Rule · MNB · 17 Nov 2026
UCITS management companies and AIFMs managing open-ended AIFs must apply the recommendation from 1 December 2026, or from 16 April 2027 for funds registered before 16 April 2026; sub-threshold fund managers are exempt but may apply it voluntarily with notification under Section 36(9) of the Kbftv. Fund managers must calibrate activation thresholds for redemption limits, extensions and anti-dilution tools, review swing pricing and anti-dilution levies, and demonstrate calibration on MNB request.
The purpose of the recommendation is to formulate the expectations of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (hereinafter: MNB) in relation to the liquidity management tools of undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (hereinafter: UCITS) and open-ended alternative investment funds (hereinafter: AIFs) supervised by the MNB (hereinafter together: fund), and thereby to increase the predictability of law enforcement and to promote the uniform application of the relevant legislation.
During the preparation of the recommendation, consideration was given to the guidelines issued by the European Securities and Markets Authority (hereinafter: ESMA) on 12 March 2026 on the liquidity management tools of UCITS and open-ended AIFs (hereinafter: ESMA Guidelines).
By publishing this recommendation, the MNB ensures compliance with the provisions of the ESMA Guidelines.
The addressees of the recommendation are the UCITS management companies falling under the scope of Act XVI of 2014 on collective investment forms and their managers, and on the amendment of certain financial laws (hereinafter: Kbftv.) and the alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) managing open-ended AIFs (hereinafter together: fund manager). The so-called "sub-threshold" fund managers under Section 2 (2) of the Kbftv. are exempt – among other things – from the mandatory application of Section 36 of the Kbftv. on liquidity management, however, the MNB considers it good practice and recommends in their case as well the voluntary application of the provisions on liquidity management tools. At the same time, the MNB also records that if these "sub-threshold" fund managers voluntarily decide to apply liquidity management tools, this may only take place – subject to the notification of the MNB in accordance with Section 36 (9) of the Kbftv. – in compliance with the relevant legislation and other legal regulatory instruments (such as, where applicable, this recommendation).
This recommendation applies to the selection, activation and calibration of liquidity management tools by the fund manager in order to establish consistent, effective and efficient supervisory practices.
This recommendation does not refer back in full to the legislative provisions when formulating the principles and expectations, however, the addressees of the recommendation are of course still obliged to comply with the related legislative requirements.
This recommendation does not formulate guidance on data management and data protection issues, does not contain any expectation regarding the processing of personal data, and the requirements contained therein may not be interpreted in any way as an authorisation for the processing of personal data. Data processing in connection with the fulfilment of the supervisory expectations set out in the recommendation may only be carried out in compliance with the data protection legislative provisions in force at any given time.
1. The MNB records that the primary responsibility for the management of liquidity risk, as well as for the selection, calibration, activation and deactivation of liquidity management tools, lies with the fund manager. When selecting the appropriate liquidity management tools, the fund manager is expected to bear in mind that the selected liquidity management tools must enable the effective management of the fund's liquidity risk under both normal and stressed market conditions, and that the selected tool(s) must be as comprehensive as possible in order to manage a number of different possible circumstances.
2. The MNB expects that, when selecting the liquidity management tools under Point 69a of Section 4 (1) of the Kbftv., the fund manager assesses the suitability of these tools taking into account all relevant factors, including at least the following:
a. the legal structure of the fund and the specificities related to the structure [e.g. ETF, master-feeder (target and feeder AIF, or UCITS) structure];
b. the investment strategy and investment policy of the fund;
c. the distribution conditions of the fund, including among others the minimum duration of the redemption period, the lock-up period, the settlement period, the redemption policy and the distribution frequency;
d. the liquidity profile of the fund and the underlying assets, including the expected liquidity needs, taking into account investor redemptions and other possible sources of liquidity risk related to the liability side of the fund's balance sheet (e.g. margin call, i.e. a request for additional collateral) under normal and stressed market conditions, as well as the impact of the activation of liquidity management tools on the fund's liquidity profile;
e. the results of liquidity stress tests;
f. the characteristics of the fund's investor base;
g. the fund's distribution policy;
h. any other relevant operational obstacles and difficulties that may affect the feasibility of applying certain liquidity management tools.
