Draft General Explanation for Amendments to the Measures for Financial Institutions and Virtual Asset Service Providers to Prevent Fraud Crime Hazards

The Financial Supervisory Commission, pursuant to Articles 8 through 11 of the Fraud Crime Hazard Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as "this Act"), promulgated the "Measures for Financial Institutions and Virtual Asset Service Providers to Prevent Fraud Crime Hazards" (hereinafter referred to as "these Measures") on November 29, 2024.

Partial amendments to this Act were promulgated on January 21, 2026. The amended Articles 8 through 11 involve provisions for financial institutions and virtual asset service providers (hereinafter referred to as "virtual asset service providers") to establish cross-industry inquiry mechanisms, cross-institutional anti-fraud platforms, cross-industry joint defense reporting, and fund return procedures. To implement the legislative intent of these amendments, these Measures are hereby amended to complete the relevant legal framework and facilitate compliance by industry participants. The current text consists of 70 articles; this amendment revises 52 articles and adds 3 new articles. The key points are as follows:

1. Revision of Virtual Asset Account Definition: The definition of virtual asset accounts is revised, and definitions for the anti-fraud platform and its participating institutions are added. (Revised Article 2)
2. Expansion of Identification Standards: The criteria for identifying abnormal deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, virtual asset accounts, or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are appropriately expanded to enable early warning of suspicious accounts or transactions. (Revised Articles 3, 6, 9, and 12)
3. Cross-Industry Inquiry Scope: The scope of inquiries available to each industry and the objects of cross-industry inquiries are added, along with the specific inquiry items that respondents must provide. (Revised Articles 5, 8, 11, and 14)
4. Handling of Warning Virtual Accounts: Measures to be taken by deposit business institutions and virtual asset service providers when a warning virtual account is a trust deposit special account under a virtual asset service provider entrusted by a deposit business institution are added. (Revised Article 16)
5. Inquiry Channels for Account Holders: It is clarified who account holders, users, cardholders, or clients may consult if they have objections to the control measures notified by judicial police agencies for deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, and virtual asset accounts. (Revised Articles 17, 20, 23, and 26)
6. Record Keeping for Cross-Industry Inquiries: The scope of inquiry data and records to be preserved is expanded beyond same-industry inquiries to include cross-industry inquiries. (Revised Articles 15, 18, 21, and 24)
7. Cross-Industry Joint Defense Mechanism: Matters to be followed in the cross-industry joint defense mechanism among deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, and virtual asset service providers are added. (Revised Articles 27, 28, 30, 33 through 35, 37, 40, 45, 46, 48, and 51)
8. Return of Remaining Funds/Assets: The agencies authorized to notify the return of remaining funds or virtual assets are expanded beyond the original agency that reported the warning account; other judicial police agencies may also do so. (Revised Articles 52, 54 through 56, 58 through 60, 62 through 64, 66, and 67)
9. Documentation for Victim Claims: The documents required for victims to apply for the return of remaining funds or virtual assets are expanded from a case receipt issued by police to a case receipt or document issued by any judicial police agency. (Revised Articles 53, 57, 61, and 65)
10. Sale of Remaining Virtual Assets: To protect the rights of fraud victims and align with practical operations, it is added that virtual asset service providers may sell remaining virtual assets in warning virtual asset accounts and then return the proceeds. (Revised Article 64)
11. Notification and Information Sharing: It is added that virtual asset service providers shall notify victims through relevant remittance/outward transfer institutions, and that relevant institutions shall cooperate to provide information necessary for the return process to confirm the victim and amount. (Revised Article 65)
12. Dedicated Personnel: The requirement that personnel handling remaining funds or virtual assets in warning accounts (numbers) must be dedicated is revised to avoid ambiguity regarding full-time status. (Revised Article 68)
13. Judgment of Disputes: It is clarified that deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers shall determine whether cases involve suspected transaction disputes or complex circumstances, aligning with practice. (Revised Article 69)
14. Platform Establishment and Cooperation: Matters regarding the establishment of the anti-fraud platform and related cooperation are added, including documents required for application to the Financial Supervisory Commission, operations permitted for participating institutions, and the scope of collection, processing, and use of customer information by platform establishing and participating institutions. (Revised Articles 70 through 72)

Comparison Table of Draft Amendments to the Measures for Financial Institutions and Virtual Asset Service Providers to Prevent Fraud Crime Hazards

