Enforcement · SMV · 12 Jul 2018
The Deputy Superintendency for Market Conduct Supervision dismissed the reconsideration appeal filed by Filamentos Industriales S.A. against Resolution No. 102-2017-SMV/11, which imposed a fine of 9.50 UIT (S/ 37,525.00) for the late submission of audited individual financial statements as of December 31, 2015, and the 2015 annual report. The resolution confirms the fine, rejecting arguments of due process violations, lack of motivation, force majeure, and other principles, and upholds the sanction under the applicable regulations.
SMV Deputy Superintendency Resolution
No. 104-2018-SMV/11
| Lima, July 12, 2018 |
Summary: The reconsideration appeal filed by Filamentos Industriales S.A. against Deputy Superintendency Resolution No. 102-2017-SMV/11 is declared unfounded.
| Administered entity | : | FILAMENTOS INDUSTRIALES S.A. |
| Subject | : | Administrative Sanctioning Procedure |
| File No. | : | 2016031970 |
The Deputy Superintendent for Market Conduct Supervision
WHEREAS:
Administrative file No. 2016031970 and Report No. 261-2018-SMV/11.2 (hereinafter, the Report), issued by the General Intendancy for Conduct Compliance (IGCC) of the Superintendency of the Securities Market (SMV);
CONSIDERING:
The Issuer maintains that the Resolution has breached this principle, because its right to use the word before the authority responsible for adopting the final decision has been violated, since said authority was not present at the oral report.
In this regard, it is necessary to point out that numeral 1.2 Principle of due procedure of article IV principles of the administrative procedure of the Preliminary Title of the TUO of the LPAG textually states:
"1.2. Principle of due procedure.- Administered entities enjoy the rights and guarantees implicit in due administrative procedure. Such rights and guarantees include, by way of example but not limitation, the rights to be notified; to access the file; to refute the charges imputed; to present arguments and complementary allegations; to offer and produce evidence; to request the use of the word, when appropriate; to obtain a reasoned decision, based on law, issued by a competent authority, and within a reasonable period; and to challenge decisions that affect them.
The institution of due administrative procedure is governed by the principles of Administrative Law. (…)"[1]
As can be seen, the TUO of the LPAG recognizes due procedure as a principle that must govern the administrative procedure and expressly mentions the main rights included or indicators of compliance with it.
In this context and in the particular case of this administrative sanctioning procedure, it is evident in the file that the Issuer has been able to exercise all the mentioned rights before the different SMV bodies participating in said procedure: the charges formulated according to law were duly notified, it was able to access the file and refuted the charges by submitting its arguments before the instructing body of the procedure, it had the possibility to request the use of the word from the instructor, during the procedure it was able to present allegations, evidence or arguments; the report containing the proposal of the instructing body was sent to it, it requested and was granted the use of the word before the sanctioning body, it made use of the word and after said proceeding it submitted documentation containing defense arguments.
Thus, the documentation in the procedure file evidences that the Issuer was able and in fact exercised the rights referred to in the TUO of the LPAG, so the principle of due procedure was complied with.
Regarding the Issuer's request to use the word before the sanctioning body, it should be noted that said request was attended and the proceeding for the use of the word by the Issuer was scheduled in advance. In said proceeding, the undersigned —Deputy Superintendent for Market Conduct Supervision— could not be present, however the proceeding was held before the advisor of the office of the aforementioned Deputy Superintendent, who also, when the latter is absent, regularly replaces the holder in the exercise of his functions, including the function of resolving administrative sanctioning procedures.
It should be noted that such proceeding was held on October 26, 2017, normally, with the participation of the Issuer's representative and its contracted external lawyer, who presented their arguments and, despite having been able to timely formulate any objection or request the rescheduling of their oral report due to the absence of the titular Deputy Superintendent —even more so if they considered that this was violating some right— it is evident that they did nothing in this regard. Likewise, after the proceeding for the use of the word, the Issuer sent the SMV a document containing the allegations or arguments made during its oral report.
In that context, we consider that the Issuer's request to declare the Resolution null is unfounded, since the Issuer exercised the rights indicated in the TUO of the LPAG as part of its defense, thus observing due procedure.
The Issuer maintains that the Resolution does not comply with due procedure, because it has not respected the administered entity's right to obtain a reasoned decision; stating that it has repeatedly maintained that the infraction determined is not attributable to it, because a case of force majeure had arisen, due to the act of a third party. According to the Issuer, this third party is the audit firm that should have delivered the audit report so that it could be submitted to the SMV.
