Enforcement · SMV · 12 Apr 2022
The Deputy Superintendence of Market Conduct Supervision fines Luz del Sur S.A.A. 45 UIT for two minor infractions: incomplete disclosure of a material event of 28 January 2019 and late disclosure of a material event of 8 February 2019 regarding knowledge of plans implying a change in control. A third charge of late disclosure of the 10 October 2019 material event is also analyzed. The resolution details the charges, the company's defenses, and the evaluation of the case.
SMV Deputy Superintendence Resolution
No. 018-2022-SMV/11
| Lima, April 12, 2022 |
Summary: Sanction Luz del Sur S.A.A. with one (01) fine of 45 UIT, for having incurred in two (02) infractions of a minor nature typified in numeral 3.1 of subsection 3 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation
| Administered | : | LUZ DEL SUR S.A.A. |
| Subject | : | Administrative Sanctioning Procedure |
| File No. | : | 2021014106 |
The Deputy Superintendent of Market Conduct Supervision
WHEREAS:
The administrative file No. 2021014106 and Report No. 758-2021-SMV/11.2 (hereinafter, the Report), issued by the General Intendancy of Conduct Compliance (hereinafter, IGCC) of the Deputy Superintendence of Market Conduct Supervision (SASCM);
CONSIDERING:
2.1 Facts
2.2 Charges
This infraction is typified in numeral 3, subsection 3.1 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation.
This charge was formulated in attention to the fact that the Issuer would have communicated incompletely the material event of January 28, 2019, in relation to what was announced in the press release issued by Sempra Energy (hereinafter, SEMPRA), on that same date, based on the following:
Through the material event of January 28, 2019, the Issuer communicated that on that date it became aware that SEMPRA decided to initiate a process of sale of its participation in its energy sector businesses in South America, which includes its indirect participation in the Issuer, as shown below:
However, through the press release of January 28, 2019, SEMPRA announced on its website, among others, that the planned sale includes 100% of its participation in Chilquinta Energía (Chile) and 83.6% of Luz del Sur (Peru), as well as its participations in Tecnored S.A. (Chile) (hereinafter, Tecnored) and Tecsur S.A. (Peru) (hereinafter, Tecsur), companies that provide construction and infrastructure services to Chilquinta Energía and Luz del Sur, respectively (Free translation), as shown below:
According to what was indicated, it was evidenced that the Issuer would have communicated incompletely the material event of January 28, 2019, by not expressly including in the mentioned material event that SEMPRA's sale process also included its participation in the companies Chilquinta Energía, Tecnored and Tecsur, as announced in the press release issued by SEMPRA on January 28, 2019.
This infraction is typified in numeral 3, subsection 3.1 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation.
This charge was formulated in attention to the fact that the Issuer would have infringed the regulations by not having timely communicated as a material event the existence of plans that implied a change in its control unit, based on the following:
From the material event of February 8, 2019, presented in response to Official Letter No. 561-2019-SMV/11, it is noted that on December 14, 2018, the general manager of the Issuer, Mr. Mile Cacic Enriquez, was informed about the existence of initial conversations with potential investors to evaluate the possibility of a transaction of SEMPRA's participation in the Issuer. Likewise, he was informed that SEMPRA and its Board of Directors had not yet made a decision on the sale of its assets in South America.
Below is what was communicated through the material event of February 8, 2019:
According to what was indicated and in application of the presumption established in numeral 9.2 of article 9 of the Regulation of Material Events and Reserved Information, approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2014-SMV/01[2] (hereinafter, Regulation of Material Events), it is evidenced that the Issuer would have had knowledge of the plans that imply a change in the control unit in the issuer, on December 14, 2018.
In this sense, the knowledge of plans that imply a change in the control unit in the Issuer, which occurred on December 14, 2018, which should have been communicated on the same day, was communicated extemporaneously on February 8, 2019, at the request of the General Intendancy of Conduct Supervision. As is known, plans that imply a change in the control unit constitute material events, admitting, if applicable, and at the discretion of the Issuer, giving to a fact or negotiation in progress, the quality of reserved information, in accordance with the Regulation of Material Events, a situation that has not occurred in this case.
This infraction is typified in numeral 3, subsection 3.1 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation.
This charge was formulated in attention to the fact that the Issuer would have infringed the regulations by not having timely communicated as a material event information that complies with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation of Material Events and that was disclosed in a foreign market.
On the matter, it is mentioned that the Issuer through the material event of September 30, 2019, communicated the celebration of a purchase-sale contract between Sempra Energy International Holdings N.V., a Dutch subsidiary of SEMPRA, and China Yangtze Power International (Hong Kong) Co., Limited, regarding its participation in the Issuer and Tecsur (hereinafter, purchase-sale contract).
However, on the same date, SEMPRA published the "Form 8-K" on the portal of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter, SEC), https://www.sec.gov/, with information referring to the sale of its indirect ownership of 83.6% in the Issuer and Tecsur. In said publication, SEMPRA reported, among others, the following: (i) that the purchase-sale contract was signed on September 27, 2019, (ii) the conditions to which the closing of the transaction is subject, and (iii) the conditions of representation, warranty, indemnification and termination of the purchase-sale contract. Likewise, the form includes the documents of the purchase-sale agreement and a commitment letter.
In this regard, the Issuer should have communicated as a material event on September 30, 2019, the "Form 8-K", as SEMPRA did before the SEC, because it contained relevant information according to articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation of Material Events[3].
It should be noted that the Issuer only published the material event on October 10, 2019, prior request of the SMV. In addition to this, it was considered that the Issuer knew of the information provided by SEMPRA to the SEC on September 30, 2019, in application of the presumption established in numeral 9.2 of article 9 of the Regulation of Material Events[4].
In this sense, the publication of the "Form 8-K" on the SEC Portal, which occurred on September 30, 2019, which should have been communicated to the SMV on the same day, would have been communicated extemporaneously on October 10, 2019**.**
2.3 Defenses
On the matter, the Issuer maintains as main arguments of its defense against the first imputed charge, the following:
The Issuer states that upon receiving SEMPRA's press release of January 28, 2019, it complied with its obligation to evaluate it according to the materiality criteria indicated in articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation of Material Events, ensuring that the information it communicates to the SMV as a material event on January 28, 2019, has the capacity to significantly influence, for which it explains the following regarding the information it revealed in the referred material event:
The Issuer states that it was information involving a possible change of control and a total separation from the SEMPRA group, since it was anticipated, in the referred material event that the sale would be for the "entirety" of the participation that SEMPRA maintained in Luz del Sur.
This information is reasonably accurate and sufficient for any "sensible investor" to determine in a simple, direct manner and without greater effort or cost, that SEMPRA's energy businesses maintained in South America at the date included not only Luz del Sur but also Chilquinta Energía and Tecnored in Chile, and Tecsur in Peru.
The Issuer argues, although at a lower level of relevance, that it refers to the fact that SEMPRA had made the determination to sell its controlling participation in the Issuer, within the framework of a sale process that would involve all of SEMPRA's businesses in the "energy sector in South America."
This information was relevant for any "sensible investor", to the extent that it meant that the sale or change of control of the Issuer could occur within the framework of a regional operation that would involve the rest of the energy assets that SEMPRA maintained in South America, which clearly represents a transaction of characteristics, complexities and risks different from a direct sale transaction of the Issuer.
Likewise, the Issuer states that the press release that SEMPRA made public on January 28, 2019 included not only the information that the Issuer communicated in the material event of January 28, 2019, but also certain complementary information that was contained in the referred material event or, if applicable, did not have sufficient materiality to qualify as a material event.
According to what was exposed, the Issuer concludes that it must be considered that the information contained in the material event of January 28, 2019, represented a complete reference of the transaction that SEMPRA had announced to the market, being that any sensible investor should have been in perfect capacity to understand what the announced sale involved and that with the dedication of a prudent time to obtain information, they could have known that SEMPRA's sale not only included the Issuer, but also Chilquinta Energía and Tecnored in Chile, and Tecsur in Peru.
According to the defenses presented, the Issuer maintains as main arguments of its defense against the second imputed charge, the following:
The Issuer states that the infraction is based on a paragraph included in its communication of February 8, 2019, sent to the SMV in response to an explicit question formulated by the SMV through Official Letter No. 561-2019-SMV/11, in which it was required to reveal in detail all information related to SEMPRA's sale process, for which it considers that it must clarify the confusion that apparently would have generated said response paragraph, leaving record that at no time was the general manager of the Issuer informed by SEMPRA regarding the existence of "plans that imply a change in the control unit" of the Issuer.
Likewise, the Issuer adds that the purpose of said paragraph was to provide the SMV with all the information it had at that time, regarding the context linked to the sale process that had been approved and announced by Sempra on January 28, 2019, and that said paragraph had been included as a response to a question formulated by the SMV through Official Letter 561-2019-SMV/11, requiring it to «reveal in detail all information related to the sale process that Sempra Energy (…) is following», and that the cited interaction held by the general manager of the Issuer, Mr. Mile Cacic, with SEMPRA officials, in December 2018, did not imply that said general manager was informed by SEMPRA regarding the existence of "plans that imply a change in the control unit" of the Issuer, within the scope provided in numeral 7 of Annex 1 of the Regulation of Material Events.
Regarding this charge, the Issuer exposes other defense arguments, which have been transcribed and are analyzed in literal B of section 4.2 «Evaluation of the case» of numeral IV Analysis of this Resolution.
According to the defenses presented, the Issuer maintains as main supports of its defense against the third imputed charge, the following arguments:
The Issuer states that it must be considered that the material event of September 30, 2019 not only comprises the letter signed by its stock market representative, but also the documents that were attached as annexes to said letter: the letter sent by SEMPRA on said date and the press release of the agreement.
Likewise, it maintains that it complied with informing the market through the material event of September 30, 2019, that those interested in obtaining more information on the risks associated with the purchase-sale contract, including information on the conditions for closing and the indemnification obligations agreed, among others, could access such information through the reports that SEMPRA had made available (including Report 8-K) freely and free of charge, through the EDGAR system on the SEC website, including even the corresponding link.
It adds that numeral 6.6 of the Regulation of Material Events does not require a presentation as a material event of exactly the same document or format that the controlling company of the issuer has disclosed in other markets, but requires the communication of the same information contained in such documents or formats, to the extent that such information meets the required materiality standard. In this sense, it is clear that the Issuer did not have the legal obligation to present as a material event a copy of the PDF of the "Form 8-K" presented by SEMPRA to the SEC.
Likewise, the Issuer states that from the review of the "Form 8-K" certain additional information can be obtained to the information revealed, which in the SMV's criteria would qualify as relevant, namely: (i) that the purchase-sale contract was signed on September 27, 2019, (ii) the conditions to which the closing of the transaction is subject, and (iii) the conditions of representation, warranty, indemnification and termination of the purchase-sale contract. In this sense, it maintains that the omitted information does not have a level of materiality, according to the following:
This is dated Friday, September 27, 2019, having been communicated on Monday, September 30 (entry to MVNet at 8:50 am), before the start of the trading session of the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL).
In the material event of September 30, 2019, it was pointed out specifically that the closing would be "subject to customary closing conditions, including approval by the Peruvian anti-trust authority and the Bermuda Monetary Authority", while on the other hand we have a complete list of the conditions precedent of the purchase-sale contract. Indeed, it is a fairly typical and short list, where none can be appreciated that should be highlighted as special or unusual and where the need to obtain government authorizations for the transaction to be completed stands out, which constitutes relevant information to be communicated.
These only have relevance as a source of information to the extent that they can be reviewed jointly with the "Disclosure Schedules", which are prepared in relation to them, in which all those acts, events, circumstances or risks that will be considered as exceptions to the representations and warranties formulated are included. It is necessary to specify that the "Form 8-K" does not include the corresponding "Disclosure Schedules".
The indemnity obligations agreed are relevant solely and exclusively for the parties. In this sense, the fact that an investor has not had access to the clauses in question does not provide any relevant element.
Beyond replicating the termination events for own and frequent contractual breaches, a special voluntary termination event is included, by either party, what is called "Long Stop Date", a typical figure in the framework of these transactions, subject to conditions precedent.
Finally, it considers that the knowledge of the existence of a "Long-Stop Date" in the purchase-sale contract does not constitute information of such relevance that it would have significantly influenced the decision of a sensible investor or affected the value of the Issuer's share on the BVL.
It adds that when it is required to report the signing of a "Material Definitive Agreement", the SEC's legal norms are quite precise and clear regarding the specific information of the agreement that must be included as part of the "Form 8-K", however, in the case of Peruvian regulation, in the specific case that we are facing an event that qualifies as a material event because it is directly linked to a change in the control unit of the Issuer, it is appreciated that numerals 6, 7 and 8 of Annex 1 of the Regulation of Material Events do not provide any indication or guidance regarding the content or detail of the information that must be reported as a material event to the market.
According to the above, the Issuer states that in the face of this regulatory vacuum, it has always corresponded to the issuer to determine what is the level of detail of the information that must be disclosed to the market in the framework of a change of control operation, naturally applying criteria of materiality and reasonableness, concluding that it was clear that the material event of September 30, 2019 complied more than enough with the requirement required under the Regulation of Material Events.