Revised Text	Current Text	Explanation
Chapter 1 General Provisions	Chapter 1 General Provisions	Chapter title unchanged.
Article 1 These Measures are formulated pursuant to Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 5 of Article 8, Paragraph 3 of Article 9, Paragraph 3 of Article 10, and Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Fraud Crime Hazard Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as "this Act").	Article 1 These Measures are formulated pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Article 8, Paragraph 3 of Article 9, Paragraph 3 of Article 10, and Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Fraud Crime Hazard Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as "this Act").	Partial amendments to this Act were promulgated on January 21, 2026, adding the authorization provision in Paragraph 5 of Article 8. Therefore, the legal basis for these Measures is revised.
Article 2 The terms used in these Measures are defined as follows:<br><br>1. Deposit Account: Refers to check, demand, and time deposit accounts established at financial institutions defined in Paragraph 1, Item 1, and Items 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.<br>2. Electronic Payment Account: Refers to the electronic payment account defined in Item 4 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.<br>3. Credit Card: Refers to the credit card defined in Item 1 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.<br>4. Credit Card Billing Number: Refers to the account number assigned by the issuing institution for cardholders to pay credit card bills.<br>5. Virtual Account: Refers to the virtual payment account assigned by a deposit business institution for payers or designated transactions, allowing payers or transactors to deposit funds into the corresponding physical deposit account via the virtual payment account.<br>6. Virtual Asset Account: Refers to the account provided by a business or individual providing virtual asset services (hereinafter referred to as "virtual asset service provider") to customers for providing virtual asset services.<br>7. Warning Deposit Account: Refers to a deposit account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to a deposit business institution to be listed as a warning.<br>8. Warning Electronic Payment Account: Refers to an electronic payment account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to an electronic payment institution to be listed as a warning.<br>9. Warning Virtual Account: Refers to a virtual account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to a deposit business institution to be listed as a warning.<br>10. Warning Credit Card Billing Number: Refers to a credit card billing number notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to an issuing institution to be listed as a warning.<br>11. Warning Virtual Asset Account: Refers to a virtual asset account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to a virtual asset service provider to be listed as a warning.<br>12. Deposit Business Institution: Refers to the financial institutions defined in Paragraph 1, Item 1, and Items 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.<br>13. Electronic Payment Institution: Refers to the electronic payment institution defined in Item 1 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.<br>14. Credit Card Business Institution: Refers to the credit card business institution defined in Item 7 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.<br>15. Issuing Institution: Refers to the issuing institution defined in Item 9 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.<br>16. Anti-Fraud Platform: Refers to the financial
information service business operating fund transfer and clearing between financial institutions, or the service business operating credit data processing and exchange between financial institutions, as defined in Article 47-3 of the Bank Act, which is approved by the Financial Supervisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as "FSC") to establish a system platform to assist financial institutions or virtual asset service providers of this Act in same-industry or cross-industry cooperation, collecting, processing, and using customer information within the necessary scope, and using technology to analyze and identify abnormal deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, or virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>17. Anti-Fraud Platform Participating Institution: Refers to financial institutions or virtual asset service providers participating in the anti-fraud platform.	Article 2 The terms used in these Measures are defined as follows:<br><br>1. Deposit Account: Refers to check, demand, and time deposit accounts established at financial institutions defined in Paragraph 1, Item 1, and Items 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.<br>2. Electronic Payment Account: Refers to the electronic payment account defined in Item 4 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.<br>3. Credit Card: Refers to the credit card defined in Item 1 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.<br>4. Credit Card Billing Number: Refers to the account number assigned by the issuing institution for cardholders to pay credit card bills.<br>5. Virtual Account: Refers to the virtual payment account assigned by a deposit business institution for payers or designated transactions, allowing payers or transactors to deposit funds into the corresponding physical deposit account via the virtual payment account.<br>6. Virtual Asset Account: Refers to the account opened by a virtual asset customer at a business or individual providing virtual asset services (hereinafter referred to as "virtual asset service provider").<br>7. Warning Deposit Account: Refers to a deposit account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to a deposit business institution to be listed as a warning.<br>8. Warning Electronic Payment Account: Refers to an electronic payment account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to an electronic payment institution to be listed as a warning.<br>9. Warning Virtual Account: Refers to a virtual account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to a deposit business institution to be listed as a warning.<br>10. Warning Credit Card Billing Number: Refers to a credit card billing number notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to an issuing institution to be listed as a warning.<br>11. Warning Virtual Asset Account: Refers to a
virtual asset account notified by a court, procuratorate, or judicial police agency to a virtual asset service provider to be listed as a warning.<br>12. Deposit Business Institution: Refers to the financial institutions defined in Paragraph 1, Item 1, and Items 3 through 7 of Article 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.<br>13. Electronic Payment Institution: Refers to the electronic payment institution defined in Item 1 of Article 3 of the Electronic Payment Institution Management Act.<br>14. Credit Card Business Institution: Refers to the credit card business institution defined in Item 7 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.<br>15. Issuing Institution: Refers to the issuing institution defined in Item 9 of Article 2 of the Credit Card Business Institution Management Measures.<br>16. Anti-Fraud Platform: Refers to the financial information service business operating fund transfer and clearing between financial institutions, or the service business operating credit data processing and exchange between financial institutions, as defined in Article 47-3 of the Bank Act, which is approved by the Financial Supervisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as "FSC") to establish a system platform to assist financial institutions or virtual asset service providers of this Act in same-industry or cross-industry cooperation, collecting, processing, and using customer information within the necessary scope, and using technology to analyze and identify abnormal deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, or virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>17. Anti-Fraud Platform Participating Institution: Refers to financial institutions or virtual asset service providers participating in the anti-fraud platform.	1. Considering that virtual asset service providers provide virtual asset accounts to customers, and that virtual accounts are applied for by virtual asset service providers from financial institutions and then provided to customers, rather than being directly opened by the virtual asset service provider, Item 6 is slightly revised for clarity.<br>2. In conjunction with the addition of Chapter 6 "Operations of the Anti-Fraud Platform" to these Measures, Items 16 and 17 are added to define terms for clarity.
Chapter 2 Criteria for Identifying Accounts/Numbers and Inquiry Operations	Chapter 2 Criteria for Identifying Accounts/Numbers and Inquiry Operations	Chapter title unchanged.
Section 1 Deposit Accounts	Section 1 Deposit Accounts	Section title unchanged.
Article 3 The criteria for identifying abnormal deposit accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open deposit accounts or setting up designated accounts within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The transaction functions applied for by the account holder are significantly inconsistent with the account holder's age or background.<br>3. The contact information provided by the account holder cannot be verified by reasonable means.<br>4. The deposit account is notified by a financial institution or the public to be suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>5. The deposit account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.<br>6. Intensive use of electronic services or equipment of the deposit business institution within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the account holder's daily transaction habits.<br>7. The deposit account has been inactive for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>8. The mobile number retained by the account holder is the same as the mobile number retained by the account holder of other warning deposit accounts within the same deposit business institution, and is suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>9. The virtual account linked to the deposit account is listed as a warning virtual account multiple times within a certain period.<br>10. Non-citizens, where the deposit business institution learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the deposit account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>11. The deposit business institution learns that the account holder has been reported as a missing person.<br>12. The deposit account is listed by judicial police agencies as a suspected deposit account in the territory involved in fraud.<br>13. The deposit account has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Banks to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>14. Other abnormal deposit accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the deposit business institution.	Article 3 The criteria for identifying abnormal deposit accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open deposit accounts or setting up designated accounts within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The transaction functions applied for by the account holder are significantly inconsistent with the account holder's age or background.<br>3. The contact information provided by the account holder cannot be verified by reasonable means.<br>4. The deposit account is notified by a financial institution or the public to be suspected of being used by a
criminal.<br>5. The deposit account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.<br>6. Intensive use of electronic services or equipment of the deposit business institution within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the account holder's daily transaction habits.<br>7. The deposit account has been inactive for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>8. The contact telephone number retained by the account holder is the same as the contact telephone number retained by the account holder of other warning deposit accounts within the same deposit business institution, and is suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>9. The virtual account linked to the deposit account is listed as a warning virtual account multiple times within a certain period.<br>10. The deposit account has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Banks to Prevent Money Laundering suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>11. Other abnormal deposit accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the deposit business institution.<br>12. Non-citizens, where the deposit business institution learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the deposit account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>13. The deposit account has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Banks to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>14. Other abnormal deposit accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the deposit business institution.	1. Considering that mobile phone numbers are more identifiable than landlines in practice, Item 8 is slightly revised.<br>2. To enable early warning of abnormal deposit accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes and to take appropriate handling measures in a timely manner, referring to suggestions from law enforcement agencies on investigating illegal cases, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded. Items 10 through 12 are added. Current Items 10 and 11 are moved to Items 13 and 14, and Item 13 is slightly revised.
Article 4 Deposit business institutions shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the account holder of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the account holder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	Article 4 Deposit business institutions shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the account holder of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the account holder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	This article is unchanged.
Article 5 When deposit business institutions implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, or when there is a need to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. When the respondent is a deposit business institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the deposit account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of account opening or transaction of the account holder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the deposit account and whether the deposit account is under monitoring.<br>2. When the respondent is an electronic payment institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the electronic payment account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age of the user.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the electronic payment account and whether the electronic payment account is under monitoring.<br>3. When the respondent is an issuing institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the credit card holder and card issuance date.<br>(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the credit card and whether the credit card is under monitoring.<br>4. When the respondent is a virtual asset service provider, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the customer of the virtual asset account and the date the virtual asset account was opened.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the customer.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the virtual asset account and whether the virtual asset account is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual operational difficulties, and the
respondent has explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are deposit business institutions, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the National Federation of Banks and Commercial Banks of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.	Article 5 When deposit business institutions implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other deposit business institutions via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. Name of the deposit account and account opening date.<br>2. Age, occupation category, and purpose of account opening or transaction of the account holder.<br>3. Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the deposit account and whether the deposit account is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual operational difficulties, and the respondent has explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are deposit business institutions, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the National Federation of Banks and Commercial Banks of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.	1. In conjunction with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act, which allows inquiries to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, and the ability of financial institutions and virtual asset service providers to conduct cross-industry inquiries, Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 are revised.<br>2. Considering that the inquiry items to be provided by each industry are not entirely the same, the inquiry items to be provided by each industry when responding to inquiries are listed in Paragraph 2.
Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts	Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts	Section title unchanged.
Article 6 The criteria for identifying abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open electronic payment accounts within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The transaction functions applied for by the user are significantly inconsistent with the user's age or background.<br>3. The contact information provided by the user cannot be verified by reasonable means.<br>4. The electronic payment account is notified by a financial institution or the public to be suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>5. The electronic payment account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.<br>6. Intensive use of services or equipment of the electronic payment institution within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the user's daily transaction habits.<br>7. The electronic payment account has been inactive for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>8. The mobile number retained by the user is the same as the mobile number retained by the user of other warning electronic payment accounts, and is suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>9. Non-citizens, where the electronic payment institution learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the electronic payment account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>10. The electronic payment institution learns that the user has been reported as a missing person.<br>11. The electronic payment account is listed by judicial police agencies as a suspected electronic payment account in the territory involved in fraud.<br>12. The electronic payment account has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Electronic Payment Institutions to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>13. Other abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the electronic payment institution.	Article 6 The criteria for identifying abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open electronic payment accounts within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The transaction functions applied for by the user are significantly inconsistent with the user's age or background.<br>3. The contact information provided by the user cannot be verified by reasonable means.<br>4. The electronic payment account is notified by a financial institution or the public to be suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>5. The electronic payment account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.<br>6. Intensive use of services or equipment
of the electronic payment institution within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the user's daily transaction habits.<br>7. The electronic payment account has been inactive for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>8. The contact telephone number retained by the user is the same as the contact telephone number retained by the user of other warning electronic payment accounts, and is suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>9. The electronic payment account has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Electronic Payment Institutions to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>10. Other abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the electronic payment institution.<br>11. Non-citizens, where the electronic payment institution learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the electronic payment account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>12. The electronic payment account has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Electronic Payment Institutions to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>13. Other abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the electronic payment institution.	1. Considering that mobile phone numbers are more identifiable than landlines in practice, Item 8 is slightly revised.<br>2. To enable early warning of abnormal electronic payment accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes and to take appropriate handling measures in a timely manner, referring to suggestions from law enforcement agencies on investigating illegal cases, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded. Items 9 through 11 are added. Current Items 9 and 10 are moved to Items 12 and 13, and Item 13 is slightly revised.
Article 7 Electronic payment institutions shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the user of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the user's source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	Article 7 Electronic payment institutions shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the user of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the user's source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	This article is unchanged.
Article 8 When electronic payment institutions implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, or when there is a need to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. When the respondent is a deposit business institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the deposit account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of account opening or transaction of the account holder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the deposit account and whether the deposit account is under monitoring.<br>2. When the respondent is an electronic payment institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the electronic payment account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age of the user.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the electronic payment account and whether the electronic payment account is under monitoring.<br>3. When the respondent is an issuing institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the credit card holder and card issuance date.<br>(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the credit card and whether the credit card is under monitoring.<br>4. When the respondent is a virtual asset service provider, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the customer of the virtual asset account and the date the virtual asset account was opened.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the customer.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the virtual asset account and whether the virtual asset account is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual
operational difficulties, and the respondent has explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are electronic payment institutions, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the Electronic Payment Business Association of the Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "E-Payment Association") and reported to the competent authority for the record.	Article 8 When electronic payment institutions implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other electronic payment institutions via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. Name of the electronic payment account and account opening date.<br>2. Age of the user.<br>3. Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the electronic payment account and whether the electronic payment account is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual operational difficulties, and the respondent has explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are electronic payment institutions, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the National Federation of Banks and Commercial Banks of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.	1. In conjunction with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act, which allows inquiries to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, and the ability of financial institutions and virtual asset service providers to conduct cross-industry inquiries, and in conjunction with the establishment of the Electronic Payment Business Association of the Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "E-Payment Association") by electronic payment institutions, Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 are revised.<br>2. Considering that the inquiry items to be provided by each industry are not entirely the same, the inquiry items to be provided by each industry when responding to
inquiries are listed in Paragraph 2.
Section 3 Credit Cards	Section 3 Credit Cards	Section title unchanged.
Article 9 The criteria for identifying abnormal credit cards or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open credit cards within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The credit card is notified by a financial institution or the public to be suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>3. The credit card often conducts multiple small-amount transactions, resembling testing behavior.<br>4. Intensive credit card transactions within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the cardholder's daily transaction habits.<br>5. The credit card has not been used for transactions for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>6. The mobile number retained by the cardholder is the same as the mobile number retained by the cardholder of other warning credit card billing numbers within the same issuing institution, and is suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>7. Non-citizens, where the issuing institution learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the credit card have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>8. The issuing institution learns that the cardholder has been reported as a missing person.<br>9. The credit card has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Credit Card Business Institutions to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>10. Other abnormal credit cards or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the issuing institution.	Article 9 The criteria for identifying abnormal credit cards or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open credit cards within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The credit card is notified by a financial institution or the public to be suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>3. The credit card often conducts multiple small-amount transactions, resembling testing behavior.<br>4. Intensive credit card transactions within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the cardholder's daily transaction habits.<br>5. The credit card has not been used for transactions for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>6. The contact telephone number retained by the cardholder is the same as the contact telephone number retained by the cardholder of other warning credit card billing numbers within the same issuing institution, and is suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>7. The credit card has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Credit Card Business Institutions to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>8. Other abnormal credit cards or transactions suspected of
involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the issuing institution.<br>9. Non-citizens, where the issuing institution learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the credit card have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>10. The credit card has transaction characteristics listed in the Model of Precautions for Credit Card Business Institutions to Prevent Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>11. Other abnormal credit cards or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the issuing institution.	1. Considering that mobile phone numbers are more identifiable than landlines in practice, Item 6 is slightly revised.<br>2. To enable early warning of abnormal credit cards or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes and to take appropriate handling measures in a timely manner, referring to suggestions from law enforcement agencies on investigating illegal cases, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded. Items 7 and 8 are added. Current Items 7 and 8 are moved to Items 9 and 10, and Item 10 is slightly revised.
Article 10 Issuing institutions shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the cardholder of abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the cardholder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	Article 10 Issuing institutions shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the cardholder of abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the cardholder's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	This article is unchanged.
