Guidance Note on Proliferation and Proliferation Financing

GUIDANCE NOTE ON PROLIFERATION AND
PROLIFERATION FINANCING
The Central Bank of The Bahamas
The Compliance Commission of The Bahamas
The Insurance Commission of The Bahamas
Securities Commission of The Bahamas
Publication Date: 21 st August 2018

THE COMPLIANCE
COMMISSION OF
THE BAHAMAS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTIONS TITLE PAGE
ACRONYMS 3
TERMINOLOGY/DEFINITIONS 4

1. INTRODUCTION 6
2. PURPOSE 6
3. SCOPE 7
4. APPLICABILITY 7
5. WHAT IS PROLIFERATION? 7
6. WHAT IS PROLIFERATION FINANCING? 8
7. INTERNTATIONAL STANDARDS AND OBLIGATIONS
   TO COUNTER PROLIFERATION FINANCING RISKS
8. THE BAHAMIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
   COMBATTING PROLIFERATION FINANCING
9. UNDERSTANDING HOW PROLIFERATORS OPERATE 11
10. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH PROLIFERATION
    FINANCING
11. MANAGEMENT OF PROLIFERATION FINANCING
    RISKS
12. RED FLAG INDICATORS AND TYPOLOGIES OF
    POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION FINANCING RISKS
13. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR BAHAMIAN
    INSTITUTIONS?
    TABLE OF REFERNCE
    REFERENCE: UK/EU SPECIALLY TARGETED
    COUNTRY LISTING AND OFAC LISTING
    ANNEX A: TYPOLOGIES 21

ACRONYMS
ACAMS Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists AG Attorney General BTCRA Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 2000 CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Capabilities CFP Countering the Financing of Proliferation CBOB Central Bank of The Bahamas DNFBPs Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions FATF Financial Action Task Force FIU Financial Intelligence Unit ICB Insurance Commission of The Bahamas Licensees i. Bank and Trust Companies, Credit Unions, Money Transfer Businesses of the CBOB;
ii. Securities Exchanges Dealers, arrangers, managers and advisors in
securities, Investment Fund Administrators, Investment Funds, Financial and Corporate Service Providers of the SCB;
iii. Insurance companies, intermediaries and insurance managers of the
ICB; and
iv. Non-financial Entities/Individuals of the CCB
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control
POCA Proceeds of Crime Act
PF Proliferation Financing
RBA Risk-Based Approach
SCB Securities Commission of The Bahamas
SDN/L Specially Designated Nations or List
SFI(s) Supervised Financial Institution(s)
SRB Self-Regulating Body
STR Suspicious Transaction Report
TF Terrorist Financing
WMDs Weapons of Mass Destruction
UN United Nations
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

TERMINOLOGY/DEFINITIONS
In discussing proliferation financing risk and its assessment, it is important to have the following common understanding of certain terms and concepts that will be used throughout the Guidance Note:
Competent Authorities Competent Authorities refer to all public authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering and/or terrorist financing and /or proliferation financing. In The Bahamas, this includes the CBOB, the SCB, the CCB, the ICB, the FIU and others (such as the AG’s Office). These authorities are responsible for assessing, monitoring and managing money laundering and terrorist financing risks in the licensees they supervise, or in the case of the FIU, investigating such risks, and in the case of the AG’s Office, prosecuting money laundering, terrorist financing (including proliferation financing) and predicate or associated offences, as well as seizing/freezing and confiscating criminal assets. Dual-Use Goods Dual-Use Goods are items that have both commercial and military or proliferation applications. These goods could be components of a weapon or items used in the manufacture of a weapon (i.e. specific machine tools for repairing automobiles which could also be used to manufacture a missile). Proliferation In the context of terrorist financing, proliferation is defined as “the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans￾shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations”. Proliferator A Proliferator is an individual or group of individuals that abuse both the formal and informal sectors of the international financial system or resort to cash in order to trade in proliferated goods. (FATF Report: “Combating Proliferation Financing” 2010). PF/Proliferation Financing Proliferation Financing refers to the underlying financial services which make proliferation possible. It is the financing of proliferation activities. PF Convention Proliferation Financing Convention refers to the United Nations’ Security Council’s International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Proliferation.

