number of new plan sales, which will result in reduced revenues for plan providers.
• Providers who are reliant on third party intermediaries are the most impacted.
  They are likely to try and change their distribution processes in response to our proposals. For example, providers may seek to increase distribution through independentfuneraldirectors,orin‑housesalesstaff.Theseprovidersmaynot be successful in recouping the sales lost through no longer using third party intermediaries.
• Some providers may decide to exit the funeral plans market. This is most likely if
  they are currently dependent on the use of intermediaries to sell their plans and are unabletofindalternativedistributionchannels.Thiscouldreducecompetitionand consumer choice. We cannot reasonably estimate these costs because they depend on firms’ dynamic response to regulation, and their ability to establish alternative distribution channels. Impacts on funeral plan distributors As stated above, our survey data show that over half of funeral plans are currently sold through intermediaries, although just over half of those are through funeral directors who generally do not receive commission. Most firms selling through third party intermediaries pay variable amounts of commission based on the type of plan sold. Our 2019 survey indicates average commission of £543 for each plan sold. This is calculated based on the number of reported sales through each distribution channel21, and the rates of commission firms told us they paid to each distribution channel. Our second survey in 2020 indicated that the average commission for firms’ bestselling plans is £550. This is usually paid in a single lump sum shortly after the plan is sold. Our 2019 survey gathered evidence from just over 145,000 sales which represented 78% of the total sales in 2018. We found that around 60,000 of these sales paid a total of around £25.6m commission to intermediaries. From this, we estimated the total value of commission being paid annually to intermediaries as £32.8m. Of this total, over 80% (£27m) was paid to third party intermediaries. Almost all the remaining commission comes from firms paying commission to funeral directors. We think it is likely that many third-party intermediaries may withdraw from the funeral plan market if our proposals are brought into force. This is because they will lose some if not all of the above revenue stream. We do not expect that all third-party intermediaries will cease their funeral plan activities, for the following reasons:
  21 In our survey, we asked firms to provide a split of their annual sales for 2018 through different distribution channels. The distribution channels we asked for were: direct to customer (telephone and web), vertically integrated intermediaries funeral directors, other vertically integrated intermediaries, independent funeral directors, and independent intermediaries.

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• Firms may attempt to recoup some of this lost revenue through changing to an
  advisor/arranger charging22 model. However, we do not consider this will be viable for mostfirmsasconsumersmaynotbewillingtopayafeefortheseservices.
• We are aware that there are a number of intermediaries selling funeral plans
  alongsideotherserviceswhichconsumerspayfor.Theseincludefinancialadvisors/ planners, will writers, and equity release advisors. Although they could no longer receivecommissionforsellingfuneralplans,thesefirmsmaycontinuetooffer them to their customers as part of their broader services.

123. Where some third-party intermediaries do exit the funeral plans market, we do not
     expect this to adversely impact competition or be detrimental to consumers’ interests. This is because we expect our intervention to reduce competition driven by high commissions and shift it to being on parameters of quality and price of the plan.
124. We do not consider it is reasonably practicable for us to quantify the impact on third
     party intermediaries because this will partly depend on their dynamic response to regulation, and the extent to which they are willing to continue distributing funeral plans as part of their services.
125. Our proposals are expected to have a minimal impact on independent funeral
     directors, as they are generally remunerated for providing the funeral services rather than through commission for distributing plans. Where commission is paid, the information from our 2019 survey indicates that it is much lower than the commission paid to third party intermediaries (around £85 compared to the market average of £550). The loss of this income is unlikely to deter funeral directors from continuing to distribute funeral plans. The proposals could impact vertically integrated funeral directors. Such firms have told us that they generally do not receive commission from the plan provider, but we do not know the extent to which they could be receiving additional remuneration within the sums allocated to them to pay for the funeral services. Alternatives to a commission ban considered and proportionality assessment
126. We recognise that our proposed ban on intermediary commission is a significant
     intervention in the funeral plans market. We have considered whether our intervention is proportionate to the harms identified and whether similar benefits could be obtained with less intrusive remedies.
127. In Chapter 5, we outline alternative policy responses to this harm:

• Introducing full commission disclosure requirements for funeral plans
• Requiringfirmstoassesswhethertheirremunerationoffersfairvalueto
  consumers, and to amend their practices if they are not providing fair value
• Prohibiting remuneration unless it enhances the quality of service and does not
  conflictwiththecustomer’sbestinterests

128. Our analysis finds that these options are unlikely to be as beneficial as the proposed
     intervention.
129. First, by prohibiting intermediaries from receiving commission from funeral plan
     providers we directly address the current mismatch of incentives between firms and 22 Where the customer pays the intermediary a fee for their advising or arranging services. This fee would be completely separate from the payment for the funeral plan.

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consumers. This conflict of interest may incentivise firms to sell as many plans as possible, or more expensive plans, regardless of whether they meet the consumer’s needs. The other policies considered may lead to a reduction in commission fees paid by consumers but would address the current conflict of interests between firms and consumers only indirectly and so customers may still be sold unsuitable products.
130. Second, by prohibiting intermediaries from receiving commission from funeral plan
providers we directly address the impact that high commissions have on prices. We have found little evidence that intermediaries provide added value to consumers. As such, commissions are leading to consumers paying prices which are too high relative to the benefits they receive. Two of the alternative options may mitigate this harm but are less transparent and harder to monitor, and so the outcome is more uncertain.
131. Third, as Fletcher (2016) notes, while disclosure requirements can have valuable
positive impacts on consumers’ decision-making, there is also evidence of these requirements being ineffective or even harmful:

• Consumers may still have limited awareness of the disclosure. For example, OFT’s
  ex-post evaluation of a disclosure remedy in the Care home market found that care homes had improved in terms of providing information on prices. Nevertheless, consumers were found to have only limited awareness of fees and the evaluation found no evidence of downward pressure being exerted on fees due to increased transparency.
• Where consumers do engage with the disclosures, they may place too much weight
  onthisintheirdecisionmaking(andnotontotalcosts).TheUSFederalTrade Commission (FTC) conducted an experiment to examine the impact of requiring mortgage brokers to reveal their commission. It found that disclosing the existence and level of the broker commission increased customer take-up of the more expensive mortgage by 22 per cent on average.
• Providersmayseektoworkaroundtheremedy,inordertomakeitlesseffective.

132. Fourth, we consider that vulnerability as a result of life events and resilience may be
     common amongst funeral plan customers:

• Data provided to us shows that more than half of funeral plan sales are made by
  funeral directors. Firms have told us that it is very common for a plan to be sold following a bereavement, where the family initially contact the funeral director to purchase an at-need funeral.
• As is stated in chapter 5, it has been broadly stated that a key motivation for their
  customerspurchasingplansistoprotecttheirlovedonesfromthefinancialstrain of arranging and paying for their funeral. We note that a great deal of funeral plan marketingfocusesontheincreasingcostofat‑needfunerals,andthebenefitsof protectinglovedonesfromfinancialandemotionalburden.Suchmotivationsmay indicateconcernsoverabilitytowithstandfinancialshocks.

133. The presence of vulnerability suggests that stronger action is justified to protect these
     consumers from the harms identified.
134. The above suggests that, although the costs of the alternatives may be lower, there is
     much more uncertainty over whether they would reduce the harm we have identified, compared to a ban. As such, we believe the net benefit of a ban would be higher than any of the alternatives.

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Handling Plan Redemptions
135. We are proposing a number of rules which are intended to ensure funeral services are
provided in a timely manner, and with sufficient care and skill. We consider these rules are likely to result in costs of minimal significance to firms, because:

• The rules are similar to existing FPA requirements
• The rules are based on ensuring that providers meet their contractual obligations
  to customers
  Product governance

136. In addition to the rules concerning plans which risk not providing funeral services
     (considered below), we propose to apply a broad range of product governance (PROD) rules to funeral plan providers. These will be based primarily on the PROD rules for insurance products, including the changes on which we consulted in CP20/1923. We are proposing to make a number of amendments to ensure the rules are appropriate for funeral plans.
137. Undertherules,planproviders(andintermediarieswhoareinvolvedinmanufacturing
     plans), will need to ensure their products are designed to meet the needs of a defined target market. This includes ensuring that the price of the plan is providing fair value to customers.
138. Firms will need to consider all the features of their plans. This means not just looking
     at the key benefits and exclusions, but also other features such as how the customer pays for the plan, how it is distributed, and the levels of commission that providers and intermediaries receive.
139. Firms will need to put in a place a documented product approval process, and ensure
     that all products are reviewed regularly. They will need to take remedial action where products are not meeting customers’ needs. Implementation costs
140. Firms are likely to incur costs implementing the requirements, as they will need to
     set up product approval processes and potentially hire new staff to conduct product reviews. Large firms told us that on average they would incur up-front costs of £25,000 on changing their systems to incorporate these design changes. Medium firms told us this would be £2,000, and small firms £11,000. On an ongoing basis, these costs were £316,000 for large firms, £37,500 for medium firms, and £8,071 for small firms.
141. Taken in conjunction with our firm population assumptions, this leads to total one-off
     costs of £502k, and ongoing annual costs of £1.2m.
142. We do not consider it is reasonably practicable to fully assess the quantitative impact
     of the product oversight and governance regime as a whole. This is because we cannot fully assess the extent to which firms are currently selling products which are not fair value, or not meeting the needs of a defined target market. However, we expect that the rules would lead to plans being aligned better to customers’ needs. This could result in fewer plan sales, and an increase in costs to providers as plans are fully provided more often. 23 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp20-19.pdf

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143. We anticipate that providers will also need to increase the oversight they have of their
distributors. Currently providers do an average of 13 hours of due diligence before agreeing to permit a third party to distribute their products. The proposed product oversight and governance rules do not set a minimum requirement, but we consider it likely that firms may need to increase their due diligence in order to ensure that the distributor meets the requirements of the PROD and SYSC rules. It is not reasonably practicable for us to estimate how much additional due diligence will be required because it will depend on a range of factors, such as the risk of harm posed by the distributor, and the amount of work the provider already undertakes. We also expect that the number of third-party distributors operating in the market may change as a result of our regulation, which could significantly impact the costs of due diligence. It is not reasonably practicable to predict the exact extent of these changes. Costs of expected product changes
144. The proposed PROD rules will require firms to ensure their plans provide fair value
to plan holders. This means a fair relationship between the price of the plan and the benefits it provides. We have compared the current price and benefits of insurance-backed funeral plans with the sum assured provided by an equivalent insurance product. For life insurance-backed funeral plans, the average sum assured of the underlying insurance policy (i.e. the amount which is used to pay for the funeral services) is £7k and the average instalment payment is £28 per month. For a similar monthly payment, a customer could buy a whole of life insurance policy with an average benefit amount of £8,379. Whilst we recognise that funeral plans provide the additional (non-financial) benefit of allowing customers to pre-arrange their affairs and save their representatives from hassle and distress, this gap in the financial value of the benefits provided may be significant to some consumers.
145. We are aware that the funeral plan provider is usually paid a commission by the
insurance company providing the policy that backs the plan. The plan provider may also pay commission to an intermediary who sold the plan. We consider that these may explain some of the differences highlighted in paragraph 145. Commission paid to an intermediary by the insurance company that backs the plan would also be subject to the commission ban.
146. It is not possible to do a similar analysis for trust-backed funeral plans, because there
is no direct comparison product on which it could be based. However, we are aware that both trust and insurance backed funeral plan prices usually include remuneration received by the plan provider. The requirement to ensure that plans offer fair value is likely to lead to a reduction in this remuneration, which could lead to a loss of profit to plan providers. This may be offset to some extent by a reduced acquisition cost if the providers are no longer paying commission to intermediaries.
147. Overall, we expect the product governance rules to lead to a reduction in:

• ThedifferencebetweenthebenefitamountoftheWholeofLifeinsuranceandthe
  cost to the plan provider of providing the plan services. This will lead to prices going down.
• Theamountofmoneyfirmsextractfromtrustsinordertopayremunerationtothe
  plan provider.

148. As a result of the above changes funeral plan providers may see a reduction in revenue
     and profit due to lower sales. We do not think it is reasonably practicable to estimate this loss in revenue and profit. This is because:

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• As noted above, the impact of our proposals on intermediary remuneration cannot
  reasonablybeestimated.Furthermoresomeactionsmaymitigatetheeffectsof the remedies, such as distributors increasing base salaries to compensate for the lack of commissions.
• Firms may increase prices by passing compliance costs for the PROD and other
  regulatory proposals outlined in this document onto consumers. Disentangling andidentifyingeffectsonfirmrevenuefromtheproposalsisnotreasonably practicable.
• Our proposals may result in some changes in competitive pressure following
  regulation.Forexample,firmsmaycompetemoreaggressivelyovertheabilityto distributeproductsthroughfuneraldirectors.Thiswillaffectfirms’abilitytoraise prices.
• Thecounterfactualscenario,iewhatrevenueandprofitswouldhavelooked
  like absent our intervention, is unclear, especially following the impact of the coronavirus situation Prohibition of plans that risk not providing the funeral services

149. We are proposing to prohibit firms from offering plans that do not provide the funeral
     services without additional payment, where the customer dies during the instalment period. Firms will still be able to sell funeral plans with instalments, but the funeral must be provided even if the customer dies before making all their payments. This will be achieved by three separate rules:

• Arulebanningallfirmsfromenteringintosuchfuneralplans
• Arulepreventingfirmsfrommanufacturingsuchproducts,andrequiringthat
  existing products cease being distributed
• Arulepreventingfirmsfromseekingadditionalsumsfromthecustomer’sestate
  after their death

150. Given our cost estimates of the broader PROD implementation, we consider that
     the marginal implementation costs to implement and comply with the rules will be of minimal significance. However, we do believe the proposals could result in lost profits to firms.
151. Our survey found that, on average, 38% of plans are sold with an instalment period
     greater than 12 months; with 2 providers selling up to 70% of plans that way. More recent market data shows an increase in plans sold through instalments for a period greater than 12 months, with them now representing 41% of new sales. Although some firms already include provision for funerals for those who die during the instalment period in their plans, most firms do not. The data we have received suggests that 34% of all plan sales carry the risk that the expected funeral may not be provided unless the customer’s estate makes additional payments. In what proportion of cases this risk will crystallise is unclear. Our survey data shows that across the market, the average number of instalment plans which end with a customer dying before payment is complete and therefore no funeral being delivered is 4.6%. However, evidence suggests that in some firms this figure can range from 20% to 32%. Additional costs of paying for funerals, and loss of cancellation fees
152. In the event that a customer dies before completing their instalment payments, the
     relatives of the deceased currently typically have two options:

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153.
154.
155.
156.

• Make additional payments to make up for the shortfall in payments and ensure
  funeral delivery
• Cancel the plan and have prior payments returned to them. Typically this will incur a
  cancellation fee
  Underournewrulesfirmswillberequiredtoensurefuneralsaredeliveredintheevent that a customer dies before making all payments. Firms can comply with this rule either by:
• Directlymakinguptheshortfallpaymentoutoffirmresources
• Insuring against the risk through a supplementary life insurance policy
  To estimate the potential ongoing costs to firms we have used two alternative approaches here:
• Firms were unable to tell us the average amount outstanding where a customer
  dies during the instalment period. Given that customers are likely to die closer to the end of their instalment periods, we assume an average £500 shortfall per funeral in these instances, which is around 15% of an average funeral price based onCMAdata.Assomeprovidersarealreadyofferingplanswhichwillpayforthe funeral regardless of whether the customer has paid all their instalments, we have assumed that our rules will only result in 75-90% of outstanding instalments no longerbeingrecoveredfromthecustomer’sestate.Usingtheaverageproportion of instalment plans which end with a customer dying before payment is complete (4.6%),weestimatethat3,400and4,000planswouldbeaffected24. On that basis weestimatetheongoingpotentialcoststofirmstobe£1.7m–£2mperyear.
• Anotheroptionforfirmsistotakeoutsupplementaryinsurancetocovertheriskof
  earlydeath.Iffirmsweretocomplythroughpurchasingsupplementaryinsurance, we can estimate the ongoing costs incurred as the cost of the relevant insurance policy. We cannot accurately estimate this because insurance will depend on factorssuchasthecustomer’sage.However,firmshavetoldusthattheinsurance is usually 30p – £5 per month per plan. Based on the 2020 survey, approximately 34% of sales may not be delivered in the event a consumer dies before making the payments. Given total sales in 2019 from the FPA at 174,000 (adjusted) we estimateongoingcoststofirmsof£212k–£3.5m. We note that firms have the option to cover these additional costs through increasing the amount of money that is held in their trust, or through purchasing supplementary insurance, but not both. We know from conversations with firms that both of these two options are currently used in the market. It is possible that other alternatives may be developed in the future. The approach that firms select is likely to be influenced by multiple factors, such as their estimates of the risks and their trust’s ability to absorb additional costs. We note that some firms are already providing funerals to customers who die during the instalment period. To the extent that this already occurs in the market it will result in lower potential costs to firms than we have estimated above. Although we have tried 24 The lower bound is based on the CMA estimate of 99,000 funerals that were pre-paid through funeral plans. If a policy dies before all the instalments have been paid, the representative may either make up the difference and redeem the plan or arrange a new funeral. The CMA figure may, therefore, be an underestimate of pre-paid funeral plans tried to be redeemed that year. To account for this our upper bound is based on this figure inflated by the average 4.6% of plans redeemed each year resulting in the consumer dying before all the instalments have been paid (104,000).

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157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162. to account for this in our estimates, it is impossible to do this accurately as it depends
on how long current funeral plan customers live.
As such, we estimate the overall direct cost of our rules to firms to be in the range of £212k – £3.5m. This is based on the estimated insurance costs, although in practice the range captures any of the alternative estimates above. Our interactions with multiple firms across the sector indicate that firms are likely to adapt their pricing to account for the need to provide funerals in cases where the full instalments have not been paid. Of the firms that currently offer this, most do so through purchasing supplementary insurance on the customers’ life. There are other ways the cost could be met, such as placing additional funds into the trust, but all approaches could potentially lead to price changes. The effective net costs to firms of our proposals may be lower than those estimated above. This will depend on the extent to which firms pass the additional costs on to customers through price increases. It is not reasonably practical for us to estimate the extent of this cost pass-through as it depends on firms’ dynamic response to regulation and to other changes in competitive pressures in the market, which we cannot predict. If these factors lead to firms not passing on their costs, this will result in a direct transfer of benefit to customers. Loss of sales In response to the rules we expect some consumers will purchase alternative products (such as over-50s life insurance). Others will simply opt to put their money into a savings account instead. This would represent a loss of demand and profit for the broader funeral plans market. Alternatively, consumers with the ability to afford it may opt to pay the increased price in order to purchase a plan that will provide a funeral should they die during the instalment period. Where customers decide not to purchase a funeral plan, this will impact firms who will lose the profits they would otherwise have made from the sale of the plan. Firms have told us that the profits they make are heavily linked to market fluctuations. There are also some firms who operate on a not-for-profit basis, or who profit primarily through the ultimate provision of the funeral rather than the sale of the plan. Furthermore, there is no data available to accurately show how customers will react once the rules come into force. However, we consider that the potential loss of profits will be mitigated to some extent by the following factors:

• Asignificantnumberofplanscurrentlybeingsoldthroughinstalmentsalready
  meettherequirements,andsowillbeunaffectedbyourrules.
• The knowledge that their funeral is guaranteed to be provided may enable some
  customerswhoareunabletoaffordhighermonthlypricestopayoveralonger instalmentperiod,wherefirmsoffersuchlongerplans.Datasuggeststhatthese plans can cost around £20 per month less; although customers will pay a greater total amount if they live to the end of the instalment period. The wide variation of business models, and the lack of data showing how consumers and firms might react to our proposed rules, means that it is not reasonably practicable for us to estimate the amount of profit firms are likely to lose from a reduction in sales.

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Senior Managers and Certification Regime
163. The Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) sets out our expectations
of the governance and oversight of regulated firms. The requirements of this regime span multiple sourcebooks, including SYSC, COCON, and FIT. The aim is to address the root cause of the harms discussed above, by improving the responsibility and accountability of senior managers in the funeral plan sector. The key aims of the SM&CR are to:

• encouragestafftotakepersonalresponsibilityfortheiractions
• improve conduct at all levels
• makesurefirmsandstaffclearlyunderstandandcandemonstratewhodoeswhat

164. We propose to regulate funeral plan providers and intermediaries as ‘core’ firms for the
     purposes of the SM&CR.
165. To calculate costs for this we used data collected for the cost benefit analysis25 of
     the introduction of the SM&CR, which estimated a one-off cost to core firms of £13,880-£14,070, and ongoing costs of £3,870-£5,540. These estimates are based on the questionnaires sent to about 2,000 firms, on a legal entity level. The limitations of those CBAs apply also to this one. The estimates are subject to reporting inaccuracies and small sample size bias.
166. Usingthesecostsandourassumptionsoffirmsizes,weestimateone‑offcostsfor
     providers to be £666k – £675k and ongoing costs of £186k – £266k.
167. Recent engagement with the sector has indicated that approximately 17% of
     intermediaries are already either authorised by us for other activities or are appointed representatives. This means that these firms already have some exposure to the SM&CR, so we would reasonably expect the costs incurred to be lower than those stated. As such, the assumptions set out above suggest for intermediaries one-off costs of £7m – £7.1m, and ongoing costs of £2.0m – £2.8m.
168. However, that cost benefit analysis was based on firms that were already subject to
     FCA regulation and operating under the Approved Persons Regime. Because most providers and authorised intermediaries operating in the prepaid funeral plan market will be entirely new to FCA regulation, there will also be a cost of introducing an individual authorisations regime for these firms. We do not consider it is reasonably practicable to estimate this as we do not know the exact composition (or skills and experience) of funeral plan firms’ current senior management. Costs of the approved persons regime
169. As noted above, our expectation is that the majority of intermediaries selling funeral
     plans will do so as appointed representatives. These firms will not be subject to SM&CR, but we propose to require them to follow the Approved Persons Regime. We expect that this will require firms to make some one-off changes to their management structures (such as recruitment costs), as well as incurring some ongoing costs. We have based our cost assessments on our expected costs of complying with the limited scope SM&CR; namely £5,920-£5,980 for one off costs and £1,990 – £2,470 for ongoing costs per intermediary. However, we know that approximately 30% of intermediaries currently selling funeral plans are already appointed representatives. We 25 https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/cba-extension-senior-managers-certification-regime.pdf

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do not expect these firms to have any additional costs. Based on this, we expect total one-off costs of £7.2m to £7.3m, and ongoing costs of £2.4m to £3m. Prudential rules
170. Once a person has purchased a pre-arranged funeral plan contract, the primary
concern from a customer perspective is the situation that when they die the funeral plan provider will fulfil their obligation to deliver the pre-agreed funeral as per the funeral plan contract. This is true whether the funeral plan is backed by trust arrangements or a whole of life insurance policy.
171. Our proposed rules will require plan providers to ensure that there is sufficient money
held within their trusts to meeting at least 100% of their funeral liabilities, as assessed by an independent actuary at least annually. We are proposing similar requirements for insurance-backed plans. This is broadly similar to the existing FPA requirements and so we do not consider our proposals will have a more than minimal cost across the industry as a whole. There may be some firms whose trusts are currently insufficiently capitalised and who will need to secure additional funds to meet our requirements. We do not consider it reasonably practical for us to conduct a full actuarial assessment of every trust currently being used in the market; especially as we currently have no powers to compel the disclosure of information by funeral plan firms.
172. We are also proposing that firms should not be permitted to withdraw funds from
trusts (other than to pay for funerals) unless the trust is holding sufficient funds to meet 110% of the provider’s liabilities. This may result in lower profits for providers if they are unable to extract funds which previously were available to them. We do not consider it reasonably practical for us to quantify this impact, for the same reasons as stated above.
173. Prudential requirements aim to minimise the risk of harm to customers and mitigate
market disruption. They play an important role in driving the right behaviour, including encouraging the firm to monitor and manage their business and financial risks.
174. Through our Funeral Plans survey that was sent out to firms in the summer of 2019,
a small sample of firms responded with their financial statement information that included their capital position, and annual income data.
175. To provide a financial picture of the prepaid funeral plan sector, we supplemented
this survey data with publicly available information from Companies House and further updated information provided by firms. We also asked a subset of funeral plan providers to provide further information regarding their number of undrawn funeral plans that are yet to be redeemed against a funeral.
176. Of the 19 funeral plan providers that responded to our original survey (together with
updated information provided by certain firms in terms of our engagement), 9 of them sold funeral plans backed by trust arrangements over the previous 12-month period. 10 providers sold insurance-backed plans during the same period. Our sample of firms includes the largest funeral plan providers that offer trust-backed and/ or insurance-backed funeral plans. Therefore, we consider our sample covers the market well.