3. Considering that the fund manager is obliged to select at least two appropriate liquidity management tools, it may also decide to apply more than two liquidity management tools and additional liquidity measures in order to ensure the fund's overall resilience and its ability to manage its liquidity under both normal and stressed market conditions. At the same time, the MNB draws the fund manager's attention to the fact that this (or even the selection of all liquidity management tools) does not exempt it from the expectation to assess the suitability of each tool in the light of all relevant factors, including at least those mentioned in the previous point.
4. When selecting the two mandatory liquidity management tools, the fund manager is expected to consider the advantages of selecting at least one quantitative-based liquidity management tool (redemption limits, extension of redemption time) and at least one anti-dilution tool (redemption fee, swing pricing, dual pricing, anti-dilution protection fee), keeping in mind the fund's investment strategy, redemption policy and liquidity profile, as well as the market conditions under which the liquidity management tool can be activated. In this context, the fund manager may also consider selecting a liquidity management tool to be applied under normal market conditions and a liquidity management tool to be applied under market stress conditions.
5. When considering the activation of the liquidity management tool(s), the MNB also expects the fund manager to consider whether to activate the liquidity management tools independently or in combination with other liquidity management tools or other liquidity measures.
6. The MNB expects the fund manager to demonstrate, upon request, that the activation and calibration of the selected liquidity management tools serve the interests of all investors and are appropriate and effective in light of market conditions and the relevant characteristics of the fund (e.g. liquidity profile, type of underlying assets, investor base).
7. The fund manager is also expected to ensure that data on the volume of incoming subscription and redemption orders is handled in a way that prevents certain investors from obtaining and benefiting from information on the likelihood of activation of liquidity management tools (e.g. in the case of redemption limits, information on the possible reaching of activation thresholds).
8. The MNB expects the fund manager to consider the activation of the suspension of subscriptions, redemptions and redemptions (hereinafter together: suspensions) only in exceptional circumstances and, taking into account the interests of investors, in justified cases. The following list contains a non-exhaustive list of exceptional circumstances in the presence of which the fund manager may consider this: asset valuation difficulties; serious liquidity problems (e.g. margin call, i.e. requests for additional collateral, due to significant withdrawal), when the execution of the sale of the underlying assets may cause liquidity problems for the fund (e.g. large discounts in asset sales, significant dilution of remaining investors); critical cybersecurity incident affecting the operational capacity of the fund, the fund manager or the fund's external service provider; unforeseen market closures, trading restrictions, closure of trading venues; severe financial and/or political crisis; identification of significant fraud; natural disaster.
9. Suspensions may also extend to the suspension of the calculation of the net asset value, in particular in the case of uncertain valuation, and when the net asset value of the investment fund(s) cannot be calculated. In other cases, however - where possible - the fund manager must continue to value the assets in the fund and publish the net asset value in order to ensure that investors receive appropriate information – including that the fund is closed for subscriptions, redemptions and redemptions.
10. In certain cases, suspensions may also be activated for the period until the fund manager makes the decision on the termination of the fund, but the fund manager must ensure that suspensions are activated only on a temporary basis (i.e. with the aim that the fund is not permanently suspended, but that it is reopened, terminated or, if necessary, at a given time, the segregated asset accounts are activated).
11. In the calibration of suspensions, the fund manager is expected to take into account the following:
a. the criteria for assessing and monitoring the conditions triggering their activation;
b. the criteria for reviewing and possibly amending the decision on suspension, and the change in circumstances justifying this.
12. The fund manager should consider the selection of redemption limits for every fund, since under stressed market conditions all assets may struggle with liquidity problems, and by activating this liquidity management tool, the activation of suspensions may be avoided.
13. The selection of redemption limits should be considered in particular by the following fund managers:
a. fund managers of funds with a concentrated investor base, where a significant amount of redemption may cause liquidity problems for the fund and may affect investors;
b. fund managers of funds whose assets are less liquid, inherently illiquid, or may become illiquid under stressed market conditions, and/or whose assets may take longer to sell.
