Report · GFSC · 8 Jan 2020
The Financial Action Task Force issued this typology report to analyze how legal professionals are vulnerable to being used for money laundering and terrorist financing activities. The document identifies specific methods criminals exploit, such as the misuse of client accounts, property purchases, and the creation of trusts, while outlining red flag indicators to help distinguish legitimate services from illicit ones. It concludes that increased education and awareness of these vulnerabilities are necessary to ensure legal professionals can effectively prevent the misuse of their services and comply with anti-money laundering obligations.
fatf REPORT
Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing
Vulnerabilities of
Legal Professionals
June 2013
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard. For more information about the FATF, please visit the website:
www.fatf-gafi.org
© 2013 FATF/OECD. All rights reserved.
No reproduction or translation of this publication may be made without prior written permission. Applications for such permission, for all or part of this publication, should be made to the FATF Secretariat, 2 rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France (fax: +33 1 44 30 61 37 or e-mail: contact@fatf-gafi.org). Photocredits coverphoto: ©Thinkstock
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................................. 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 4
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 7
Background .................................................................................................................... 7
Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 9
Methodology used in this study .................................................................................. 10
CHAPTER 2: SCOPE OF THE LEGAL SECTOR.......................................................................... 12
Types of legal professionals and their roles................................................................. 12
Application of AML/CFT obligations ............................................................................ 13
Unique features of the sector...................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER 3: VULNERABILITIES.............................................................................................. 23
Vulnerabilities identified in literature.......................................................................... 23
Vulnerabilities identified through STRs and asset recovery ........................................ 24
Supervision of legal professionals................................................................................ 28
Disciplinary and criminal sanctions imposed on legal professionals........................... 30
Taking enforcement action against legal professionals............................................... 30
CHAPTER 4: MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES................................................................. 34
Method 1: Misuse of client account............................................................................ 37
Method 2: Property purchases.................................................................................... 44
Method 3: Creation of companies and trusts............................................................. 54
Method 4: Management of companies and trusts...................................................... 59
Method 5: Managing client affairs and making introductions.................................... 63
Method 6: Litigation.................................................................................................... 69
Method 7: Other methods........................................................................................... 71
CHAPTER 5: RED FLAG INDICATORS..................................................................................... 77
Red flags about the client............................................................................................ 77
Red flags in the source of funds................................................................................... 79
Red flags in the choice of lawyer................................................................................. 80
Red Flags in the nature of the retainer........................................................................ 81
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................... 83
Key findings.................................................................................................................. 83
Opportunities for future action ................................................................................... 84
ANNEX 1: BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................... 87
ANNEX 2: RESPONDENTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE............................................................ 91
ANNEX 3: DEFINITIONS......................................................................................................... 92
ANNEX 4: TYPES OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS........................................................................ 93
ANNEX 5: SCHEDULE OF CASES ............................................................................................ 96
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2 2013
ANNEX 6: ADDITIONAL CASE STUDIES ............................................................................... 108
Method: Misuse of client account............................................................................. 108
Method: Purchase of real property ........................................................................... 115
Method: Creation of companies and trusts............................................................... 128
Method: Management of companies and trusts....................................................... 137
Method: Managing client affairs and making introductions..................................... 139
Method: Use of specialised legal skills ...................................................................... 145
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 3 ACRONYMS AML/CFT Anti-money laundering/counter financing of terrorism APG Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering CDD Customer due diligence CFATF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force DNFBPs Designated non-financial businesses and professions ECHR European Convention on Human Rights FIU Financial intelligence units GIABA Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa GIFCS Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors MENAFATF Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force ML Money laundering OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PEP Politically exposed person SRBs Self-regulatory bodies STR Suspicious transaction report TF Terrorist financing
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 4 2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In June 2012, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Plenary met in Rome and agreed to conduct typology research into the money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) vulnerabilities of the legal profession. Since the inclusion of legal professionals in the scope of professionals in the FATF Recommendations in 2003, there has been extensive debate as to whether there is evidence that legal professionals have been involved in ML/TF and whether the application of the Recommendations is consistent with fundamental human rights and the ethical obligations of legal professionals. The purpose of this typology is to determine the degree to which legal professionals globally are vulnerable for ML/TF risks in light of the specific legal services they provide, and to describe red flag indicators of ML/TF which may be useful to legal professionals, self-regulatory bodies (SRBs), competent authorities and law enforcement agencies. This typology report does not offer guidance or policy recommendations, nor can it serve as a “onesize-fits-all” educational tool for individual legal professionals practicing in different settings, across countries with varying supervisory regimes and secrecy, privilege and confidentiality rules. The report concludes that criminals seek out the involvement of legal professionals in their ML/TF activities, sometimes because a legal professional is required to complete certain transactions, and sometimes to access specialised legal and notarial skills and services which could assist the laundering of the proceeds of crime and the funding of terrorism. The report identifies a number of ML/TF methods that commonly employ or, in some countries, require the services of a legal professional. Inherently these activities pose ML/TF risk and when clients seek to misuse the legal professional’s services in these areas, even law abiding legal professionals may be vulnerable. The methods are:
misuse of client accounts;
purchase of real property;
creation of trusts and companies;
management of trusts and companies;
managing client affairs and making introductions; undertaking certain litigation; and setting up and managing charities. In this report, over 100 case studies referring to these and other ML/TF methods were taken into account. While the majority of case studies in this report relate to ML activity, similar methodologies are capable of being used for TF activity. While some cases show instances where the legal professional has made a suspicious transaction report (STR), a significant number involve a prosecution or disciplinary action, so a higher standard
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 5 of intent had to be proven, meaning those cases were more likely to involve a legal professional who was or became complicit. From reviewing the case studies and literature as a whole, the involvement of legal professionals in the money laundering of their clients is not as stark as complicit or unwitting, but can best be described as a continuum. Involvement of Legal Professionals in money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) Red flag indicators relating to the client, the source of funds, the type of legal professional and the nature of the retainer, were developed with reference to these cases and educational material provided by SRBs and competent authorities. Whatever the involvement of the legal professional, the red flag indicators are often consistent and may be useful for legal professionals, SRBs, competent authorities and law enforcement agencies. Red flag indicators should be considered in context and prompt legal professionals to undertake risk-based client due diligence. If the legal professional remains unsatisfied with the client’s explanation of the red flags, the next step taken will depend on the unique and complex ethical codes, law governing his or her professional conduct and any national AML/CFT obligations. Combating ML/TF relies on legal professionals:
being alert to red flags indicating that the client is seeking to involve them in criminal activity choosing to abide by the law, their ethical obligations and applicable professional rules; and discerning legitimate client wishes from transactions and structures intended to conceal or promote criminal activity or thwart law enforcement. While some SRBs and professional bodies are quite active in educating their members on the ML/TF vulnerabilities they face and the red flag indicators which could alert them to a suspicious ML/TF Innocent involvement No red flag indicators apparent. Unwitting Basic CDD undertaken. Some red flags, but missed or significance misunderstood. Alert & Proactive 1 Low level of suspicion – STR made where required and proceed with caution if appropriate or stop acting. Wilfully blind Further questions are not asked, isolated transaction is completed and often no STR is filed where required. Being corrupted Wilful blindness persists for repeat instructions from the same client, the client’s associates or other matters with similar red flag indicators. Complicit Actual knowledge of the criminality in which they are involved. Alert & Proactive 2 Higher level of suspicion or knowledge– STR made where required and stops acting. Red flags identified
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 6 2013 transaction, this level of understanding or access to information on vulnerabilities was not consistent across all countries which replied to the questionnaire. A lack of awareness and attendant lack of education increases the vulnerability of legal professionals to clients seeking to misuse otherwise legitimate legal services to further ML/TF activities. Case studies show that not all legal professionals are undertaking client due diligence (CDD) when required. Even where due diligence is obtained, if the legal professional lacks understanding of the ML/TF vulnerabilities and red flag indicators, they are less able to use that information to prevent the misuse of their services. Greater education on vulnerabilities and awareness of red flag indictors at a national level may assist to reduce the incidence of criminals successfully misusing the services of legal professionals for ML/TF purposes. Finally, the report challenges the perception sometimes held by criminals, and at times supported by claims from legal professionals themselves, that legal professional privilege or professional secrecy would lawfully enable a legal professional to continue to act for a client who was engaging in criminal activity and/or prevent law enforcement from accessing information to enable the client to be prosecuted. However, it is apparent that there is significant diversity between countries in the scope of legal professional privilege or professional secrecy. Practically, this diversity and differing interpretations by legal professionals and law enforcement has at times provided a disincentive for law enforcement to take action against legal professionals suspected of being complicit in or wilfully blind to ML/TF activity.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 7
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
As financial institutions have put anti-money laundering (AML) measures into place, the risk of detection has become greater for those seeking to use the global banking system to launder criminal proceeds. Increasingly, law enforcement see money launderers seeking the advice or services of specialised professionals to help them with their illicit financial operations.1 In 2004, Stephen Schneider2 published a detailed analysis of legal sector involvement in money laundering cases investigated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This is the only academic study to date which has had access to law enforcement cases and contains a section focussed solely on the legal sector, both in terms of vulnerabilities and laundering methods. His research identified a range of services provided by legal professionals which were attractive to criminals wanting to launder the proceeds of their crime. Some of the services identified include: the purchasing of real estate, the establishment of companies and trusts (whether domestically, in foreign countries or offshore financial centres), and passing funds through the legal professional’s client account. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) typologies have confirmed that criminals in many countries are making use of mechanisms which involve services frequently provided by legal professionals, for the purpose of laundering money.3 A particular challenge for researching money laundering / terrorist financing methods that may involve legal professionals is that many of the services sought by criminals for the purposes of money laundering are services used every day by clients with legitimate means.4 There is evidence that some criminals seek to co-opt and knowingly involve legal professionals in their money laundering schemes. Often however the involvement of the legal professional is sought because the services they offer are essential to the specific transaction being undertaken and because legal professionals add respectability to the transaction.5 Schneider’s study noted that in some cases the legal professional was innocently involved in the act of money laundering. In those cases, there were no overt signs that would alert a legal professional
1 FATF (2004)
2 Schneider, S. (2004)
3 FATF (2006) and FATF (2007)
4 Schneider, S. (2004)
5 Schneider, S. (2004)
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 8 2013 that he/she was being used to launder the proceeds of crime. However, Schneider identified other cases where legal professionals continued with a retainer in the face of clear warning signs. He questioned whether it might be the case that legal professionals lacked awareness of the warning signs that they were dealing with a suspicious transaction or were simply wilfully blind to the suspicious circumstances. 6 Subsequent FATF typologies research mentions the involvement of legal professionals in money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF). This research has generally tended to focus more on how the transactions were structured, rather than on the role of the legal professional or his/her awareness of the client’s criminal intentions. Organisations representing legal professionals and some academics have sometimes criticised claims that legal professionals are unwittingly involved in money laundering.7 They have questioned whether it is even possible to identify key warning signs which might justify imposing anti-money laundering/counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements on legal professionals and even whether this might be an effective addition to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.8 Further, certain sources suggest that legal professionals are required to adhere to strict ethical or professional rules and this fact should therefore be a sufficient deterrent to money laundering or terrorist financing occurring in or through the legal sector. Following this same line of thinking, these sources of existing criminal law may sufficiently deter legal professionals from wilfully engaging in money laundering9. Since Schneider’s 2004 study, a number of countries have implemented the FATF Recommendations for legal professionals.10 This extension of AML/CFT requirements to the legal professions has created the need for legal professionals, their supervisory bodies and financial intelligence units (FIUs) to better understand how legal services may be misused by criminals for money laundering and terrorist financing. This typology study was undertaken to synthesise current knowledge, to systematically assess the vulnerabilities of the legal profession to involvement in money laundering and terrorist financing, and to explore whether red flag indicators can be identified so as to enable legal professionals to distinguish potentially illegal transactions from legitimate ones.
6 Schneider, S. (2004), pp. 72
7 Middleton, D.J. and Levi, M. (2004), pp 4
8 Middleton, D.J. and Levi, M. (2004), pp 4
9 For example the CCBE Comments on the Commission Staff Working Document “The application to the legal profession of Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering” www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/EN_130207_CCBE_comme1_1194003555.pdf 10 FATF Recommendations 22(d), 23(a) and Interpretative Note to Recommendations 23 and 28 (b).
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 9 OBJECTIVES The key objectives of this report:
11 Gallant, M. (2010); Levi, M. (2004); Chervier, E. (2004) 12 European Commission(2006); Deloitte (2011)
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 10 2013 METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS STUDY Led by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the project team was made up of experts from: the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, France, the Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS), Italy, the MONEYVAL Committee of the Council of Europe, Switzerland, the United States and the World Bank. In addition, to government and law enforcement representatives, the project team included members from the private sector having supervisory responsibilities for AML/CFT compliance. In preparing this report, the project team has used literature and initiatives from the sources listed below (a detailed list of these sources is included in Annex 1). The research relies on literature and studies from 2003 onwards to ensure a focus on more current case examples and determine whether vulnerabilities persisted following the inclusion of legal professionals in the FATF Recommendations. Typologies studies previously undertaken by FATF. Other studies produced by international organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Research initiatives carried out by academics and consultants either within individual countries or on a regional basis. Research initiatives carried out by government authorities. Research initiatives undertaken by AML/CFT supervisors, non-government organisations and the private sector. To supplement information from these sources, the project team also developed two questionnaires: one for FATF members and associate members and one for self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) and professional bodies (a list of countries who responded to the questionnaire is available in Annex 2). The project team received 76 responses to the questionnaire were received from October 2012 to January 2013 from 38 countries. Responses were from both civil and common law countries and included members of FATF, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), GIFCS, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) and Moneyval. SRBs and professional bodies also provided responses. A workshop on money laundering and terrorist financing in the legal sector was held during the joint FATF/GIABA (Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa) experts’ meeting on typologies held in Dakar, Senegal, in November 2012. Presentations were made by participating representatives from government departments, FIUs and law enforcement agencies (Netherlands, Canada, Nigeria, the United Kingdom) as well as from AML/CFT supervisors (Spain, Gibraltar and the Netherlands) and from the International Bar Association. The workshop considered:
Ethical challenges for the legal profession;
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 11 Good practice in supervision; The usefulness of STRs filed by legal professionals; and Money laundering case studies demonstrating different types of involvement by legal professionals, in order to identify vulnerabilities and red flag indicators. Informal workshops were also held in February 2013 with the American Bar Association and the Council of European Bars to consider a number of the case studies identified from the literature review and the FATF questionnaire responses. The purpose of these workshops was to consider case studies from the perspective of the private sector to understand the professional, ethical and legal obligations of the range of legal professions in different countries, as well as identify warning signs of money laundering for either the legal professionals themselves or the SRBs representing them. The literature review, workshops and questionnaire responses painted a consistent picture of the vulnerabilities of legal professionals, as well as a consistent view of the red flag indicators, which may be of use for legal professionals, supervisors and law enforcement. These sources also provided an extensive collection of cases demonstrating different types of involvement of legal professionals in money laundering and a few cases involving possible terrorist financing. While the majority of case studies in this report relate to ML activity, similar methodologies are capable of being used for TF activity. In May 2013, a consultation on the draft report took place in London with representatives from the legal sector, who had previously contributed to the typology project. This consultation aimed to ensure that nuances specific to different legal systems and countries where sufficiently recognised and that the responses provided to the questionnaire by SRBs and professional bodies where accurately reflected in the report.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 12 2013
CHAPTER 2
SCOPE OF THE LEGAL SECTOR
The FATF Recommendations, including in the most recent revision of 2012, apply to legal professionals only when they undertake specified financial transactional activities in the course of business. The Recommendations do not apply where a person provides legal services ‘in-house’ as an employee of an organisation.13 This section examines the context in which legal professionals covered by the FATF Recommendations undertake their activities and how those Recommendations have been applied in a range of countries14. TYPES OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR ROLES Legal professionals are not a homogenous group, from one country to another or even within an individual country. There are approximately 2.5 million legal professionals practicing in the countries covered by the questionnaire responses.. The size of the sector within each country ranged from 66 legal professionals to over 1.2 million. Titles given to different legal professionals varied between countries, with the same title not always having the same meaning or area of responsibility from one country to another. While some generalisations can be made depending on whether the country has a common law or civil law tradition, even these will not always hold true in all countries. See
Annex 4 for a discussion of the types of activities undertaken by legal professional identified
through the questionnaire responses.
The range of activities carried out by legal professions is diverse and varies from one country to another. It is therefore important that competent authorities understand the specific roles undertaken by different legal professionals within their respective country when assessing the vulnerabilities and risks that concern their legal sector.
13 Annex 3 contains the relevant definitions for the range of legal professions considered in this report. 14 Jurisdictions that responded to the questionnaire.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 13 APPLICATION OF AML/CFT OBLIGATIONS In 2003, FATF issued updated Recommendations, which for the first time specifically included legal professionals. The FATF Recommendations have explicitly required legal professionals to undertake CDD15 and to submit STRs since the revision of the Recommendations in 2003. From that time, competent authorities have also been required to ensure that legal professionals are supervised for AML/CFT purposes. As evidenced by mutual evaluation reports16, full implementation of these specific Recommendations has not been universal. As a consequence, a major part of the legal profession is not covered. In order to assess the current vulnerabilities, the project team felt it was important to understand in what situations legal professionals were covered by the AML/CFT obligations within their countries and how these obligations applied to them. The application of the CDD and reporting obligations are discussed below, while the approach to the supervisory obligations is covered in Chapter 3. From the questionnaire responses, while countries have continued to transpose the requirements almost every year since 2001, the majority of countries did so between 2002 and 2004 and between 2007 and 2008. CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE Box 1: Recommendation 22 The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in Recommendations 1, 11, 12, 15, and 17, apply to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) in the following situations:
(d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – where they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following activities:
15 CDD includes identifying and verifying the identity of the client, beneficial owners where relevant, understanding the nature and purpose of the business relationship (including the source of funds). Records of the CDD material must be maintained. 16 The third round of mutual evaluations was based on the 40+9 Recommendations. The FATF Recommendations were revised in 2012, for the fourth round of mutual evaluations, due to begin after the publication of this report.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 14 2013 The majority of countries that apply CDD obligations to legal professionals have done so through national law. A few countries also have SRB-issued guidance to reinforce the legal requirements or provide specific details of the requirements. In three of the four responses to the questionnaire, where legal professionals are not currently subject to CDD provisions as set out in the FATF Recommendations17, a number of professional bodies have applied some CDD requirements to their members. To ensure compliance with international obligations imposed by the United Nations and the FATF regarding targeted financial sanctions, many countries require legal professionals to have regard to whether a client is on a sanctions list. In the United States this list also includes known terrorists, narcotics traffickers and organised crime figures. While this is a separate requirement, apart from the AML/CFT CDD obligations, it does require legal professionals to have some understanding of the identity of their client. REPORTING OBLIGATIONS Box 2: Recommendation 23 The requirements set out in Recommendation 18 to 21 apply to all DNFBPs, subject to the following qualifications:
a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should be required to report suspicious transaction when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d) of Recommendation 22. Countries are strongly encouraged to extend the reporting requirement to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, including auditing. Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23
17 Australia, Canada (although notaries in British Columbia are covered in law), and the United States. In Turkey the law applying the obligations has been suspended awaiting the outcome of legal action, but no specific due diligence requirements have been applied by the relevant professional body. In Canada, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) and associated regulations provide that lawyers must undertake client identification and due diligence, record-keeping and internal compliance measures when undertaking designated financial transactions. These provisions are in force but are inoperative as a result of a court ruling and related injunctions.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 15 accountants to send their STR to their appropriate self-regulatory organisations, provided that there are appropriate forms of cooperation between these organisations and the FIU.
4. Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants acting as
independent legal professionals seek to dissuade a client from engaging in illegal activity, this does not amount to tipping-off. The reporting obligations in the countries which responded to the questionnaire can be characterised as follows:
Where the obligation to file an STR is applied to legal professionals the obligation is always contained in law rather than guidance. In the majority of countries, the STR is submitted directly to the FIU. In seven18 of the countries, the STR is filed with the SRB. These are civil law countries in Europe. In the two of the four countries where AML/CFT obligations for filing an STR have not been extended to legal professionals19, there is a requirement to comply with threshold reporting, which applies to cash payments above a certain amount. In such cases, the legal professional reports with the knowledge of the client. A few20 countries combine the requirement to make an STR with threshold reporting. UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE SECTOR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS Ethical obligations apply to legal professionals and the work they undertake. During the joint FATF/GIABA experts’ meeting in November 2012 the International Bar Association (IBA) presented its International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession21 and outlined some of the competing ethical requirements that legal professionals (other than notaries) must consider when complying with AML/CFT requirements. The IBA principles were adopted in 2011 and are not binding for member bar associations and law societies. Each professional association and legal sector regulator or supervisor has its own ethical or professional rules or code of conduct22. Many – but not all -- are able to enforce compliance with those rules and have the power to remove legal professionals from practice.
18 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Portugal. 19 Australia and the United States. 20 Curacao requires all cash transactions over 20 000 to be reported, while in Montenegro all contracts for sale of real property must be filed in addition to STRs being made. 21 International Bar Association (2011) 22 Note – in countries which have a federal system, this can differ from state to state as well.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 16 2013 While differences may apply in individual countries, the relevant principles from the IBA are outlined below to give an indication of the types of professional obligations which apply to legal professionals other than notaries. Box 3: The IBA principles on conduct for the legal profession
23 International Union of Notaries (2004)
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 17 Box 4: International Union of Notaries Code of Ethics Notaries must carry out their professional duties competently and with adequate preparation, performing their essential functions of advising, interpreting and applying the law, acquiring specific knowledge of notarial matters and conforming to professional standards. Notaries must always verify the identities of parties and the capacity in which they are acting. They must also give expression to their wishes. Notaries must comply with their professional duty of confidentiality both in the course of their professional services and thereafter. They are also obliged to ensure that this requirement is similarly satisfied by their employees and agents. Notaries are not bound by their professional duty of confidentiality purely as a result of their obligation to act in concert with any public authorities with which they become involved because of a specific regulation or an order of a judicial or administrative body, including in particular the authority responsible for monitoring the propriety of commercial transactions. Notaries must conduct themselves in the course of their professional duties with impartiality and independence, avoiding all personal influence over their activities and any form of discrimination against clients. When acting in their official capacity notaries must balance the respective interests of the parties concerned and seek a solution with the sole objective of safeguarding both parties. Notaries must act suitably and constructively in the discharge of their duties; they must inform and advise the parties as to the possible consequences of their instructions, having regard to all aspects of normal legal procedure for which they are responsible; they must select the judicial form most appropriate to their intentions and ensure its legality and relevance; they must provide the parties with any clarification requested or necessary to ensure conformity with decisions taken and awareness of the legal force of the deed. Many SRBs consider that these codes of conduct and professional rules prevent legal professionals from being knowingly involved in money laundering or terrorist financing. Furthermore, if a member had doubts about a transaction or client, that the member would either stop acting or refuse to act, as he or she could not, according to the code of ethics, engage in criminal activity with the client. The case studies show that many areas of the legal professional’s work are open to exploitation by criminals and may attract misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, as criminals identify weaknesses in processes, legislation and understanding of red flag indicators. Under professional obligations, the duties to the court (and in the case of the notaries - to the public), take precedence over duties to the client, with the result that the legal professional must not engage
in criminal conduct and must not act in a way which facilitates their client engaging in criminal conduct. Participants at the Dakar meeting acknowledged that the FATF Recommendations specifically recognise the challenges posed by legal professional privilege and professional secrecy. The
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 18 2013 Recommendations seek to ease that conflict for legal professionals by specifying that there is no requirement to submit an STR when privilege or secrecy applies. Further, where legal professionals fail to act with integrity by becoming involved in money laundering or terrorist financing, then professional disciplinary action can be considered. Depending on the specific involvement of the legal professional, this can be in addition to, or instead of, taking criminal action against the professional. However, there are a number of other ethical or professional challenges highlighted in responses to questionnaires and in meetings, particularly with regard to the manner in which the AML/CFT regime applied to legal professionals other than notaries:
Where there was a requirement in national law to obtain due diligence information and provide it to law enforcement or other competent authorities, especially without the requirement for a court order, many legal professionals considered this to impinge upon their ability to act with appropriate independence. Where following the filing of an STR, legal professionals were required to continue with a transaction or expected to do so to avoid tipping off, but were unable to discuss the STR with the client, then some legal professionals felt they were being required by law to continue to act in the face of a conflict of interest. Many expressed the view that if an STR was warranted, it was a sign that the trust at the heart of the client/legal professional relationship had been broken and it was no longer appropriate to act on behalf of the client. As this is a typology project, it is not appropriate for this report to comment on the merits of these views or to recommend a policy response. However, further consideration of these challenges by others at a future date may assist in more effectively addressing the vulnerabilities identified later in this report. CLIENT FUNDS Most legal professionals are permitted to hold client funds. From the questionnaire responses, the professional body holds the client funds in a few civil law countries24. The professional body requires an explanation of who the funds are held for and why, and will monitor the accounts for any unusual transactions which would suggest money laundering. In almost all other countries however, legal professionals are required to hold client funds in a separate account25 with a recognised financial institution, and use it only in accordance with their client’s instructions and in relation to the provision of legal services.
24 Belgium, France, the Netherlands , In Austria the legal professional holds the money but must notify the Bar of any payment over EUR 40 000, while all deposits with a notary in Italy must be recorded in a public register. 25 These accounts have various names, including client accounts and trust accounts.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 19 In many countries there is a requirement to provide an annual report to the professional body that could also inspect the accounts. In a few26 countries, rules prohibit the acceptance of cash over set limits, although these limits varied significantly. Within some countries, cash is an acceptable form of payment for legal professionals’ services, but its receipt is subject to threshold reporting requirements. These obligations are often outlined in law or professional rules and could be enforced by disciplinary sanctions. Box 5: Example of professional body holding client funds: CARPA (France) The system in France known as CARPA is outlined below1:
This system was introduced by an Act of 25 July 1985 and requires that all income be credited to a special account. There is one CARPA for each Bar, one account for each legal professional member of the Bar and one sub-account for each case. Any withdrawal of money must be authorised by the CARPA. Any receipt of fees cannot be done without a written authorisation by the client. Any movement of capital from one sub-account to another is forbidden unless authorised by the President of the CARPA. The sums of money only pass in transit through the CARPA and the CARPA immediately controls the suspicious lack of movement on a sub-account. No sub-account is allowed to be overdrawn. The CARPA is controlled by an internal committee but also by the bankers and an independent accountant: they check the nature of the case handled by the legal professional, the origin of the money and the identity of the beneficiary of a payment.
26 Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
27 Schneider (2004); FATF (2004).
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 20 2013 As outlined above, the FATF Recommendations recognise this right by excluding information covered by legal professional privilege or professional secrecy from the obligation to file an STR and provides that it is a matter for each country as to what those terms cover.28 The terms confidentiality, legal professional privilege and professional secrecy are often used interchangeably to describe the protection provided for this right, but legally each term has a different application, meaning and consequence, depending on the country under consideration. The area of legal professional privilege and professional secrecy is complex, with subtle differences in application from country to country. The summary below is taken from questionnaire responses and provides a high-level overview. The concept of confidentiality seems to apply to all types of legal professionals and to all information obtained in the course of the legal professional’s interaction with clients and potential clients. In most countries, it appears that confidentiality can be waived by the client or overridden by express provisions in law. Legal professional privilege and professional secrecy appear to offer a higher level of protection to information than does confidentiality. The remit of legal professional privilege and professional secrecy is often contained in constitutional law or is recognised by common law, and is tied to fundamental rights laid down in treaty or other international obligations. Often, the protection offered to information subject to legal professional privilege and professional secrecy is also contained in criminal law, either in a statute or a rule of evidence. In many countries, the protection will be given to information received or given either for the purpose of current or contemplated litigation, or for the seeking of advice where the legal professional is exercising their skill and judgement as a legal professional. However, some of the questionnaire responses suggested that the protection applies to all information obtained by or provided to the legal professional In many countries:
The client can waive his or her right to legal professional privilege or professional secrecy, but in some countries, the legal professional is obliged to ignore the client’s waiver if the professional decides that a waiver is not in the client’s best interests. Legal professional privilege or professional secrecy will be lost if the legal professional is being used for the purpose of committing a crime or a fraud. However the extent of information needed to invoke the crime/fraud exemption varies from country to country, but is usually higher than the basis on which an STR is required to be filed. Legal professional privilege or professional secrecy can be removed by express words contained in a statute but only for limited purposes. The consequences of a breach of legal professional privilege and professional secrecy also vary from one country to another.
28 FATF (2012).
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 21 In some countries, such a breach will constitute a criminal offence and the legal professional could be subject to imprisonment. In other countries a breach is sanctioned by disciplinary action and/or the client can sue the legal professional. Therefore, any uncertainty over the extent to which legal professional privilege or professional secrecy is exempt from the STR obligations within a country may expose the legal professional to significant personal liability. In most countries, if evidence is obtained in breach of legal professional privilege or professional secrecy, that evidence cannot be used in court, and in some cases any other evidence obtained as a result of the inappropriately obtained evidence is also inadmissible. This may cause the prosecution to collapse. A number of respondents indicated that legal professional privilege and/or professional secrecy did not apply to notaries in their country. A number of countries also reported there were significant restrictions on their ability to obtain search warrants for a legal professional’s office or other orders for the production of papers from a legal professional. Essentially the remit of confidentiality, legal professional privilege and professional secrecy depends on the legal framework in place in the country under consideration and the specific type of legal professional involved. There have been four completed legal challenges29 to the application of AML/CFT obligations to legal professionals in Europe. Each of these cases related to the national implementation of the FATF Recommendations in the specific country and considered the rights of access to justice and to privacy enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In each of those cases, the infringement of the broader rights under consideration by the application of the AML/CFT regime to legal professionals was considered proportionate and appropriate, on the basis that legal professional privilege/ professional secrecy was sufficiently protected. For two of the countries30, this protection required that STRs be submitted via the SRB rather than directly to the FIU. Box 6: Summary of decision in the Michaud case In its final decision, given on 6 March 2013, in the case of Michaud v France (request no 12323/11), the European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that there was no violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life) of the ECHR. The case concerned the application of the AML/CFT requirements on legal professionals, with respect to the requirement to file STRs. The applicant claimed this obligation contradicted Article 8 of the Convention which protects the confidentiality of the exchanges between a legal professional and his client.
29 Bowman v Fels (2005) EWCA Civ 226; ECJ C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone et al. v. Conseil des Ministres, 2007; ECHR André et autres v. France, 2008 and Michaud v. France ECtHR (Application no. 12323/11). 30 Belgium and France.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 22 2013 The Court underlined the importance of the confidentiality of the exchanges between legal professionals and their clients, as well as the professional secrecy of legal professionals. However the Court considered that the obligation to report suspicious transactions was necessary to achieve the justifiable purpose of the defence of order and the prevention of criminal offences, since it is aimed at fighting against money laundering and associated offences. The Court decided that the implementation of the obligation to report suspicious transactions in France was not a disproportionate infringement on the professional secrecy of legal professionals for two reasons. Firstly, because they were not required to make a report when they are defending a citizen; and secondly, because French law allows legal professionals to make the report to the president of their bar rather than directly to the authorities. The questionnaire responses indicate that further litigation on similar issues is currently underway in Monaco and Turkey. In Canada, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia31 has recently upheld an earlier decision that the application of CDD obligations to legal professionals was constitutionally invalid. The requirement to retain the CDD material was found to constitute an unacceptable infringement of the indepence of legal professionals because of the court’s concern that law enforcement might obtain an use this material to investigate clients. The Canadian government is seeking to appeal the decision.
31 Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada (Attorney General) 2013 BCCA 147.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 23
CHAPTER 3
VULNERABILITIES
VULNERABILITIES IDENTIFIED IN LITERATURE
The literature reviewed for this typology suggested that criminals would seek out the involvement of legal professionals in their money laundering schemes, sometimes because a legal professional is required to complete certain transactions, but also, to access specialised legal and notarial skills and services which could assist in laundering the proceeds of crime and in the financing of terrorism. Key ML/TF methods that commonly employ or, in some countries, require the services of a legal professional were identified in the literature as follows:
use of client accounts
purchase of real property
creation of trusts and companies
management of trusts and companies
setting up and managing charities
While not all legal professionals are actively involved in providing these legitimate legal services which may be abused by criminals, the use of legal professionals to provide a veneer of respectability to the client’s activity, and access to the legal professional’s client account, is attractive to criminals. There is also a perception among criminals that legal professional privilege/professional secrecy will delay, obstruct or prevent investigation or prosecution by authorities if they utilise the services of a legal professional. In terms of TF, while few case studies specifically mention the involvement of legal professionals, they do mention the use of companies, charities and the sale of property. As such it is clear that similar methods and techniques could be used to facilitate either ML or TF, although the sums in relation to the later may be smaller, and therefore the vulnerability of legal professionals to involvement in TF cannot be dismissed.32
32 FATF (2008)
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 24 2013 VULNERABILITIES IDENTIFIED THROUGH STRS AND ASSET RECOVERY STRs and confiscated assets are two data sets that can provide information for competent authorities to assess the extent of AML/CFT risk and vulnerability within their country. The observations below are taken from responses to the FATF questionnaire. CONFISCATION OF ASSETS The types of assets acquired by criminals with the proceeds of their crime are evidence of the laundering methods utilised and highlight areas of potential vulnerability. Real estate accounted for up to 30% of criminal assets confiscated in the last two years, demonstrating this as a clear area of vulnerability. REPORTS ABOUT LEGAL PROFESSIONALS Analysis of the STRs information provided in the FATF questionnaire responses reveals that financial institutions and other designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) were reporting suspicious transactions involving legal professionals, whether they were complicitly or unknowingly involved in their client’s criminality. These STRs mentioning potential involvement of legal professionals in money laundering amounted to between .035% and 3% of all STRs reported33. REPORTING BY LEGAL PROFESSIONALS The table below shows the number of reports as identified via the FATF questionnaire34. The wide range of activities undertaken by different types of legal professionals in different countries complicates comparisons. In certain countries, notaries and/or solicitors undertake the majority of transactional activities and advocates, barristers or legal professionals have a predominantly advocacy-based role. In these situations, there are naturally more reports originated by the former group than the latter. The level of reporting by the legal sector is unlikely to be at the same level as that of the financial institutions. There is a significant difference in the volume of transactions undertaken by legal professionals in comparison to financial institutions. Also, the level of involvement in each transaction, which affects the basis on which a suspicion may arise and be assessed, is significantly different. A more relevant comparison may be to other DFNBPs, especially those providing professional services. From the figures below, the reports by legal professionals averaged 10% of those of DFNBPs, ranging from less than 1% to 20%. Understanding the proportion of the legal sector to the rest of the DFNBPS in a country makes such a comparison more informative.
33 These figures were calculated by comparing the number of STRs identified by the FIU in the questionnaire response as having a legal professional as a subject, with the total number of STRs in that jurisdiction for the relevant year. 34 Not all of the thirty-eight jurisdictions which responded to the questionnaire provided STR figures.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 25 However, given the number of legal professionals in each of the countries responding to the FATF questionnaire and the range of transactions they are involved in, reporting levels of zero or even single figures year after year, raises the question as to the underlying reasons relevant to that country. Chapter 6 of this report considers a number of possible contributing factors to the current reporting levels.