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177. We used the survey respondents’ annual income, together with the number of
undrawn plans yet to be redeemed against a funeral and the distribution of the amount that is due to be paid out when a funeral is required, to calculate an estimate of the core capital resources requirement for each funeral plan provider survey respondent.
178. For funeral plan providers that are part of a wider group of companies, since financials
may be produced on a consolidated basis, it is not always possible to separate out the funeral plans business from the rest of their business. Therefore, in a few cases, it was necessary to adopt certain assumptions with respect to proportioning income and capital resources when considering a firm that is part of a wider group of companies.
179. To determine the incremental cost of the proposed prudential requirements it is
necessary to examine the amount of eligible capital resources that is already held by firms. In our survey, we asked firms to provide items that would be found on their balance sheet, specifically, items which could be used to calculate the amount of eligible capital resources held by each funeral plan provider survey respondent. Comparing this against their core capital resources requirement, based on the proposed rules, it is possible to calculate the firm’s capital surplus/deficit (relative to their existing capital resources).
180. A deficit represents the amount that a firm would need to raise to meet the proposed
capital resources requirement.
181. In Table 9, we present a summary of the estimated average core capital resources
requirement for funeral plan providers and the corresponding capital deficit that we estimate will exist per firm at the start of the new regulatory framework for the prepaid funeral plan sector. This average is based on a wide range of firms of different sizes. The individual requirements for firms will vary.
Table 9: Estimate of the average core capital resources requirement and average capital
resources deficit per firm (rounded to the nearest thousand) Funeral Plan Provider Estimated average core capital resources requirement (per firm basis) £1,932,000 Estimated average capital resources deficit (per firm basis) £316,000
182. Based upon our estimates in Table 9 and under the assumption that it is representative
of the pre-paid funeral plan sector, we can infer that the incremental increase in the capital resources required by funeral plan providers across the sector would amount to a one-off cost of £15.2m. The estimated figures are strongly influenced by the large Funeral plan providers. However, these firms do account for a significant share of the pre-arranged funeral plan market.
183. Estimating the cost of the proposed prudential requirements, requires an evaluation
of the opportunity cost of capital arising from the incremental adjustment that firms would need to make to their existing capital resources to meet their estimated core capital resources requirement. We used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), where we consider the return that investors would require from an equity investment, conditional on that equity’s sensitivity to overall market risk, the equity market risk

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premium, and the risk-free rate.26 The use of the CAPM, a commonly used model for estimating cost of capital, allows us to produce a reasonable proxy estimate under the assumptions outlined. Our estimate for the cost of capital for funeral plan providers is equal to 6.05%.
184. Therefore, the estimated capital resource deficit for the funeral plan sector would
correspond to an annual cost of £718k.
Resolution
185. Our resolution proposals aim to provide consumers with protection if their funeral plan
provider fails (ie enters into insolvency proceedings). The proposals predominantly affect funeral plans entered into from authorisation. However firms should consider whether its arrangements for existing contracts meet the new requirements, and what changes they could take to bring them more into line with these requirements.
186. The key resolution-related proposals include for Funeral Plan providers to:

• have arrangements that ensure that, in the event of the funeral plan provider’s
  failure, there is a reasonable likelihood that plans entered into after authorisation willcontinuetobecarriedoutbyanotherfirmthathastherelevantpermission.
• have arrangements to ensure that, if funeral plan contracts will not be carried out by
  thefuneralplanprovideroranotherfirm,consumerswillreceiveapromptpayment. This is to support the costs associated with funding alternative arrangements. We will be consulting on the amount and approach to funding such a payment in a second consultation.
• provide consumers with a contractual right to a prompt reimbursement in the event
  offailurewhereneitherthefirmnoranotherproviderwillcontinuetocarryoutthe plans. Prior and informed consent must be sought from consumers for the transfer of administration under the same contractual terms.
• hold trust assets and insurance policies in relation to consumers’ funerals, on both
  an ongoing and insolvent basis. This includes ensuring that such assets and policies cannot be claimed by general creditors in the event of insolvency.
• produce and maintain a resolution manual, containing information that would assist
  withresolvingthefirm’sbusiness,whichweproposetoapplytobothnewand existing contracts.
• maintain a central record of each new funeral plan contract to enable transfer or a
  prompt reimbursement to consumers. This should contain pertinent information anddocumentation,andenableidentificationofthecontractsthatcouldbe transferred,thepaymentobligationsofthefirm,thedetailsofthecustomer, coveredindividual(ifdifferent)andnominatedrepresentative,andtheamountpaid by consumers that has been applied towards an insurance contract or paid into a trust.
• put in place trust or insurance related arrangements that will prevent the assets of
  the trust, or the proceeds of an insurance policy, from forming part of the funeral 26 This can be described by the following equation:
  Where is the required return on equity, is the risk-free rate, is the sensitivity of the investment to overall market risk, and isthemarketriskpremium.Weestimatetherisk‑freeratebyadjustinglong‑termUK government bond yields for inflation, which is approximately equal to zero. We also set the equity market risk premium to be equal to 5.5% and the corresponding equal to 1.1, under the assumption that equity for funeral plan providers is only marginally more sensitive to the market.

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plan provider’s assets. Such arrangements will help to ensure monies are available toconsumersforreimbursementsintheeventoffirmfailure.
187. As shown in Table 10, we have estimated the costs associated with implementing
continuity and reimbursement arrangements (including a resolution manual) and a records ledger for transfer or reimbursement. The sections below set out how we have arrived at these estimates.
Table 10: Estimated cost of resolution requirements
Policy
Continuity and reimbursement arrangements, including resolution manual One‑off costs £1.1m Ongoing costs (per annum) £42k – £126k Records ledger for transfer or reimbursement £126k £111k Total industry costs £1.3m £153.1k – £237.3k Continuity and reimbursement arrangement (including a resolution manual) costs
188. Firms will incur one off costs in amending arrangements in relation to new plans with
respect to continuity and reimbursement, including contractual arrangements with trustees and insurers. Insurers and trustees are also expected to bear costs as the counterparty to these arrangements. We also expect there to be a cost of amending contracts that will be entered into with customers after authorisation, in particular to obtain pre-consent and to include a contractual right to continuity or a reimbursement.
189. In considering the extent of these costs we note that:

• These requirements only apply in respect of plans taken out from authorisation,
  although,dependingontheirmethodofimplementation,firmsmayalsochoose to apply the changes to existing plans. These choices would be discretionary to thefirm.Firmsmayalsoconsiderobtainingprofessionaladviceontheadequacyof their arrangements, although this is not required.
• Fortrust‑backedplans,firmsmaychoosetocomplyeitherbyupdatingtrustdeeds
  onexistingtruststoreflectthenewrequirementsorbyestablishingnewtrusts, whererelevant.Firmsmayalsochoosetoenterintoarrangementswithotherfirms to ensure a reasonable likelihood of continuity in administration, although this is not required.Wewouldexpectfirmswouldbeincentivisedtochoosethemostefficient approach for their circumstances.
• The FPA rules require that “The terms of the trust make adequate provision for the
  administration of plan funds in the event that the Registered Provider becomes insolvent or ceases trading.” In addition, FPA members agree to cooperate with the FPA’s “Pledge to Customers”, which sets out that “in the event of the insolvency of a Registered Provider, the other Registered Providers will examine ways in which the [FPA] might assist in arranging delivery of the funerals of customers of the insolventRegisteredProvider.”Consequently,FPAregulatedfirmswillalreadyhave certain continuity arrangements in place which go at least some way to meeting our requirements. However, it is uncertain as to what extent such arrangements will complywithournewrequirementsgiventhedegreeofflexibilityfirmswillhavehad in complying with the FPAs requirements. It is also uncertain what arrangements non-FPA members have in place.
• Intermsofreimbursement,somefirmsalreadyindicatethattheyhave
  arrangements in place to provide reimbursements, while others will need to

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190.
191.
192.
193. establish these. On the trust-backed side, we are aware of reimbursements being
paid out of funds held in trust. On the insurance-backed side, funeral plan providers havereporteddifferentwaysofmakingpaymentstoclientsfollowingtheirfailure. We will be consulting on the amount and approach to funding reimbursements, and accompanyingcostbenefitanalysis,inasecondconsultation.

• Some funeral plan providers have indicated that, on insolvency, trust assets and
  thebenefitofinsurancepoliciesarealreadysafeguardedandheldinrelationto consumers’ funerals. In addition, FPA rules require trusts to ensure that in the event of a funeral plan provider’s insolvency, “any liquidator/administrator or other person who may be appointed as a consequence of the insolvency has no claim against the trust fund or its assets for purposes other than the delivery of the clients’ funeral.” However, it is unclear how uniform such practice is, including for non-FPA members and in the case of insurance-backed plans. Firms may therefore incur costs associated with updating their arrangements, including contractually and operationally. This includes costs associated with our proposal for customers ofnewcontractstobethebeneficiariesoftrustassets. Depending on initial circumstances and given the above, whilst the marginal costs of implementation may be of relatively minimal significance for some firms, they could be more substantial for others. Firms will also incur costs in establishing a resolution manual which contains information that would assist in resolving the firm’s business. This includes explaining any steps that would need to be implemented under the new continuity and reimbursement arrangements. The scale of this manual will also depend on the size and complexity of the funeral plan provider’s business. Some firms may already have something similar to a resolution manual in place to support their arrangements in the event of failure. We expect firms will need to implement a ‘minor’ (as per the definition in our standardised cost model) change project to ensure a resolution manual, and both continuity and reimbursement arrangements, are in place. We have assumed all providerswillincurcoststomeetthenewrequirements.Usingtheassumptionsfor minor change projects in our standardised cost model, we have assumed small firms will take 10 project days to complete the change and medium and large firms will take 40 and 60 days respectively. Given the nature of the changes we have also accounted for board and executive review of the necessary changes. This gives a one-off cost of £1.1m across the 48 identified funeral plan providers. We expect ongoing costs for an annual review of the continuity and reimbursement arrangements, including the resolution manual, following their initial implementation. Our assumption from previous CBAs (see CP13/13 on crowdfunding) is that it costs £704 per day for a director review of resolution arrangements, including the resolution manual. Adjusting for inflation, at an average compounded rate of 2.5% per annum from 2011 to 2020, suggests a 1 day review will cost £877 per firm in current prices. Based on the assumption this may take a funeral plan provider between 1 and 3 days for a review, we estimate annual ongoing industry costs of £42k – £126k. Records ledger for transfer or reimbursements The creation of a records ledger for funeral contracts to enable a transfer or reimbursement is likely to lead
  to costs that depend on the size of each firm. Many firms will already have systems for keeping records which they can modify, as appropriate.Usingthestandardisedcostmodel,weassumethiswillsitbetweena small and minor IT project, taking 5, 20 and 30 project days for small, medium and large

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firms, respectively. A per day cost of £287, £371 and £403 will be incurred for each small, medium and large firm respectively. Total one-off costs of implementing this aspect of the policy are estimated at £126k.
194. We have assumed that maintenance of firms’ records involves 0.5 days of compliance
staff time per month, costing each firm on average £193 per month. We estimate ongoing costs for the industry of the records ledger of £111k per annum. Disclosure costs
195. Firms will incur one off costs in updating, where appropriate, the funeral plan
summary and nominated representative disclosure documents for resolution specific disclosures. We consider such costs are incorporated into our disclosure requirements cost estimates presented earlier in this CBA.
196. Marginal costs associated with notifying consumers and nominated representatives
about any material changes to the information provided or of communicating with the FCA in respect of Principle 11 (Relations with regulators) are expected to be of minimal significance. Financial Services Compensation Scheme
197. We are proposing to extend FSCS protection to provide compensation of up to
£85,000 to eligible claimants who have a valid claim against firms carrying out certain funeral plan contract regulated activities, where the firm is unable, or likely to be unable, to meet those claims against it. FSCS protection will apply from the date that regulation commences, for liabilities arising from that point onwards. Compensation costs would be funded by a new funding class made up of firms undertaking relevant regulated activities in relation to funeral plan contracts and will include providers and distributors of such contracts. We propose that the initial threshold for the new funeral plan funding class will be £5 million. This would represent the maximum FSCS compensation costs that the funeral plan firms contributing to the new funeral plan class are required to cover before the retail pool is required to contribute.
198. FSCS has estimated that it would cost £150,000 to make system changes to prepare
for the introduction of FSCS protection for funeral plan. These management expenses will ultimately be passed on to firms through the levy. Set up costs for firms to introduce FSCS protection will likely be of minimal significance as FSCS levies are paid through the same processes as FCA fees.
199. At this time, we are not able to robustly estimate the ongoing cost of potential FSCS
compensation costs arising from the failure of funeral plan firms. In particular, we are not aware of any history of failures in the sector and so are unable to robustly forecast how many firms could fail or what liabilities may be protected by FSCS.
200. However, we have estimated the costs to firms – based on notional ranges of eligible
income – if compensation costs were to amount to £1 million and £5 million (£5 million being the proposed threshold for the new funding class). Although we have no evidence to indicate that FSCS liabilities could reach those levels in any given year, we consider this illustration will help firms understand the potential cost to them if FSCS liabilities were to arise (whether from funeral plan claims or exposure to the retail pool). The number of firms in each notional eligible income band has been estimated based

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on our assumption of the profile of firms in the sector and we have based the notional eligible income bands on average income data from our firm survey conducted in 201927.
Table 11: Illustration of distribution of Compensation Cost levy based on hypothetical
liabilities
Category
Provider – large(2firms)
Notional eligible income
£15,000,000
Cost per firm if compensation costs reached £1m £106,007 Total for category if costs reached £1m £212,014 Cost per firm if compensation costs totalled £5m (class limit) £530,035 Total for category if costs reached £5m £1,060,071 Provider – medium (6firms) £2,000,000 £14,134 £84,806 £70,671 £424,028 Provider – small (40 firms) £200,000 £1,413 £56,537 £7,067 £282,686 Authorised distributor (610firms) £150,000 £1,060 £646,643 £5,300 £3,233,216 658 firms £1,000,000 £5,000,000
201. For example, based on the profile of firms set out in the table, a small funeral plan
provider which has an income from funeral plans of £200,000 would be required to pay a compensation cost levy of £1,413 if the overall levy in a given year was £1 million, and £7,067 if the overall levy was £5 million. However, these amounts will change depending on the number of firms who become authorised and contribute to the new Funeral Plan Claims funding class and the relevant income earned by those firms.
202. If costs arising from funeral plan claims were to exceed the £5 million funding class
limit, the wider retail pool of firms from other classes would be required to contribute. Due to the uncertainty about potential costs we have not speculated as to what that exposure could be (although liabilities would be limited to the class limit applicable to the relevant funding class).
203. Funeral plan firms will also be required to contribute to FSCS’s management expenses
(including base costs and specific costs). Firms’ contribution to FSCS’s management expenses is in addition to the compensation costs set out at the above paragraph. We are not currently able to estimate the cost of the base cost element of management expenses for firms, but will provide further information when we publish our annual consultation on FCA fee-rates, which is due for publication early in April.
204. In addition, FSCS has estimated that, in the event of a funeral plan failure, specific
costs (i.e. FSCS costs which can be attributed to a funding class) of approximately £750,000 may be incurred. This is based on certain assumptions about how much it would cost FSCS to respond to the firm failure and process claims. However, as 27 As explained above, a survey of funeral plan providers and intermediaries was conducted in 2019. The notional eligible income bands shown at Table 11 are derived from this survey data. However, the survey data represents a very small population of firms which is not necessarily representative of the ultimate population of funeral plan firms that will become authorised. The table therefore provides an illustration of how FSCS compensation costs could be apportioned between firms. Alternative sources of income data were considered (such as company accounts published on Companies House) but were discounted due to difficulties in establishing a consistent measure of relevant income across different types of firm.

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explained above, we are not able to robustly predict what failures may arise. We are, therefore, not able to say when those specific costs may arise.
205. Underourrules,afirmwhichbecomesaparticipantfirmpartwaythroughafinancial
year will not be liable to pay a share of a compensation costs levy or specific costs levy made in that year. Accordingly, assuming most funeral plan firms become regulated mid-way through 2022/23, they will not be required to meet any compensation or specific costs that arise during that first year when regulation of the funeral plans sector commences. Other handbook rules Dispute resolution
206. We propose to apply our rules regarding complaints handling in our Dispute Resolution:
Complaints sourcebook (DISP). This sets out rules for how firms should handle complaints, and when complaints must be referred to the Ombudsman Service. We are proposing to:

• Bring funeral plan providers and intermediaries within the compulsory jurisdiction of
  the Ombudsman Service
• Apply our DISP complaints-handling standards to funeral plan providers and
  intermediaries to ensure that complaints are dealt with consistently, fairly, and promptly

207. Most firms in our survey told us that they already have a complaint handling process.
     These processes typically meet our requirements for the timescales around investigating and handling complaints, and informing the customer about their right to pursue their complaint with an independent body (currently the FPA). We note also that the FPA’s definition of a complaint is similar to ours. Respondents to the survey also told us that they already submit complaints data to the FPA, so there will be no additional cost in complying with our reporting requirements.
208. The only significant difference between the current position and our rules is that the
     final response letter must also include the standard Financial Ombudsman Service explanatory leaflet, or a link to the leaflet if the complaint was made by email. Based on the number of complaints reported in our survey (78), and assumed cost of 20p per leaflet, we estimate a small total cost to the industry of £394 per year.
209. It is possible that there could be some changes to the outcomes of complaints
     once customers have the right to refer cases to the Financial Ombudsman Service. We cannot assess the impact of this as it is entirely dependent on the nature of the complaints made in the future. Supervision and reporting
210. In order to inform our supervision of firms in the prepaid funeral plan market, we are
     proposing to require that firms comply with the relevant sections of our Supervision (SUP)manual.Specifically,weareproposingthatplanproviders:

• Notifyusofsignificantchangesintheirbusiness

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212.
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Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation

• Provide core data (postal address, key contacts, email address etc)
  We are also proposing that firms will need to send us regular reports on conduct of business, the firm’s financial position, and complaints ThecostsofcomplyingwithSUP,includingnotificationandreportingrequirements, should be of minimal significance. Firms are already required to provide reports to the FPA, and we do not consider there are likely to be more than minimal costs in adapting their existing reporting processes to meet our proposed requirements. Costs to consumers

213. Our proposed regime is intended to deliver benefits to consumers by improving funeral
     plan firms’ conduct of business and financial soundness. However, we recognise that some of the proposals may result in additional costs to consumers. Firm exit, product offering and market size
214. It is likely that some firms will decide to exit the funeral plans market. Where this is a
     result of the decision to bring the sector into our regulation, as opposed to specific choices related to the regulatory regime itself, we have not assessed this as part of our CBA.
215. The number of firms which may choose to exit as a result of The Treasury’s decision to
     bring the sector into regulation and the proportion of sales and undrawn plans these firms represent is uncertain. However, some evidence has indicated the potential scale of exit:

• TheFPA’ssubmissiontotheHouseofLordsindicatedthatfirmsholding
  an estimated 0.4% – 4% of currently undrawn plans may not seek or obtain authorisation
• 4%ofintermediariesrespondingtoourfirmsurveystatedtheywillexitthemarket
  as a result of the decision to bring the sector into our regulation

216. The actual levels of exit could be higher than this. There may be some providers and
     intermediaries who fail to meet the threshold conditions as a result of our approach to authorisations. Additionally, some firms may choose not to get authorised or, upon receiving authorisation, decide to exit the market as a result of the impacts of our regulatory framework on their business model. Specific situations where we think this could happen are:

• Providersandintermediariesmayfindthattheyareunabletomakethesamelevels
  ofprofitastheydidpreviouslyduetothecommissionrules.Thiswillespeciallybe thecasewherefirmscurrentlyhaveahigherproportionofrevenuederivedfrom commission-led sales.
• Providersmayfindthattheirprofitlevelsarereducedbecauseofapotential
  decrease in sales or increase in operational costs
• Providers who rely more heavily on the sale of plans through instalments cannot
  findwaysofensuringthedeliveryofthefuneral
• Capitalrequirementsimpactfirmprofitability,especiallyforintermediaries

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218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation It is not reasonably practicable for us to estimate this potential additional exit rate due to the uncertainty around individual firms’ responses to our proposals and how they may choose to adapt their business models. However, previous experience of new sectors coming into FCA regulation suggests that between 4% – 20% of firms may not receive authorisation. In addition, some firms may respond to our regulatory proposals by limiting their product offering or scaling back the size of their activities to allocate capital and firm resources to alternative business activities. This is likely to be particularly driven by proposals related to:

• The commission rules which impact how plans can be sold and may reduce
  incentives for distributors to sell products
• Product governance, in particular those related to instalment plans, which place
  limitationsonwhattypesofproductsfirmscansell
• Capitalrequirementswhichdirectlyreduceprofitabilityoperationsandlimit
  deploymentofcapitaltomoreprofitableactivities Overall, we would expect the above factors to lead to a reduction in sales volumes. This reduced market size could negatively impact consumers in terms of access and how competition operates, which we consider below. Consumer access Consumer access could be negatively impacted through two key mechanisms related to market size:
• Firm exit or scaling back of activity may reduce the overall supply of funeral plans to
  the market
• Removalofcertainproductofferingsbyfirmsmaydisproportionatelyimpact
  consumers who rely on those product types for access. For instance, consumers withlimitedassetsandlowerincomesmaybenefitfromaccessthroughpayingin instalments. Consumers may also face reduced access due to price increases, either due to cost pass-through (see ‘Cost pass-through’) or changes in competitive pressure within the market (see ‘Impact on competition’). This may particularly impact consumers paying through instalments, who may face additional cost increases compared to other consumers due to our requirements to guarantee funeral plan provision. We do not consider it reasonably practicable to estimate the potential cost to consumers of loss of access, because it would require knowledge of consumers’ valuation of future consumption decisions, as well as modelling of firms’ potential response to the intervention. Based on the provider and intermediary exit rates outlined above, we do not consider access issues resulting from firm exit to be a significant risk. Potential access issues are more likely to come from reduced product offerings and higher prices, especially impacting lower income consumers. However, we would expect the potential harm of reduced access from these sources to be mitigated by three factors:
• Where consumers were accessing and purchasing unsuitable plans either as a
  result of mis-selling or product mismanagement, the actual value of the product to the consumer would be lower than the price paid for the plan. This would mean thereisnocosttolossofaccess(ratherabenefit).

