SMV Deputy Superintendency Resolution
No. 032-2021-SMV/10
Summary: BTG Pactual Perú S.A. Sociedad Agente de Bolsa is sanctioned with a fine of 05 UIT equivalent to S/ 20,250.00 (Twenty thousand two hundred fifty and 00/100 Soles), for having incurred two (02) infractions of a serious nature, classified in Annex XIX, numeral 2, items 2.3 and 2.20 of the Sanctions Regulation, in force at the time of the events, for not applying the intensified customer due diligence procedure, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7, numerals 7.4 and 7.5 of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing; and for not having included in its Unusual Operations Registry the criteria so that they are not considered suspicious, in accordance with the provisions of Article 14, numeral 14.9 of the aforementioned Rules, respectively.
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| Administered | : | BTG Pactual Perú S.A. Sociedad Agente de Bolsa |
| Subject | : | Administrative sanctioning procedure |
| File No. | : | 2020044009 |
The Deputy Superintendent of Prudential Supervision
WHEREAS:
The administrative file No. 2020044009, and Report No. 669-2021-SMV/10.3, issued by the General Intendancy of Prudential Compliance;
CONSIDERING:
- In accordance with Article 1 of Law No. 29782, Law for the Strengthening of Securities Market Supervision, the name of the National Supervisory Commission of Companies and Securities (CONASEV) is replaced by that of the Securities Market Superintendency (SMV), so that any reference to CONASEV in legal norms shall be understood as referring to the SMV;
I. FACTS
- Through Report No. 736-2020-SMV/10.2, the General Intendancy of Entity Supervision informed the General Intendancy of Compliance of indications of possible infractions by BTG Pactual Perú S.A. Sociedad Agente de Bolsa (hereinafter, BTG SAB), as it would have failed to comply with the provisions of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 033-2011-EF/94.01.1 and its amendments (hereinafter, Plaft Rules);
- Under the provisions of the Single Ordered Text of the General Administrative Procedure Law, Law No. 27444 (hereinafter, TUO LPAG), approved by Supreme Decree No. 004-2019-JUS, through Official Letter No. 4427-2020-SMV/10.3 (hereinafter, Letter of Charges), notified on December 7, 2020, an administrative sanctioning procedure was initiated against BTG SAB regarding the facts evidenced in the investigation carried out;
- By letter received on December 9, 2020, BTG SAB accredited its representative and requested access to the file of the sanctioning procedure. Accordingly, through Official Letter No. 4467-2020-SMV/10.3, notified on December 10, 2020, BTG SAB was informed of the form of access to the file via MVNet;
- By letter received on December 15, 2020, BTG SAB requested an extension of the deadline for the presentation of its defenses; therefore, through Official Letter No. 4542-2020-SMV/10.3 of December 16, 2020, BTG SAB was granted the requested extension; it submitted its defenses on January 8, 2021;
- The charges formulated against BTG SAB and the defenses of the latter have been evaluated in Report No. 669-2021-SMV/10.3, which has been submitted to the knowledge of this Deputy Superintendency;
- In observance of the Principle of Due Process contemplated both in Article IV, numeral 1.2, of the Preliminary Title and in Article 230, item 2, of the TUO LPAG, through Official Letter No. 2396-2021-SMV/10, the administrative file referred to in Report No. 669-2021-SMV/10.3 was made available to BTG SAB for its review;
- On June 19, 2021, the intermediary submitted additional written arguments;
II. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
- In the present administrative procedure, in the opinion of this Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision, it corresponds to determine the following:
- Whether BTG SAB incurred or not in an infraction classified as serious in Annex XIX, numeral 2, item 2.3 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10 and its amendments (hereinafter Previous Sanctions Regulation), in force at the time of the events, for non-compliance with Article 7, numeral 7.5, literal d) of the Plaft Rules;
- Whether BTG SAB incurred or not in an infraction of the provisions of Annex XIX, numeral 2, item 2.20 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation, in force at the time of the events, by not having complied with Article 14, numeral 14.9, of the Plaft Rules.
- Whether or not it corresponds to impose a sanction on BTG SAB;
III. ANALYSIS
- First Charge: Intensified customer due diligence (CDD) procedures
On the Regulations
- Article 6, numerals 6.1 and 6.2, and Article 7, numerals 7.4 and 7.5, of the Plaft Rules establish:
"Article 6.- On Customer Profiles
6.1 The obligated subject must have policies and procedures that allow it to acquire sufficient, timely and updated knowledge of customers, verify the information presented by them and carry out adequate monitoring of their commercial operations, considering their respective profiles.
6.2 The policies and procedures mentioned in the previous numeral must incorporate the development of customer profiles according to their risk level, which will lead to classifying the risk of each customer.
6.3 In developing the customer profile, the following variables must be taken into consideration, among others:
- Type of customer (natural person/legal person or other legal structure, nationality, place of residence, institutional/non-institutional investor);
- Economic activity of the customer/occupation;
- Amount and origin of their income; and,
- Characteristics (currency, instrument, market, country or geographic area of origin of funds, among others) and amounts of operations.
Such information must be duly documented and will form part of the individual file of each customer.
"Article 7.- Customer Due Diligence by the Obligated Subject"
(…)
7.4 Obligated subjects, based on the information obtained through their policies and procedures for adequate knowledge of their customers and with a risk-based approach, must identify those cases in which it is warranted to intensify their customer due diligence procedures, among which the following must be considered:
(…)
- Non-resident customers, national or foreign.
(…)
c) Customers acting through a representative or customers whose shareholders, partners or associates directly or indirectly hold more than 5% of their share capital, contribution or participation, as the case may be, are foreign natural or legal persons.
(…)
e) Non-domiciled companies.
f) Politically exposed persons (PEP) or those who administer public resources. Obligated subjects must have appropriate risk management systems and must reinforce their customer knowledge procedures when one of their customers becomes a PEP or an official who administers public resources, as the case may be, after having initiated commercial relations with the obligated subject.
(…)
In the file of each customer, it must be indicated whether it is a customer to whom the intensified customer due diligence procedure applies.
(…)
7.5 Obligated subjects, in order to reinforce their customer knowledge procedures, must at a minimum carry out the following additional measures, as applicable:
(…)
c) Carry out at least once (1) a year a review of the profile, background, documentation, among other aspects, of the customer, as well as, if domiciled in Peru, carry out a visit to their domicile or offices, when deemed necessary, if from the review of the customer's profile, background, documentation, it does not correspond with what was declared.
d)* The decision to accept the customer will be in charge of the highest managerial level of the obligated subject, who in turn may delegate this function to another managerial position within the organization, retaining, however, the responsibility for the acceptance or not of the customer.