Likewise, the Issuer states that a case of force majeure due to the act of a third party arises, that is, the audit firm unjustifiably, and before an action by the tax authority, extended the deadline for issuing its audit report, and delivered said report in June 2016, outside the legal deadline to submit its audited financial information to the SMV.
In that sense, the Issuer indicates that since the financial statements were not available, it was not possible to hold the general shareholders' meeting. That is why they presented as a defense argument the application of the principle of causality, material truth, lawfulness and culpability. Likewise, it specifies that these principles and the abstention from imposing sanctions in case of force majeure have even been recognized in various resolutions issued by the SMV. Regarding these questions, it is noted that they are based on the following observations:
Having reviewed the Resolution subject to challenge, we consider that it is duly motivated in accordance with the provisions of article 3 numeral 4 of the TUO of the LPAG, which states: "The administrative act must be duly motivated in proportion to the content and in accordance with the legal system."
Indeed, the aforementioned Resolution responds to each of the arguments presented by the Issuer, and such factual and legal grounds are sufficient to indicate the reasons why the company has been sanctioned. It should be noted that from a simple reading of the Resolution it can be verified that it contains the grounds or reasons supporting the decision. Without prejudice to the latter, it should be noted that in addition to this, it is expressed that the ISSUER's arguments have been evaluated and that the report issued by the instructing body (IGCC) has been viewed and considered as pertinent, which is admissible, since this type of motivation is possible under the provisions of numeral 6.2 of article 6 of the TUO of the LPAG, therefore, allegations such as those made by the Issuer regarding an alleged lack of motivation have no support or evidence.
Additionally, the Constitutional Court in STC 09212-2005-AA/TC (ground 4) has stated: "(…) the Constitution, in the terms of subsection 5) of the aforementioned article 139 –also applicable to administrative procedure– does not guarantee a specific extent of motivation, so its essential content is respected as long as there is legal foundation, consistency between what is requested and what is resolved, and that, by itself, it expresses sufficient justification for the decision adopted, even if it is brief or concise or the case of motivation by reference is presented."
It should be noted that in a large part of the grounds by which the Issuer states that the Resolution was not founded because its oral arguments made on October 26, 2017 before the SASCM were not considered, where they reiterated that the delay of its audit firm in delivering its audited financial statements was due to the procedures initiated by the National Superintendency of Tax Administration (SUNAT). In this regard, it is pertinent to note that these grounds were presented for the first time by the Issuer in its document of September 29, 2016, by which it responded to the charges formulated by the IGCC. Likewise, these arguments were evaluated in Report No. 1039-2016-SMV/11.2 and in the Resolution.
According to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the Resolution had adequate motivation, which did not generate defenselessness for the Issuer, that is, the principle of due procedure was not affected.
Although the regulations governing the securities market, cited in the Resolution, recognize the issuer as responsible for the submission of financial information and annual report, in this case the Issuer seeks to exempt itself from responsibility, arguing that it was its audit firm that delivered the audit report in June 2016.
On this matter, it should be noted that according to the principle of causality, the sanction must fall on the administered entity that carried out the conduct typified as an infraction. This is established by numeral 8 of article 246 Principles of administrative sanctioning power of the TUO of the LPAG.
Accordingly, the party responsible for complying with an obligation cannot transfer said responsibility to a third party, since this principle is linked to the principle of personality of sanctions, which determines that the sanction can only fall on the authors of the infraction.
Thus, if the argument that an obligation —regarding the deadline for submitting certain information— could not be met because a contracted third party did not comply with the conditions of the respective contract, were admissible to exempt from responsibility; it would be very easy for anyone to use such an argument and it would also break the effectiveness of the system of obligations and responsibilities related to the timeliness of submitting information to the market, harming the transparency of information, potential users thereof and the securities market itself. Fundamentally for such reasons, an argument in that sense should not be upheld, unless a case of fortuitous event or force majeure is evidenced.
In that order, in this procedure no affectation to the referred principle of causality is evidenced, since the Issuer has been charged with an infraction of an obligation under its charge, and whose non-compliance is duly proven, that is, it did not comply with its obligation to submit financial information and its annual report within the deadlines established by the regulations.