Article 11 When issuing institutions implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes, or when there is a need to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. When the respondent is a deposit business institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the deposit account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of account opening or transaction of the account holder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the deposit account and whether the deposit account is under monitoring.<br>2. When the respondent is an electronic payment institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the electronic payment account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age of the user.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the electronic payment account and whether the electronic payment account is under monitoring.<br>3. When the respondent is an issuing institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the credit card holder and card issuance date.<br>(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the credit card and whether the credit card is under monitoring.<br>4. When the respondent is a virtual asset service provider, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the customer of the virtual asset account and the date the virtual asset account was opened.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the customer.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the virtual asset account and whether the virtual asset account is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual operational difficulties, and the respondent has
explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are issuing institutions, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the National Federation of Banks and Commercial Banks of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.	Article 11 When issuing institutions implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other credit card business institutions via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. Name of the credit card holder and card issuance date.<br>2. Age and occupation category of the cardholder.<br>3. Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the credit card and whether the credit card is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual operational difficulties, and the respondent has explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are issuing institutions, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the National Federation of Banks and Commercial Banks of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.	1. In conjunction with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act, which allows inquiries to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, and the ability of financial institutions and virtual asset service providers to conduct cross-industry inquiries, Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 are revised.<br>2. Considering that the inquiry items to be provided by each industry are not entirely the same, the inquiry items to be provided by each industry when responding to inquiries are listed in Paragraph 2.
Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts	Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts	Section title unchanged.
Article 12 The criteria for identifying abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open virtual asset accounts within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The transaction functions applied for by the customer are significantly inconsistent with the customer's age or background.<br>3. The contact information provided by the customer cannot be verified by reasonable means.<br>4. The virtual asset account is notified by a virtual asset service provider, financial institution, government agency, or the public to be suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>5. The virtual asset account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.<br>6. Intensive use of services or equipment of the virtual asset service provider within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the customer's daily transaction habits.<br>7. The virtual asset account has been inactive for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>8. The mobile number retained by the customer is the same as the mobile number retained by the customer of other warning virtual asset accounts within the same virtual asset service provider, and is suspected of being used by a criminal.<br>9. Non-citizens, where the virtual asset service provider learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the virtual asset account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>10. The virtual asset service provider learns that the customer has been reported as a missing person.<br>11. The virtual asset account is listed by judicial police agencies as a suspected virtual asset account in the territory involved in fraud.<br>12. The virtual asset account has transaction characteristics listed in the Self-Discipline Norms for Preventing Money Laundering, Combating Financing of Terrorism, Combating Fraud Crimes, and Industry Joint Defense Mechanisms of the Virtual Currency Business Association of the Republic of China suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>13. Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the virtual asset service provider.	Article 12 The criteria for identifying abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes are as follows:<br><br>1. Frequently applying to open virtual asset accounts within a short period, and unable to provide a reasonable explanation.<br>2. The transaction functions applied for by the customer are significantly inconsistent with the customer's age or background.<br>3. The contact information provided by the customer cannot be verified by reasonable means.<br>4. The virtual asset account is notified by a virtual asset service provider or the public to be suspected of being
used by a criminal.<br>5. The virtual asset account often has multiple small-amount transfers in and out, resembling testing behavior.<br>6. Intensive use of services or equipment of the virtual asset service provider within a short period, significantly inconsistent with the customer's daily transaction habits.<br>7. The virtual asset account has been inactive for a long time and suddenly has abnormal transactions.<br>8. The virtual asset account has transaction characteristics listed in the Self-Discipline Norms for Preventing Money Laundering, Combating Financing of Terrorism, Combating Fraud Crimes, and Industry Joint Defense Mechanisms of the Virtual Currency Business Association of the Republic of China suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>9. Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the virtual asset service provider.<br>10. Non-citizens, where the virtual asset service provider learns that the residence permit or other relevant identity documents provided for verification when opening the virtual asset account have been cancelled before expiration, are overstaying, or have been reported as missing.<br>11. The virtual asset account has transaction characteristics listed in the Self-Discipline Norms for Preventing Money Laundering, Combating Financing of Terrorism, Combating Fraud Crimes, and Industry Joint Defense Mechanisms of the Virtual Currency Business Association of the Republic of China suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>12. Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the virtual asset service provider.<br>13. The virtual asset account has transaction characteristics listed in the Self-Discipline Norms for Preventing Money Laundering, Combating Financing of Terrorism, Combating Fraud Crimes, and Industry Joint Defense Mechanisms of the Virtual Currency Business Association of the Republic of China suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>14. Other abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes as determined by the competent authority or the virtual asset service provider.	To enable early warning of abnormal virtual asset accounts or transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes and to take appropriate handling measures in a timely manner, referring to suggestions from law enforcement agencies on investigating illegal cases, the scope of identification is appropriately expanded. Items 8 through 11 are added. Current Items 8 and 9 are moved to Items 12 and 13, and Items 4 and 13 are slightly revised.
Article 13 Virtual asset service providers shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the customer of abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the customer's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	Article 13 Virtual asset service providers shall strengthen the confirmation of the identity of the customer of abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, and may take the following continuous review measures:<br><br>1. Obtain consent from senior management before establishing or adding a business relationship.<br>2. Take reasonable measures to understand the customer's wealth and source of funds. The source of funds refers to the actual source generating the funds.<br>3. Continuously supervise the business relationship.	This article is unchanged.
Article 14 When virtual asset service providers implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, or when there is a need to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, the anti-fraud platform, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. When the respondent is a deposit business institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the deposit account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of account opening or transaction of the account holder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the deposit account and whether the deposit account is under monitoring.<br>2. When the respondent is an electronic payment institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the electronic payment account and account opening date.<br>(2) Age of the user.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the electronic payment account and whether the electronic payment account is under monitoring.<br>3. When the respondent is an issuing institution, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the credit card holder and card issuance date.<br>(2) Age and occupation category of the cardholder.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the credit card and whether the credit card is under monitoring.<br>4. When the respondent is a virtual asset service provider, it shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br>(1) Name of the customer of the virtual asset account and the date the virtual asset account was opened.<br>(2) Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the customer.<br>(3) Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the virtual asset account and whether the virtual asset account is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, or to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual operational
difficulties, and the respondent has explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are virtual asset service providers, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the Virtual Currency Business Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.	Article 14 When virtual asset service providers implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act for abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, they may inquire with other virtual asset service providers via telephone, email, or other methods accepted by the respondent, to obtain relevant information about such abnormal virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br><br>Respondents shall provide the following inquiry items according to the request of the inquirer:<br><br>1. Name of the customer of the virtual asset account and the date the virtual asset account was opened.<br>2. Age, occupation category, and purpose of opening or transaction of the virtual asset account of the customer.<br>3. Whether there are abnormal circumstances in the transactions of the virtual asset account and whether the virtual asset account is under monitoring.<br><br>Except for the inquiry items in the preceding paragraph, respondents may also provide other necessary information requested by the inquirer to implement the control measures in the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act.<br><br>Respondents shall provide inquiry information within five business days. However, if there are actual operational difficulties, and the respondent has explained this to the inquirer within the aforementioned period and both parties agree to extend the period for providing inquiry information, this limitation does not apply.<br><br>For respondents that are virtual asset service providers, the precautions for confirming the identity of the inquirer or other inquiry operation procedures shall be formulated by the Virtual Currency Business Association of the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.	1. In conjunction with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act, which allows inquiries to identify transactions suspected of involving fraud crimes, and the ability of financial institutions and virtual asset service providers to conduct cross-industry inquiries, Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 are revised.<br>2. Considering that the inquiry items to be provided by each industry are not entirely the same, the inquiry items to be provided by each industry when responding to inquiries are listed in Paragraph 2.
Chapter 3 Preservation of Data and Transaction Records, Reporting, and Account/Number Control Operations	Chapter 3 Preservation of Data and Transaction Records, Reporting, and Account/Number Control Operations	Chapter title unchanged.
Section 1 Deposit Accounts	Section 1 Deposit Accounts	Section title unchanged.
Article 15 When deposit business institutions implement the provisions of the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:<br><br>1. All records obtained to confirm the identity of the account holder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.<br>2. Contract document files.<br>3. All abnormal transaction records of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>4. Data and records obtained through inquiries regarding abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.<br><br>The all abnormal transaction records of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes referred to in Paragraph 1, Item 3, shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities.	Article 15 When deposit business institutions implement the provisions of the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:<br><br>1. All records obtained to confirm the identity of the account holder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.<br>2. Contract document files.<br>3. All abnormal transaction records of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>4. Data and records obtained through inquiries with same-industry entities regarding abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.<br><br>The all abnormal transaction records of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes referred to in Paragraph 1, Item 3, shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities.	In conjunction with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act, which allows cross-industry inquiries between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, the data and records to be preserved are expanded beyond same-industry inquiries. Therefore, Item 4 of Paragraph 1 is slightly revised.
Article 16 When a deposit account is identified as an abnormal deposit account suspected of involving fraud crimes, the deposit business institution shall take the following handling measures:<br><br>1. In accordance with the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthen the confirmation of the account holder's identity, and may take control measures such as continuous review of the account holder's identity, suspending deposits or withdrawals, suspending remittance or transfer of funds, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish a business relationship or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police agencies.<br>2. If a virtual account is listed as a warning, the deposit business institution shall suspend all transaction functions of the virtual account, earmark the funds in the deposit account corresponding to the virtual account. Subsequent remittances to the virtual account shall be directly returned to the deposit business institution or electronic payment institution from which the remittance originated. If there is no corresponding outgoing account for the virtual account to return the funds, the deposit business institution shall earmark the amount of the virtual account. The deposit business institution shall immediately notify the account holder to take relevant control measures for the user of the virtual account.<br>3. If the warning virtual account is a virtual account under a trust deposit special account of a virtual asset service provider entrusted by the deposit business institution, the deposit business institution shall immediately notify the virtual asset service provider. Upon receiving the notification from the deposit business institution, the virtual asset service provider shall inquire whether the reported fraud funds are all or partially retained in the virtual account, and reply to the receiving deposit business institution with the inquiry results.<br>4. Handling measures in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws and regulations.<br><br>When deposit business institutions report to judicial police agencies in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platform, or other feasible means, and provide documents of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, identity information of the account holder, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method, in accordance with relevant requirements.	Article 16 When a deposit account is identified as an abnormal deposit account suspected of involving fraud crimes, the deposit business institution shall take the following handling measures:<br><br>1. In accordance with the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthen the confirmation of the account holder's identity, and may take control measures such as continuous review of the account holder's identity,
suspending deposits or withdrawals, suspending remittance or transfer of funds, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish a business relationship or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police agencies.<br>2. If a virtual account is listed as a warning, the deposit business institution shall suspend all transaction functions of the virtual account, earmark the funds in the deposit account corresponding to the virtual account. Subsequent remittances to the virtual account shall be directly returned to the deposit business institution or electronic payment institution from which the remittance originated. If there is no corresponding outgoing account for the virtual account to return the funds, the deposit business institution shall earmark the amount of the virtual account. The deposit business institution shall immediately notify the account holder to take relevant control measures for the user of the virtual account.<br>3. Handling measures in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws and regulations.<br><br>When deposit business institutions report to judicial police agencies in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platform, or other feasible means, and provide documents of abnormal deposit accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, identity information of the account holder, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method, in accordance with relevant requirements.	Referring to the letter from the National Federation of Banks and Commercial Banks of the Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "Bank Association") No. 1141000484, if the warning virtual account is a trust deposit special account of a virtual asset service provider entrusted by the deposit business institution, the handling methods for the deposit business institution and the virtual asset service provider are established. Therefore, Item 3 of Paragraph 1 is added, and current Item 3 is moved to Item 4.
Article 17 Upon receiving the report from the deposit business institution, the judicial police agency shall notify the deposit business institution in writing within twenty days to implement subsequent control or lift control for the abnormal deposit account suspected of involving fraud crimes. If no notification is made to the deposit business institution within the time limit, the deposit business institution may continue to control the account.<br><br>If it is a major emergency case, the judicial police agency may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible means, and shall complete the written document delivery to the deposit business institution within five business days after the notification.<br><br>If the account holder has objections to the control measures implemented by the deposit business institution upon notification by the judicial police agency, they may consult the deposit business institution, and if necessary, may also consult the judicial police agency that originally notified the control measures.	Article 17 Upon receiving the report from the deposit business institution, the judicial police agency shall notify the deposit business institution in writing within twenty days to implement subsequent control or lift control for the abnormal deposit account suspected of involving fraud crimes. If no notification is made to the deposit business institution within the time limit, the deposit business institution may continue to control the account.<br><br>If it is a major emergency case, the judicial police agency may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible means, and shall complete the written document delivery to the deposit business institution within five business days after the notification.	Considering that the notification by the judicial police agency to the deposit business institution to control the deposit account will have a certain impact on the account holder, to clarify the consultation channel when the account holder has objections, Item 3 is added.
Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts	Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts	Section title unchanged.
Article 18 When electronic payment institutions implement the provisions of the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:<br><br>1. All records obtained to confirm the identity of the user, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, or similar official identity documents.<br>2. Contract document files.<br>3. All abnormal transaction records of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>4. Data and records obtained through inquiries regarding abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.<br><br>The all abnormal transaction records of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes referred to in Paragraph 1, Item 3, shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities.	Article 18 When electronic payment institutions implement the provisions of the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:<br><br>1. All records obtained to confirm the identity of the user, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, or similar official identity documents.<br>2. Contract document files.<br>3. All abnormal transaction records of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>4. Data and records obtained through inquiries with same-industry entities regarding abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.<br><br>The all abnormal transaction records of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes referred to in Paragraph 1, Item 3, shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities.	In conjunction with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act, which allows cross-industry inquiries between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, the data and records to be preserved are expanded beyond same-industry inquiries. Therefore, Item 4 of Paragraph 1 is slightly revised.
Article 19 When an electronic payment account is identified as an abnormal electronic payment account suspected of involving fraud crimes, the electronic payment institution shall take the following handling measures:<br><br>1. In accordance with the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthen the confirmation of the user's identity, and may take control measures such as continuous review of the user's identity, suspending remittance (transfer) in or withdrawal, transfer out of funds, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish a business relationship or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police agencies.<br>2. Handling measures in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws and regulations.<br><br>When electronic payment institutions report to judicial police agencies in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platform, or other feasible means, and provide documents of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, identity information of the user, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method, in accordance with relevant requirements.	Article 19 When an electronic payment account is identified as an abnormal electronic payment account suspected of involving fraud crimes, the electronic payment institution shall take the following handling measures:<br><br>1. In accordance with the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthen the confirmation of the user's identity, and may take control measures such as continuous review of the user's identity, suspending remittance (transfer) in or withdrawal, transfer out of funds, suspending all or part of transaction functions, refusing to establish a business relationship or provide services, etc., and may report to judicial police agencies.<br>2. Handling measures in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act and other relevant laws and regulations.<br><br>When electronic payment institutions report to judicial police agencies in accordance with the preceding paragraph, they shall do so via telephone, fax, email, electronic platform, or other feasible means, and provide documents of abnormal electronic payment accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes, identity information of the user, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method, in accordance with relevant requirements.	This article is unchanged.
Article 20 Upon receiving the report from the electronic payment institution, the judicial police agency shall notify the electronic payment institution in writing within twenty days to implement subsequent control or lift control for the abnormal electronic payment account suspected of involving fraud crimes. If no notification is made to the electronic payment institution within the time limit, the electronic payment institution may continue to control the account.<br><br>If it is a major emergency case, the judicial police agency may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible means, and shall complete the written document delivery to the electronic payment institution within five business days after the notification.<br><br>If the user has objections to the control measures implemented by the electronic payment institution upon notification by the judicial police agency, they may consult the electronic payment institution, and if necessary, may also consult the judicial police agency that originally notified the control measures.	Article 20 Upon receiving the report from the electronic payment institution, the judicial police agency shall notify the electronic payment institution in writing within twenty days to implement subsequent control or lift control for the abnormal electronic payment account suspected of involving fraud crimes. If no notification is made to the electronic payment institution within the time limit, the electronic payment institution may continue to control the account.<br><br>If it is a major emergency case, the judicial police agency may first notify via telephone, fax, email, or other feasible means, and shall complete the written document delivery to the electronic payment institution within five business days after the notification.	Considering that the notification by the judicial police agency to the electronic payment institution to control the electronic payment account will have a certain impact on the user, to clarify the consultation channel when the user has objections, Item 3 is added.
Section 3 Credit Cards	Section 3 Credit Cards	Section title unchanged.
Article 21 When issuing institutions implement the provisions of the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:<br><br>1. All records obtained to confirm the identity of the cardholder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.<br>2. Contract document files.<br>3. All abnormal transaction records of abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>4. Data and records obtained through inquiries regarding abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.<br><br>The all abnormal transaction records of abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes referred to in Paragraph 1, Item 3, shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities.	Article 21 When issuing institutions implement the provisions of the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:<br><br>1. All records obtained to confirm the identity of the cardholder, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.<br>2. Contract document files.<br>3. All abnormal transaction records of abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes.<br>4. Data and records obtained through inquiries with same-industry entities regarding abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes in accordance with Chapter 2.<br><br>The all abnormal transaction records of abnormal credit cards suspected of involving fraud crimes referred to in Paragraph 1, Item 3, shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities.	In conjunction with the addition of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Act, which allows cross-industry inquiries between financial institutions and virtual asset service providers, the data and records to be preserved are expanded beyond same-industry inquiries. Therefore, Item 4 of Paragraph 1 is slightly revised.
Article 22 When a credit card is identified as an abnormal credit card suspected of involving fraud crimes, the issuing institution shall take the following handling measures:<br><br>1. In accordance with the latter part of Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of this Act, strengthen the confirmation of the cardholder's identity, and may take control measures such as continuous review of the cardholder's identity,