(…)
On the facts that occurred
- In the inspection carried out on BTG SAB from October 23 to November 14, 2017 (hereinafter, Inspection), from the review of the documents supporting the Customer Due Diligence (hereinafter, CDD) procedures of the sample of customers, with respect to the customers indicated in Table No. 1, for whom it is warranted to intensify CDD procedures, no documents were found indicating that BTG SAB had carried out at least once (1) a year a review of the profile, background, documentation, among other aspects, of these customers;
TABLE No. 1
ANNUAL UPDATE OF CUSTOMER PROFILE
| No. | Customer | Date of registration or last update | Customer characteristic | Annual update of profile, background, documentation, among other aspects |
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| 1 | Denise Del Pilar Gonzales Alva | 02/21/2013 | Acts through a representative | NO (As of Feb 17) |
| 2 | Fondo de Seguro de Retiro y Cesación - Marina de Guerra del Perú | 03/24/2014 | PEP | NO (As of Mar 17) |
| 3 | Arca Trading Limited | 01/26/2015 | Non-domiciled company | NO (As of Jan 17) |
| 4 | Carlos Miguel Salazar Muro | 02/23/2015 | PEP | NO (As of Feb 17) |
| 5 | José Angel Adriazola Cahuas | 09/14/2015 | PEP | NO (As of Sep 17) |
| 6 | Inversiones Capistrano S.A. | 03/03/2016 | Non-domiciled company | NO (As of Mar 17) |
- On the other hand, in the file of Mr. David Eduardo Hidalgo Valdivia, a customer who is a politically exposed person (PEP), reviewed in the Inspection, it is not indicated that he is a customer to whom the intensified CDD procedure applies;
- Finally, it should be noted that section 7.2 of the Corporate Manual for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing of BTG SAB[1] (hereinafter, Plaft Manual) states that BTG SAB will categorize its customers into 3 risk levels (Low, Medium and High), indicating that customers who are PEPs are categorized as high risk;
- Likewise, said manual states that the customer's risk level will be used to determine the "AML (Anti-Money Laundering) approval level of the relationship", and the "Diligence level";
- Likewise, section 7.3 of the Plaft Manual states that the approval level of customers will depend on the risk category, and for the approval of high-risk customers, three approval levels are required. In this regard, this manual states:
"The Legal & Compliance area, prior to categorizing the customer as "high" risk, must obtain from the Business Sponsor – BS (account executive) and Business Head – BH (manager of the brokerage or private banking division) of the company an approval via email in which both representatives indicate that they feel comfortable with the business relationship and that they assure having carried out due diligence regarding the information obtained from the customer. Additionally, after the approval of BS and BH, the Legal & Compliance area will manage the approval of the Global AML Head, attaching the acceptance emails sent by the executives".
(Our emphasis)
- On this matter, in the Inspection, when BTG SAB[2] was asked about how the approval of the Global AML Head is materialized for customers with high risk exposure, BTG SAB responded:
"(…) Regarding the approval procedure of the Global AML Head of BTG Pactual, this was implemented in recent years, as it is a global corporate policy, previously (Celfin Capital SA.SAB) it did not exist: When the compliance officer has categorized a customer with a high-risk profile, he sends an email communicating the categorization of the potential customer to the Business Sponsor, so that he may agree or otherwise indicate to cancel the registration. If he agrees, a communication will be sent to the Business Head indicating the categorization of the potential customer, together with the agreement of the Business Sponsor. The Business Head will give his agreement or disagreement; if in agreement, a communication with the chain of communications and approvals is sent to the Global AML Head of BTG Pactual, who will give his approval, only if applicable (according to his criteria) they could request additional information in this regard". (sic)
- However, from the review of the documents supporting the CDD procedures of the sample of customers in the Inspection, the three (3) necessary authorizations established in the Plaft Manual for the acceptance of the high-risk PEP customer Mr. David Eduardo Hidalgo Valdivia were not evidenced, but rather the registration form of this customer is signed by a representative and the Operations Manager of BTG SAB, but the approval of the Global AML Head was not accredited;
- Therefore, according to the above, BTG SAB was charged with having failed to comply with the provisions of Article 7, numeral 7.4 and numeral 7.5, literal c) of the PLAFT Rules, since in 2017 and with respect to the customers mentioned in Table No. 1, a review of the profile, background, documentation, among other aspects, would not have been carried out;
- Likewise, BTG SAB would have failed to comply with the provisions of Article 7, numeral 7.4 and numeral 7.5, literal d) of the PLAFT Rules, since, from the sample obtained, in the file of the PEP customer David Eduardo Hidalgo Valdivia it is not indicated that he is a customer to whom the intensified CDD procedure applies. Likewise, the decision to accept the PEP customer Mr. David Eduardo Hidalgo Valdivia would not have been in charge of the highest managerial level of BTG SAB;
On the defenses presented
- Regarding the clients indicated in Table No. 1, BTG SAB states:
- Client Denise Del Pilar Gonzales Alva, whose risk profile at the date of the Inspection was high risk and who, according to the information indicated in Table No. 1, is shown with a registration or last update date of February 21, 2013, BTG SAB states that part of the documents corresponding to the DDC and the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention System (hereinafter, the "PLAFT System") contained in the client's file, which were provided to the SMV officials and the Financial Intelligence Unit ("FIU") and which are in the record of this proceeding, are: Certificates of Compliance Tracker, World Check and OFAC queries issued in the following periods: 02/21/2013; 09/05/2014; 06/20/2016; 03/01/2017 and 10/25/2017, both of the client and of her attorney-in-fact, who is in turn the client's father;
- Likewise, BTG SAB states that there are copies of the powers of attorney validity certificates of the attorney-in-fact dated 02/27/2013 and 06/16/2016, which were fully valid at the date of the Inspection visit; copies of the registration of powers of attorney of the attorney-in-fact dated 02/27/2013 and 06/15/2016; "Reniec" query certificates from 2013 of the client and attorney-in-fact. "Equifax" and "Sentinel" risk center reports from 2013 and 06/20/2016;
- BTG SAB states that, as can be corroborated in the documents in the record, it demonstrates that it did perform due diligence in reviewing background, documentation, and updating legal information with documents issued by public entities such as SUNARP and RENIEC from the client's registration date until the date of the Inspection, the last documents issued and related to the PLAFT System being dated 03/01/2017 and 10/25/2017, meaning they were updated more than once a year. Likewise, BTG states that, to date, the client's file contains information updated in 2019 and 2020;
- Client: Fondo de Seguro de Retiro y Cesación - Marina de Guerra del Perú (FOSERESE), BTG SAB states that the file of said client is composed of 3 digital archives containing a total of 149 documents that support the due diligence performed by BTG SAB on its client up to the date of the Inspection;
- Likewise, BTG SAB states that there are copies of directorate resolutions, and in some cases supreme resolutions issued by the General Command of the Peruvian Navy, designating the new commands (equivalent to the powers of attorney of the attorneys-in-fact acting on behalf of FOSERESE) of the following dates: 09/02/2009; 03/29/2010; 04/16/2010; 01/09/2012; 05/27/2012; 12/29/2012; 01/24/2013; 02/06/2013; 12/27/2013; 02/09/2016; 02/23/2016; and 03/22/2016;
- Likewise, BTG SAB states that it has the update of records and registration documents of attorneys-in-fact of the following dates: 06/06/2010; 02/17/2012; 02/01/2013; and 03/24/2014; with the update of the risk profile dated 07/31/2016; as Annex 06 of its defense - Declaration of direct and indirect ownership of share capital form dated 10/27/2017; Legal representatives forms from 2016; Legalized copies of DNI 2016 of the attorneys-in-fact registered at the date of the Inspection; copy of the PLAFT query certificates from the Compliance Tracker system, issued in the following periods: 03/24/2014 and 02/08/2016; World Check Certificates dated 03/24/2014 and 02/08/2016; "Sentinel" risk center reports dated: 03/24/2014 and 02/08/2016; PEP forms of the attorneys-in-fact registered at the date of the Inspection visit; and the latest as of the Inspection visit date; and other documents that can be corroborated in the client's file;
- BTG SAB considers it important to note that in the case of FOSERESE, being a military institution, the commands are generally changed every two years, and it is at that moment that they designate the new representatives and obtain the directorate resolutions of their appointments, so although they appear dated 2016, they were fully valid at the date of the Inspection, and furthermore, there were updated documents such as the Declaration of direct and indirect ownership of share capital, which has an update date of 10/27/2017;
- Consequently, BTG SAB considers that it has been applying due diligence procedures and not only in the last year, but throughout the business relationship, since there is a large amount of documentation contained in three files and at the date of the Inspection there was valid documentation whose latest dates correspond to 2016 and 2017;