Finally, the Issuer states that it is relevant to bring up again the «Inretail Case», since in said case the second of the charges imputed by the SMV to the issuer involved was an alleged omission to reveal, as a material event, "complete" information regarding the acquisition of the company Quicorp S.A.
In this regard, it indicates that after the initiation and development of an administrative sanctioning procedure, the SMV concluded that there was no infraction on the part of Inretail Perú Corp. S.A. (hereinafter, Inretail) because (i) the Regulation of Material Events does not include a list of information to be presented in the case of a purchase-sale operation, so there was no way to determine if the information presented by the issuer was complete or not, (ii) in the face of this regulatory vacuum, it would correspond to evaluate only if the information presented by the issuer was "sufficient", and (iii) from the evaluation carried out, it was concluded that the information presented by Inretail in its material event of January 26, 2018, "(…) would be within the minimum disclosure standards, even more so, when the material event presented by the Issuer comprises the most important aspects of the purchase operation (…)".
2.4 Arguments
That, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 5 of article 255 of the Single Ordered Text of the General Administrative Procedure Law – Law No. 27444, approved by Supreme Decree No. 004-2019-JUS (hereinafter, the Single Ordered Text of the LPAG), by brief of 01 October 2021, the Issuer submitted to this Deputy Superintendency as the sanctioning body of this PAS the arguments detailed summarily below, which — as noted — are essentially quite similar to the defenses presented before the IGCC:
Regarding the FIRST CHARGE referring to the incomplete communication of the material event of 28 January 2019
The Issuer states that it agrees with the evaluation carried out by the IGCC in the Report in relation to the defenses presented for the first charge and with the conclusion reached. Likewise, it reiterates that the information on the identity of the other entities controlled by SEMPRA involved in the sale process (the Chilean companies Chilquinta Energía and Tecnored and the Peruvian company Tecsur) did not have the capacity to significantly influence the decision of a reasonable investor to buy, sell or hold a security, nor on the liquidity, price, or quotation of the securities issued by the Issuer.
As extensively developed in its defense brief, the Issuer states that without such approval, any project is nothing more than a concept or a proposal; generated in any area of the company or even outside it, but that it could absolutely not be considered to bind the legal entity or impose any legal obligation or regulatory consequence on it.
Consequently, it states that it is perfectly valid and reasonable to infer that, as of December 2018, SEMPRA's management (i) was in a preliminary evaluation phase, sounding out potential market interest through initial contacts with possible investors and (ii) had been carrying out exploration work for a possible transaction that "could" eventually involve SEMPRA's participation in the Issuer.
Finally, it states that it is clear that nothing of what was informed to the Issuer's general manager in December 2018 — and to which reference is made in the material event of 08 February 2019 — can lead to the conclusion that there were "plans that implied a change in the control unit" of the Issuer.
For its part, upon receiving SEMPRA's communication referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Issuer states that it complied with its legal obligation to make a material event communication to the market, announcing the signing of the purchase and sale agreement and attaching copies of the communication received from SEMPRA and the Press Release of the Agreement (material event of 30 September 2019).
On the same 30 September 2019 and in compliance with its obligations under the United States securities market regulation, SEMPRA filed with the SEC the Form 8-K, which included additional and complementary information regarding certain terms and conditions of the purchase and sale agreement and a copy of the main transaction documents. The Issuer also states that SEMPRA did not expressly inform it about the filing of Form 8-K.
The materiality evaluation of the omitted information carried out by the IGCC begins by noting, without further analysis, a supposed contradiction derived from having presented the omitted information in the United States market (as part of Form 8-K), thus recognizing its materiality, but not having communicated it as a material event in the Peruvian market, now denying said materiality.
Such contradiction does not exist since, to begin with, they are different subjects (i.e. SEMPRA and the Issuer) subject to different regulations (i.e. United States and Peruvian, respectively), and that operate in different markets under practices and standards that are not necessarily coincident (for which they are not necessarily automatically transferable from one jurisdiction to another).
Likewise, SEMPRA disclosed the omitted information because it is expressly required by the regulation applicable to it and the established practice in said market regarding the scope of information normally reported in Form 8-K in relation to a change of control transaction.
The Issuer states that it had to make a materiality analysis, as required by numeral 6.1 of article 6 of the Material Events Regulation, after which it concluded that the information that satisfied the materiality standard of articles 3 and 4 of the aforementioned regulation was that which it effectively disclosed through the material event of 30 September 2019.
Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Issuer adds that the supposed contradiction is also refuted because at no time has the Issuer denied the relevance of the execution of the purchase and sale agreement. Indeed, the Issuer considers that it is a material contract and, precisely for that reason, it communicated its execution through the material event of 30 September 2019. This is perfectly in line with the qualification of "Material Definitive Agreement" that the purchase and sale agreement has under the United States regulation applicable to SEMPRA.
This does not imply, however, that all its terms and conditions (nor those terms and conditions summarized by SEMPRA in the Form 8-K filed) necessarily also satisfy the materiality standard set forth in articles 3 and 4 of the Material Events Regulation, as it has been applied in the Peruvian market in the framework of change of control transactions. Indeed, the communication made by SEMPRA about certain details of the purchase and sale agreement responds to an express mandate of the regulation applicable to it. Consequently, the inclusion of such details of the purchase and sale agreement in Form 8-K does not evidence any implicit recognition of materiality by SEMPRA, much less by a third party such as the Issuer, but only SEMPRA's compliance with the regulation applicable to it.
The incorrect establishment of the automatic correlation of materiality would also be due to an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the Material Events Regulation. Indeed, the IGCC does not interpret them in a concordant and harmonious manner, by stating that "this extreme of the present administrative sanctioning procedure is a breach of numeral 6.6 of article 6 of the Material Events Regulation" and that, therefore, "it is not evaluated whether the issuer complied or not with its obligation to communicate as a material event all the information that corresponds to be disclosed in cases of changes of control unit of the issuer, an assumption established in numeral 8 of Annex 1 of the Material Events Regulation"
The Issuer states that, as indicated above, the basic element for certain information to be communicated as a material event under numeral 6.6 of article 6 of the Material Events Regulation is that such information satisfies the materiality standard of articles 3 and 4 of the same regulation. Therefore, it is indispensable that said numeral 6.6 be interpreted systematically with numerals 6.1 of article 6 and 8.1 of article 8 of the Material Events Regulation.
Therefore, the Issuer adds that, as regards the scope of the obligation to disclose information disclosed in a foreign market, there will only be an obligation to disclose that information that satisfies the materiality standard referred to in numeral 6.1, in the manner provided in numeral 8.1.
With respect to the exact date of execution of the purchase and sale agreement, there does not appear to be any other support for its qualification as material information than the fact of having been communicated in the foreign market.
For its part, the Issuer states that it does not understand how the lack of knowledge of the exact date of execution of the purchase and sale agreement harmed or could have harmed a reasonable investor, especially if the execution itself was informed as a material event on 30 September 2019, as soon as the Issuer was informed thereof by SEMPRA.
As regards the closing conditions, representations and warranties, the indemnification obligation and the termination date, the IGCC confuses the relevance of a contractual stipulation in the context of the contract itself and for the parties thereto, with the relevance referred to in articles 3 and 4 of the Material Events Regulation and which is the essential element to determine whether there is an obligation to communicate certain information as a material event.
Indeed, the IGCC defines well the closing conditions, representations and warranties, the indemnification obligation and the termination date, and highlights their importance. However, it confuses that importance that corresponds to the contractual sphere and to the relationship between the parties to the contract, with the materiality referred to in the Material Events Regulation.
The Issuer states that the IGCC appears to have focused - erroneously - the materiality analysis on the parties to the contract and not on the reasonable investor. In synthesis, the materiality evaluation of the omitted information carried out by the IGCC is incorrect and insufficient and, therefore, does not prove that it is information that should have been disclosed as a material event. Said incorrect evaluation would be the consequence of not having considered the reasonable investor as the subject with respect to whom the materiality of the information must be evaluated, as required by article 3 of the Material Events Regulation, and as we developed above, of erroneously considering that there is an automatic correlation of materiality that would lead to the conclusion that all information disclosed in a foreign market is material under Peruvian law and, consequently, must be disclosed as a material event.
Consequently, the requirement of direct links to certain information constitutes a notorious deviation from the reasonable investor standard set forth in our securities market regulations and which has been delimited by the SMV and the entities that preceded it.
The Issuer considers that it is reasonably expected that any reasonable investor would have been in perfect capacity to understand the scope of the press release and, by only dedicating "a prudent time to obtaining information", from the information contained in the same press release, would have been able to access, without greater effort or cost, all the information that SEMPRA had disclosed to the SEC and that was available on the latter's website.
«Principle 1: Equal treatment.- The company recognizes in its actions an equal treatment to shareholders of the same class and who maintain the same conditions, which in no case implies the delivery of privileged information to a group of shareholders to the detriment of the rest of the shareholders.
(…)
Principle 4: Information and communication to shareholders
Shareholders have the right to receive and request timely, reliable and truthful information that allows them to adequately safeguard their rights, including mechanisms for permanent access to express their opinion on the development of the company.
(…)
Principle 25: Environment of the risk management system
The Board of Directors approves a comprehensive risk management policy according to the size and complexity of the company; defines the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines that correspond; and promotes a risk culture within the company, from the Board of Directors and Senior Management to the collaborators themselves. In the case of economic groups, said policy reaches all companies that are part of the group and allows a global vision of critical risks.
The General Management periodically supervises the risks to which the company is exposed and brings them to the attention of the Board of Directors. The comprehensive risk management system allows the identification, measurement, administration, control and monitoring of risks.
The Board of Directors of the company is responsible for the existence of an internal and external control system, as well as for supervising its effectiveness and suitability. For this purpose, it constitutes an Audit Committee.
(…)
Principle 28: Information policy
The Board of Directors establishes in the respective corporate document an information policy for shareholders, investors, other interest groups and the market in general, with which it formally, orderly and comprehensively defines the guidelines, standards and criteria that will be applied in the management, collection, preparation, classification, organization and/or distribution of the information generated or received by the company.
The information policy covers all that could influence the economic decisions of its users, such as the company's objectives, the list of members of the Board of Directors and Senior Management, the shareholding structure, the description of the economic group to which it belongs and the financial statements, among others.
The Board of Directors ensures that the information is sufficient, truthful and delivered in a timely and equitable manner.
(…)»
Regarding the Issuer's argument that the information contained in the material fact of January 28, 2019 was communicated completely, by indicating that it was decided to initiate “a process of sale of the entirety of its participation in its businesses in the energy sector in South America”, and that the reference made through the press release of January 28, 2019, in which SEMPRA announced on its website, among others, that the planned sale includes 100% of its participation in Chilquinta Energía (Chile) and 83.6% of Luz del Sur (Peru), as well as its participations in Tecnored S.A. (Chile) (hereinafter, Tecnored) and Tecsur S.A. (Peru) (hereinafter, Tecsur), companies that provide construction and infrastructure services to Chilquinta Energía and Luz del Sur, respectively; does not imply that the Issuer has disseminated the respective material fact with incomplete information; it corresponds to appreciate precisely the content of the material fact disseminated by the Issuer on January 28, 2019.
In this regard, in the particular or concrete case, it is noted that the text of the information on the referred sale that was disseminated by the Issuer is short, 5 lines, and is easy to understand for any reader with an average or reasonable reading comprehension. It is therefore not necessary to resort to an advisor or interpreter to have a better or clearer understanding of what was being reported in that material fact, in the sense that the controller of the Issuer (SEMPRA) had decided to sell all its participation in the Issuer, and therefore it is a decision adopted by the controlling shareholder of the Issuer that was publicly announced on that date, making it clear that SEMPRA had decided, as the text of the material fact states: «sell the entirety of its indirect participation in Luz del Sur».
Therefore, it is considered that the material fact of January 28, 2019 contains information that accounted for the decision adopted by its controlling shareholder to sell all its participation in the Issuer, and consequently it corresponds to declare the non-existence of infraction by virtue of the foregoing and to archive this PAS at this point.