On the other hand, the Issuer states that Deputy Superintendency Resolution No. 230-2012-SMV/11, which exempts an administered entity from responsibility insofar as it was impeded by the action of third parties from submitting information within a certain period, is an identical case to its own, so it should be exempted from responsibility.
In this regard, the resolution in question exempts the administered entity from responsibility regarding the timely submission of its financial information and annual report, due to force majeure, since there was a strike by workers that prevented personnel from entering the company, that is, there was a situation in the company itself that prevented the corporate bodies from exercising their functions.
In that sense, the case set forth in the referred resolution is a fact that does qualify as an exemption from responsibility and cannot be equated to this administrative sanctioning procedure under analysis, which, as indicated above, does not qualify as an exemption from responsibility due to force majeure.
The Issuer has stated that it is absurd what was specified in the Resolution regarding its negligence in not requesting an exception to the submission deadline, which is not provided for in the regulation.
In this regard, in accordance with article 115 of the TUO of the LPAG, every administered entity may promote an administrative procedure before the administrative authority, exercising for this purpose its right of petition. In that sense, the Issuer could have exercised said right and received a response. Consequently, the argument that since it is not provided for in the regulation, it does not have the possibility to exercise its right of petition is not admissible.
The Issuer also states that the Resolution contravenes the principle of material truth, because it indicates that the administration must fully verify the facts. According to the Issuer, in this case no type of investigation was carried out regarding the alleged facts, nor does it seem to be of interest, on the contrary it only limits itself to verifying that the information was not submitted to the SMV.
In this regard, it should be noted that although it corresponds to the Public Administration the burden of proof in order to attribute to administered entities the infractions that serve as the basis for sanctioning them; in the event that the Administration has proven the commission of the infraction, it corresponds to the administered entity to prove with evidence or documentation the facts that in its opinion would exempt it from responsibility.
In that sense, since the Public Administration is the one that has the burden of proving the infraction, in this case, as it is an infraction regarding late submission of periodic information, it is proven with the receipt of submission of the financial information and annual report, which indicates that the financial information and annual report were submitted by the Issuer late on June 24, 2016, although it should have been submitted by April 15, 2016 at the latest, that is, it was submitted more than two months late.
In this case, the Issuer alleges a circumstance of force majeure by stating that the non-compliance was due to the audit firm unjustifiably not sending the audit report to the Issuer— in the terms stated by the Issuer: "unilaterally and unexpectedly, and without us being able to prevent it in any way, said audit firm extended the review period"— however, it has not presented evidence proving said circumstance.
Indeed, although the Issuer presented emails showing that the audit firm sent it the audit report on June 22, 2016, and a receipt showing the reception of said report on June 24, 2016; this does not prove a circumstance of force majeure as alleged by the Issuer, it is rather the responsibility of the Issuer to demand that deadlines be respected, take the necessary precautions, be diligent and rigorous in monitoring the services it contracts as well as their conditions, given that it is fully aware that it has a legal obligation to submit such information to the market within the deadlines established by the regulations, and it is important to add that these elements are under its sphere of control.
Consequently, in this administrative sanctioning procedure, it is not appropriate to exempt the Issuer from responsibility because a circumstance of force majeure has not been proven.
The Issuer states that the Resolution does not comply with the Principle of Concurrence of Infractions developed in article 15 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10.
In this regard, the Issuer does not state whether the concurrence of infractions refers to ideal or real concurrence. In the case of real concurrence, as they are conducts corresponding to two (02) different infractions, it should be noted that infractions for non-compliance with the rules regulating the submission of periodic or eventual information are governed by the criteria applicable to the administrative sanctioning procedure for non-compliance with the rules regulating the submission of periodic or eventual information, which were approved by SMV Resolution No. 006-2012-SMV/01 (Special Sanction Criteria).
According to these criteria, both non-compliances in the submission of annual audited financial information and non-compliance in the submission of the annual report are independent infractions that have the same degree since they are minor infractions.
Consequently, these non-compliances have a maximum sanction of 25 UIT, so we could not subsume infractions that have the same fine range. This figure of real concurrence would apply if one of the infractions were more serious than the other, in which case the less serious one would be included in the more serious one, which does not occur in this case.