14. The fund manager should consider activating redemption limits if redemption requests exceed the threshold. However, activating redemption limits may be a less appropriate solution if the fund is struggling with valuation problems – in this case, the fund manager may consider the use of other liquidity management tools (e.g. suspensions – simultaneously with the suspension of the calculation of the net asset value).
15. The fund manager is expected to properly calibrate the activation threshold so that it operates effectively and the redemption limit can be activated when the fund manager, keeping the interests of investors in mind, must restrict redemptions. When calibrating this threshold, the fund manager should duly take into account the following:
a. the frequency of calculating the net asset value;
b. the fund's investment objective;
c. the liquidity of the underlying assets;
d. current market conditions;
e. expected cash flows.
16. If the activation of the redemption limit is temporary in nature, the fund manager may not restrict its application either with respect to the maximum duration of their use (the maximum duration of redemption limits) or the maximum number of activations of redemption limits (the maximum number of applications of redemption limits). These questions must be decided by the fund manager on a case-by-case basis.
17. Fund managers of ABAs without retail investors and with a limited number of professional investors should, in order to reduce the first-mover advantage, consider applying investor-level redemption limits, either on their own or in combination with limits enforced at the fund level.
18. The fund manager should consider, for every fund, the selection of the extension of the redemption period, while bearing in mind that this liquidity management tool provides more time for the liquidation of the underlying assets, it is expected that particular attention be paid to the following funds:
a) funds whose liquidity is particularly sensitive to deterioration in market stress situations;
b) ABAs investing in less liquid assets, with particular regard to real estate funds, which must already have, under normal market conditions, an appropriate redemption frequency consistent with the level of liquidity of the given assets.
19. The fund manager should, where applicable, consider activating the extension of the redemption period under both normal and stressed market conditions, taking into account that this may be particularly useful under certain circumstances – for example, in the event of redemption pressure.
20. The fund manager must carefully consider whether the activation of the extension of the redemption period is appropriate for UCITS under normal market conditions, taking into account the liquidity of their assets and the best interests of investors.
21. In order to ensure that the number of redemption requests does not increase, the fund manager must carefully determine the duration of the extension of the redemption period, taking into account the time required for the orderly liquidation of the underlying assets, with the interests of investors in mind.
22. The MNB expects that, if redemptions in kind are chosen, the fund manager take the following into account:
a) the structure of the fund;
b) investor concentration;
c) the types of assets; and
d) restrictions on the use of redemptions in kind applicable exclusively to professional investors.
23. The fund manager should consider, for every fund type, the selection of anti-dilution tools in order to mitigate significant dilution of investors and the first-mover advantage.
24. The fund manager is furthermore expected to carefully consider the different levels of activation of anti-dilution tools at the fund level, and to determine in advance and regularly review appropriate and prudent activation thresholds in order to avoid a material dilution effect on investors under both ordinary and stressed market conditions, taking into account the investment strategy, the assets under management, the size and characteristics of the portfolio, the estimated liquidity cost, the investor profile, the liquidity profile of the individual funds and the funds' historical cash flows.
25. The fund manager should take into account that the activation of anti-dilution tools may be more difficult under certain circumstances – for example, in the case of limited market liquidity and/or valuation uncertainty. In these cases, the fund manager may also consider the use of liquidity management tools other than anti-dilution tools (e.g. quantitative-based liquidity management tools).
26. The fund manager must ensure that the activation of anti-dilution tools does not infringe the fund manager's obligation to always value every asset fairly and properly.
27. The fund manager may find it appropriate to activate anti-dilution tools under both normal and stressed market conditions in order to pass on the estimated costs of liquidity to the subscribing or redeeming investors. The estimated cost of liquidity:
a) must in itself include the explicit transaction costs of subscriptions, buy-backs or redemptions;
b) must take into account implicit transaction costs – including the significant market impact of asset purchases or sales – only if this is consistent with the investment strategy, and the estimate must be made on the basis of the principle of utmost care. A reasonable basis for estimating the market impact may be the analysis of previous transactions carried out under similar market conditions, and the comparison of the difference between the price valid at the time of the order and the final price valid at the time of execution;
c) must, as a starting point, be based on the transaction-related costs of a proportionate slice of all assets in the portfolio ("proportionate approach"), unless this cannot be considered a correct estimate of the actual liquidity cost. In the latter case, the estimate may be adjusted in order to more accurately reflect the expected cost of liquidity in transactions with the selected individual assets of the portfolio. The fund manager may consider the application of a proportional cost in a stress situation where it is most relevant for mitigating the potential dilution effect on remaining investors.