PF Offences Any criminal offence which constitutes proliferation or proliferation financing under the laws of The Bahamas, and any criminal offence which constitutes proliferation or proliferation financing under a law of a foreign jurisdiction, in relation to acts or omissions which, had they occurred in The Bahamas, would have constituted an offence in The Bahamas. A Proliferation financing offence relates specifically to the development, production, acquisition, retention and transfer of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Non-State Actor An individual or entity not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities, which come within the scope of the USCR 1540 Resolution. SFIs SFIs are Bahamian supervised financial institutions, consisting of any natural or legal person who is supervised by one or more of the above noted Competent Authorities, and conducts as a business one or more activities or operations within the parameters of their license, for or on behalf of a customer.

1. INTRODUCTION
   1.1 The Bahamas has not encountered any direct acts of terrorism or proliferation within its
   jurisdiction to date, so this threat is uncommon. Nonetheless, instances of proliferation financing are still possible due to The Bahamas’s location as an international financial center, with over two hundred (200) international banks and trust companies, one hundred and forty-six (146) securities firms, and eight hundred and forty-nine (849) investment funds which cater to a wide variety of international and local clients1 .
   1.2 Given the potential for human and social catastrophe associated with proliferation, a low
   probability risk of proliferation and proliferation financing must also be taken seriously.
2. PURPOSE
   2.1 This Guidance Note has been issued to raise awareness of the risks and vulnerabilities in
   regards to proliferation and proliferation financing, as well as the potential damage to The Bahamas if a regulated entity knowingly or unknowingly plays an appreciable role in proliferation financing.
   2.2 This Guidance Note provides common definitions surrounding proliferation financing
   and describes the regulatory framework in The Bahamas, coupled with international standards and obligations that are relevant to combatting proliferation financing risks. The identification, assessment, understanding and transparency of proliferation financing risks by SFIs are essential to a stronger Bahamian AML/CFT & CPF regime. This Guidance Note also focuses on indicators of possible proliferation financing risks, and the relevant risk management practices and tools SFIs should implement and incorporate in their AML/CFT programs in order to counter the risks and vulnerabilities associated with proliferation financing.
   2.3 The Financial Regulators in The Bahamas (collectively referred to as “the Regulatory
   Authorities”) are providing this Guidance Note on the identification, assessment, management and mitigation of financial crime risk. The following Regulatory Authorities have agreed to participate:
   2.3.1 The Central Bank of The Bahamas (“CBOB”) – responsible for the regulation and
   supervision of banks, trust companies, co-operative credit unions and money transmission businesses (collectively known as “supervised financial institutions” or “SFIs”);
   2.3.2 The Compliance Commission of The Bahamas (“CCB”) – an independent
   Statutory Authority responsible for regulating DNFPBs to ensure compliance with the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) rules and regulations found in the Financial Transactions Reporting Act,

1 As of March 2018

2018 (FTRA); the Financial Transactions Reporting Regulations, 2018; and the Financial Intelligence (Transactions Reporting) Regulations 2001, and other substantive laws in The Bahamas, Codes of Practice and guidelines;
2.3.3 The Insurance Commission of The Bahamas (“ICB”) – a Statutory Body
responsible for the regulation and supervision of all insurance activity within or through The Bahamas. It is concerned with the ongoing monitoring and supervisory oversight of domestic and external insurers as well as intermediaries, including agents, brokers, salespersons, insurance managers; and
2.3.4 The Securities Commission of The Bahamas (“SCB”) – a Statutory Body
mandated to administer the various Securities and Investment Funds Acts and Regulations, with regulatory responsibilities for stock exchanges, brokers, broker￾dealers, securities investment advisors and Financial and Corporate Service Providers operating in or from The Bahamas.
3. SCOPE
3.1 This Guidance Note should be read in conjunction with local and international standards
and guidelines produced by the Competent Authorities, the BCBS and FATF, as well as by the relevant regulators operating in other jurisdictions that are engaged in the supervision of multi-national SFIs and DNFBPs (ref BCP 12 in Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 2012). Licensees in The Bahamas frequently have clients with multiple relationships and/or accounts within the same Group, but located in offices spanning different countries.
4. APPLICABILITY
4.1 These Guidance Notes are applicable to all persons and entities regulated and supervised
by Bahamian Competent Authorities.
5. WHAT IS PROLIFERATION?
5.1 The FATF’s 2008 Typologies and Proliferation Financing Report’s definition of
“Proliferation” is:
“Proliferation has many guises but ultimately involves the transfer and export of technology, goods, software, services or expertise that could be used in nuclear, chemical or biological weapon-related programs, including delivery systems; it poses a significant threat to global security.”
5.2 The Report, which identifies a link between proliferation of WMD and terrorism, states
that:

“If appropriate safeguards are not established, maintained and enforced for sensitive materials, technology, services and expertise, they can become accessible to individuals and entities seeking to profit from the acquisition and resale, or for intended use in WMD programs”.
6. WHAT IS PROLIFERATION FINANCING?
6.1 The 2010 FATF Status Report on Combating Proliferation Financing defines
Proliferation Financing as:
“the act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations”. The Report adds that:
“PF facilitates the movement and development of proliferation-sensitive items and can contribute to global instability and potentially catastrophic loss of life if weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are developed and deployed”.
6.2 There is current evidence that terrorists/terrorist organizations have sought to use WMD
(i.e. chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear capabilities) in acts of terrorism (See
Appendix on Typologies). As such, terrorism financing which supports terrorist
organizations may also contribute to proliferation.
7. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND OBLIGATIONS TO COUNTER
PROLIFERATION FINANCING RISKS
The United Nation Security Council’s Resolution (UNSCR 1540)
7.1 On April 28, 2004 the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1540, which was
established to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials. The resolution filled a gap in international law by addressing the risk that terrorists might obtain, proliferate, or use WMDs.
7.2 The UNSCR 1540 imposed the following three (3) primary obligations upon its UN
membership (including The Bahamas) in an effort to restrict proliferation financing. The financial provisions of the Resolution require that all States:
a. abstain from supporting non-State actors seeking WMDs and their means of delivery;

b. adopt and implement effective laws (i.e. criminal or civil penalties for violations of export control laws) to prohibit non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery; and
c. establish and enforce effective measures and domestic controls (i.e. export and
transhipment controls) to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials.
7.3 Additionally, the UNSC has adopted another approach to counter proliferation financing
through resolutions made under Chapter VII of the UN Chapter and thereby imposing mandatory obligations for UN Member States. Articles 39 through 51 speak to such obligations. The Financial Action Task Force Recommendations (FATF 7)
7.4 FATF Recommendation 7, which was issued to combat proliferation and proliferation
financing, states that countries should implement targeted financial sanctions to prevent, suppress and disrupt the proliferation of WMDs and their financing, to comply with the United Nations Resolution UNSCR 1540. The FATF also noted that implementation of the UN resolution would require countries to impose financial services restrictions such as freezing client accounts of named entities or individuals without delay, who have been placed on a UN or National Restricted Listing. The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 7 has further emphasized the need for financial institutions to implement ‘preventive measures’ to counter the flow of funds or assets to proliferators or those who are responsible for weapons proliferation. Immediate Outcome 11 states that persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are to be prevented from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant UNSCRs. The Bahamas Adoption of International Standards
7.5 To address the potential risk of proliferation financing and comply with the above
requirements of UNSCR 1540 and the FATF Recommendation 7, The Bahamas has established legislation and regulations. These include the International Obligations (Economic Ancillary Measures) Act, and the adoption and issuance of several International Obligations (Economic and Ancillary Measures) Orders that have targeted such countries as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Liberia, Libya, Cote D’Ivoire, Somalia and Sudan. The FATF’s Recommendation 2 states that relevant competent authorities at the policy-making and operational levels, should have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to cooperate, and where appropriate, coordinate domestically with each other concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat ML, TF and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