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that for the determination of the sanction, each infraction is evaluated (non-compliance in the submission of audited financial information and non-compliance in the submission of the annual report), with an individual limit of twenty-five (25) UIT that can be applied to minor infractions. If there are several infractions punishable by fine, they are added up to a cap of seven hundred (700) UIT, in accordance with numeral 4 —Determination of the Sanction— of the Special Sanction Criteria. Consequently, what the Issuer argued in its reconsideration appeal is also not admissible.
The Issuer considers that the Resolution contravenes the principle of lawfulness, in the sense that entities must presume that administered entities have acted in accordance with their duties as long as they do not have evidence to the contrary. In that sense, it states that the audit firm, by not having timely delivered the opinion on the audited individual financial information, generates a reasonable doubt that the company's conduct was not the cause of the non-compliance, so it should be absolved.
The principle of lawfulness is linked to the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence, provided in literal e) of subsection 24 of article 2 of the Political Constitution of Peru, which states that every person is considered innocent, as long as their responsibility has not been judicially declared, a principle that applies in the administrative sanctioning field.
These principles are intended to indicate that the burden of proof falls on the Administration, which entails that it acts with the purpose of rebutting the mentioned presumption, without excluding the possibility that the administered entity presents evidence, even more so when it comes to proving that its conduct would be within one of the exemptions from responsibility referred to in 255 of the TUO of the LPAG.
In this case, as indicated above, the unlawfulness in the Issuer's conduct has been proven, that is, the late submission of financial information and annual report to the SMV, consequently, the presumption of innocence alleged by the Issuer is rebutted insofar as it was proven that it did not act in accordance with the regulations.
According to the above, the Issuer has not presented sufficient evidence to eliminate the unlawfulness, culpability, or any other element excluding responsibility, consequently, the principle of causality has not been affected.
Consequently, the Issuer, by invoking that the audit firm unilaterally, unusually, and unjustifiably did not present its audit report in a timely manner, has not generated a reasonable doubt, especially since it has not presented evidentiary means regarding its allegation; consequently, what was indicated by the Issuer is not admissible and no impairment of the principle of presumption of lawfulness is evidenced.
As part of its arguments, the Issuer states that the Resolution breaches the principle of culpability stipulated in numeral 10 of article 246 of the TUO of the LPAG. In this regard, numeral 6 of the Special Sanction Criteria specifies those sanction criteria that must be observed or taken into account as aggravating factors in order to determine the sanction, among them, willful misconduct in the commission of the infraction. It should be noted that this criterion was already contemplated before the amendment of numeral 10 of article 246 of the TUO of the LPAG.
As noted from recital 22 of the Resolution, it is specified that the existence of intent for the non-compliance incurred by the Issuer has not been proven, therefore it was not incorporated as an aggravating factor of the sanction imposed.
In this sense, since there is no willful misconduct in this non-compliance, we are faced with liability for negligence, having stated in subsection (ii) of recital 18 of the Resolution that the Issuer is obligated to present its financial information from the registration of its securities in the RPMV, due to which it is the absolute responsibility of the Issuer to submit its periodic information, as it is in the interest of investors and the market to have such information, since based on its duty of diligence, the issuer should have adopted adequate measures to present its Individual Audited Financial Statements as of December 31, 2015, and the Annual Report corresponding to fiscal year 2015 within the deadlines.
Finally, the Issuer states that the Resolution contravenes the Principle of Reasonableness, since even in the denied assumption that it were to be sanctioned, the following was not considered: a) The illicit benefit resulting from the commission of the infraction; b) The probability of detection of the infraction; c) The severity of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal right; d) The economic harm caused; e) Recidivism, for the commission of the same infraction within a period of one (1) year from the finality of the resolution that sanctioned the first infraction; f) The circumstances of the commission of the infraction; and g) The existence or not of intent in the conduct of the offender; indicated in numeral 3 of article 246 of the TUO of the LPAG.
Regarding the Issuer's argument concerning the principle of reasonableness, it should be noted that said principle, among others, is incorporated in the Special Sanction Criteria; therefore, the challenged Resolution took said norm into consideration, as detailed in recitals 20, 21, 22, and 33 of the Resolution;
In accordance with the provisions of numerals 14 and 22 of article 43 of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF;
RESOLVES:
Register, communicate, and publish,
Roberto Pereda Gálvez
Deputy Superintendent
Deputy Superintendency for Market Conduct Supervision
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The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“The Issuer states that Deputy Superintendency Resolution No. 230-2012-SMV/11, which exempts an administered entity from responsibility... is an identical case to its own...”
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