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223.
224.
225.

• Poor value plans may generate additional harm beyond the value generated for the
  plan holder. For instance, the bereaved facing additional stress at the time of the funeral as a result of being required to make additional payments or not seeing a funeral plan delivered. Removing such products from the market may be overall net beneficialforconsumers.
• Specificallyrelatingtothepotentiallyhighercostpassthroughforinstalmentplans
  as a result of our proposals to guarantee plan delivery, evidence gathered from firmmeetingssuggeststhatthemarginalcoststoprovidethisbenefitislikelyto be between 30p to £5 per month per plan. This is the additional cost to insure against the risk, either through an insurance contract or retaining own funds for the purpose. To put it in context, as an example, if this cost is fully passed onto consumers it represents an additional 0.4% to 6.5% price increase in the monthly payment for an average 5-year plan. This is a relatively small increase compared tocost,especiallywhenaccountingforthebenefitofaguaranteedfuneraland that consumers may be able to extend the payment period with such a guarantee. Therefore, such additional price increases could be relatively small compared to cost,especiallywhenaccountingforthebenefitofaguaranteedfuneralandthat consumers may be able to extend the payment period with such a guarantee. Impact on competition Competition in the market may be negatively affected due to:
• Firmexitandreducedproductofferings(asoutlinedabove)
• Prospective entrants to the funeral plan market facing higher barriers to entry due
  toincreasedregulatorycostsandreducedprospectiveprofits
• Theabilityoflargerfirmstomoreeasilyabsorbincreasedcompliancethansmaller
  firms
• Specificproposalsonguaranteeingplanslongerthan12monthswhichwilllikely
  impose greater costs and restrictions on those providers and distributors whose share of sales from instalment plans is relatively greater
• Potentialadvantagesofferedtoverticallyintegratedfirms,orfirmswithin‑house
  sales teams in adapting to our commission rules. This maybe driven by:
  – Thelimitedimpactoftherulesonbusinessmodelsforfirmswheresalesinvolve no or little commission (including intra-group commission) – Thecomparativeeasewithwhichverticallyintegratedfirmswhodouse intra-group commission can rearrange their payment structures and distribution strategy to become compliant
• Agreaterincentiveforfirmstoverticallyintegrateinresponsetoourcommission
  banrules,potentiallyresultinginfirms:
  – Being incentivised to input foreclosure to give their group distributors a greater competitive advantage – Cross subsidising between their distribution and production operations in such awaythateffectivecompetitionisimpeded The combined negative effects on competition of the above could ultimately result in increased prices, reduced quality and lower levels of innovation. We do not consider it reasonably practicable to estimate these effects due to the dynamic nature and long-term impacts of competition and the uncertainty around firms becoming FCA authorised and how they will choose to comply with our rules and guidance.

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226. We consider that the negative effects on competition and consumer outcomes could
be mitigated by several factors:

• Various proposals, such as on disclosure and pressure selling, should improve
  clarity, reduce information asymmetry and make it easier to compare products betweenfirms.Suchproposalscouldimproveconsumerengagementand encourageshoppingaround.Suchdemand‑sidepressureshouldincentivisefirms to focus competition on plan price and quality. Prior academic evidence, such as the Which? Report, suggests that whilst such impacts are generally small in scale, theycanstillbesignificant.
• Funeral plans are not the only option available to consumers looking to make
  provision for their funeral, and funeral plan providers will remain in competition with otherproductsasoutlinedabove.Asignificantriseinthepriceoffuneralplans could make them uncompetitive compared to other products, such as over-50s life insurance or Whole of Life insurance. Although as noted above, such products are notperfectsubstitutesanddonotoffertheultimatedeliveryofafuneral.
• Theeffectsoncompetitioncouldbelimitedbythescaleofexitifthelevelsof
  provider and distributor market exit outlined earlier prove hold. Whilst a higher level ofexitwouldincreasethepotentialnegativecompetitioneffectsintheprovider market,especiallyifoneofthelargerfirmswastoexit,thenumberofdistributors andtheirrelativediffusionsuggeststhenegativeeffectscouldbemorelimitedin the intermediary market.
• The regulatory framework contains numerous proposals related to improving
  product quality. In addition, any planned price increases will need to adequately considerourproductgovernancerulesandbejustifiedrelativetothevalueoffered to consumers. Cost pass-through

227. As outlined in the costs section of this CBA, our regulatory requirements will result
     in additional costs for firms in the funeral plans sector. It is likely that firms will adapt product pricing to pass some or all of these additional compliance costs onto consumers.
228. The following considerations could influence the rate of cost pass-through in the
     funeral plans market (for a review of the theory and empirical evidence on cost pass-through see RBB economics, 2014):

• Our regulatory requirements will result in an industry wide cost increase, although
  somefirmsmayfacehighercoststhanotherseitherrelativetotheirsizeasaresult ofsomefixedcostcomponentofcomplianceorduetoundertakingcertaintypes of activities, such as selling a high proportion of instalment plans as part of their product mix.
• Theprovider(upstream)marketisfairlyconcentratedwiththelargestthreefirms
  holding 70-80% of market share whilst the distributor (downstream) market is less concentrated with a much larger number of participants.
• Twoofthethreelargestfirmsareverticallyintegrated.Otherverticalrelationships
  between providers and distributors and horizontal relationships between distributors may exist but their strength is unclear.

229. Given the conditions outlined above we would expect some cost pass-through to
     consumers. The nature of the industry wide cost is likely to lead to a higher cost pass-through rate. However, as neither the provider or distributor markets are

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perfectly competitive, we would expect such pass-through to be less than 100% because firms can absorb costs without becoming loss making. The structure of the Funeral Plans market and other relevant factors mean an assessment of the extent of cost pass-through is inconclusive and therefore not reasonably practicable to estimate.
230. As noted in the preceding competition section, the scope of any price increases
may be mitigated by a number of other factors due to our regulatory changes or the presence of substitute products.
231. Specifically related to the requirement to provide funerals for customers who die
during the instalment period, eg by purchasing additional insurance to cover the cost, firms have indicated that they are likely to pass some or all of this cost on to consumers. However, it should be noted that an increase in monthly prices does not mean that customers will pay more overall. The fact that plans guarantee provision of a funeral if the customer dies during the instalment period, may mean that customers opt to take plans with longer instalment periods (providing firms continue to offer them). A five-year difference in instalment length can equate to approximately £20 per month less, based on current prices. Whilst paying over a longer period would generally mean paying more overall, this will only be the case if the customers live throughout the instalment period. Costs to FCA
232. We anticipate that the proposed interventions may lead to additional material costs
for the FCA. However, we are not currently in a position to assess these. We will set out further details in the fees proposals as part of our annual consultation on FCA fee rates, which is due for publication early in April. Benefits to consumers
233. Benefits to consumers should primarily be driven by our proposals reducing the
identified harms. The first part of this section identifies and analyses how we expect these benefits will accrue. Some of our proposals are not focused on mitigating specific harms. However, in these cases they should improve overall conduct in the sector, ultimately benefitting consumers. Analysis of these policies is covered in the second part of this section.
234. Where reasonably practicable we have sought to estimate the potential benefits of
our proposals. In some cases, such estimates are indicative scenarios based on key assumptions around consumer or firm behaviour. However, in many cases we have not considered it reasonably practicable to robustly estimate benefits. Broadly this is as:

• This sector was previously self-regulated the quality and level of data available
  requiressignificantandgenerallyuntestableassumptionstobemadeformost benefitsestimates.
• The wide scope and scale of our package of remedies means:
  – Itismethodologicallycomplexornotpossibletodisentangletheeffectsof onespecificelementofourpackagefromanother,suchthatattributingsome effectstoaparticularpolicywouldbelargelyarbitrary.

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235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
– Certainelementsofourpackagemayhavecountervailingeffects.Forinstance, as outlined earlier, the rules on commission may reduce access to (or awareness of) funeral plans if a large number of intermediaries decide to withdraw from the market. But we expect these rules also to lead to lower prices for consumers. – Itisunclearexactlyhowfirmswillchoosetoimplementourrequirements, especially where this concerns sales practices. Firms’ responses will also be driven by how they perceive or observe their competitors responding. This generatessignificantuncertaintyandcomplexityforanymodelling.

• Giventhenatureoftheproduct,acorebenefitgeneratedbyourproposalsisa
  reductioninpsychologicaldistress.Suchbenefitsareintangibleandthereforenot reasonably practicable to estimate in terms of monetary values.
• Thecounterfactualscenarioofwhatsalesandfirmbehaviourwouldhavelooked
  like absent our interventions is uncertain, especially following the impact of the coronavirussituationwhichcontinuestoaffecttheeconomyandfinancialmarkets. Where we have not been able to estimate benefits, we have provided a qualitative analysis. In some cases, we provide additional, proposal-specific, reasoning as to why we are unable to provide estimates. We then produce an overall breakeven analysis to estimate how much in benefits would be required for such interventions to produce a net consumer benefit. Suitability of purchases In our harm section we outlined harms relating to products being purchased not meeting consumers’ needs:
• Firms using high pressure sales tactics and misleading information, and
  commissions which may be incentivising poor sales practice, resulting in consumers purchasing plans which are not suitable for their needs. Some plans in the market do not deliver in line with consumers’ needs or expectations. Below we detail how a range of our proposals produce benefits for consumers in remedying these harms by:
• Increasing consumer awareness of plan features
• Improvingfirmincentivesandpracticesaroundsales
• Ensuring plans deliver funerals
  Increasing consumer awareness of plan features We are proposing a range of disclosure measures. These will ensure that consumers are better aware of the features of their plan. Our intention is that the disclosure regime be comprehensive, covering the whole lifecycle of the plan. First, we are proposing that all plan providers will be required to produce a short and standalone product disclosure document. This information is important because there are currently no plans on the market which cover all of the costs traditionally associated with a funeral. For example, we have not found any plans which cover the cost of venue hire or catering. We consider that better pre-contract information, especially about the limitations of plans, will benefit consumers by making it easier for them to understand what they are purchasing, and to decide whether the proposed plan is suitable for them. In addition, it should make it easier for consumers to compare funeral plans with other substitute products, such as Over 50s plans. These already have similar requirements for pre-contract disclosure.

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240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation Second, we are proposing that plan providers will be required to send the consumer an annual statement. By requiring firms to actively contact existing consumers to make them aware of the plan details and give them the opportunity to review whether the plan remains suitable for them, we expect that some consumers will make changes to their plans. Some of these changes could result in savings to the consumer, for example:

• If the consumer decides to switch from instalment payments to a lump sum, this
  could save £500-£1000 in instalment fees (based on a consumer switching from afive‑yearinstalmentterm).Theexactamountwilldependonthetypeofplan the consumer has, the original instalment term length, and the point at which the consumer makes the change.
• If the consumer decides to cancel their plan because it no longer meets their
  needs, this will save them future payments and will often see their money returned. Finally, we are proposing that all firms will need to ensure that their advertising and communications are clear, fair and not misleading. This includes ensuring that marketing is clearly identifiable as such. The FPA requirements already have some similarity to our proposed rules. As such we expect minimal benefits from this relative to the baseline under the assumption of full compliance with the FPA requirements. Overall, we expect that such proposals will improve the suitability of purchases made by consumers as a result of being better informed about and more engaged with the products they are buying. In addition, we expect some marginal benefits in terms of downward pressure on prices and improved quality as a result of competition driven by:
• IncreasedcomparabilitybetweendifferentFuneralPlanproviders,includingas
  a result of increased ease with which aggregators and other intermediaries can provide comparison services
• Increased comparability between Funeral plans and substitute products
  Improving firm incentives and practices around sales In many situations, we have found that firms and their employees may be incentivised by commission or performance management practices, coupled with limited claw back arrangements. Such incentives potentially represent a conflict of interest, resulting in consumers purchasing unsuitable or poor value products. We seek to minimise this conflict of interest and improve firms’ incentives and ultimately lead to more sales that meet consumers’ needs through the following:
• allfirmswillneedtoacthonestly,fairlyandprofessionallyinthebestinterestsofthe
  consumer.
• intermediary commission will be prohibited, removing the incentive to sell products
  which do not meet the consumer’s needs.
• firms will be required to ensure they do not remunerate or performance manage
  theiremployeesinawaywhichconflictswiththecustomer’sbestinterests. Ultimatelyconsumersreceivingmoresuitableproductsthatmeettheirneedswill benefit from deriving greater value from them. This can be as a result of an increase in the monetary value of services received or because of a reduction in the psychological distress caused by unsuitable products. We do not consider it reasonably practicable to estimate these benefits for the reasons outlined at the beginning of this section. Prior to taking on regulatory

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246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation responsibility for funeral plans, we also cannot reasonably assess the extent to which plans are currently being mis-sold, and so we cannot provide a reliable estimate for the reduction in mis-sold products which these rules will produce. However, our analysis indicates that 41% of all funeral plan sales involve commission payments, with 35% of all sales (50,700 per year) resulting in commission being paid to a third party. It is likely that all of these sales will be impacted by our proposed rules on commission. Consumers who currently buy via intermediaries may still purchase funeral plans, but if they do, the plans are more likely to be better aligned to their needs and cheaper than current prices. Alternatively, these consumers may benefit by purchasing a different product which better meets their needs. We do not consider it is reasonably practicable to estimate the impact as it will depend on how firms adapt to our rules, and on the future decisions that consumers make. However, as noted above, Fairer Finance reported that 42% of consumers expected their plan would cover more than it actually did, and 30% felt pushed into purchasing their plan. We expect our proposals to reduce competition based on remuneration and focus it instead on price and quality. This is likely to benefit consumers as they are more likely to obtain a plan which meets their requirements. In addition, our proposed 30-day cancellation period will allow consumers time to reflect and reconsider their purchase decision. This should reduce the number of unsuitable sales by allowing consumers time to reconsider, and to cancel purchases which are unsuitable. As such unsuitable sales may have been driven by sales incentives, this proposal provides marginal benefits above the benefits outlined above. Our proposals will ensure consistency across the industry, and that the benefits of cancellation rights are retained. Ensuring plans deliver funerals We are proposing to prohibit the manufacture and sale of plans which risk not providing a funeral if the consumer dies during the instalment period. Consumers purchase funeral plans with the belief that a funeral will be delivered on their death. This proposal increases the probability that the plan delivers in line with consumer expectations. The key consumer benefits generated by this proposal are:

• Increased product suitability through reductions in the probability that a funeral
  is not delivered by the plan, for instance in the event of death before instalment payments are completed
• Savings to consumers who previously would have had to make additional payments
  to fully deliver a funeral which they believed to be paid for
• Decreased psychological distress which being required to make additional
  payments or alternative arrangement can have at a such an emotionally sensitive time In paragraph 154, we set out our estimate of the costs to firms in meeting cost shortfalls. These costs represent a transfer and corresponding benefit to consumers, as they will no longer be required to pay the shortfall. We estimate this benefit at £1.69m – £2m per year28. In practice, we expect this to be at the lower end of the estimate, because not all consumers will choose to pay the increased prices which 28 This estimate is based on the potential transfer of cost from the consumer’s estate to plan providers in the absence of our proposal. The alternative method of calculating this cost to firms (the monthly insurance cost) does not represent a transfer to consumers because the payout from the insurance policy goes to the firm not the consumer.

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could arise from firms protecting themselves by putting more money into their trusts, or purchasing supplementary insurance.
251. In addition, we propose that providers must, within 30 days of the sale, nominate a
funeral director who will carry out the funeral services. This will give greater certainty to consumers and their representatives as to who will provide their services whilst removing the possibility of a firm being unable to identify a funeral director at the time of the claim. The following illustrate the benefits from these proposals:

• Not having a nominated funeral director can lead to delay in the funeral
  arrangements being made after the consumer dies, risking uncertainty and distress fortheconsumer’sfamilyatanalreadydifficulttime.Havinganominatedfuneral director appointed shortly after the sale will remove this uncertainty.
• Where the plan provider is only able to place the business with a funeral director
  whose place of business is not local to the consumer, it can cause additional travel burdens and costs on the consumer’s relatives. Requiring the funeral director to be nominated shortly after the plan is taken out will prevent this from happening. Consumers are paying high prices for plans which are not providing them with fair value

252. We have identified a number of issues which may lead to the price of funeral plans
     being too high, and plans (or plan features) not providing fair value to consumers:

• Plans may not be designed to meet the needs of consumers in the target market,
  and to provide funerals in all cases
• Commission arrangements mayinflatethepriceoftheplan
• Feeschargedbyfirmsmayleadtoconsumerspayingforserviceswhichrepresent
  noorlimitedbenefittothem

253. The proposals outlined above aimed at improving product suitability should contribute
     to mitigating this harm by increasing the value to the consumer of the product they are purchasing. In addition, the proposals outlined below should remedy this harm either by putting downward pressure on prices or increasing the quality of the products. In either case this should increase the value of funeral plans relative to the price.
254. First, the proposal to prohibit commission should remove a significant component
     of the price paid by consumers. As noted above, we estimate that the total value of commissions being paid annually to intermediaries is £32.8m (see paragraph 122). This is extracted from the price paid by the consumer. We cannot reasonably estimate the extent to which the proposed ban will result in this amount being reduced, leading to benefits in the form of transfers from firms to consumers. This is because:

• We expect some intermediaries will operate on an advisor/arranger charging model.
  This means that customers will pay fees directly to the intermediary rather than commission.
• Werefirmstoadaptbychangingtheirdistributionstrategies(forexample,by
  creatingin‑housesalesfunctions),thiswillleadtoincreasedcostswhichwilloffset some of the savings from no longer paying commission to intermediaries.

255. However, the information from our 2019 survey indicates that the majority of plans are
     sold without high intermediary commissions being paid. This is either through funeral directors who typically receive no commission, or only a comparatively small amount,

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
or through in-house sales staff who receive comparatively small incentives for sales. Given that these other sales channels operate successfully without payment of large commissions, we consider it reasonable to expect that over time firms can achieve lower acquisition costs as a result of our commission ban. This should result in lower prices for consumers.
256. Second, the proposed product oversight and governance regime will benefit
consumers through improved assessment of target markets, distribution strategies and product reviews. This should lead to products that are better designed to meet the needs of consumers, and are distributed through appropriate distribution channels, in turn leading to the following benefits:

• Downward pressure on prices as a result of reductions in remuneration and other
  deductions from the headline price of a plan. In paragraphs 144 to 148 we have set outourassessmentofthecurrentlevelsofremunerationinfluencingplanprices. Weconsiderthatthebenefittoconsumersislikelytobeadirecttransferfromfirms through a reduction in these elements of the price.
• Reductions in psychological distress and additional funeral costs for the family or
  friends of consumers as the funeral will proceed as they expected. The emotional contextofthecircumstanceswhenaplanisdrawnmeansthebenefitislikelytobe substantial.

257. Third, we propose to limit the circumstances in which firms can charge cancellation
     fees. This will produce benefits to consumers in the form of direct savings. Based on the costs to firms set out in paragraphs 103 and 106, we expect consumers to save £125k – £249k in no longer paying cancellation fees.
258. Fourth, we are also proposing that all other fees should be limited to the cost the firm
     incurs. This will benefit consumers by removing the risk that consumers end up paying an excessive amount for the service they receive. Currently the only other fees that firms charge are instalment fees, which firms already state are purely intended to cover the costs of allowing the consumer to pay by instalments. However, we have seen a significant variation in the fees charged; ranging from 3% – 6%. This suggests that some fees are higher than the costs the firms incur, so there is likely to be a reduction in fees charged, which provides a direct transfer to consumers.
259. Finally, due to the rules outlined above as well as those related to suitability of sales
     and consumer awareness, consumers may be encouraged or find it easier to compare funeral plans with lower priced substitute products, such as over-50s plans. As a result, some consumers may opt to purchase cheaper substitute products. To provide an indicative example of the effect of such substitution we consider the savings from purchasing an over-50s life insurance product instead of a funeral plan, though these products work in a different way so we recognise there may be other differences that need also to be accounted for. However, we have used data provided by firms to compare the cost of a funeral plan with a 25-year instalment period to the cost of an over-50s life insurance product for a consumer who pays it for 25 years based on current rates. This analysis shows that, to receive a benefit of equivalent monetary amount, the over-50s life insurance consumer would pay approximately £5 per month less. For illustrative purposes only, if 10% of consumers currently paying for funeral plans on instalments (with the risk of not receiving the funeral) switched onto a broadly equivalent over-50s life insurance product, we estimate there would be an annual saving of £355k – £1m.