- Likewise, to demonstrate that BTG SAB has been performing the DDC and updating its client information all these years, it attaches as Annex No. 2 to its defense various information found in the client's file after the Inspection performed, which corresponds even to 2017 and to the years 2018, 2019 and 2020, which confirms that BTG SAB has been performing the DDC continuously for the client in question;
- Client: Arca Trading Limited, BTG SAB states that given its characteristics, the information provided and its status as a non-domiciled client, it was registered with a high risk profile, a rating that was maintained at the time of the Inspection and to date;
- On the other hand, BTG SAB states that according to the documents contained in the client's file that are in the record of this proceeding, there are due diligence documents that are part of BTG SAB's PLAFT System, such as the certificates issued by the Compliance Tracker and World Check system dated 02/23/2016, the year prior to the date of the Inspection;
- BTG adds that in 2019 the client updated its information, according to Annex No. 03 of its defense, for which a review of its profile was performed and it remained at high risk, since it maintains the same characteristics and registration information. It adds that currently, it is in the process of annual coordination with the client, to verify and corroborate information that allows it to evaluate or determine whether there has been any variation in its risk profile in the last period;
- Client: Carlos Miguel Salazar Muro, BTG SAB states that said client was registered with a high risk profile for being a Politically Exposed Person, as can be corroborated in the PEP form signed by the client, and at the date of the Inspection maintained said high risk client profile, a condition it still maintains to date, according to information updated as of 12/31/2020;
- BTG SAB adds that Mr. Salazar was a director or attorney-in-fact of the Fondo de Retiro y Cesación de la Marina de Guerra del Perú – FOSERESE, and later became a client as a natural person, so there was adequate knowledge of the client from well before the relationship with him. On the other hand, it states that the client's file, which is in the record, contains a report of information search in the OFAC database dated 10/25/2017;
- Currently, BTG SAB states that its personal file contains updated information referring to the Stock Brokerage Intermediation Contract, Foreign Market Instruments Contract, Stock Repo Operations, registration form, declaration of origin of funds, client investment profile, KYC, risk categorization, among others, dated 04/16/2019. As well as OFAC, World Check, Compliance Tracker information search certificates dated 12/27/2019, risk profile review performed in March 2020, and due diligence documents of the PLAFT system such as Compliance Tracker, World Check and OFAC dated 12/16/2020 according to Annex No. 04 attached to its defense brief, all in order to demonstrate that BTG SAB has been performing a DDC on the client, whose risk profile to date remains high for maintaining PEP status;
- Client José Angel Adriazola Cahuas, BTG SAB states that this case is very similar to the client indicated in the previous point, since both persons were at one time directors or attorneys-in-fact of the Fondo de Retiro y Cesación de la Marina de Guerra del Perú – FOSERESE and later became clients as natural persons, so there was adequate knowledge of the client from well before the relationship with the client;
- BTG SAB adds that at the date of the Inspection he also maintained a high risk profile for being a PEP, which is why he appeared in the list of PEP clients, and as can be corroborated in the PEP form signed by the client;
- BTG SAB states that in the client's file there are due diligence documents, such as the Compliance Tracker certificate with information search dated March 24 and 28, 2014, and also records of information search through World check dated 02/23/2016 and OFAC dated 10/25/2017; specifying that to date, the client no longer performs operations with BTG SAB, so the account is inactive;
- Client Inversiones Capistrano S.A. BTG SAB states that the client is non-domiciled and according to its characteristics at the date of the Inspection maintained its high risk profile. The stock brokerage firm states that according to the documents contained in the client's file, and which are in the record of this proceeding, it has the update of the declaration of origin of funds dated 03/03/2016, as well as the declaration form of direct and indirect ownership of share capital dated 03/03/2016, copy of the validity of powers of attorney and copy of their registration with issuance date 03/11/2016, so it argues that said legal documents not only demonstrate the legality and validity of the powers of attorney but also the validity of the company registered in the legal persons registries in the book of powers of attorney granted by companies incorporated or established abroad, valid at the date of the Inspection;
- BTG SAB adds that there is the risk review and/or update form performed in the second half of 2017, signed by the Compliance Officer in office, and given the characteristics of the account the high risk profile was maintained;
- Consequently, BTG SAB considers that by virtue of the foregoing it would have complied with performing due diligence and updating the profile review, as well as the review of background, and other documentation of the clients indicated in Table No. 1;
- Likewise, BTG SAB states that its Compliance Tracker system daily at the end of the day performs an audit of its database (clients, attorneys-in-fact, beneficiaries, suppliers, etc.), and automatically generates a communication via email to the Compliance Officer with the results obtained; specifying that if there were any change in the status of any of its clients, for example, that they took a public office considered as a Politically Exposed Person, it would automatically become aware and proceed to update their risk profile and initiate the procedure through its representative to update their information;
- Likewise, BTG SAB states that the representatives are always in direct contact with their clients, whether by telephone or in person when necessary, so there is always updated knowledge of the client regarding their economic activities, investment profile, risk profile, personal information, financial information, etc.;
- BTG SAB adds that the clients in question, whose profiles have remained the same to date (active), is due to the knowledge of the client and the information they have been updating and which is in the record of this proceeding, so it argues that due to this and the additional information attached to its defense, it is proven that it has indeed been performing, in accordance with the provisions of current regulations, at least once a year a review of the profile, background, documentation, among other aspects, of the clients indicated but that no record has been left of it that allows verifying or corroborating compliance with said requirement although the documents as a whole demonstrate it, without this implying a breach of the obligation to periodically review and update client profiles. However, in view of the observation noted by the SMV, it is implementing a procedure that allows it to leave a record of compliance with said procedure;
- On the other hand, regarding the PEP client David Eduardo Hidalgo Valdivia, of whom it is indicated that the approval of the Global AML Head was not evidenced, BTG SAB states that as already informed at the time[3] this approval by the Global AML Head was no longer performed; however, the PLAFT Manual was not updated in this regard, which is why in this case said approval is not available;
- BTG SAB states that currently, for the registration of a high risk client, it must have the following approvals: Compliance Officer, General Management and the Compliance Committee, or, if the latter does not exist, the Company's board of directors;
- BTG SAB considers it important to indicate that subsection d) of numeral 7.5 of article 7 of the PLAFT Rules states: "The decision to accept the client shall be the responsibility of the highest managerial level of the obligated subject, who may in turn delegate this function to another managerial position within the organization, retaining, however, the responsibility for the acceptance or non-acceptance of the client";
- By virtue of this, BTG SAB states that the client was registered with the approval of the general manager, whose position constitutes the highest managerial level of BTG SAB, in accordance with the regulations, therefore it considers, by virtue of the provisions of the rule, that there has been no breach thereof, since the responsibility for client acceptance always corresponded and will correspond to the general manager, even if he has delegated this function to another managerial position within the organization, as would be the case here to the Global AML Head;
- For its part, BTG SAB states that it has already implemented a client account inactivation procedure which is part of the client policy, where grounds have been established such as: at the client's request, accounts without movement for one year, failure to update information when requested or refusal to update it, among others. In its written arguments of June 19, 2021, the stock brokerage firm states that among the improvements made to its PLAFT System are: (i) Due diligence processes of client knowledge, especially for intensified procedures; (ii) Approval levels for client registration, according to the type of LA/FT risk assigned; (iii) Client information and documentation update processes; (iv) Cross-border correspondent banking; among others. Likewise, it states that as part of the improvements made to its PLAFT System, this year its board of directors approved the creation and operation of the BTG SAB Prevention and Compliance Committee, which it specifies has the objective and purpose of supporting and advising, as well as contributing to a better development of activities, to the Compliance area on PLAFT and Compliance matters;