Article 23 After receiving the report from the card issuer, the judicial police organ shall, within twenty days, notify the card issuer in writing regarding the subsequent control or lifting of control measures for the suspected abnormal credit card involved in fraud. If the judicial police organ fails to notify the card issuer within the time limit, the card issuer may continue to control the account.

In cases of major emergencies, the judicial police organ may first notify the card issuer by telephone, fax, email, electronic platform, or other feasible means. Such notification shall be followed by the delivery of written documents to the card issuer within five business days after the initial notification.

If the cardholder has doubts regarding the control measures taken by the card issuer upon notification from the judicial police organ, the cardholder may inquire with the card issuer, and if necessary, with the judicial police organ that issued the notification.

Article 24 When virtual asset service providers handle matters pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act, they shall preserve the following data and transaction records in paper or electronic form:

1. All records obtained for customer identity verification, such as copies or records of passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, or similar official identity documents.
2. Contract document files.
3. All abnormal transaction records of virtual asset accounts suspected of involvement in fraud crimes.
4. Data and records obtained through inquiries with other institutions regarding virtual asset accounts suspected of involvement in fraud crimes, as prescribed in Chapter 2.

The "all abnormal transaction records" of virtual asset accounts suspected of involvement in fraud crimes referred to in the preceding paragraph, Item 3, shall be sufficient to reconstruct individual abnormal transactions, to serve as evidence for determining illegal activities.

Article 25 When a virtual asset account is determined to be an abnormal virtual asset account suspected of involvement in fraud crimes, the virtual asset service provider shall take the following handling measures:

1. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act, strengthen customer identity verification, and may take control measures such as continuous review of the customer's identity, suspending deposits or withdrawals, suspending all or part of the transaction functions, refusing to establish business relationships or provide services, and may report to the judicial police organ.
2. Handling measures prescribed by relevant laws and regulations such as the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

When the virtual asset service provider reports to the judicial police organ pursuant to the preceding paragraph, it shall do so by telephone, fax, email, electronic platform, or other feasible means, and shall provide documents of the suspected abnormal virtual asset account involved in fraud, the customer's identity information, relevant transaction records, or other documents required by the reporting method.