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
260. We recognise the limitations of the analysis in paragraph 260.

• Consumers who take out over-50s life insurance products generally have to
  continue paying until they die, whereas longer-term instalment funeral plans stopwhentheconsumerfinishespaying.Assuch,thesavingestimatereduces significantlyiftheconsumerlivespastthe25yearswehaveusedforouranalysis. However,over‑50sproductswouldpayoutthesamebenefitamountifthe consumerlivedlessthan25years,sothesavingcouldbesignificantlygreater
• Over-50s life insurance simply pays a sum of money, whereas a funeral plan allows
  the consumer to specify the details of their funeral. Consumers may value the additional certainty and peace of mind that comes from this. We cannot reasonably practicablyestimatethevalueofsuchpsychologicalbenefitsinmonetarytermsas we are unable to infer the value consumers place on these features from the overall valueofthepolicy.However,werecognisethatitisabenefitofafuneralplanwhich isnotofferedbyanOver‑50slifeinsuranceplan. Poor governance and controls within firms

261. We think applying SM&CR to funeral plan providers and intermediaries will lead to
     benefits in the form of:

• driving up culture and standards through increased accountability at the senior
  level. This is supported by a new duty of responsibility on Senior Managers
• increasingthelikelihoodofinstancesofmisconductbeingidentified,whichshould
  prevent or at least reduce harm to consumers, thanks to the application of Conduct Rulesandassociatedreportingrequirements,andfirm‑levelassessmentoffitness and propriety
• broadening the scope for the FCA to take disciplinary actions, which should provide
  incentives to improve behaviour
• encouragingbetterdecisionmakingwithinfirms,throughincreasedaccountability
  and clarity about each individual’s responsibilities
• advancingimprovedstaffhiringprocessesandprofessionalismthroughregularfit
  and proper checks, conditional approvals and regulatory references
• encouragingimprovedtrustinfinancialservices,asalloftheabovewillhelpraise
  publicconfidenceintheindustry,aswellasclarifytheFCA’sexpectationsonfirms

262. We do not consider it is reasonably practicable to estimate these benefits, as they
     depend on future changes in behaviour, for which we do not have comparable evidence. Additionally, this change will arise from a combination of factors, including the transfer of regulation to the FCA and the implementation of the new conduct rules proposed in this consultation paper. We cannot isolate the specific impact of SM&CR. We also note that some of the benefits cannot be easily expressed in monetary terms. This is particularly true for benefits relating to improvements in consumers’ confidence in the funeral plans sector. Plans are often not redeemed as the consumer’s family is not aware of them
263. We are proposing that plan providers will be required to send a statement to the
     consumer’s representative. This proposal is intended to reduce the likelihood of a funeral plan going unclaimed, ensuring that the consumer and their family receive the benefits of their purchase. Currently, families who are unaware their relative had a pre-paid funeral plan can incur unnecessary financial loss, as they may pay for a funeral.

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Annex 1
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
Financial Conduct Authority
Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation This is a risk in the funeral plan sector because the costs will generally be incurred shortly after the consumer’s death, so if a plan is discovered months later it is unlikely to be of use. This proposal is intended to reduce the incidence of this. As for other aspects of the proposed package, we expect this proposal will reduce additional stress on the bereaved, as they will know the plan details and how to claim it at the time of need. It is not possible to know with certainty how many plans currently go unredeemed after the consumer dies because, by definition, the provider only knows that the consumer has died when a redemption is made. Some providers told us that they do periodic audits to try and identify these cases but could not give us conclusive figures. In our survey we asked plan providers to tell us how many undrawn plans they have where the consumer is over 90 years old. The average across the market was 5.4% of plans. We recognise that many of these consumers may well be alive. Assuming 9,396 new plans go unredeemed each year, we have calculated a range of benefits based on different reductions of unredeemed plans per year:

• Saving from a 1% reduction in unredeemed plans – £352k per year
• Saving from a 3% reduction in unredeemed plans – £1m per year
• Saving from a 5% reduction in unredeemed plans – £1.7m per year
  As the disclosure requirement will only apply to new plan sales, we have based the figures on the potential future savings to families of consumers purchasing funeral plans from the time our rules come into force. Given the age of these new consumers, it will take a number of years before these benefits will be realised, because for some time the majority of redemptions will come from providers’ existing plans. However, we are implementing guidance that firms should consider contacting the representatives of their existing consumers, where this can be done through reasonable steps. This may bring forward some of these benefits. Poor financial management of firms means that sufficient funds may not be available to cover funeral liabilities Our prudential rules seek to improve firm financial management through improved capital requirements which reduce the probability of firm failure. However, in the event that a firm does fail, our resolution rules and application of the FSCS will provide consumers with additional protection from losses. The nature of these benefits is outlined below. Prudential rules Our focus is to ensure that a firm has adequate capital resources, and adequate trust or insurance arrangements to absorb losses, and meet liabilities as they fall due (including meeting their obligations to deliver the pre-agreed funeral under a pre-arranged funeral plan contract), ensuring the firm is still a going concern and to prevent, as far as possible, a disorderly wind-down of its regulated activities. Holding adequate capital resources, both in terms of quality and quantity, helps a firm to reduce the probability of financial distress and enables the firm to remain financially viable in the face of operational failures and unexpected shocks. It further signals to consumers the commitment of the firm’s owners and the financial soundness of the entity, which allows consumers to have the confidence to engage with the firm and to form reasonable expectations that the firm will fulfil their obligations.

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
Our proposals outlined in chapter 4 should translate into an increase in the capital resources position of firms, which should help to build greater trust from consumers and other stakeholders that interact with funeral plan providers and funeral plans intermediaries. This increased confidence could result in greater participation in the market from consumers. It is not reasonably practicable to estimate the benefits of increased confidence due to the multitude of channels through which they take place and the dynamic nature of how increased confidence and participation could impact the market. Firms can only make an orderly exit from the market if they have sufficient financial resources of the necessary quality to meet both the costs of winding-down and of continuing to run the business until it is wound down or its activities are restructured. Our proposals provide benefits to consumers by reducing the probability of disorderly wind down on firm exit which may impact delivery of service to the consumer. It is not reasonably practicable to estimate the marginal effect of this benefit due to uncertainty around what a counterfactual scenario for firm exit and wind down would be without the imposition of our proposals. Resolution and Financial Services Compensation Scheme We consider that the resolution proposals will increase the likelihood of consumers receiving continuity in funeral service provision if their funeral plan provider fails. We also expect the proposals to increase the likelihood of consumers receiving a reimbursement from firms where continuity is not provided. Both of these outcomes are supported by safeguarding proposals which restrict the circumstances in which claims can be made on trust assets and insurance policies and safeguard them from general creditors in the event of insolvency. Funeral plan providers may already have some arrangements in place, but our requirements will ensure the arrangements apply more broadly, and more consistently. There is the risk that a customer of a funeral plan provider or distributor could suffer financial harm if the firm went out of business and owed the customer money. Financial harm could include damages which are due to the consumer (e.g. following a claim for negligence or breach of contract) not being paid or funeral costs not being met upon the death of the consumer. In an extreme scenario, it may mean that the customer’s estate does not have the funds to pay funeral costs. Providing FSCS protection for customers in relation to funeral plan contracts, in conjunction with reimbursements made by firms, is essential to ensure that consumers and their estates are protected in the event of the failure of their funeral plan provider or distributor. Accordingly, consumers and their estates will benefit from the availability of FSCS compensation in circumstances where they have a valid claim against a failed funeral plan firm which has been declared “in default” by FSCS. Together, the
resolution arrangements and FSCS protection will serve to mitigate harm from financial loss and/or psychological distress arising from the failure of a funeral plan firm. By mitigating against disorderly firm failure, the proposals will also increase consumer confidence in funeral plans and therefore potentially improve consumer participation in the market. Given the make-up of funeral consumers is disproportionately those who are elderly and/or potentially vulnerable, these benefits accrue to such groups. If such benefits occur, they will also accrue to the funeral plan sector in terms of higher sales.

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
275. Consumers will also benefit from disclosure on what resolution arrangements firms
have in place, and particular risks that they may face. This will improve the ability for plan-holders to take decisions regarding funeral plans.
276. It is not reasonably practicable to quantify the value of these benefits, as we do
not have sufficient evidence on past firm failure where harm might have arisen. It is therefore not practicable to robustly predict the harm avoided by the resolution and FSCS proposals. Other benefits High level standards
277. We expect consumers to receive benefits from a number of other proposals. These
benefits are not specifically directed to remedy particular harms and are likely to manifest as general improvements to standards across the funeral plans sector. We do not believe it is reasonably practicable to calculate these benefits due to them being inextricably linked to a broad range of other rules and the intangible nature in which matters such as proper systems and controls, monitoring and training will translate into better consumer experience and more suitable sales.

• Firms will be required to comply with our Principles for Businesses, including the
  requirementtotreatconsumersfairly.Theseoverarchingrequirementswillbenefit consumers.
• Preventing funeral plan providers and intermediaries from buying indemnity
  insuranceagainstfinancialpenaltiesisintendedtoensurethatregulatory enforcementactionoffersagenuinedeterrenttopoorpracticebyfirms.
• The rules will prohibit the use of premium rate phone numbers. If any such numbers
  arecurrentlyused,thisproposalwillbenefitconsumersbysavingthemthecostof the call. Most of the systems and controls requirements are concerned with risk management and governance. We consider that consumers are generally likely to benefitfromfirmshavingimprovedmonitoringandoversightprocessesinplaceto reduceinstancesofharm.Inparticular,weexpectthatconsumerswillbenefitfrom firmshavinggreatercontrolsoveroutsourcedproviders.
• Consumersarelikelytobenefitfromdealingwithmorehighlytrainedemployees,
  whoareabletoofferbetteradviceandguidance.
  Dispute resolution

278. Consumers will benefit from receiving the Ombudsman Service’s standard explanatory
     leaflet in the final response to their complaint. They will be able to more easily gain an understanding of their rights to complain. Plan providers and intermediaries will also be more likely to focus on reducing the number of complaints because of having to report complaints annually to us, and potentially publishing this data if they receive a high volume of complaints. As a result, consumers should benefit from improved consumer service. In turn, this should bring benefits to plan providers and intermediaries through higher consumer satisfaction.

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Average benefits that need to be realised for our proposals to be net beneficial
279. For illustration, we have estimated the benefits for an average consumer that would
need to be generated for our proposals to be net beneficial, given the compliance costs incurred by firms.
280. To produce this estimate, we first group one-off and ongoing costs of our intervention
into those affecting existing plan holders and new consumers and those affecting just new consumers, estimating totals for each group. We then estimate the total net present value (NPV) of costs for each group over a 10-year period, using the Treasury’s Green Book discount rate of 3.5%. We produce these estimates for our low and high range cost estimates.
281. We have not adjusted for the benefits we have already quantified in this analysis. This
is because the benefits we have quantified are either direct transfers from firms to consumers or indicative only due to limitations in data which inform our assumptions. There is also uncertainty about the timing over which certain benefits will be realised. Finally, as previously noted, it is difficult to determine the marginal benefit of each proposed rule as our proposals interact with one another.
282. We exclude from our breakeven analysis the costs for rules which lead to benefits to
consumers in the form of transfers, as these will net each other out. As we have also not adjusted for the benefits we have already quantified, the estimates in this section reflect the highest possible benefits which need to be realised by consumers for the policies to be net beneficial.
283. Based on the most recent sales data provided by the FPA, adjusted for the proportion
of the market they represent, we estimate that 174,000 new consumers per year will be impacted by our proposals. This equates to 1.7 million new consumers over 10 years. Based on the same source and approach, we estimate that around 1.6 million existing plans could also be affected by our proposals. This suggests that, in total, around 3.3 million consumers could be affected by our interventions over a 10-year period.
284. We estimate the total NPV of costs to be £173m – £219m for proposals affecting
both existing and new consumers and £17m – £50m for those only affecting new consumers. To estimate the discounted cost per consumer, we divide the relevant total NPV of costs by the relevant number of affected consumers, based on which type of consumers it affects.
285. We estimate that for the impacts of our intervention to breakeven in monetary terms,
the average existing plan holder would need to realise between £52 – £66 in benefits and the average new consumer would need to realise between £62 – £95 in benefits. The higher figure for new consumers reflects the additional cost of rules which will only affect them, such as pre-purchase disclosure requirements.
286. Usingfiguresfromour2020surveyofproviders,weestimatethattheaverageprice
of a plan is £4,100 to £4,600. Dividing the average plan holder benefits required to breakeven by the average plan price range suggests that these figures only represent 1.1% – 1.6% of a plan price for an existing plan holder and 1.4% – 2.3% of a plan price for a new consumer. We note that as we utilise prevailing plan prices, where existing plans were purchased many years ago the relative proportion of plan price maybe higher as

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Annex 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
plan prices were likely lower. We are unable to produce an inflation adjusted estimate as we do not have sufficient data on such plans.
Table 12: Breakeven analysis
New Customers Existing Customers
Monetarybenefitneededtobreakeven £62 – £95 £52 – £66 Monetarybenefitneededtobreakeven as % of average plan price 1.4% – 2.3% 1.1% – 1.6% Benefits to industry
287. We consider that our proposals will benefit both the funeral plans sector and others.
By setting clear requirements for the funeral plans sector, we are ensuring that all firms meet a specified level of conduct. This removes the risk that firms who do not act properly receive a competitive advantage due to lower compliance costs and increases the likelihood of firms competing on quality of products and services. This should also lead to improved confidence in the sector, which may encourage more consumers to purchase funeral plan products. Funeral plan products compete with other products many of which are already regulated by the FCA. By ensuring consistency of standards, our proposals will create a more level playing field between competing products, with similar standards and compliance costs. This will benefit firms providing substitute products to funeral plans. Q57: Do you have any comments on our cost benefit analysis?

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Annex 2
Compatibility statement
Compliance with legal requirements

1. This Annex records the FCA’s compliance with a number of legal requirements
   applicable to the proposals in this consultation, including an explanation of the FCA’s reasons for concluding that our proposals in this consultation are compatible with certain requirements under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).
2. When consulting on new rules, the FCA is required by section 138I(2)(d) FSMA to
   include an explanation of why it believes making the proposed rules is (a) compatible with its general duty, under s. 1B(1) FSMA, so far as reasonably possible, to act in a way which is compatible with its strategic objective and advances one or more of its operational objectives, and (b) its general duty under s. 1B(5)(a) FSMA to have regard totheregulatoryprinciplesins.3BFSMA.TheFCAisalsorequiredbys.138K(2)FSMA to state its opinion on whether the proposed rules will have a significantly different impact on mutual societies as opposed to other authorised persons.
3. This Annex also sets out the FCA’s view of how the proposed rules are compatible with
   the duty on the FCA to discharge its general functions (which include rule-making) in a way which promotes effective competition in the interests of consumers (s. 1B(4)). This duty applies in so far as promoting competition is compatible with advancing the FCA’s consumer protection and/or integrity objectives.
4. In addition, this Annex explains how we have considered the recommendations made
   by the Treasury under s. 1JA FSMA about aspects of the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government to which we should have regard in connection with our general duties.
5. This annex includes our assessment of the equality and diversity implications of these
   proposals.
6. UndertheLegislativeandRegulatoryReformAct2006(LRRA)theFCAissubjectto
   requirements to have regard to a number of high-level ‘Principles’ in the exercise of some of our regulatory functions and to have regard to a ‘Regulators’ Code’ when determining general policies and principles and giving general guidance (but not when exercising other legislative functions like making rules). This Annex sets out how we have complied with requirements under the LRRA.

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The FCA’s objectives and regulatory principles: Compatibility statement Strategic objective
7. We consider these proposals are compatible with the FCA’s strategic objective of
ensuring that the relevant markets function well because they will drive higher service standards, provide greater consumer protection and promote competition. For the purposes of the FCA’s strategic objective, “relevant markets” are defined by s. 1F FSMA and include the markets for regulated financial services. Operational objectives
8. The proposals set out in this consultation are primarily intended to advance the FCA’s
operational objective of consumer protection. They are also relevant to our objective of promoting competition in the interests of consumers. Consumer Protection objective
9. The mandate of the FCA includes the requirement to secure an appropriate degree
of protection for consumers. The FCA has in this consultation had regard to the 8 matters listed in s.1C(2)(a)-(h) FSMA on consumer protection.
10. We have considered the target market for funeral plan providers and how this may
affect decision making and expectations. Our proposals for disclosure requirements will ensure firms provide plan holders, and their nominated representatives, with the necessary information to make clear and well-informed decisions. Firms will be required to ensure that their disclosure documents are clear, fair and not misleading which will help in clarifying the services that the plan holder and nominated representative will receive from their plan.
11. Our proposals on longer term instalment plans will also ensure that firms are selling
products that better meet consumer needs and more closely align with consumer’s expectations of the plans they purchase.
12. By ensuring both plan holders and their nominated representatives are eligible to
complain to the FOS, this ensures greater protection for consumers where they feel they have been treated unfairly. Competition objective and our Competition Duty
13. The mandate of the FCA includes the requirement to promote competition. The
FCA has in this consultation had regard to the 5 matters listed in s.1E(2)(a)-(e) FSMA on promoting competition. For example, our proposals for disclosure will empower consumers to make informed choices in line with s.1E(2)(a). Furthermore, our proposals to ban cancellation fees where the consumer has not received any benefit will allow them to switch providers more easily in line with s.1E(2)(c).
14. These proposals also meet our competition duty under s.1(B)(4) as they will allow
consumers to better compare products both in terms of the service they deliver and their value for money. Therefore, this should improve competition both on price and standard of service.

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The FCA’s regulatory principles
15. In preparing the proposals set out in this consultation, the FCA has had regard to the
regulatory principles set out in s. 3B FSMA.
The need to use our resources in the most efficient and economic way
16. We have largely based our rules for funeral plans on those that already apply to
non-investment life insurance products, such as guaranteed over-50s plans. Where we have identified harms specific to the funeral plan market, we have introduced additional measures. By focusing new proposals on these specific harms, we allow our resources to be used in the most efficient way.
17. Our approach to authorising firms will ensure we mitigate harm by identifying poor
practice and bad actors at the gateway. This will ensure our supervisory resources are used efficiently as those firms who become authorised will already meet the threshold conditions and our wider expectations. The principle that a burden or restriction should be proportionate to the benefits
18. We have considered the impact of proposals on both firms and consumers and have
undertaken a cost-benefit analysis which is included in Annex 2 of this CP. We consider the costs are proportionate to the benefits. The desirability of sustainable growth in the economy of the United Kingdom in the medium or long term
19. Our proposals have regard to the desirability of sustainable growth in the medium and
long term. Those funeral plan providers authorised in the regulated market should be more sustainable due to our prudential requirements, and should provide a higher standard of service overall, due to our enhanced conduct regime. The general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions
20. Our proposals to require firms to provide plan holders with necessary information
pre-sale, through the Funeral Plan Summary, will empower consumers to decide whether a funeral plan is the right product for them and more easily compare providers. Our proposals to require firms to provide an annual statement to plan holders will ensure consumers continue to review their plan and assess whether it still meets their needs.
21. Consumers will therefore remain responsible for their decisions on whether a funeral
plan is the right product for them, and if so, which provider to use, and each of these decisions will be better-informed. The responsibilities of senior management
22. Our proposals to apply the Senior Managers & Certification Regime to Funeral Plan
Providers will ensure that firms and the FCA are able to hold individuals to account. This will help to:

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• Encouragestafftotakepersonalresponsibilityfortheiractions
• Improve conduct at all levels
• Makesurefirmsandstaffclearlyunderstandandareabletodemonstratewhodoes
  what
  The desirability of recognising differences in the nature of, and objectives of, businesses carried on by different persons including mutual societies and other kinds of business organisation

23. Our proposals are not relevant for this field. Our proposals will not discriminate
    between different business models. This is intended to ensure a level playing field for all entities in the market. The desirability of publishing information relating to persons subject to requirements imposed under FSMA, or requiring them to publish information
24. Our proposals are not relevant for this field.
    The principle that we should exercise of our functions as transparently as possible
25. We have engaged regularly with the Funeral Planning Authority, the current
    non-statutory regulator of the funeral plans market, as well as firms in the market. We have worked closely with those in the industry to understand how to shape our proposals and we will continue to do so as part of this consultation process. Financial Crime
26. In formulating these proposals, the FCA has had regard to the importance of taking
    action intended to minimise the extent to which it is possible for a business carried on (i) by an authorised person or a recognised investment exchange; or (ii) in contravention of the general prohibition, to be used for a purpose connected with financial crime (as required by s. 1B(5)(b) FSMA). Funeral Plan providers authorised by the FCA will be required under our proposals to actively implement and maintain measures to counter the risk that the provider might be used to further financial crime (SYSC 6.1.1R). Expected effect on mutual societies
27. The FCA does not expect the proposals in this paper to have a significantly different
    impact on mutual societies.

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Treasury recommendations about economic policy
28. IntheremitletterpublishedbytheChancelloroftheExchequeron8 March201729,
the Chancellor affirms the FCA’s role in ensuring that effective competition in financial services can create the right conditions for access to finance, which is part of the Government’s economic objective to create strong, sustainable and balanced growth. The FCA has regard to this letter and the recommendations within. As set out in this
Annex, we consider that our proposals are proportionate and will promote effective
competition.
Equality and diversity
29. We are required under the Equality Act 2010 in exercising our functions to ‘have
due regard’ to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct prohibited by or under the Act, advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and those who do not, to and foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.
30. As part of this, we ensure the equality and diversity implications of any new policy
proposals are considered. The outcome of our consideration in relation to these matters in this case is stated in Chapter 2. 29 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/recommendations-for-the-financial-conduct-authority-spring-budget-2017

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Annex 3
Questions in this paper
Q1: Do you agree that our proposed rules will not have a material impact on groups with protected characteristics? Q2: Do you agree with our proposal for applying high-level standards to funeral plan firms? Q3: Do you agree with our proposal to require firms to back funeral plan contracts with a trust or insurance arrangement going forward? Q4: Do you agree with our proposed rules on trust arrangements? Q5: Do you agree with our proposals for trust solvency and how trust solvency should be assessed? Q6: Do you agree with our proposed prudential requirements on funeral plan providers and intermediaries? Q7: Do you agree with the way we propose to apply our FPCOB rules? Q8: Do you agree with our proposed general conduct of business standards for funeral plans? Q9: Do you agree with our proposed ban on intermediaries receiving remuneration other than advice or arrangement fees from the customer? Q10: Do you agree with our assessment that commissions are leading to mis‑matched incentives and conflicts of interests between firms and customers in the funeral plan market? If you disagree, it would be helpful to explain why by reference to current commission structures and practices you are aware of in the market and, in particular, why you do not consider these to risk creating mis‑matched incentives and conflicts of interests. Q11: Do you agree with our assessment that commissions are leading to customers paying prices which are too high relative to the benefits the funeral plan provides?