- Finally, BTG SAB states that at the end of the third quarter of 2019 the client information update process began, which was also reported by letter in response to Official Letter No. 4516-2019-SMV/10.2, but that due to the National State of Emergency due to Covid-19 there has been a delay, however to date it continues with said process in order to have all its client information updated. Therefore, the accounts of those clients who do not update the requested information will be inactivated;
Analysis of the defense
- Below is an evaluation of what BTG SAB states regarding each of the clients:
Denise Del Pilar Gonzales Alva
- In this client's file it is observed that BTG SAB uses as query tools for client knowledge queries of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities of the United Nations (Resolution No. 1267), the OFAC list, among others; risk center reports; and RENIEC and SUNARP queries, the latter for verification of validity of powers of attorney; however, regarding the risk center report documentation and RENIEC query, it is observed that it is not updated to 2017, which is the fact imputed regarding said client;
- It should be noted that at the close of the Inspection, the last documentation regarding the client is from 2013, when she registered with the SAB. Likewise, no documents are observed that support that BTG SAB performed the review of this client's risk profile, updated to 2017, which have also not been presented in the defense;
- Indeed, regarding the copies of registration of powers of attorney of the attorney-in-fact dated 02/27/2013 and 06/15/2016; the copies of the "Reniec" query certificates from 2013 of the client and her attorney-in-fact; and the "Equifax" and "Sentinel" risk center reports from 2013 and 06/20/2016, we must indicate that all of them do not correspond to the observed 2017 fiscal year;
- Regarding the copies of validity of powers of attorney of the client's attorney-in-fact dated 02/27/2013 and 06/16/2016, which according to BTG were fully valid at the date of the Inspection visit, it should be indicated that in accordance with article 132, subsection c)[4] of the Single Ordered Text of the General Regulations of Public Registries, approved by Resolution of the Superintendent of Public Registries No. 126-2012-SUNARP and its amendments, the validity of such certificates accredits the existence of the act or right registered at the date of its issuance, so at the date of the Inspection they did not have the alleged validity;
- Regarding the copies of the "Compliance Tracker", "World Check" and OFAC query certificates issued on 03/01/2017 and 10/25/2017, both of the client and of her attorney-in-fact, who is in turn the client's father, although these have been accredited in the record, it should be indicated that by themselves they do not reasonably accredit that BTG SAB has performed the update of the background, documentation and other aspects of the client since, as observed in the files, BTG SAB uses various query tools for the DDC and not only the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others;
Fondo de Seguro de Retiro y Cesación - Marina de Guerra del Perú (FOSERESE)
- In this client's file it is observed that BTG SAB uses as query tools for updated client knowledge queries of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others; risk center reports; resolutions designating the client's attorneys-in-fact; declaration form of direct and indirect ownership of share capital; however, regarding the risk center report documentation and queries of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others, it is observed that they are not updated to 2017 as indicated in the imputed charge since said information has its last update in 2016, which was evidenced at the close of the Inspection;
- It should be indicated that the queries of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list by themselves do not reasonably accredit that BTG SAB has performed the update of the background, documentation and other aspects of the client since, as observed in the files, this SAB uses various query tools for the DDC and not only the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others;
- Likewise, no documents are observed that support that BTG SAB had performed the review of this client's risk profile, updated to 2017; since the last update is from 2016; it should be added that in Annex 2 of its defense BTG SAB has stated that it has documentation that accredits the update to 2017, however, from the review of what is in the record, none from 2017 is observed, only documents from the years 2018 to 2020;
- It should be noted that what BTG SAB argues regarding the client being a military institution, and that the directors are generally changed every two years, and it is at that moment that the new representatives are designated and consequently the SAB obtains a copy of the directorate resolutions of their appointments, does not constitute evidentiary means to sustain that it has performed the queries of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others; risk center reports; of the client's representatives at least once a year, until these representatives are changed;
Arca Trading Limited
- In this client's file it is observed that BTG SAB uses as query tools for updated client knowledge queries of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others; however, it is observed that these queries are not updated to 2017, which is the fact imputed regarding said client; at the close of the Inspection, the last update is from 2016;
- It should be indicated that the queries of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list by themselves do not reasonably accredit that BTG SAB has performed the update of the background, documentation and other aspects of the client since, as observed in the files, this SAB uses various query tools for the DDC and not only the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others;
- Likewise, no documents are observed that support that BTG SAB has performed the review of this client's risk profile, updated to 2017, nor documentation that evidences having performed the due diligence required for said year;
- Finally, regarding that in 2019 the client updated its information, it should be indicated that the imputed fact is for not having accredited the action corresponding to 2017;
Carlos Miguel Salazar Muro
- In this client's file it is observed that BTG SAB uses as consultation tools for the updated knowledge of the client consultations of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others; reports from credit bureaus; however, it is observed that the credit bureau reports are not updated to 2017; at the close of the Inspection, the last documentation is from 2015 when the client was registered;
- Regarding the fact that Mr. Salazar Muro was a director of FOSERESE, and therefore BTG SAB had adequate knowledge of the client from long before the start of the relationship with the latter, it must be indicated that this does not prevent the intermediary from complying with its obligation to annually update the information on said client that the regulations require;
- As for the OFAC list search report issued on October 25, 2017, although it has been evidenced in the file, it must be indicated that by itself it does not reasonably prove that BTG SAB has carried out the updating of the client's background, documentation and other aspects since, as observed in the files, this SAB uses various consultation tools for the DDC and not only the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others;
- Finally, in relation to the other documents that BTG SAB points out contain updated information on Mr. Salazar Muro, it must be indicated that these are subsequent to the evaluated period, that is, they correspond to years after 2017, so this does not remedy the observation made;
José Angel Adriazola Cahuas
- In this client's file it is observed that BTG SAB uses as consultation tools for the updated knowledge of the client consultations of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others; reports from credit bureaus; however, it is observed that the credit bureau reports are not updated to 2017; at the close of the Inspection, the last documentation is from 2015 when the client was registered;
- Likewise, no documents are observed that support that BTG SAB has carried out the review of the risk profile of this client, updated to 2017; at the close of the Inspection, the last review is from 2015 when the client was registered;
- Regarding the fact that Mr. Adriazola Cahuas was a director of FOSERESE, and therefore BTG SAB had adequate knowledge of the client from long before the start of the relationship with the latter, it must be indicated that this does not prevent the intermediary from complying with its obligation to annually update the information on said client that the regulations require;
- As for the OFAC list search report issued on October 25, 2017, although it has been evidenced in the file, it must be indicated that by itself it does not reasonably prove that BTG SAB has carried out the updating of the client's background, documentation and other aspects since, as observed in the files, this SAB uses various consultation tools for the DDC and not only the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others;
- Finally, in relation to the other documents that BTG SAB points out contain updated information on Mr. Adriazola Cahuas, it must be indicated that these are subsequent to the evaluated period, that is, they correspond to years before or after 2017, so this does not lift the observation made;
Inversiones Capistrano S.A.