1. Evaluation of the second charge referring to the Issuer communicating late the material fact of February 8, 2019 regarding the knowledge of plans that implied a change in its control unit
2. That, in principle, it is necessary to point out that, in relation to this second charge of the Charge Letter, the Report proposes to declare that the Issuer has not incurred in infraction and to order the archiving of the sanctioning procedure in this extreme;
3. That, from the analysis carried out that is set forth in this Resolution, said proposal does not generate conviction in this Deputy Superintendency to the extent that it is based essentially on the Issuer's argument — which the Report accepts —, in the sense that the knowledge that its general manager had about the existence of conversations between its controlling shareholder (SEMPRA) with potential investors to sell its participation in the Issuer is information that lacked materiality to be reported to the market or that did not qualify as a material fact, against which it is considered that this line of argument of the Issuer must be analyzed and evaluated under the considerations and foundations of fact and law set forth in the following recitals;
4. That, with respect to what is indicated in the preceding recital, it is necessary to indicate that the Report is not binding on this Deputy Superintendency as the sanctioning organ of this PAS, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 182.2 of Article 182 of the TUO of the LPAG[8], so the Issuer may continue exercising its legal rights and among them, its unrestricted right of defense;[9] [10]
5. That, entering into the matter, it must be taken into account that the charge under analysis originates from the material fact that was disseminated by the Issuer itself at 16:12 hours on January 28, 2019 (File No. 2019003217)[11], in which it informed the Peruvian securities market of the following (See ANNEX 1):
1. That, with respect to the evident impact and repercussion of said information for the securities market, in addition to the legal provisions indicated in the Charge Letter and Report of the IGCC, we must consider the provisions of Article 5 of the Regulation against Market Abuse - Rules on improper use of Privileged Information and Market Manipulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2012-SMV-01:
«Article 5.- INFORMATION THAT COULD QUALIFY AS PRIVILEGED.- As long as it complies with the provisions of Article 40 of the Securities Market Law, the information that in an enunciative and non-exhaustive manner refers to an issuer, its businesses, or one or several securities issued or guaranteed by them, is detailed below:
5.1. Changes in the decision or control unit of the issuer.
(…)
Article 6.- PROHIBITIONS
(…)
The prohibition of use provided in Article 43 subsection c) of the Securities Market Law is incurred when operations are carried out with securities with respect to which there is privileged information.
(…)»
«Article 40.- Definition.- For the purposes of this law, privileged information is understood as any information referring to an issuer, its businesses or one or several securities issued or guaranteed by them, not disclosed to the market; and whose public knowledge, by its nature, is capable of influencing the liquidity, price or quotation of the issued securities. It also includes the reserved information referred to in Article 34 of this Law and that which is held regarding acquisition or disposal operations to be carried out by an institutional investor in the securities market, as well as that referring to public acquisition offers.»;
Regarding SEMPRA's sale decision:
Therefore, as noted in the cited material events, from the announcement of the sale (01/28/2019) until the announcement of the closing of the sale (04/24/2020), almost 15 months elapsed.
Regarding the Subsequent OPA:
Therefore, as seen in the cited communications, from when YAHCL took (bought) control of the Issuer (04/24/2020) until the OPA concluded (02/22/2021), almost 10 months elapsed.
In total, from the public announcement of the decision to sell control of the Issuer by SEMPRA and until the end of the Subsequent OPA formulated by the new controller of the Issuer, 25 months elapsed, that is, more than 02 years, during which all relevant information referring to the Issuer and both processes captured the attention and interest of the Peruvian securities market and of course of the SMV as supervisor, and it is reasonable to maintain that this information qualified as relevant and consequently should have been reported as a material event.
«Article 6.- Control
Control is the preponderant and continuous influence in the decision-making of the governing bodies of a legal person or bodies that fulfill the same purpose in the case of a legal entity.
For the application of this article, the following must be taken into account:
6.1 Control exists when one has ownership of rights that allow, directly or indirectly, the exercise of voting rights with respect to more than fifty percent (50%) of the shares or participations representing the capital stock, and in the case of legal entities through those modalities of contributions that grant similar rights.
6.2 It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that persons who control an economic group also control an entity when the majority of the members of the board of directors of the latter are linked to those persons.
(…)»
«Article 9.- Timeliness to report material events
9.1. The Issuer must report its material event as soon as such event occurs or the Issuer becomes aware of it, and in no case beyond the day on which it has occurred or has been known. This information must be communicated to the SMV before any other person, entity or media, and simultaneously when applicable to the Exchange or the entity administering the respective centralized trading mechanism. This, regardless of whether the information has been generated or not in the Issuer itself.
In the event that the material event occurs or that the Issuer becomes aware of it on a non-business day, it must communicate it no later than the next business day and before the start of the trading session of the centralized trading mechanism in which its securities are listed.
9.2. It is presumed that an Issuer is aware of a material event referring to it when said event originates in its own organization or controlling shareholder; when it is communicated or informed of the occurrence of the event or is an event that has been publicly disclosed or disseminated. Additionally, it is considered that an Issuer is aware of a material event referring to it that originates in the controlling entity of its economic group, when there are reasonable indications that its main officers have become aware of the event or if the Issuer could reasonably have known it.»
«SEMPRA ENERGY ANNOUNCES AGREEMENT TO SELL STAKE IN LUZ DEL SUR IN PERU
SAN DIEGO, Sept. 30, 2019 – Sempra Energy (NYSE:SRE) today announced that it has entered into an agreement to sell its equity interests in its Peruvian businesses, including its 83.6% stake in Luz del Sur S.A.A. (Luz del Sur), to China Yangtze Power International (Hongkong) Co., Limited (CYP). Sempra Energy’s interests will be sold for $3.59 billion in cash, subject to closing adjustments for working capital and net indebtedness»[15].
On this, it is necessary to indicate that, considering the price that the offeror paid in the OPA for the shares issued by the Issuer, it is estimated that the value of said transfer at the OPA price was greater than 3.5 billion dollars, it being necessary to keep in mind that the Issuer itself has reported in its annual report that it was a record figure;[16]
1. That, as indicated, the announcement about a change in the control unit of the Issuer captured the attention of the securities market supervisor — specifically the IGSC — and from that point a series of evidence was determined indicating that the first material event disclosed by the Issuer on January 28, 2019 — regarding the decision of its controlling shareholder SEMPRA to transfer precisely that control — not only qualified as a material event of special relevance for the Peruvian securities market, but also that there was information related to that material event that had not been disclosed until then and that qualified as privileged information, and that, precisely for that reason, it was particularly relevant to know since when the Issuer and/or SEMPRA (its controlling shareholder) had known the information regarding the change of control;
2. That, in that context, as a result of the aforementioned material event that the Issuer disclosed on January 28, 2019, up to three (03) requests for information were generated by the IGSC, the competent authority to supervise material events, which were answered through the appropriate channel and in the capacity of material events by the Issuer on February 08[17], 14[18] and 25[19], 2019, in Files No. 2019004893, 2019005926 and 2019007546, respectively, and which are set out in ANNEX 2, ANNEX 3 and ANNEX 4, respectively, of this resolution;
3. That, it is necessary to keep in mind that in the context of those information requests from the IGSC, the Issuer, through a material event disclosed on February 25, 2019 (See ANNEX 5), reported that, complementing what was revealed through the material event of January 28, 2019, it attached the press release that SEMPRA had issued that same day (February 25, 2019) regarding the start of the formal process for the sale of its participation in its businesses in South America, including its indirect participation in Luz del Sur (File No. 2019007570)[20];
4. That, it is in the conceptual context expressed above and within the framework of the events that occurred in relation to the material event of January 28, 2019, that the charge under analysis and the administrative sanctioning procedure to which this resolution refers must be evaluated, whose importance lies in the grounds that will be set out below;
5. That, with respect to the relevant grounds regarding the events that occurred between December 2018 and February 2019, we have, first, that the charge under analysis refers to the information disclosed to the Peruvian securities market by the Issuer on a specific occasion or date (January 28, 2019), regarding the decision of its economic group or controlling shareholder (SEMPRA) to transfer all of its participation (and/or control) in it, which is a company with securities registered in the RPMV and as such is subject to obligations to present relevant information according to the national legislation in force and applicable at the time the events occurred;
6. That, the securities market regulations contemplate the obligation of issuers to publicly disclose relevant information referring to them, under conditions of truthfulness, sufficiency and timeliness, fundamentally through material events, an inherent characteristic of which is that they are material or relevant information made public;
7. That, likewise, the securities market regulations have established that when an issuer determines that premature disclosure of material information through material events could cause it harm, it may assign to that information (about an event or negotiation in progress) the status of reserved information for a determined period, and communicate that decision to the SMV, thereby deferring the disclosure of that information, and this institution of reserved information has existed for more than 20 years and is used by issuers in the Peruvian securities market;
8. That, however, it is necessary to point out that in the case under analysis it has been verified that, prior to the disclosure of the aforementioned material event of January 28, 2019 regarding the decision to sell by its controller, the Issuer had not revealed to the market any material event related to that decision, nor had it communicated to the SMV any event or act related to that sale decision as reserved information; that is, the first time the Issuer disclosed information about the aforementioned sale decision taken by SEMPRA — and therefore, the first time the market was informed about it — was through the cited material event of January 28, 2019;
9. That, regarding this issue, it should be noted that, generally in practice and as the regulations have recognized, the issuer and/or its controlling shareholder know all the information referring to the issuer — including information that could be maintained or argued not to be relevant to the other shareholders —, and it is the issuer and/or its controlling shareholder (because it exerts preponderant and continuous influence on the decisions of the governing bodies of the controlled issuer) who decide what information — as well as the detail and timing of it — is revealed to the market and to its minority shareholders;
10. That, it goes without saying that this fact or situation determines, with respect to the information referring to the issuer, a possession of and privileged access to it by the issuer itself — represented by its governing bodies, among them its general manager — and by its controlling shareholder;
11. That, likewise, and even though it is or seems obvious, that same situation also determines that the issuer is always the source or origin of the information it discloses to the market about itself or that referring to it or its businesses, from which it also follows that responsibility for the information disclosed to the market always falls on the issuer;
12. That, between December 2018 and February 2019, the Issuer was controlled by SEMPRA and, therefore, in its capacity as controller, it exerted preponderant and continuous influence on the decision-making of the Issuer's governing bodies, it being necessary to state that, since its participation level was 83.6%, the control it exerted over the Issuer was total or almost total and, from that reality, it is logical to maintain that all relevant information — and even that which did not have such status — was known to SEMPRA, and even more so in this case since the decision to transfer control of the Issuer could only be adopted by that controlling shareholder;
13. That, based on the foregoing and on what was previously indicated, it is valid to maintain that all information related to the sale decision of its controlling shareholder SEMPRA must also have been known to the Issuer, which is perfectly aligned with the provisions of Article 9, numeral 9.2, of the Material Events Regulation, which expressly establishes that it is «presumed that an Issuer has knowledge of a material event referring to it when said event originates in its own organization or controlling shareholder», and the regulation, because of how evident the scope of said presumption is, has not provided for the possibility that the contrary can be demonstrated, simply because that would go against all logic or because even if such a possibility existed it would be a clear indicator of what has been mentioned previously, that is, that (i) the controlling shareholder deliberately hides information from the controlled issuer, thereby exposing it to a regulatory breach or (ii) that the controlling shareholder has executed agreements so that the issuer — if a challenge arises regarding the relevant acts it should have known — argues that it did not have knowledge of that relevant act because it would have originated in its controller;
14. That, at this point we consider it necessary to express the conviction that the controlling shareholder of an issuer, because it exerts preponderant and continuous influence on the decisions of the governing bodies of the controlled issuer — exercising its political rights, including to appoint or remove them —, is the one who holds and exercises power to determine what that issuer must know and report and what it must not report, how much and when the other shareholders are informed, and moreover — as we have indicated — that power of the controlling shareholder always places it in a position of advantage or privilege compared to the other shareholders or minority shareholders, and allows it to know in the first order and with better detail each step or event referring to the issuer and even more so if it has directors or managers in common with the issuer. Thus it is reasonable to maintain that the issuer's will to comply with its information obligations is a reflection of the will or diligence of its controller, there being a bidirectional relationship between controller and controlled, and in that sense something similar occurs with the omissions or breaches observed in the one who is subject to supervision and liable to be sanctioned. Consequently, it would be very wrong to admit an argument like that, not only because it would empty of content the cited regulatory provisions that support the duty to report material events, which is the basis of information transparency in the securities market, generating — among other damages — serious harm to the cited legal interests that must be protected; but also because it is so basic, so elementary, even implausible, and also so simple to be formulated henceforth by any issuer, that under that argument it could easily exempt itself from responsibility and in all cases stop informing the market, alleging that what its controlling shareholder does with respect to it is not known to it and claiming that it be believed and that such assertion be accepted; and in the face of such argument it is appropriate to clearly establish that such arguments must be dismissed outright;
15. That, along those lines, it is considered that the aforementioned presumption established in numeral 9.2 of Article 9 of the Material Events Regulation recognizes that objective and evident situation, irrefutable and consistent with the most elementary logic and common sense, since ignoring it or attempting to maintain the contrary (the ignorance alleged by the controlled issuer of what its controlling shareholder does with respect to it) would not only lack foundation, but would imply validating the risk and probable harm that would be generated for investors or minority shareholders and their consequent lack of protection, in the sense that any relevant decision adopted regarding the controlled issuer and that must be disclosed as a material event would not be mandatory to disclose to the minority shareholders of that issuer, since the latter would have the option of alleging that it does not know what its controlling shareholder does or decides with respect to it, and among other effects, we repeat, serious harm would be caused to the legal interests that must be protected, a vicious circle with negative effects and a situation in which one does not want to see a concrete reality or situation;