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Q12: Do you agree with our assessment that intermediaries receiving commission are providing little or no benefit to customers? If you disagree, it would be helpful to explain why by reference to current commission structures and intermediary services you are aware of in the market and, in particular, how you think they provide benefit to customers. Q13: Do you have any comments on the alternative approaches to tackling the harms caused by commission? In particular, do you have any comments on the alternative option we would be minded to follow if we conclude that a ban is not required? Q14: Do you agree that with our proposals for remuneration of plan providers? Q15: Do you agree with our proposals for pre-contract disclosures? Q16: Do you agree with our proposals for plans sold through instalments? Q17: Do you agree with our proposed standards sales standards? Q18: Do you agree with our proposed approach to cancellation rights and other fees? Q19: Do you have any comments on whether our proposals are likely to impact the relationship between funeral plan contracts and underlying insurance contracts? Q20: Do you agree with our proposal to require plan providers to nominate a funeral director within 30 days of the plan being purchased? Q21: Do you agree with our proposal to require plan providers to send a letter to the customer’s representative once a plan has been purchased? Q22: Do you agree with our proposal to require plan providers to send an annual letter to consumers? Q23: Do you agree with our proposed rules for plan redemption? Q24: Do you agree with our proposals for rules to apply to plans entered into before 29 July 2022? Q25: Do you agree with our proposed product oversight and governance requirements for funeral plan manufacturers?

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Q26: Do you agree with our proposed product oversight and governance requirements for funeral plan distributors? Q27: Do you agree with our proposed rules on fair value for funeral plans? Q28: Do you agree with our proposed resolution rules? Q29: Do you have any views on reimbursement and what amount should be considered adequate noting option 1 (to reimburse an amount equal to the retail cost of an equivalent replacement plan), option 2 (an amount linked to monies paid by the consumer), and other options that sit between these eg sums paid by the consumer that have been paid into a trust plus a pro-rated share of the remainder of the trust assets? Q30: Do you have any views on how these reimbursement options could be funded? In particular, how could funeral plan arrangements be structured in such a way as to ensure that the funeral plan provider’s obligations could be met at all times? Q31: Do you have any views and evidence on the costs and benefits of these options, including relating to consumer protection and commercial impact on firms? We also welcome any evidence on the likely differential between the amounts relating to options 1 and 2, and between these amounts and the amount available from trust and insurance arrangements. Q32: Do you agree with the proposal to introduce FSCS protection for certain funeral plan activities in relation to firms that are declared “in default” by FSCS, and for acts or omission arising, from the date FCA takes on regulation of the funeral plan activity? Q33: Do you agree with the scope of proposed FSCS coverage? Q34: Do you agree with the proposed approach to FSCS quantification, the payment of compensation and the compensation limit? Q35: Do you agree with the proposal to introduce a new funeral plan activity FSCS funding class as set out above? If not, please set out an alternative funding approach with justification. Q36: Do you agree that an initial class limit of £5 million for the new funeral plan activity FSCS funding class would be appropriate, on the basis that this limit will be reviewed at least one year after regulation commences?

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Q37: Do you have any other comments on the proposals in relation to FSCS? Q38: Do you agree with our proposal to apply the SM&CR to funeral plan providers? Q39: Do you agree with our proposals to treat funeral plan firms (that have no other regulatory permissions) as Core firms, except for intermediaries whose primary business is not funeral plan intermediation and who only have permission to carry on funeral plan mediation activity, which we propose would be Limited Scope? Q40: Do you agree with our proposed fit and proper requirements, including criminal record checks and regulatory references? Q41: Do you agree with our proposed approach to applying the Conduct Rules to funeral plan firms? Q42: Do you agree with our proposal above to extend the rules and guidance for ARs to funeral plan firms? Q43: Do you agree with our proposal above to apply the existing Approved Persons Regime to funeral plan firms? Q44: Do you agree with our proposal to require funeral plan principal firms to notify us of changes in relation to their ARs as detailed above? Q45: Do you agree with our approach to apply our complaint handling rules and guidance in DISP, including the compulsory jurisdiction of the ombudsman service, to all authorised funeral plan providers and which will also apply to intermediaries (e.g. appointed representatives)? Q46: Do you think there are any gaps in ombudsman service coverage in the scenarios discussed above or are there any other issues you have identified? If so, please provide details. Q47: Do you agree with our assessment that it is not necessary to make any changes to the rules on eligible complainants? Q48: Do you agree that this covers all likely forms of redress? If you consider further categories are needed please provide details in your response. Q49: Do you agree with the ombudsman service’s proposal to expand the scope of the voluntary jurisdiction in this manner?

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Q50: Do you have any comments on the proposals in Table 1 on the application of our FEES rules and guidance to Funeral plan providers and intermediaries, in particular the proposal to create a new Funeral plan provider and Intermediary industry block with the tariff base based on annual income subject to a minimum fee? Q51: Do you agree with our proposed application of the existing SUP rules to funeral plan firms? Q52: Do you agree with the notification requirements and guidance we are introducing into SUP 15? Q53: Do you have any comments on the reporting requirements set out in this CP? Q54: Do you agree with the proposal for the FCA to impose an administration fee on funeral plan firms for late submission? Q55: Do you have any comments on our proposal to apply the same approach to enforcement investigations and actions to funeral Plan firms as we do to other regulated firms, as set out in EG? Q56: Do you have any comments on our proposal to follow the same procedures for decision-making and imposing penalties in relation to funeral plan firms and individuals set out in DEPP? Q57: Do you have any comments on our cost benefit analysis?

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Annex 4 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Annex 4
Abbreviations used in this paper
FSMA The Financial Services and Markets Act 2001 PRIN Principles for Businesses SYSC Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook COND Threshold Conditions sourcebook The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) RAO Order 2001 (SI 2001/544) FPA Funeral Planning Authority FCA Financial Conduct Authority FSCS Financial Services Compensation Scheme CP Consultation paper CBA Cost benefit analysis The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) FPO Order 2005 (SI 2005/1529) TC Training and Competence sourcebook SUP Supervision sourcebook GEN General Provisions sourcebook FPCOB Funeral Plans: Conduct of Business sourcebook SAR Solvency assessment report IoFA Institute and Faculty of Actuaries O50s plan Over 50s plans ICOBS Insurance: Conduct of Business sourcebook The Responsibilities of Providers and Distributors for the Fair RPPD Treatment of Customers guide MiFID II The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2014/65)

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Annex 4 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
IDD The Insurance Distribution Directive (Directive 2016/97) PRA The Prudential Regulation Authority COMP Compensation sourcebook SM&CR The Senior Managers and Certification regime FOS The Financial Ombudsman Service CJ Compulsory jurisdiction (of the Financial Ombudsman Service) VJ Voluntary jurisdiction (of the Financial Ombudsman Service) EG The Enforcement Guide PERG The Perimeter Guidance Manual COCON Code of Conduct FIT Fit and Proper test for Employees and Senior Personnel AR Appointed Representative TCs Threshold Conditions IA Impact Assessment DISP Dispute Resolution: Complaints SAIF Society of Allied and Independent Funeral Directors NAFD National Association of Funeral Directors FEES Fees Manual NPV Net Present Value DEPP Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual

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Annex 4 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Sign up for our news and publications alerts We make all responses to formal consultation available for public inspection unless the respondent requestsotherwise.Wewillnotregardastandardconfidentialitystatementinanemailmessageasa request for non-disclosure. Despitethis,wemaybeaskedtodiscloseaconfidentialresponseundertheFreedomofInformation Act 2000. We may consult you if we receive such a request. Any decision we make not to disclose the response is reviewable by the Information Commissioner and the Information Rights Tribunal. All our publications are available to download from www.fca.org.uk. If you would like to receive this paper in an alternative format, please call 020 7066 7948 or email: publications_graphics@fca.org.uk or write to:
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CP21/4 Financial Conduct Authority
Appendix 1 Funeral Plans: Proposed approach to regulation
Appendix 1
Draft Handbook text

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FUNERAL PLANS INSTRUMENT 2021
Powers exercised by the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited A. The Financial Ombudsman Service Limited makes and amends the scheme rules and guidance relating to the complaints handling procedures of the Financial Ombudsman Service; makes and amends the rules and guidance for the Voluntary Jurisdiction; and fixes and varies the standard terms for Voluntary Jurisdiction participants, as set out in Annex A and Annex J to this instrument, in the exercise of the following powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Act”):
(1) section 227 (Voluntary jurisdiction);
(2) paragraph 8 (Information, advice and guidance) of Schedule 17; (3) paragraph 14 (Scheme operator’s rules) of Schedule 17; (4) paragraph 18 (Terms of reference to the scheme) of Schedule 17; and (5) paragraph 20 (Voluntary jurisdiction rules: procedure). B. The Financial Ombudsman Service Limited notes that, for the avoidance of doubt, the Transitional Provisions at TP 1.1 in Annex J to this instrument apply equally to the Voluntary Jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Service and the Compulsory Jurisdiction.
C. The making and amendment of the rules and guidance and the fixing and varying of
the standard terms by the Financial Ombudsman Service, as set out at paragraph A above, is subject to the consent and approval of the Financial Conduct Authority. Powers exercised by the Financial Conduct Authority D. The Financial Conduct Authority (“the FCA”) makes this instrument in the exercise of the following powers and related provisions in or under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Act”):
(1) section 59 (Approval for particular arrangements); (2) section 60 (Applications for approval); (3) section 60A (Vetting candidates by authorised persons); (4) section 61 (Determination of applications); (5) section 62 A (Changes to responsibilities of senior managers); (6) section 63ZA (Variations of senior manager’s approval at request of authorised person); (7) section 63ZD (Statement of policy relating to conditional approval and variation); (8) section 63C (Statement of policy); (9) section 63E (Certification of employees by authorised persons); (10) section 63F (Issuing of certificates); (11) section 64A (Rules of conduct); (12) section 64C (Requirements for authorised persons to notify regulator of disciplinary action); (13) section 69 (Statement of policy);

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(14) section 137A (The FCA’s general rules); (15) section 137D (FCA general rules: product intervention); (16) section 137H (General rules about remuneration); (17) section 137R (Financial promotion rules); (18) section 137T (General supplementary powers); (19) section 138C (Evidential provisions); (20) section 138D (Action for damages); (21) section 139A (Power of the FCA to give guidance); (22) section 213 (The compensation scheme); (23) section 214 (General); (24) section 215 (Rights of the scheme in insolvency); (25) section 226 (Compulsory jurisdiction); (26) section 332 (Rules in relation to persons to whom the general prohibition does not apply); (27) section 347 (The record of authorised persons etc); (28) section 395 (The FCA’s and PRA’s procedures); (29) paragraph 23 of Schedule 1ZA (Fees); and (30) paragraph 13 (FCA’s procedural rules) of Schedule 17. E. The rule-making powers listed above are specified for the purpose of section 138G(2) (Rule-making instruments) of the Act. F. The Financial Conduct Authority consents to and approves the rules and guidance and standard terms made and amended and fixed and varied by the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited, as set out at Annex J. Commencement G. This instrument comes into force on [29 July 2022]. Amendments to the Handbook H. The modules of the FCA’s Handbook of rules and guidance listed in column (1) below are amended in accordance with the Annexes in this instrument listed in column (2) below. (1) (2) Glossary Annex A Principles for Businesses (PRIN) Annex B Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook (SYSC)
Annex C
Threshold Conditions (COND) Annex D
Training and Competence (TC) Annex E
Fees manual (FEES) Annex F
Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS) Annex G Product Intervention and Product Governance sourcebook (PROD)
Annex H
Supervision manual (SUP) Annex I
Dispute Resolution: Complaints sourcebook (DISP) Annex J Compensation sourcebook (COMP) Annex K

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I. The Financial Conduct Authority confirms and remakes in the Glossary of definitions
the defined expressions relating to any UK legislation which has been amended further to Part 2 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2021. Making the Funeral Plan: Conduct of Business sourcebook J. The Financial Conduct Authority makes the rules and gives the guidance in accordance with Annex L to this instrument. K. The Funeral Plan: Conduct of Business sourcebook (FPCOB) is added to the Business Standards block within the Handbook, immediately after the Claims Management: Conduct of Business sourcebook (CMCOB). Amendments to material outside the Handbook
L. The Perimeter Guidance manual (PERG) is amended in accordance with Annex M to
this instrument.
Notes
M. In the Annexes to this instrument, the “notes” shown as “Editor’s note:” and “Note:” are included for the convenience of readers, but do not form part of the legislative text. Citation N. This instrument may be cited as the Funeral Plans Instrument 2021. By order of the Board [of the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited] [date] By order of the Board [of the Financial Conduct Authority] [date]

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Annex A
Amendments to the Glossary of definitions
In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text, unless otherwise stated. Insert the following new definitions in the appropriate alphabetical position. The text is not underlined. best estimate a best estimate valuation should reflect the actuary’s expectation of future experience for each risk factor given all available, relevant experience and information pertaining to the assumption being estimated and set in such a manner that there is an equal likelihood of the actual value being greater than or less than the expected value. carrying out a the regulated activity, specified in article 59(1A) of the Regulated Activities funeral plan Order, of carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider. contract as provider core capital (1) for a firm to which FPCOB 15 applies that also has a Part 4A resources permission to carry on other regulated activities, the requirement requirement specified in FPCOB 15.7.1R; (2) for a firm with a Part 4A permission to carry on funeral plan distribution activity to which FPCOB 15 applies and that does not also carry on any other regulated funeral plan activity, the requirement specified in FPCOB 15.6.1R; or (3) for a firm with a Part 4A permission to carry on any other regulated funeral plan activity to which FPCOB 15 applies, the requirement specified in FPCOB 15.5.1R; covered the individual on whose death a funeral will be provided or secured under a individual funeral plan contract or prospective funeral plan contract. existing funeral (for the purposes of PROD 1.7 and PROD 7) a funeral plan product:
plan product
(1) that was manufactured prior to 29 July 2022; (2) is available to be marketed or distributed to customers. FPCOB the Funeral Plan: Conduct of Business sourcebook. FP distribution any form of charge payable by a customer to a firm in relation to the charge provision of a funeral plan distribution activity and agreed between the firm and the customer. funeral plan a funeral plan contract.

Funeral Plans
Authority funeral plan customer balance funeral plan distribution activity funeral plan intermediary Funeral Plans Order funeral plan product funeral plan provider funeral plan resolution manual funeral plan provision activity funeral plan summary FCA 2021/XX FOS 2021/XX the Funeral Planning Authority Community Interest Company. [see paragraphs 7.22-7.31 of CP21/4 for a discussion on how this term should be proposed to be defined in the forthcoming FCA consultation paper] any of the following regulated activities carried on in relation to a funeral plan contract:
(a) dealing in investments as agent (article 21); (b) arranging (bringing about) deals in investments (article 25(1)); (c) making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments (article 25(2)); (d) advising on investments (except P2P agreements) (article 53(1)); and (e) agreeing to carry on a regulated activity in (a) to (d) (article 64). a firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activity other than a funeral plan provider. the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2021 (SI 2021/90). the product for distribution as a funeral plan contract to customers generally but not intended to refer to each individual funeral plan contract being sold or provided (unless the context indicates otherwise). a firm with permission for one or both of the regulated activities of:
(a) entering as provider into a funeral plan contract; (b) carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider. the manual required by FPCOB 16.2.3R. the regulated activities of:
(a) entering as provider into a funeral plan contract; and (b) carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider. a summary of a funeral plan contract in the format and containing the information in FPCOB 9 Annex 1.

general solvency requirement instalment payment fee instalment payment funeral plan legacy funeral plan contract moratorium period new funeral plan nominated representative document primary purpose protected funeral plan business regulated funeral plan activity FCA 2021/XX FOS 2021/XX the requirement specified in FPCOB 15.2.1R. a fee which is additional to the cost of the funeral plan product and is charged to a customer in connection with a firm accepting payments by one or more instalments in respect of an instalment payment funeral plan. a funeral plan contract under which the customer is required to make more than one payment/periodic payments to the funeral provider. a funeral plan contract entered into before 1 January 2002. the period under a funeral plan contract during which the funeral plan provider is not obliged to provide, or secure the provision of, a funeral on the death of the covered individual. a funeral plan contract entered into on or after 29 July 2022. a document in the format and containing the information in FPCOB 9 Annex 2. the purpose set out in FPCOB 3.1.5R. regulated funeral plan activities which are covered by the compensation scheme, as defined in COMP 5.9. any regulated activity carried on in relation to a funeral plan contract, that is:
(a) dealing in investments as agent (article 21); (b) arranging (bringing about) deals in investments (article 25(1)); (c) making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments (article 25(2)); (d) managing investments (article 37); (e) safeguarding and administering investments (article 40); (f) sending dematerialised instructions (article 45(1)); (g) causing dematerialised instructions to be sent (article 45(2)); (h) advising on investments (except P2P agreements) (article 53(1));

relevant transitional funeral plan complaint remediation plan resolution rules solvency assessment report subsisting funeral plan trust arrangement whole of life insurance policy FCA 2021/XX FOS 2021/XX (i) entering as provider into a funeral plan contract (article 59(1)); (j) carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider (article 59(1A)); and (k) agreeing to carry on a regulated activity in (a) to (j) (article 64). a complaint in respect of which the Financial Ombudsman Service has jurisdiction by operation of article 7 of the Funeral Plans Order. a plan that is produced in accordance with FPCOB 3.2.6R and FPCOB 3.2.7R (including any amendments agreed with the FCA or imposed by the FCA by requirement). the rules in FPCOB 16. a report produced in accordance with FPCOB 3.2.2R and FPCOB 3.2.3R. a funeral plan contract that was entered into before 29 July 2022. (1) in relation to a new funeral plan, a trust meeting the requirements of FPCOB 3.1.9R; (2) in relation to a subsisting funeral plan, a trust that was established to meet the requirements of article 60(1)(b) of the Regulated Activities Order, as it applied at that time. (1) in relation to a new funeral plan, a contract of insurance meeting the requirements of FPCOB 3.1.8R; (2) in relation to a subsisting funeral plan, a contract of insurance that was entered into to meet the requirements of article 60(1)(a) of the Regulated Activities Order, as it applied at that time. Amend the following definitions as shown. annual income (1) (in MIPRU) the income referred to in MIPRU 4.3. (2) (in IPRU(INV) 13) the income referred to in IPRU(INV) 13.14 (Calculation of annual income). (3) (in FPCOB 15) the income referred to in FPCOB 15.8 (Calculation of annual income). client …

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(B) in the FCA Handbook:
(1) (except in PROF, in relation to a credit-related regulated activity, in relation to regulated funeral plan activity, in relation to a home finance transaction and in relation to insurance risk transformation and activities directly arising from insurance risk transformation) … … (11) (in relation to regulated funeral plan activity) a customer. contract of … insurance but not including a funeral plan contract (or a contract which would be a funeral plan contract but for the exclusion in article 60 of the Regulated Activities Order (Plans covered by insurance or trust arrangements)); in this definition “annuities on human life” does not include superannuation allowances and annuities payable out of any fund applicable solely to the relief and maintenance of persons engaged, or who have been engaged, in any particular profession, trade or employment, or of the dependants of such persons. customer … (B) in the FCA Handbook:
(1) (except in relation to SYSC 19F.2, ICOBS, a credit-related regulated activity, regulated claims management activity, regulated funeral plan activity, MCOB 3A, an MCD credit agreement, CASS 5, PRIN in relation to MiFID or equivalent third country business, DISP 1.1.10-BR, PROD 1.4 and PROD 4) and in relation to payment services and issuing electronic money (where not a regulated activity) a client who is not an eligible counterparty for the relevant purposes. … (9) (in relation to regulated funeral plan activity):
(a) (except in PRIN) the person referred to in article 59 (2)(a) of the Regulated Activities Order who makes, or will make, one or more payments to another person under a funeral plan contract or prospective funeral plan contract; (b) (in PRIN) a ‘customer’ in (a) and, if different in relation to a funeral plan contract or prospective funeral plan contract, a covered individual.

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FOS 2021/XX customer’s best interests rule
(1)
(2)
(in relation to regulated funeral plan activity) FPCOB 2.1.2R.
(for all other purposes) ICOBS 2.5.-1R. dealing in investments as agent the regulated activity, specified in article 21 of the Regulated Activities Order (Dealing in investments as agent), which is in summary: buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting designated investments (other than P2P agreements), pure protection contracts, general insurance contracts, or structured deposits or funeral plan contracts as agent. distribute … (4) (in relation to PROD 1.7 and PROD 7) advising on or proposing a funeral plan contract. distributor … (3) (in relation to PROD 1.7 and PROD 7) a firm which advises on or proposes funeral plan contracts which it does not manufacture. employee … (2) (for the purposes of:
…
(b) SUP 12 (Appointed representatives); and (c) TC) TC; and (d) SYSC 19F.3) … entering as provider into a funeral plan contract the regulated activity, specified in article 59 of the Regulated Activities Order (Funeral plan contracts) which comes into force on 1 January 2002, of entering as provider into a funeral plan contract. fair, clear and not misleading rule (1) (2) COBS 4.2.1R or, (in relation to regulated claims management activity and ancillary activity,) CMCOB 3.2.1R. (in relation to regulated funeral plan activity) FPCOB 4.1.3R. (3) (for all other purposes) COBS 4.2.1R. fee … (3) (in FPCOB) remuneration payable directly by a customer in relation to a funeral plan contract that is not included in the price of the funeral plan.

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… financial promotion rules
…
(7) (in relation to FPCOB) any or all of the rules in FPCOB 4, that impose requirements in relation to a financial promotion but only to the extent that they apply to a financial promotion. firm (1) … … (10) … (10A ) (in DISP 2 and 3) includes, in accordance with the Funeral Plans Order, an unauthorised person subject to the Compulsory Jurisdiction in relation to a relevant transitional funeral plan complaint. former scheme (1) (except in relation to a relevant transitional complaint, or a relevant claims management complaint or a relevant transitional funeral plan complaint) any of the following:
(a) …
…
(4) (in relation to a relevant transitional funeral plan complaint) the complaints procedure which is contained in the Funeral Plans Authority’s Code of Practice and Rules in force immediately before 29 July 2022. funeral plan contract the investment, specified in articles 59(2), 60 and 87 of the Regulated Activities Order which comes into force on 1 January 2002, which is in summary: rights under a contract which:
… unless, at the time of entering into the contract, the customer and the provider intend or expect the funeral to occur within one month; but excluding certain contracts under which sums paid will be applied towards a contract of insurance or will be held on trust. individual capital guidance (1) (other than in (2)) guidance given to a firm about the amount and quality of capital resources that the appropriate regulator thinks the firm should hold at all times under the overall financial adequacy rule as it applies on a solo level or a consolidated level. (2) (in FPCOB 15) guidance given to a firm about the amount and quality of capital resources that the FCA thinks the firm should hold at all times under FPCOB 15.2.1R (General solvency requirement).