28. In order to ensure that the calibration of anti-dilution tools effectively reflects the estimated liquidity costs in accordance with the previous point, the MNB expects the fund manager to regularly review and, if necessary, modify the calibration.
29. At the request of the MNB, the fund manager must demonstrate that the calibration of anti-dilution tools is fair and reasonable under both normal and stressed market conditions, with the interests of investors in mind.
30. The fund manager may consider the introduction of redemption fees for any type of fund, but they may be most useful for the following funds:
a) funds investing in assets whose transaction costs are fixed, transparent and/or predictable (such as real estate agency fees or notary fees) and/or whose transaction costs vary only to a small extent (e.g. fixed taxes and duties levied on real estate transactions);
b) funds investing in less liquid assets where, due to rare and limited pricing sources, the use of other anti-dilution tools – such as swing pricing – may be challenging or even impracticable.
31. When calibrating the predetermined range of redemption fees, the fund manager must apply a methodology that, in the case of a static value, allows for review and adjustment to reflect higher liquidity costs or stressed market conditions.
32. The fund manager should consider choosing swing pricing for funds whose underlying assets are actively traded and for which information on trading costs (the bid-ask spread) is available and frequently updated, especially if the funds invest mainly in assets with market-condition-dependent liquidity costs. The fund manager should consider that swing pricing may be a less suitable solution if trading costs are not easily accessible.
33. The fund manager shall decide, based on market conditions and according to its own methodology, on the activation of a given swing pricing model (a full or partial model based on a single-level or multi-level swing factor) and on the calibration of the swing factor.
34. When calibrating swing pricing, the fund manager is expected to ensure that the estimated liquidity cost – in light of market conditions and in accordance with the principles set out in point 27 – is incorporated into the swing factor, including, where applicable, any significant market impact of the transactions.
35. The fund manager may also determine a maximum swing factor. In the event that the modification of the swing factor exceeds the level of the maximum swing factor, the fund manager must, at the request of the MNB, retrospectively justify the use of the applied swing factor.
36. The fund manager must ensure that the decision on the recalibration of the maximum swing factor is justified and serves the best interests of investors.
37. The fund manager should, where applicable, consider choosing dual pricing for funds that invest mainly in assets whose liquidity costs are primarily reflected in the bid-ask spread.
38. Although dual pricing may be more suitable for funds that invest in assets whose liquidity costs arise mainly from the bid-ask spread, the fund manager must separately account for any significant market impact or explicit transaction costs through a further modification of the net asset value.
39. The fund manager should consider the application of the anti-dilution levy especially for the following funds:
a) funds with high investor concentration (i.e. with a small number of investors), as this allows managing the risk that one or more investors fully redeem their investment within a short period;
b) funds experiencing significant subscription and/or redemption activity, which may have a negative impact on the fund's existing investors (e.g. for smaller funds in terms of net asset value, the liquidity costs caused by larger redemptions may represent a greater burden);
c) funds investing in less liquid assets (e.g. high-yield bonds, shares of small-cap companies);
d) funds for which information on trading costs (the bid-ask spread) is generally available (e.g. funds investing in assets with market-condition-dependent liquidity costs).
40. The MNB recommends that the fund manager take into account* that the anti-dilution levy can be activated on a continuous or dynamic basis, also based on predetermined trigger events and thresholds.
41. Although the anti-dilution levy can be applied consistently under normal market conditions, in light of changing market conditions the fund manager is expected to review the calibration, thereby ensuring that the tool effectively maintains the fund's liquidity.