16. That, in that order of ideas, in this PAS it is concluded, based on the provisions of numeral 9.2 of Article 9 of the Material Events Regulation, that the acts that the controlling shareholder SEMPRA had to carry out, prior to its decision to sell its participation in the Issuer (a decision communicated as a material event only on January 28, 2019), had to be and must have been known to the Issuer.;
17. That, for greater clarity of the preceding conclusion, it must be noted that, in this PAS it must not and cannot be admitted that the prior acts that were necessary for the controlling shareholder SEMPRA to adopt the aforementioned decision to sell the Issuer, were not known to the Issuer; because that argument would in practice be the recognition that the controlling shareholder SEMPRA, which exercised control in a preponderant and continuous manner in the decision-making of the Issuer's governing bodies (according to the regulatory definition of control), did not act diligently with or in reference to said governing bodies of the Issuer, incurring non-compliance with the applicable Peruvian regulations and, along those lines, other matters of investigation would be opened regarding what really happened as to the reasons why SEMPRA did not follow all the procedures established in the regulations for the Issuer to disclose or communicate as reserved information to the SMV relevant information prior to that which the Issuer only disclosed on January 28, 2019, in which it should have revealed that it was going to transfer all of its participation in the Issuer or whether, in this case, the principle of transparency of information in the securities market was fully observed or not, considering that on a certain day (January 28, 2019) the Issuer, without any prior information (publicly revealed or communicated as reserved information), announced that its controlling shareholder had decided to transfer its participation in it, especially since the securities market supervisor had to make up to three (03) information requests to it, among other questions;
18. That, likewise, the analysis must necessarily consider the fact that the Issuer and its controlling shareholder SEMPRA qualify as qualified investors as defined in Peruvian securities market legislation, it being necessary to state that both knew that the Issuer was an open stock corporation with more than thirty-seven thousand (37,000) minority shareholders holding shares with voting rights, who had and have a legitimate interest in knowing the relevant information of the Issuer;
19. That, the entity of the Issuer must also be taken into consideration, that is, that it is a large corporation that, due to its lines of business, is subject to special regulation, that has broad and full knowledge of the obligations that are enforceable upon it in its capacity as an issuer in the securities market and that has sufficient financial resources to, among other things, have specialized legal advice in whatever is necessary for full compliance with and observance of said regulations;
20. That, in addition to the foregoing, according to the information in the file, between December 2018 and February 2019, the controlling shareholder of the Issuer was SEMPRA, which, to date, is a corporation with international presence in other highly developed securities markets and that, therefore, it is reasonable to infer that it has specialized knowledge about the regulations enforceable in each market, which can be corroborated on SEMPRA's website https://www.sempra.com/es, especially through the 2018 and 2019 annual reports;[21] [22]
21. That, likewise, the fact must not be lost sight of that minority shareholders, compared to the controlling shareholder of an issuer, do not have greater means, resources or facilities to know or access the relevant information of that issuer and that such knowledge is limited, almost exclusively, to that which they obtain from the information that the issuer reveals in compliance with regulations, such as material events, financial statements, annual report, among others, including the information requests made by the securities market supervisor on specific and concrete aspects;
22. That, in that sense, said minority shareholders depend, mainly, on the issuer's information policy and on the proper functioning of regulatory compliance mechanisms, which have been approved and established by the issuer's governing bodies (general shareholders' meeting, Board of Directors and/or management), precisely so that the issuer or the natural persons acting on its behalf fully comply with their functions and duties to provide information, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations, acting in good faith and always in the interest of the company;
23. That, a natural consequence of the foregoing is that the responses of an issuer that are disclosed as material events, in compliance with information requests — made by the securities market supervisor so that they are disclosed through that channel —, is relevant information referring to that issuer and has the capacity to significantly influence the decisions of an investor or potential investor in that issuer's securities — including a sensible investor —, and also has the capacity to significantly influence the price or liquidity of that issuer's securities;
24. That, therefore, it is beyond doubt that the responses sent by an issuer to requests from the supervisory authority qualify as material events, with the additional particularity that the market as a whole becomes aware of the existence of an administrative deployment with respect to that information, which adds to its relevance;
25. That, the status of material events of the Issuer's responses to SMV requests is evident in this case, because they are closely and directly related to the information that was publicly disclosed by the Issuer on January 28, 2019;
26. That, likewise, it must be taken into account that when requesting information from an issuer, the SMV does not act as a private law subject or as a minority shareholder of the Issuer, since it acts as the supervisory authority of the securities market in strict compliance with a legal mandate and within the framework of its powers and attributions;
27. That, the reason for being or existing for the SMV lies in the fulfillment of its missionary duty to supervise and to watch over its purpose and that is the only understanding that all securities market participants must have, even more so in the case of the Issuer, since it has perfect knowledge of the rules applicable to it, that it has participated in the Peruvian securities market for many years, that it qualifies as an institutional investor and that it is part of an economic group with international presence;
28. That, therefore, it is appropriate to conclude here that the rigor and due diligence that is required of and must be fulfilled by an issuer when it discloses its material events must be equal, or even greater, when it responds as material events to the requests made by the securities market supervisor, especially when that request is directly related to or has been generated by a material event disclosed by the issuer itself or with information referring to that issuer that has been disseminated in media, social networks or among a determined segment of the public, among others;
29. That, in the case under evaluation, the information requests that the IGSC made to the Issuer, as the facts show, are directly related to the material event that the Issuer disclosed on January 28, 2019;
30. That, in all cases and in this one in particular, the announcement informing the market about the transfer of control of an issuer is relevant information and as such qualifies as a material event and, in due course, all non-public information related to said transfer qualified as privileged information, and it corresponds to the securities market supervisor to deploy administrative activity to evaluate regulatory compliance and observance of the principle of transparency of information in the securities market, as well as for the protection of the mentioned legal interests;
31. That, in this case, upon the Issuer's disclosure of the aforementioned material event of January 28, 2019, the IGSC, through Letters No. 561 and 760-2019-SMV/11, made information requests to the Issuer, which were answered as material events on February 08[23] and 14[24], 2019;
32. That, the charge under evaluation is one related to the evaluation carried out by the securities market authority, the SMV, through its indicated bodies and instances, regarding the Issuer's compliance with its duties and obligations to disclose information to the Peruvian securities market — in accordance with the applicable regulatory framework —, specifically the information referring to the Issuer's knowledge of its controlling shareholder's decision to sell all of its participation in it and of that information that it disclosed to the market through the material events indicated in the Statement of Charges and in this charge in particular regarding the fact that the Issuer communicated extemporaneously (material event of February 08, 2019) about the knowledge of plans that implied a change in its control unit;
33. That, it is necessary to recall once again that, as of January 28, 2019, SEMPRA held 83.65% of the Issuer's common shares with voting rights[25] and that, on that date, at 16:12 hours, (File No. 2019003217)[26], the Issuer disclosed as a material event (See ANNEX 1):
1. That, in the Statement of Charges and in reference to what the Issuer itself reported in the material event of February 08, 2019, the Issuer was charged with having infringed the regulations for not having timely communicated to the Peruvian securities market, as a material event, the Issuer's knowledge of plans that implied a change in its control unit (SEMPRA), it being indicated that this should have been reported on December 14, 2018 when the Issuer's general manager was informed of conversations with potential investors (buyers), as can be seen in said communication;
2. That, considering the nature of the charge under analysis, it is of utmost necessity and importance to keep in mind the relevant grounds set out previously, the dates of the acts and communications (content and scope of what the Issuer reported), since on the basis of them, it will be possible to show how the Issuer conducted itself to comply with its duty and obligation to inform the securities market and from the analysis of that information, the facts, and the additional information requested by the securities market supervisor, it will also be possible to show and determine whether or not the Issuer complied with its duty to inform;
3. That, through the material event of February 08, 2019 (See ANNEX 2), in response to the requests made by the securities market supervisor, through Letter No. 561-2019-SMV/11, the Issuer reported regarding its general manager:
«(…)
(…)» [27];
1. That, as can be seen in the previous image, considering that in the aforementioned material event of January 28, 2019, in which in 5 lines the Issuer indicates that on that date it became aware that its controlling shareholder SEMPRA had decided to initiate a process to sell its stake in it —as indeed subsequently occurred, that is, SEMPRA sold all its stake in the Issuer—, it is noted that the supervision area of the SMV requires the Issuer to disclose ALL information related to the aforementioned "sale process" of the Issuer (See ANNEX 2);
2. That the charge under analysis is limited to the fact that the Issuer did not communicate on December 14, 2018, about the knowledge of plans involving a change in its control unit, and that it only reported it —belatedly— through the material event of February 8, 2018;
3. That, in addition, it is necessary to indicate that in the aforementioned material event of February 8, 2019, upon request of the SMV, the Issuer reported:
1. That, likewise, in the material event disseminated by the Issuer on February 14, 2019 (See ANNEX 3), it is reported:
1. That, during this PAS, in relation to response 1 of its material event of February 8, 2019, the Issuer in its defenses and arguments minimizes what was reported in this material event. Thus, in its defenses of April 29, 2021, it states:
"(…)
2.2 In this regard, we comply with clarifying the confusion that apparently would have been generated by the paragraph transcribed above, in relation to the interaction sustained by the General Manager of LDS, Mr. Mile Cacic, with officials of Sempra in the month of December 2018, leaving record that at no time was the General Manager of LDS informed by Sempra regarding the existence of "plans involving a change in the control unit" of LDS, within the scope provided in numeral 7 of Annex 1 of the HDI Regulation.
2.3 The sole purpose of the aforementioned paragraph was to provide the SMV all the information that LDS had at that time, regarding the context linked to the Sale Process that had been approved and announced by Sempra as of January 28, 2019. Take into account that said paragraph has been included as a response to an explicit question formulated by the SMV in its Official Letter 561-2019-SMV/11, by which LDS is required to "disclose in detail all information related to the sale process that Sempra Energy (…) is following". That is, it is not information disclosed by LDS because it considers that it qualifies as a material event (under the materiality criteria provided in articles 3 and 4 of the HDI Regulation), but because it is complementary general information related to the internal evaluation process followed by Sempra before approving the start of the Sale Process. This type of information, as we will explain below, given its preliminary nature, merely exploratory and even speculative, evidently does not have the level of materiality and certainty required to qualify as a material event. That is why LDS did not disclose this information as such to the market once it became aware of it, but only when the SMV expressly required, under its regulatory powers, that LDS communicate "all" the information related to the Sale Process (without establishing any materiality parameter).
(…)";
"(…)
2.4 Now then, having made the foregoing clarification, we will proceed to explain the reasons why the information received by the General Manager of LDS could in no case have been considered, nor interpreted by a "sensible investor", as reflecting the existence of "plans involving a change in the control unit" of LDS. As a starting point, it is important to understand what exactly the HDI Regulation refers to when it mentions the term "plans" as a basis for determining whether a material event is configured (or not). In this regard, it must first be recognized that there is no legal definition applicable to the term "plans" that clarifies the scope of numeral 7 of Annex 1 of the HDI Regulation. If we resort to the general definition provided in the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, we see that the term "plan" is defined (in the sense we consider most appropriate for the case under analysis) as the "systematic model of public or private action, which is prepared in advance to direct and guide it". On that basis, it is clear that ***every plan,*regardless of the objective it pursues, necessarily requires being prepared in advance, for which it must go through a prior preparation process, which naturally involves a significant level of research, evaluation, analysis and conclusions. During that preparation process prior, there is not yet a plan, but rather ideas, proposals and/or projects that, eventually, under certain circumstances and compliance with certain conditions and approvals, could become a plan or ultimately remain only as ideas, proposals and/or projects that never materialized as a plan and much less as closed transactions."
"(...)
2.5 This distinction referred to above, between what qualifies as a plan and what constitutes the preliminary work of research, evaluation and analysis that are necessary to reasonably arrive at a plan (especially in the case of a plan involving a "change in the control unit" of a listed company), is absolutely consistent with the criterion applied by the SMV itself in recent cases. Thus, for example, in Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 069-2019-SMV/11, dated June 7, 2019, in the framework of the administrative proceeding followed against Inretail Peru Corp. S.A. (the "Inretail Case"), in which it was sanctioned for "not timely disclosing as a material event its binding offer of January 9, 2018 for the shares of Quicorp S.A., or failing that communicating it as a reserved event", the SMV adopted certain positions and interpretive criteria regarding the materiality of certain events and acts typically developed in the context of a sale process, which can perfectly be extrapolated to the case under analysis, namely:
(a) In the framework of the aforementioned sale process, the issuer's controller (i) signed a confidentiality agreement to participate as a bidder in the process on September 6, 2017, (ii) had access to the virtual data room to conduct a due diligence of the target company on November 7, 2017, (iii) engaged a financial advisor for the process on November 30, 2017, (iv) submitted a binding offer on January 9, 2018, and (v) completed the acquisition, and the issuer only communicated that acquisition to the market as a material event on January 26, 2018.
(b) After evaluating each of the facts described above, the SMV concluded that the issuer involved had incurred an infraction of the HDI Regulation for "not timely disclosing as a material event its binding offer of January 9, 2018", thereby ruling out the existence of any infraction for not having disclosed as a material event any of the other actions carried out in the framework of the aforementioned sale process prior to January 9, 2018.