Article 26 After receiving the report from the virtual asset service provider, the judicial police organ shall, within twenty days, notify the virtual asset service provider in writing regarding the subsequent control or lifting of control measures for the suspected abnormal virtual asset account involved in fraud. If the judicial police organ fails to notify the virtual asset service provider within the time limit, the virtual asset service provider may continue to control the account.

In cases of major emergencies, the judicial police organ may first notify the virtual asset service provider by telephone, fax, email, or other feasible means. Such notification shall be followed by the delivery of written documents to the virtual asset service provider within five business days after the initial notification.

If the customer has doubts regarding the control measures taken by the virtual asset service provider upon notification from the judicial police organ, the customer may inquire with the virtual asset service provider, and if necessary, with the judicial police organ that issued the notification.

Chapter 4 Joint Defense Reporting Mechanism and Fund Freezing Operations

Section 1 Deposit Accounts

Article 27 When a deposit account is reported as a warning deposit account, the deposit business institution, besides confirming the source of the report and setting the warning account, shall immediately inquire into the relevant transactions of the account. If it is found that the reported fraud funds have been transferred to other deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, or virtual asset accounts, the institution shall report the data of the transferred funds to the receiving deposit business institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider.

Upon receiving the report from the previous receiving institution or virtual asset service provider, the receiving deposit business institution shall immediately inquire into the transactions of the receiving account. If the funds have been transferred out, it shall report the data of the transferred funds to the next receiving deposit business institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider.

If the deposit business institution to which the trust deposit account linked to the virtual asset account finds that the reported fraud funds have been transferred into a virtual account under the trust deposit account, it shall immediately notify the virtual asset service provider to inquire whether the reported fraud funds are all or partially retained in the virtual account. The virtual asset service provider shall reply the inquiry result to the deposit business institution of the trust deposit account. The deposit business institution shall reply the inquiry result to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning.

If the receiving deposit business institution finds that the reported fraud funds have been withdrawn, it shall reply to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning deposit account.

After verifying the data from the preceding paragraph, if the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning deposit account believes that the receiving accounts or virtual asset accounts also need to be listed as warnings, it shall notify the relevant deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, or virtual asset service providers to list the accounts or accounts as warnings.

Article 28 When a fraud victim personally informs a deposit business institution of being defrauded during the business hours of the deposit business institution, the deposit business institution shall confirm the citizen's identity, remittance or transfer information, and understand the reason for being defrauded, then ask the citizen to fill out a letter of undertaking and dial 165.

The deposit business institution shall report to the receiving deposit business institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider based on the letter of undertaking and remittance or transfer information from the preceding paragraph. The receiving deposit business institution, upon receiving the report from the previous deposit business institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider, shall apply the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

When a fraud victim personally informs the deposit business institution of being defrauded pursuant to the first paragraph, the police organ shall dispatch personnel to the deposit business institution within two hours to complete the citizen's report. If necessary, the deposit account shall be reported as a warning.

Upon receiving the report from the police organ in the preceding paragraph, the deposit business institution shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

Article 29 The content of the joint defense report of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the reporting organ for warning deposit accounts.
The format of the joint defense report content, report forms, letters of undertaking, or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the National Federation of Banks in the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

Article 30 Upon receiving a report from the previous deposit business institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider, the deposit business institution shall freeze the reported receiving amount; if the account balance is less than the reported receiving amount, it shall freeze the current balance of the account. The amount of funds or virtual assets frozen by each deposit business institution, electronic payment institution, and virtual asset service provider for the same reporting case shall not exceed the amount reported by the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning or the amount of fraud funds or virtual assets declared by the fraud victim in the letter of undertaking.

The deposit business institution shall reply the freezing result to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning.

Upon receiving the reply from the preceding paragraph, the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning shall verify as soon as possible and, within forty-eight hours from the time of freezing, notify the deposit business institution whether the reported frozen deposit account should be marked as a warning or the freeze should be lifted.

If the deposit business institution does not receive a report within the time limit of the preceding paragraph stating that the reported frozen deposit account should be listed as a warning, it shall directly lift the freeze.

If the deposit business institution, after careful verification, determines that the reported frozen deposit account has no illegal or abnormal circumstances, it may lift the freeze in advance.

The deposit business institution shall continuously monitor the deposit account receiving the frozen funds. If it determines that the account is an abnormal deposit account suspected of involvement in fraud crimes, it may handle it pursuant to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act.

Article 31 If the funds in a deposit account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions pursuant to other laws, and a report is received to freeze the fraud funds in the deposit account, the deposit business institution shall still freeze the fraud funds, but such funds shall be handled primarily in accordance with the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Article 32 Deposit business institutions shall, as much as possible, set up a twenty-four-hour dedicated window for joint defense reporting to conduct joint defense reporting mechanism operations.

When a deposit business institution sets up the reporting window of the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately report to Financial Information Service Corporation; the same applies when the window changes.

Article 33 If the account holder of a deposit account with frozen funds has doubts regarding the freezing of their funds, the account holder shall handle the matter with the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning, and the deposit business institution shall provide assistance when necessary.

If, after verification, it is found that no fraud exists, but the customer's rights are damaged due to the joint defense reporting by the deposit business institution or bills are returned due to the freezing of funds, the deposit business institution shall assist in applying to the Taiwan Cheque Clearing House to cancel the return record or assist in other remedial measures.

Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts

Article 34 When an electronic payment account is reported as a warning electronic payment account, the electronic payment institution, besides confirming the source of the report and setting the warning account, shall immediately inquire into the relevant transactions of the account. If it is found that the reported fraud funds have been transferred to other deposit accounts or electronic payment accounts, it shall report the data of the transferred funds to the receiving deposit business institution or electronic payment institution.

Upon receiving the report from the previous receiving institution, the receiving electronic payment institution shall immediately inquire into the transactions of the receiving account. If the funds have been transferred out, it shall report the data of the transferred funds to the next receiving deposit business institution or electronic payment institution. If the funds have not been transferred out, it shall report to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning electronic payment account.

After verifying the data from the preceding paragraph, if the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning electronic payment account believes that the receiving accounts also need to be listed as warning electronic payment accounts, it shall notify the relevant electronic payment institutions to list the accounts as warnings.

Article 35 When a fraud victim personally informs an electronic payment institution of being defrauded, the electronic payment institution shall confirm the citizen's identity, electronic payment account transaction proof, and understand the reason for being defrauded, then ask the citizen to fill out a letter of undertaking and dial 165.

If a fraud victim informs the electronic payment institution's customer service of being defrauded, the electronic payment institution shall refer the citizen to dial 165.

The electronic payment institution shall report to the receiving deposit business institution or electronic payment institution based on the letter of undertaking and electronic payment account transaction proof from the preceding paragraph. The receiving electronic payment institution, upon receiving the report from the previous deposit business institution or electronic payment institution, shall apply the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

If a fraud victim personally informs the electronic payment institution of being defrauded, the police organ shall dispatch personnel to the electronic payment institution within two hours to complete the citizen's report. If necessary, the electronic payment account shall be reported as a warning.

Upon receiving the report from the police organ in the preceding paragraph, the electronic payment institution shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

Article 36 The content of the joint defense report of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the reporting organ for warning electronic payment accounts.
The format of the joint defense report content, report forms, letters of undertaking, or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the Banks in the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

Article 37 Upon receiving a report from the previous deposit business institution, electronic payment institution, or virtual asset service provider, the electronic payment institution shall freeze the reported receiving amount; if the account balance is less than the reported receiving amount, it shall freeze the current balance of the account. The amount of funds or virtual assets frozen by each electronic payment institution, deposit business institution, and virtual asset service provider for the same reporting case shall not exceed the amount reported by the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning or the amount of fraud funds or virtual assets declared by the fraud victim in the letter of undertaking.

The electronic payment institution shall reply the freezing result to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning.

Upon receiving the reply from the preceding paragraph, the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning shall verify as soon as possible and, within forty-eight hours from the time of freezing, notify the electronic payment institution whether the reported frozen electronic payment account should be marked as a warning or the freeze should be lifted.

If the electronic payment institution does not receive a report within the time limit of the preceding paragraph stating that the reported frozen electronic payment account should be listed as a warning, it shall directly lift the freeze.

If the electronic payment institution, after careful verification, determines that the reported frozen electronic payment account has no illegal or abnormal circumstances, it may lift the freeze in advance.

The electronic payment institution shall continuously monitor the electronic payment account receiving the frozen funds. If it determines that the account is an abnormal electronic payment account suspected of involvement in fraud crimes, it may handle it pursuant to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act.

Article 38 If the funds in an electronic payment account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions pursuant to other laws, and a report is received to freeze the fraud funds in the electronic payment account, the electronic payment institution shall still freeze the fraud funds, but such funds shall be handled primarily in accordance with the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Article 39 Electronic payment institutions shall, as much as possible, set up a twenty-four-hour dedicated window for joint defense reporting to conduct joint defense reporting mechanism operations.

When an electronic payment institution sets up the reporting window of the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately report to Financial Information Service Corporation; the same applies when the window changes.

Article 40 If the user of an electronic payment account with frozen funds has doubts regarding the freezing of their funds, the user shall handle the matter with the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning, and the electronic payment institution shall provide assistance when necessary.

Section 3 Credit Cards

Article 41 When a credit card closing number is reported as a warning credit card closing number, the card issuer shall immediately suspend all transaction functions of the credit card and close the payment functions of automated payment channels. However, this does not apply if the card issuer confirms that the payment is made by the cardholder themselves.

If the card issuer finds that the reported fraud funds have been transferred to the cardholder's other deposit accounts or electronic payment accounts, it shall report the data of the transferred funds to the receiving deposit business institution or electronic payment institution and reply to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning credit card closing number.