- In this client's file it is observed that BTG SAB uses as consultation tools for the updated knowledge of the client consultations of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others; credit bureau reports; SUNARP consultations, the latter for verifying the validity of powers; and a form declaring direct and indirect ownership of the share capital; however, regarding the credit bureau report documentation, it is observed that it is not updated to 2017; at the close of the Inspection, the last credit bureau report documentation regarding the client's representative is from 2014;
- On the other hand, the consultations of the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others, are not updated to 2017, the last update is from 2016; it must be indicated that said documentation by itself does not reasonably prove that BTG SAB has carried out the updating of the client's background, documentation and other aspects since, as observed in the files, this SAB uses various consultation tools for the DDC and not only the lists on persons involved in terrorist activities (Resolution No. 1267) of the United Nations, the OFAC list, among others;
- Likewise, it must be noted that no documents are observed that support that BTG SAB has carried out the review of the risk profile of this client, updated to 2017. At the close of the Inspection, the last review is from 2016 when the client's record was updated. It should be noted that in the responses, BTG SAB has not presented documentation regarding the 2017 update of this client's risk profile, it only mentions it in its brief;
- Regarding the fact that BTG SAB executes other search means to evidence the regulatory compliance observed on the clients mentioned above, it should be noted that the aforementioned has not been evidenced in this administrative proceeding;
- As for the argument of the operation of BTG SAB's "Compliance Tracker" system, or the work being carried out by its representatives for the due updating of the information of the aforementioned clients, it must be indicated that this does not relieve said intermediary from complying with the observed regulations, since it has not evidenced that they have contributed to remedying the imputed infraction regarding the observed period, that is, the 2017 fiscal year;
- Therefore, it is concluded that regarding the clients mentioned above, BTG SAB has not complied with carrying out at least once (1) a year a review of the risk profile and documentation of the client contained in its file, taking into account the consultation tools it uses for the updated knowledge of clients, and therefore has breached Article 7.5, numeral c) of the Plaft Rules;
- On the other hand, regarding the fact that in the file of Mr. David Eduardo Hidalgo Valdivia, it is not indicated that he is a client to whom the intensified DDC procedure should be applied, it should be noted that BTG SAB has not referred in its responses to this imputation;
- Regarding the fact that according to the Plaft Manual the approval of the aforementioned client corresponded to the Global AML Head, BTG SAB states that this procedure was no longer carried out; since its PLAFT Manual was outdated, which is why in this case said approval is not available;
- BTG SAB states that, currently, for the registration of a high-risk client, it must have the following approvals: Compliance Officer, General Management and the Compliance Committee, or, if the latter does not exist, by the company's board of directors and, in this case, the client was registered with the approval of the general manager, whose position constitutes the highest managerial level of BTG SAB;
- On this matter, it should be noted that BTG SAB has not evidenced with the corresponding documentation that the client was registered with the approval of the general manager, and only the client registration form collected in the Inspection is available, in which the signature of the Operations Manager and a BTG SAB Representative is observed, and the document "Check List – Client Registration Form" signed by the Compliance Officer;
- Likewise, regarding the fact that the reason why the approval of the Global AML Head is not available for the case of Mr. Hidalgo Valdivia at the date of the events is because the PLAFT Manual was outdated, it must be indicated that this does not exempt it from compliance with the provisions of said manual, so such situation does not disprove the charge formulated on the matter;
- Therefore, it is concluded that BTG SAB has not complied with indicating in the file of Mr. David Eduardo Hidalgo Valdivia that he is a client to whom the intensified DDC procedure should be applied and likewise has not evidenced that this client was registered with the approval of the General Manager of BTG SAB, and therefore has breached Article 7.5, numeral d) of the Plaft Rules;
- According to the above, BTG SAB has incurred an infraction classified as serious typified in Annex XIX, numeral 2, subsection 2.3 of the Prior Sanctions Regulation, in force at the time of the events, which establishes as an infraction of a serious nature "Failure to carry out the client due diligence process, in accordance with the regulations on prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, in cases where, according to the provisions of said regulation, its application corresponds;
- Second charge: Criteria for not considering unusual operations as suspicious
From the regulations
- Article 14, numeral 14.9, of the Plaft Rules establishes:
Article 14.- Suspicious operation reports (ROS)
(…)
"14.9 Obligated subjects must have a document controlling the numbering of operations classified as unusual, called the Registry of Unusual Operations, which contains the date of the operation, type of operation, amount involved in the operation, date of detection of the operation as unusual and criteria for not having been considered suspicious."
events occurred
- From the review of the Registry of Unusual Operations corresponding to the 2017 fiscal year[5] of BTG SAB carried out during the Inspection, it was observed that there are thirty-six (36) records classified by the intermediary itself as unusual, however, it was determined that they do not include the "criteria for not having been considered suspicious";
- In this regard, when during the Inspection BTG SAB was asked to explain the criteria for not having been considered suspicious the unusual records of the 2017 fiscal year[6], detailed in Annex C of Memorandum No. 003-2017-INSP.BTG PACTUAL SAB, and to attach the working papers of the analysis carried out (including the emails sent to the representatives and their respective responses), BTG SAB responded[7]:
"the operations indicated in Annex C were not considered suspicious, because due diligence has been done (communication to the representatives, responses, in some cases the information was in the documents presented, but had not been entered into the system and in other cases they have not yet responded to the requirements. In some cases, follow-up is still being done, since not all clients justify or provide information proactively; in the cases where follow-up is being done, a specific deadline will be given to substantiate with documents the variation on the operation carried out in that period.