(c) Among the considerations evaluated by the SMV to reach the aforementioned conclusion, the following is expressly stated: "It is possible to consider that in an initial and very incipient stage of negotiation there may still be no materiality or the possibility of a capacity for significant influence or transcendence. However, this does not occur in the submission of binding offers (...)". With this the SMV concludes that all acts carried out by the bidder in the framework of a sale process prior to the submission of the binding offer are acts or events that do not have sufficient materiality to qualify as material events, and therefore there would be no legal obligation of the issuer to report them as material events at the time they occur.
(d) Along the same lines, it is also expressly stated that "although the confidentiality agreement between Intercorp Retail Inc. and Quicorp, in order to give natural and legal persons access to the information in the virtual data room for the purpose of evaluating the possible acquisition of Quicorp, as well as access to Intercorp Retail Inc.'s financial and legal advisors to a virtual data room to begin the legal and financial due diligence process of Quicorp, were part of the ongoing negotiation, all of this led to the binding offer that Intercorp Retail Inc. made for the acquisition of Quicorp's shares, subject to a series of conditions and validity of certain assumptions for the purchase, was a fact or information that the Issuer should have informed observing and complying with the regulations".
(e) Finally, the SMV maintains that "In conclusion, it is duly established that the Issuer, as of January 9, 2018, was obliged to communicate as a material event the binding offer entered into on that date, however, this communication could be made through the channels or in the forms established in the Material Events Regulation, including qualifying the information as a reserved event".
2.6 The Inretail Case constitutes a precedent especially relevant in the framework of a sale process (whether of a listed company or in which a listed company participates as bidder or seller), and leaves us several relevant lessons. The most important, in view of the case under analysis in the Oficio, is that within the various actions, events and circumstances that usually occur in a sale process (which the SMV itself recognizes may be considered part of an ongoing negotiation), it is necessary to apply a materiality criterion in order to determine which of those actions, events or circumstances have the "capacity to significantly influence" the issuer or its securities, and must therefore be disclosed as material events. Based on that premise, the SMV concluded in the Inretail Case that those acts carried out by a bidder in the framework of a sale process, prior to the submission of a binding offer, do not have sufficient materiality and do not require being reported to the market as material events. That is, the entire prior stage of research and evaluation of the target company as well as the identification of different options and alternatives to capitalize on the synergies that may be generated from a possible acquisition, the engagement of financial, legal and other advisors to provide support in this research and evaluation work, and even the signing of agreements regulating the participation of the interested bidder in the sale process, constitute actions, events or circumstances that, according to what was resolved by the SMV in the Inretail Case, do not have the "capacity to significantly influence" the issuer or its securities, and therefore do not have the materiality required to be reported as a material event.
2.7 Extrapolating the criteria applied by the SMV in the Inretail Case to the specific case under analysis, it is relatively simple to understand that all the actions, events and circumstances carried out by Sempra during the initial or preliminary evaluation stage of a possible sale transaction involving LDS, including holding "initial conversations with potential investors to explore the possibility of a transaction that could involve Sempra's participation in LDS", as a step prior to its approval by Sempra's Board of Directors (and its communication to the market as a material event), lack the materiality, or the "capacity for significant influence or transcendence", to qualify as material events.
2.8 On the other hand, and without prejudice to the foregoing, in the case of plans adopted by a commercial company, we appreciate that among the conditions that must necessarily be met for an idea or project to eventually be considered a plan attributable to that company, it will be required that said idea or project be approved by some body or officer with sufficient competence and authority for that purpose. Thus, for example, a business plan, a profit distribution plan, a plan for disposal of material assets, or a corporate integration or reorganization plan, could not seriously be considered as plans of a company (and generate legal consequences for it) until they have been approved by the competent body of the company for that purpose (usually the Board of Directors). As we explained earlier, the conception and development of such plans require prior and complex planning and evaluation work, which is usually carried out by the company's management and its advisors, in order to shape this idea or project and convert it into a viable proposal that can be taken for evaluation and approval by the competent body, and thus finally become, if approved, a plan of the company. Before reaching that moment, any corporate plan is nothing more than a concept, an idea or a proposal, which could have been generated in any area or level of the company (or even outside it), and which, therefore, could not be susceptible to generating any type of legal obligation or regulatory consequence for the company in question and even less for companies outside it (as in the present case would be LDS). To maintain otherwise would be absurd, since it would lead us to an illogical and unreal scenario in which any concept, idea or proposal developed by any officer or employee of a company (regardless of their level, capacity and powers), could come to be qualified as a "plan" of the company and generate legal effects for it.
2.9 In the specific case under analysis, it must be emphasized that, during the meetings held by the General Manager of LDS with Sempra officers in December 2018, at no time was he informed of the existence of "plans involving a change in the control unit" of LDS (in the terms previously explained). From the information received by the General Manager in the December 2018 meetings referred to in HDI07/02, it could reasonably be inferred at that time that Sempra's management (i) was in a preliminary evaluation phase, in which the eventual interest of the market was being probed through initial contacts with potential investors, and (ii) had been carrying out exploratory work for a possible transaction that "could" eventually involve Sempra's participation in LDS. That is, based on the information received by the General Manager in December 2018, not only was there no certain evidence that would allow reasonably concluding that Sempra already had at that time a plan to sell its participation in LDS, but on the contrary, it was clear that neither Sempra nor its Board of Directors had made a decision regarding the sale of its assets in South America.
2.10 It is clear, therefore, that none of the facts reported to the General Manager of LDS, to which reference is made in HDI07/02, can be considered as evidence of the existence of "plans involving a change in the control unit" of LDS. Likewise, regardless of the interpretation one may have regarding the aforementioned facts, what is finally conclusive and definitively settles any interpretive discussion that may exist, is the objective fact that the General Manager was informed that "Sempra and its Board of Directors had not yet made a decision regarding the sale of its assets in South America". This specific information can only be understood in the sense that Sempra did not yet have at that time a defined "plan" regarding its controlling participation in LDS.
2.11 In view of the foregoing, it is evident that on December 14, 2018 there were no "plans" of Sempra "involving a change in the control unit" of LDS. To that extent, it is a factual impossibility that the General Manager of LDS could have known on that date of the existence of supposed "plans" that should be communicated as material events.
"With this the SMV concludes that all acts carried out by the bidder in the framework of a sale process, prior to the submission of the binding offer, are acts or events that do not have sufficient materiality to qualify as material events, therefore, consequently, there would be no legal obligation of the issuer to report them as material events at the time they occur."
"(…)
On the other hand, and notwithstanding the foregoing, in the case of plans adopted by a commercial company, we appreciate that among the conditions that must necessarily be met for an idea or project to eventually be considered as a plan attributable to said company, it will be required that said idea or project be approved by some body or official with sufficient competence and authority for that purpose. Thus, for example, a business plan, a profit distribution plan, a plan for disposal of material assets, or a plan for corporate integration or reorganization, could not seriously be considered as plans of a company (and generate legal consequences for it) until the moment they have been approved by the competent body of the company for that purpose (usually the Board of Directors)";
1. That, in this regard, it is necessary to again highlight and clearly establish that the referred assumption "Knowledge of plans, which imply a change in the control unit", must be understood as set forth in the norm, in the broad sense of intention or project, that is, in the broadest sense, and must not and cannot be interpreted as a "plan" in the meaning of the term that the issuer raises, since that empties the content of the assumption of the norm and limits its purpose, which is to achieve greater transparency in the information that must be communicated, all the more so if said information qualifies as privileged information and with all the implications regarding compliance with duties, obligations and prohibitions that are generated for the Issuer and its insiders before it, and even the emergence of supervision obligations for the SMV, a function that is harmed by the lack of information;
2. That, therefore, this argument of the Issuer not only has no basis in the norm but is also an interpretation that collides with and harms the purpose and essence of information transparency and, therefore, must be dismissed;
3. That, regarding the arguments in numeral 2.9 of the Issuer's defenses, it is necessary to reiterate that the information received by its general manager on December 14, 2018 is relevant information in principle because it is its highest executive and legal representative, and all expressions in the sense that on that date it was preliminary, incipient information and others, and therefore not significant, lose their foundation with reality, when in subsequent events it is held that after only six (06) weeks from that date, the Issuer itself and its controlling shareholder SEMPRA publicly disseminated the referred decision of SEMPRA to sell its participation in the Issuer;
4. That, in addition, we reiterate that the norm does not expressly establish that to comply with the duty to communicate knowledge of plans on the change of control, one must previously and necessarily have a plan approved by the Board of Directors in that sense, which by the way in the present case also did not occur because in the material event of January 28, 2019, the Issuer did not communicate the approval of a plan of such nature by its Board of Directors or the Board of Directors of SEMPRA, rather it communicated that the latter had taken the agreement to sell its participation in the Issuer, which in reality shows that the proposal underlying the Issuer's arguments is that these types of events should not be communicated as material events, which is inadmissible for being contrary to the principle of transparency and for harming the other legal assets that must be protected;
5. That, notwithstanding this, it should be noted that this defense of the Issuer is confusing, since on the one hand it indicates that a "plan" to sell the control of a company to be such and be relevant must be approved by the Board of Directors of its controller, however, in its particular and concrete case, it has not wanted to inform, consistent with what it maintains, whether there was a "plan to sell control of the Issuer" that was approved by the Board of Directors of SEMPRA since on January 28, 2018 what was announced was the referred sale decision and it has never ruled on whether at the time it had or did not have that plan, to which the Issuer itself refers in its defenses and arguments;
6. That, everything seems to be a play on words or texts cunningly structured by the Issuer's legal defense, since in numeral 2.10 of its defenses, it is stated: "2.10. (…). Likewise, regardless of the interpretation one may have regarding the referred facts, what is finally conclusive and definitively settles any interpretive discussion that may exist, is the objective fact that the General Manager was informed that "Sempra and its Board of Directors had not yet made a decision regarding the sale of its assets in South America". This concrete information can only be understood in the sense that Sempra did not yet have at that moment a defined "plan" regarding its controlling participation in LDS.";
7. That, considering what the Issuer indicates, the doubt arises as to whether there was in SEMPRA or was known to the Issuer or its general manager, a defined plan referring to the sale of the Issuer or if there was none and it was directly decided to sell, and if there was that plan when it was prepared and when it acquired relevant character according to the criteria of the Issuer or its controlling shareholder;
8. That, finally in numeral 2.11 of its defenses the Issuer argues: "2.11. Based on the above, it is evident that on December 14, 2018 there were no "plans" of Sempra"that imply a change in the control unit" of LDS. To that extent, it is a factual impossibility that the General Manager of LDS could have known on that date of the existence of supposed "plans" that should be communicated as material events";
9. That, in this regard, it is necessary to reiterate that the plans to which the Issuer refers in its defenses and arguments are those that it has defined and circumscribed to its free interpretation, and that in no way conform to the assumption defined in numeral 7 of Annex 1 of the Regulations on Material Events "Knowledge of plans that imply a change in the control unit", so we again reiterate that the Issuer's arguments in that sense lack legal basis and therefore must be dismissed;
10. That, however, it should be noted that these expressions in numeral 2.11 of the Issuer's defenses generate doubts as to whether at some time between December 15, 2018 (since December 14, 2018 is denied) and January 28, 2019 when the referred sale is announced, there was a plan of SEMPRA that implies a change in the control unit of the Issuer, as the Issuer seems to indicate in its defenses, but imprecisely;
11. That, based on the evaluation of the defenses and arguments presented by the Issuer regarding the second charge, they have no basis in the norm nor are they sufficient to disprove the charge formulated and consequently to exempt it from responsibility; and on the other hand, the systematic use of certain expressions in order to generate ambiguity in its responses to the information requests made by the supervisor, which we have previously analyzed and evaluated, are indicators and written evidence that the Issuer did not adapt its conduct and its duty to inform to what is required by the norm, did not comply with its duty and obligation to timely inform about its knowledge of the existence of plans that implied the change in its control unit, and thereby affected the transparency of the information disseminated in the stock market, the protection of stock market investors and the confidence of said investors and the general public, and in addition also harmed the role of the SMV as supervisor of the Peruvian stock market which was unable to deploy preventive and inspection actions in a timely manner;
12. That, leaving aside the conclusion indicated in the preceding recital, it is necessary to note that the Issuer's argument is inadmissible in the sense that SEMPRA, on January 25 and 28, 2019, approved and disseminated, respectively, the decision to sell its participation in the Issuer adopted by its Board of Directors, without before January 25, 2019 (date of the respective session of the SEMPRA Board of Directors) having carried out preparatory acts, work meetings and other acts in order to prepare and submit reports that would serve as a basis to evaluate and adopt a decision of such nature and importance;
13. That, it is implausible to consider that the SEMPRA Board of Directors would have adopted that decision without any information prepared about the Issuer, which in addition would not be legally possible, among other reasons due to the fiduciary and due diligence duties required of the Directors of SEMPRA;