Table 1: Sampling of Suspicious Transaction Reports Filed in 2010 from those countries
responding to the questionnaire
Country
Legal professionals DNFBPs Total
Advocate/
Barrister/ Lawyer Notary/Other Solicitor
Austria 23 - 2 211
Belgium 0 163 1 179 18 673
Curacao 0 0 69 757
Denmark 4 26 2 315
Finland 7 4 040 21 454
France 881 1 303 19 208
Hong Kong/China 99 157 19 690
Ireland 19 82 13 416
Italy 12 66 223 37 047
Jordan 0 0 208
Liechtenstein 1 5 113 324
Montenegro 0 - 68
Netherlands 2 27 356 - 198 877
Norway 7 82 6 660
Portugal 5 - 1 459
St Vincent and
Grenadines 0 1 502
Spain 39 345 580 2 991
Sweden 1 321 12 218
Switzerland 13 322 1 146
Trinidad and Tobago 0 25 111
United Kingdom 11 141 4 913 13 729 228 834
Table Notes:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 26 2013
Table 2: Sampling of Suspicious Transaction Reports Filed in 2011 from those countries
responding to the questionnaire
Country
Legal Professionals DNFBPs Total
Advocate/ Barrister/
Lawyer Notary/Other Solicitor
Austria 10 - 2 075
Belgium 1 319 1 382 20 001
Curacao 3 7 887 10 421
Denmark 5 14 3 020
Finland 16 6 247 28 364
France 1 357 1 691 22 856
Hong Kong/China 116 161 20 287
Ireland 32 129 11 168
Italy 12 195 492 48 836
Jordan 0 0 248
Liechtenstein 1 5 142 289
Montenegro 1 - 50
Netherlands 2 11 359 - 167 237
Norway 11 68 4 018
Portugal 7 - 1 838
St Vincent and
Grenadines 0 1 255
Spain 31 382 537 2850
Sweden 0 321 11 461
Switzerland 31 527 1 615
Trinidad and Tobago 2 90 303
United Kingdom 4 166 4 406 11 800 247 160
Table Notes:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 27 REPORTING ON CLIENTS Respondents to the FATF questionnaire advised that almost all the STRs submitted by the legal profession are on their own clients. The FATF Recommendations state that STRs should relate to all funds, irrespective of whether they are held by the client or third parties. Only the United Kingdom and Norway identified STRs being made by legal professionals in this broader context. VULNERABILITIES IDENTIFIED BY LEGAL PROFESSIONALS Respondents to the FATF questionnaire identified that, among the STRs submitted by legal professionals, the top four areas reported are:
Purchase and sale of real property,
Formation, merger, acquisition of companies, Formation of trusts and Providing company or trust services. A number of countries’ legal professionals also identify probate (administering estates of deceased individuals), tax advice and working for charities as areas giving rise to circumstances requiring them to file an STR. The top five predicate offences featuring in STRs from legal professionals among the respondent countries were:
corruption and bribery
fraud
tax crimes
trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances unclear offences, but unexplained levels of cash or private funding STRs from legal professionals in a few countries also identified a range of other offences such as terrorism, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, insider trading, and forgery. . USEFULNESS OF STRS BY LEGAL PROFESSIONALS It is difficult to assess the direct usefulness of individual STRs, as the collection of feedback in many countries is sporadic. However, from the level of case studies and questionnaire responses, it appears that STRs submitted by legal professionals are often of high quality and lead to further action. For example, Switzerland reported that 93.5% of STRs from legal professionals were passed to law enforcement, with 62% resulting in proceedings being instituted. In addition, Belgium, Italy, Liechtenstein, Ireland and the United Kingdom commented positively on the general quality of the STRs provided by legal professionals. While the United Kingdom and the Netherlands noted that STRs from legal professionals contributed to both law enforcement activity and prosecutions, as well as assisting in identifying and locating the proceeds of crime for confiscation activity.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 28 2013 A number of case studies contained in Chapter 4 and Annex 6 of this report demonstrate successful prosecutions, where a legal professional has filed an STR. SUPERVISION OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS Box 7: Recommendation 28 Countries should ensure that other categories of DNFBPS are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with AML/CFT requirements. This should be performed on a risk-sensitive basis. This may be performed by a) a supervisor or b) by an appropriate SRB, provided that such a body can ensure that its members comply with their obligations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The supervisor or SRB should also a) take the necessary measures to prevent criminals or their associates from being professionally accredited, or holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function, e.g. through evaluating persons on the basis of a ‘fit and proper’ test; and (b) have effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in line with Recommendation 35 available to deal with failure to comply with AML.CFT requirements. APPROACH TO SUPERVISION Supervisors generally have the opportunity to monitor the conduct of all of their members, irrespective of whether there has been a complaint of potentially criminal conduct or professional misconduct. Therefore, they are a potential source of information on vulnerabilities of a sector, even where the existence or exploitation of the vulnerability has not yet come to the attention of law enforcement agencies. An absence of supervision may aggravate pre-existing vulnerabilities. The questionnaire responses show a number of different supervisory frameworks which have been implemented for legal professionals:
Twenty-three countries have allocated supervisory responsibility to SRBs. In many cases there is interaction with either the FIU or a relevant government ministry on the overall approach to supervision. Five countries have allocated supervisory responsibility to the FIU. In all cases, the professional bodies are involved in providing advice on compliance to their members. Three countries have allocated supervisory responsibility to other external supervisors. In each of those cases the professional bodies liaised with the external supervisor on compliance and education. In two countries it was unclear from responses who had supervisory responsibility, and another two countries were in the process of establishing supervisors for the legal profession.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 29 In three of the four countries that responded to the questionnaire where AML/CFT obligations have not been extended to legal professionals35, the FIU, relevant government departments and/or professional bodies provide some advice on ML/TF risks. They either have a role in monitoring compliance with professional rules or in monitoring compliance with threshold reporting obligations. The SRBs generally indicated that they had the ability to refuse membership admission to those persons who either did not meet a fit and proper test or who had relevant criminal convictions. The SRBs also indicated they had the power to monitor compliance and take disciplinary action, although some mentioned they had very limited resources with which to undertake this role. A few of the external supervisors/FIUs mentioned that due to constitutional requirements regarding access to the offices of legal professionals, they either undertook their supervisory functions with the consent of the legal professionals or they had delegated the onsite inspections to the professional body. EDUCATION AND RAISING AWARENESS Almost all countries that responded to the questionnaire provide education, advice and guidance to legal professionals on AML/CFT compliance, and a number provided links to a large range of detailed educational material. However, debate is ongoing within some countries about the type of red flag indicators that legal professionals should be educated about:
Twenty-two countries either did not answer the question or said that there were no specific risks or red flag indicators for legal professionals; Two countries have only recently applied the AML/CFT obligations to legal professionals and are in the processes of developing red flag indicator relevant to their country; Of the remaining respondents in some cases both the FIU and the SRB or professional body were able to articulate risks to the legal sector and red flag indicators relevant to the activities of legal professionals. In other cases it was only the FIU or the SRB which provided that information. In one country, the two SRBs who responded, had actively co-operated with the FIU in compiling a very detailed list of red flag indicators for legal professionals, although in their responses they stated that they were not aware of specific risks to their members. Only one SRB said that the lack of information about warning signs and lack of disciplinary action suggested to them that the potential for misuse of their members was high. On the other hand a number of SRBs who did not provide information on red flag indicators thought that the fact that they did not need to take disciplinary action against their members was an indication that the
35 Australia, Canada and the United States – although the Canadian FIU is the AML/CFT supervisor for the Notaries in British Columbia.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 30 2013 ML/TF risks to their members must be low or that their members were able to deal with the risks adequately. The questionnaire specifically asked about the interaction between SRBs and professional bodies, and FIUs. Five of the private sector respondents mentioned that they did not have any interaction with the FIU in their country, and four of those were SRBs. A further three SRBs did not respond to the questions about interaction with the FIU. Generally these respondents indicated that they would have welcomed dialogue with the FIU and thought that this would assist them in helping to improve compliance by their members. DISCIPLINARY AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON LEGAL PROFESSIONALS Disciplinary and criminal action taken against legal professionals helps to identify areas of vulnerability and provides case studies of both witting and unwitting involvement. The FATF questionnaire specifically looked at disciplinary and criminal action within the preceding five years. SRBs from ten countries provided advice about disciplinary action taken, however the number of disciplinary cases reported exceeded double figures only in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Criminal prosecutions were started in sixteen countries, with Austria, Spain, Italy, and Poland joining the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States reaching double figures of prosecutions in the last five years. For both disciplinary and criminal actions only a small number were substantiated to the relevant standard of proof and resulted in sanctions. The United Kingdom and the United States provided the most examples of successful disciplinary and criminal prosecutions. The individual case studies provided have been included in both Chapter 4 and Annex 6 of this report and the red flag indicators and other lessons to be learnt from those cases are considered in more detail in those sections. Some also contain details on sanctions imposed, which range from fines to removal from practice to imprisonment. The case studies clearly demonstrate that criminals still seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities that caused the FATF to call for extending AML/CFT obligations to legal professionals. However, the case studies also show that, at least in some instances, it is now the legal professional who becomes aware of the attempted misuse of their services and submits an STR that then prompts an investigation. TAKING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST LEGAL PROFESSIONALS Within the literature and other typology research, law enforcement often cites “challenges” in successfully prosecuting legal professionals for money laundering as a basis for legal professionals posing a greater risk of ML/TF. While the actual ML/TF offences are the same for legal professionals as they are for ordinary citizens, a number of potential hurdles to prosecuting legal professionals have been identified.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 31 EVIDENCE GATHERING Most of the practical issues concerning the investigation of ML/TF by or through legal professionals relate to legal professional privilege or professional secrecy and the process of gathering evidence. FATF Recommendation 31 is relevant as it stipulates that the powers of law enforcement agencies and investigative authorities should include evidence-gathering methods and compulsory measures for the production of records held by DNFBPs. Whether any evidence gathered or created in the course of an investigation is subject to legal professional privilege or professional secrecy is a legal issue that cannot be predicted with certainty. Some of the practical challenges identified in investigating ML/TF by or through legal professionals include: uncertainty about the scope of privilege, the difficult and time-consuming processes for seizing legal professional’s documents, and the lack of access to client account information. DIFFERENCES IN SCOPE OF PRIVILEGE As outlined in Chapter 2 of this report, legal professional privilege and professional secrecy are considered fundamental human rights and the legal professional is obliged to take steps to protect that privilege. However, the remit of confidentiality, legal professional privilege and professional secrecy varies from one country to another, and the practical basis on which this protection can be overridden is not always clear or easily understood. In some countries, the FIU may have greater powers to access underlying information on which an STR is based, while in other countries it is also possible for law enforcement to have access to such material. In some countries financial and banking records may be accessed just as easily for legal professionals as for any other individual, while tax information may be accessed easily by some law enforcement agencies. But in other countries this kind of information is also subject to privilege. In some countries, both law enforcement agencies and the private sector have said that they find the lack of clarity on the extent of the reporting duty under the AML/CFT legislation challenging. DOCUMENTS Regulatory officials, police, and prosecutors must be careful to respect solicitor-client privilege during the course of their work. This can result in an increase in time and resources required to build a case against a legal professional when compared to other persons or professionals. A number of the questionnaire responses highlighted this point, especially in relation to the seizure of documents from a legal professional’s office – whether provided by the client or created by the legal professional. Claims of legal professional privilege or professional secrecy could impede and delay the criminal investigation. Once a claim of privilege is made over a document obtained pursuant to a search warrant, for example, the document is essentially removed from
consideration in the investigation until the claim for legal professional privilege is resolved. This delay may still occur were the claim is made correctly and in accordance with the law, or if made with the genuine but mistaken belief by the legal professional that privilege or secrecy applies. This may be particularly relevant if there is misunderstanding of the extent of privilege or secrecy in particular circumstances by either the legal professional or law enforcement, or if there is a dispute
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 32 2013 as to whether any of the grounds for removing the privilege or secrecy (such as the crime fraud exemption) apply. However, some of the case studies do evidence extremely wide claims of privilege or secrecy being occasionally made which exceed the generally understood provisions of the protections within the relevant country, an experience which was reflected in some of the responses to the questionnaire. Law enforcement agencies are required by law to have strong evidence from the outset to demonstrate that privilege or secrecy should be removed. In many instances this means that the claim of legal professional privilege or professional secrecy will need to be resolved by a court, which can delay the investigation process for a substantial period of time. As time is a critical factor in pursuing the proceeds of crime, this may influence the decision of investigators of whether to investigate the possible involvement of the legal professional or to seek evidence of their client’s activities from alternative sources. . CLIENT ACCOUNTS Several countries stated that tax authorities, police and prosecutors do not have the right to investigate transactions that touch legal professionals’ client accounts, as these are covered by confidentiality requirements. Sight of such accounts can of course be given voluntarily by those under investigation, but this is a practical solution only where the investigating agency is willing to reveal the fact that they are conducting the investigation. OTHER CHALLENGES The use of certain investigative techniques such as intercepting the telephone or electronic communications may be virtually forbidden when those communications involve legal professionals. In some countries, prior consent to the recording by a party to the communication or the subsequent removal of sections of the recorded conversations covered by legal professional privilege or professional secrecy may permit some limited use of this technique. Some countries noted the special position of the legal professional within a legal community as presenting a challenge in being permitted to investigate legal professionals. Legal professionals and judges will often be well-known to each other and the question has been raised of whether a court is obliged to find a judge who is not known by a defendant or suspect legal professional, and who is therefore demonstrably impartial. PROSECUTING LEGAL PROFESSIONALS Legal professionals have professional training, and even if they do not “know” the AML laws, they will generally be sufficiently aware to avoid crossing the line between questionable behaviour and criminality, making it more difficult to prove the relevant mental element in a money laundering prosecution. More importantly, if they do cross that line knowingly and willingly, legal professionals, especially in law firms, have access to employees who can establish companies
or accounts (thus, further insulating the legal professional). Legal professionals who cross the line may also have access to other professionals (in both the legal and financial sectors) who can help them layer and conceal the proceeds of crime involved in money laundering transactions. Lastly, being a member of
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 33 the bar, affords a certain standing and prestige in society. This may cause others with whom the legal professional interacts, to favour or trust him/her, merely due to his/her status, when they would otherwise look suspiciously upon certain behaviour. Responses to the questionnaire showed that in some cases, legal professionals were not charged with the criminal offence of money laundering although it was clear to the investigating officers that they were involved in the ML/TF activity. Two main reasons were provided as to why this may be the case:
Firstly, because of the inability to secure sufficient evidence to prove their complicit involvement in the money laundering schemes. Domestically, access to evidence may have been refused because claims to legal professional privilege or professional secrecy were upheld; or investigators decided not to pursue that evidence because of the more complicated processes involved in seeking access to such evidence and demonstrating that it is appropriate to be released. In the case of an international investigation, the evidence-gathering process can be hindered by the fact that privilege and secrecy varies across the countries that are trying to cooperate. Secondly, because they are likely to make useful co-operators, informants, and/or cooperating witnesses. A legal professional has every incentive to co-operate with law enforcement once his/her illegal activity is discovered to avoid reputational harm, loss of license (livelihood), and censure by the bar.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 34 2013
CHAPTER 4
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES
This section of the report looks at case studies which illustrate the ML/TF methods and techniques which involve the services of a legal professional. FATF recognises that the vast majority of legal professionals seek to comply with the law and their ethical obligations, and will not deliberately seek to assist clients with money laundering or terrorist financing. This report has identified case studies where legal professionals have stopped acting for clients and/or made an STR; although comprehensive information about the extent to which this occurs is not available, especially in the absence of a reporting obligation being imposed at a country level. 36 However, as identified in Chapter 3, there are a range of legal services which are of interest to criminals because they assist in laundering money and may assist in terrorist financing. The criminal may seek out the use of a legal professional, because they need expert advice to devise complicated schemes to launder vast amounts of money, and they will either corrupt the legal professional or find one who is already willing to wilfully assist them. However in many other cases, the criminal will use the legal professional because:
either by virtue of a legal requirement or custom, a legal professional is used to undertake the otherwise legitimate transaction, which in that instance involves the proceeds of crime; the involvement of a legal professional provides an impression of respectability sought in order to dissuade questioning or suspicion from professionals and/or financial institutions; or the involvement of a legal professional provides a further step in the chain to frustrate investigation by law enforcement. At the outset of this typology exercise, the objective was to identify examples of complicit involvement by legal professionals on the one hand and unknowing involvement on the other. A more detailed review of the case studies has indicated that such a stark distinction is not really appropriate. The involvement of a legal professional in money laundering may more appropriately be described as a continuum:
36 It should be noted that legal professionals may cease to act but not make an STR when legal professional privilege or professional secrecy applies.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 35 Depending on the extent to which the proceeds of crime have already been laundered previously, there may realistically be no red flag indicators apparent to the legal professional during the transaction or the client is able to provide convincing explanations to any generic red flag indicators identified. In other cases, red flag indicators may be present, but due to lack of awareness or proper systems, the legal professional genuinely does not see the red flag indicators or appreciate their significance. Where the red flag indicators are present and identified by the legal profession, two separate approaches may be taken. o In some cases the legal professional, for a variety of reasons may turn a blind eye to the red flag indicators, become more deeply involved in the criminal activity and may in a minority of cases become a future willing accomplice for one or more criminals. Law enforcement has reported that in some cases they may still receive an STR from such a legal professional after the police investigation has commenced. o Alternatively, the legal professional may make a STR (where required) and depending on the level of information they have causing the suspicion and their professional obligations in the given circumstances, either proceed with the transaction with caution, or cease acting for the client.
Figure 1. Involvement of Legal Professionals in money laundering and terrorist financing
(ML/TF)
ML/TF
Innocent involvement
No red flag indicators apparent.
Unwitting
Basic CDD undertaken.
Some red flags, but missed or significance misunderstood.
Alert & Proactive 1
Low level of suspicion –
STR made where required and proceed with caution if appropriate or stop acting. Wilfully blind Further questions are not asked, isolated transaction is completed and often no STR is filed where required. Being corrupted Wilful blindness persists for repeat instructions from the same client, the client’s associates or other matters with similar red flag indicators. Complicit Actual knowledge of the criminality in which they are involved. Alert & Proactive 2 Higher level of suspicion or knowledge– STR made where required and stops acting. Red flags identified
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 36 2013 APPROACH TO CASE STUDIES IN THIS REPORT For each method and technique identified, this report considers the attractiveness of the method for criminals and a relevant ethical or professional obligation of the legal professional. Case studies are identified which demonstrate each technique and where possible, case studies have been sourced from both civil and common law countries and show different types of involvement from the legal professionals. Under each case study, attention is drawn to the red flag indicators which may have been apparent to the legal professional and/or to the SRB or law enforcement investigating the transaction. These red flag indicators are drawn from a comprehensive list contained in Chapter 5. Red flag indicators should always be considered in the context of the specific case. Individual red flag indicators may not be a basis on their own for having a suspicion of money laundering, but they will be a basis to ask questions of a client.37 The answers to these questions may remove concerns about the source of funds being used in the transaction. Alternatively, the answers or lack of answers may cause a legal professional to be suspicious that his/her services are being misused, especially where there is more than one red flag indicator present. A table of all case studies, with key methods and techniques is in Annex 5, as individual cases may demonstrate more than one method. Additional case studies are contained in Annex 6.
