Enforcement · SMV · 18 Aug 2023
Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. is sanctioned with six (6) UIT, equivalent to S/ 25,200.00, for three infractions: one serious infraction under Annex X, numeral 2, subsection 2.24; one serious infraction under Annex XVI, numeral 2, subsection 2.1; and one minor infraction under Annex I, numeral 3, subsection 3.6 of the Sanctions Regulation. The infractions consisted of not including in clients' account statements the monetary balances at the end of each date for each transaction, the availability status of financial instruments, and the name of the depository or custody institution for global accounts; not complying with its Manual for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism regarding due diligence in personnel knowledge; and not submitting information on its own-account operations.
PERÚ Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas
SMV
Superintendency of the Market de Valores
“Decade of Equal Opportunities for Women and Men” “Year of unity, peace and development”
No. 055-2023-SMV/10
Lima, 18 August 2023
Summary: Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. is sanctioned with six (6) UIT equivalent to S/ 25,200.00 (Twenty-five thousand two hundred and 00/100 Soles) for having incurred in three (03) infractions: One (01) serious infraction, typified in Annex X, numeral 2, subsection 2.24, one (01) serious infraction typified in Annex XVI, numeral 2, subsection 2.1, and one (01) minor infraction typified in Annex I, numeral 3, subsection 3.6 of the Sanctions Regulation, for not including in the clients' account statements the monetary balances at the end of each date for each transaction carried out, the availability status of the financial instruments owned by the clients, and for not specifying the name of the depository or custody institution of the financial instruments managed in the global accounts in the name of the stock brokerage firm; for not complying with the provisions of its Manual for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism regarding due diligence in the knowledge of personnel; and for not complying with submitting information related to its own-account operations, respectively.
Administered
:
Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.
Subject
:
Administrative sanctioning procedure
File No. :
2023001495
The Deputy Superintendent of Prudential Supervision
Administrative file No. 2022015238, Report No. 239-2023-SMV/10.3, issued by the General Intendancy of Prudential Compliance; as well as the discharges presented by Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.; and,
Pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 29782, Law for the Strengthening of Securities Market Supervision, the name of the National Supervisory Commission of Companies and Securities (CONASEV) is replaced by that of the Superintendency of Securities Market (SMV), so that any reference in legal norms to CONASEV shall be understood as SMV;
1. Through Reports No. 706-2022-SMV/10.2 and No. 886-2022-SMV/10.2, the General Intendancy of Entity Supervision (hereinafter, IGSE) communicated to the General Intendancy of Prudential Compliance the indications of possible infractions by Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. (hereinafter, CREDICORP SAB);
2. As a result of the evaluation of said indications of infraction and under the provisions of the Single Ordered Text of the General Administrative Procedure Law, Law No. 27444, approved by Supreme Decree No. 004-2019-JUS (hereinafter, TUO LPAG), the General Intendancy of Prudential Compliance, through Official Letter No. 206-2023-SMV/10.3, notified on 13 January 2023 (hereinafter, OFFICIAL LETTER OF CHARGES), formulated charges against CREDICORP SAB for infractions to the Regulation of Intermediation Agents, approved by SMV Resolution No. 034-2015-SMV-01 and its amendments (hereinafter, RAI);
3. On 27 January 2023, CREDICORP SAB presented its discharges to the observations made;
4. The charges formulated against CREDICORP SAB, as well as the discharges of the latter and their evaluation have been subject to analysis in Report No. 239-2023-SMV/10.3, which has been submitted to the knowledge of this Deputy Superintendency;
5. In observance of the Principle of Due Process contemplated both in Article IV, numeral 1.2, of the Preliminary Title and in article 248, subsection 2, of the TUO LPAG, through Official Letter No. 697-2023-SMV/10, the administrative file to which this resolution refers was made available to CREDICORP SAB for its review;
6. In the present administrative procedure, in the opinion of this Deputy Superintendency, it corresponds to determine the following:
a) Whether CREDICORP SAB incurred or not in infraction by not having the account statement of a client and not contemplating the minimum content for account statements established in articles 18 and 92 of the RAI;
b) Whether CREDICORP SAB incurred or not in infraction by not complying with the provisions of its Manual for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter, MANUAL PLAFT) 1;
c) Whether CREDICORP SAB incurred or not in infraction by not communicating the over-the-counter operations carried out on its own account pursuant to article 196, subsection f) of the Securities Market Law, Legislative Decree No. 861 and its amendments, whose Single Ordered Text was approved by Supreme Decree No. 093-2002-EF, in force at the date of the events, (hereinafter, LMV)
[1] Of 28 June 2019, submitted by CREDICORP SAB on 3 July 2019 in response to Official Letter No. 3326-2019-SMV/10.3 of the IGSE. (File No. 2019029163).
d) Whether it corresponds or not to impose a sanction on CREDICORP SAB;
7. Articles 18 and 92 of the RAI, in force at the date of the events, establish the following:
"Article 18.- Account statement and its availability The client's account statement is a report that shows in detail the movements made during a determined period and the balances of Financial Instruments and resources in the name of a client. The account statement must have the information contained in article 92. (…)”2
“Article 92.- Content of the account statement Each client must have an account statement, which must contain at least the following information for each transaction carried out:
a) Transaction date.
b) Type of transaction: Purchase, sale, collection, payment, transfer or any other.
c) Description corresponding to the type of transaction: The description must be clear and sufficient to identify the nature of the transaction, especially in the case of transfers or others different from purchases, sales, collections or payments.
d) Identification of the corresponding document: policy, receipt or other.
e) In the case of purchase and sale operations of Financial Instruments, for each of these:
1. Name of the Financial Instrument;
2. The quantity purchased and/or sold; and,
3. Unit price.
f) Currency of the transaction.
g) Amount of the transaction.
h) Monetary balance at the end of each date.
In addition, the client's account statement must present separately and clearly, the balance of all Financial Instruments owned by the client, under the control or responsibility of the Agent, specifying their availability status or any other.
[2] Article 18 of the RAI was modified by Article 1 of Superintendente Resolution No. 108-2020-SMV-02, published on 04 November 2020, being worded as follows: "Article 18.- Account Statement The client's account statement is a report of the services provided to the client by the Agent during a determined period, which shows in detail the movements made in said period and the balances of Financial Instruments and resources in their name. The account statement must have the information contained in Article 92."