14. That, in that order of ideas, by way of an illustrative explanation related to the present case, it is necessary to indicate that the Regulations on Material Events have collected, among others, the experience of years prior to its approval in which, among others, it was quite frequent that an issuer be bought or sold by another issuer (there could be up to 03 issuers involved, the buyer, the seller and the transferred) or by a person different from an issuer, and a situation arose in which the market and the SMV only learned of that transfer at the time it was announced that said issuer had already been bought or sold, and that example could be replicated for the transfer of a line of business, assets, for mergers and acquisitions, among others; and before this, it has been sought to achieve in the norm that situations like those be informed to the market or the supervisor, as it should be;
15. That, in line with what is indicated at the end of the preceding recital, the Regulations on Material Events expressly refers to giving special consideration to evaluating the information that is known or possessed, in order to comply with the duty to inform material events (including privileged information) to the assumptions that would qualify as such; and among those that stand out are ongoing negotiations, in which there may or may not be a counterparty (article 28 of the LMV); knowledge of plans, which imply a change in the control unit (numeral 7 of Annex 1 of the Regulations on Material Events); changes in the control unit of the issuer (numeral 8 of Annex 1 of the Regulations on Material Events); valuation reports prepared on the occasion of or related to public offerings of securities—formulated or to be formulated—(numeral 24 of Annex 1 of the Regulations on Material Events); valuation reports prepared in a due diligence (numeral 24 of Annex 1 of the Regulations on Material Events); the start of a due diligence process or similar requested by a shareholder or by third parties (including the controlling shareholder), or arranged by the issuer itself (numeral 29 of Annex 1 of the Regulations on Material Events), and; relevant changes in results or in net equity, specifying the reason for them (numeral 12 of Annex 1 of the Regulations on Material Events), among other assumptions that have been established with the purpose of strengthening the transparency and integrity of the Peruvian stock market;
16. That, as can be seen, in none of those assumptions has the approval of the corresponding act by any corporate body been established as a prior and necessary requirement to be informed as a material event, and due to the nature and scope of said assumptions it is highly probable that all significant transfers for an issuer must be informed—as a material event or as a reserved fact—not necessarily when the operation has been closed, but even from before, from a point at which the Issuer can reasonably evidence before third parties and/or the supervisor that it applied due diligence and observed the norm, to comply with its duty to inform material events (including those that qualify as privileged information or are classified as reserved information), whether in the existence of evidence related to: ongoing negotiations that may or may not finally materialize, the existence of intentions to transfer something significant, the signing of memoranda of understanding, the execution of confidentiality agreements, corporate or management agreements of an issuer, the carrying out of a due diligence, the request for public or non-public information, the creation of a physical or virtual space for the exchange of information, the hiring of legal, financial or other advisors and consultants; among other events or milestones in a process, up to for example the formulation or receipt of binding or non-binding offers and up to the closing or not of the operation;
17. That, notwithstanding that it has been reliably demonstrated that the Issuer committed the mentioned infraction, as an additional and relevant element to consider, it is necessary to indicate that according to available public information, among it the annual report of the year 2018[35], at least between December 2018 and February 2019, period in which the Issuer committed the referred infraction, it had only four (04) full members on its Board of Directors, of which two (02) were during that same period, directors or managers at SEMPRA, which is evidenced on page 342 of SEMPRA's 2018 annual report[36]. Indeed, Mr. Dennis V. Arriola, was Chairman of the Board of the Issuer and simultaneously was Executive Vice President of SEMPRA and Ms. Kathryn Joy Collier, was Director of the Issuer and simultaneously was CFO of Sempra North American Infrastructure, of the SEMPRA group;
18. That, therefore, it is not easy to construct an argumentative line and that is plausible as the one sustained by the Issuer in the sense that it did not know about the plans that implied a change in its control unit, when two (02) of its directors had the status of director and CFO in its controlling shareholder SEMPRA, as indicated below:
1. Evaluation of the third charge referring to communicating extemporaneously the material event of October 10, 2019 on information that complies with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the regulations on material events and that was disclosed in a foreign market
2. That, in relation to the defenses and arguments corresponding to the third charge, presented by the Issuer, it should be indicated as follows:
Previously, and in attention to the defenses presented, it is appropriate to specify that this part of the present PAS deals with a breach of numeral 6.6 of article 6 of the Regulations on Material Events, because the Issuer did not timely communicate information that complies with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the Regulations on Material Events and that was disclosed in the United States stock market and before the authority of that stock market, the SEC.
In this regard, numeral 6.6 of Article 6 of the Regulation on Material Events establishes that the issuer is responsible for "Communicating as a material event any information that complies with the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 specifically referring to the Issuer that has been disclosed in foreign markets because the Issuer itself or its controlling companies or those of its economic group maintain securities registered in said markets". (Underlining added).
According to the charge imputed and as can be corroborated in the facts, the Issuer disclosed on September 30, 2019, as a material event (File No. 2019039212), that it had received a letter from its controlling shareholder SEMPRA informing it about the execution of a purchase and sale agreement with China Yangtze Power International (Hong Kong) Co., regarding the sale of its stake in the Issuer, and attached the aforementioned SEMPRA letter in Spanish and a press release in English (See ANNEX 6).[37]
As a result of its follow-up actions on material events, the IGSC, in the exercise of its function as supervisor of such events, through Official Letter No. 4821-2019-SMV/11 of October 9, 2019, required the Issuer to disclose the same information that had been sent by SEMPRA to the SEC on September 30, 2019, through "Form 8-K" regarding the sale of its shares in the Issuer.
In response to such requirement and not on its own initiative, the Issuer disclosed on October 10, 2019, as a material event, the response letter set out below and attached in digital format the aforementioned "Form 8-K" consisting of ninety-four (94) pages which can be seen in File No. 2019040543 or in the material events of the stock market portal (www.smv.gob.pe) whose web links are: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={70ECB76D-0000-CD12-A71D-CB795A8F18BE}; https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={80ECB76D-0000-C818-BF40-539462631A97}; https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={C092BB6D-0000-CB14-AE5F-DFEDBD6969BF}; https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={D092BB6D-0000-CF23-B46C-EA9A2F19CD78}.
The aforementioned response letter of October 10, 2019 states:
As can be seen in the image above, which is the letter of the material event of October 10, 2019, among other things, it highlights the fact that the Issuer states in the reference of that letter that it is a «Material Event», and in the text it expressly says: that based on the provisions of Article 5[38] of the Regulation on Material Events and its respective annex, it complies with informing the market of what it details in the letter through which it precisely attaches the "Form 8-K" which is precisely what was required of it, and adds that it has asked its controlling shareholder SEMPRA to confirm whether there is additional information (it should be understood as information about the Issuer) that has been reported in other markets and that should be reported in Peru as a material event. In addition, note that the Issuer specifies that it has requested confirmation, and not that it be informed, which could be understood as the Issuer being aware of the existence of the aforementioned "Form 8-K"; however, the Issuer's legal defense in its arguments of October 1, 2021, has stated that «It should also be remembered that Sempra did not expressly inform LDS about the filing of Form 8-K.», and then we are faced with a situation in which the Issuer blames —for its lack of knowledge and omission to inform— the person who is now not its controller, and admits that neither it nor its then controlling shareholder (SEMPRA) were diligent in complying with Peruvian stock market regulations by establishing operational or risk management procedures or of another nature, which needless to say were necessary to ensure that a situation like the one that indeed occurred does not happen, and such diligence should have been greater on the part of both, in the context of a process of sale of control of the Issuer itself that as we know was announced 08 months earlier by both, which makes it clear that neither of the 02 was diligent in that sense even having all that prior time to prepare.
In that direction, it is necessary to indicate that this lack of due diligence of both is not admissible, among other reasons, because based on the provisions of numeral 9.2 of Article 9 of the Regulation on Material Events, in the present case and in view of that process of sale of control of the Issuer, the necessary and sufficient communication channels (due diligence) should have been adopted to comply with their legal obligations in the Peruvian stock market. It is also not a justification and even less a mitigating factor that the Issuer seeks to exempt itself from responsibility by blaming its former controlling shareholder entirely, indicating that its lack of knowledge was due to SEMPRA not expressly informing it about what it reported regarding it in the U.S. stock market or in other markets. Indeed, the lack of due diligence of both (SEMPRA and the ISSUER) regarding their duty to inform in Peru of what was reported in other markets is, on the contrary, an aggravating factor in the present PAS since it generates doubts about the existence of other material information that could have been revealed in the U.S. stock market or in other markets, and about which the Issuer itself would have had doubts, as can be seen in the letter that it disclosed as a material event on October 10, 2019: «(…) Without prejudice to the foregoing, we also inform that, on this date, we have sent a communication to Sempra Energy requesting that it confirm whether there is additional information that has been reported in other markets and that should be reported in Peru as a material event». This Deputy Superintendency has not been able to find the response to this query that the Issuer made to SEMPRA and this increases our doubts.
And at this point, we must also indicate that given that revelation of the Issuer's lack of knowledge, it strongly draws our attention that in the arguments made by the Issuer's legal defense, as can be seen in its responses and arguments, the Issuer's lack of knowledge of SEMPRA's filing of the "Form 8-K" containing information referring to it is expressly stated, and if that was true at the time, then how can that lack of knowledge be consistent —and not rather inconsistent and appear to be a closed defense without foundations against the imputation of charges of April 15, 2021 after the Issuer remedied its omission to disclose said form in Peru—, with the same arguments of the Issuer's legal defense to the effect that the information contained in the aforementioned «Form 8K» was not relevant information for the Peruvian stock market, if it is true that SEMPRA did not inform it of its filing. And this omission and the respective justification of the Issuer, for not having filed the Form 8-K in the material event of September 30, 2019, gets even worse when we see that the Issuer expressly records in its arguments of October 1, 2019, stating: «It should also be remembered that Sempra did not expressly inform LDS about the filing of Form 8-K.», however in those same arguments it also states:
«3.8 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the materiality assessment of the Omitted Information carried out by the IGCC starts by noting, without further analysis, an alleged contradiction arising from having filed the Omitted Information in the U.S. market (as part of the Form 8-K), thus acknowledging its materiality, but not having communicated it as a material event in the Peruvian market, now denying such materiality.
Such contradiction does not exist. To begin with, they are different subjects (i.e. Sempra and LDS) subject to different regulations (i.e. U.S. and Peruvian, respectively), and that operate in different markets under practices and standards that are not necessarily coincident (and therefore are not necessarily automatically transferable from one jurisdiction to another).
Likewise, Sempra disclosed the Omitted Information because it is expressly required by the regulation applicable to it and the established practice in that market regarding the scope of information normally reported in the Form 8-K in relation to a change of control transaction.
LDS, on the other hand, had to make a materiality analysis, as required by numeral 6.1 of Article 6 of the HDI Regulation, at the end of which it concluded that the information that satisfied the materiality standard of Articles 3 and 4 of the aforementioned regulation was that which it effectively disclosed through HDI30/09.
(…)»
Regarding the situation set out, at least one flagrant contradiction is noted that would indicate a manifest inaccuracy of the Issuer —which, incidentally, would be an aggravating factor in the present PAS and a new situation—, since on the one hand the Issuer states that SEMPRA did not inform it about the filing of Form 8-K but immediately contradicts itself and states that it made a materiality analysis of the information contained in said form, and that as a result of that analysis it did not file the Form 8-K or the information contained therein. Consequently, it is necessary to state that this conduct of the Issuer is not consistent with the aforementioned procedural good faith, since although it has a legitimate right to exercise its defense, this does not imply that it presents defense arguments with contradictions such as the one exposed, which are not favorable for clarifying the facts and rather generate more doubts and questions about what really happened.
In that line of reasoning, it is necessary to point out that it is not coherent at all that after several months of having been filed in the United States as material information and having been disclosed by the Issuer as a material event in the Peruvian stock market, and after the requirement of the IGSC as supervisor of material events, the Issuer, after the present PAS was initiated, formulates arguments, we reiterate, to the effect that the information referring to the Issuer itself, which SEMPRA disclosed in the U.S. stock market as material information, is not necessarily relevant and qualifies as a material event in the Peruvian stock market, and that in addition it formulates arguments indicating that in order to determine whether the material information disclosed regarding the Issuer in the U.S. market qualifies in Peru as a material event to be disclosed by the Issuer, the analyses listed in its responses and arguments must be made, including those of materiality and of what is relevant for the reasonable investor standard, among others.
Regarding the latter, it is necessary to indicate that these arguments of the Issuer's legal defense have no foundation or correlation or reference in the norm nor are they supported by the facts constituting the infraction imputed to the Issuer, as has been previously demonstrated.
As for the materiality analysis, we reiterate what was stated in the evaluation of the second charge, in the sense that the material event of January 28, 2019 announcing the decision to sell all of SEMPRA's stake in the Issuer initiated what the Issuer itself has called the sale process, which lasted more than a year (approximately 15 months), until April 24, 2020.
During this process it must be understood that all information directly related to said sale acquired the character of relevant information and therefore it was the Issuer's duty to disclose it to the market or communicate it as reserved information.