37 This is consistent with the FATF requirements to identify the client, the beneficial owners, understand the source of funds and the nature and the purpose of the business relationship.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 37 METHOD 1: MISUSE OF CLIENT ACCOUNT While the use of the client account is part of many legitimate transactions undertaken by legal professionals, it may be attractive to criminals as it can:
be used as part of the first step in converting the cash proceeds of crime into other less suspicious assets; permit access to the financial system when the criminal may be otherwise suspicious or undesirable to a financial institution as a customer; serve to help hide ownership of criminally derived funds or other assets; and be used as an essential link between different money laundering techniques, such as purchasing real estate, setting up shell companies and transferring the proceeds of crime.38
38 Australia, Canada and the United States – although the Canadian FIU is the AML/CFT supervisor for the Notaries in British Columbia.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 38 2013 TECHNIQUE: TRANSFERRING FUNDS WITHOUT PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES The majority of legal professionals are required to meet strict obligations when handling client money, including the requirement that they deal with client money only in connection with the provision of legal services and do not simply act as a bank or deposit-taking institution. Failure to comply with these obligations will generally be grounds for disciplinary action. However, law enforcement and SRBs are still finding cases where legal professionals are simply transferring funds through their client account without providing an underlying legal service. In some cases this could raise questions as to whether a law firm had appropriate procedures or was supervising staff members or junior lawyers appropriately. In discussion with SRBs during the workshops, it was suggested that if legal services are not provided, there may not be a lawyer-client relationship and privilege or secrecy may not apply. Case 1: Use of client account without underlying legal services provided – common law country An employee working in a very small law firm in Australia received an email from a web-based account referring to a previous telephone conversation confirming that the law firm would act on the person’s behalf. The ‘client’ asked the employee to accept a deposit of AUD 260 000 for the purchase of machinery in London. The ‘client’ requested details of the firm’s account, provided the surname of two customers of a bank in London, and confirmed the costs could be deducted from the deposit amount. The details were provided, the funds arrived and the ‘client’ asked that the money be transferred as soon as possible to the London bank account (details provided) after costs and transfer fees were deducted. The funds were transferred, but no actual legal work was undertaken in relation to the purchase of the machinery. The transfer of the funds to the law firm was an unauthorised withdrawal from a third party’s account. This specific case was brought to the attention of the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (OLSC) in Australia, which took the view that the law firm had failed to ensure that the identity and contact details of the individual were adequately established. This was particularly important given the individual was not a previous client of the law firm. The employee – proceeding on the basis of instructions received solely via email and telephone without this further verification of identity – was criticised. The OLSC also found that the law firm failed to take reasonable steps to establish the purpose of the transaction and failed to enquire into the basis for the use of the client account. The law firm was reprimanded for their conduct in this case. Source: Australia (2012) questionnaire response. Case 1 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 39 Case 2: Deliberate misuse of client account without underlying legal transaction – hybrid civil and common law country A Quebec lawyer received approximately USD 3 million in American currency from a Montreal businessman, which he deposited into the bank account of his law practice. The lawyer then had the bank transfer the funds to accounts in Switzerland, the United States, and Panama. In Switzerland, another lawyer, who was used as part of the laundering process, transferred on one occasion USD 1 760 000 to an account in Panama on the same day he received it from the Canadian lawyer. When depositing the funds in Canada, the Quebec lawyer completed the large transaction reports as required by the bank, fraudulently indicating that that the funds came from the sale of real estate. A police investigation into the Quebec lawyer established that these funds were transferred to a reputed Colombian drug trafficker linked to the Cali Cartel. In their attempts to gather further information about the suspicious transactions, bank officials contacted the lawyer about the funds. The lawyer refused to provide any further information, claiming solicitor-client confidentiality. The bank subsequently informed the lawyer that it could no longer accept his business. Source: Schneider, S. (2004) Case 2 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 40 2013 and Matt Smith pled guilty to federal charges. Evidence before the trial commissioner included an affidavit from the FBI agent on the case, stating that Dixon was not charged with a crime because prosecution of Dixon required Raymond Smith’s assistance, which was unlikely.” Despite the absence of a current attorney-client relationship between Dixon and the judge, the Court found that the relevant ethics rule prohibited an attorney from engaging in any conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, even outside of an attorney-client relationship. The Court ordered Dixon to be publicly reprimanded for his violation of the spirit of the ethics rules, the “global appearance of impropriety by Dixon,” and his conduct which was deemed serious enough to “bring the Bar into disrepute.” The Court held that even though he was not prosecuted for a money laundering offence, Dixon should have known better than to use his “escrow account for ‘banking services’ for individuals.” Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Dixon, 373 S.W.3d 444 (Ky. 2012) Case 3 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 41 organised conveyancing for the purchase of residential property and carried out structured transactions in an attempt to avoid detection. The solicitor established trust accounts for the individual under investigation and ensured that structured payments were used to purchase properties and pay off mortgages. Some properties were ostensibly purchased for the individual relatives, though the solicitor had no dealings with them. The solicitor also advised the individual on shares he should buy and received structured payments into his trust account for payment Source: FATF (2007) Case 4 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 42 2013 Case 6 Red flag indicators:
39 This technique was specifically noted in the Australian questionnaire response to this project.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 43 Case 8: Legal professional removed from practice after ignoring red flag indicators on an aborted transaction – common law country In 2011 a solicitor was struck off the roll for acting in a number of property purchases which had all the hallmarks of money laundering. In 2008 the solicitor received instructions from an individual to purchase property on behalf of other clients, who provided funds for the purchase prior to the solicitor indicating the need for the funds to be deposited. The solicitor did not meet the clients, undertake due diligence checks or obtain instructions in writing. The funds came into the client account, the transaction was cancelled and there was a request to provide the funds to a third party – all on the same day. Source: United Kingdom (2012) questionnaire response Case 8 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 44 2013 METHOD 2: PROPERTY PURCHASES Criminals, like those with legitimate incomes, require a place to live and premises from which to conduct their business activities. Irrespective of economic conditions, real estate investment often remains attractive for criminals and non-criminals alike. Consequently, the purchase of real estate is a common outlet for criminal proceeds. Real estate is generally an appreciating asset and the subsequent sale of the asset can provide a legitimate reason for the appearance of the funds In many countries a legal professional is either required by law to undertake the transfer of property or their involvement is a matter of custom and practice. However the specific role of the legal professional in real estate transactions varies significantly from country to country, or even within countries. In some countries, the legal professional will customarily hold and transfer the relevant funds for the purchase. In other countries this will be done by other parties, such as a title insurance agent. Even if the legal professional is not handling the money, they will be aware of the financial details and in many cases will be in a position to ask further questions about the purchase or sale. Therefore, real estate transactions are a key area of potential ML/TF vulnerability for legal professionals. TECHNIQUE: INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME IN PROPERTY From the cases obtained, it is clear that some criminals will seek to invest the proceeds of their crime in real estate without attempting to obscure their ownership. Despite many countries introducing reporting requirements on cash payments, and many professional bodies restricting the amount of cash which legal professionals may receive, some criminals will still seek to use the purchase of real property as a means of placing cash obtained from criminal activity. Increasingly, this is seen as part of the layering process, where the funds have been accumulated in one or more bank accounts and the property purchase is wholly or predominantly funded through private means rather than a mortgage or loan. There has been extensive publicity about the money laundering risks posed by large amounts of cash or unexplained levels of private funding in relation to property purchases. Where legal professionals are involved and an STR is not made, it is more likely that the legal professional is either complicit in the money laundering, or is being wilfully blind by failing to ask more questions when warning signs are present. Case 9: Legal professional files STR after noticing red flag indicators on property transaction – civil law country The CTIF-CFI (the Belgium FIU) received a notification from a notary on a person from Eastern Europe, who resided in Belgium and had bought a property there. The purchase happened by depositing the total purchase price in cash before the document authenticating the
purchase was signed. The person claimed that he could not open a bank account
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 45 and so had to pay cash for the property. After the notification of the notary, the FIU learned that the person did have an account at a Belgian bank and that the size of the transaction was not in proportion with his financial situation as he was receiving state benefits. Police sources revealed the person was known for illicit trafficking in goods and merchandise Source: Cellule de traitement des informations Financières, (2005) Case 9 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 46 2013 Source: United Kingdom (2012) questionnaire response Case 11 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 47 TECHNIQUE: TRANSFERRING VALUE – SALES WITHIN AN ORGANISED CRIME GROUP Case 13: Legal professional facilitates multiple back to back property sales within an organised crime group – civil law country The attention of Tracfin was drawn to atypical financial flows relating to real estate purchases undertaken in the regions of Midi-Pyrénées, Languedoc-Roussillon and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. The analysis brought to light a possible network of organised criminality involving people who were either current or former members of the Foreign Legion. The individuals were mostly of the same foreign nationality and involved a real estate civil society (property investment scheme). Between April 2009 and March 2011 the office of a notary public registered 28 deeds of real estate transfer for this group. All the sales, bar one, were officialised by the same notary in the office. Twelve individuals and six different real estate civil societies (non-trading companies) were listed as the purchaser, while seven individuals and five societies were sellers of the properties. Of these 28 deeds, 16 were paid in full for EUR 1.925 million; six were financed through loans of EUR 841 149 in total, and the source of financing was not able to be determined for five properties which had a value of EUR 308 200. Nine of the transactions were paid in full by individuals in the amount of EUR 1.152 million, which was a significant amount given the profession of the clients. The properties were also resold within relatively short timeframes. For example, one of the properties in Castres was resold every year since 2009 with occasionally significant increases in the sale price. All these sales were registered by the same notary. The real estate civil society thereby multiplied by six the purchase price of this property. In some instances the sellers claimed the property had increased in value because they had done work on those properties (they hadn’t). The notary registered two further transactions in 2011 which were paid for in cash and were at a significant distance from the notary’s office. Source: France (2012) questionnaire response Case 13 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 48 2013 The use of false or counterfeited documents should always be a red flag to the legitimacy of the individual and the action they wish to take. While legal professionals are not expected to be forgery experts, with the increased ability of criminals to access such materials through the internet, having some familiarity with identity documents at least within their country, may help them avoid being taken in by obvious forgeries. Case 14: Legal Professional facilitates property purchase in a false name – common law country Law enforcement investigated a matter involving a drug offender actively growing a large crop of cannabis on a property. When the person of interest (POI) was arrested for this offence, it was established that the person had purchased the block of land under a false name. Under provisions of Chapter 3 of the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002, if the POI had effective control of the land, and used that land to produce dangerous drugs, then the property was liable for forfeiture. Initial inquiries revealed the property was registered as being owned by a different person. Further enquiries made with another government department revealed the person had the same first names as the POI, but a different surname. The date of birth recorded at this department was very similar to the POI with the year and month identical, but the day slightly different. It was alleged the POI had purchased the property under a false name, as no identification was required by the real estate agent to sign the contract. It is further suspected the POI took the contract to a solicitor for conveyance and had the solicitor sign the transfer documents on the POI’s behalf. The sale was executed in 2002, but the final payment (made via a solicitor) was not made until 2004. This payment method was written into the contract. Source: Australia (2012) questionnaire response Case 14 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 49 Case 15: Family members used as a front for purchasing property – common law country A Canadian career criminal, with a record including drug trafficking, fraud, auto theft, and telecommunications theft, deposited cash into a bank account in his parents’ name. The accused purchased a home with the assistance of a lawyer, the title of which was registered to his parents. He financed the home through a mortgage, also registered to his parents. The CAD 320 000 mortgage was paid off in less than six months. Source: Schneider (2004) Case 15 Red flag indicators:
40 FATF (2007) and Schneider (2004).
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 50 2013
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 51 Case 18: Legal professional files STR when companies are used to purchase properties to facilitate laundering of drug proceeds and/or terrorist financing – civil law country A Spanish married couple of Moroccan origins, who own three properties, incorporate a limited company. They own 100% of the shares between them, the value of which is EUR 12 000 euro. Within the first five months, the company has undertaken investments of over EUR 260 000, without apparent recourse to external financing. This includes purchasing five properties for over EUR 193 000 in cash. One of the property purchases is from an Islamic community in the south of Spain, the vice-president of which was arrested in 2009 within the context of a Civil Guard antidrugs trafficking operation. The couple are found to be associated with other companies which do not file accounts as required under law or receive official gazette notifications. The notary involved in some of the property purchases makes an STR. According to subsequent information obtained by the Spanish Executive Service of the Commission for Monitoring Exchange Control Offences (SEPBLAC), the transactions could be connected with people possibly related to drug trafficking or terrorist financing. Source: Spain (2012) questionnaire response Case 18 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 52 2013 Case 19: Legal professional disciplined for failing to notice warning signs of mortgage fraud and handling the proceeds of crime – common law country In 2008 a law firm employee was approached by three individuals who were accompanied by a friend to seek a quote to purchase three separate properties. They returned later that day with passports and utility bills and instructed the law firm to act for them in the purchases. The clients asked for the purchases to be processed quickly and did not want the normal searches undertaken. They did not provide any money to the solicitors for expenses (such funds would normally be provided) but said the seller’s solicitors would be covering all fees and expenses. The clients said they had paid the deposit directly to the seller. The mortgages were paid to the law firm, which retained their fees and then sent the funds to a bank account which the law firm employee thought belonged to solicitors acting for the sellers. No due diligence was undertaken. In fact the actual owners of the property were not selling the properties and had no knowledge of the transaction or the mortgages taken out over their properties. The mortgage funds were paid away to the fraudsters, not to another solicitors firm. In 2010, the supervising solicitor was fined GBP 10 000 for not properly supervising the employee who allowed the fraud to take place and the proceeds of the funds to be laundered. The solicitor’s advanced age was taken into account as a mitigating factor in deciding the penalty. Source: United Kingdom (2012) questionnaire response Case 19 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 53 Case 20 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 54 2013 METHOD 3: CREATION OF COMPANIES AND TRUSTS Criminals will often seek the opportunity to retain control over criminally derived assets while frustrating the ability of law enforcement to trace the origin and ownership of the assets. Companies and trusts are seen by criminals as potentially useful vehicles to achieve this outcome. TECHNIQUE: CREATION OF TRUSTS TO OBSCURE OWNERSHIP AND RETAIN CONTROL Disguising the real owners and parties to the transaction is a necessary requirement for money laundering to be successful and therefore, although there may be legitimate reasons for obscuring ownership it should be considered as a red flag. Case 21: Trust established to receive proceeds of tax crime and invest in criminal property Two trusts were established in an offshore centre by a law firm. The law firm requested the trustee to accept two payment orders in favour of a bank in order to buy real estate. It appeared that the trust had been used to conceal the identity of the beneficial owners. Information obtained by the Belgian FIU revealed that the beneficiaries of the trusts were individuals A and B, who were managers of two companies, established in Belgium that were the subject of a judicial investigation regarding serious tax fraud. Part of the funds in these trusts could have originated from criminal activity of the companies. Source: FATF (2010) Case 21 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 55 daughter’s ownership. Through controlling the Trust he was able to funnel funds back to himself through loaning funds from the Trust and receive payments on that loan. Source: FATF (2010) Case 22 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 56 2013 failure to ask such questions may be an indicator that the legal professional is complicit in the scheme. Case 23: Legal professional approached over internet to set up multiple companies without information on identity, source of funds or purpose – hybrid common law / civil law country A legal professional was approached over the internet to set up companies with limited or no details about the future uses of the company. Over three years they were asked to set up at least 1 000 such companies in this way. The people they were asked to list as directors included individuals known to be involved with high level organised crime in that country. They never met the clients and did not undertake any due diligence. The companies were used to facilitate money laundering from loan sharking. Source: Japan (2012) questionnaire response Case 23 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 57 TECHNIQUE: USE OF BEARER SHARES TO OBSCURE OWNERSHIP Bearer shares are an equity security that is wholly-owned by whoever holds the physical stock certificate. The issuing firm neither registers the owner of the stock, nor does it track transfers of ownership. Quite a number of countries have banned the use of bearer shares by legal entities, while in other countries; these types of securities are quite common, even for companies acting legally. Case 25: Creation of company with bearer shares to obscure ownership in a property transaction – civil law country A Spanish lawyer created several companies for a client on the same day (with ownership through bearer shares, thus hiding the identity of the true owners). One of these companies acquired a property that was an area of undeveloped land. A few weeks later, the area was re-classified by the local authorities where it was located so it could be urbanised. The lawyer came to the Property Registry and in successive operations, transferred the ownership of the property by means of the transfer of mortgage loans constituted in entities located in offshore jurisdictions. With each succeeding transfer of the property the price of the land was increased. The participants in the individual transfers were shell companies controlled by the lawyer. Finally the mortgage was cancelled with a cheque issued by a correspondent account. The cheque was received by a company different from the one that appeared as the acquirer on the deed (cheque endorsement). Since the company used a correspondent account exclusively, it can be inferred that this company was a front set up merely for the purpose of carrying out the property transactions. After investigation it was learned that the purchaser and seller were the same person: the leader of a criminal organisation. Money used in the transaction was of illegal origin (drug trafficking). Additionally, in the process of reclassification, administrative anomalies and bribes were detected. Source: FATF (2007) Case 25 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 58 2013 documents as nominee directors and administrators. The articles of incorporation and the bearer shares were forwarded to the lawyer, via the management company, who provided them to the client. The client was involved in drug importation. Approximately USD 1.73 million was restrained in combined assets from residential property and bank accounts in relation to those companies Source: FATF 2010 Case 26 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 59 METHOD 4: MANAGEMENT OF COMPANIES AND TRUSTS While the creation of companies and trusts is a key area of vulnerability for legal professionals, criminals will also often seek to have legal professionals involved in the management of those companies and trusts in order to provide greater respectability and legitimacy to the entity and its activities. In some countries professional rules preclude a legal professional from acting as a trustee or as a company director. In countries where this is permitted, there are differing rules as to whether that legal professional can also provide external legal advice or otherwise act for the company or trust. This will affect whether any funds relating to activities by the company or trust can go through the client account. TECHNIQUE: ACTING AS TRUSTEE – RECEIVING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME Where a settlor creates a trust using the proceeds of crime or deposits further assets into the trust which are the proceeds of crime, a legal professional acting as trustee will be facilitating the laundering of those proceeds by managing the trust. Under common law there is an obligation on the trustee to acquaint themselves with all trust property and the FATF standards require that those providing trust services in a business capacity undertake CDD, including ascertaining the source of funds. Such enquiries would assist in minimising the risks of legal professionals who are acting as trustees inadvertently becoming involved in money laundering. Case 27: Legal professional uses client account to transfer proceeds of crime into a trust he managed – common law country Defendant Paul Monea was convicted of various money laundering counts in connection with his attempt to accept payment for the sale of a large diamond by requiring the purchasers to wire funds, which he knew to be drug proceeds, to his attorney’s IOLTA (attorney trust) account and onward to his family trust account, which was managed by the same attorney. It does not appear as if the attorney was prosecuted. See 376 F. App’x 531 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 356 (2010). Monea’s Family Trust was in possession of a 43-carat flawless yellow diamond that Monea was looking to sell for a profit. Monea was introduced to an undercover federal agent who used the name “Rizzo,” and Rizzo volunteered that he knew someone (a drug dealer) who would be interested in purchasing the diamond. Monea explained that he did not want to conduct the sale in cash because of apprehension that he was being “watched” by the government. The court noted that the pair discussed at a meeting: “the best way to conduct the transaction, the problem of receiving cash, Monea’s conversations with his attorney about his responsibilities concerning knowledge of the money’s source, and whether Monea could use the [Attorney Trust Account] of the attorney representing the Monea Family Trust.” On meeting
with another undercover agent posing as the buyer’s representative, Monea told the man (who he believed to be the associate of the drug dealerpurchaser) that USD19.5 million should be wired into his Attorney’s Trust Account. Funds were wired in the amount of USD 100 000 in three instalments when the deal was supposed to close at the attorney’s office with a gemmologist present to certify the authenticity of the stone. Rizzo pretended to make a call to have the remainder of the purchase price wired into the Attorney Trust
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 60 2013 Account, but instead, he called other law enforcement agents and the scheme was disrupted. The court held that Monea’s “intent to conceal” the nature of the drug dealer’s proceeds used to buy the diamond was shown by his desire to use the Attorney Trust Account to funnel the funds to the Monea Family Trust account, which the attorney also managed. Routing the transaction through the Attorney Trust Account was an extra and unnecessary step, not integral to the sale, which should have raised red flags with the attorney. Furthermore, according to recorded conversations, Monea discussed with the attorney that he did not want the wire transfers “looked at.” The attorney allegedly stated that he represented his Attorney Trust Account and Monea’s trust, so there was no problem as long as the diamond was sold for fair market value. Monea paraphrased the attorney speaking to him, in a recorded conversation:
“you [Monea] don’t really have the responsibility or obligation to interview people to find out how they got the money [for the diamond] . . . it’s not your responsibility.” Monea later stated: “I’ll tell you why I want [the money] going into my [Attorney’s Trust Account]. Because my attorney represents the [Monea Family Trust]. And my attorney can legitimately represent the [Monea Family Trust] . . . and we’re conducting the sale on behalf of the trust. And it keeps me clean.” Monea used his attorney and his trust account as intermediaries, and then further used his trust account that was managed by the attorney to conceal drug proceeds and insulate himself by virtue of the attorney-client relationship. See 376 F. App’x 531 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 356 (2010). Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response United States v. Monea, No. 07-cr-30 (N.D. Ohio) Case 27 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 61 TECHNIQUE: MANAGEMENT OF A COMPANY OR TRUST –APPEARANCE OF LEGITIMACY AND PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES Case 28: Legal practitioner incorporates companies and acts as front man to launder proceeds of embezzlement A money laundering operation involved a massive purchase of derivatives by companies which paid hefty fees to fake intermediaries, then surreptitiously transferred to the bank directors either in cash or on foreign banks accounts. In this scheme the notary participated by incorporating some of the fake intermediaries, whilst the lawyer appeared as the beneficial owner of such companies and actively participated in a complex scheme of bank transactions put in place to embezzle the funds illicitly obtained. Several bank accounts at different institutions were used, with the involvement of figureheads and shell companies, so as to transfer funds from one account to another by mainly making use of cheques and cash. Source: Italy (2012) questionnaire response Case 28 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 62 2013 professionals regularly act as nominees. Where a legal professional is asked to act as a nominee, they should understand the reason for this request. Case 30: Legal professionals acting as undisclosed nominees in companies suspected as vehicles for organised crime – civil law country A lawyer was reported by an Italian banking institution in connection with some banking transactions performed on behalf of companies operating in the wind power sector in which he held a stake. The reporting entities suspected the stake was in fact held on behalf of some clients of his rather than for himself. The report concerned a company owned by the lawyer who sold his minority stake (acquired two years earlier for a much lower price) to another company authorised to build a wind farm. The majority stake belonged to a firm owned by another lawyer specialising in the renewable energy sector and involved in several law enforcement investigations concerning the infiltration of organised criminal organisations in the sector. The whole company was purchased by a major corporation operating in the energy sector. Financial flows showed that the parent firm of the company being sold received €59million from the corporation. Although most of the funds were either used in instalments to repay lines of financing previously obtained both from Italian and foreign lenders or transferred to other companies belonging to the same financial group, some funds were credited to the account held in the name of the law firm of which the reported lawyer was a partner. Transfers to other legal professional were also observed. Source: Italy (2012) questionnaire response Case 30 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 63 METHOD 5: MANAGING CLIENT AFFAIRS AND MAKING INTRODUCTIONS Because of their ethical and professional obligations, the involvement of legal professionals in a transaction or their referral of a client to other professionals or businesses often provides the activities of the criminal with a veneer of legitimacy. TECHNIQUE: OPENING BANK ACCOUNTS ON BEHALF OF CLIENTS Financial institutions who are complying with their AML/CFT obligations may choose not to provide bank accounts to certain individuals who pose a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. In the questionnaire responses and literature reviewed, there were cases where legal professionals have either encouraged financial institutions to open accounts (despite being aware of the money laundering risks) or have opened accounts specifically for the use of clients, in such a way as to avoid disclosing to the financial institution the true beneficial owner of the account. The lack of alleged access to a bank account may be a red flag indicator that the individual is subject to sanctions or a court freezing or restraint order. Case 31: Legal professional assisting client to obtain banking services despite warning signs of money laundering by a politically exposed person – common law country From 2000 to 2008, Jennifer Douglas, a U.S. citizen and the fourth wife of Atiku Abubakar, former Vice President and former candidate for President of Nigeria, helped her husband bring over USD 40 million in suspect funds into the United States through wire transfers sent by offshore corporations to U.S. bank accounts. In a 2008 civil complaint, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that Ms. Douglas received over USD 2 million in bribe payments in 2001 and 2002 from Siemens AG, a major German corporation. While Ms. Douglas denies wrongdoing, Siemens has already pled guilty to U.S. criminal charges and settled civil charges related to bribery. Siemens told the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that it sent the payments to one of Ms. Douglas’ U.S. accounts. In 2007, Mr. Abubakar was the subject of corruption allegations in Nigeria related to the Petroleum Technology Development Fund. Of the USD 40 million in suspect funds, USD 25 million was wire transferred by offshore corporations into more than 30 U.S. bank accounts opened by Ms. Douglas, primarily by Guernsey Trust Company Nigeria Ltd., LetsGo Ltd. Inc. and Sima Holding Ltd. The U.S. banks maintaining those accounts were, at times, unaware of her Politically Exposed Person (PEP) status, and they allowed multiple, large offshore wire transfers into her accounts. As each bank began to question the offshore wire transfers, Ms. Douglas indicated that all of the funds came from her husband and professed little familiarity with the offshore corporations actually sending her money. When one bank closed her account due to the offshore
wire transfers, her lawyer helped convince other banks to provide a new account. Source: United States Senate Permanente Subcommittee on Investigations (2010) Case 31 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 64 2013 characteristics involved.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 65 Case 33: Legal professional coordinates banking activities and sets up companies to assist with laundering – civil law country An individual in the Netherlands set up three companies. For one of the companies he held bearer shares. To hide his involvement in the companies he used a front man and a trust and company service provider as legal representatives. For each of the companies, the legal representatives opened bank accounts with three different banks in different countries. The individual used the three companies to set up a loan-back scheme in order to transfer, layer and integrate his criminal money. He then co-mingled the criminal funds with the funds that originated from the legal activities of one of his companies. Next the front man bought real estate. To finance that transaction he arranged for a loan between the two companies. Source: FATF (2007) Case 33 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 66 2013 the notary to be involved in the transaction, there was no legitimate reason for the funds to be passed through the lawyer, and it would be against client account rules for the lawyer to put client’s money into his personal account. Case 35: Criminal defence legal professional introduces clients to other professionals to assist with laundering the proceeds of their crime – common law country A prominent criminal defence attorney in Boston, Robert A. George helped a former client launder USD 200 000 in proceeds from various crimes, including wire fraud and cocaine distribution. George connected his former client to “his guy” who owned a mortgage company in Massachusetts and who accepted currency in duffel bags from the former client. George’s associate then cut cheques to the former client to make the illicit funds appear to be a loan. George was paid a fee for his part in the laundering scheme and also arranged a fee-splitting agreement with the former client to refer other criminals to him so that George could represent them in federal cases and launder their drug proceeds. Furthermore, George structured a USD 25 000 cash “retainer fee” from an undercover agent posing as a drug dealer into a bank account held in the name of his law firm, and issued a cheque to the apparent drug dealer with a memorandum note meant to conceal the purpose of the transaction. A notice of appeal has been filed in this case. George was sentenced on October 31, 2012, to three and a half years for money laundering and related crimes following his jury trial in June 2012. George was convicted of money laundering conspiracy, aiding and abetting money laundering, money laundering, and structuring transactions to avoid reporting requirements. Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response - United States v. George, No. 11-cr-10201-NMG (D. Mass.) Case 35 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 67 In reported cases where illicit proceeds were involved, clients have had full capacity to manage their affairs and there is limited justification requiring specialist skills of the legal professional or use of their client account. From the cases considered during this typology, it is apparent that the legal professional is more likely to be either complicit or wilfully blind to the red flag indicators of money laundering when this technique is employed In order to act in the client’s best interests in such situations it is imperative they fully understand the financial and business affairs they are being asked to manage. Other management activities may raise the question as to whether the legal professional is really acting as a financial advisor and mortgage broker. Such conduct especially when provided without connection to other legal services, may not be within the scope of the activities of a legal professional; may require separate licensing depending on the country; and may not attract professional secrecy/ legal professional privilege. Case 36: Criminal defence legal professional introduces clients to other professionals to assist with laundering the proceeds of their crime – common law country A lawyer was instructed by his client, a drug trafficker, to deposit cash into the lawyer‘s trust account and then make routine payments to mortgages on properties beneficially owned by the drug trafficker. The lawyer received commissions from the sale of these properties and brokering the mortgages. While he later admitted to receiving the cash from the trafficker, depositing it into his trust account and administering payments to the trafficker‘s mortgages, the lawyer denied knowledge of the source of funds. Source: FATF (2004) Case 36 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 68 2013 Case 37 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 69 METHOD 6: LITIGATION Litigation is not an activity covered by the FATF Recommendations and, as outlined above, the courts to date have held that its exclusion is important for the protection of the fundamental human right of access to justice. However, in the case of Bowman v Fels41 – the only case to specifically consider the question in the context of a real case involving clients42 – the English Court of Appeal held that while genuine litigation should be exempt from the reporting requirements, sham litigation would not as such litigation is an abuse of the court’s processes. Litigation could constitute sham litigation if the subject of the dispute was fabricated (for example if there is no actual debt and the funds being transferred are simply the proceeds of crime being passed from one entity to another) or if the subject of the litigation was a contract relating to criminal activity which a court would not enforce.43 Case 38: Legal professionals pursue debts relating to criminal activity – civil law country In 2005, two lawyers unsuccessfully defended two clients who were prosecuted for criminal offences. They then assisted those clients to recover debts of over 5 million NOK from other known criminals. Both lawyers were convicted of money laundering. Source: Norway (2012) questionnaire response Case 38 Red flag indicators:
41 [2005] EWCA Civ 226.
42 All of the other cases were constitutional challenges on the legitimacy of legislation in principle. 43 Corbin A.L 1962 Corbin on Contracts West Publishing Co.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 70 2013 Later that year, Company B acknowledges to a notary a debt of around EUR 600 000 to the Swiss Company, who bought Company C. The agreement the notary is asked to confirm involves quarterly payments of EUR 7 500 with the Swiss company obtaining stock options for Company C. The basis of this debt was also unclear. Source: Spain (2012) questionnaire response Case 39 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 71 METHOD 7: OTHER METHODS TECHNIQUE: USE OF SPECIALISED LEGAL SKILLS Legal professionals possess a range of specialised legal skills which may be of interest to criminals, in order to enable them to transfer value obtained from criminal activity between parties and obscure ownership. These specialised skills include the creation of financial instruments, advice on and drafting of contractual arrangements, and the creation of powers of attorney. In other areas of legal specialisation, such as probate (succession) and insolvency or bankruptcy work, the legal professional may simply come across information giving rise to a suspicion that the deceased or insolvent individual previously engaged in criminal activity or that parties may be hiding assets to avoid payment to legitimate creditors. Countries differ on how unexpected sums of cash are treated in relation to probate or insolvency cases, in some a threshold report will be made and the government becomes a super-creditor able to recover the money before any other beneficiary; in other countries this would give rise to a suspicion of money laundering, requiring a STR to be filed and possibly putting the executor or the legal professional at risk of money laundering. Depending on the complexity of the arrangement, a legal professional could be unwittingly involved in the money laundering, complicit or wilfully blind through failing to ask further questions about suspicious instructions. Case 41: Legal professional prepares a power of attorney to dispose of all assets belonging to a client facing drug trafficking charges A legal professional was asked to prepare a power of attorney for a client to give control of all of his assets to his girlfriend, including power to dispose of those assets. The legal professional then prepared a deed of conveyance under which the girlfriend transferred all of the property to the client’s brother and sister. The legal professional had just secured bail for the client in relation to a drug trafficking charge. The legal professional was acquitted of money laundering. Source: Trinidad & Tobago (2012) questionnaire response Case 41 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 72 2013 Case 42: Legal professional submits STR on commercial arrangement which has not economic rationale – civil law country In 2008 a Spanish citizen (Mr A) and a citizen from a Middle East country (Mr B) attended a notary office to formalise a contract which provided:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 73 Case 44: Legal professional’s attention drawn to unusual purchases of assets during the administration of a bankruptcy – civil law country In a bankruptcy case where A and B were guarantors, a notary was appointed by the court to proceed with the public sale of different goods of the parties concerned. In the context of the public sale. The attention of the notary was drawn to the fact that several of the goods were purchased by X, the daughter of A and B. Additionally, the total amount of the purchases was significant and was not commensurate with the socio-economic status of X, who was unemployed. The purchased goods were partially funded by a cheque of a mortgage loan that a bank granted to X. The balance came from an account which was opened in the name of a third person, C. This account had received several deposits in cash and transfers from a company of which both C and B were partners. B had been a partner in different companies that were declared bankrupt and for which he was known to the judicial authorities. Further, the daughter who had purchased the goods was not a director of this company, was not subject to VAT in Belgium and her official income consisted only of unemployment benefits. With this information the FIU research indicated that the funds that were deposited on the accounts of C in cash may have come from funds that B had taken without permission to help his daughter to buy a part of his own real estate. C and B knew each other as they were partners in the same company. In this case, the account of C was used as inadvertent account to conceal the illegal origin of the funds. Taking the above elements the various purchases of X can therefore be associated with a crime relating to the bankruptcy. A law enforcement investigation started. Source: Cellule de traitement des informations Financières (2006) Case 44 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 74 2013 with drug trafficking, Rodriguez-Orejuela agreed to pay the defence expenses of any of his associates and to compensate their families while they were in prison. Through his law firm, Michael Abbell facilitated the payments to family and prison commissary accounts on behalf Rodriguez-Orejuela. The funds Abbell accepted to reimburse these payments came from Rodriguez-Orejuela, who had no legitimate form of income (all his businesses were in fact funded by narco-trafficking). Abbell would make the payments, often using money orders paid for by the law firm, and then bill Rodriguez-Orejuela for reimbursement and fees. The transactions were designed to conceal the fact that Rodriguez-Orejuela was funding the payments and was associated with drug activity. After two trials, a jury convicted Abbell of money laundering and racketeering charges. See 271 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming convictions and reversing district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal on racketeering-related counts). Abbell was sentenced to 97 months’ incarceration. Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response United States v. Abbell, No. 93-cr-470(17) (S.D. Fla.) Case 45 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 75 (phone and environmental wiretapping), corroborated by the lawyer‘s confession. The lawyer‘s office was the operational base for the criminal activities of two high-profile mafia bosses. According to the indictment, the lawyer was paid a monthly salary of about EUR 6 000 to be always available for the needs of the mafia family. Source: Di Nicola, A. and Zoffi, P. (2004) Case 47 Red flag indicators:
44 FATF (2008b); FATF typology 2002-2003.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 76 2013 Case 49: Legal professional sets up charities to undertake criminal activity and deal with the proceeds of that crime – common law country Attorney and lobbyist Jack Abramoff pleaded guilty in 2006 to three counts including conspiracy to defraud the United States, tax evasion, and “honest services” fraud (a corruption offense), upon the filing of a criminal information in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. While working for two law and lobbying firms between 1999 and 2004, Abramoff solicited and lobbied for various groups and businesses, including Native American tribal governments operating or interested in operating casinos. Abramoff conspired with former Congressional staff member Michael Scanlon to: defraud his lobbying clients by pocketing approximately USD 50 million; misuse his charitable organization by using it to finance a lavish golf trip to Scotland for public officials and others; and to provide numerous “things of value” to public officials in exchange for benefits to his clients. In one set of schemes, Abramoff employed a non-profit that he founded called Capital Athletic Foundation. The Foundation was intended to fundraise for a non-profit school and it was granted tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service, however, Abramoff used it as a personal slush fund. One congressional staffer solicited a contribution from a Russian distilled beverage company and Abramoff client on behalf of the Foundation. Abramoff used the Russian client’s donation for personal and professional benefit, namely, to finance a trip to Scotland attended by members of Congress that cost the Foundation approximately USD 166 000. Another Abramoff client, a wireless company, was solicited to make a contribution of at least USD 50 000 to the Foundation, in exchange for Abramoff securing a license for the company without charging his firm’s usual lobbying fee or even informing his firm of the arrangement. According to the criminal information, Abramoff also concealed assets and sources of income from the Internal Revenue Service through the use of nominees, some of which were tax-exempt organizations. Although not detailed in the court filings in this case, it was widely reported at the time that a congressional staff member’s spouse received USD 50 000 from another non-profit affiliated with Abramoff, which in turn, received money from Abramoff clients interested in internet gambling and postal rate issues before Congress. Further, the Capital Athletic Foundation allegedly donated USD 25 000 to Representative and House Majority Leader Tom DeLay’s Foundation for Kids. These are just a few examples of Abramoff’s misuse of non-profits, some of which were founded by him and some of which existed previously and accepted contributions from Abramoff, Scanlon, or their clients, often due to Abramoff’s personal relationships with the heads of such
charities. Abramoff was also indicted in 2005 in the Southern District of Florida in connection with a massive fraud that he conducted involving his purchase of a casino and cruise company. Abramoff pleaded guilty to two more counts of conspiracy and wire fraud in the Florida case, which did not involve the misuse of tax-exempt entities. He was never charged with money laundering. Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response - United States v. Abramoff, No. 06-cr-00001 (D.D.C.) Case 49 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 77
CHAPTER 5
RED FLAG INDICATORS
As outlined in Chapter 4 the methods and techniques used by criminals to launder money may also be used by clients with legitimate means for legitimate purposes. Because of this, red flag indicators should always be considered in context. The mere presence of a red flag indicator is not necessarily a basis for a suspicion of ML or TF, as a client may be able to provide a legitimate explanation. These red flag indicators should assist legal professionals in applying a risk-based approach to their CDD requirements of knowing who their client and the beneficial owners are, understanding the nature and the purpose of the business relationship, and understanding the source of funds being used in a retainer. Where there are a number of red flag indicators, it is more likely that a legal professional should have a suspicion that ML or TF is occurring. SRBs and law enforcement may also find these red flag indicators to be useful when monitoring the professional conduct of or investigating legal professionals or their clients. Where a legal professional has information about a red flag indicator and has failed to ask questions of the client, this may be relevant in assessing whether their conduct was complicit or unwitting. This chapter contains a collection of red flag indicators identified through the case studies, literature reviewed, and existing advice published by FIUs and SRBs which were provided in response to the questionnaire. RED FLAGS ABOUT THE CLIENT Red flag 1: The client is overly secret or evasive about:
o who the client is o who the beneficial owner is o where the money is coming from o why they are doing this transaction this way o what the big picture is. Red flag 2: The client:
o is using an agent or intermediary without good reason. o is actively avoiding personal contact without good reason.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 78 2013 o is reluctant to provide or refuses to provide information, data and documents usually required in order to enable the transaction’s execution o holds or has previously held a public position (political or high-level professional appointment) or has professional or family ties to such an individual and is engaged in unusual private business given the frequency or characteristics involved. o provides false or counterfeited documentation o is a business entity which cannot be found on the internet and/or uses an email address with an unusual domain part such as Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo etc., especially if the client is otherwise secretive or avoids direct contact. o is known to have convictions for acquisitive crime, known to be currently under investigation for acquisitive crime or have known connections with criminals o is or is related to or is a known associate of a person listed as being involved or suspected of involvement with terrorist or terrorist financing related activities. o shows an unusual familiarity with respect to the ordinary standards provided for by the law in the matter of satisfactory customer identification, data entries and suspicious transaction reports – that is – asks repeated questions on the procedures for applying the ordinary standards. Red flag 3: The parties:
o The parties or their representatives (and, where applicable, the real owners or intermediary companies in the chain of ownership of legal entities), are native to, resident in or incorporated in a high-risk country o The parties to the transaction are connected without an apparent business reason. o The ties between the parties of a family, employment, corporate or any other nature generate doubts as to the real nature or reason for the transaction. o There are multiple appearances of the same parties in transactions over a short period of time. o The age of the executing parties is unusual for the transaction, especially if they are under legal age, or the executing parties
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 79 are incapacitated, and there is no logical explanation for their involvement. o There are attempts to disguise the real owner or parties to the transaction. o The person actually directing the operation is not one of the formal parties to the transaction or their representative. o The natural person acting as a director or representative does not appear a suitable representative. RED FLAGS IN THE SOURCE OF FUNDS Red Flag 4: The transaction involves a disproportional amount of private funding, bearer cheques or cash, especially if it is inconsistent with the socio-economic profile of the individual or the company’s economic profile. Red flag 5: The client or third party is contributing a significant sum in cash as collateral provided by the borrower/debtor rather than simply using those funds directly, without logical explanation. Red flag 6: The source of funds is unusual:
o third party funding either for the transaction or for fees/taxes involved with no apparent connection or legitimate explanation o funds received from or sent to a foreign country when there is no apparent connection between the country and the client o funds received from or sent to high-risk countries. Red flag 7: The client is using multiple bank accounts or foreign accounts without good reason. Red flag 8: Private expenditure is funded by a company, business or government. Red flag 9: Selecting the method of payment has been deferred to a date very close to the time of notarisation, in a jurisdiction where the method of payment is usually included in the contract, particularly if no guarantee securing the payment is established, without a logical explanation. Red flag 10: An unusually short repayment period has been set without logical explanation. Red flag 11: Mortgages are repeatedly repaid significantly prior to the initially agreed maturity date, with no logical explanation. Red flag 12: The asset is purchased with cash and then rapidly used as collateral for a loan.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 80 2013 Red flag 13: There is a request to change the payment procedures previously agreed upon without logical explanation, especially when payment instruments are suggested which are not appropriate for the common practice used for the ordered transaction. Red Flag 14: Finance is provided by a lender, either a natural or legal person, other than a credit institution, with no logical explanation or economic justification. Red Flag 15: The collateral being provided for the transaction is currently located in a high-risk country. Red flag 16: There has been a significant increase in capital for a recently incorporated company or successive contributions over a short period of time to the same company, with no logical explanation. Red flag 17: There has been an increase in capital from a foreign country, which either has no relationship to the company or is high risk. Red flag 18: The company receives an injection of capital or assets in kind which is notably high in comparison with the business, size or market value of the company performing, with no logical explanation. Red flag 19: There is an excessively high or low price attached to the securities transferred, with regard to any circumstance indicating such an excess (e.g. volume of revenue, trade or business, premises, size, knowledge of declaration of systematic losses or gains) or with regard to the sum declared in another operation. Red flag 20: Large financial transactions, especially if requested by recently created companies, where these transactions are not justified by the corporate purpose, the activity of the client or the possible group of companies to which it belongs or other justifiable reasons. RED FLAGS IN THE CHOICE OF LAWYER Red flag 21: Instruction of a legal professional at a distance from the client or transaction without legitimate or economic reason. Red flag 22: Instruction of a legal professional without experience in a particular specialty or without experience in providing services in complicated or especially large transactions.. Red flag 23: The client is prepared to pay substantially higher fees than usual, without legitimate reason. Red flag 24: The client has changed advisor a number of times in a short space of time or engaged multiple legal advisers without legitimate reason
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 81 Red flag 25: The required service was refused by another professional or the relationship with another professional was terminated. RED FLAGS IN THE NATURE OF THE RETAINER Red flag 26: The transaction is unusual, e.g.:
o the type of operation being notarised is clearly inconsistent with the size, age, or activity of the legal entity or natural person acting o the transactions are unusual because of their size, nature, frequency, or manner of execution o there are remarkable and highly significant differences between the declared price and the approximate actual values in accordance with any reference which could give an approximate idea of this value or in the judgement of the legal professional o a non-profit organisation requests services for purposes or transactions not compatible with those declared or not typical for that body. Red flag 27: The client:
o is involved in transactions which do not correspond to his normal professional or business activities o shows he does not have a suitable knowledge of the nature, object or the purpose of the professional performance requested o wishes to establish or take over a legal person or entity with a dubious description of the aim, or a description of the aim which is not related to his normal professional or commercial activities or his other activities, or with a description of the aim for which a license is required, while the customer does not have the intention to obtain such a licence o frequently changes legal structures and/or managers of legal persons o asks for short-cuts or unexplained speed in completing a transaction o appears very disinterested in the outcome of the retainer o requires introduction to financial institutions to help secure banking facilities
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 82 2013 Red flag 28: Creation of complicated ownership structures when there is no legitimate or economic reason. Red flag 29: Involvement of structures with multiple countries where there is no apparent link to the client or transaction, or no other legitimate or economic reason. Red flag 30: Incorporation and/or purchase of stock or securities of several companies, enterprises or legal entities within a short period of time with elements in common (one or several partners or shareholders, director, registered company office, corporate purpose etc.) with no logical explanation. Red flag 31: There is an absence of documentation to support the client’s story, previous transactions, or company activities. Red flag 32: There are several elements in common between a number of transactions in a short period of time without logical explanations. Red flag 33: Back to back (or ABC) property transactions, with rapidly increasing value or purchase price. Red flag 34: Abandoned transactions with no concern for the fee level or after receipt of funds. Red flag 35: There are unexplained changes in instructions, especially at the last minute. Red flag 36: The retainer exclusively relates to keeping documents or other goods, holding large deposits of money or otherwise using the client account without the provision of legal services. Red flag 37 There is a lack of sensible commercial/financial/tax or legal reason for the transaction. Red flag 38 There is increased complexity in the transaction or the structures used for the transaction which results in higher taxes and fees than apparently necessary. Red flag 39: A power of attorney is sought for the administration or disposal of assets under conditions which are unusual, where there is no logical explanation. Red flag 40: Investment in immovable property, in the absence of any links with the place where the property is located and/ or of any financial advantage from the investment. Red flag 41: Litigation is settled too easily or quickly, with little/no involvement by the legal professional retained. Red flag 42: Requests for payments to third parties without substantiating reason or corresponding transaction.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 83
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
KEY FINDINGS
This typology has found evidence that criminals seek out the involvement of legal professionals in their money laundering schemes, sometimes because the involvement of a legal professional is required to carry out certain types of activities, and sometimes because access to specialised legal and notarial skills and services may assist the laundering of the proceeds of crime and the funding of terrorism. Case studies, STRs and literature point to the following legal services being vulnerable to misuse for the purpose of ML/TF:
client accounts (administered by the legal professional) purchase of real property creation of trusts and companies management of trusts and companies setting up and managing charities administration of deceased estates providing insolvency services providing tax advice preparing powers of attorney engaging in litigation – where the underlying dispute is a sham or the debt involves the proceeds of crime. Not all legal professionals are involved in providing these types of legitimate legal services that criminals may seek to abuse, but in some cases a legal professional may need to be involved. This makes the use of legal professionals carrying out these activities uniquely exposed to criminality, irrespective of the attitude of the legal professional to the criminality. It is accepted that the vast majority of legal professionals seek to comply with the law and their professional requirements, and they have no desire to be involved in ML/TF activity. The legal profession is highly regulated. Furthermore, ethical obligations, professional rules and guidance on ML/TF provided by SRBs and professional bodies should cause legal professionals to refuse to act for clients who seek to misuse legal services for ML/TF purposes.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 84 2013 To keep legal professionals from becoming involved in ML/TF however, the above factors rely on the legal professionals:
being alert to red flags indicating that the client is seeking to involve them in criminal activity choosing to abide by their ethical obligations and applicable professional rules; and discerning legitimate client wishes from transactions and structures intended to conceal or promote criminal activity or thwart law enforcement. Equally, the application of FATF Recommendations to legal professionals over the last decade should provide the legal sector with tools to better identify situations where criminals are seeking to misuse legal services. Some SRBs and professional bodies are quite active in educating their members on the ML/TF vulnerabilities they face and the red flag indicators which could alert them to a suspicious transaction. STRs from legal professionals have also assisted law enforcement in detecting and prosecuting criminals engaged in ML/TF activity. However, not all legal professionals are undertaking the CDD measures required by the FATF Recommendations, and not all SRBs and professional bodies have a clear understanding of information on ML/TF vulnerabilities specific to the legal sector to provide to their members. A lack of awareness and/or lack of education of ML/TF vulnerabilities and red flag indicators reduces the likelihood that legal professionals would be in a position prevent the misuse of their services and avoid a breach of their professional obligations. This typology research recognises that investigating a legal professional presents more practical challenges than investigating other professionals, due to the important protections for fundamental human rights which attach to the discharge of a legal professional’s activities. However, the research has also confirmed that neither legal professional privilege nor professional secrecy would ever permit a legal professional to continue to act for a client who was engaging in criminal activity. The scope of legal professional privilege/professional secrecy depends on the constitutional and legal framework of each country, and in some federal systems, in each state within the country. Practically, this diversity and differing interpretations by legal professionals and law enforcement on what information is actually covered by legal professional privilege / professional secrecy has, at times provided a disincentive for law enforcement to take action against legal professionals suspected of being complicit in or wilfully blind to ML/TF activity. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE ACTION This typology study should be used to increase awareness of the red flag indicators for potential misuse of legal professionals for ML/TF purposes and in particular for:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 85 Legal professionals – as this would assist in reducing their unwitting involvement in ML/TF activities undertaken by their clients and promote the filing of STRs where appropriate; Financial institutions and other DFNBPs – as this may alert them to situations where legal professionals are complicit in their client’s ML/TF activity or are not aware of the red flag indicators to promote the filing of STRs where appropriate; SRBs and professional bodies – as this will assist in developing training programmes and guidance which focus not just on the law but the practical application of the law to everyday legal practice and assist in identifying both witting and unwitting involvement in ML/TF activities as part of their monitoring of professional conduct; and Competent authorities and partner law enforcement agencies – to assist in their investigation of ML/TF where legal services are a method used and to inform the assessment of whether it is likely that the legal professional is involved wittingly or unwittingly, so that appropriate action can be taken. Potentially, the increased education of legal professionals on ML/TF vulnerabilities may include a discussion of AML/CFT risks and obligations in the course of the legal education or licensing of legal new professionals. Initially, this education can take place in the context of ethics and professionalism in courses and law schools, and later, through continuing education curricula. Competent authorities, SRBs and professional bodies should review the case examples in this typology study and fit them to the specific roles and vulnerabilities of their members. Increased interaction between competent authorities, supervisors and professional bodies in terms of sharing information on trends and vulnerabilities, as well as notifying each other of instances where legal professionals are failing to meet their ethical and legal obligations in an AML/CFT context, may also assist in reducing misuse of legal professionals. SRBs and professional bodies may find the red flag indicators in this report useful when monitoring their members’ conduct against professional and client account rules. There will be many factors taken into consideration when deciding whether to criminally prosecute a legal professional for money laundering of failing to submit an STR where required. In some instances, it will be more appropriate and effective for the SRB or professional body to take disciplinary or remedial action where the legal professional’s conduct falls short of professional requirements and permits money laundering to occur, but was not intended to aid in money laundering. This shared approach to enforcement not only helps to combat ML / TF, but also helps to ensure that legal professionals uphold the rule of law and do not bring the wider profession into disrepute. Competent authorities, SRBs and professional bodies
should work to ensure that there is a clear and shared understanding of the remit of confidentiality, legal professional privilege and/or professional secrecy in their own country. A clear understanding of the remit of these principles and the procedures for investigating a legal professional will assist in reducing mistrust from both
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 86 2013 parties during this process and may help to dispel the perception that privilege or secrecy is designed to protect criminals. It may also assist in more prompt investigation and prosecution of those who would misuse the services of legal professionals or abuse their role as a legal professional, while reducing the concern of legal professionals that they may be sanctioned for breaching privilege or secrecy when complying with their AML/CFT obligations. Finally, this typology found that the analysis of STRs made about legal professionals and the types of assets being confiscated provided useful information on the AML/CFT risks posed by the legal sector. Member states may wish to consider using these sources of information when assessing risks for the purpose of completing the national risk assessment in line with FATF Recommendation
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 87
ANNEX 1
BIBLIOGRAPHY
FATF (2004), Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2003-2004, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2003_2004_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf FATF (2006), Misuse of Corporate Vehicles Including Trust and Company Service Providers, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Misuse%20of%20Corporate%20Vehicles%20including%2 0Trusts%20and%20Company%20Services%20Providers.pdf FATF (2007), Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through the Real Estate Sector, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20through%20the%20Real%20Estat e%20Sector.pdf FATF (2008a) Risk Based Approach Guidance for the Legal Sector, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20professions.pdf FATF (2008b) Terrorist Financing and Typologies Report, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Rep ort.pdf FATF (2010), Money Laundering Using Trust and Company Service Providers, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Money%20Laundering%20Using%20Trust%20and%20C ompany%20Service%20Providers..pdf FATF (2011), Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Laundering%20the%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pd f FATF (2012) International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation – the FATF Recommendations, FATF, Paris, www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf
AUSTRAC (2011) Money laundering in Australia 2011, Austrac, Australia, http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/money_laundering_in_australia_2011.pdf Cellule de traitement des information Financieres (2005), Doorgemelde dossiers in verband met corruptie, typologische aspecten (files reported in connection with corruption, typological aspects), Cellule de traitement des information Financieres, Belgium Cellule de traitement des information Financieres (2006), Notarissen en witwasbestrijding (Notaries and combating money laundering), Cellule de traitement des information Financieres, Brussels
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 88 2013 Cellule de traitement des information Financieres (2007), Jaarverslag 2007 (annual report 2007) Cellule de traitement des information Financieres, Brussels Cellule de traitement des information Financieres (2008), Jaarverslag 2008 (annual report 2008) Cellule de traitement des information Financieres, Brussels Cellule de traitement des information Financieres (2009), Jaarverslag 2009 (annual report 2009) Cellule de traitement des information Financieres, Brussels Cummings, L. and Stepnowsky, P.T. (2011), My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney Facilitation of Money Laundering through Commercial Transactions, University of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-32, University of Maryland, College Park Deloitte (2011), Final Study on the Application of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive: Commissioned by the European Commission, Deloitte DG Internal Market and Services – Budget, European Commission, Brussels Dodek, A. (2011), Solicitor-Client Privilege in Canada: Challenges for the 21st Century, The Canadian Bar Association, Ottawa Does, van der, E. et al. (2011), The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), World Bank/UNODC, Washington, D.C. European Commission (2006), The application to the legal profession of Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, European Commission, Brussels Gallant, M. (2010), Uncertainties Collide: Lawyers and Money Laundering, Terrorist Finance Regulation, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 16, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg Global Witness (2009), The Secret Life of a Shopaholic: How an African Dictator’s Playboy Son Went on a Multi-million Dollar Shopping Spree in the US, Global Witness, London, www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/gw_obiang_low.pdf IBA, OECD and UNODC (2010), Risks and Threats of Corruption and the Legal Profession Survey, IBA, OECD and UNODC, at www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/46137847.pdf International Bar Association (2011), IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession (IBA International Principles), London www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=BC99FD2C-D253-4BFE-A3B9-C13F196D9E60 International Union of Notaries (2004), Principles of Notarial Ethics, Rome http://uinl.net/presentacion.asp?idioma=ing&submenu=DEONTOLOGIA Journal of Crime, Law & Social Change (2004), Vol. 42, Springer, Boston o Levi, M. et al. (2004), “Lawyers as crime facilitators in Europe: An introduction and overview”
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 89 o Middleton, D.J. (2004), “The legal and regulatory response to solicitors involved in serious fraud” o Middleton D.J. and Levi, M. (2004), “The role of solicitors in facilitating organised crime:
situational crime opportunities and their regulation” o Lankhorst, F. and Nelen, H. (2004), “Professional services and organised crime in the Netherlands” o Chevrier, E., “The French government’s will to fight organised crime and clean up the legal professions: the awkward compromise between professional secrecy and mandatory reporting” o Di Nicola, A. and Zoffi, P. (2004), “Italian lawyers and criminal clients: Risks and countermeasures” Parlementaire enquête-commissie opsporings-methoden (parliamentary hearing regarding methods of investigation) (1996), Inzake Opsporing (“Regarding investigation”), The Hague Schneider, S. (2004), Money Laundering in Canada: An analysis of RCMP cases, Nathan Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, Toronto, https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=232379 Tavares, C., et al. (2010), Money Laundering in Europe: Report of Work Carried Out by Eurostat and DG Home Affairs, Eurostat, Brussels United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2010), Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Four Case Histories, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=2de71520-5901- 4a31-98ad-5138aebc49c2 Van Dijken, A. (2009), Verdachte transacties bij advocaten en juridisch adviseurs, een analyse van verdachte transacties uit 2009 gemeld door advocaten en juridisch adviseurs (Suspicious transactions at lawyers and legal advisers, an analysis of suspicious transactions reported by lawyers and legal advisers from 2009), FIU-Netherlands, The Hague Van Duyne, P.C., et al. Eds., (2007), Crime business and crime money in Europe: the dirty linen of illicit enterprise, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen World Economic Forum (2012), Organised Crime Enablers, World Economic Forum, Geneva, www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC_OrganizedCrimeEnablers_Report_2012.pdf Other Resources:
American Bar Association (2010), Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_ taskforce_gtfgoodpracticesguidance.authcheckdam.pdf IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum www.anti-moneylaundering.org/
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 90 2013 Law Society of England and Wales (2012) Anti-Money Laundering Practice Note, Law Society, London www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/anti-money-laundering/ Federation of Law Societies Canada Model Rules to Fighting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/anti-money-laundering/ Law Council of Australia (2009) Anti-Money Laundering Guide for legal practitioners, Law Council, Canberra, www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=8FCE74BF1E4F-17FA-D2A2-C549BD6656B4&siteName=lca
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 91
ANNEX 2
RESPONDENTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM MEMBER STATES AND ASSOCIATE MEMBER STATES:
Australia Austria Belgium
Canada Denmark Finland
France Japan Ireland
Italy Japan Netherlands
Norway Portugal Spain
Sweden Switzerland Turkey
United Kingdom United States Bermuda
Curacao St Vincent & the Grenadines Trinidad & Tobago Gibraltar Jordan Liechtenstein Montenegro RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM SRBS OR PROFESSIONAL BODIES IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES:
Australia Austria Belgium
Canada Denmark France
Germany Ireland Italy
Japan Luxembourg Netherlands
Norway Portugal South Africa
Spain Sweden Switzerland
United Kingdom United States Bermuda
Curacao Namibia Saint Vincent & the Grenadines Trinidad & Tobago Malawi Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Montenegro Poland Slovakia Slovenia Swaziland
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 92 2013
ANNEX 3
DEFINITIONS
Mechanism: An ML/TF mechanism is a system or element that carries out part of the ML/TF process. Examples of ML/TF mechanisms include financial institutions, legal professionals, legal entities and legal arrangements. Method: In the ML/TF context, a method is a discrete procedure or process used to carry out ML/TF activities. It may combine various techniques, mechanisms and instruments, and it may or may not represent a typology in and of its self. Scheme: An ML/TF scheme is a specific operation or case of money laundering or terrorist financing that combines various methods (techniques, mechanisms and instruments) into a single structure. Technique: An ML/TF technique is a particular action or practice for carrying out ML/TF activity. Examples of ML/TF techniques include structuring financial transactions, co-mingling of legal and illegal funds, over and under valuing merchandise, transmission of funds by wire transfer, etc. Typology: An ML/TF typology is a pattern or series of similar types of money laundering or terrorist financing schemes or methods. Legal professional: Lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals – this refers to sole practitioners, partners, or employed professionals within professional firms. It is not meant to refer to ‘internal’ professionals that are employees of other types of businesses, nor to professionals working for government agencies, who may already be subject to AML/CFT measures. Legal professionals are covered by the FATF Recommendations when they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following activities:
buying and selling of real estate
managing of client money, securities or other assets management of bank, savings or securities accounts; organisation of contributions for the creation, operation, or management of companies creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and the buying and selling of business entities. SRB: Self-regulatory body – is a body that represents a profession (e.g. lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals or accountants), and which is made up of members from the profession, has a role in regulating the persons that are qualified to enter and who practice in the profession, and also performs certain supervisory or monitoring type functions. Such bodies should enforce rules to ensure that high ethical and moral standards are maintained by those practicing in the profession.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 93
ANNEX 4
TYPES OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
The Risk Based Approach Guidance for Legal Professionals, produced by FATF, in consultation with the legal sector in 2008, provided high level definitions of the legal professionals in terms of Lawyers and Notaries.45 In summary these definitions highlighted the regulated nature of these professions, their important role in promoting adherence to the rule of law, providing impartial and independent legal advice on complex rights and obligations, and/or authenticating documents. For this typology research, greater focus was on the actual areas of law and specific tasks in which different types of legal professionals provided services, to obtain a clearer understanding of which vulnerabilities may be more relevant to which legal professionals. The questionnaire sent to SRBs specifically asked for information on whether their members:
engaged in activities covered by the FATF Recommendations; only provided legal and advice and representation; held exclusive licences for a particular legal services; and held client money From the many responses received a number of trends were identifiable:
45 www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20professions.pdf 46 For example the European Directive to facilitate practice of the profession of a lawyer on a permanent basis in a member state other than that in which the qualification was obtained provides a useful overview of lawyers in the European union. See the CCBE website for more information www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=94&id_comite=8&L=0
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 94 2013 clients with the preparation of documents and carrying out of transactions, as well as representing those clients in court and negotiations. In many countries legal professionals in this category held an exclusive licence for representation in court, but generally they did not hold an exclusive licence for legal services covered by the FATF Recommendations.47 In most countries all legal professionals in this category were able to receive clients directly48 and were able to hold client money, either in specified accounts or accounts held by their professional body. Both confidentiality and either legal professional privilege or professional secrecy reportedly applied to many or all of the activities of legal professionals within this category.