In the case of Financial Instruments managed in global accounts in the name of the Agent, the name of the Depository or Custody Institution of said Financial Instruments must be specified."
8. As a result of the inspection ordered by Oficio No. 3569-2019-SMV/10.2, and carried out from 15 July to 21 August 2019 (hereinafter, the INSPECTION), possible non-compliances with the regulations applicable to stock brokerage firms by CREDICORP SAB were observed in relation to the availability and content of the account statements of a sample of clients, which were requested by Memorandum No. 002-2019-SMV-INSP.CREDICORP SAB of 23 July 2019 (hereinafter, MEMORANDUM No. 002-2019)3 .
9. First, it was observed that twenty-two (22) client account statements, which are shown in Table No. 1, from the period January to June 2019, did not include the minimum content established in Articles 18 and 92 of the RAI.
TABLE No. 1 Clients with observed account statements
| No. | Client code | Code type | Intermediation in National Market | Intermediation in Foreign Market |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 20002132 | SAB | X | |
| 2 | 20012717 | SAB | X | |
| 3 | 904647 | RUT | X | |
| 4 | 20047431 | SAB | X | |
| 5 | 20003871 | SAB | X | |
| 6 | 1266804 | RUT | X | |
| 7 | 955590 | RUT | X | |
| 8 | 322182 | RUT | X | |
| 9 | 20077799 | SAB | X | |
| 10 | 207643819 | MDC | X | |
| 11 | 211879678 | MDC | X | |
| 12 | 20078885 | SAB | X | |
| 13 | 242933 | RUT | X | |
| 14 | 20073672 | SAB | X | |
| 15 | 120495561 | MDC | X | |
| 16 | 20043186 | SAB | X | |
| 17 | 923870 | RUT | X | |
| 18 | 922341 | RUT | X | |
| 19 | 20070048 | SAB | X | X |
| 20 | 20003214 | SAB | X | X |
| 21 | 20046898 | SAB | X | X |
[3] By means of MEMORANDUM No. 002-2019, among others, the account statements of a sample of twenty-five (25) clients were requested, in soles and in dollars, covering the period from 1 January 2019 to 30 June 2019.
| No. | Client code | Code type | Intermediation in the Domestic Market | Intermediation in the Foreign Market |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | 20003513 | SAB | X | X |
10. Indeed, in the account statements of the clients indicated in Table No. 1, to whom CREDICORP SAB provided intermediation services in the local market, it was observed that CREDICORP SAB did not report the monetary balances at the end of each date for each transaction carried out;
11. Likewise, in the account statements of the clients to whom CREDICORP SAB additionally provided intermediation services in the foreign market, indicated in Table No. 1, it was observed that they did not include the dates and type of the transactions, such as purchase, sale, collection, payment, transfer or any other, such as the purchase and sale of financial instruments and the payment of dividends; the monetary balance at the end of each date for each transaction carried out, among other information indicated in article 92 of the RAI. Additionally, it was observed that CREDICORP SAB did not specify the availability status of the financial instruments owned by the clients, under the control or responsibility of the brokerage firm, nor did it specify the name of the depository or custody institution of the financial instruments managed in the global accounts in the name of the stock brokerage firm;
12. Secondly, it was observed that CREDICORP SAB did not prove that it had the account statement of the client identified with RUT Code No. 171857 for the period from January to June 2019, requested through MEMORANDUM No. 002-2019. In this regard, in the email of 31 July 2019, CREDICORP SAB stated that it did not have custody of the securities of the aforementioned client; therefore, it did not have its securities held in its master account;
13. The observations described were brought to the attention of CREDICORP SAB with Official Letter No. 1065-2020-SMV/10.2, notified on 26 February 2020 (hereinafter, OFFICIAL LETTER OF OBSERVATIONS). In response to the aforementioned official letter, the stock brokerage firm stated the following4:
Due to the limitations that our systems present, CCSAB has difficulties in sending a single account statement to our clients that fully complies with the provisions of article 18 of the RAI, so that it reflects (i) the detail of all movements carried out during a given period; and, (ii) the balances of instruments and resources in the name of a client.
Regarding the aforementioned numeral (i), by September 2019 the CCSAB custody team began the implementation of improvements to the Quipu system, with the purpose that the account statements reflect the detail of the transaction movements (Annex 5 and Annex 6). In view of the current situation, the production and delivery phase of the system was delayed, from June 2020 to December 2020. Although the foregoing is not a definitive solution to the observation identified by the SMV, we consider that in the short term it will be beneficial for our clients to have the new version of the account statement.”
14. In accordance with the foregoing, it was imputed to CREDICORP SAB that it would have incurred the infraction classified as serious typified in subsection
[4] Through the letter submitted on 20 August 2020.
2.24, numeral 2, of Annex X of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01, (hereinafter, SANCTIONS REGULATION), which establishes as an infraction of a serious nature “Not having an account statement for each client, not complying with the minimum content and other provisions established in the regulation on the matter”;
15. CREDICORP SAB states that it expressly acknowledges the commission of the infraction; this in order to contribute to a correct and proportional graduation of the sanction to be imposed, if deemed necessary;
16. In this sense, the intermediary states that since May 2021, it has implemented an improvement in its system so that its clients can view in their respective account statement the detail of all movements corresponding to a given period. It states that it attaches to its brief an extract of the corrected information, in the form presented as of the aforementioned date;
17. In principle, it should be noted that CREDICORP SAB has acknowledged the commission of the infraction subject to charge relating to the availability and content of the account statements of the clients requested in the INSPECTION. Such acknowledgment will be considered when evaluating the sanction to be imposed;
18. Additionally, CREDICORP SAB states that, in May 2021, it implemented an improvement in its system so that its clients can view in their respective account statements the detail of all corresponding movements, indicating that, as of the aforementioned date, the form in which the information is presented is as in the account statement corresponding to the period December 2022 attached to its brief;
19. In this sense, it has been proven that the stock brokerage firm did not have the account statement corresponding to the client identified with RUT No. 171857 requested through MEMORANDUM No. 002-2019 and that the account statements of the clients indicated in Table No. 1, reviewed during the INSPECTION, do not include the minimum content established in articles 18 and 92 of the RAI;
20. In accordance with the foregoing, CREDICORP SAB incurred the infraction classified as serious typified in Annex X, numeral 2, subsection 2.24, of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, which establishes as an infraction of a serious nature “Not having an account statement for each client, not complying with the minimum content and other provisions established in the regulation on the matter”;
21. Article 3 of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 033-2011-EF-94.01.1 and its amendments (hereinafter, PLAFT RULES) provides the following:
"Article 3.- Purpose and Scope of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention System (...) 3.2 (...). Likewise, obligated subjects must ensure that their directors, managers and workers have a high level of integrity, gathering information on their personal, employment, financial and credit history backgrounds, requiring them to submit a sworn statement of assets. This information must be recorded in the file of each director, manager and worker of the obligated subject, and must be kept permanently up to date".