42. The MNB expects the fund manager to calibrate the anti-dilution protection fee based on the same factors as those used to calibrate the swing pricing factors – that is, the calibration of the anti-dilution protection fee must, in accordance with the principles set out in point 27, take into account all estimated explicit and implicit transaction costs, and it must be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted to ensure that the fee continuously aligns with market conditions.
43. The MNB expects that the fund manager should consider the activation of segregated asset accounts only in exceptional circumstances and, taking into account the interests of investors, in justified cases. The following list contains a non-exhaustive list of those exceptional circumstances in the presence of which the fund manager may consider the activation of segregated asset accounts:
a) significant valuation uncertainty or illiquidity affecting a specific part of the investment fund's portfolio for which there is no active market and/or trading in which is prohibited (e.g. due to sanctions), and/or the fair valuation of which is temporarily not possible; in this case, the purpose of activation is to segregate this part of the fund from the other parts (so that the remaining part can remain open to investors);
b) fraud, financial crisis or war affecting a given sector or region.
44. When calibrating segregated asset accounts, the fund manager should take into account the following:
a) the determination of the circumstances for activating the segregated asset account, as well as the specification of when these conditions cease to exist;
b) the establishment of criteria for assessing and monitoring the conditions triggering the use of the segregated asset account;
c) the question of whether it is appropriate to set aside a certain amount of money to manage potential liabilities related to the segregated asset accounts;
d) the criteria for reviewing and possibly revising the decision on the segregated asset account, as well as the changing circumstances justifying this.
45. The recommendation is a regulatory instrument issued pursuant to Article 13(2)(i) of Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which is not binding on the supervised financial organisations. The content of the recommendation issued by the MNB expresses the requirements set by legislation, the principles and methods recommended for application based on the MNB's law enforcement practice, and market standards and customs.
46. The MNB monitors and evaluates compliance with the recommendation among the financial organisations it supervises during its inspection and monitoring activities, in line with general European supervisory practice.
47. The MNB draws attention to the fact that the financial organisation may make the content of the recommendation part of its internal rules. In this case, the financial organisation is entitled to indicate that the provisions in its relevant internal rules comply with the relevant numbered recommendation issued by the MNB. If the financial organisation wishes to incorporate only certain parts of the recommendation into its internal rules, it should avoid referring to the recommendation, or apply the reference only with respect to the parts taken over from the recommendation.
48. The MNB expects the application of this recommendation – with the exception of point 49 – from 1 December 2026 from the affected financial organisations.
49. In respect of a fund registered by the MNB before 16 April 2026, the MNB expects the application of the recommendation from 16 April 2027 from the affected financial organisations, provided that if the fund manager of an investment fund falling within this scope decides that an earlier date than 16 April 2027 is to be considered applicable as the starting date for the given investment fund – depending on the case – for an ABA, on the basis of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/465 of 17 November 2025 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards determining the characteristics of liquidity management tools, or for a UCITS, on the basis of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/466 of 17 November 2025 supplementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards determining the characteristics of liquidity management tools, and takes the measures resulting from this decision and notifies all of this to the MNB, the MNB expects the application of the recommendation from the starting date according to this notification from the financial organisations affected by the notification.
Mihály Varga s.k.
President of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Note from RegAlert. AI assistants can read this document in full, and search 70,000+ more, through the RegAlert MCP connector (https://mcp.regalert.today/mcp). Free with an account. How to connect ChatGPT, Claude or Cursor.
RegAlert holds no document that amends or replaces this one. This is not a check that it is in force: confirm with the regulator.
“The recommendation is a regulatory instrument issued pursuant to Article 13(2)(i) of Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank”
“Act XVI of 2014 on collective investment forms and their managers, and on the amendment of certain financial laws (hereinafter: Kbftv.)”
“depending on the case – for an ABA, on the basis of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/465 of 17 November 2025 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU”
“or for a UCITS, on the basis of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/466 of 17 November 2025 supplementing Directive 2009/65/EC”
More like this from MNB
MNB published 1 document in the last 30 days. We email you each new one the day it's published.
Source: Magyar Nemzeti Bank — original document · Summary generated with machine assistance and checked by an AI reviewer before publication; the authoritative text is the regulator's original document. How RegAlert works
In RegAlert: added