Rule · NBB · 10 Nov 2026 · NBB_2026_13
Credit institutions incorporated under Belgian law, Belgian branches of non-EEA credit institutions, and Belgian financial and mixed financial holding companies must draw up individual statements and a mapping of duties, keep them available to the supervisory authority, and ensure their statutory governing body includes independent directors and specialised committees of at least three members. Non-significant institutions must have at least one independent director per committee, except the audit committee, where a majority must be independent; significant institutions need a majority of independent directors on all specialised committees. The chair of the statutory governing body may no longer chair the management committee.
14 Boulevard de Berlaimont – 1000 Brussels
+32 2 221 38 12
Company number: 0203.201.340
Brussels RLE www.nbb.be
BanqueNationale Jank
DE BELGIQUE
VAN BELGIË
Eurosystem
Public
Brussels, 10 November 2026
Reference: NBB_2026_13
Your contact:
Nicolas Strypstein
Tel. +32 2 221 44 74 nicolas.strypstein@nbb.be
Credit institutions incorporated under Belgian law
Belgian branches of credit institutions incorporated under the law of a non-EEA country
Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies incorporated under Belgian law
The Act of 22 July 2026, which amended the Banking Act for the purpose of transposing CRD VI into Belgian law, has strengthened the prudential governance requirements for the banking sector in several respects. In this communication, the National Bank of Belgium (the “NBB”) summarises these changes and indicates the upcoming revision of its Governance Manual for the banking sector.
Dear Sir or Madam,
The Act of 22 July 2026 amended the Act of 25 April 2014 on the legal status and supervision of credit institutions (the “Banking Act”) in order to transpose into Belgian law the sixth Capital Requirements Directive VI (CRD VI) 1 as well as certain recommendations issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) further to its 2023 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) for Belgium.
In this context, various prudential governance requirements for the banking sector have been strengthened.
This communication provides an overview of these changes and notes the upcoming revision of the NBB’s Governance Manual for the banking sector.
The main governance-related changes resulting from the Act of 22 July 2026 are summarised below.2
1. New definitions (Article 3 of the Banking Act)
o The terms “persons participating in the effective management”, “key function holders”, “heads of independent control functions” and “chief financial officer” have been defined.
2. Introduction of an obligation to draw up “individual statements” and a “mapping of duties” (Article 26/2 of the Banking Act)
o “Individual statements” must be drawn up for (i) each member of the management committee, (ii) other persons participating in the effective management of the institution (department heads) and (iii) key function holders (heads of independent control functions and the chief financial officer). These are statements setting out the roles and duties of each person.
o In addition, a “mapping of duties” must be drawn up, including details of the on reporting lines, of the lines of responsibility and of the persons who are part of the governance arrangements as referred to in Article 21, § 1 of the Banking Act, as well as their duties.
o The individual statements and mapping of duties are to be drawn up, maintained and updated by the statutory governing body. They must be made available at all times to the supervisory authority and communicated to the latter in due time upon request.
3. New provisions regarding the number of independent directors (Articles 24 and 25 of the Banking Act)
o The Banking Act requires that the statutory governing body now include an adequate number of independent directors, taking into account the size and risk profile of the institution and the requirements of Article 27 of the Banking Act. Having regard to the requirements of the aforementioned Article 27, which relate to the minimum number of independent directors on specialised committees, this means that significant credit institutions, within the meaning of Article 3, 30° of the Banking Act, must have at least three independent directors while institutions that are not significant must have at least two independent directors.
o If the institution forms part of a group within the meaning of Article 3, 85° or a financial conglomerate, the statutory governing body must henceforth have an independent director who holds no other directorship on the decision-making bodies of undertakings forming part of the group or the financial conglomerate.
[1] Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches and environmental, social and governance risks.
[2] Notwithstanding the changes pertaining to suitability (“fit and proper”) assessment which are outlined in the circular on this subject published concurrently with the present communication.
o The rules on the composition of specialised committees have been supplemented with the following provisions:
Each such committee must have at least three members. Furthermore, the rule that no member may sit on more than three specialised committees remains in force.