22. Likewise, item 2.4.1. "System for evaluating the personal, employment and financial backgrounds of personnel" of section 2, "Prevention mechanisms", of the PLAFT MANUAL in force at the date of the events, establishes the following:
"2. Prevention Mechanisms (...)
The Administration and Human Resources area safeguards and administers personnel files, which shall contain the personal and employment documents of each worker; likewise, the aforementioned management shall ensure the proper updating of the documentation, in accordance with the provisions of current regulations.
In this regard, all personnel of Credicorp Capital Peru SAA and subsidiaries must have a file, which must be continuously updated and shall contain at least the documentation detailed below:
Personal background.
Employment background.
Statement of Assets, a mandatory document for every director, manager, officer and employee of Credicorp Capital Peru SAA and subsidiaries.
Credit history.
Training on the SPLAFT.
Letter of Commitment to the principles of the Code of Conduct for PLAFT.
Likewise, it is the responsibility of the collaborator to inform the Administration and Human Resources area of any change in their assets, for which they must update the information contained in the application used by the GDH of Credicorp Capital Peru SAA and subsidiaries".
23. During the INSPECTION, the personal files of a sample of six (6) workers of CREDICORP SAB were reviewed, requested through MEMORANDUM No. 002-2019 dated 23 July 2019;
| No. | Collaborator |
|---|---|
| 1 | Alfonso Enrique Cornejo Ruiz |
| 2 | Sonia Peñaloza Murillo |
| 3 | Enrique Manuel Bolaños Gordillo |
| 4 | Luis Carlos Fermi Blanco |
| 5 | Jose Espósito Li Carrillo |
| 6 | Oscar Alfredo Bernal Arredondo |
24. According to the system for evaluating the personal, employment and financial backgrounds of personnel, established in the PLAFT MANUAL, in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the PLAFT RULES, all personnel of the stock brokerage firm must have a file, which must be continuously updated and shall contain at least: (i) personal background, (ii) employment background, (iii) statement of assets, (iv) credit history, (v) training on SPLAFT, and (vi) letter of commitment to the principles of the code of conduct for PLAFT;
25. However, with the review during the INSPECTION of the files of the sample workers, it was observed that the personal file corresponding to worker Sonia Peñaloza Murillo did not contain the credit history and that the personal files of workers Enrique Manuel Bolaños Gordillo, Luis Carlos Fermi Blanco and Oscar Alfredo Bernal Arredondo did not contain the SPLAFT training;
26. Through the OFFICIAL LETTER OF OBSERVATIONS, CREDICORP SAB was informed, among others, of the observation described so that the company adopts the pertinent measures and reports on them. In response to the aforementioned official letter, the stock brokerage firm stated the following:
"c) Regarding the Due Diligence of Knowledge of Personnel, regarding the information in the personal files, we must indicate the following:
The information on Mrs. Peñaloza's credit history has been documented. However, we must point out that the credit history held by Mrs. Peñaloza was indeed known, since this information was in the file of Credicorp Capital Colombia (former company where she worked). In view of the aforementioned, we are updating the process for the transfer of collaborators who come from other companies of the Credicorp group.
Regarding the PLAFT training, we attach the evidence that accredits the monitoring of compliance with the development of the training and the results obtained by Messrs. Bolaños, Fermi and Bernal (the latter is in our records with the highest grade in the PLAFT courses corresponding to the year 2018). In the cases of Messrs. Bolaños and Fermi, although they did not take the second PLAFT course of 2018 (for which they were subject to exhortation emails), it was confirmed that the corrective measures were effective since both registered the highest grade in the two PLAFT courses deployed in the year 2019.
(...)".
27. In this regard, it should be noted that the information related to Mrs. Peñaloza's credit history and the documents accrediting the SPLAFT training of Messrs. Bolaños, Fermi and Bernal are not in the file of the INSPECTION;
28. In that sense, it was noted that CREDICORP SAB would not have complied with the provisions of item 2.4.1 of the Plaft Manual, in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the PLAFT RULES, given that the files of the workers reviewed during the INSPECTION did not include the minimum documentation established in application of the PLAFT MANUAL. In accordance with the foregoing, it was imputed to CREDICORP SAB that it would have incurred an infraction classified as serious, in accordance with Annex XVI, numeral 2, subsection 2.1 of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, according to which the following constitutes an infraction: “Not having the Code of Conduct or the Manual of the system for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing or, having them, not applying them”;
29. CREDICORP SAB expressly acknowledges that it was able to verify that in the personal file of Mrs. Sonia Peñaloza Murillo the summary of her credit history had not been filed, despite having the highest market standards for the selection and hiring of personnel, which includes the review and verification of their technical, economic and moral suitability before incorporating them into any of the group's companies;
30. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the stock brokerage firm emphasizes that, as was evidenced in the inspection visit carried out by the SMV audit team, Mrs. Peñaloza's file did contain the following information: personal background, employment history, asset declaration, academic training, and sworn declaration of commitment to comply with the policies and standards applicable to CREDICORP SAB;
31. CREDICORP SAB states that the aforementioned aspects allowed it to have adequate knowledge of the moral and economic suitability of Mrs. Peñaloza, which is why it considers that its PLAFT system fulfills its purpose, as required by the PLAFT NORMS;
32. Additionally, it reports that it incorporated a new provision for the recruitment of foreign collaborators, which can be seen in the Recruitment, Selection and Hiring Policy: “Only for foreign candidates: It will ask the candidate to present the necessary documents that evidence adequate credit behavior in their country of origin”;
33. Regarding the information on PLAFT training, CREDICORP SAB points out that, as was reported during the INSPECTION, the training carried out by its compliance team on PLAFT topics is executed through a virtual platform specially designed for said purpose. It indicates that one of the functionalities of this platform is the recording of participation and results of the evaluations that personnel obtain after completing the training, which are stored electronically on it;
34. CREDICORP SAB declares that it did have a record of the training of all personnel for the year 2018, referring to annex 4 of its brief. It specifies that in the particular case of Messrs. Bolaños and Fermi, the training certificate for the PLAFT course was not found in their files because they did not take it, so it was materially impossible to have it. It adds that once the compliance unit became aware of said situation, the corresponding corrective measures were executed against these collaborators for not taking these exams; which consisted of emails dated 27 December 2018 through which Messrs. Bolaños and Fermi were informed of which November 2018 courses they had not completed and urged them to comply in the future with taking such types of courses;