On the other hand, these operations do not fall within the definition of "suspicious operations" made by Article 2, subsection q) of CONASEV Resolution No. 033-2011-EF-94.01.1 and its amendment SMV Resolution No. 007-2013-SMV.01 defines the concept of suspicious operations "Suspicious operations: Operations of handling assets or liabilities or other resources, whose amount or characteristics are not related to the economic activity of its clients, or transactions of its users that due to their number, the amounts traded or the particular characteristics of these, may reasonably lead to suspect that the obligated subject is being used to transfer, manage, take advantage of or invest resources from criminal activities or destined for their financing";
- As seen in the previous response, BTG SAB does not indicate the criteria for not having been considered suspicious the unusual records of the sample, based on a case-by-case analysis, but rather provides a general response on the definition of suspicious operation of the Plaft Rules. Likewise, it is important to highlight the fact that BTG SAB also does not evidence the respective documentation that supports the analysis carried out regarding said unusual operations, in particular, the one referring to their non-classification as suspicious;
- In this regard, Article 14, numeral 14.9 of the Plaft Rules establishes that obligated subjects must have a Registry of Unusual Operations in which they keep control of said operations; likewise, said records must indicate the date of the operation, type of operation, amount involved in the operation, date of detection of the operation as unusual and criteria for not having been considered suspicious;
- In that sense, it follows that obligated subjects must have sufficient grounds to support why an unusual operation does not qualify as a suspicious operation; in that sense, it corresponds first to identify an unusual operation and for this the alert signals serve; therefore, for the obligated subject to justify why it did not classify an operation as suspicious, as part of the procedure it should also document the analysis and evaluations of the occurrence of the alert signals that gave rise to the unusual operation;
- Therefore, according to the above, BTG SAB was imputed that it would not have complied with the provisions of Article 14, numeral 14.9, of the Plaft Rules, because in the Registry of Unusual Operations of the 2017 fiscal year, detailed in Annex C of Memorandum No. 003-2017-INSP.BTG PACTUAL SAB, the criteria for not having been considered suspicious are not indicated, for each of the operations;
From the Responses Presented
- Regarding the fact that it would not have indicated the criteria for not having considered the imputed unusual operations as suspicious, BTG SAB states that the information contained in the document (file) called "Registry of Unusual Operations", which was provided to the SMV at the time, does not correspond to the registry of unusual operations but rather to the consolidated file of alerts that are generated monthly and are consolidated into a single file (registry) for the due follow-up through the representative to obtain information and/or supporting documentation or update of the existing one, as appropriate, which will allow lifting said alert, or otherwise determining it as an unusual operation, following the procedures established in the regulation;
- In that sense, BTG SAB states that in a conversation with the SMV official during the Inspection, he indicated that at that date the agent company had no unusual operations and that it only maintained a registry of alerts with which it was working and doing the corresponding follow-up through the representatives, as can be verified in the file in the record erroneously called "registry of unusual operations", where the follow-up being carried out is indicated for each operation;
- BTG SAB considers that this is where an erroneous interpretation occurs on its part, since the name "Registry of Unusual Operations" is inaccurately assigned to the "Registry of Alerts" file, when the agent company knows that said registry according to the PLAFT Rules must comply with certain characteristics, which it evidently did not comply with since it is not such a registry, which has an established format and is generated automatically in its system when determined as such;
- BTG SAB indicates that it is evident that said information was erroneously provided as if they were unusual operations, when in reality they were the alerts to which the respective follow-up was being done in coordination with the representatives to obtain the information or documentation that corresponded. Thus, as can be seen in the list of the supposed unusual operations of the aforementioned registry, there are eleven (11) operations of clients that are considered institutional;;;,;Likewise, BTG SAB states that within these supposed unusual operations there are natural person clients, to mention some such as its Country Manager (BTG Pactual) who carried out an FX exchange operation and other very active regular clients to date, who have not carried out unusual operations to date, but since they are very active clients in the securities market, they register some variations with respect to their declared AUM, so the system detects this variation, and consequently the procedure of requesting information through its representative must be carried out to verify and corroborate that said variation is not due to anomalous or illicit situations, and thus update the information in its systems;
- In the same line, BTG SAB states that there is a person who was a collaborator of the SAB, and who no longer works there and does not carry out operations, so his account is inactive;
- To all these and the other alerts, at the date of the Inspection, BTG SAB indicates, the corresponding follow-up was being done as recorded in the same file and in the coordination emails with the account representative that are in the record;
- On the other hand, BTG SAB states that as can be seen in the supposed registry of unusual operations, regarding clients with RUT No. 375727 and No. 1298018, the information was indeed in the client's file; however, due to an involuntary error it had not been entered at the time of registration, which is why the alert was generated because the information was not in the system, as indicated in the comments and follow-up column in which it was indicated that the data or information was in the client's file, consequently this alert had been lifted, so it was not and never was an unusual operation;
- Regarding the other cases, BTG SAB comments that the corresponding follow-up was being done to obtain the information, but since not all clients justify or provide information proactively and timely, generally they proceeded to continue requesting the information from the representative until obtaining the documentary support;
- BTG SAB mentions that another of the observations related to PLAFT matters taken from the Inspection Report in Office No. 4516-2019-SMV/10.2, was the one related to the procedures of alert signals and unusual operations;
- In this regard, by response letter dated October 9, 2019, BTG SAB, within the schedule of activities to be implemented, informed that in coordination with the general management, deadlines would be established for the follow-ups and evaluations of alerts and unusual operations, which were approved and included in the PLAFT Manual and approved by the company's board of directors;
- As for the response on why the operations indicated in Annex "C" were not considered suspicious, BTG SAB indicates that based on the above and under the same circumstances, it gave an erroneous and general response, since the registry of such operations were indeed alerts and not unusual operations;
- BTG SAB considers it important to note that, if at the date of the Inspection said operations had been considered unusual operations, each one would have had the corresponding support and analysis of said classification, and, therefore, the criteria for why they would or would not have been considered a suspicious operation individually according to the regulation;
- BTG SAB cites that the Indicia Report states the following: "In that sense, it follows that obligated subjects must have sufficient grounds to support why an unusual operation does not qualify as a suspicious operation; in that sense, it corresponds first to identify an unusual operation and for this the alert signals serve; therefore, for the obligated subject to justify why it did not classify an operation as suspicious, as part of the procedure it should also document the analysis and evaluations of the occurrence of the alert signals that gave rise to the unusual operation (…)";
- In view of this, BTG SAB states that in accordance with the above, at the date of the Inspection what was observed is in the phase of "alert signals" or "evaluations of the occurrence of alert signals";
- On the other hand, BTG SAB emphasizes that if these operations had been effectively declared as unusual, they would have been registered through its automated system that generates said report, in accordance with the regulatory requirement, as shown in Annex 5 to the brief of its responses;
- Therefore, according to the above, BTG SAB considers that it would not have breached Article 14, numeral 14.9, of the PLAFT Rules, because these did not constitute unusual operations, but rather constituted the alerts that were being evaluated at the date of the Inspection carried out in 2017, and that were erroneously reported during said inspection as unusual operations, which is why it was not possible to indicate the criteria for not having been considered suspicious, for each of the operations, but rather a general response was given based on information provided erroneously;
Analysis of the responses