With regard to the presence of independent directors on these committees, it is specified that each committee must have an appropriate number of independent directors. Furthermore, institutions that are not significant within the meaning of Article 3, 30° of the Banking Act remain obliged to have at least one independent director on these committees, with the exception of the audit committee for which a majority of members must be independent directors. Conversely, significant institutions within the meaning of Article 3, 30° of the Banking Act are now required to have a majority of independent directors on their specialised committees.
o The Act also stipulates that there is an obligation to obtain the opinion of an ad hoc committee in the following circumstances:
If the credit institution forms part of a group within the meaning of Article 3, 85° or a financial conglomerate and is not an EU parent credit institution, it must set up an ad hoc committee prior to:
a. any material transaction3 between the credit institution and one or more entities forming part of the same group or financial conglomerate;
b. any decision of the credit institution of which one or more of the abovementioned entities is the beneficiary and which would have a material impact3 on the credit institution.
The committee must be composed solely of independent directors and is tasked with issuing an opinion to the statutory governing body on the merits of the material transaction in question for the institution, in particular its compliance with the institution’s corporate interest, and any potential conflicts of interest that could arise as a result of the operation.
o The independence of the independent control functions, the heads of these functions and the staff engaged in independent control functions has been explicitly clarified. Independent control functions report directly and regularly to the statutory governing body.
o The tasks allocated to the risk management, compliance and internal audit functions have been clarified.
o Participation by the heads of the risk management and compliance functions in risk committee meetings and by the head of the internal audit function in audit committee meetings, for matters relating to risk strategy, has now been enshrined in the Banking Act.
o The rules on the holding of multiple offices by the member of the management committee which acts as the chief risk officer (CRO) have been clarified.
The general principle still applies that the CRO must be a member of the management committee and is individually responsible solely for the risk management function. However, it has been clarified that the compliance function may be added to the CRO’s areas of responsibility on a purely organisational basis, without the CRO assuming responsibility for this function, provided these two functions are exercised separately.
For credit institutions that are not significant within the meaning of Article 3, 30° of the Banking Act, a request may be submitted to the NBB/ECB to authorise (i) a staff member who is part of senior management (at N-1 level) to perform the risk management function, provided there is no conflict of interest on the part of this person
[3] A transaction is in particular considered material or a decision is considered having a material impact where it represents at least 5% of the value of the institution’s total assets or may have a significant impact on its liquidity or solvency position or its profitability.
and that (ii) the a person, who is a member of the management committee (at N level) or forms part of senior management (at N-1 level), is responsible for both the risk management and compliance functions, provided there is no conflict of interest on the part of this person and they fulfil the suitability criteria and requirements of knowledge, skills and experience necessary for the different areas concerned and have sufficiently time to perform both control functions correctly.
o The statutory governing body is responsible for approving risk strategies and policies, which should incorporate ESG risks.
o The risk committee must ensure that the remuneration system takes ESG risks into account.
o The statutory governing body shall develop specific plans with quantifiable targets and processes to monitor and address the financial risks arising from ESG factors. It shall also develop specific plans and quantifiable targets in accordance with the requirements laid down in Article 7a of Regulation No 648/2012 to monitor and address concentration risk arising from exposures to central counterparties offering services of substantial systemic importance for the Union or one or more of its Member States.
o ESG risks and risks arising from crypto-asset exposures, as well as the concentration risk arising from exposures towards central counterparties should be incorporated into risk management processes.
o The derogation allowing the chair of the statutory governing body to also serve as chair of the management committee has been abolished, even though it had already become theoretical in practice.
The Bank will update its Governance Manual for the banking sector in the coming weeks to further specify and clarify the developments outlined above. It will also take this opportunity to incorporate the new European Banking Authority Guidelines on internal governance, published on 5 November 2026.
Yours faithfully,
Pierre Wunsch
Governor
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