8. THE BAHAMIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATTING
   PROLIFERATION FINANCING
   The Proceeds of Crime Act, 2018 (“POCA”)
   8.1 This Act empowers the Police, Customs and the Courts in relation to money laundering,
   search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime and for connected purposes. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2018 (“ATA”)
   8.2 This Act defines the offence of terrorism and criminalizes the financing of terrorism and
   of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It applies to actions, persons and property both inside and outside The Bahamas. The Financial Transaction Reporting Act, 2018 (“FTRA)
   8.3 This Act imposes certain obligations on financial institutions in relation to the conduct of
   financial transactions; and for connected purposes.
   The Financial Transaction Reporting Regulations, 2018 (“FTRR”)
   8.4 These Regulations impose certain obligations on financial institutions to verify the
   identity of an individual or person or corporation doing business in The Bahamas. The Financial Intelligence Unit Act, 2000 (“FIUA”)
   8.5 This agency is responsible for receiving, analyzing, obtaining and disseminating
   information which relates to or may relate to the proceeds of the offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act and under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Customs
   8.6 The Bahamas Customs Department enforces Import Control Regulations, which align
   with the International obligations and United Nations sanctions.2 Data Protection (Privacy of Personal Information) Act, 2003
   8.7 An Act to protect the privacy of individuals in relation to personal data and to regulate the
   collection, processing, keeping, use and disclosure of certain information relating to individuals and to provide for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.

2 www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/un-sc-consolidated-list

AML/CFT Guidelines
8.8 These guidelines incorporate both the mandatory minimum requirements of the
AML/CFT laws of The Bahamas, and industry best practices. It is important that the management of every SFI views money laundering prevention and countering the financing of terrorism as part of their risk management strategies. These guidelines cover the following areas: Internal Controls, Policies and Procedures, Risk Rating Customers, Verification of Customer Identity, Money Transmission Businesses, Electronic Funds Transfers, Record Keeping, the Role of the Money Laundering Reporting Officer, and Education and Training.
9. UNDERSTANDING HOW PROLIFERATORS OPERATE
9.1 The FATF’s 2008 Proliferation Financing Typologies Report3
has outlined several characteristics attributed to Proliferators and their Networks, which are highlighted below:
9.1.1 Proliferators:
9.1.1.1 operate globally;
9.1.1.2 mask their acquisitions as legitimate trade; and
9.1.1.3 exploit global commerce (i.e. operate in countries with weak export controls or
free trade zones – where their procurements and shipments might escape scrutiny).
9.1.2 Proliferation Networks are comprised of Proliferators who:
9.1.2.1 abuse both the formal/informal sectors of the international financial system by
using the ordinary financial transactions to pay intermediaries and suppliers outside the network;
9.1.2.2 use cash to trade in proliferation type goods to circumvent the system;
9.1.2.3 purchase proliferation-sensitive goods/services in the open market and make
them appear legitimate to avoid suspicions of proliferation (i.e. purchase of dual-use goods);
9.1.2.4 conduct financial transactions in the banking system through false
intermediaries, front companies and illegal trade brokers; and

3 www.FATF.org: 2008 Proliferation Financing Typologies Report

9.1.2.5 create complex procurement networks to avoid detection of the true end-users
of proliferation-sensitive goods.
10. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH PROLIFERATION FINANCING
10.1 Amongst other risk factors, during their risk assessment of clients, SFIs should consider
the following associated indicators of increased potential proliferation risks:
Country/Geographic Risks
10.1.1 Assess whether the client/client business is located in a country that is subject to a
relevant UN sanction (i.e. Democratic Republic of Korea or Iran) or is listed on a National Listing for high risk entities (i.e. UK/EU Specially Targeted List or OFAC Listing). Customer Risk
10.1.2 During the account opening and ongoing due diligence processes, determine the type of
business the client is engaged in to assess whether it poses potential proliferation risks (i.e. If the client is involved in the export business, then assess if client is involved in transactions with end-users who are listed on a National Listing); and
10.1.3 Assess whether the client’s end user is associated with a listed Military or Research
Company connected with a high risk jurisdiction of proliferation concern. Product/Service Risk
10.1.4 Determine if specific products/services offered by the Licensee could involve potential
proliferation factors (i.e. delivery of financial services such as correspondent banking to a country targeted on the EU or UN Sanctions Listing).
10.1.5 Consider other variables specific to the customer or transaction such as:
10.1.5.1 Duration of relationship;
10.1.5.2 Purpose of relationship;
10.1.5.3 Corporate structure; and
10.1.5.4 Volume of anticipated transaction.