35. The stock brokerage firm highlights that, as indicated in subsection g) of point 2.4.2 of its PLAFT Manual, the information and records of PLAFT training are safeguarded by Human Management and Development (GDH) with respect to all personnel of the companies that make up the Credicorp Capital Group. Therefore, it reiterates that it did have information regarding the training of Messrs. Bernal, Bolaños and Fermi, which, according to it, was made available to the inspection team at the time. Therefore, it states that the objective pursued by the norm would have been complied with, which consists of training the collaborators of the obligated subjects on compliance with the PLAFT Norms and preserving the supporting information on these trainings;
36. CREDICORP SAB adds that it has a PLAFT Manual prepared within the framework of the PLAFT NORMS that has been applied efficiently, complying with the objectives pursued by the regulations, therefore, it considers that no sanction should be applied for the facts described above;
37. CREDICORP SAB states that it expressly acknowledges that it did not file the summary of the credit history of Mrs. Sonia Peñaloza in her personal file or record, however, as detailed below, as a result of the evaluation of said acknowledgment as a mitigating factor of responsibility, it is considered that the intermediary did not expressly acknowledge the commission of the infraction in this regard;
38. Indeed, the stock brokerage firm declares that the information that was contained in Mrs. Peñaloza's personal file, such as personal and employment background, allowed it to have adequate knowledge of the economic and moral suitability of its worker, which is why it considers that its PLAFT system fulfills its purpose, as required by the PLAFT NORMS;
39. In this regard, it should be noted that said fact does not release CREDICORP SAB from its obligation to collect information referring to the credit history of its workers, information that must appear in the corresponding file or record;
40. Likewise, it should be noted that the aforementioned obligation is not limited by the nationality of the employees of the obligated subjects, so the new provision in the Recruitment, Selection and Hiring Policy described in the defense is not relevant in the analysis contained in this resolution;
41. Regarding the facts related to the personal files of the employees Enrique Bolaños, Luis Fermi and Oscar Bernal, CREDICORP SAB states that it did have a record of the training of all personnel for 2018, referring to annex 4 of its brief, which consists of an Excel file titled “PLAFT Report”. It should be noted that said file shows the alleged training received by the aforementioned gentlemen for the periods 2017-2, 2018-1, 2018-2, 2019-1 and 2019-2, observing that for the period 2018-2, Messrs. Bolaños and Fermi have no evaluation grade;
42. On this matter, first, it should be noted that the “PLAFT Report” does not constitute the information submitted in response to MEMORANDUM No. 002-2019, since said document was not part of the personal files of the employees presented by CREDICORP SAB in response to the aforementioned memorandum within the provided term, but rather an annex attached to the response to the OBSERVATIONS LETTER, provided by the stock brokerage firm on 20 August 2020;
43. Second, it must be taken into account that, as indicated in the PLAFT MANUAL, paragraph 2.4.2, subparagraph g)5, CREDICORP SAB was required to have a record of each employee's proof of participation in PLAFT training; however, it is noted that said proof of participation is not the “PLAFT Report” submitted, since the same, as CREDICORP SAB states in response to the OBSERVATIONS LETTER, constitutes the evidence that accredits the monitoring of compliance with the development of the training and the results obtained by the employees, that is, it constitutes a different document;
44. Additionally, it should be noted that the charge under evaluation does not refer to whether the training on the SPLAFT was carried out or not by Messrs. Bolaños and Remi in 2018, but rather to CREDICORP SAB's compliance with its obligation to collect at least the information detailed in the PLAFT MANUAL, paragraph 2.4.1, in the personal files of its employees;
45. For the foregoing, it has been evidenced that CREDICORP SAB has not complied with the provisions of the PLAFT MANUAL, paragraph 2.4.1, in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the PLAFT NORMS, given that the employees' files, reviewed during the INSPECTION, did not include the minimum documentation established in application of the PLAFT MANUAL;
46. According to the foregoing, CREDICORP SAB has incurred an infraction classified as serious, according to Annex XVI, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2.1 of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, according to which it constitutes an infraction: “Not having the Code of Conduct or the Manual of the system for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing or, having them, not applying them”;
47. Article 196, subparagraph f) of the LMV establishes the following:
“Article 196.- Obligations and Responsibilities The obligations and responsibilities of brokerage firms are: (…) f) Provide CONASEV, with the periodicity it determines, with information concerning its activities and operations, as well as its financial statements, duly audited by auditing firms; (…)” (Underline added)
48. Likewise, it should be noted that article 6 of the Regulation of Participation of Likewise, article 88 of the RAI states:
[5] “The Administration and Human Resources area must maintain the record of each employee's proof of participation in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention training”.
The SMV establishes, through general provisions, the form, means and other technical specifications that the Agent must comply with regarding the preparation and submission of its information to the SMV.”
49. In light of this, the Manual of Technical Specifications for the Remission to the SMV of Information of Intermediation Agents, approved by Superintendency Resolution No. 026-2012-SMV/01 (hereinafter, MANUAL OF SPECIFICATIONS) establishes the guidelines that intermediation agents must follow for compliance with their obligations to submit information to the SMV. Paragraph 1.2, point 1.2.1 of the referred document establishes the information that intermediation agents must submit:
The provisions indicated in the following point establish the obligations of the AI to submit to the SMV information related to:
Client Data.
Intermediation operations data: orders, allocations and policies.
Intermediated amounts.
(…)”
(Underline added)
50. Regarding intermediation operations, article 47 of the REGULATION indicates:
The intermediation activity is a process that fundamentally comprises the performance of any of the following acts, whether in the local or foreign market:
a) Receipt of orders on behalf of third parties.
b) Recording of orders on behalf of third parties.
c) Transmission of orders on behalf of third parties.
d) Execution and allocation of operations.