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FOS 2021/XX individual liquidity guidance
(1) (other than in (2)) guidance given to a firm about the amount, quality and funding profile of liquidity resources that the appropriate regulator has asked the firm to maintain. (2) (in FPCOB 15) guidance given to a firm about the amount, quality and funding profile of liquidity resources that the FCA thinks the firm should hold at all times under FPCOB 15.2.1R (General solvency requirement). manufacture … (4) (in relation to PROD 1.7 and PROD 7) any of:
(a) creating;
(b) developing;
(c) designing; and/or
(d) entering as provider into a funeral plan contract and/or carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider, a funeral plan product. manufacturer … (3) (in relation to PROD 1.7 and PROD 7) a firm which manufactures funeral plan products for sale to customers. payment shortfall … (3) the total sum of periodic instalments towards the purchase price of a funeral plan that have become due under the terms of the funeral plan contract but which, in breach of those terms, remains unpaid. regulated activity (B) in the FCA Handbook: (in accordance with section 22 of the Act (Regulated activities)) the activities specified in Part II (Specified activities), Part 3A (Specified activities in relation to information) and Part 3B (Claims management activities in Great Britain) of the Regulated Activities Order, which are, in summary: … … (t) entering as provider into a funeral plan contract (article 59(1)); (t-a) carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider (article 59(1A)); …

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FOS 2021/XX relevant complaint
(1) (in DISP) a relevant existing complaint, relevant new complaint, a relevant transitional complaint, and (in DISP and FEES 5) a relevant claims management complaint and a relevant transitional funeral plan complaint. … remuneration … (3) (in SYSC 19F.2, SYSC 19F.3, ICOBS and, in relation to a life policy, in COBS 6.1ZA) any commission, fee, charge or other payment, including an economic benefit of any kind or any other financial or non-financial advantage or incentive offered or given in respect of insurance distribution activities, funeral plan distribution activities or funeral plan provision activities. [Note: article 2(1)(9) of the IDD] respondent (1) … … (7) (in DISP 2 and 3 and FEES 5) includes, in accordance with the Funeral Plans Order, an unauthorised person subject to the Compulsory Jurisdiction in relation to a relevant transitional funeral plan complaint. third party processor (1) A firm (“Firm A”) which carries on home finance activities, funeral plan distribution activities or insurance distribution activities other than advising on life policies, or both all of these, for another firm (or an appointed representative) (“Firm B”) under a properly documented outsourcing agreement, the terms of which provide that when Firm A carries on any of these activities (“the outsourced activities”) for Firm B:
…
(2) A firm (“Firm C”) which carries on home finance activities, funeral plan distribution activities or insurance distribution activities other than advising on life policies, or both all of these, for a third party processor within (1) (“Firm A”), where:

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Annex B
Amendments to the Principles for Businesses (PRIN) In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text. 1 Introduction …
1.2 Clients and the Principles
…
Approach to client categorisation
1.2.2 G Principles 6, 8 and 9 and parts of Principle 7, as qualified by PRIN 3.4.1R,
apply only in relation to customers. The approach that a firm (other than for credit-related regulated activities, and regulated claims management activities, payment services and issuing electronic money (where not a regulated activity) in relation to which client categorisation does not apply) needs to take regarding categorisation of clients into customers and eligible counterparties will depend on whether the firm is carrying on designated investment business, insurance risk transformation and activities directly arising from insurance risk transformation, or other activities, as described in PRIN 1.2.3G. [deleted]
1.2.3 G (1) In relation to the carrying on of designated investment business,
insurance risk transformation and activities directly arising from insurance risk transformation, a firm’s categorisation of a client under the COBS client categorisation chapter (COBS 3) will be applicable for the purposes of Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9. [deleted] (1AA) In relation to the carrying on of insurance risk transformation and activities directly arising from insurance risk transformation, the COBS client categorisation chapter (COBS 3) applies as modified by COBS 18.6A.3R. (1A) Client categorisation under COBS 3 or PRIN 1 Annex 1 is not relevant to credit-related regulated activities and therefore the guidance on client categorisation does not apply in relation to a credit-related regulated activity. The definitions of client and customer in relation to those regulated activities reflect the modified meaning of “consumer” in articles 36J, 39M, 60LA, 60S and 89E of the Regulated Activities Order, as well as the definitions of “individual” and of “relevant recipient of credit” in that Order. (1AB) Client categorisation under COBS 3 or PRIN 1 Annex 1R is not relevant to regulated claims management activities and therefore the

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FOS 2021/XX guidance on client categorisation does not apply in relation to a regulated claims management activity. (2) The person to whom a firm gives basic advice on a stakeholder product will be a retail client for all purposes, including the purposes of Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9. (3) In relation to carrying on activities other than designated investment business, insurance risk transformation or activities directly arising from insurance risk transformation (for example, general insurance business or accepting deposits) the firm may choose to comply with Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9 as if all its clients were customers. Alternatively, it may choose to distinguish between eligible counterparties and customers in complying with those Principles. If it chooses to make such a distinction, it must comply with PRIN 1
Annex 1 in determining whether that client is an eligible counterparty
(see PRIN 3.4.2R). In doing so, the requirements in SYSC will apply, including the requirement to make and retain adequate records. (4) In relation to carrying on activities that fall within both (1) and (3) (for example, mixed designated investment business and accepting deposits), a firm’s categorisation of a client under the COBS client categorisation chapter (COBS 3) will be applicable for the purposes of Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9. … Acting through an agent
1.2.6 G …
…
3 Rules about application
…
3.2 What?
3.2.1A R PRIN applies with respect to the carrying on of:
…
(3) ancillary activities in relation to designated investment business, home finance activity, regulated funeral plan activity, credit-related regulated activity, insurance distribution activity and accepting deposits; and … …

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3.2.2A R PRIN 1 Annex 1, PRIN 3.4.1R and PRIN 3.4.2R do not apply with respect to the carrying on of credit-related regulated activities or regulated claims management activities, or to the provision of payment services or the issuing of electronic money (where not a regulated activity). [deleted] …
3.4 General
Clients and the Principles
3.4.-1 R PRIN 3.4.1R, PRIN 3.4.2R and PRIN 1 Annex 1 do not apply with respect to:
(1) credit-related regulated activities; or (2) regulated claims management activities; or (3) regulated funeral plan activities; or (4) payment services; or (5) the issuing of electronic money (where not a regulated activity). …
3.4.3 G (1) COBS 3 (Client categorisation) applies to a firm intending to conduct,
or conducting, designated investment business (other than giving basic advice), ancillary activities relating to designated investment business and to a firm intending to carry on, or carrying on, insurance risk transformation and activities directly arising from insurance risk transformation. Any client categorisation established in relation to such business will be applicable for the purposes of Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9. [deleted] (2) The person to whom a firm gives basic advice will be a retail client for all purposes including the purposes of Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9. (3) PRIN 3.4.1R and PRIN 3.4.2R do not apply with respect to the carrying on of credit-related regulated activities. Client categorisation does not apply in relation to carrying on a credit-related regulated activity. The definitions of client and customer in relation to those regulated activities reflect the modified meaning of “consumer” in articles 36J, 39M and 89E of the Regulated Activities Order, as well as the definitions of “individual” and of “relevant recipient of credit” in that Order. (4) PRIN 3.4.1R and PRIN 3.4.2R do not apply with respect to the carrying on of regulated claims management activities. Client categorisation does not apply in relation to carrying on a regulated claims management activity.

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(5) PRIN 3.4.1R and PRIN 3.4.2R do not apply with respect to the provision of payment services or the issuing of electronic money where it is not a regulated activity. Client categorisation does not apply in relation to carrying on of those activities. The definitions of customer in relation to those activities reflects the scope of the corporate opt out under the Payment Services Regulations. …

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Annex C
Amendments to the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook (SYSC) In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text, unless otherwise stated. 1 Application and purpose … 1 Annex Detailed application of SYSC …
Part 2 Application of the common platform requirements
Who?
…
What?
…
2.11 R The common platform requirements on financial crime apply as set out in
SYSC 1 Annex 1 2.8R, except that they do not apply:
…
(2) in relation to the following regulated activities:
…
(g) reversion activity; and
(h) meeting of repayment claims and managing dormant account funds (including the investment of such funds); and (i) regulated funeral plan activities. … …
Table A: Application of the common platform requirements in SYSC 4 to SYSC 10
…

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Provision COLUMN B
A A+ A++ SYSC 10 Application to all other firms Applicatio Application Application to apart from insurers, UK ISPVs, n to a to a UCITS a full-scope managing agents, the Society, common managemen UK AIFM of full-scope UK AIFMs of platform t company an authorised unauthorised AIFs, MiFID firm other AIF optional exemption firms and than to a third country firms UCITS investment firm SYSC 10.1. Not applicable Guidance in relation to funeral -5G applicable applicable plan distribution activities … SYSC Not Rule, but Not applicable Guidance - but applies as a rule 10.1.4R applicable not in relation to the production or applicable arrangement of investment in relation research, or the production or to insurance dissemination of non￾distribution independent research, in activities accordance with COBS 12.2 Not applicable in relation to insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities SYSC Not applicable Guidance - but not applicable in 10.1.4AG applicable applicable relation to insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities SYSC Not Rule in Rule in Rule in relation to insurance 10.1.4BR applicable relation to relation to distribution activities and funeral insurance insurance plan distribution activities distribution distribution activities activities

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SYSC Not Rule in Rule in Rule in relation to insurance 10.1.4CR applicable relation to insurance distribution activities relation to insurance distribution activities distribution activities and funeral plan distribution activities … SYSC Not Rule Rule in Guidance - but applies as a rule:
10.1.6R applicable relation to insurance distribution activities. Otherwise, not applicable (a) in relation to the production or arrangement of investment research, or the production or dissemination of non￾independent research, in accordance with COBS 12.2; and (b) in relation to insurance distribution activities and funeral plan distribution activities SYSC Not Not Guidance - but Guidance - but not applicable in 10.1.6AG applicable applicable not applicable in relation to insurance distribution activities relation to insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities SYSC Not Rule in Rule in Rule in relation to insurance 10.1.6AAR applicable relation to insurance distribution activities relation to insurance distribution activities distribution activities and funeral plan distribution activities … SYSC Not Rule in Rule in Guidance - but applies as a rule 10.1.9AR applicable relation to insurance distribution activities. Otherwise, not applicable relation to insurance distribution activities. Otherwise, not applicable in relation to insurance distribution activities and funeral plan distribution activities

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SYSC Not Rule Rule in Guidance - but applies as a rule:
10.1.10R applicable relation to insurance distribution activities. Otherwise, not applicable (a) in relation to the production or arrangement of investment research, or the production or dissemination of non￾independent research, in accordance with COBS 12.2; and (b) in relation to insurance distribution activities and funeral plan distribution activities SYSC Not Rule Rule in Guidance - but applies as a rule:
10.1.11R applicable relation to insurance distribution activities. Otherwise, not applicable (a) in relation to the production or arrangement of investment research, or the production or dissemination of non￾independent research, in accordance with COBS 12.2; and (b) in relation to insurance distribution activities and funeral plan distribution activities SYSC Not Not Guidance - but Guidance - but not applicable in 10.1.11AG applicable applicable not applicable in relation to insurance distribution activities relation to insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities SYSC 10.1.11AA R Not applicable Rule in relation to insurance distribution activities Rule in relation to insurance distribution activities Rule in relation to insurance distribution activities and funeral plan distribution activities … …
Table
B:
Application of the common platform requirements in SYSC 4 to 10 to MiFID optional exemption firms and third country firms … Provision COLUMN A MiFID optional exemption firms COLUMN B Third country firms … … …

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SYSC 6.1.4CR SYSC 6.1.4CR(2)(c) and
SYSC 6.1.4CR(3) applies apply as specified in that rule SYSC 6.1.4CR Otherwise not applicable. SYSC 6.1.4CR(3) applies as specified in that rule SYSC 6.1.4CR Otherwise not applicable … … 4 General organisational requirements …
4.4 Apportionment of responsibilities
…
Allocating functions of apportionment and oversight …
4.4.6 G Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5R
…
…
Question
Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5R need to be an approved person? … How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5R apply to an EEA SMCR firm other than a claims management or funeral plan firm? … Answer Yes. They will be performing the limited scope function. However, the limited scope function does not apply to an EEA SMCR firm (except claims management and funeral plan firms) or an authorised professional firm that is a core SMCR firm. … … … … Conflicts of interest

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10.1 Application
Application to funeral plan distribution activities 10.1.-5 G This section applies to a firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities in accordance with the tables in Part 3 of SYSC 1 Annex 1. Application to insurance intermediaries … Types of conflicts … 10.1.4B R For the purposes of identifying the types of conflict of interest that arise, or may arise, in the course of carrying on insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities and whose existence may damage the interests of a client (“A”), a firm must assess whether:
(1) the firm or a relevant person, or a person directly or indirectly linked by control to the firm; or (2) (in the case of conflicts between A and another client) the other client, has an interest in the outcome of the insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities, which meets the following criteria:
(3) it is distinct from A’s interest in the outcome of the insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities; and … … Record of conflicts
10.1.6 R A management company, and an insurance intermediary and a firm
carrying on funeral plan distribution activities must keep and regularly update a record of the kinds of service or activity carried out by or on behalf of that firm in which a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clients has arisen or, in the case of an ongoing service or activity, may arise. [Note: article 20(1) of the UCITS implementing Directive] … 10.1.6A R An insurance intermediary and firm carrying on funeral plan distribution A activities must ensure that its management body receives on a frequent basis, and at least annually, written reports on all situations referred to in SYSC 10.1.6R.

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…
Disclosure of conflicts
10.1.8 R …
(2) The disclosure must:
…
(c) include specific description of the conflicts of interest that arise in the provision of funeral plan distribution activities, insurance distribution activities, investment services or ancillary services; … … … Conflicts policy
10.1.10 R (1) A management company, and an insurance intermediary and a firm
carrying on funeral plan distribution activities must establish, implement and maintain an effective conflicts of interest policy that is set out in writing and is appropriate to the size and organisation of the firm and the nature, scale and complexity of its business. (2) Where the management company, or insurance intermediary or firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities is a member of a group, the policy must also take into account any circumstances, of which the firm is or should be aware, which may give rise to a conflict of interest arising as a result of the structure and business activities of other members of the group. … Contents of policy
10.1.11 R (1) The conflicts of interest policy must include the following content:
(a) it must identify in accordance with SYSC 10.1.3 R, SYSC 10.1.4 R, SYSC 10.1.4BR and SYSC 10.1.4CR (as applicable), by reference to the specific services and activities carried out by or on behalf of the management company, or insurance intermediary or firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities, the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clients; and … (2) …

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(a)
(aa
)
(for an insurance intermediary or a firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities) be designed to ensure that the insurance distribution activities or funeral plan distribution activities are carried out in accordance with the best interests of the client and are not biased due to conflicting interests of the insurance intermediary, the firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities or another client; and (b) include, for an insurance intermediary or a firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities, where appropriate, the following, and for a management company, such of the following as are necessary and appropriate for the management company to ensure the requisite degree of independence:
…
(3) …
(vi) (for insurance intermediaries or firms carrying on funeral plan distribution activities) a gifts and benefits policy which determines clearly under which conditions gifts and benefits can be accepted or granted and which steps are to be taken when accepting and granting gifts and benefits. (4) (5) If one or more of the measures and procedures in paragraph (2) is not appropriate for the purposes of paragraph (2)(aa), an insurance intermediary or a firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities must adopt such alternative measures and procedures as are necessary and appropriate. The procedures and measures provided for in paragraph (1)(b) must be appropriate to the size and activities of an insurance intermediary’s or a firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities size and activities, the group to which it may belong and to the risk of damage to the interests of the client. … 10.1.11 A G Other firms (except common platform firms, UCITS management companies, and insurance intermediaries and firms carrying on funeral plan distribution activities) should take account of the rules relating to conflicts of interest policies (see SYSC 10.1.10R and SYSC 10.1.11R) in accordance with SYSC 1 Annex 1.3.2BR, SYSC 1 Annex 1 3.2CR and SYSC 1 Annex 1 3.3R.

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10.1.11
AA
R An insurance intermediary and firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities must assess and periodically review, on at least an annual basis, the conflicts of interest policy established in accordance with SYSC 10.1.10R and SYSC 10.1.11R and should take all appropriate measures to address any deficiencies (such as over reliance on disclosure of conflicts of interest). … 10.1.11 B G A firm (other than a common platform firm, and an and an insurance intermediary and a firm carrying on funeral plan distribution activities)) should read SYSC 10.1.11AAR as if “should” appeared in that rule instead of “must”. … After SYSC 19F.2 (IDD remuneration incentives) insert the following new section SYSC 19F.3. The text is not underlined. 19F.3 Funeral plan remuneration incentives Application 19F.3.1 R This section applies to a firm carrying on regulated funeral plan activities. Remuneration and the customer’s best interests 19F.3.2 R (1) A firm must not:
(a) be remunerated; or
(b) remunerate or assess the performance of its employees, in a way that conflicts with its duty to comply with the customer’s best interests rule. (2) In particular, a firm must not make any arrangements by way of remuneration, sales target or otherwise that could provide an incentive to itself or its employees to recommend or offer a particular funeral plan contract to a customer when the firm could offer a different funeral plan contract which would better meet the customer’s needs. 19F.3.3 G (1) A firm should consider FPCOB 6.4R and FPCOB 6.5R when making arrangements which concern remuneration or performance incentives. (2) Examples of remuneration arrangements which may conflict with the customer’s best interests rule include:

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(a) arrangements which provide for higher levels of remuneration based on the price of the plan that is recommended or offered (i.e. higher remuneration for selling a more expensive plan); (b) arrangements for remuneration or performance management which are based primarily on the number of plans sold, or the price of plans sold; and (c) arrangements which do not have adequate provision for remuneration to be taken back if the customer cancels the plan. Amend the following as shown. … 23 Senior managers and certification regime: Introduction and classification …
23.2 Definitions and types of firms
…
23.2.3 G Broadly speaking, firms covered by the senior managers and certification
regime that are regulated by the FCA are divided into three categories:
…
(3) Firms whose business is limited to certain types. These are called “limited scope SMCR firms”. A large number of firms will be in this category. The main examples are:
…
(e) a firm that only has regulated claims management activities in its permission; and (f) a firm that only has permission for benchmark activities and has the benefit of a waiver treating it as a limited scope SMCR firm as described in SYSC 23 Annex 1 6.12R (Benchmark firms:
Waiver applying limited scope status).; and (g) a firm that only has permission for funeral plan distribution activities. … 23 Definition of SMCR firm and different types of SMCR firms
Annex 1

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…
Part Six: Definition of limited scope SMCR firm
…
…
6.4 R Table: List of limited scope SMCR firms referred to in SYSC 23 Annex 1
6.3R
…
(5) …
(6) A firm that meets the following conditions:
(a) it has permission for any funeral plan distribution activities; and (b) it does not have permission to carry on any other regulated activity. … 27 Senior managers and certification regime: Certification regime …
27.8 Definitions of the FCA certification functions
…
Client-dealing function
…
27.8.19 R Table: Activities covered by the client-dealing FCA certification function
Activity
(1) The following activities:
(a) …
(b) performing other functions related to this, such as dealing, and arranging and (where the product is a contract) entering into and carrying it out; Comments …

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(2) …
(3) If the firm does any of the following activities:
(a) dealing, as principal or as agent; or
(b) arranging (bringing about) deals in investments; or (c) a funeral plan distribution activity (but not advising on investments) or a funeral plan provision activity; taking part in those activities is included. … … … After SYSC 28 (Insurance distribution: specific knowledge, ability and good repute requirements) insert the following new chapter SYSC 28A. The text is not underlined. 28A Regulated funeral plan activities: good repute requirements 28A.1 Application 28A.1.1 R This chapter applies to a firm with respect to regulated funeral plan activities. 28A.2 Good repute Good repute requirements 28A.2.1 R A firm must ensure that all the persons in its management structure and any staff directly involved in the activities specified in SYSC 28A.1.1R are of good repute. 28A.2.2 G This includes but is not limited to those natural persons:
(1) that are directly involved in the activities specified in SYSC 28A.1.1R; or (2) within the management structure responsible for the activities specified in SYSC 28A.1.1R; or

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(3) within the management structure responsible for any staff directly involved in the activities specified in SYSC 28A.1.1R. 28A.2.3 R In considering a person’s repute the firm must at a minimum ensure that the person:
(1) has a clean criminal record or any other national equivalent in relation to serious criminal offences linked to crimes against property or other crimes related to financial activities; and (2) has not previously been declared bankrupt, unless they have been rehabilitated in accordance with national law. 28A.2.4 G (1) In the United Kingdom the following persons will be considered to have been rehabilitated:
(a) in relation to a serious criminal offence, where the conviction is considered ‘spent’ under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974; (b) in relation to bankruptcy, where the bankruptcy has been discharged. (2) References to “serious criminal offences” are not restricted to offences considered to have been committed in or under the law of the United Kingdom. (3) A firm should give particular consideration to offences of dishonesty, fraud, financial crime or other offences under legislation relating to banking and financial services, companies, insurance and consumer protection. 28A.2.5 G A firm’s systems and controls should enable it to satisfy itself of the suitability of anyone who acts for it (see SYSC 5.1.2G). This includes, among other things, the assessment of an individual’s honesty. 28A.3 Record keeping requirements Record keeping requirements 28A.3.1 R A firm must:
(1) establish, maintain and keep appropriate records to demonstrate compliance with this chapter; and (2) be in a position to provide to the FCA, on request, the name of the person responsible for the record-keeping requirement in (1).