11. MANAGEMENT OF PROLIFERATION FINANCING RISKS
    11.1 The FATF in its 2010 Policy Report on Combatting PF recommends that SFIs should
    manage their potential PF risks by implementing a Risk-Based Approach that incorporates controls to mitigate the risk of PF within their current AML/CFT structure.
    11.2 This could be achieved through:
    11.2.1 applying objective criteria to assess the potential PF risk by using SFIs’
    expertise and obtaining information from government agencies;
    11.2.2 building on the SFI’s existing AML/CFT framework by incorporating
    proliferation risk factors for consideration along with the wider determination of risk factors;
    11.2.3 using the SFI’s established AML/CFT mechanism to conduct risk assessments
    and identify suspicious activity that is applicable to proliferation considerations;
    11.2.4 implementing risk-based anti-proliferation and proliferation financing policies
    and procedures, comparable to international standards. Including training to identify suspicious activity and a system for reporting suspicious transactions; and
    11.2.5 developing and maintaining in-house policies and procedures relative to
    countering proliferation and proliferation financing and compliance with these proliferation financing guidelines.
    11.3 Introducing proliferation financing into an institution’s current risk assessment practice
    should be proportionate to the overall proliferation risk of the activities currently undertaken by the institution. It is open to Bahamian SFIs to adopt policies preventing client relationships that expose the SFI to countries, customers, and products that are higher risk for proliferation financing.
    11.4 Additionally, the following risks should be considered when formulating a proliferation
    focused risk assessment:
    11.4.1 Country or Geographic Risk – a strong indicator will be links to a country
    that is subject to sanctions against proliferation, an embargoed destination, or countries that have strong links with terrorist groups and activities.
    11.4.2 Customer Risk – in particular, where a customer is involved in the supply,
    purchase or sale of dual-use, proliferation-sensitive or military goods. Also, customers who are on national lists concerning high risk entities and those connected to a higher-risk jurisdiction of proliferation concern.

11.4.3 Product and Service Risks – project financing of sensitive industries in higher
risk jurisdictions; higher risks may result where delivery of services is subject to sanctions; trade finance services, transactions and insurance products involving higher risk jurisdictions; and the delivery of high volumes of dual￾use, proliferation-sensitive or military goods, particularly to a higher risk country.
11.4.4 Higher Risk Transactions and Entities – lists compiled by national
authorities may assist an institution, by providing information on entities and individuals who may pose a proliferation concern.
11.4.5 Import and Export Goods – SFIs can mitigate against proliferation financing
by asking the customer to provide a valid export license or a reference to the export control requirements in the relevant jurisdiction, thereby proving that the goods which are being exported do not require a license.
11.4.6 Trade Finance and Insurance Products – can impose challenges and risks.
Enhanced due diligence should focus on direct loans or general credit facilities to facilitate export transactions; provision of guarantees on behalf of exporters; provision of insurance against certain risks in the trading process; and purchase of promissory notes issued by foreign buyers to exporters for the purchase of goods and services, freeing up cash for the exporter. The FATF Working Group on Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering (WGTM)
11.5 The FATF’s WGTM Project Team on Proliferation Financing suggests several measures
which can be implemented by SFIs to mitigate the risk posed by high risk customers. All SFIs should possess adequate policies and processes including strict customer due diligence (CDD) rules to promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the SFI from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities.
11.5.1 SFIs must have a strong ML/FT Risk Management program in place that
incorporates the following:
11.5.2 customer and transaction screening, which includes, enhanced due diligence,
increased monitoring, enhanced frequency relationship reviews and senior management approval;
11.5.3 account monitoring, with the use of automatic systems such as post-event
monitoring of account activity; and
11.5.4 reporting of Suspicious Transactions & Asset Freezing – a licensee can include
entities of interest to counter-proliferation investigators including the FIU. Particularly where a licensee is an asset or deposit-taking institution, the relevant