Negotiation of Financial Instruments that the Agent carries out on its own account also constitutes intermediation.”
(Underline added)
51. As a result of the review of the information from Cavali S.A. I.C.L.V. regarding securities transactions through private operations, it was identified that, between 1 October and 31 December 2021, CREDICORP SAB carried out seven hundred eighty-eight (788) transactions on its own account outside centralized trading mechanisms with the financial instruments “SB12AGO24”, “SB12AGO32” and “SB12AGO28” with ISIN “PEP01000C4W4”,
[6] Intermediation Agent.
“PEP01000C5E9” and “PEP01000C5D1”, respectively, which were not reported to the SMV;
52. Likewise, with respect to the instruments “SB12AGO32” and “SB12AGO28”, the transactions carried out by CREDICORP SAB on its own account in over-the-counter markets between 1 January and 31 March 2022 were reviewed; as a result, it identified six (6) transactions carried out between 11 and 17 January 2022 that were not reported to the SMV in accordance with the MANUAL DE ESPECIFICACIONES. Those transactions, as well as those mentioned in the preceding recital, were detailed in the OFICIO DE CARGOS;
53. By means of Oficio Nº 567-2022-SMV/10.27, notified to CREDICORP SAB on 9 February 2022, the brokerage firm was informed of the facts described above regarding the transactions on its own account from October to December 2021. In the official letter, the brokerage firm was requested to confirm whether the transactions had been reported in the daily files or, failing that, to explain the reasons why those transactions were not reported;
54. In response, by means of the letter submitted on 16 February 2022, the brokerage firm indicated that the transactions referred to in the official letter should not be reported through the daily transaction files because they were not considered “intermediation” transactions in which there is an order involved, in accordance with what was informed in various telephone conversations and communications addressed to the SMV through Files No. 20190067818 and No. 2022005247;
55. Likewise, CREDICORP SAB pointed out that the transactions were transactions carried out in over-the-counter markets by CREDICORP SAB with foreign “counterparties” and brokers, most of which were not its clients;
56. By means of Oficio Nº 817-2022-SMV/10.29, notified to CREDICORP SAB on 24 February 2022, the intermediary was informed that, in accordance with the last paragraph of article 47 of the RAI, the negotiation of financial instruments that the intermediation agent carries out on its own account also constitutes intermediation. In the same official letter, the brokerage firm was informed that the coordinations to which CREDICORP SAB refers in its letter of 16 February 202210 dated from 2019, and that at the meeting of 18 September 2019, the intermediary's representatives indicated that it would submit the information on the transactions on its own
[7] File 2022005247.
[8] With respect to the supervisory actions contained in File No. 2019006781, it should be noted that they referred to compliance with the provisions of the MANUAL DE ESPECIFICACIONES in relation to the structure and consistency of the information previously submitted (information covering the period from July to October 2018), but did not consist of a verification, with different sources, of an omission to submit information. Therefore, it is not related to the aspects subject to evaluation in the present case.
[9] With file 2022005247.
[10] In order to clarify the various coordinations to which CREDICORP SAB refers in its letter of 16 February 2022, the IGSE attached to Oficio Nº 817-2022-SMV/10.2 a copy of the email dated 16 September 2019 by which the officials of CREDICORP SAB request a meeting and detail the situation subject to consultation, indicating as a proposal the following: “(…) In order to be able to comply with the submission of information, the proposal is to report all transactions carried out by CCB, (CCB Buy, CCB Sell) without the need to report the data of the counterparty with which the trade was closed, information that could be provided in detail when requested by the regulator.” The IGSE indicates that at the meeting held on 18 September 2019, it was confirmed that the proposed criterion was in accordance with the provisions of the regulations, so the officials of CREDICORP SAB indicated that they would report the transactions on their own account.
own account. Likewise, in Oficio Nº 817-2022-SMV/10.2, CREDICORP SAB was informed that despite having identified the situation described since, at least, fiscal year 2019 and having received comments from SMV officials through a meeting, CREDICORP SAB, as of 24 February 2022, had not complied with remedying the non-compliance voluntarily; therefore, it was required to make the corresponding adjustments to its systems in order to report to the SMV the transactions in the daily files according to the MANUAL DE ESPECIFICACIONES;
57. In response to the requirement, CREDICORP SAB submits the letter of 31 March 2022, by which it indicates that it is ready to report the transactions on its own account carried out in over-the-counter markets with foreign “counterparties” and brokers in the daily files11;
58. Subsequently, with respect to the financial instruments “SB12AGO24”, “SB12AGO32” and “SB12AGO28” with ISIN “PEP01000C4W4”, “PEP01000C5E9” and “PEP01000C5D1”, respectively, it was verified that all transactions carried out by CREDICORP SAB on its own account in over-the-counter markets from 1 April to 10 May 2022 were reported to the SMV;
59. CREDICORP SAB expressly acknowledges the commission of the infraction related to the failure to communicate the over-the-counter transactions carried out on its own account;
60. Furthermore, in order to contribute to the correct gradation of the sanction to be imposed, it states that through File 2022005247, it complied with informing the SMV that as of 01 April 2022, it has implemented the operational and technological developments that allow it to report, through daily files, the operations carried out in over-the-counter markets with foreign counterparties and brokers by CREDICORP SAB;
61. It requests that it be taken into account that, through the daily files and as required, it has complied with reporting the intermediation operations to which the OFICIO CARGOS refers as of 01 April 2022;
62. CREDICORP SAB has expressly acknowledged the commission of the infraction subject to charges referring to the failure to communicate the over-the-counter operations carried out on its own account that were the subject of observation in the OFICIO DE CARGOS; which will be considered at the time of evaluating the sanction to be imposed;
63. On the other hand, the stock brokerage firm states that, as of 1 April 2022, it reports the operations carried out in over-the-counter markets with foreign counterparties and brokers on its own account. In this regard, it should be reiterated that it was verified that the operations carried out by CREDICORP SAB on its own account in over-the-counter markets from 1 April to 10 May 2022 with respect to the financial instruments “SB12AGO24”, “SB12AGO32” and “SB12AGO28” with ISIN “PEP01000C4W4”, “PEP01000C5E9” and “PEP01000C5D1”, respectively, were reported to the SMV;
[11] It should be mentioned that CREDICORP SAB requested an additional period to make the corresponding adjustments to its systems and report the operations as of 1 April 2022.