Article 42 When a fraud victim informs the card issuer of being defrauded, the card issuer shall refer the citizen to dial 165.

If a fraud victim personally informs the card issuer of being defrauded during the card issuer's business hours, the card issuer shall confirm the citizen's identity, remittance or transfer information, and understand the reason for being defrauded, and dial 165.

The police organ shall dispatch personnel to the card issuer within two hours to complete the citizen's report. If necessary, the credit card closing number shall be reported as a warning.

Upon receiving the report from the police organ in the preceding paragraph, the card issuer shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

Article 43 The content of the joint defense report of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the reporting organ for warning credit card closing numbers.
The format of the joint defense report content or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the National Federation of Banks in the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

Article 44 Card issuers shall, as much as possible, set up a twenty-four-hour dedicated window for joint defense reporting to conduct joint defense reporting mechanism operations.

When a card issuer sets up the reporting window of the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately report to Financial Information Service Corporation; the same applies when the window changes.

Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts

Article 45 When a virtual asset account is reported as a warning virtual asset account, the virtual asset service provider, besides confirming the source of the report and setting the warning virtual asset account, shall immediately inquire into the relevant transactions of the account. If it is found that the reported fraud virtual assets have been transferred to other virtual asset service providers, it shall report the data of the transferred virtual assets to the virtual asset service provider of the receiving account.

Upon receiving the report from the previous virtual asset service provider, the receiving virtual asset service provider shall immediately inquire into the transactions of the receiving account. If the virtual assets have been transferred out, it shall report the data of the transferred virtual assets to the next receiving virtual asset service provider.

If the receiving virtual asset service provider finds that the reported fraud virtual assets have been withdrawn or transferred to overseas virtual asset accounts, it shall report to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning virtual asset account.

After verifying the data from the preceding paragraph, if the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning virtual asset account believes that the receiving virtual asset accounts also need to be listed as warning virtual asset accounts, it shall notify the relevant virtual asset service providers to list the accounts as warnings.

To prevent fraud crimes, virtual asset service providers may report information regarding the warning virtual asset account or fraud virtual assets to the deposit business institution to which the trust deposit account linked to the warning virtual asset account belongs, or to the deposit business institution or electronic payment institution to which the linked deposit account or electronic payment account belongs. The deposit business institution or electronic payment institution may execute control measures pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act based on the relevant information provided by the virtual asset service provider.

Article 46 When a fraud victim personally informs a virtual asset service provider of being defrauded during the business hours of the virtual asset service provider, the virtual asset service provider shall confirm the citizen's identity, transfer, remittance, or transfer information of virtual assets or funds, and understand the reason for being defrauded, then ask the citizen to fill out a letter of undertaking and dial 165.

If a fraud victim informs the virtual asset service provider's customer service of being defrauded, the virtual asset service provider shall refer the citizen to dial 165.

The virtual asset service provider shall report to the virtual asset service provider of the receiving account based on the letter of undertaking and transfer, remittance, or transfer information of virtual assets or funds from the preceding paragraph. The virtual asset service provider of the receiving account, upon receiving the report from the previous virtual asset service provider, deposit business institution, or electronic payment institution, shall apply the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

If a fraud victim personally informs the virtual asset service provider of being defrauded pursuant to the first paragraph, the police organ shall dispatch personnel to the virtual asset service provider within two hours to complete the citizen's report. If necessary, the virtual asset account shall be reported as a warning.

Upon receiving the report from the police organ in the preceding paragraph, the virtual asset service provider shall handle the matter according to the inquiry and reporting procedures of the preceding article.

Article 47 The content of the joint defense report of the preceding two articles shall be registered in the manner prescribed by the reporting organ for warning virtual asset accounts.
The format of the joint defense report content, report forms, letters of undertaking, or other reporting operational details shall be formulated by the Virtual Currency Business Association in the Republic of China and reported to the competent authority for the record.

Article 48 Upon receiving a report from the previous virtual asset service provider, deposit business institution, or electronic payment institution, the virtual asset service provider shall freeze the reported incoming virtual assets or funds; if the remaining virtual assets or funds in the account are less than the reported incoming amount, it shall freeze the current virtual assets or funds in the account. The amount of virtual assets or funds frozen by each virtual asset service provider, deposit business institution, and electronic payment institution for the same reporting case shall not exceed the amount reported by the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning or the amount of fraud virtual assets or funds declared by the fraud victim in the letter of undertaking.

The virtual asset service provider shall reply the freezing result to the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning.

Upon receiving the reply from the preceding paragraph, the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning shall verify as soon as possible and, within forty-eight hours from the time of freezing, notify the virtual asset service provider whether the reported frozen virtual asset account should be marked as a warning or the freeze should be lifted.

If the virtual asset service provider does not receive a report within the time limit of the preceding paragraph stating that the reported frozen virtual asset account should be listed as a warning, it shall directly lift the freeze.

If the virtual asset service provider, after careful verification, determines that the reported frozen virtual asset account has no illegal or abnormal circumstances, it may lift the freeze in advance.

The virtual asset service provider shall continuously monitor the account receiving the frozen virtual assets or funds. If it determines that the account is an abnormal virtual asset account suspected of involvement in fraud crimes, it may handle it pursuant to Article 8, Paragraph 1 of this Act.

Article 49 If the virtual assets or funds in a virtual asset account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions pursuant to other laws, and a report is received to freeze the fraud virtual assets or funds in the virtual asset account, the virtual asset service provider shall still freeze the fraud virtual assets or funds, but such virtual assets or funds shall be handled primarily in accordance with the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Article 50 Virtual asset service providers shall, as much as possible, set up a twenty-four-hour dedicated window for joint defense reporting to conduct joint defense reporting mechanism operations.

When a virtual asset service provider sets up the reporting window of the preceding paragraph, it shall immediately report to the Virtual Currency Business Association in the Republic of China; the same applies when the window changes.

Article 51 If the customer of a virtual asset account with frozen virtual assets or funds has doubts regarding the freezing of their virtual assets or funds, the customer shall handle the matter with the judicial police organ that originally reported the warning, and the virtual asset service provider shall provide assistance when necessary.

Chapter 5 Return of Remaining Funds or Virtual Assets

Section 1 Deposit Accounts

Article 52 When a deposit account suspected of involvement in fraud crimes is reported as a warning deposit account, if there are still funds remitted (transferred) by the victim in the account that have not been withdrawn, upon written notification from the judicial police organ to the deposit business institution to return the remaining funds in the warning deposit account to the victim, and copying the account holder, the deposit business institution may proceed with the return upon receiving the written notification.

Article 53 When the deposit business institution handles the matter pursuant to the preceding article, it shall notify the victim through the deposit business institution or electronic payment institution from which the funds were remitted (transferred). The victim shall submit the following documents, and the deposit business institution shall verify the unwithdrawn portion of each transaction in the order of remittance (transfer) time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the account balance reaches zero, to return the remaining funds in the warning deposit account:

1. Identity documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) certificate or documents issued by the judicial police organ.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes loss to the deposit business institution, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Article 54 When the deposit business institution handles the return of remaining funds in warning deposit accounts pursuant to the preceding two articles, it may directly close the account and transfer the remaining funds to other payables for handling when applicants legally entitled to receive them apply for payment, if any of the following circumstances exist:

1. The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical to handle.
2. More than three months have passed since the warning report, and the original notifying organ has not notified the handling of the return, or the victim cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the deposit business institution directly closes the account pursuant to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning to be lifted by report or for the warning period to expire before lifting the warning effect on the account holder.

Article 55 If the funds in a deposit account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions pursuant to other laws, and the deposit business institution receives notification from the judicial police organ of Article 52 to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled primarily in accordance with the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Section 2 Electronic Payment Accounts

Article 56 When an electronic payment account suspected of involvement in fraud crimes is reported as a warning electronic payment account, if there are still funds remitted (transferred) by the victim in the account that have not been withdrawn, upon written notification from the judicial police organ to the electronic payment institution to return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account to the victim, and copying the account holder, the electronic payment institution may proceed with the return upon receiving the written notification.

Article 57 When the electronic payment institution handles the matter pursuant to the preceding article, it shall notify the victim through the electronic payment institution or deposit business institution from which the funds were remitted (transferred). The victim shall submit the following documents, and the electronic payment institution shall verify the unwithdrawn portion of each transaction in the order of remittance (transfer) time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the account balance reaches zero, to return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account:

1. Identity documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) certificate or documents issued by the judicial police organ.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes loss to the electronic payment institution, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Article 58 When the electronic payment institution handles the return of remaining funds in warning electronic payment accounts pursuant to the preceding two articles, it may directly close the account and transfer the remaining funds to other payables for handling when applicants legally entitled to receive them apply for payment, if any of the following circumstances exist:

1. The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical to handle.
2. More than three months have passed since the warning report, and the original notifying organ has not notified the handling of the return, or the victim cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the electronic payment institution directly closes the account pursuant to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning to be lifted by report or for the warning period to expire before lifting the warning effect on the account holder.

Article 59 If the funds in an electronic payment account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions pursuant to other laws, and the electronic payment institution receives notification from the judicial police organ of Article 56 to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled primarily in accordance with the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Section 3 Credit Cards

Article 60 When a credit card closing number suspected of involvement in fraud crimes is reported as a warning credit card closing number, if there are still funds remitted (transferred) by the victim in the account that have not been withdrawn, upon written notification from the judicial police organ to the card issuer to return the remaining funds in the warning credit card closing number to the victim, and copying the cardholder, the card issuer may proceed with the return upon receiving the written notification.

Article 61 When the card issuer handles the matter pursuant to the preceding article, it shall notify the victim through the card issuer or deposit business institution from which the funds were remitted (transferred). The victim shall submit the following documents, and the card issuer shall verify the unwithdrawn portion of each transaction in the order of remittance (transfer) time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the account balance reaches zero, to return the remaining funds in the warning credit card closing number:

1. Identity documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) certificate or documents issued by the judicial police organ.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes loss to the card issuer, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Article 62 When the card issuer handles the return of remaining funds in warning credit card closing numbers pursuant to the preceding two articles, it may directly close the account and transfer the remaining funds to other payables for handling when applicants legally entitled to receive them apply for payment, if any of the following circumstances exist:

1. The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical to handle.
2. More than three months have passed since the warning report, and the original notifying organ has not notified the handling of the return, or the victim cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the card issuer directly closes the account pursuant to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning to be lifted by report or for the warning period to expire before lifting the warning effect on the cardholder.