Regulatory Authorities must also be advised. Jurisdictions should consider whether proceeds and instrumentalities of proliferation financing acts may be subject to asset freezing and confiscation, on the basis set out in FATF Recommendation 3.
12. RED FLAG INDICATORS AND TYPOLOGIES OF POTENTIAL
PROLIFERATION FINANCING RISKS
12.1 Customer:
12.1.1 The customer is involved in the supply, sale, delivery or purchase of dual-use,
proliferation-sensitive or military goods, particularly to higher risk jurisdictions.
12.1.2 The customer or counter-party, or its address, is the same or similar to that of an
individual or entity found on publicly available sanctions lists.
12.1.3 The customer is a military or research body connected with a higher risk
jurisdiction of proliferation concern.
12.1.4 The customer’s activities do not match the business profile.
12.1.5 The customer is vague about the end user(s) and provides incomplete
information or is resistant when requested to provide additional information.
12.1.6 A new customer requests a letter of credit from a SFI, whilst still awaiting
approval of its account.
12.1.7 The customer uses complicated structures to conceal involvement, for example,
uses layered letters of credit, front companies, intermediaries and brokers.
12.2 Transactions/Orders:
12.2.1 The transaction(s) concern(s) dual-use, proliferation-sensitive or military goods,
whether licensed or not.
12.2.2 The transaction(s) involve(s) an individual or entity in any country of
proliferation concern.
12.2.3 The transaction reflect(s) a link between representatives of companies (e.g. same
owners or management) exchanging goods, in order to evade scrutiny of the goods exchanged.
12.2.4 The transaction(s) involve(s) the shipment of goods inconsistent with normal
geographic trade patterns i.e. where the country involved does not normally export or import the types of goods concerned.

12.2.5 The order for goods is placed by firms or individuals from countries, other than
the country of the stated end-user.
12.3 Jurisdiction:
12.3.1 Countries with weak financial safeguards and which are actively engaged with a
sanctioned country.
12.3.2 The presence of an industry that produces dual-use goods, proliferation-sensitive
items or military goods.
12.3.3 Deliberate insertion of extra links into the supply chain.
12.3.4 Countries that are known to have weak import/export control laws or poor
enforcement.
12.3.5 Countries that do not have the required level of technical competence in regard
to certain goods involved.
12.4 Other:
12.4.1 The final destination or end-user is unclear.
12.4.2 Project financing and complex loans, where there is a presence of other
objective factors such as an unidentified end-user.
12.4.3 Declared value of shipment under-valued in relation to shipping cost.
12.4.4 Inconsistencies in information contained in trade documents and financial flow
e.g. names, addresses, final destination.
12.4.5 The use of fraudulent documents and identities e.g. false end-use certificates and
forged export certificates.
12.4.6 The use of facilitators to ensure the transfer of goods avoids inspection.
12.4.7 A freight forwarding firm being listed as the product’s final destination.
12.4.8 Wire instructions or payment from or due to entities not identified on the
original letter of credit or other documentation.
12.4.9 Pattern of wire transfer activity that shows unusual patterns or has no apparent
purpose.

13. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR BAHAMIAN INSTITUTIONS?
    13.1 Entities in The Bahamas can presume that conventional domestic business with
    Bahamian persons is a near-zero risk of proliferation financing. However, this near-zero risk should be covered by effective application of the institution’s general suite of AML and CFT measures. Employees of SFIs should also be aware of the red flags for proliferation financing and be in a position to report any suspicions, if necessary.
    13.2 The general expectation is that Bahamian SFIs will exercise extreme caution when
    dealing with countries on the UN or EU sanctions lists, or residents of those countries, or transactions associated with those countries (see EU Sanctions Risk List Countries). Most Bahamian SFIs would do better in risk-management terms to ensure that they are not engaging people or entities that are appreciably exposed to proliferation risks, rather than attempting to manage those risks.
    13.3 Any SFIs operating internationally, or possessing international clients, who choose to do
    business with countries with a high risk profile, will need to know in real time which countries are on the EU or UN sanctions lists, as per the UK/EU Specially Targeted List or as per the OFAC listing, and carefully monitor any connections to those countries, including reporting suspicious transactions to the FIU in a timely manner.
    13.4 SFIs should be sensitive to the risks associated with financing the potential tools of
    proliferation, including nuclear and dual-use material, and military items.

TABLE OF REFERENCE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 2015/2016 http://www.centralbankbahamas.com/download/016371800.pdf FATF FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE – MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST FINANCING TYPOLOGIES (2004 – 2005) http://www.fatf￾gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2004_2005_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf FATF REPORT – COMBATING PROLIFERATION FINANCING: A STATUS REPORT ON POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND CONSULTATION 2010 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Status-report-proliferation￾financing.pdf FATF PROLIFERATION FINANCING (PF) TYPOLOGIES REPORT 2008 http://www.fatf￾gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Typologies%20Report%20on%20Proliferation%20 Financing.pdf FATF REPORT ON EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS 2015 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing￾Risks.pdf FATF GUIDANCE – NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING RISK ASSESSMENT 2013 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION – The FATF RECOMMENDATIONS – updated February 2018 http://www.fatf￾gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%2020 12.pdf FATF GUIDANCE ON COUNTER PROLIFERATION FINANCING 2018 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-Countering-Proliferation￾Financing.pdf THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FINANCIAL PROVISIONS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS TO COUNTER THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 2013 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-UNSCRS￾Prolif-WMD.pdf