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28A.3.2 R A firm must not prevent any person from obtaining a copy of the records relating to them which are maintained by the firm for the purposes of SYSC 28A.3.1R. 28A.3.3 G The rules specified in SYSC 28A.3.1R relate to the requirements specified in SYSC 5.1.1R, SYSC 9.1.1R and SYSC 10.1.6R. Amend the following as shown. … TP 7 Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016: Certification and regulatory references
7.1 Application and purpose
…
7.1.3 G SYSC TP 7:
…
(3) has certain other transitional provisions relating to the amendments made to the FCA Handbook by the Individual Accountability (Dual￾Regulated Firms) Instrument 2018, the Individual Accountability (FCA-Authorised Firms) Instrument 2019 and the Individual Accountability (FCA-Authorised Benchmark Firms) Instrument 2020; and (4) is adjusted and supplemented by SYSC TP 8 in relation to certain claims management firms. ; and (5) does not apply to a firm that becomes an SMCR firm after 31 March 2021 except that:
(a) it may apply after then in relation to certain claims management firms covered by SYSC TP 8; and (b) the parts of SYSC TP 7 that are described in the table in SYSC TP 7.1.2R (Table: Application of SYSC TP 7) as applying to “All other firms” might apply although in practice the material about employment references will not normally apply because of the time period in which SYSC TP 7 operates as described in SYSC TP 7.1.4G. …

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Annex D
Amendments to the Threshold Conditions sourcebook (COND) Underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text. 2 The threshold conditions …
2.5 Suitability
…
Paragraph 3D to Schedule 6 of the Act
…
2.5.6 G Examples of the kind of particular considerations to which the FCA may
have regard when assessing whether a firm will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, this threshold condition include, but are not limited to, whether:
…
(18
A) in the case of a firm that carries on regulated funeral plan activities:
(a) all the persons in the firm’s management structure and any staff directly involved in regulated funeral plan activities are of good repute (see SYSC 28A.2 (Good repute)); and (19 ) …

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Annex E
Amendments to the Training and Competence sourcebook (TC) In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text. 2 Competence
2.1 Assessing and maintaining competence
…
2.1.23C …
Continuing professional development for persons involved in regulated funeral plan activities 2.1.23D R In this section, relevant employees are employees and other persons:
(1) directly involved in regulated funeral plan activities; or (2) within the management structure responsible for the firm’s regulated funeral plan activities; or (3) responsible for the supervision of a relevant employee acting in the capacity as set out in (1). 2.1.23E R In this section ‘employee’:
(1) is not restricted to an individual working under a contract of employment; and (2) includes (without limitation) any natural or legal person whose services are placed at the disposal of the firm, under an arrangement between the firm and a third party; and (3) also includes appointed representatives and their employees. 2.1.23F R A firm must ensure that each relevant employee who has been assessed as competent for the purposes of TC 2.1.1R remains competent by completing a minimum of 15 hours of appropriate continuing professional development in each 12 month period. 2.1.23G R The appropriate continuing professional development in SYSC 2.1.23FR is in addition to any other continuing professional development completed. Continuing professional development completed by a relevant employee in relation to activities other than regulated funeral plan activities must not be taken into account for the purpose of SYSC 2.1.23FR. 2.1.23H R For the purposes of SYSC 2.1.23FR, a firm must take into account the:

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(1) role and activity carried out by the relevant employee within the firm; and 2.1.23I G (2) (1) (2) the nature of the products sold. Appropriate continued professional development has the same meaning as given in TC 2.1.22G(1), (3) to (5). For this purpose, reference to retail investment adviser should be read as if it were a reference to a relevant employee. In relation to SYSC 2.1.23FR, the 15 hours of appropriate continuing professional development can include structured and unstructured training and need not consist of only formal classroom-based learning. For examples of structured and unstructured professional development see TC 2.1.20G and TC 2.1.21G. 2.1.23J R TC 2.1.17R (suspending the continuing professional development requirement) and related guidance apply in relation to a relevant employee and references to:
(1) TC 2.1.15R must be read as if it were a reference to TC 2.1.23FR; and (2) a retail investment adviser must be read as if it were a reference to a relevant employee. Continuing professional development record keeping
2.1.24 R A firm must, for the purposes of TC 3.1.1R (Record keeping), make and
retain records of:
(1) the continuing professional development completed by each:
…
(b) pension transfer specialist (under TC 2.1.23AR); (c) relevant employee (under TC 2.1.23FR) and (2) the dates of and reasons for any suspension of the continuing professional development requirements under TC 2.1.17R, or TC 2.1.23CR or TC 2.1.23JR.
2.1.25 R A firm must not prevent a retail investment adviser, or a pension transfer
specialist or a relevant employee from obtaining a copy of the records relating to them which are maintained by the firm for the purposes of TC 2.1.24R. …

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App 1 Appendix 1
App 1.1 Activities and Products/Sectors to which TC applies subject to TC Appendices 2 and 3 App R 1.1.1 Activity Products/Sectors Is there an appropriate qualification requirement? … Overseeing an execution-only sale on a day-to-day basis 26 Regulated sale and rent back agreements No Regulated funeral plan activity carried on for a customer Dealing in investments as agent 27 Funeral plan contracts No Arranging (bringing about) deals in investments 28 Funeral plan contracts No Making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments 29 Funeral plan contracts No Managing investments 30 Funeral plan contracts No Safeguarding and administering investments 31 Funeral plan contracts No Sending dematerialised instructions 32 Funeral plan contracts No Causing dematerialised instructions to be sent 33 Funeral plan contracts No Advising on investments 34 Funeral plan contracts No Entering as provider into a funeral plan contract 35 Funeral plan contracts No

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Carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider 36 Funeral plan contracts No Agreeing to carry on a regulated activity 37 Funeral plan contracts No Notes:
…
…
Sch 1 Record keeping Requirements
-1.1 G TC 2.1.24R provides:
A firm must, for the purposes of TC 3.1.1R (Record keeping), make and retain records of:
(1) the continuing professional development completed by each retail investment adviser and relevant employee for the purposes of regulated funeral plan activities; and (2) the dates of and reasons for any suspension of the continuing professional development requirements under TC 2.1.17R or TC 2.1.23JR. …

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Annex F
Amendments to the Fees manual (FEES)
In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text. 5 Financial Ombudsman Service Funding … 5 Annex Annual General Levy Payable in Relation to the Compulsory Jurisdiction 1R for 2020/21 … Compulsory jurisdiction - general levy Industry block Tariff base General levy payable by firm … … … 25 – funeral plan intermediaries and funeral plan providers Annual income [tbc] 6 Financial Services Compensation Scheme Funding
6.1 Application
…
6.1.7A G In order to allocate a share of the amount of specific costs and compensation costs to be funded by an individual participant firm, the funding arrangements are split into six seven classes: the General Insurance Distribution Claims class; the Investment Intermediation Claims class; the Investment Provision Claims class; the Home Finance Intermediation Claims class; the Debt Management Claims class; and the deposit acceptors’ contribution class; and the Funeral Plans Claims class. The permissions held by a participant firm determine into which class, or classes, it falls. … 6 Annex 2 Financial Services Compensation Scheme – annual levy limits This table belongs to FEES 6.3.5R

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Class Category Levy Limit
(£million)
…
Class 7: Funeral Plan
Claims
6 Annex 3A Financial Services Compensation Scheme – classes and categories This table belongs to FEES 6.5.6AR … Class 2 Investment Intermediation Claims … … Category 2.2 Life insurance provision Firms with permission for: effecting contracts of insurance; and/or carrying out contracts of insurance; that are long-term insurance contracts (including pure protection contracts); and/or. entering as provider into a funeral plan contract. Also includes: the Society … Class 6 Deposit acceptors’ contribution … Class 7 Funeral Plan Claims Firms with permission for: any of the following in relation to a funeral plan contract:

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FOS 2021/XX entering as provider into a funeral plan contract; carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider; dealing in investments as agent; arranging (bringing about) deals in investments; making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments; managing investments; safeguarding and administering investments; sending dematerialised instructions; causing dematerialised instructions to be sent; advising on investments; agreeing to carry on a regulated activity which is within any of the above. Tariff base Annual eligible income where annual income is equal to the net amount retained by the firm of all income due to the firm in respect of or in relation to activities falling within class 7. Notes on annual eligible income for class 7: For the purposes of calculating annual income, net amount retained means all the commission, fees, etc. in respect of activities falling within class 7, that the firm has not rebated to customers or passed on to other firms (for example, where there is a commission chain). Items such as general business expenses (for example, employees’ salaries and overheads) must not be deducted.

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Annex G
Amendments to the Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS) In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text. 4 Communicating with clients, including financial promotions
4.1 Application
Who? What?
4.1.1 R This chapter applies to a firm:
…
(2) communicating or approving a financial promotion other than:
…
(d) a financial promotion in relation to a credit agreement, a consumer hire agreement or a credit-related regulated activity.; or (e) a financial promotion in relation to a funeral plan contract or a regulated funeral plan activity. … …

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Annex H
Amendments to the Product Intervention and Product Governance sourcebook (PROD) After PROD 1.6 (Application of PROD 6) insert the following new section, PROD 1.7. The text is not underlined. 1 Product Intervention and Product Governance Sourcebook (PROD) …
1.7 Application of PROD 7
Application of PROD 7
1.7.1 R (1) PROD 7 applies to:
(a) a funeral plan provider; and
(b) a funeral plan intermediary, with respect to:
(c) manufacturing funeral plan products; and (d) distributing funeral plan products.
1.7.2 R A Gibraltar-based firm must also comply with the provisions in PROD 7
(Product governance: funeral plans).
Manufacturing a funeral plan product
1.7.3 G The Glossary term ‘manufacture’ includes ‘designing, developing, creating
and/or entering into or carrying out a funeral plan contract as provider’ which cover activities prior to the funeral plan product being approved for marketing and distributed, and on a continuing basis after such approval.
1.7.4 R (1) For the purposes of PROD 7, a funeral plan intermediary is a
manufacturer of a funeral plan product where an overall analysis of their activity shows that they have a decision-making role in designing and developing a funeral plan contract for the market. (2) A decision-making role will be assumed, in particular, where a funeral plan intermediary autonomously determines the essential features and main elements of a funeral plan contract, including any of its price, costs, target market or guarantee rights, which are not substantially modified by the funeral plan provider. (3) Personalisation of and adaptation of existing funeral plan products in the context of funeral plan distribution activities for individual customers,

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FOS 2021/XX as well as the design of tailor-made contracts at the request of a single customer, are not manufacturing. Territorial scope
1.7.5 R PROD 7 applies to a firm with respect to activities carried on by it, or its
appointed representative, in relation to:
(1) a funeral plan product; and
(2) a subsisting funeral plan.
Interaction of PROD 7 and the RPPD Guide
1.7.6 G The RPPD Guide does not apply to a firm to which PROD 7 applies for
matters covered by, and where the firm has complied with, PROD 7. After PROD 6 (Product governance: additional provisions for pathway investments) insert the following new chapter, PROD 7. The text is not underlined. 7 Product governance: funeral plans
7.1 General
Other requirements
7.1.1 G This chapter does not affect the application of other requirements in the FCA
Handbook applying to funeral plan providers or firms in relation to funeral plan distribution activities including but not limited to:
(1) Identification and management of conflicts of interest (SYSC 10.1 (Conflicts of interest)); (2) Funeral plan remuneration incentives (SYSC 19F.3 Funeral plan remuneration incentives)); (3) Structure arrangements (FPCOB 3 (Structure provisions￾arrangements underpinning a funeral plan contract)); (4) Disclosure (FPCOB 6 (Information about the firm and its services) and FPCOB 9 (Product information)); (5) Remuneration (FPCOB 6.4 (Charging for funeral plan distribution) and FPCOB 6.5 (Payments to funeral plan intermediaries)).
7.2 Manufacture of funeral plans
Product governance arrangements: product approval
7.2.1 R A manufacturer must maintain, operate and review a process for the approval
of:

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(1) a funeral plan product; and
(2) any significant adaptation of an existing funeral plan product, in each case before it is marketed or distributed to customers.
7.2.2 G (1) PROD 7.2.1R(1) includes any funeral plan product whether a new
product manufactured on or after [29 July 2022] or any existing funeral plan product. In relation to an existing funeral plan product, references in PROD 7.2 and 7.3 to ‘marketing’ or ‘distributing’ includes reference to any future activity regardless of whether the product has previously been made available for marketing or distribution. (2) For the purposes of PROD 7.2.2R(2):
( whether a proposed change to the product would be a ‘significant a adaptation’ should include consideration of the potential impact the ) adaptation may have on an existing or potential customer (when compared to the unadapted version of the product). ( a ‘significant adaptation’ in relation to a funeral plan product may b include, but is not restricted to, a proposed change to the ) undertaking to provide funeral arrangements, services added or removed, level of monetary benefits (other than adjustments for inflation or other cost variations) costs, and any other significant change to the terms and conditions. Product governance arrangements: identifying the necessary approval process
7.2.3 R The product approval process in PROD 7.2.1R must be proportionate and
appropriate to the nature of the funeral plan product.
7.2.4 G A manufacturer should take into account the following when considering
whether the product approval process is proportionate and appropriate:
(1) the complexity of the funeral plan product; (2) the degree to which publicly available information can be obtained; (3) the nature of the funeral plan and the risk of consumer detriment related to it; (4) the characteristics of the target market; (5) the scale and complexity of the relevant business of the manufacturer or distributor; (6) the potential risk, and possible levels, of harm to customers if the product design is flawed, in particular, due to the potential scale of harm if the product is intended for a wide target market;

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(7) the nature of the cover that the product is intended to provide; (8) whether the distribution arrangements could mean customers are at a greater risk of not receiving fair value from the product; (9) any particularly notable features of, or relating to, existing products (including how it has been distributed); and (10) the nature and complexity of the firm’s existing or intended customer base, for example whether it includes or is likely to include:
(a) different types of customers with varying characteristics including in relation to their understanding of financial matters; and (b) a significant number of vulnerable customers. Product approval process: outcomes, measures and procedures
7.2.5 R A manufacturer must have a product approval process that:
(1) ensures the design of a funeral plan product:
(a) identifies how funeral arrangements will be provided; (b) delivers fair value; (c) takes into account the intended customers including their objectives, interests, needs and characteristics; (d) does not adversely affect customers; and (e) is driven by features that benefit the customer and not by a business model which relies on poor customer outcomes to be profitable; (2) prevents or mitigates customer detriment; and (3) supports a proper management of conflicts of interest.
7.2.6 R The product approval process must contain appropriate measures and
procedures for:
(1) the design, distribution, monitoring and review of a funeral plan product; (2) identifying whether the product is, or remains, appropriate to be marketed or distributed to customers; and (3) taking corrective and/or mitigating action for funeral plan products where actual or potential customer detriment is identified.

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Product approval process: written policy and record keeping
7.2.7 R A manufacturer must set out the product approval process in a written
document (“product oversight and governance policy”), which is made available to the relevant staff.
7.2.8 R A manufacturer must make and retain a record of any relevant actions taken
in relation to the product approval process. The record must be made available to the FCA upon request. Product approval process: governing body responsibility
7.2.9 R A manufacturer’s governing body must:
(1) endorse and be responsible for establishing, implementing and reviewing the product approval process; and (2) verify internal compliance with that process on an ongoing basis. Product approval process: staff competence
7.2.10 R A manufacturer must ensure that any of its staff involved in the manufacture
of a funeral plan product has the necessary skills, knowledge and expertise to properly carry out this role and in particular to understand the funeral plan product and the interests, objectives and characteristics of the customers belonging to the target market. (Also see SYSC 5.1.1R (competent employee rule)).
7.2.11 R Where a manufacturer uses a third party to undertake any part of the
manufacture of the funeral plan product on its behalf, the manufacturer remains fully responsible for compliance with the product approval process. Product approval process: review of process
7.2.12 R (1) A manufacturer must regularly review its product approval process to
ensure that process is still appropriate and up to date.
(2) Where the process is identified to no longer be appropriate, the manufacturer must:
(a) amend the product approval process;
(b) review any product approved since the approval process was last deemed to be appropriate to:
(i) ensure these products were correctly approved for marketing and/or distribution; and (ii) take all necessary steps for the mitigation and remediation of any actual or potential harm to consumers.

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Product approval process: manufacture by more than one manufacturer
7.2.13 R (1) Where two or more firms collaborate to manufacture a funeral plan
product, the firms must outline their mutual responsibilities in a signed written agreement. (2) The written agreement in (1) must specify:
(a) their respective roles in the product approval process; and (b) how they will collaborate to comply with the requirements in PROD 7.2 (Manufacture of funeral plans) including the procedures through which they will agree on the identification of the target market. Product approval process: need for product to have fair value
7.2.14 R A manufacturer must only approve a funeral plan product where it provides
fair value to customers in the target market.
7.2.15 R (1) A manufacturer must:
(a) be able to clearly demonstrate how any funeral plan product provides fair value; and (b) make and retain a record of the value assessment required by PROD 7.2.14R. (2) Where a firm is unable to both:
(a) identify; and
(b) clearly demonstrate, that the funeral plan product will provide fair value, the manufacturer must not:
(c) market the funeral plan product; or
(d) permit the funeral plan product to be distributed (whether directly or through another person), unless the manufacturer has ensured appropriate changes have been made so that fair value will be provided. Product approval process: meaning of value
7.2.16 R In PROD 7 ‘value’ means the relationship between the total price to the
customer and the quality of the product(s) and/or services provided. The assessment of value must include consideration of at least the following:

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(1) the nature of the product including the benefits that will be provided, their quality, and any limitations (for example in the scope of the funeral arrangements or other features); (2) the type and quality of services provided to customers; (3) the expected total price to be paid by the customer when buying the funeral plan product, and the elements that make up the total price. This will need to include consideration of at least the following:
(a) the overall cost to the firm of the funeral plan product of:
(i) operating the product including the costs of the trust or premiums paid towards an insurance policy to meet the requirements in FPCOB 3 (Structure provisions - arrangements underpinning a funeral plan contract); and (ii) the delivery of funeral benefits under it, and (b) the individual elements of the expected total price to be paid by the customer including, but not limited to:
(i) the funeral plan product;
(ii) the costs of the distribution arrangements, including the remuneration of any relevant person in the distribution arrangements, and including where a manufacturer delegates the final decision on setting the price to another person; and (4) how the intended distribution arrangements support, and will not adversely affect, the intended value of the product.
7.2.17 R A manufacturer must not rely on individual customers to consider whether
they are making fair value purchases in place of any part of the manufacturer’s own assessment. Product approval process: events indicating contravention of fair value
7.2.18 G The following evidential provision provides examples of arrangements the
FCA considers will breach PROD 7.2.14R.
7.2.19 E (1) To ensure a funeral plan product will be providing fair value a firm
must ensure:
(a) the difference between the cost of delivering the funeral plan contract obligations to the manufacturer and the total price paid by the customer bears a reasonable relationship to:

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(i) the actual costs incurred by the manufacturer or any other person involved in the distribution arrangements; (ii) the quality of any benefits (including of the funeral plan product); or (b) any difference between the cost of the funeral arrangements under the funeral plan product and the cost of the equivalent funeral arrangements purchased without a funeral plan contract has an objective and reasonable basis. (2) Contravention of any of (1) may be relied on as tending to establish contravention of PROD 7.2.14R. Product approval process: information to be used when assessing a product for approval
7.2.20 R When assessing whether a product should be approved for the purposes of
PROD 7.2.1R, a firm must use the full range of data and information available to it including but not limited to:
(1) information available to the firm internally including:
(a) customer research;
(b) the performance of the funeral plan product or other funeral plan products of the firm including for example:
(i) how the estimated costs of funerals compare to actual costs; (ii) number of customers cancelling the funeral plan contracts, missed instalment plan payments by the customer; and (iii) number of funeral plan contracts expected to be claimed but have not been redeemed; (c) complaints data (including root cause analysis and handling times), both expected for the product itself and/or any actual information from a comparable product; (2) public information or information obtainable by the firm from external sources including analysis of similar funeral plan products available from other firms; (3) information available to the firm specifically from persons in the distribution arrangements or external funeral provider, including:
(a) any remuneration and its impact on the value of the product;

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(b) levels or quality of service provided by any person in the distribution arrangements; (c) any results of monitoring and oversight of the processes of any persons in the distribution arrangement (for example, call monitoring or file checks) including in relation to other products that person distributes; and (d) the wholesale and retail prices of a funeral not paid for using a funeral plan contract (whether paid for in advance or after the death of a person). Product approval process: product backing arrangements
7.2.21 R A manufacturer must only approve a funeral plan product where it has
established adequate processes and procedures to ensure:
(1) any funeral plan contracts entered into using that product will have the necessary and robust trust or insurance arrangements required to comply with FPCOB 3 (Structure provisions – arrangements underpinning a funeral plan contract); and (2) at a product level, there is sufficient oversight and management of those trust or insurance arrangements to mitigate the risk of customer harm. Product approval process: identifying the target market
7.2.22 R A manufacturer must ensure that for each funeral plan product the product
approval process:
(1) specifies an identified target market;
(2) assesses all relevant risks to the identified target market; (3) identifies that a funeral plan product offers fair value to the specified target market, taking into account in particular their needs, objectives, interests, characteristics; (4) permits only the approval of funeral plan products that are compatible with the needs, characteristics and objectives of the customers belonging to the target market; (5) verifies that the intended distribution strategy is consistent with the identified target market; and (6) requires reasonable steps are taken to ensure that the funeral plan product is distributed to the identified target market.