In this regard, it should be considered that this obligation of the Issuer is expressly established in Article 5 and numeral 8 of Annex 1 of the Regulation on Material Events, additionally considering the provisions of Article 40 of the LMV and Article 5 of the Regulation against Market Abuse - Rules on improper use of Inside Information and Market Manipulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2012-SMV-01:
Regulation on Material Events
«Article 5.- Information that by its nature may qualify as a material event
5.1. The Annex that forms part of this Regulation includes an illustrative list of facts, acts, agreements and decisions, whose purpose is to facilitate the Issuer's identification, qualification and classification of information that could qualify as a material event.
5.2. The assumptions of the Annex must be communicated as material events when they have the capacity to significantly influence as defined in Articles 3 and 4. If any act, decision, agreement, fact or negotiation in progress does not appear in said Annex, it does not necessarily imply that it does not qualify as a material event, and must be communicated as such if it complies with the provisions of the cited articles.
The provisions of this numeral do not apply to the specific assumptions contained in the current regulations approved by the SMV that qualify certain assumptions as material events.
(…)
ANNEX 1
(…)
8. Changes in the control unit of the Issuer, in accordance with the provisions of the SMV Regulation on Indirect Ownership, Linkage and Economic Groups, including shareholders' agreements or agreements between holders of shares of the Issuer, directly or indirectly.
(…)»
LMV
«Article 40.- Definition.- For the purposes of this law, inside information is understood as any information referring to an issuer, its businesses or one or several securities issued or guaranteed by them, not disclosed to the market; and whose public knowledge, by its nature, is capable of influencing the liquidity, price or quotation of the issued securities. It also includes the reserved information referred to in Article 34 of this Law and that which is held regarding acquisition or disposal operations to be carried out by an institutional investor in the stock market, as well as that referring to public acquisition offers.»
Regulation against Market Abuse
«Article 5.- INFORMATION THAT COULD QUALIFY AS INSIDE INFORMATION.- As long as it complies with the provisions of Article 40 of the Stock Market Law, information that, by way of illustration and not exhaustively, refers to an issuer, its businesses, or one or several securities issued or guaranteed by them, is detailed below, shall be considered as inside information:
5.1. Changes in the decision or control unit of the issuer.
(…)
Article 6.- PROHIBITIONS
(…)
The prohibition of use provided for in Article 43, subsection c) of the Stock Market Law is incurred when operations are carried out with securities for which inside information is held.
(…)»
Thus, we reiterate that the provisions of the cited provisions warn of the especially significant nature of the information revealed by the Issuer on January 28, 2019, since, in principle, it was disclosed through a material event announcing that a change in the control unit of the Issuer was going to occur (which subsequently occurred) and, consequently, it was information about a sale process with a series of implications and consequences of the utmost relevance, such as the generation of the obligation for a Public Acquisition Offer (OPA) to be formulated, as indeed occurred, and all of which constitute evidence the acts and material events disclosed in relation to the sale process and with said OPA, all of which —and as could not have been otherwise—, forced the stock market supervisor to monitor the information referring to the sale process —whether or not it was disclosed by the Issuer—, and to deploy administrative supervision actions such as the requirement it made on October 9, 2019 and which generated the disclosure of the material event of October 10, 2019 containing the information that the Issuer had omitted to disclose, that is, the aforementioned Form 8-K.
It goes without saying, but given the Issuer's arguments to the effect that Form 8-K did not contain information that qualified as a material event in Peru, that in accordance with the cited provisions, the information referring to the Issuer and that was directly related to the sale of control of the Issuer had not only the character of a material event but also, prior to its public disclosure, had the character of inside information.
In addition, it is necessary to reiterate and highlight that the "Form 8-K" which has the character of material information in the U.S. stock market, and which was disclosed by the Issuer on October 10, 2019, as a material event, consists of 94 pages with abundant relevant information referring to the Issuer. Thus, only on page 3 of 94 pages of said document the following relevant information referring and related to the sale of control of the Issuer is set out:
As can be seen, given that image which is clear evidence of the lack of factual foundations of the Issuer's arguments with reality, and given the information that can be seen in Form 8-K, it is not understood how the Issuer's legal defense can or could continue insisting and continue building legal arguments, cunningly elaborated, to try to convince someone that the information contained in said form that was directly referring to the Issuer did not qualify as material or relevant information and therefore does not correspond to the qualification of a material event. Frankly, it is an argument that could even be degrading, since it would challenge the intelligence of any investor, including the one they repeatedly cite «reasonable investor», which, by the way, is the word or phrase we analyze below, and which the Issuer's legal defense uses at its free understanding and incorrectly in its arguments, and with the purpose of generating confusion.
In addition, it should be noted that this double standard of material information referring to the Issuer (the one disclosed by SEMPRA in the U.S. market versus the one disclosed by the Issuer in the Peruvian stock market) is evidence of discriminatory treatment by the Issuer and its controlling shareholder SEMPRA towards the investors of the Peruvian stock market, to whom it gave worse treatment than to the Americans. In that line, the arguments of the Issuer's legal defense would tenaciously defend that it is legally possible for a Peruvian issuer and/or its controlling shareholder, faced with information that is clearly and directly related to that issuer, to discriminate against the investors of the Peruvian stock market and give them worse treatment than to the investors of the U.S. market (by providing them with less information referring to the Issuer), which must be dismissed and we reject in this resolution.
Therefore, all the arguments of the responses and arguments of the Issuer's legal defense, to the effect of trying to convince that the information referring to the Issuer contained in the aforementioned Form 8-K did not qualify as a material event and therefore it would not have committed the fault imputed to it in the Charge Letter, lack legal foundation and are even irrational.
Complementarily, in relation to the analysis of the so-called reasonable investor standard, used and alleged by the Issuer, it is necessary to warn that although the LMV and the Stock Market Regulation refer to the «reasonable investor», however, it is a fact that in none of those normative bodies has it been defined what should be understood by reasonable investor.
What we have seen is that definitions of reasonable investor that appear in resolutions of the Administrative Court of the former CONASEV from approximately more than twenty (20) years ago are usually resorted to, and those definitions are resorted to, in most cases, to use them with a restrictive purpose or as an exemption from something, and not in the broader sense and of real protection of stock market investors, which is what should correspond.
Thus, as can be seen in the Report, it contains the texts:
«(…)
Likewise, in relation to the standard of a reasonable or sensible investor it must take into consideration the provisions of Resolution of the CONASEV Court No. 032-2002-EF/94.12, which states: "They are those investors who are characterized, in general, by not being too astute nor too clumsy, they are not professionals in the field, although they have sufficient capacity to understand the meaning of their acts, they have certain knowledge and/or experience about the behavior of the market and the rules that regulate it, they are sufficiently aware of the risk that it implies, they meditate before making an investment decision adopting reasonable precautions and dedicate a prudent time to obtaining information and, in general, to managing their investments."
Likewise, Resolution of the CONASEV Court No. 116-2003/94.12 of October 28, 2003, the Court continued in that line of conceptualization by indicating that there would be three (03) types of investors: (i) the institutional, (ii) the sophisticated and (iii) the sensible, average or reasonable. Regarding the latter, it was specified that this "(…) is capable of evaluating –without needing to be a specialized analyst– the risk of securities in which it has an interest before adopting an investment or divestment decision, having as an element of judgment the information it has at its disposal.
(…)»[39]
In this regard, in principle we must point out that this Deputy Superintendency does not share the scope of those two (02) definitions of «reasonable investor» mainly for the following:
Thus, the first definition indicates that a sensible investor is not astute but also not clumsy, leaving a broad spectrum in between, but it immediately circumscribes it and would significantly raise the requirements to be considered as such, by indicating that this sensible investor has certain knowledge and/or experience about market behavior and the rules that regulate it. However, the word "certain" again makes that definition imprecise, doubtful, and therefore nothing is defined.
Likewise, the first definition indicates that a sensible investor is sufficiently aware of the risk involved in participating in the securities market; and in contrast, the second definition states that a sensible investor is capable of evaluating the risk of the securities that interest them but is not necessarily specialized in analyzing such risks.
In addition, the first definition indicates that a sensible investor dedicates a prudent amount of time to obtaining information and managing their investments; and conversely, the second definition states that a sensible investor has as an element of judgment for making decisions the information at their disposal, that is, they would not dedicate themselves to obtaining it.
Therefore, this Deputy Superintendency considers that those two (02) definitions of sensible investor should be dismissed and that the understanding of what a sensible investor is should be the broadest and most protective possible.
In that line of thought, it is necessary to indicate that although the commission of the infraction is easily appreciable from the reading of the material events in question, the legal defense of the Issuer has presented the arguments and allegations that have been set forth and are in the file of this PAS, which, as can be seen, go mainly in the direction of trying to convince us, with astutely structured legal arguments, that the information disseminated regarding the Issuer itself in the midst of the aforementioned sale process of SEMPRA's total participation in the Issuer, in the "Form 8-K" in the U.S. securities market — which by definition is information of the quality of important corporate events that shareholders should know (in this case SEMPRA's shareholders, but let us remember that it is the sale of all of SEMPRA's participation in the Issuer) — was (or is) relevant in and for the U.S. market, but was not (or is not) necessarily relevant in and for the Peruvian securities market.
Therefore, it must be kept in mind that given its non-communication of the "Form 8-K" in the material event of September 30, 2019, and given the request of the IGSC as supervisor of material events, and not by its own will, the Issuer disseminated on October 10, 2019, a material event with the "Form 8-K", with which the Issuer expressly admitted its omission; however, a few months later when the IGCC charged it for that lateness, the Issuer's legal defense in its arguments and allegations has elaborated astutely structured legal arguments similar to those of the second charge, and which have no basis in the applicable regulatory framework and which we must respectfully point out are incorrect and even lead to unreasonable conclusions and therefore must be dismissed.
Therefore, up to this point, according to the regulations expressly cited by the Issuer, as evidenced in the material events and in accordance with what has been previously stated, it is clear that the Issuer sent on October 10, 2019, additional relevant information to complete that information that it had not sent on September 30, 2019, such communications having the quality of material events, and this is indubitable and is reliable evidence of the commission of the infraction imputed to it.
In addition, it should be noted that as expressed in the Charge Letter and Report, the charge and the fault committed are easily evidenced by the simple reading of the aforementioned material events. Indeed, as can be seen in the material events of September 30, 2019 and October 10, 2019, first the Issuer flagrantly omitted disseminating relevant information referring to it (the "Form 8-K") that had been disseminated in the U.S. securities market and not in the Peruvian market, and then upon the request of the IGSC and not by its own will, only on October 10, 2019, the Issuer belatedly remedied said omission.
On this last point, it should be indicated that the omission of relevant information or material events is an infraction that corresponds to a serious grade sanction, while late communication of information corresponds to a minor grade sanction. In that line of reasoning, and solely for illustrative purposes, we consider it necessary to point out that in the present case, before the omission was remedied, and in order to safeguard the legal interests that must be protected by the SMV and discourage this type of omissive conduct that is more harmful to transparency and to the role of the SMV than those of lateness (timeliness), and that generate information asymmetry, the IGSC could have proceeded to send indications of infraction for omission of information and then initiate what is necessary for it to issue an administrative measure to remedy that omission.
Returning to the matter, it should be indicated that the "Form 8-K" is the report that public companies must file with the SEC to inform about certain material corporate events, as stated on the SEC Portal:
«Form 8-K
In addition to filing annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, public companies must report certain material corporate events on a more current basis. Form 8-K is the “current report” companies must file with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders should know about.» [40]
As can be seen, by definition the "Form 8-K" contains material information about the sale of SEMPRA's indirect ownership in the Issuer, and in Tecsur, and that in application of subsection 6.6 of article 6 of the Regulation of Material Events, such information should have been communicated as a material event by the Issuer; however, we reiterate that the Issuer in its arguments and allegations alleges that the specific information contained in the "Form 8-K", which was not communicated in the Peruvian market, is not material information.
Without prejudice to what has been previously stated and the conclusions we have reached, below we proceed to evaluate the arguments and allegations presented by the Issuer referring to the supposed lack of materiality of the specific information contained in the "Form 8-K", which was not voluntarily communicated by the Issuer in the Peruvian market, but only when required by the SMV:
The Issuer states that “this [the purchase-sale contract] is dated Friday, September 27, 2019, its celebration having been communicated first thing on Monday, September 30 (the HDI30/09 has its entry to MVNet registered at 8:50 am), before the start of the trading session of the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL).”
Likewise, it considers that knowledge of the exact date of signing of the purchase-sale contract would not have been information of such relevance that it would have significantly influenced the decision of a sensible investor or affected the value of the Issuer's share on the BVL.
In this regard, it should be indicated that the aforementioned material event of September 30, 2019 does not indicate the date of signing of the contract, which was communicated in the "Form 8-K" filed with the SEC, as shown below:
Excerpt from press release (material event of September 30, 2019)
Excerpt from "Form 8-K" filed with the SEC
In that sense, without prejudice to what was previously indicated, we consider that the date of signing of the contract is material information that was disclosed in the U.S. market, however, it was not communicated in the Peruvian securities market in the material event of September 30, 2019.