2. Notaries49
There is a distinction between civil law notaries and common law ‘notaries public’, with the latter certifying signatures and documents and the former having the status of a qualified legal professional and of public office holders in terms of establishing authentic instruments in the area of preventative justice.50 Civil law notaries often have an exclusive licence in relation to their role in the following areas:
47 There are exceptions to this, for example in Bermuda barristers have an exclusive licence in relation to legal work involving the transfer of real property and in Hungary attorneys are the only legal professionals able to undertake legal work relating to real property and the formation of companies 48 An exception to this was found in some common law countries, where a barrister will usually only act for a client who has been referred to them by a solicitor. The barrister is also precluded from holding client funds. 49 In Japan the category of notary is not known, although similar activities are undertaken by Judicial Scriveners and Certified Administrative Procedures Specialists. 50 In addition to the information about the role of civil and common law notaries in the FATF RBA guidance, the Council of Notariats of the European Union provide information on the role of notaries on their website: www.notaries-of-europe.eu/notary-s-role/overview
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 95 These legal professionals would occasionally hold client money or facilitate the transfer of a monetary instrument such as a cheque between parties, always in a traceable and recorded way. They would deal with the clients (or an authorised representative) directly, but sometimes on referral from another legal professional. Confidentiality generally applied to these legal professionals. Some SRBS advised that legal professional privilege or professional secrecy also applied to these legal professionals, but others said that it would not.
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 96 2013
ANNEX 5
SCHEDULE OF CASES
Case. Country /
Source
Method Technique Source of
Illicit
Proceeds
Economic
Sector(s)
Action by or against legal professional
Red
Flags
1 Australia Misuse of
Client Account
Transferring funds without providing legal services Unspecified Financial Institution Disciplinary sanction imposed 2, 23, 27 2 Canada Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution No information 2, 3, 4, 36 3 United States Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Corruption Financial Institution Disciplinary sanction imposed 36, 42 4 Australia Misuse of Client Account Structuring payments Unspecified Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 4, 5 5 United States Misuse of Client Account Structuring payments Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution Criminal conviction 2, 4, 18 6 Spain Misuse of Client Account Structuring payments Fraud Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 26 7 United Kingdom Misuse of Client Account Aborted transactions Fraud Company Disciplinary sanction imposed 3, 34 8 United Kingdom Misuse of Client Account Aborted transactions Unspecified Real Estate Removed from practice 2, 27, 34 9 Belgium Property Purchases Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit trafficking in goods and merchandise Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 4, 26 10 United Kingdom Property Purchases Investment of proceeds of crime in property Unspecified Real Estate Legal professional acted as prosecution witness 2, 4, 5
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 97 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 11 United Kingdom Property Purchases Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit Drug Trafficking Real Estate Criminal conviction 4, 5 12 France Property Purchases Transferring value - back to back or ABC sales Unspecified Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 3, 4, 24, 33 13 France Property Purchases Transferring value - sales within an organised crime group Organised Crime Real Estate No information 3, 4, 26 14 Australia Property Purchases Obscuring ownership - purchase with false name / counterfeit documents Illicit Drug Trafficking Real Estate No information 2, 26 15 Canada Property Purchases Obscuring ownership - purchasing [purchase] through intermediaries Illicit Drug Trafficking, Fraud or Theft Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 4, 11 16 France Property Purchases Obscuring ownership - purchase through a company or trust Corruption (?) Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 3, 4, 21, 26, 28, 35 17 Belgium Property Purchases Obscuring ownership - purchase through a company or trust Organised Crime (?) Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate Investigation commenced 2, 6, 28, 29 18 Spain Property Purchases Obscuring ownership - purchase through a company or trust Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 3, 4, 19,20 19 United Kingdom Property Purchases Mortgage fraud with antecedent laundering Fraud Financial Institution, Real Estate Disciplinary sanction imposed 2, 26, 27 20 United Kingdom Property Purchases Mortgage fraud with antecedent laundering Unspecified Financial Institution, Real Estate Removed from practice 26, 28, 33
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 98 2013 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 21 Belgium Creation of Companies and Trusts Creation of trusts to obscure ownership and retain control Tax Fraud (?) Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate, Trust No information 2, 29 22 FATF Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of trusts to obscure ownership and retain control Smuggling Company, Financial Institution, Trust, Real Estate No information 2, 3, 28 23 Japan Creation of Companies and Trusts Creation of shell companies to place or layer Loan Sharking Company No information 1, 2, 26 24 Spain Creation of Companies and Trusts Creation of shell companies to place or layer, Management of a company or trust - creation of legitimacy and provision of legal services Organised Crime Company No information 2, 3, 29 25 Spain Creation of Companies and Trusts, Management of Companies and Trusts Use of bearer shares to obscure ownership, Creation of shell companies to place or layer Unspecified Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 11, 33 26 Jersey Creation of Companies and Trusts Use of bearer shares to obscure ownership Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 4, 29 27 United States Management of Companies and Trusts Acting as trustee - receiving the proceeds of crime Illicit Drug Trafficking Trust Decision not to prosecute legal practitioner 3, 36 28 Italy Management of Companies and Trusts Management of a company or trust - appearance of legitimacy and provision of legal services Money laundering operation Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 19 29 United States Management of Companies and Trusts Management of a company or trust - appearance of legitimacy and provision of legal services Advance-fee scheme Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 2, 42
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 99 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 30 Italy Management of Companies and Trusts Holding shares as an undisclosed nominee Organised Crime (?) Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 19 31 United States Management of Client Affairs and Making Introductions Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Corruption Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 8, 27, 29 32 United States Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Corruption Company, Financial Institution Real Estate No information 2, 8, 27 33 Netherlands Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Unspecified Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 14, 26, 27 34 Egmont Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Introduction of other professionals for parts of a transaction Organised Crime Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 26 35 United States Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Introduction of other professionals for parts of a transaction Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 2, 4, 26 36 FATF Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions, Misuse of Client Account Management of a client's general affairs Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 4 37 Belgium Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Management of a client's general affairs Fraud Financial Institution, Insurance No information 8, 11, 26 38 Norway Litigation Sham litigation Unspecified Unspecified Criminal conviction 2, 41 39 Spain Litigation Sham litigation Organised Crime (?) Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 3, 20 40 Australia Litigation Sham litigation Unspecified Company STR filed by legal professional 21, 22, 27, 38, 41
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 100 2013 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 41 Trinidad & Tobago Other Methods Use of specialised legal skills Illicit Drug Trafficking Real Estate Legal professional acquitted 2, 27, 39 42 Spain Other Methods Use of specialised legal skills Unspecified Unspecified STR filed by legal professional 2, 3, 22, 37 43 United Kingdom Other Methods Use of specialised legal skills Fraud Unspecified STR filed by legal professional 2, 4 44 Belgium Other Methods Use of specialised legal skills Fraud Company, Financial Institution Investigation commenced 3, 4, 5 45 United States Other Methods Payment of legal fees and associated expenses Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution / Money or value transfer service Criminal conviction 2, 4 46 United States Other Methods Payment of legal fees and associated expenses Illicit Drug Trafficking Unspecified Criminal conviction 2, 4 47 Italy Other Methods Payment of legal fees and associated expenses Organised Crime Unspecified Legal professional charged 2, 4, 26 48 Netherlands Other Methods Providing legal services for charities Terrorism Company (Foundation) Decision not to prosecute legal practitioner 2, 25 49 United States Other Methods Providing legal services for charities Fraud Company (Foundation) Criminal conviction (for predicate offences) 2, 26 50 Australia Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Unspecified Company, Financial Institution No information 7, 26, 28 51 Australia Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Fraud Financial Institution No information 4, 8, 36 52 Belgium Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Tax Evasion Company, Financial Institution No information 29, 36
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 101 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 53 Belgium Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Fraud Company, Financial Institution Investigation commenced 2, 29, 36 54 Canada Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution No information 2, 4, 26, 36 55 South Africa Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Unspecified Company, Financial Institution No information 3, 4, 36 56 United Kingdom Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Tax Fraud Unspecified Criminal conviction 3, 36 57 United States Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Sale of Stolen Goods Unspecified Criminal conviction, new trial granted on appeal which is currently being appealed 3, 36 58 United States Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Fraud Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 36 59 United States Misuse of Client Account Transferring funds without providing legal services Unspecified Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 29, 36 60 United States Misuse of Client Account Structuring payments Illicit Drug Trafficking Company Criminal conviction 3, 4, 26 61 United States Misuse of Client Account Structuring payments Fraud Financial Institution, Real Estate Criminal conviction 4, 26 62 United States Misuse of Client Account Structuring payments Illicit Drug Trafficking (Undercover Operation) Real Estate (Undercover Operation) Criminal conviction 2, 3, 26, 28 63 United Kingdom Misuse of Client Account Aborted transactions Fraud (?) Real Estate Removed from practice 26, 34, 36 64 FATF Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate, Trust No information 4, 26, 28, 29
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 102 2013 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 65 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Unspecified Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 4, 5 66 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 4 67 Canada Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit Drug Trafficking Real Estate No information 4, 26 68 Canada Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 4, 7, 26 69 United Kingdom Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution, Real Estate Criminal conviction 2, 4 70 United Kingdom Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution, Real Estate Legal professional acted as prosecution witness 4 71 United Kingdom Purchase of Real Property Investment of proceeds of crime in property Fraud Real Estate One legal professional removed from practice and two received disciplinary sanctions 2, 3, 26, 36 72 France Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through intermediaries Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution, Real Estate Criminal conviction 2, 4, 7 73 United States Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through intermediaries Illicit Drug Trafficking Real Estate Criminal conviction 2, 4 74 FATF Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Embezzlement Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 28, 29
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 103 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 75 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Fraud Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 4, 29 76 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Fraud Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate Investigation commenced 2, 4, 28, 29 77 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Unspecified Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate Investigation commenced 28, 29 78 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Organised Crime Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 4, 28, 29 79 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Organised crime Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 17, 26, 37 80 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Fraud Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 5, 26 81 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 4, 26 82 Belgium Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 3, 26, 36
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 104 2013 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 83 Spain Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Unspecified Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 8, 20, 26, 37 84 Switzerland Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Corruption (?) Company ["yet to be established"], Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 2, 4, 26 85 United Kingdom Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Unspecified Real Estate Decision not to prosecute legal practitioner 26 86 United Kingdom Purchase of Real Property Obscuring ownership - purchasing through a company or trust Housing illegal immigrants Company, Real Estate Criminal conviction 29 87 France Purchase of Real Property Mortgage fraud with antecedent laundering Fraud Financial Institution, Real Estate Prosecution commenced 3, 8, 26 88 United Kingdom Purchase of Real Property Mortgage fraud with antecedent laundering Fraud, Organised Crime Real Estate Criminal conviction 2 89 United Kingdom Purchase of Real Property Mortgage fraud with antecedent laundering Fraud Real Estate Disciplinary sanction imposed 2, 26, 35 90 FATF Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution Decision not to prosecute legal practitioner 2, 29, 36 91 Belgium Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Tax Fraud (?) Company, Financial Institution Investigation commenced 17, 28, 29, 30 92 Belgium Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Organised Crime Company Investigation commenced 29, 30
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 105 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 93 Belgium Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Unspecified Company No information 26, 30 94 Canada Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 29, 30 95 Canada Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate No information 4, 24 96 Canada Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Illicit Drug Trafficking Company No information 2, 30 97 Spain Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Unspecified Company No information 3, 19, 27 98 Spain Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Unspecified Company No information 18, 29, 30 99 Netherlands Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Fraud Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 4, 26, 29 100 Netherlands Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Fraud Company No information 24, 28 101 United Kingdom Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Fraud, Tax Fraud Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 2, 4, 29, 36 102 United Kingdom Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Corruption Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate STR filed by legal professional 2, 3, 8
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 106 2013 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 103 United Kingdom Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Corruption, Fraud Company, Financial Institution, Real Estate Criminal conviction (currently under appeal) 2, 3, 4, 8 104 United States Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution Prosecution commenced 2, 7, 29, 36 105 United States Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Illicit Drug Trafficking (Undercover Operation) Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 27, 29, 36 106 United States Creation of Companies and Trusts, Misuse of Client Account Creation of shell companies to place or layer Corruption Company Criminal conviction 2, 4, 26 107 Austria Management of Companies and Trusts Management of a company or trust - appearance of legitimacy and provision of legal services Fraud, Breach of Trust Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 7, 26, 29 108 Canada Management of Companies and Trusts Management of a company or trust - creation of legitimacy and provision of legal services Smuggling Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 4, 24, 30, 36 109 Belgium Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Organised Crime Financial Institution No information 27 110 Belgium Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Corruption Company / Trust, Financial Institution No information 2, 8, 27 111 Belgium Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Fraud Company, Financial Institution No information 2, 27, 29 112 United States Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions, Misuse of Client Account Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Fraud Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 26, 29
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 107 Case. Country / Source Method Technique Source of Illicit Proceeds Economic Sector(s) Action by or against legal professional Red Flags 113 United States Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Opening bank accounts on behalf of clients Unspecified Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 7, 26, 27, 30 114 Australia Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Management of client's general affairs through client account Unspecified Financial Institution, Insurance No information 5, 26, 36 115 Belgium Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions Management of client's general affairs through client account Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime Company, Financial Institution No information 5, 14, 21, 40 116 Canada Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions, Misuse of Client Account Management of client's general affairs through client account Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution No information 4, 24, 30, 36 117 United States Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions, Misuse of Client Account Management of client's general affairs through client account Fraud Company, Financial Institution Removed from practice 2, 26, 27, 36 118 United States Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions, Misuse of Client Account Management of client's general affairs through client account Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution Criminal conviction 2, 4, 5, 36 119 United States Managing Client Affairs and Making Introductions, Misuse of Client Account Management of client's general affairs through client account Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution Criminal conviction 2, 4, 26, 36 120 Netherlands Use of Specialised Legal Skills Illicit Drug Trafficking Financial Institution Legal professional arrested 2, 7, 39 121 Trinidad & Tobago Use of Specialised Legal Skills, Misuse of Client Account Fraud Company, Financial Institution Prosecution commenced 7, 27, 30 122 United Kingdom Use of Specialised Legal Skills Fraud (Art) Criminal conviction 2, 4, 36 123 United States Use of Specialised Legal Skills Illicit Drug Trafficking Company, Financial Institution Criminal conviction 2, 4, 26, 27
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 108 2013
ANNEX 6
ADDITIONAL CASE STUDIES
METHOD: MISUSE OF CLIENT ACCOUNT
TECHNIQUE: TRANSFERRING FUNDS WITHOUT PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES Case 50: Legal professional acts as cash courier and makes international transfers without underlying legal transaction – common law country An Australian-based solicitor structured funds to an offshore account in Hong Kong. At times it was believed he actually carried cash to Hong Kong. His colleague, a Hong Kong-based solicitor, arranged for the creation of offshore companies in the British Virgin Islands and bank accounts in Hong Kong to receive structured funds from Australia. These funds were then transferred to other countries by the Hong Kong-based solicitor to hide from authorities or returned to Australia in order to appear legitimate. Source: Australia (2012) questionnaire response Case 50 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 109 company. He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, with a nine-and-a-half-year non-parole period. Source: Australia (2012) questionnaire response Case 51 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 110 2013 to the order of company X. The Unit was informed by the bank that the transfer order was false. Based on this information the bank countermanded the cheque issued by the lawyer, and further investigation by the Unit showed that company X was managed by a foreign national who had performed the exchange transaction. This transaction for company X’s account did not have any known economic justification. Information by the tax administration indicated the company had not made its tax returns for quite some time. Police intelligence revealed that company X, its managing director and its lawyer were on record for fraud. Part of the proceeds of this fraud was used to finance the purchase of GBP by a foreign national on behalf of company X. The Unit reported this file for financial fraud related money laundering. Source: Belgium (2012) questionnaire response Case 53 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 111 Case 55: Legal professional uses client account as a banking facility for clients and applies their funds to his personal credit card – common law country The South African FIU received several STRs about an attorney who appeared to be abusing his attorney trust facility. The suspicious transactions in the reports pointed out the following:
i) Multiple large sums of money were being deposited into the trust account by different people and companies over a period exceeding two years ii) These funds were used to make payments to other depositors in South Africa and abroad iii) Funds from this account were being remitted to foreign countries deemed to be tax havens iv) Money was transferred to the attorney‘s personal credit card; his practice expenses were also paid directly from the trust account. Source: Deloitte (2011) Case 55 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 112 2013 to Pantages and his wife, keeping a fee for herself. Pantages pleaded guilty to all counts against him and testified against Harmon at trial. Following a guilty verdict on five counts of money laundering, the district court granted Harmon a new trial based on an improper jury instruction. In so doing, the judge expressed concern regarding the difficulties defence counsel face when accepting fees from clients that may be criminal proceeds. See 2011 WL 7937876, at *5 n.12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011) (denying motion for judgment of acquittal but granting motion for a new trial based on improper jury instruction). The government’s appeal of the grant of a new trial is pending. Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response – United States v Harmon, No. 08-cr-938 (ND Cal) Case 57 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 113 account, he transferred the money to a corporation and bank accounts in Liechtenstein that he had established. See 868 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that Foster’s sentence calculation should be increased because of an enhancement for use of “special skills”). Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response United States v Foster No 93-cr-80141 (Ed Mich) Case 59 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 114 2013 Cir. 2010) (affirming sentence). Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response United States v. Sinko, No. 07-cr-703 (E.D. Pa.) Case 61 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 115