1. During the Inspection, through Memorandum No. 001-2017-INSP.BTG PACTUAL SA, numeral 25, BTG SAB was requested to deliver the Unusual Operations Registry corresponding to fiscal year 2017, a request that was attended by the intermediary, delivering the referred registry subject to charges to the SMV officials;
2. As a result of the review of the 2017 Unusual Operations Registry, it was observed that BTG SAB had not complied with indicating the criteria by which the records included therein were not considered as suspicious operations;
3. Likewise, during the inspection BTG SAB indicated that the reason for the aforementioned is that the operations in said registry were not considered as suspicious operations to the extent that it had carried out due diligence on its clients and indicating the actions adopted in order to obtain additional information and documentation regarding the operations carried out; from which it follows that the referred registry delivered during the inspection does not contain the indicated criteria;
4. On its part, in its brief of October 9, 2019, numeral 9, BTG SAB states the following;
1. From the foregoing it follows that the registry delivered by the intermediary and understood by it as such during the Inspection is the Unusual Operations Registry, with BTG SAB acknowledging that it did not have the field in which to record information regarding the criteria for an operation not to be considered suspicious. Likewise, in Annex 15 of the referred brief, BTG SAB establishes an action plan to remedy the observation; not rectifying or specifying what in the present administrative procedure it now states as part of its defenses;
2. In this sense, it should be noted that Article 10 of the Securities Market Law, approved by Legislative Decree No. 681 and its amendments (hereinafter, LMV), establishes that all information made available to the SMV must be truthful, sufficient and timely;
3. Accordingly, it is a permanent obligation of the administered parties to observe the greatest possible diligence in the information provided to SMV officials as part of an inspection, ensuring that it is truthful, clear, sufficient and timely so that it is not confusing or misleading;
4. In this order of ideas, and given the importance of the veracity and integrity of the information that obligated subjects must provide, the presentation of inaccurate, false or biased information is classified as a very serious infraction and consequently is sanctioned more severely than incurring in acts or omissions that constitute non-compliance with any of the provisions established in the regulations for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing;
5. In this sense, the 2017 Unusual Operations Registry presented to SMV officials during the inspection is considered and understood by the supervisor as such, complying with being truthful, since assuming or perceiving the contrary would imply that such information did not comply with such requirement, that is, it could be considered as inaccurate, confusing or misleading;
6. In this sense, BTGA SAB has not disproved the charge imputed referring to the fact that the 2017 Unusual Operations Registry delivered to the SMV during the Inspection has thirty-six (36) records qualified by the intermediary itself as unusual, however, in them the "criteria for not having been considered suspicious" are not stated;
7. According to the indicated, BTG SAB has incurred in an infraction classified as serious typified in Annex XIX, numeral 2, subsection 2.20 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation, in force at the time of the events, which establishes as an infraction of a serious nature "Incurring in acts or omissions that constitute non-compliance with any of the provisions established in the regulations for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing;
IV. EVALUATION OF THE SANCTION
- According to Article 348 of the Securities Market Law (hereinafter, LMV) and Article 6 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation, in accordance with Article 248, numeral 3, of the TUO LPAG and Article 257 of the aforementioned normative body, the administrative sanctions imposed must take into account the criteria set forth by the LMV, the Previous Sanctions Regulation and the TUO LPAG;
- Within this framework, the evaluation of the sanction must consider: a) Offender's antecedents; b) The seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest; c) The harm caused and the repercussion in the market; d) Recidivism[8]; e) The circumstances of the commission of the infraction; f) The illicit benefit resulting from the commission of the infraction; g) The existence or not of intentionality in the offender's conduct; h) The probability of detection of the infraction; and, i) The voluntary declaration of the commission of the infraction and the offender's contribution to its clarification;
- In accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation, sanctions that became final within the four (04) years prior to the commission of the infraction are considered as offender's antecedents;
- Regarding the determined infractions, BTG SAB has the following infraction antecedents that have become final in the administrative instance to the extent that they were not subject to challenge:
- Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 020-2014-SMV/10 of October 28, 2014, through which BTG SAB is sanctioned with a fine of 2.50 UIT equivalent to S/. 9,125.00 (Nine thousand one hundred twenty-five and 00/100 Nuevos Soles) for having incurred in one (01) infraction of a minor nature typified in Annex I, numeral 3, subsection 3.1 of the Sanctions Regulation for having presented periodic information outside the established deadline.
- Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 040-2015-SMV/10 of December 23, 2015, through which BTG SAB is sanctioned with a fine of 01 UIT amounting to S/ 3,700.00 (Three thousand seven hundred and 00/100 Soles) for having incurred in one (01) infraction of a minor nature typified in Annex X, numeral 3, subsection 3.5 of the Sanctions Regulation for not complying with collecting its clients' orders.
- Regarding the seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest, in the present case it has not been possible to prove that BTG SAB's action in the commission of the infraction analyzed in this sanctioning procedure has caused damage to the public interest. However, in the present case, it is observed that BTG SAB has breached provisions on the regulations referred to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing;
- In this sense, in relation to the infraction referred to not applying the intensified CDD procedure to the observed clients of the intermediary, clients that due to their particular characteristics could be more exposed to money laundering risks, it should be indicated that within the framework of the indicated regulations, the principle of customer knowledge allows intermediaries to obtain information from their clients, which in turn allows comparing the characteristics of their transactions with those of their economic activity, their risk profile, continuously monitoring client operations, and having elements of judgment that allow analyzing unusual transactions of those clients and determining the existence of suspicious operations. Likewise, having an Unusual Operations Registry that complies at least with the characteristics established by the regulatory framework allows intermediaries to carry out effective monitoring of unusual and suspicious operations, thus enabling them to adopt in a timely manner the pertinent measures related to money laundering and terrorist financing;
- Given the aforementioned, it should be indicated that the process of proper customer identification and the Unusual Operations Registry are key components within the regulatory framework of the securities market, which allows the achievement of its objectives such as the protection of investors, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; as well as the prevention of illegal use of the securities market, which helps prevent the occurrence of fraud and market abuse practices; as well as money laundering and terrorist financing. In this sense, a complete unusual operations registry and effective customer identification and procedures for said purpose are necessary for market transparency, investor protection and to maintain market integrity; therefore, in the present case, the referred protected legal interests have been affected;
- Regarding the economic harm and the repercussion in the market, it has not been possible to evidence that the infraction in which BTG SAB has incurred has caused a concrete economic harm or that it has had a repercussion in the market;
- With reference to recidivism for the commission of the same infraction, the final sanction imposed by the SMV within one (1) year prior to the commission of the infraction to be sanctioned is taken into account. It has been verified that BTG SAB does not present final sanctions for the commission of the infraction subject to analysis in this administrative sanctioning procedure, so recidivism is not configured;
- Regarding the circumstances of the commission of the infraction, it should be noted that BTG SAB, in its capacity as a company supervised by the SMV, must know the rules that regulate the securities market, the specific regulation for brokerage firms, in particular, the AML/CFT Rules;