Article 63 If the funds in a credit card closing number have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions pursuant to other laws, and the card issuer receives notification from the judicial police organ of Article 60 to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled primarily in accordance with the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts

Article 64 When a virtual asset account suspected of involvement in fraud crimes is reported as a warning virtual asset account, if there are still virtual assets or funds remitted (transferred) by the victim in the account that have not been withdrawn, upon written notification from the judicial police organ to the virtual asset service provider to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the warning virtual asset account to the victim, and copying the account holder, the virtual asset service provider may proceed with the return upon receiving the written notification.

Article 65 When the virtual asset service provider handles the matter pursuant to the preceding article, it shall notify the victim through the virtual asset service provider or deposit business institution from which the virtual assets or funds were remitted (transferred). The victim shall submit the following documents, and the virtual asset service provider shall verify the unwithdrawn portion of each transaction in the order of remittance (transfer) time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the account balance reaches zero, to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the warning virtual asset account:

1. Identity documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) certificate or documents issued by the judicial police organ.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes loss to the virtual asset service provider, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Article 66 When the virtual asset service provider handles the return of remaining virtual assets or funds in warning virtual asset accounts pursuant to the preceding two articles, it may directly close the account and transfer the remaining virtual assets or funds to other payables for handling when applicants legally entitled to receive them apply for payment, if any of the following circumstances exist:

1. The remaining virtual assets or funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical to handle.
2. More than three months have passed since the warning report, and the original notifying organ has not notified the handling of the return, or the victim cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the virtual asset service provider directly closes the account pursuant to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning to be lifted by report or for the warning period to expire before lifting the warning effect on the account holder.

Article 67 If the virtual assets or funds in a virtual asset account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions pursuant to other laws, and the virtual asset service provider receives notification from the judicial police organ of Article 64 to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the account, such virtual assets or funds shall be handled primarily in accordance with the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

For accounts reported as warning electronic payment accounts, if there are remaining funds deposited (transferred) by victims that have not been withdrawn, upon written notification from judicial police organs to the electronic payment institution to return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account to the victim, with a copy to the user, the electronic payment institution may proceed with the return upon receipt of the written notification.

For accounts reported as warning electronic payment accounts, if there are remaining funds deposited (transferred) by victims that have not been withdrawn, upon written notification from the original notifying organ to the electronic payment institution to return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account to the victim, with a copy to the user, the electronic payment institution may proceed with the return upon receipt of the written notification.

The organ returning the remaining funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made.

Article 57 When electronic payment institutions handle matters according to the preceding article, they shall notify the victim through the deposit (transfer) out electronic payment institution or deposit business institution. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the electronic payment institution shall verify the undrawn portions item by item according to the order of deposit (transfer) in time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the account balance reaches zero, and return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account:

1. Identity proof documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet or documents issued by judicial police organs.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the electronic payment institution, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Article 57 When electronic payment institutions handle matters according to the preceding article, they shall notify the victim through the deposit (transfer) out electronic payment institution or deposit business institution. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the electronic payment institution shall verify the undrawn portions item by item according to the order of deposit (transfer) in time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the account balance reaches zero, and return the remaining funds in the warning electronic payment account:

1. Identity proof documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet issued by the police.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the electronic payment institution, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Considering that in practice, victims may report to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, but this bureau does not have a statutory case acceptance (handling) proof sheet for victims to use as reference during criminal investigations. Instead, the case handling unit provides letters or other documents for victims to use as evidence. Therefore, textual corrections have been made to item 2.

Article 58 When electronic payment institutions handle the return of remaining funds in warning electronic payment accounts according to the preceding two articles, if any of the following circumstances occur, they may directly settle the account and transfer the remaining funds to other payables, to be handled when legally entitled persons apply for payment:

1. The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical in terms of operational costs.
2. More than three months have passed since receiving the notification from judicial police organs to return the funds, and the victim still cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the electronic payment institution directly settles the account according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning notification to be lifted or the warning period to expire before it can lift the warning effect on the user of the account.

Article 58 When electronic payment institutions handle the return of remaining funds in warning electronic payment accounts according to the preceding two articles, if any of the following circumstances occur, they may directly settle the account and transfer the remaining funds to other payables, to be handled when legally entitled persons apply for payment:

1. The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical in terms of operational costs.
2. More than three months have passed since the warning notification, and the original notifying organ has not notified the institution to handle the refund, or the victim cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the electronic payment institution directly settles the account according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning notification to be lifted or the warning period to expire before it can lift the warning effect on the user of the account.

To clarify the meaning and in conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining virtual assets or funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made to item 2 of Paragraph 1.

Article 59 If the funds in an electronic payment account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions according to other laws, and the institution subsequently receives notification from the judicial police organ under Article 56 to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled优先 according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Article 59 If the funds in an electronic payment account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions according to other laws, and the institution subsequently receives notification from the original notifying organ under Article 56 to return the remaining funds in the account, such funds shall be handled优先 according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

In conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made.

Section 3 Credit Cards
Section 3 Credit Cards
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 60 For credit card account numbers suspected of involving fraud crimes and reported as warning credit card account numbers, if there are remaining funds deposited (transferred) by victims in the account number, upon written notification from judicial police organs to the credit card business institution to return the remaining funds in the warning credit card account number to the victim, with a copy to the cardholder, the credit card business institution may proceed with the return upon receipt of the written notification.

Article 60 For credit card account numbers suspected of involving fraud crimes and reported as warning credit card account numbers, if there are remaining funds deposited (transferred) by victims in the account number, upon written notification from the original notifying organ to the credit card business institution to return the remaining funds in the warning credit card account number to the victim, with a copy to the cardholder, the credit card business institution may proceed with the return upon receipt of the written notification.

In conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made.

Article 61 When credit card business institutions handle matters according to the preceding article, if the funds were deposited (transferred) through a deposit business institution or electronic payment institution, they may notify the victim through the deposit (transfer) out deposit business institution or electronic payment institution. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the credit card business institution shall verify item by item according to the order of deposit (transfer) in time, and return the remaining funds in the warning credit card account number:

1. Identity proof documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet or documents issued by judicial police organs.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the credit card business institution, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Article 61 When credit card business institutions handle matters according to the preceding article, if the funds were deposited (transferred) through a deposit business institution or electronic payment institution, they may notify the victim through the deposit (transfer) out deposit business institution or electronic payment institution. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the credit card business institution shall verify item by item according to the order of deposit (transfer) in time, and return the remaining funds in the warning credit card account number:

1. Identity proof documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet issued by the police.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the credit card business institution, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

Considering that in practice, victims may report to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, but this bureau does not have a statutory case acceptance (handling) proof sheet for victims to use as reference during criminal investigations. Instead, the case handling unit provides letters or other documents for victims to use as evidence. Therefore, textual corrections have been made to item 2.

Article 62 When credit card business institutions handle the return of remaining funds in warning credit card account numbers according to the preceding two articles, if any of the following circumstances occur, they may directly transfer the remaining funds in the account number to other payables, to be handled when legally entitled persons apply for payment:

1. The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical in terms of operational costs.
2. More than three months have passed since receiving the notification from judicial police organs to return the funds, and the victim still cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the credit card business institution directly transfers the remaining funds in the account number to other payables according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning notification to be lifted or the warning period to expire before it can lift the warning effect on the credit card.

Article 62 When credit card business institutions handle the return of remaining funds in warning credit card account numbers according to the preceding two articles, if any of the following circumstances occur, they may directly transfer the remaining funds in the account number to other payables, to be handled when legally entitled persons apply for payment:

1. The remaining funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical in terms of operational costs.
2. More than three months have passed since the warning notification, and the original notifying organ has not notified the institution to handle the refund, or the victim cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the funds.

After the credit card business institution directly transfers the remaining funds in the account number to other payables according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning notification to be lifted or the warning period to expire before it can lift the warning effect on the credit card.

To clarify the meaning and in conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining virtual assets or funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made to item 2 of Paragraph 1.

Article 63 If the funds in a credit card account number have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions according to other laws, and the institution subsequently receives notification from the judicial police organ under Article 60 to return the remaining funds in the account number, such funds shall be handled优先 according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Article 63 If the funds in a credit card account number have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions according to other laws, and the institution subsequently receives notification from the original notifying organ under Article 60 to return the remaining funds in the account number, such funds shall be handled优先 according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

In conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made.

Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts
Section 4 Virtual Asset Accounts
The section title remains unchanged.

Article 64 For virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes and reported as warning virtual asset accounts, if there are remaining virtual assets or funds delivered or deposited (transferred) by victims that have not been withdrawn or transferred, upon written notification from judicial police organs to the virtual asset service provider to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the warning virtual asset account to the victim, with a copy to the virtual asset account customer, the virtual asset service provider may proceed with the return upon receipt of the written notification.

When the virtual asset service provider returns the remaining virtual assets in the warning virtual asset account according to the preceding paragraph, it may first sell the remaining virtual assets in the warning virtual asset account through the virtual asset service provider, and then return the proceeds to the victim.

Article 64 For virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes and reported as warning virtual asset accounts, if there are remaining virtual assets or funds delivered or deposited (transferred) by victims that have not been withdrawn or transferred, upon written notification from the original notifying organ to the virtual asset service provider to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the warning virtual asset account to the victim, with a copy to the virtual asset account customer, the virtual asset service provider may proceed with the return upon receipt of the written notification.

1. In conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining virtual assets or funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made to Paragraph 1.
2. Considering that some victims of fraud crimes do not have virtual asset accounts and cannot receive fraud funds converted into virtual assets, and since the value of virtual assets fluctuates with the market, to determine the total value of remaining funds and virtual assets in the warning virtual asset account for subsequent item-by-item return procedures, it is specified that virtual asset service providers may sell the remaining virtual assets in the warning virtual asset account before returning them, to comply with practical return operations. Therefore, Paragraph 2 has been added.