64. In that sense, it is noted that CREDICORP SAB breached the provisions of the applicable regulations, since it failed to submit information regarding the operations on its own account with the financial instruments “SB12AGO24”, “SB12AGO32” and “SB12AGO28” with ISIN “PEP01000C4W4”, “PEP01000C5E9” and “PEP01000C5D1”, respectively, carried out between 1 October 2021 and 17 January 2022;
65. According to the foregoing, CREDICORP SAB has incurred an infraction classified as minor, in accordance with Annex I, numeral 3, subsection 3.6 of the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS; according to which it constitutes an infraction: “Submit after the deadline, or fail to submit, the documentation or information, other than that indicated in the preceding numeral 3.1, that they are obliged to provide by regulation or by requirement of the SMV or fail to submit it in accordance with the technical specifications, when applicable, or submit it incompletely”;
66. In accordance with article 348° of the LMV, article 25° of the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS, in accordance with article 248°, numeral 312, of the TUO LPAG13 and article 25714 of the aforementioned normative body15; the administrative sanctions to be imposed must take into account the criteria set forth by the LMV, the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS and the TUO DE LA LPAG;
67. Within that framework, the evaluation of the sanction must consider: a) antecedents of the offender; b) recidivism; c) the circumstances of the
[12] Article 230°, numeral 3 of Law No. 27444 (hereinafter, LPAG).
[13] “Article 248.- Principles of administrative sanctioning power The sanctioning power of all entities is additionally governed by the following special principles: (…) 3. Reasonableness.- The authorities must foresee that the commission of the sanctionable conduct is not more advantageous for the offender than complying with the infringed norms or assuming the sanction. However, the sanctions to be applied must be proportional to the non-compliance classified as an infraction, observing the following criteria that are indicated for the purposes of their gradation: a) The illicit benefit resulting from the commission of the infraction; b) The probability of detection of the infraction; c) The severity of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal good; d) The economic harm caused; e) Recidivism, for the commission of the same infraction within a period of one (1) year from when the resolution that sanctioned the first infraction became final. f) The circumstances of the commission of the infraction; and g) The existence or not of intentionality in the conduct of the offender”.
[14] “Article 257°.- Exemptions and mitigating circumstances of liability for infractions 1.- The following constitute conditions exempting liability for infractions: a) Fortuitous event or force majeure duly proven. b) Acting in compliance with a legal duty or the legitimate exercise of the right of defense. c) Mental incapacity duly proven by the competent authority, provided that it affects the ability to understand the infraction. d) The mandatory order of a competent authority, issued in the exercise of its functions. e) The error induced by the Administration or by a confusing or illegal administrative provision. f) The voluntary correction by the possible sanctioned party of the act or omission imputed as constituting an administrative infraction, prior to the notification of the imputation of charges referred to in subsection 3) of article 253. 2.- The following constitute conditions mitigating liability for infractions: a) If, once an administrative sanctioning procedure has been initiated, the offender acknowledges its responsibility expressly and in writing. In cases where the applicable sanction is a fine, it is reduced to an amount not less than half of its amount. b) Others established by special norm”.
[15] Article 2° of Legislative Decree No. 1272 modified article 236-A of the LPAG, and in that sense incorporates and restructures the assumptions of exemptions and mitigating circumstances of liability.
commission of the infringement; d) the harm caused and the repercussion on the market; e) the illicit benefit resulting from the commission of the infringement; f) probability of detection of the infringement; g) seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest; h) the existence or not of intent in the conduct of the infringer;
68. With regard to the seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest, in the present case it has not been possible to prove that the actions of CREDICORP SAB in the commission of the infringements analyzed in this sanctioning proceeding have caused damage to the public interest;
69. Notwithstanding the foregoing, with respect to the infringement described in the first charge under evaluation, it must be noted that the breach of the provisions of articles 18 and 92 of the RAI by CREDICORP SAB resulted in the company's clients not being able to have their account statements with the minimum established content, thereby affecting the legal interest of investor protection. It should be noted that the information omitted in the corresponding account statements must be provided to the principals so that they can monitor the movement of their funds and securities after the settlements of each of their operations, which in turn contributes to an adequate process of making investment decisions and contracting services; this in protection of the interests of investors;
70. Consequently, the infringement mentioned in the preceding recital affects the confidence that investors may have in brokerage firms in the diligent performance of their functions in the securities market; likewise, as a result of said situation, the minimum caution that such companies must exercise in order not to harm, through their actions, not only the interests of their clients, but also those of the company itself, is neglected;
71. On the other hand, it must be mentioned that the infringement described in the second charge under evaluation, referring to compliance with the PLAFT MANUAL in the personnel due diligence procedure, affects the confidence that investors may have in brokerage firms;
72. In this regard, it should be noted that the procedures that allow the company to adequately manage the LAFT risks to which it is exposed must be applied by all workers of the obligated subject, who are required to have a high level of integrity by applying due diligence procedures in personnel knowledge;
73. Likewise, it should be noted that it is essential that obligated subjects comply with all preventive measures against money laundering and terrorist financing set forth in the PLAFT NORMS, since these allow them to manage their money laundering risks through the establishment of procedures, policies and controls detailed in the norms, as well as those linked to the timely detection and reporting of suspicious operations;