- In the present case, the customer knowledge procedure continuously carried out by BTG SAB was observed, which knows the obligations contained in the AML/CFT Rules, determining that with respect to the observed clients, said intermediary did not documentarily evidence that it carried out intensified CDD in 2017 in order to acquire timely, sufficient, effective and updated knowledge of these clients and beneficial owners, and thus manage the ML/TF risks to which it is exposed in its business relationships; in particular considering that these are clients acting through representatives, with non-domiciled companies or politically exposed persons. It should be noted that the fact of not carrying out due diligence procedures or not carrying them out with the periodicity of the case and with the rigor that it implies; exposes the brokerage firm to initiate or maintain links with persons that could imply a high exposure to ML/TF risks, which could lead to consequences from reputational, legal, operational and contagion points of view that could even affect the continuity of a business of the intermediary;
- Likewise, it was evidenced that the intermediary did not comply with having an Unusual Operations Registry that includes for its 36 records the criteria for not being considered suspicious. It should be indicated that during the Inspection, as part of attending to what was requested and in response to what was observed, BTG SAB maintained at all times arguments based on the fact that the document delivered was its Unusual Operations Registry for fiscal year 2017; a situation that it maintained even in its brief of October 9, 2019, presenting for that purpose an action plan to remedy the observation that is subject to charge; however, said situation has been attempted to be disowned as part of its defenses;
- Regarding the illicit benefit resulting from the commission of the infraction, it has not been accredited in this administrative sanctioning procedure that BTG SAB has obtained any illicit benefit as a result of having incurred in the infraction subject to analysis;
- In relation to the existence or not of intentionality in the offender's conduct, no intentionality has been evidenced in BTG SAB's conduct regarding the infraction subject to analysis;
- On the probability of detection of the infractions, it should be indicated that the facts constituting the infraction committed by BTG SAB, which are analyzed, were evidenced as a result of the supervision and control actions carried out by the SMV regarding the regulations governing the activities of brokerage firms. The infraction was detected in an inspection carried out at BTG SAB's offices, and as a consequence of the review and analysis of the information and documentation delivered by the brokerage firm only in this diligence. Therefore, the probability of detection of the infraction was low;
- In relation to the voluntary declaration of the commission of the infraction and the offender's contribution to its clarification, it should be indicated that BTG SAB has not acknowledged the commission of the infractions subject to this administrative sanctioning procedure, limiting itself only to the presentation of its defenses;
- Finally, it should be noted that in the present case none of the assumptions that constitute exempting and mitigating conditions of responsibility established in Article 257 of the TUO LPAG have been configured;
- According to the foregoing, BTG SAB has incurred in two (02) infractions classified as serious, one typified in Annex XIX, numeral 2, subsection 2.3 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation, in force at the time of the events, which establishes as an infraction of a serious nature "Not carrying out the customer due diligence process, in accordance with the regulations for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, in cases where according to the provisions of said regulation its application corresponds"; and another typified in Annex XIX, numeral 2, subsection 2.20 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation, in force at the time of the events, which establishes as an infraction of a serious nature: "Incurring in acts or omissions that constitute non-compliance with any of the provisions established in the regulations for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing"
- In accordance with Article 21 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation, in force at the date of the events, said infraction is punishable with a fine greater than twenty-five (25) and up to fifty (50) Tax Units (UIT) or with suspension of the authorization to operate for up to twenty (20) days;
- It should be noted that the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01, in force as of December 19, 2018 (hereinafter, New Sanctions Regulation) states that said infraction is punishable with a fine not less than twenty-five (25) and up to fifty (50) UIT or with suspension of the authorization to operate for up to twenty (20) days. It should be indicated that said norm will be the applicable one to the present case as it is more favorable;
- However, taking into account the sanction criteria analyzed in application of the Principle of Reasonableness contemplated in Article 248, numeral 3 of the TUO LPAG, which states that sanctions must be proportional to the non-compliances classified as infractions, and, considering that it has not been evidenced that the infraction committed has caused damage to the public interest, nor that it has had a repercussion in the market, or that the brokerage firm has obtained any illicit benefit from its commission, that no intentionality was evidenced in its action and that the brokerage firm is not a recidivist regarding the referred infraction, it is considered that it is possible to impose on BTG SAB a sanction corresponding to a lower classification than that provided for serious infractions, in accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 6 of the Previous Sanctions Regulation;
In accordance with the provisions of Article 32, numeral 16, of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF.
RESOLVES:
Article 1.- Declare that BTG Pactual Perú S.A. Sociedad Agente de Bolsa has incurred in an infraction of a serious nature typified in Annex XIX, numeral 2, subsection 2.3 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10 and its amending norms, in force at the date of the events, for not having complied with applying the intensified due diligence procedure in customer knowledge, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7, numerals 7.4 and 7.5, of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and/or Terrorist Financing, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 033-2011-EF/94.01.1 and its amendments.
Article 2.- Declare that BTG Pactual Perú S.A. Sociedad Agente de Bolsa has incurred in one (01) infraction of a serious nature typified in Annex XIX, numeral, subsection 2.20 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10 and its amending norms in force at the date of the events, for not having complied with indicating the criteria for not considering as suspicious the operations included in its Unusual Operations Registry for fiscal year 2017, in accordance with the provisions of Article 14, numeral 14.9, of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and/or Terrorist Financing, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 033-2011-EF/94.01.1 and its amendments.
Article 3.- Sanction BTG Pactual Perú S.A. Sociedad Agente de Bolsa with the sanction of a fine of 05 UIT equivalent to S/ 20,250.00 (Twenty thousand two hundred fifty and 00/100 Soles) for the commission of the infraction referred to in the preceding articles.
Article 4.- This resolution does not exhaust the administrative route, unless it is consented, and may be challenged before the Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision through the filing of a reconsideration or appeal presented before it, within fifteen (15) business days counted from the day following its notification.
Article 5.- In the event that this resolution is not subject to challenge through a reconsideration or appeal within fifteen (15) business days of notification and becomes final, it must be published on the Portal of the Superintendency of the Securities Market, in observance of the provisions of Article 7, numeral 1, of the Policy on dissemination of regulatory projects, general legal norms, regulatory agenda and other administrative acts of the SMV, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 014-2014-SMV/01 and by the provisions of Article 14 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01.
Article 6.- Transcribe this resolution to BTG Pactual Perú S.A. Sociedad Agente de Bolsa, to the Lima Stock Exchange S.A.A. and to Cavali S.A. ICLV.
Register, communicate and publish.
Omar Gutiérrez Ochoa
Deputy Superintendent
Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision
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Presented to the SMV on December 30, 2016 (File No. 2016048258). ↑
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Question 6 formulated through Memorandum No. 003-2017-INSP.BTG PACTUAL SAB. ↑
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Referring to its response of October 9, 2019 to Official Letter No. 4516-2019-SMV/10.2 that the IGSE sent as a result of the observations found in the Inspection. ↑
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Article 132.- Compendious Certificates
Included within the compendious certificates referred to in literal b) of the previous article, among others, are the following:
(…)
c) Validity certificates: Those that accredit the existence of the act or right registered as of the date of its issuance; [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
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Requested through numeral 25 of Memorandum No. 001-2017-INSP.BTG PACTUAL SAB. ↑
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Numeral 12 of Memorandum No. 003-2017-INSP.BTG PACTUAL SAB. ↑
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Document attached to the email of November 8, 2017. ↑
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The sanction criteria referred to Recidivism and the Probability of detection of the infraction were introduced by Article 2 of Legislative Decree No. 1272 which modified, among others, Article 230, numeral 3 of the LPAG. ↑