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 116 2013 purchased a property in Belgium. The notary got suspicious when the buyer wished to pay the total price in cash. When the notary refused the Managing Director asked where the nearest bank Agency was. He came back to the Office of the notary with a cheque from the bank after he had run a deposit in cash. The suspicions of the notary were further enhanced when the company which he represented was the subject of a criminal investigation. Research by the FIU revealed that the person was already the subject of a dossier that was been sent by the FIU in connection with illicit drug trafficking. After the notification from the FIU a law enforcement investigation commenced. Source: Cellule de traitement des information Financieres (2006) Case 66 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 117 Case 68 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 118 2013 purchased the same property for GBP 230 000. In December 2006, the small company provided the firm with a payment of GBP 25 000 and GBP 20 000. The amount of GBP 25 000 was noted as covering a shortfall for the property, but there was no shortfall. The amount of £20,000 was said to be a loan to another client, but there were not documents to support the loan. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal considered the conduct of three solicitors in relation to the matter. One was struck off, one was given an indefinite suspension from practice and the other was fined GBP 10 000. Source: United Kingdom (2012) questionnaire response Case 71 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 119 origin of the proceeds. See 939 F. Supp. 417 (W.D. Penn. 1996) (affirming conviction). Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response - United States v. Nesser, No. 95-cr-36 (W.D. Penn.) Case 73 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 120 2013 transaction. That is why he used an off-shore company, represented by a lawyer in Belgium and channelled the money through a lawyer‘s office abroad to launder money from fraud by investing in real estate. Source: Deloitte (2011) Case 75 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 121 those two companies founded two other companies in the real estate sector. Then the intermediary of these two last companies made investments in real estate. This dossier is currently subject of a judicial inquiry. Source: Cellule de traitement des information Financieres (2006) Case 77 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 122 2013 from activities related to organised crime. It appeared that the company acted as a front set up merely for the purpose of carrying out the property transaction. Source: FATF (2007) Case 79 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 123 Case 81: Legal professional makes STR after unusual cash payments made in relation to a property purchase – civil law country The company ANDI, managed by Mr. Oxo, sold a property to the company BARA, managed by Mr. Rya, for a significant amount for which the deposit was paid in cash. A large part of the price was also paid in cash. When the notary who had executed the act noticed these transactions he sent a disclosure to the FIU based on article 10bis of the Law of 11 January 1993. Analysis revealed the following elements:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 124 2013 Case 83: Legal professional assists PEPs to purchase expensive foreign property though a company with a later transfer to a family member without genuine payment – civil law country A company is incorporated with a capital stock of EUR 3 050 by a Spanish lawyer, who then creates a general power of attorney over the company for a relative of the Head of State of an African country. Half the stock in the company is then transferred to another national of the same African country, who claims to be a businessman. The company purchases of a plot of land within an urban development in Spain on which a detached house has been built. The property is valued at EUR 5 700 000, the price being paid through transfers between accounts at the same Spanish credit institution. The company transfers the recently purchased property, in the following deed, to the relative of the Head of State, specifying the same price as set for the first purchase, while deferring payment of the entire sum. Source: Spain (2012) questionnaire response Case 83 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 125 into corruption and money laundering by the government official in question and members of his family. Source: Deloitte (2011) Case 84 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 126 2013 TECHNIQUE: MORTGAGE FRAUD WITH ANTECEDENT LAUNDERING Case 87: Legal professional investigated for acting in unusual property transactions - including selling maid’s rooms for 8 times their original value – civil law country Judicial investigations are in progress into the facts surrounding credit frauds to the detriment of a bank: 6 fraudulent real estate files of financing were presented to the agency on the basis of the production of false pay slips and false bank statements, for a loss at first estimated esteemed at EUR 505 000. The first investigations led by the police confirmed that the loan files were presented to the bank systematically by the same client adviser and systematically by the same real estate agent for six different borrowers. They confirmed also that the loss finally amounted to about EUR 5 million as more loans which had deceitfully been obtained by those 6 borrowers were uncovered. Searches of the offenders’ residences led to the discovery of numerous documents, and a lifestyle out of proportion to their legitimate income. However, the destination of the lent funds could only be partially determined because 5 of the 6 involved borrowers had acquired real property in Luxembourg. The investigation also identified the complicity of two agents of the defrauded bank and the assistant director of this bank who indicated they let pass at least 9 files which they knew were based on false documents and that the borrowers were involved in the fraud. The lent funds stemming from frauds allowed the purchase of properties in France and in Luxembourg. All of the purchases involved a single solicitor and his clerk, who were complicit of the organised fraud. Searches of the office of the notary revealed approximately sixty notarial acts drafted on the basis of falsified documents. The notary recognized that he had failed to make in-depth searches on the buyers. He explained that some requests of his customers were not clear, in particular when he was reselling four maid's rooms in Paris of less than 10 m2 for EUR 250 000 each while they had been initially bought for EUR 30 000 euro each.. He admitted making two transfers on bank accounts in Luxembourg belonging to two of presumed fraudsters by knowing perfectly that these are French resident and are not supposed to hold of bank accounts in Luxembourg. He finally confirmed having realised all the notarial acts by having knowledge that the properties were bought on the basis of loans obtained thanks to forgery documents and internal complicities of the bank. Without the intervention of this notary, this vast swindle would not have been so extensive The notary is at present being prosecuted for complicity of money laundering and complicity of organised fraud. Source: France (2012) questionnaire response Case 87 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 127 declared price and the approximate actual values in accordance with any reference which could give an approximate idea of this value or in the judgement of the legal professional
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 128 2013 Source: United Kingdom (2012) questionnaire response Case 89 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 129 over the first company’s activities. The whole operation was executed with the assistance of accounting and tax advisors. The first investment company had opened an account in Belgium that received an important flow of funds from foreign companies. The funds were later transferred to accounts opened with the same bank for new companies. These accounts also directly received funds from the same foreign companies. Part of it was invested on a long-term basis and the remainder was transferred to various individuals abroad, including the former shareholders of the investment company. The FIU’s analysis revealed that the investment company’s account and those of its various spin-offs, were used as transit accounts for considerable transfers abroad. The transformation of the investment company into a limited company under Belgian law, shortly followed by the split into several new companies, obscured the financial construction. The scale of the suspicious transactions, the international character of the construction only partly situated in Belgium, the use of company structures from offshore centres, consulting judicial, financial and fiscal experts, and the fact that there was no economic justification for the transactions all pointed to money laundering related to serious and organised tax fraud, using complex mechanisms or procedures with an international dimension. Additionally, the managing directors of the investment company had featured in another file that the FIU had forwarded on serious and organised tax fraud. The FIU forwarded this file for money laundering related to serious and organised tax fraud using complex mechanisms or procedures with an international dimension. Source: Belgium (2012) questionnaire response Case 91 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 130 2013 company, without legitimate reason Case 93: Legal professionals set up companies which promptly recycled the start up capital to establish new companies to help obscure ownership and layer criminal funds – civil law country Several notaries were involved in the setting up of a large number of companies over a number of years. Only the legal minimum of capital was paid up, it was then almost entirely withdrawn in cash and used again to establish new companies. The seat of some companies was also located at the address of an accounting firm and they were led by front men. Several cases showed that the head of the accounting firm himself had raised money for the capital. The established companies were then sold to third parties and used in the context of illegal activities. Source: Cellule de traitement des informations financières (2009) Case 93 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 131 company in which Steyne and Crawley each held 50 percent voting shares. The corporate address listed for this company was Sharp‘s law office. Documents seized by police from the law office of Sharp also showed that she represented Steyne in the purchase of real estate, the title of which was registered in the name of Vanity Fair Investments Inc. Among the documents seized by police were letters from Sharp, addressed to the Vanity Fair Investments, which included certificates of incorporation, bank statements for commercial accounts, and documents showing that Steyne and Crawley were directors and shareholders of the company. Another lawyer acted on behalf of Steyne and companies he controlled, providing such services as incorporating numbered companies, conducting real estate transactions, purchasing a car wash, and preparing lease agreements between Steyne and the tenants of a home that was used for a marijuana grow operation. Finally, documents seized by police indicated that Majah Dobbin, a partner in a local law firm, acted on behalf of Crawley and Osborne in the incorporation of three other Alberta companies. Source: Schneider, S. (2004) Case 95 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 132 2013 Case 97: Legal professional creates companies to provide cover story for international travel and movement of funds – civil law country A number of Iranian citizens were involved in the incorporation or subsequent purchase of stock in companies. On occasion they attended in person, having travelled from Tehran, while on other occasions they are represented by a German citizen or, more typically, a fellow Iranian citizen resident in Spain. In 2007 and 2008 Company A was incorporated by an Iranian citizen and the German citizen or by other Iranians citizens acting under their guidance, and the shares of the company were sold to various Iranian citizens, in each transaction for low prices (e.g. EUR 25). In 2009 and 2010 Company B was incorporated directly by Iranian citizens, with the representative or director of the company incorporated either one of the Iranian citizens or the German, appearing in all cases as interpreter. In both the purchase of stock and the incorporation of companies, the Iranian citizens travel to Spain on occasion, while on other occasions they provide a power of attorney for this purpose executed before a notary in Tehran. There was no information about the intended business of the companies and the creation of two companies in the same regional area made it unlikely that the companies would be implementing a normal business or economic project. The FIU were of the view that the creation of the companies and involvement of such a wide range of Iranian nationals was to enable them to obtain visas for entry into Spain and therefore to travel through the European Union, for which they receive substantial sums of money, thereby constituting a criminal activity generating funds to be laundered. Source: Spain (2012) questionnaire response Case 97 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 133 invested by means of the subscription of corporate stakes in the stock issues of Spanish companies. The foreign purchaser companies were based in Uruguay, Gibraltar, Seychelles, Panama, British Virgin Islands and Portugal. Several of the directors of the purchasing companies are also listed as representatives or directors of some of the transferred companies. The representatives of the foreign purchaser companies declare that there is no beneficial owner (a natural person with a controlling stake above 25%). Spanish notaries are required to be involved in all company incorporations and share sales. Source: Spain (2012) questionnaire response Case 98 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 134 2013 transactions. Client Joep trades fraudulently in companies. At one point, given the dubious circumstances surrounding the transactions, Klaas consults with a colleague notary who has previously rendered services to Joep. Although they are not able to discover anything suspicious, notary Klaas is left with a ‘gut-feeling’ that his services are being abused. Klaas does not conduct any deeper investigation into the background of his client and allows himself to be misled on the basis of the documents. He continues to render services without further question. During the police interrogation, Joep states that he used the services of Klaas because the notary worked fast and did not ask tricky questions. Source: Lankhorst, F. and Nelen, H. (2005 Case 100 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 135 Case 102 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 136 2013 solely managed by “F.J.G,” an unnamed third party. FGG won the contract described above, and payments on the contract were supposed to be directed, by the Mexican utility, through Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, to an account owned by FGG at Wells Fargo Bank in El Paso, Texas. Delgado sent a letter to the legal representative of the Mexican utility, instructing the representative to make the payments meant for FGG to a bank account in the Turks and Caicos Islands controlled by Delgado. This letter was sent without the knowledge and consent of F.J.G., the owner of FGG. In total, USD 32 million was wired into the Turks and Caicos account for Delgado’s personal enrichment. These funds were subsequently laundered back into the United States to accounts controlled by Delgado. Furthermore, in a related civil forfeiture action, prosecutors have frozen the proceeds of Delgado’s fraud that were sent to the benefit of “Delgado & Associates LLC” from the Mexican utility. The account holding the funds is actually a client account belonging to a local law firm in the Turks & Caicos. The funds belonging to Delgado have been segregated and restrained, as the law firm filed a petition the Turks and Caicos court to modify the initial restraint. Evidently, the legal representatives of Delgado & Associates LLC were unaware that their client account was being used for criminal purposes, as they were informed that the purpose of the Delgado & Associates legal structure was to assist in receiving and disbursing funds related to a client’s subcontract to sell turbines to Mexico. Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response: United States v. Delgado, No. 3:12-cr-02106-DB (W.D. Tex.) (drug money laundering); United States v. Delgado, No. 3:13-cr-00370-DB (W.D. Tex.) (Mexican utility scheme); and United States v. Any and All Contents of FirstCaribbean International Bank Account Number 10286872, No. EP 12-cv-0479 (W.D. Tex.). Case 104 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 137 (reversing the district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal). Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response: United States v. Nolan-Cooper, No. 95-cr-435-1 (E.D. Pa.) Case 105 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 138 2013 four suspects were convicted for breach of trust. Also the lawyer was convicted for breach of trust with a penalty of 3 years. Source: Austria (2012) questionnaire response Case 107 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 139 METHOD: MANAGING CLIENT AFFAIRS AND MAKING INTRODUCTIONS TECHNIQUE: OPENING BANK ACCOUNTS ON BEHALF OF CLIENTS Case 109: Legal professional assists organised criminal to open bank account – civil law country A foreigner residing in Belgium was introduced to a bank by a Belgian lawyer’s office in order to open an account. This account was then credited by substantial transfers from abroad that were used for purchasing immovable goods. The FIU’s analysis revealed that the funds originated from organised crime. Source: Belgium (2012) questionnaire response Case 109 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 140 2013 company, and to also represent this company in order to facilitate money laundering. Source: Belgium (2012) questionnaire response Case 111 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 141 Case 113 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 142 2013 company A and its directors were part of an international financial structure that was set up to launder money from criminal origin linked to trafficking in narcotics and organised crime. Source: Belgium (2012) questionnaire response Case 115 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 143 Case 117: Legal professional convicted and removed from practice for laundering the proceeds of fraud through his client account and personal account – common law jurisdiction The Louisiana Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) filed a petition to permanently disbar attorney Derrick D.T. Shepherd. In April 2008, a federal grand jury indicted Shepherd, who was then serving as a Louisiana state senator, on charges of mail fraud, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The indictment alleged that Shepherd helped a convicted bond broker launder nearly USD 141 000 in fraudulently generated bond fees, and in October 2008, Shepherd pleaded guilty to the money laundering charge. Shepherd admitted to helping broker Gwendolyn Moyo launder construction bond premiums paid to AA Communications, Inc., long after the company was banned from engaging in the insurance business and its accounts were seized by state regulators. Specifically, in December 2006, Shepherd deposited into his client trust account USD 140 686 in checks related to bond premiums and made payable to AA Communications. He then wrote checks totalling USD 75 000 payable to the broker and her associates. Of the remaining funds, Shepherd transferred USD 55 000 to his law firm’s operating account and deposited USD 15 000 into his personal checking account. He then moved USD 8 000 from the operating account back into his client trust account. On December 21, 2006, respondent paid off USD 20 000 in campaign debt from his operating account, writing “AA Communications” on the memo line of the check. To conceal this activity, respondent created false invoices and time sheets reflecting work purportedly done by his law firm on behalf of the Ms. Moyo. Upon investigating Shepherd for multiple ethical violations, the ODC obtained copies of Shepherd’s client trust account statements and determined that he had converted client funds on numerous occasions, frequently to mask negative balances in the account. He also commingled client and personal funds and failed to account for disbursements made to clients. Shepherd submitted untimely evidence to the Court documenting his “substantial assistance to the government in criminal investigations,” but the Court found Shepherd’s money laundering, which promoted his co-conspirators’ unlawful activity and benefitted him personally, to be reprehensible and deserving of the harshest sanction. Despite Shepherd’s contention that his federal conviction was not “final” and his denial of any misconduct, the Court permanently disbarred Shepherd from the practice of law. Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response In re Shepherd, 91 So.3d 283 (La. 2012) Case 117 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 144 2013 Case 118: Legal professional convicted for helping ex-police officer launder drug money by accepting cash through his client account for the purchase of stocks – common law jurisdiction Defence attorney Scott Crawford was convicted of laundering drug proceeds through his escrow account. Patrick Maxwell, an ex-police officer turned drug dealer, wanted to invest his drug proceeds in the stock market, but wanted to avoid suspicion that would arise if he deposited two large amounts of cash in a bank account. A third party would give Maxwell’s cash to Crawford, who would then deposit it in his legal practice’s escrow account. From that account, Crawford drew cashier’s checks payable to Prudential Securities. The checks were then deposited in a brokerage account controlled by Maxwell. See 281 F. App’x 444 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming 71-month sentence). Source: United States (2012) questionnaire response United States v. Crawford, No. 2:04-cr-20150 (W.D. Tenn.) Case 118 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 2013 145 METHOD: USE OF SPECIALISED LEGAL SKILLS Case 120: Legal professional arrested after attempting to clear a drug dealers accounts subject to a power of attorney – civil law jurisdiction A drug dealer is in detention. He fears that the Prosecutor/judge will confiscate his bank accounts in Luxembourg. The lawyer also approaches a colleague in Luxembourg and asks him how the relationship between the dealer and the money can be broken. The lawyer obtains a power of attorney over the account and attends the bank to withdraw all of the assets from the bank. The lawyer was arrested in his efforts to retrieve the money from the bank. Source: The Netherlands (1996) Case 120 Red flag indicators:
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 146 2013 GBP 75 000 in cash for bail where he was acting for a client whose only source of income had been fraud and money laundering, and lied as to where the money had come from when asked by investigators. Finally, he had large amounts of unexplained cash in envelopes in the office with the names of clients on them – who he was defending in criminal matters. The Court accepted that if the funds had been for the payment of fees, they should have been banked, and absent any explanation as to the reason for holding those funds, the jury conclude that Mr Blok must have been concealing the proceeds of crime on behalf of the clients. In 2009 Mr Blok was convicted of transferring criminal property, possessing criminal property, entering into an arrangement to facilitate money laundering and failure to disclose, 4 years jail. In 2011 he was stuck off the roll. Source: United Kingdom (2012) survey response Case 122 Red flag indicators:
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