74. Consequently, the breach of the obligations established in the aforementioned norms does not allow them to fully achieve the purpose of the money laundering prevention system and therefore does not allow for the adequate prevention that must exist to safeguard the integrity of the market; likewise, as previously noted, it affects the confidence that investors may have in brokerage firms in the diligent performance of their functions in the securities market;
75. With regard to the infringement described in the third charge, it is necessary to state that the information referring to own-account operations carried out by CREDICORP SAB is used by the SMV, within the framework of prudential supervision, to identify the risks to which an intermediation agent is exposed, since pursuant to article 141 of the RAI, the SMV may order the constitution of additional guarantees by intermediation agents based on the operations and risks they assume. Therefore, the breach by CREDICORP SAB affected the supervision and control work of the SMV, since it did not allow for adequate control of the own-account operations of the intermediation agent, which in turn exposes the resources of the company's investor clients to risks that are not duly identified and mitigated;
76. Regarding the harm caused and the repercussion on the market, in the present case, it has not been evidenced that the infringements incurred by CREDICORP SAB have produced a concrete quantifiable harm in the market, that is, it has not been determined that one or more investors have been concretely affected or caused economic damage, and therefore it has also not been evidenced that there has been a repercussion on the market;
77. With regard to the sanction history, it should be noted that in accordance with the provisions of article 25° of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, final sanctions imposed by the SMV within a period of four (4) years prior to the commission of the infringement to be sanctioned constitute antecedents with respect to any type of infringement;
78. In this sense, from the review carried out in said period, in relation to the charge under evaluation, it has been verified that CREDICORP SAB presents the following antecedents regarding the infringements subject to charges, some of which are related to the infringements object of this resolution:
| No. | Resolution | Resolved | Finality |
|---|---|---|---|
| i | Deputy Superintendent Resolution SMV No. 030-2017-SMV/1016 | CREDICORP SAB is sanctioned with a reprimand for having incurred one (01) serious infraction classified in Annex X, numeral 2, subparagraph 2.14 of the Sanctions Regulations; and one (01) minor infraction classified in Annex X, numeral 3, subparagraph 3.14 of the Sanctions Regulations; for not having verified that a client's account statement does not show, for each transaction carried out, the information regarding the identification of the corresponding document, nor the monetary balance at the end of each date; and for not timely communicating a relevant fact, respectively. | 12/06/2017 |
| ii | Deputy Superintendent of SMV Resolution No. 087-2017-SMV/1017 | CREDICORP SAB is sanctioned with a fine of two (02) UIT for having incurred thirteen (13) minor infractions classified in Annex X, numeral 3, subparagraph 3.14 of the PREVIOUS SANCTIONS REGULATIONS. | 11/10/2017 |
| iii | Deputy Superintendent of SMV Resolution No. 116-2017-SMV/1018 | CREDICORP SAB is sanctioned with a fine of six (06) UIT for having incurred two (02) serious infractions classified in Annex X, numeral 2, subparagraph 2.14 of the Sanctions Regulations by registering orders outside the term established by the applicable regulations and not including in the respective Account Statements the | 11/01/2018 |
[16] Notified on 19 May 2017.
[17] Notified on 19 September 2017.
[18] Notified on 16 December 2017.
| No. | Resolution | Resolved | Finality |
|---|---|---|---|
| information corresponding to the monetary balance at the end of each date. | |||
| iv | Deputy Superintendent of SMV Resolution No. 001-2019-SMV/1019 | CREDICORP SAB is sanctioned with a fine amounting to 4 UIT for having incurred nine (09) minor infractions classified in Annex X, numeral 3, subparagraph 3.14 of the Sanctions Regulations for not having complied with communicating nine (09) relevant facts within the term established in the applicable regulations and one (01) serious infraction, classified in Annex XIX, numeral 2, subparagraph 2.12 of the Sanctions Regulations, for not submitting the Semiannual Report of the Compliance Officer within the term established in the Norms for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. | 14/02/2019 |
79. With regard to recidivism for the commission of the same infraction, the final sanction imposed by the SMV within one (1) year prior to the commission of the infraction to be sanctioned is taken into account. Within this framework, it must be stated that CREDICORP SAB does not present sanctions within the aforementioned term, for the commission of the same infractions subject to analysis in this administrative sanctioning procedure, so this criterion is not met;
80. Regarding the circumstances of the commission of the infractions, it must be mentioned that CREDICORP SAB is a company supervised by the SMV, with operating authorization granted by Resolución CONASEV N° 410-91-EF/94.10 of 20 August 1991, therefore it knows the norms that regulate the securities market and, in that sense, the obligations contained in the RAI, the NORMAS PLAFT, and the MANUAL DE ESPECIFICACIONES; notwithstanding the foregoing, it incurred in the commission of the infractions subject to charges;
81. Regarding the first infraction, it should be noted that the company's noncompliance with the regulations persisted during the months between January and June 2019, the period covered by the account statements requested in the INSPECTION. It should be noted that after the INSPECTION, the stock brokerage firm stated that due to the limitations of its systems, it had difficulties in sending a single account statement to its clients that fully complies with the provisions of article 18 of the RAI; CREDICORP SAB specifying that as of May 2021 its clients can view in their respective account statements the detail of all corresponding movements;
82. On the other hand, the stock brokerage firm breached the provisions of the NORMAS PLAFT and the MANUAL PLAFT by not collecting the information established in the personal files of its workers;
83. Regarding the third charge under evaluation, CREDICORP SAB failed to inform the SMV, through daily files, of the operations carried out in over-the-counter markets with foreign counterparties and brokers on its own account; a situation that had been observed since 2019 and that, due to commitments assumed in a meeting on 18 September 2019, the intermediary undertook to remedy; however, it did not do so, so this was observed and
[19] Notified on 24 January 2019.