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7.2.23 R A manufacturer must identify the target market at a sufficiently granular
level, taking into account the characteristics, risk profile, complexity and nature of the funeral plan product.
7.2.24 R A manufacturer must identify groups of customers for whose needs,
characteristics and objectives the funeral plan product is generally not compatible.
7.2.25 R When assessing whether a funeral plan product is compatible with a target
market, a manufacturer must take into account:
(1) the level of information available to the customers belonging to that target market and their financial literacy; and (2) vulnerable customers.
7.2.26 G (1) The identification of the target market should describe a group of
customers sharing common characteristics at an abstract and generalised level in order to enable the manufacturer to adapt the features of the product to the needs, characteristics and objectives of that group of customers. (2) The identification of the target market should be distinguished from the individual assessment at the point of sale to determine whether a product meets the demands and needs of the individual customer. Product approval process: product testing
7.2.27 R (1) A manufacturer must test a funeral plan product appropriately,
including scenario analyses, in a qualitative manner and quantitative manner. (2) The product testing in (1) must assess whether the funeral plan product over its lifetime meets the identified needs, objectives and characteristics of the target market. (3) The requirement in (1) must be carried out:
(a) before approving the product for marketing or distribution; (b) when the product is being significantly adapted; and (c) where the target market has significantly changed.
7.2.28 R A manufacturer must not bring a funeral plan product to the market if the
results of the product testing show that the product does not provide fair value including where it would not meet the identified needs, objectives and characteristics of the target market. Distribution channels: selecting channels

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7.2.29 R A manufacturer must carefully select distribution arrangements including
specific distribution channels that are appropriate for the target market, taking into account the particular characteristics of the relevant funeral plan product.
7.2.30 R (1) When selecting any distribution arrangements including any particular
distribution channel a manufacturer must be able to demonstrate clearly that these arrangements:
(a) result in fair value to the customer;
(b) are consistent with the requirements in FPCOB 6.4 (charging for funeral plan distribution); and (c) prevent or mitigate the risk of customer detriment arising from the distribution of the product, for example by verifying that any proposed distributor has the necessary knowledge, expertise and competence; and does not pose a significant risk of a distribution channel failing to meet the requirements in FPCOB. (2) A manufacturer that is unable to demonstrate the requirements in (1) are met must not use that channel.
7.2.31 G Manufacturers should only select distributors that have the necessary
knowledge, expertise and competence to understand the features of a funeral plan product and the identified target market.
7.2.32 R Whenever making a change to the distribution arrangements, including adding
a further distribution channel, a manufacturer must:
(1) obtain all necessary information from the distributor or any other person who will be involved with the distribution arrangement, including that set out in PROD 7.2.20R; and (2) identify whether the proposed change to the distribution arrangements is consistent with the fair value requirement in PROD 7.2.14R. Distribution channels: information disclosure to distributors
7.2.33 R (1) A manufacturer must make available to a distributor all appropriate
information on the:
(a) funeral plan product including to enable the distributor to understand the intended value established by the firm; (b) product approval process; (c) identified target market of the funeral plan product including any type of customer for whom the funeral plan product is unlikely to provide fair value; and

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(d) suggested distribution strategy.
(2) The information in (1) must:
(a) include information on the main features and characteristics of the funeral plan products, their risks and costs, including implicit costs, and any circumstances which might cause a conflict of interest to the detriment of the customer; (b) be clear, complete and up to date.
7.2.34 R (1) The information a manufacturer has to make available to any
distributor under PROD 7.2.33R(1) must be of an adequate standard to enable distributors to:
(a) understand the funeral plan products;
(b) comprehend the identified target market for the funeral plan products; (c) identify any customers for whom the funeral plan products are not compatible with their needs, characteristics and objectives; and (d) carry out distribution activities for the relevant funeral plans in accordance with the best interests of their customers as prescribed in FPCOB 2.1.2R. (2) A manufacturer is not required to disclose specific information objectively considered to be commercially sensitive if the information it does make available would still allow distributors to meet PROD 7.2.35R(1)(a) and (b). Distribution channels: obtaining information from distributors
7.2.35 R A manufacturer must obtain from any person in the distribution arrangements
all necessary and relevant information to enable it to assess the remuneration associated with the distribution arrangements to allow it to assess the ongoing value of the product, including at least:
(1) the total costs of the distribution arrangement whether as part of the funeral plan contract price or not, including in relation to additional products; (2) a sufficiently detailed breakdown of the costs in (1) identifying the type and level of remuneration of each person in the distribution arrangements together with an explanation of the services provided by that person; and

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(3) confirmation from any firm in the distribution arrangements that any remuneration is consistent with their regulatory obligations including SYSC 19F.3 (Funeral plan remuneration incentives).
7.2.36 G (1) Where the manufacturer is considering the effects of the distribution
arrangements on value it should consider whether the additional costs of any individual party in the arrangements that add to the total price paid by the customer deliver any, or a proportional, additional benefit. If not, a manufacturer should consider how they can be satisfied that the arrangements are consistent with their obligations to be able to clearly demonstrate fair value to the customer. (2) A benefit that could be consistent with fair value might include where the party’s inclusion in the distribution arrangements increases access to the product for customers in the target market in a way that is proportionate to the additional cost involved. Monitoring and review of funeral plan products
7.2.37 R A manufacturer must regularly review the funeral plan products it offers or
markets taking into account any event that could materially affect the potential risk to the identified target market, the main features or the guarantees of the funeral plan product. In doing so, the manufacturer must assess at least the following:
(1) whether the funeral plan product remains consistent with:
(a) the identified target market including their interests, needs, characteristics and objectives; (b) the fair value assessment required under PROD 7.2.14R; and (2) whether the intended distribution strategy remains appropriate including whether those products are being distributed to the target market or are reaching customers outside the target market.
7.2.38 R A manufacturer must ensure the review process has:
(1) the necessary measures to be able to identify if the funeral plan product is not providing fair value; and (2) in that case, provide that appropriate actions be taken:
(a) for the mitigation and any potential remediation of the harm to existing customers; and (b) to prevent harm to new customers. Monitoring and review of funeral plan products: minimum review period
7.2.39 R A manufacturer must undertake the regular review:

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(1) every 12 months; or
(2) more frequently where the potential risk associated with the funeral plan product makes it appropriate to do so.
7.2.40 R When determining the appropriate interval for review of a funeral plan, a
manufacturer must take into account:
(1) the nature of the customer base, including whether there are significant numbers of vulnerable customers; (2) any specific indicators seen in the manufacturer’s assessment of the product’s value to the customer; (3) the nature and type of distribution arrangements being used; (4) any indicators of customer harm potentially emerging from the performance of the product (for example through redemptions of funeral plan contracts,, missed instalment plan payments by the customer, number of funeral plan contracts expected to be redeemed but have not been redeemed and complaints data); and (5) any relevant external factors such as changes to the applicable legal rules, technological developments, or changes to the market situation. Product monitoring and review: monitoring through lifetime of the plan
7.2.41 R (1) A manufacturer must identify during the lifetime of a funeral plan
product any circumstances related to the funeral plan product that may adversely affect a customer of that product. (2) Where a manufacturer identifies an event that may adversely affect a customer of the product, the manufacturer must:
(a) take appropriate action to mitigate the situation and prevent further occurrences of the detrimental event; and (b) promptly inform concerned distributors and customers about the remedial action taken. Product monitoring and review: monitoring distribution arrangements
7.2.42 R (1) A manufacturer must take appropriate steps to monitor:
(a) that a funeral plan product distributor acts in accordance with the objectives of the manufacturer’s product approval process; and (b) any impact which the distribution arrangements are having on the value including whether the distribution channels remain appropriate.

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(2) A manufacturer must verify on a regular basis whether the funeral plans products are distributed on the identified target market. (3) The monitoring activities must be reasonable, taking into consideration the characteristics and the legal framework of the respective distribution channels.
7.2.43 G PROD 7.2 does not require the manufacturer to monitor a distributor’s
compliance with general regulatory requirements when carrying out funeral plan distribution activities for individual customers.
7.2.44 R A manufacturer must:
(1) ensure that it has sufficient, good quality management information; and (2) use the full range of data and information available to it (whether it holds this information already, the information is publicly available, or it is able to obtain it from another person), to enable it to properly understand and monitor the funeral plan product.
7.2.45 G A manufacturer should identify whether there is a risk to its continuing to
provide fair value where there is a material change in the relationship between the price to the customer and the actual costs to the manufacturer or another party involved in the ongoing service/distribution of the product. Product monitoring and review: considering changes to funeral plan products
7.2.46 R For the purposes of showing the requirement in PROD 7.2.1R is met, where a
manufacturer makes a change to a funeral plan product it must make and retain a record of:
(1) the assessment of whether that change would amount to a significant adaptation of the funeral plan product; and (2) where the assessment in (1) is that the change would not be a significant adaptation, the reasons for that decision. Product monitoring and review: remedial and mitigating action
7.2.47 R Manufacturers considering that the distribution of their funeral plan products
is not in accordance with the objectives of their product approval process must take appropriate remedial action including but not limited to:
(1) amending the distribution arrangements, including ceasing to use certain distributors or distribution channels; (2) amending remuneration structures;

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(3) withdrawing the funeral plan product from continued marketing or distribution. (4) paying redress as appropriate.
7.3 Distribution of funeral plans
Distribution arrangements: general requirements
7.3.1 R A distributor must have in place product distribution arrangements containing
appropriate measures and procedures to:
(1) aim to prevent and mitigate customer detriment; (2) be consistent with the aim of providing fair value to the customer; (3) support a proper management of conflicts of interest; and (4) ensure that the objectives, interests and characteristics of customers are duly taken into account. Distribution arrangements: obtaining and understanding information
7.3.2 R (1) A distributor must ensure the product distribution arrangements
contain effective measures and procedures to:
(a) obtain from the manufacturer all appropriate information sufficient, adequate and reliable about the funeral plan products they intend to offer to their customers to ensure that they will be distributed in accordance with the characteristics, objectives and needs of the target market; and (b) fully comprehend those funeral plan products, taking into account the level of complexity and the risks related to the products as well as the nature, scale and complexity of the relevant business of the distributor. (2) The information in (1) must be sufficient to understand:
(a) the characteristics of each funeral plan product; (b) the outcome of the value assessment required by PROD 7.2.14R, including:
(i) the value that the funeral plan product is intended to provide to the customer; and (ii) the impact that the distribution arrangements (including any remuneration it, or another person in the distribution chain to which it belongs, receives) has on

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7.3.3 R For the purposes of PROD 7.3.2R a distributor must consider at least the
following:
(1) the benefits the product is intended to provide to the customer; (2) the characteristics, objectives, interests and needs of the target market; (3) the interaction between the price paid by the customer and the extent and quality of any services the distributor (or any person connected to it) provides; (4) whether any remuneration it receives in relation to the funeral plan product would result in the product ceasing to provide fair value to the customer. Distribution arrangements: events indicating contravention of fair value
7.3.4 G The following evidential provision provides examples of what the FCA
considers indicate that the customer is not being provided fair value which, if relied on by a firm, the FCA considers will breach PROD.
7.3.5 E (1) A firm should ensure that no person at any stage of the distribution
chain receives a level of remuneration which does not bear a reasonable relationship to the person’s actual costs, or their contribution, level of involvement or the benefit added by them, to the arrangements for the distribution of the product, including where the person provides little or no benefit beyond that which the customer would receive if they obtained the funeral plan product through another distribution channel. (2) A firm must not have, and must ensure that no other person in the distribution arrangement has, remuneration arrangements which give an incentive to propose or recommend a funeral plan product which either does not meet the customer’s needs (or not as well as another product would) or is not in accordance with the customer’s best interests rule. (3) A firm must ensure that the level of any remuneration (for which any person in the distribution arrangement is responsible for setting) is reasonably reflective of the costs actually incurred. (4) Contravention of any of PROD 7.3.5E (1) to (3) may be relied upon as tending to establish contravention of PROD 7.3.1R.

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Distribution arrangements: disclosing information to manufacturers
7.3.6 R A distributor must, upon request, provide manufacturers with:
(1) information on the distributor’s remuneration in connection with the distribution of the funeral plan product; (2) information on any additional product or service that the distributor provides to the customer, which may affect the manufacturer’s intended value of the product; (3) relevant sales information, including, where appropriate, information on the regular reviews of the product distribution arrangements; and (4) confirmation that the distribution arrangements are consistent with the obligations of the firm under the FCA Handbook including in particular in SYSC 10.1 (Conflicts of interest) and SYSC 19F.3 (Funeral plan remuneration incentives). Distribution arrangements: record keeping
7.3.7 R A distributor must set out the product distribution arrangements in a written
document and make it available to their relevant staff.
7.3.8 R A distributor must ensure that all relevant actions taken by it or any other
party in relation to their product distribution arrangements are:
(1) duly documented;
(2) kept for audit purposes; and
(3) made available to the FCA upon request.
Distribution arrangements: senior management responsibility
7.3.9 R A distributor’s governing body must:
(1) endorse and be ultimately responsible for establishing, implementing and reviewing the product distribution arrangements; and (2) verify internal compliance with those arrangements on an ongoing basis. Distribution arrangements: consistency with target market
7.3.10 R A distributor must ensure that any specific distribution strategy that it sets up
or applies is consistent with:
(1) the distribution arrangements set up by the manufacturer; and

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(2) the target market identified in PROD 7.2 (Manufacture of funeral plans) including any customers to whom the product should not be distributed. Distribution arrangements: review of distribution arrangements
7.3.11 R (1) A distributor must regularly review, at least every 12 months, their
product distribution arrangements to ensure that those arrangements are still valid and up to date. (2) When determining the appropriate intervals for the regular review of their product distribution arrangements, a distributor must take into account the size, scale and complexity of the funeral plan product involved.
7.3.12 R When reviewing the product distribution arrangements, a distributor must
verify that the funeral plan products are distributed to the identified target market. Distribution arrangements: amending distribution arrangements after review
7.3.13 R A distributor must amend the product distribution arrangements, where
appropriate, in view of the outcome of the review of the product distribution arrangements.
7.3.14 R When a distributor becomes aware:
(1) that a funeral plan product is not in line with the interests, objectives and characteristics of its identified target market; or (2) of other product-related circumstances that may adversely affect the customer, it must promptly:
(3) inform the manufacturer; and
(4) where appropriate, amend the distribution arrangements for that funeral plan product.
7.3.15 R (1) A distributor must take appropriate remedial and mitigating action,
including to amend its product distribution arrangements, where it identifies:
(a) a product is not providing fair value for customers; (b) any aspects of a product that may mean it does not offer fair value; or

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(c) the distribution arrangements including remuneration structures may mean the customer is not being provided with fair value. (2) The actions which the distributor takes for (1) must:
(a) aim to mitigate the situation and prevent further occurrences of any possible harm to customers, including, where appropriate, amending the distribution strategy for that product; and (b) include informing any relevant manufacturers promptly about any concerns they have and any action the distributor is taking.
7.3.16 G For the purposes of PROD 7.3.15R the steps a distributor may need to take
include (but are not limited to):
(1) amending its remuneration structures;
(2) amending the distribution arrangements; (3) improving the quality of, or ceasing, any service or benefits it provides; (4) where the failure to provide fair value is due to the costs or quality of additional products, renegotiating the terms of the current arrangements relating to the additional products, or selecting alternative providers or distributors of them, in order to provide for a fair outcome; (5) ceasing to distribute certain products, or ceasing to use certain distribution channels; (6) contacting existing customers to inform them of the issues and of the measures being taken to rectify them; and (7) providing redress to customers.
7.4 Product governance requirements for subsisting funeral plans
Product governance arrangements
7.4.1 R This section applies to a funeral plan provider in relation to a subsisting
funeral plan.
7.4.2 R A funeral plan provider must ensure that, in relation to its subsisting funeral
plans, there are adequate product governance arrangements in place, containing appropriate measures and procedures, to ensure a subsisting funeral plan is carried out in way that complies with the firm’s regulatory obligations under the FCA Handbook. Monitoring and review of funeral plan products

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7.4.3 R A firm must:
(1) regularly review its subsisting funeral plans taking into account any event that could cause material harm to the customers; and (2) ensure the review process in (1), provides that appropriate actions be taken for the mitigation and any potential remediation of the harm to existing customers. Monitoring and review of funeral plan products: minimum review period
7.4.4 R (1) A firm must undertake the regular review at least every 12 months.
(2) When determining the appropriate interval for review of a funeral plan, a firm must take into account:
(a) the nature of the customer base, including whether there are significant numbers of vulnerable customers; (b) any indicators of customer harm potentially emerging from the performance of the product; and (c) any relevant external factors such as changes to the applicable legal rules, technological developments, or changes to the market situation. Product monitoring and review: remedial and mitigating action
7.4.5 R (1) A firm must identify during the lifetime of a subsisting funeral plan
any circumstances related to it that may adversely affect a customer. (2) Where a firm identifies an event that may adversely affect a customer holding the funeral plan contract, the firm must:
(a) take appropriate action to mitigate the situation and prevent further occurrences of the detrimental event; and (b) promptly inform concerned customers about the remedial action taken. Insert the following new Transitional Provision, PROD TP 2 (Transitional provisions for Funeral Plan Products) after PROD TP 1 (Transitional provisions). The text is not underlined. TP 2 Transitional Provisions for Funeral Plan Products (1) (2) Material to which the transitional provision applies (3) (4) Transitional provision (5) Transitional provision:
dates in force
(6)
Handbook provision:

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FOS 2021/XX coming into force
2.1 Rules in PROD 7.2
in relation to an existing funeral plan product R Where an existing funeral plan product:
(1) has, before [29 July
2022], been available for marketing and distribution; and (2) remains available for distribution, a manufacturer must ensure the requirements in PROD
7.2 have been met to
continue to be marketed and distributed after [29 July 2022].
From [29
July 2022]
[29 July
2022]
2.2 PROD 7.2 and
PROD TP 2.1
G The effect of PROD TP 2.1 and the requirements in PROD 7.2 is that where the firm is unable to demonstrate it has satisfied these requirements then the firm will need to:
(1) cease any distribution of the product, whether directly or through another person, immediately; and/or (2) take any necessary steps to ensure the product meets the requirements in PROD 7.2, including that it offers fair value before marketing or distributing the product after [29 July 2022].
2.3 PROD 7.2 G When identifying the
necessary product approval process and arrangements and whether the From [29 July 2022] [29 July 2022]

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FOS 2021/XX requirements in PROD 7.2 are met, a manufacturer may take into account any previous product governance arrangements including reviews which the manufacturer (or where there is more than one manufacturer, any other manufacturer) has undertaken and the extent to which these would or would not have complied with PROD requirements.

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Annex I
Amendments to the Supervision manual (SUP)
In this Annex, underlining indicates new text and striking through indicates deleted text, unless otherwise stated. 10A FCA Approved Persons in Appointed Representatives … 10A.10 Customer-dealing functions … Customer function (CF 30) 10A.10.7 R The customer function is the function of:
(1) advising on investments other than a non-investment insurance contract (but not where this is advising on investments in the course of carrying on the activity of giving basic advice on a stakeholder product) and performing other functions related to this such as dealing, and arranging and (where the product is a contract) entering into and carrying it out; … (7) in relation to bidding in emissions auctions, acting as a ‘bidder’s representative’ within the meaning of subparagraph 3 of article 6(3) of the auction regulation.; and (8) performing a funeral plan distribution activity (but not advising on investments) or a funeral plan provision activity. … 10C FCA senior managers regime for approved persons in SMCR firms … 10C What functions apply to what type of firm
Annex 1
…
Part Seven: Functions applying to limited scope firms
7.1 R Limited scope SMCR firms are divided into the following categories for
the purposes of SUP 10C Annex 1:

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(1) …
(2) …
(2A) a firm falling within row (6) of the table in SYSC 23 Annex 1 6.4R (funeral plans); … …
7.3 R (1) The table in SUP 10C Annex 1 7.4R sets out which FCA
controlled functions apply to a limited scope SMCR firm covered by SUP 10C Annex 1 7.1R(1), (2), (2A), (3), (4), (4A), (8) or (9). …
7.4 R Table: Controlled functions applying to limited scope SMCR firms except
sole traders and authorised professional firms …
Part 2 (Claims management and funeral plan firms)
(1)
Brief description of function
(2)
Function number
(3)
Class 1 claims management firms
(4)
Other claims management firms
(5)
Funeral plan firms
Required functions
Compliance oversight function
SMF 16 … … ×
Limited scope function SMF 29 … …
Notes to the table
Note (1): The categories of firm in the column headings of this table are to be interpreted in accordance with the classification of firms at SUP 10C Annex 1 7.1R. Therefore:
…
(4) column three of Part 2 of the table (Class 1 claims management firms) refers to SUP 10C
Annex 1 7.1R(8); and
(5) column four of Part 2 of the table (Other Claims management firms) refers to SUP 10C
Annex 1 7.1R(9).; and
(6) column five of Part 2 of the table (Funeral plan firms) refers to SUP 10C Annex 1 7.1R(2A).

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…
12 Appointed representatives
…
12.2 Introduction
…
Business for which an appointed representative is exempt
12.2.7 G (1) The Appointed Representatives Regulations are made by the Treasury
under sections 39(1), (1C) and (1E) of the Act. These regulations describe, among other things, the business for which an appointed representative may be exempt or to which sections 20(1) and (1A) and 23(1A) of the Act may not apply, which is business which comprises any of:
(a) dealing in investments as agent (article 21 of the Regulated Activities Order) where the transaction relates to:
(i) a pure protection contract (but only where the contract is not a long-term care insurance contract) or general insurance contract; or (ii) a funeral plan contract; … …
12.7 Notification requirements
…
Notification of appointed representatives undertaking regulated funeral plan activity 12.7.6A R (1) A firm must notify the FCA in good time before:
(a) it appoints an appointed representative to carry on regulated funeral plan activity for the first time; or (b) the number of its appointed representatives appointed to carry on regulated funeral plan activity increases through a material threshold. (2) A firm that has appointed one or more appointed representatives to carry on regulated funeral plan activity must notify the FCA in good

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FOS 2021/XX time before it appoints an appointed representative to carry on any other regulated activity for the first time. 12.7.6B G The purpose of SUP 12.7.6AR is to ensure that the FCA is notified when a firm diversifies its activities around regulated funeral plan activities. This may be because the firm:
(1) intends to appoint an appointed representative for the first time where the scope of business for which the firm will accept responsibility will include regulated funeral plan activity; (2) is the principal to one or more appointed representatives:
(a) and intends to expand the scope of business of one or more of those appointed representatives for which it accepts responsibility to include regulated funeral plan activity; or (b) in relation to which it has accepted responsibility for regulated funeral plan activity only and it intends to expand the scope of business of those, or new, appointed representatives for which it accepts responsibility beyond such activity. 12.7.6C R A firm must submit to the FCA at least once a year a list of those of its appointed representatives which:
(1) undertake regulated funeral plan activity; and (2) are the subject of a multiple principal agreement (for the purposes of SUP 12.4.5BR). 12.7.6D G (1) For the purposes of SUP 12.7.6AR(1)(b), an increase through a material threshold should be understood as referring to an increase in the number of appointed representatives undertaking regulated funeral plan activity:
(a) from fewer than 25 to 25 or more;
(b) from fewer than 50 to 50 or more;
(c) from fewer than 75 to 75 or more;
(d) from fewer than 100 to 100 or more;
(e) from fewer than 200 to 200 or more;
(f) from fewer than 500 to 500 or more.
(2) Any notification required by SUP 12.7.6AR or SUP 12.7.6CR is in addition to any notification required by any other rule in SUP 12 (including the requirement to notify the FCA of the intention to appoint individual appointed representatives in SUP 12.7.1R).