STOCKHOLM INSTITUTE FOR PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) “PROLIFERATION RED FLAGS AND THE TRANSPORT SECTOR” 2016 https://www.sipri.org/publications/2016/red-flags-good-practice-guide UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 4946TH MEETING ON 28 April 2004. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004) PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT, 2018 & FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS REPORTING ACT 2018 https://bfsb-bahamas.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FTRA-POCA.May-25-2018.pdf ANTI-TERRORISM ACT, 2018 FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS REPORTING REGULATIONS, 2018 FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT ACT, 2000 http://laws.bahamas.gov.bs/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/2000/2000- 0039/FinancialIntelligenceUnitAct DATA PROTECTION ACT, 2000 http://laws.bahamas.gov.bs/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/2003/2003- 0003/DataProtectionPrivacyofPersonalInformationAct COUNTERING PROLIFERATION FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS https://rusi.org/publication/other-publications/countering-proliferation-finance-introductory-guide￾financial

REFERENCE: EU AND OFAC SPECIALLY TARGETED COUNTRY SANCTIONS LISTING EU measures in force4
Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides a legal
basis for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of the Union’s economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, where such restrictive measures are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). EU Sanctions Map5 A digital tool visualizing UN & EU sanctions US measures in force (OFAC) The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the US Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats.

4 www.bscn.nl/sanctions-consulting/sanctions-list-countries ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/sanctions_en.htm

ANNEX A: TYPOLOGIES
Example Typologies of the Financing of Proliferation

• The Khan-case (which consists of several different proliferation cases over a long period)
  concerned nuclear weapon programs in several jurisdictions of proliferation concern. The process of proliferation for each item to be constructed consisted of many steps in order to disguise the activities of the network and the true nature and end-use of the goods. Many individuals, companies and countries were- knowingly or in good faith involved. Although some operations appear to have been settled in cash, others were settled through international transfers within the framework of duly established contracts. Contracts appeared to have been financed conventionally, through letters of credit or bills of exchange. Additionally, there were cash transactions within the network of customers. Amounts were deposited in bank accounts of emerging or offshore countries before transactions were made between banks for final beneficiaries.
• A proliferator set up front companies and used other intermediaries to purchase magnets
  that could be used for manufacturing centrifuge bearings. Front Company #1 signed documents with the foreign jurisdiction’s manufacturing company concerning the manufacturing and trade of magnets, however, it was not declared in these documents, nor was it detected by authorities, that these components could be used to develop WMD. The magnets were then transshipped to a neighboring third jurisdiction to Front Company #2. This jurisdiction is used as a “turntable” for goods, which means that goods are imported and re-exported. The proliferator used an intermediary to arrange the import and export to the third jurisdiction. The intermediary had accounts in the third jurisdiction and used his accounts to finance the acquisition of the goods and to launder the illegal funds used for these transactions. A combination of cash and letters of credit were used to pay for the trade of the magnets which totaled over 4 million USD.
• Trading Company B in country Z deals in laboratory test-equipment for university and
  research centers and also for the energy sector. It is known to have procured dual-use items for country Z’s WMD programs. Company B has bank accounts in a number of countries and has a UK account with a UK bank in country U, a known diversionary destination.
• R. David Hughes was the president of an Olympia, Washington-based company,
  AMLINK. AMLINK was a medical supply company, but was involved in export of commodities that did not match its business profile. In June 1996, the U.S. Customs Service began an investigation of the exportation of nuclear power plant equipment by Hughes and AMLINK from the Port of Seattle to Cyprus. The nuclear power plant equipment was to be shipped from Cyprus to Iran via Bulgaria, in violation of the U.S. embargo on Iran. Payment was made via wire transfer from Abi-Saad into Hughes U.S. bank account; Hughes then paid for the equipment with a cashier’s check. The declared value of the shipment was under-valued. Hughes was indicted and convicted of export of nuclear equipment without a license.