Article 65 When virtual asset service providers handle matters according to the preceding article, they shall notify the victim through the virtual asset service provider from which the deposit (transfer) out occurred. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the virtual asset service provider shall verify the undrawn or untransferred portions item by item according to the order of deposit (transfer) in time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the amount of virtual assets or funds in the account reaches zero, and return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the warning virtual asset account:

1. Identity proof documents.
2. Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet or documents issued by judicial police organs.
3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the virtual asset service provider, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

When virtual asset service providers handle the return of remaining virtual assets or funds in warning virtual asset accounts, other virtual asset service providers, deposit business institutions, and electronic payment institutions shall cooperate to provide information necessary for the return operation within the necessary scope, including remittance account information, remittance time, remittance amount, virtual asset account numbers, and other information sufficient to confirm the return order and amount.

The fields, formats, timing of provision, notification methods, and operational procedures for the data in the preceding paragraph shall be formulated by the Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association in consultation with the Taiwan Bankers Association and the Taiwan Electronic Payment Business Association, and reported to the competent authority for the record.

Article 65 When virtual asset service providers handle matters according to the preceding article, they shall notify the victim through the virtual asset service provider from which the deposit (transfer) out occurred. The victim shall submit the following documents, and the virtual asset service provider shall verify the undrawn or untransferred portions item by item according to the order of deposit (transfer) in time, calculating backwards from the last amount until the amount of virtual assets or funds in the account reaches zero, and return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the warning virtual asset account:

1. Identity proof documents.

2. Case acceptance (handling) proof sheet issued by the police.

3. A letter of undertaking stating that if the application is false and causes losses to the virtual asset service provider, the victim shall bear all legal responsibilities.

4. Considering that in some virtual asset fraud cases, victims' funds are first deposited (transferred) into mule deposit accounts and then transferred into mule virtual asset accounts with the same name. Since virtual asset service providers cannot obtain upstream deposit (transfer) information, they cannot calculate or contact the victims entitled to the remaining balance of the warning virtual asset account and the amounts. Therefore, it is specified to notify victims through deposit (transfer) out deposit business institutions or electronic payment institutions. In practice, victims may report to the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, but this bureau does not have a statutory case acceptance (handling) proof sheet for victims to use as reference during criminal investigations. Instead, the case handling unit provides letters or other documents for victims to use as evidence. Therefore, Paragraph 1 has been amended.

5. Given that the flow of fraud funds often involves fiat currency collection and payment accounts of deposit business institutions, financial institutions providing virtual account services, and virtual asset service providers, each institution holds different data such as victim remittance records, virtual account correspondence information, and virtual asset transaction records. To facilitate the return of remaining funds or virtual assets in fraud cases, a cooperation mechanism among relevant institutions is established, and it is specified that relevant institutions shall cooperate to provide information necessary for the return operation within the necessary scope to facilitate the confirmation of return order and amount. The Taiwan Virtual Currency Business Association is authorized to formulate relevant specifications in consultation with the Bankers Association and the Electronic Payment Business Association regarding data fields, formats, and operational procedures, to improve the efficiency of return operations while兼顾ing personal data protection and confidentiality obligations. Therefore, Paragraphs 2 and 3 have been added.

Article 66 When virtual asset service providers handle the return of remaining virtual assets or funds in warning virtual asset accounts according to the preceding two articles, if any of the following circumstances occur, they may directly settle the account and transfer the remaining virtual assets or funds to other payables for virtual assets or other payables, to be handled when legally entitled persons apply for payment:

1. The remaining virtual assets or funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical in terms of operational costs.
2. More than three months have passed since receiving the notification from judicial police organs to return the funds, and the victim still cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the virtual assets or funds.

After the virtual asset service provider directly settles the account according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning notification to be lifted or the warning period to expire before it can lift the warning effect on the virtual asset account customer.

Article 66 When virtual asset service providers handle the return of remaining virtual assets or funds in warning virtual asset accounts according to the preceding two articles, if any of the following circumstances occur, they may directly settle the account and transfer the remaining virtual assets or funds to other payables for virtual assets or other payables, to be handled when legally entitled persons apply for payment:

1. The remaining virtual assets or funds are below a certain amount, making it uneconomical in terms of operational costs.
2. More than three months have passed since the warning notification, and the original notifying organ has not notified the institution to handle the return of virtual assets or funds, or the victim cannot be contacted.
3. The victim is unwilling to report the case or unwilling to appear to claim the virtual assets or funds.

After the virtual asset service provider directly settles the account according to the preceding paragraph, it must still wait for the warning notification to be lifted or the warning period to expire before it can lift the warning effect on the virtual asset account customer.

To clarify the meaning and in conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining virtual assets or funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made to item 2 of Paragraph 1.

Article 67 If the virtual assets or funds in a virtual asset account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions according to other laws, and the service provider subsequently receives notification from the judicial police organ under Article 64 to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the account, such virtual assets or funds shall be handled优先 according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

Article 67 If the virtual assets or funds in a virtual asset account have been seized, preserved, prohibited, or subjected to similar dispositions according to other laws, and the service provider subsequently receives notification from the original notifying organ under Article 64 to return the remaining virtual assets or funds in the account, such virtual assets or funds shall be handled优先 according to the provisions of the seizure, preservation, prohibition, or similar disposition orders.

In conjunction with the amendment of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of this Regulation, the organ notifying the return of remaining virtual assets or funds is not limited to the original notifying organ; other judicial police organs may also do so. Therefore, textual corrections have been made.

Section 5 Dedicated Supervisory Managers and Circumstances Where Return Is Impossible
Section 5 Dedicated Supervisory Managers and Circumstances Where Return Is Impossible
The section title has been adjusted.

Article 68 Deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, and virtual asset service providers shall designate a deputy general manager or a supervisor of equivalent rank to supervise the handling of remaining funds or virtual assets in warning deposit accounts, warning electronic payment accounts, warning credit card account numbers, or warning virtual asset accounts.

Article 68 Deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, and virtual asset service providers shall designate a deputy general manager or a supervisor of equivalent rank to be specifically responsible for supervising the handling of remaining funds or virtual assets in warning deposit accounts, warning electronic payment accounts, warning credit card account numbers, or warning virtual asset accounts.

To avoid ambiguity regarding whether the personnel supervising the handling of remaining funds or virtual assets in warning deposit accounts, warning electronic payment accounts, warning credit card account numbers, or warning virtual asset accounts by deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, and virtual asset service providers must be dedicated to this role, textual corrections have been made.

Article 69 Cases determined by deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers to be suspected transaction disputes or complex cases shall not apply the provisions of this Measure regarding the return of remaining funds or virtual assets, and shall be handled through judicial procedures.

Article 69 Cases suspected of being transaction disputes or complex cases shall not apply the provisions of this Measure regarding the return of remaining funds or virtual assets, and shall be handled through judicial procedures.

In practice, whether a case is a suspected transaction dispute or a complex case is determined by deposit business institutions, electronic payment institutions, credit card business institutions, or virtual asset service providers. To clarify the meaning, textual corrections have been made.

Chapter 6 Operations of the Anti-Fraud Crime Platform

1. This chapter is newly added.
2. In conjunction with the addition of Paragraphs 4 and 5 to Article 8 of this Regulation, which stipulate documents and other matters to be attached for the application and approval of the anti-fraud crime platform, Chapter 6 (Supplementary Provisions) has been moved to Chapter 7.

Article 70 To establish an anti-fraud crime platform, the institution establishing the platform shall submit the following documents to the Financial Supervisory Commission for approval:

1. Operational Planning Document: Stating the purpose of establishing the anti-fraud crime platform, participating institutions, operational structure and workflow, risk and benefit assessment, and scheduled construction timeline.
2. Explanation of the scope and necessity of customer information collected, processed, and utilized by participating institutions in the anti-fraud crime platform.
3. Agreement, template, or explanation of the rights and obligations relationship between the various parties in the anti-fraud crime platform.
4. Explanation of the information system and security control operations of the anti-fraud crime platform.
5. Other documents required by the Financial Supervisory Commission.

Before the revision and promulgation of this Measure on [Date] 115, anti-fraud crime platforms already reported to the Financial Supervisory Commission and established are deemed to have obtained the approval of the Financial Supervisory Commission.

1. This article is newly added.
2. To facilitate the establishment of the anti-fraud crime platform and related cooperation, Paragraph 1 specifies that the institution establishing the platform shall submit the required documents to the Financial Supervisory Commission for approval.
3. Before the revision and promulgation of this Measure, anti-fraud platforms already established and operating with the Financial Supervisory Commission's knowledge, such as the "Financial Anti-Fraud Joint Defense Platform" established by Financial Information Service Corporation and the "Financial Industry Inter-Industry Fraud Case Reporting System" established by the Financial Union Credit Center, are deemed to have obtained approval after the revision and implementation of this Measure, and no need to re-apply. Therefore, Paragraph 2 has been added. The original Article 70 has been moved to Article 73 in conjunction with the addition of related articles in this chapter.

Article 71 Participating institutions in the anti-fraud crime platform may use the services provided by the anti-fraud crime platform to handle the following operations:

1. Analysis or identification of abnormal deposit accounts, electronic payment accounts, credit cards, or virtual asset accounts suspected of involving fraud crimes as stipulated in this Measure.

2. Related operations such as inquiries, notifications, and account number control as stipulated in this Measure.

3. This article is newly added.

4. It specifies the operations that participating institutions in the anti-fraud crime platform may use the services provided by the platform to handle.

Article 72 The institution establishing the anti-fraud crime platform and participating institutions may, through the anti-fraud crime platform, collect, process, and utilize customer information of participating institutions within the necessary scope to execute anti-fraud measures stipulated in this Regulation and this Measure.

1. This article is newly added.
2. To兼顾 personal information protection and the needs of fraud crime prevention, it is specified that the institutions establishing and participating in the anti-fraud crime platform may collect, process, and utilize customer information of participating institutions within the scope (such as warning account information provided by judicial police organs).

Chapter 7 Supplementary Provisions
Chapter 6 Supplementary Provisions
Chapter number changed.

Article 73 This Measure shall come into force on the date of promulgation.

Article 70 This Measure shall come into force on the date of promulgation.

Article number changed.