requested through Oficios N° 567 and 817-2022-SMV/10.2. Subsequently, CREDICORP SAB declared that as of 01 April 2022 it can report the information generated from that date;
84. Regarding the benefit resulting from the commission of the infraction, it must be noted that it has not been proven that CREDICORP SAB obtained a benefit directly related to any of the infractions subject to analysis in this administrative procedure;
85. Regarding the existence or not of intent in the offender's conduct, it has not been evidenced that CREDICORP SAB acted with intent in the commission of the infractions subject to charges;
86. With regard to the probability of detection of the infractions, it must be indicated that the infractions described in the first and second charges under analysis were evidenced as a result of the supervision and control actions carried out by the SMV regarding the regulations governing the activities of stock brokerage firms; said infractions were detected in the INSPECTION carried out on CREDICORP SAB, as a consequence of the review and analysis of the information and documentation provided by the company in this proceeding. Therefore, the probability of detection of these infractions was low;
87. Regarding the infraction related to the operations carried out by CREDICORP SAB not communicated to the SMV, it must be indicated that it was evidenced as a result of the supervision and control activities carried out by the SMV regarding compliance with the obligations to which brokerage firms are subject in the development of their functions, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable regulations, which implies the verification and comparison of the securities movements in the WARI system of Cavali S.A. I.C.L.V. with the operations information submitted by CREDICORP SAB; therefore, it is considered that the probability of detection of the infraction was high;
88. In relation to the voluntary declaration of the commission of the infraction and the contribution of the offender to its clarification, established in article 257, numeral 2, subparagraph a) of the TUO LPAG and in article 26 of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, it must be indicated that CREDICORP SAB has acknowledged the commission of the infractions subject of this sanctioning procedure related to the availability and content of the account statements of the clients reviewed during the INSPECTION; and, to the information to be presented on the operations for the intermediary's own account;
89. However, taking into account what is indicated in this resolution, it must be specified that CREDICORP SAB has not acknowledged the commission of the infraction related to the breach of the applicable regulations on due diligence in the knowledge of personnel;
90. Although CREDICORP SAB indicates that the credit history of Mrs. Peñaloza was not included in its file or personal record as a worker of CREDICORP SAB, the brokerage firm states that the personal background, employment background, asset declaration, academic training, and sworn declaration of commitment to comply with policies and regulations applicable to CREDICORP SAB of this worker, which were in her file, allowed it to have adequate knowledge of the moral and economic suitability that Mrs. Peñaloza possessed, which is why it considers that its PLAFT system fulfills its purpose, as required by the PLAFT NORMS. Additionally, it argued that it incorporated a new provision for the recruitment of foreign collaborators, which can be seen in the Recruitment, Selection and Hiring Policy;
91. Likewise, the brokerage firm states that it did have information regarding the training of Messrs. Bernal, Bolaños and Fermi, and that said information was made available to the INSPECTION team in due course;
92. Therefore, such statements are not considered an acknowledgment of responsibility for the imputed infraction, since said acknowledgment must be made precisely, concisely, clearly, expressly and unconditionally, and without ambiguous or contradictory expressions;
93. Consequently, in the present case, the acknowledgment of responsibility for the infraction subject of imputation related to the breach of the applicable regulations on due diligence in the knowledge of personnel is not configured, so the application of the acknowledgment as a mitigating factor does not correspond in this case;
94. On the other hand, it must be indicated that the brokerage firm has not hindered the clarification of the commission of the infractions subject of charges;
95. Therefore, it is concluded that CREDICORP SAB has incurred in the commission of two serious infractions and one minor infraction; therefore, in application of the concurrence of infractions provided by article 29° of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, in accordance with the provisions of article 248°, numeral 6 of the TUO DE LA LPAG; it corresponds to the present case to apply the sanction provided for infractions classified as serious;
96. In accordance with the provisions of article 34° of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, serious infractions are sanctioned with a fine of no less than twenty-five (25) and up to fifty (50) UIT or with the suspension of the authorization of operation for up to twenty (20) days, for each infraction;
97. In this regard, considering that CREDICORP SAB has acknowledged the commission of one of the serious infractions; not complying with the regulations related to the availability and content of the account statements of the clients reviewed during the INSPECTION; and, has not hindered its clarification; it corresponds to apply the provisions of article 26°, literals a), numeral 1) and b) of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, so the fine for said infraction must fluctuate between 12.5 UIT and 25 UIT; that is, a reduction of 50% of the range established for serious infractions;
98. However, according to the sanction criteria analyzed, and in application of the Principle of Reasonableness contemplated in article 248°, numeral 3 of the TUO DE LA LPAG, which states that sanctions must be proportional to the non-compliances classified as infractions, this Deputy Superintendence considers that it is possible to impose on CREDICORP SAB a sanction corresponding to a lower classification than that provided for serious infractions, in accordance with the provisions of article 25°, last paragraph of the SANCTIONS REGULATION; therefore, a fine sanction applicable to minor infractions corresponds to CREDICORP SAB, in accordance with the provisions of article 35 of the SANCTIONS REGULATION
In accordance with the provisions of article 32, numeral 16, of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF.
Article 1.- Declare that Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. has incurred the serious nature infraction typified in Annex X, numeral 2, subparagraph 2.24, of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01 and its amendments, since it did not have the account statement corresponding to the client identified with RUT No. 171857 and that its clients' account statements did not include the minimum content established by not reporting therein, for operations in the local market, the monetary balances at the end of each date for each transaction carried out, and for the foreign market, not including the dates and type of transactions, the availability status of the financial instruments owned by the clients, nor specifying the name of the depository or custody institution of the financial instruments managed in the global accounts in the name of the stock brokerage firm.
Article 2.- Declare that Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. has incurred the serious nature infraction typified in Annex XVI, numeral 2, subparagraph 2.1 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01 and its amendments, for not complying with the provisions established in the Norms for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and in its Manual for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, regarding due diligence in knowing the personnel.
Article 3.- Declare that Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. has incurred the serious nature infraction typified in Annex I, numeral 3, subparagraph 3.6 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01 and its amendments, for not complying with sending information related to own-account operations.
Article 4.- Sanction Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A with a fine of six (6) UIT, equivalent to S/ 25,200.00 (Twenty-five thousand two hundred and 00/100 Soles) for the provisions in articles 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution.
Article 5.- This resolution does not exhaust the administrative route, unless it is consented to, and may be challenged before the Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision through the filing of a reconsideration or appeal presented before it, within a period of fifteen (15) business days counted from the day following its notification.
Article 6.- In the event that this resolution is not subject to challenge through a reconsideration or appeal within fifteen (15) business days of notification and becomes final, it must be published on the SMV Institutional Page on the Single Digital Platform of the Peruvian State, in observance of the provisions of numeral 1, article 7 of the Policy on dissemination of regulatory projects, general legal norms, early agenda and other administrative acts of the SMV, approved by SMV Resolution No. 014-2014-SMV/01 and its amendment, and by the provisions of article 14 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01.
Article 7.- Transcribe this resolution to Credicorp Capital Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A, and to the Lima Stock Exchange S.A.
Register, communicate and publish.
Signed by: GUTIERREZ OCHOA Omar Dani Reason:
Omar Gutiérrez Ochoa
Deputy Superintendent
Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision
Note from RegAlert. AI assistants can read this document in full, and search 70,000+ more, through the RegAlert MCP connector (https://mcp.regalert.today/mcp). Free with an account. How to connect ChatGPT, Claude or Cursor.
The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01, (hereinafter, SANCTIONS REGULATION)”
“Regulation of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF”
“Manual of Technical Specifications for the Remission to the SMV of Information of Intermediation Agents, approved by Superintendency Resolution No. 026-2012-SMV/01”
“Policy on dissemination of regulatory projects... approved by SMV Resolution No. 014-2014-SMV/01”
More like this from SMV
SMV published 22 documents in the last 30 days. We email you each new one the day it's published.
Source: Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (Peru) — original document · Summary generated with machine assistance and checked by an AI reviewer before publication; the authoritative text is the regulator's original document. How RegAlert works
In RegAlert: added