The Issuer states that in the material event of September 30, 2019, it was pointed out that the closing would be “subject to customary closing conditions, including approval by the Peruvian anti-trust authority and the Bermuda Monetary Authority”[41], and that “after reviewing them [the conditions to which the closing of the transaction is subject], the first thing one can conclude is that, indeed, it is a fairly typical (and short) list of conditions precedent for a transaction of this type, where none can be identified that should be highlighted as special or unusual, and where clearly the need to obtain the required government authorizations for the transaction to be completed stands out for importance (which, by the way, were expressly outlined in the HDI30/09)”.
In this regard, it should be indicated that the complete list of conditions precedent of the purchase-sale contract does qualify as material information, however, only one of them was communicated, the one referring to the transaction being conditioned on government authorizations.
It should be noted that on September 30, 2019, SEMPRA communicated to the SEC that the transaction is subject to various conditions for closing, which include: (a) approvals from the Peruvian antitrust authority (Instituto de Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual) and the Bermuda Monetary Authority, (b) the accuracy of each party's representations and warranties at the time of closing, subject to the usual materiality qualifiers, (c) compliance in all material respects by each party with its covenants, (d) the absence of any order prohibiting specific jurisdictions, (e) delivery of valid and effective "Certificados de Capital Invertido" from the Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administración Tributaria, and (f) approval of the shareholders of the buyer's parent in the transaction (Free translation), as shown below:
Excerpt from "Form 8-K" filed with the SEC
Regarding the content of a business purchase-sale contract, it is appropriate to indicate that “Taking into account that instrumental function, the typical content of a business purchase-sale contract not only includes the agreement on thing and price that is essential in every sale, but also addresses a series of additional aspects that respond to the complex structure of the transaction underlying the document”[42]. (Underline added).
In that sense, according to all that has been stated, the communication of a material event about the celebration of a business purchase-sale contract not only implies revealing the agreement on thing and price, which is essential, but also all those additional aspects that are part of the contract, which have direct or indirect impact to materialize the sale or finalize the transaction, which is relevant for the investor.
In that line of thought, the closing conditions referred to in subsections b), c), d), e) and f) of the list indicated above were not revealed in the material event of September 30, 2019, despite the fact that they qualify as material information and were communicated in the U.S. securities market, so the complete list of conditions for closing should have been communicated in the Peruvian market.
The Issuer states that “these [the representations and warranties] only have relevance as a source of information to the extent that they can be reviewed jointly with the ‘Disclosure Schedules’ prepared in relation to them, in which all those acts, events, circumstances or risks that will be considered as exceptions to the representations and warranties made are included”.
In this regard, it should be indicated that the communication about the existence of representations and warranties in the purchase-sale contract is indeed relevant, because such information may have implications for the price of the transaction, which may influence an investor's decision.
On this matter, it should be taken into account that representations and warranties “are a risk allocation mechanism, which has a value and a price. In this sense, there are also occasions when the seller and the buyer agree that the sale is made with strongly limited representations and warranties, which will surely translate into a lower price. In this sense, the seller is willing to accept a lower price for the company, but by way of the lesser declarations and warranties, its liability is limited”[43]. (Underline added).
In that sense, representations and warranties allow assuring the future buyer that the seller will communicate the existence of circumstances of the company being sold, assuring that they are true and that in the event of a discrepancy with what was declared, the buyer will have the right to compensation[44].
It should be noted that on September 30, 2019, SEMPRA communicated to the SEC that the purchase agreement contains customary representations and warranties of SEMPRA and the buyer. Likewise, it stated that the representations and warranties of each party have been made for the benefit of the other party to the purchase agreement, and such representations and warranties should not be invoked by any other person and that these (a) have been qualified by disclosure schedules that the parties have delivered in connection with the execution of the purchase agreement, (b) are subject to the materiality standards established in the purchase agreement, which may differ from what investors may consider material, (c) in certain cases, were made on a specific date, and (d) may have been used for purposes of allocating risk between the respective parties rather than establishing matters of fact. Consequently, no person should rely on the declarations and warranties as characterizations of the current state of facts (Free translation), as shown below:
Excerpt from "Form 8-K" filed with the SEC
In that sense, taking into account that there are share purchase-sale transactions that do not incorporate the representations and warranties clause in the respective contracts, and that since in the present case it was incorporated, due to the relevance set forth above, such information should have been part of the communication of the material event of September 30, 2019, however, it was only communicated in the U.S. market.
Likewise, it is appropriate to specify that the fact that the representations and warranties clause includes references to annexes, which detail the events, acts, or circumstances considered as exceptions to the representations and warranties established, that is, the so-called disclosure schedules, does not eliminate the relevance of informing about the existence of this clause in the purchase-sale contract. Accordingly, what the Issuer maintains is not valid, in the sense that the value of the information on the representations and warranties provided in the purchase-sale contract, which is revealed through the "Form 8-K", is practically nil.
The Issuer states that “it is evident, as occurs in the generality of bilateral contracts, that the indemnity obligations agreed are relevant solely and exclusively for and between the parties to the agreement, and in no case extend for the benefit of, nor generate obligations on the part of, third parties who are not parties to the contract. To that extent, whether a ‘sensible investor’ has had access or not to the indemnity clauses agreed in the Purchase-Sale Contract, we consider that it does not provide any relevant element (…)”.
In this regard, it is considered that the information on the indemnities provided in the purchase-sale contract is indeed relevant, because they establish the extent of the indemnifiable damage and the requirements that must be met for an indemnity to proceed.
The fact of stipulating an indemnity clause in purchase-sale contracts has the purpose of establishing that sellers are responsible for the possible falsity of the declarations made, which are related to the representations and warranties clauses, which analyzed jointly may influence the price and an investor's decision.
It should be noted that on September 30, 2019, SEMPRA communicated to the SEC that SEMPRA and the buyer had agreed, subject to certain limitations, to indemnify the other party for losses generated by certain breaches of the representations, warranties and covenants made in the purchase agreement, and in the case of SEMPRA, for certain tax obligations prior to closing incurred by the companies (Peruvian Opportunity Company S.A.C. and Sempra Americas Bermuda Ltd.) and their subsidiaries.
Excerpt from "Form 8-K" filed with the SEC
In that sense, considering the existence of representations and warranties and the agreement to indemnify the other party for losses from certain breaches thereof, the indemnity clause due to its relevance in itself should have been part of the communication of the material event of September 30, 2019, however, such information was only communicated in the U.S. market and was not communicated as part of the material event in the Peruvian market.
The Issuer states the following regarding the termination clause provided in the purchase-sale contract:
“Beyond replicating the termination events for contractual breaches that are typical and frequent in any private contract (i.e. falsity of certain especially material representations and warranties, breach of contractual obligations, or events that result in the impossibility of closing the transaction) and that any ‘sensible investor’ could reasonably anticipate, a special voluntary termination event is included, by either party, in case the fulfillment of the conditions precedent for closing has not been verified within a maximum period of nine (9) months (without fault of the party invoking termination).
This period constitutes what is commonly called a ‘Long-Stop Date’, a typical figure in the framework of mergers and acquisitions transactions, in a context in which the closing of the transaction is subject to certain conditions precedent (…).
That is why, when the press release of the Agreement expressly revealed that the closing under the Purchase-Sale Contract was ‘subject to customary closing conditions, including approval by the Peruvian anti-trust authority and the Bermuda Monetary Authority’, it was reasonable to expect that any ‘sensible investor’ would have understood that the verification of compliance with the agreed conditions precedent must necessarily occur before the expiration of a certain ‘Long-Stop Date’, which naturally had to be of a duration reasonably sufficient for the parties to obtain the government authorizations that were explicitly mentioned in the press release of the Agreement.
Moreover, even on the basis of the information revealed in the press release of the Agreement, any ‘sensible investor’ should perfectly have understood that whatever the ‘Long-Stop Date’ agreed in the Purchase-Sale Contract, it would be at least six (6) months, since, otherwise, it would not have been possible for Sempra to expressly announce in the press release of the Agreement that ‘the sale is expected to be completed in the first quarter of 2020.
(…)
Based on the foregoing, and taking into consideration the information contained in the press release of the Agreement, is it reasonable to maintain that knowledge of the existence of a Long-Stop Date in the Purchase-Sale Contract constitutes information of such relevance that it would have ‘significantly influenced’ the decision of a ‘sensible investor’ or affected the value of LDS's share on the BVL? We consider that the answer is negative”.
Regarding the Issuer's argument that knowledge of the existence of a Long-Stop Date in the purchase agreement does not constitute information of such relevance that it would have significantly influenced the decision of a reasonable investor or affected the value of the Issuer's shares on the BVL, it should be noted that the termination term of the purchase agreement does qualify as material information; however, it was not communicated in the material event of 30 September 2019.
It should be noted that on 30 September 2019, SEMPRA communicated in the "Form 8-K" to the SEC that either party may terminate the purchase agreement under certain circumstances, including, subject to certain conditions, if the closing of the transaction does not occur before nine (09) months from the execution of the purchase agreement (Free translation), as shown below:
Excerpt from "Form 8-K" filed with the SEC
Likewise, it should be taken into account that section 9.1 ("Termination Events") of article IX of the purchase agreement signed between SEMPRA and China Yangtze Power International (Hong Kong) Co., an annex document to the "Form 8-K", expressly establishes the cases in which the agreement may be terminated and the transaction abandoned before its closing, including termination by the buyer or seller if the closing of the transaction has not occurred within nine (09) months after the date of the agreement (27 September 2019), which is called the "Termination Date", a case referred to in the "Form 8-K" itself as indicated above.
In that sense, the termination term of the purchase agreement referred to in the "Form 8-K" was not disclosed in the material event of 30 September 2019, despite the fact that it qualifies as material information and was communicated in the United States market, and therefore should have been communicated in the Peruvian securities market.
It is appropriate to specify that if an investor could infer from the information in the press release that the "Termination Date" would be at least six (06) months, as the Issuer maintains, this would be information that would not meet the requirement of being sufficient or accurate, given that the "Termination Date" is nine (09) months after the date of the purchase agreement.
Likewise, as part of its defenses, the Issuer states that "it complied with informing the market, as a material event, on 30 September 2019 itself, that those interested in obtaining more information about the risks associated with the Loan Agreement (sic), including information on the closing conditions and the agreed indemnification obligations, among others, could access such information through the reports that Sempra had made available to all persons (including the 8-K Report), freely and free of charge, through the EDGAR system on the SEC's website, including even the corresponding link".
In this regard, on page 3 of the press release, which was included in the material event of 30 September 2019, the following is stated:
Press release (material event of 30 September 2019)
According to the above, we can see that in the Issuer's press release reference is made to the fact that risks and uncertainties are discussed in greater detail in the reports that SEMPRA has filed with the SEC, which are available free of charge through the EDGAR system on the SEC's website www.sec.gov. The press release makes a general reference to the reports that SEMPRA has filed with the SEC and includes an access link to the SEC's main page.
In that sense, since this is information disseminated in a foreign market, it is considered that if the intention is to disseminate that same information to the Peruvian market by reference through a web link, there must be an express indication of the information being disseminated and direct access to the source of the information, a situation that is not evidenced by what is stated in the press release included in the material event of 30 September 2019.
It should be noted that although by material event of 10 October 2019, the Issuer submitted a copy of the "Form 8-K" and its annexes, sent to the SEC on 30 September 2019, it also disseminated said information by reference through a web link in the aforementioned material event, in the following terms:
Excerpt from the material event of 10 October 2019
According to the above, it can be seen that in the material event of 10 October 2019, the Issuer expressly mentioned that the "Form 8-K" and its respective annexes were available to investors and the general public at the following link:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1032208/000103220819000026/0001032208-19-000026-index.htm.
In that sense, on this occasion, the Issuer did expressly indicate the information disseminated by reference through a web link and provided a direct link to the "Form 8-K", complying with its duty to inform, being more transparent, and providing greater ease of access to material information of interest to investors.
Additionally, as part of its defenses, the Issuer states that when it is required to report the execution of a "Material Definitive Agreement", the SEC's legal rules are quite precise and clear regarding the specific information of the agreement that must be included as part of the "Form 8-K"; however, it states that with respect to Peruvian regulation, numerals 6, 7 and 8 of Annex 1 of the Material Events Regulation do not provide any indication or guidance regarding the content or detail of the information that must be reported as a material event to the market.
According to the above, the Issuer states that "Faced with this regulatory gap, it has always been up to the issuer to determine the level of detail of the information that must be disclosed to the market in the context of a change of control transaction, naturally applying criteria of materiality and reasonableness".
The Issuer concludes that "if we take into consideration what constitutes the uniform and long-established practice in the Peruvian market for reporting, as material events, events linked to the execution of an agreement for the change of control of a listed company, it is clear that the HDI30/09, containing all the Material Information Disclosed, more than met the requirement under the HDI Regulation".
In this regard, it should be noted that, as previously stated, this charge refers to a breach of numeral 6.6 of article 6 of the Material Events Regulation, because the Issuer did not timely communicate information that meets the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the Material Events Regulation and that was disclosed to a foreign market.
Finally, as part of its defenses and arguments, the Issuer refers again to the «Inretail Case» stating that "In that case, the second of the charges imputed by the SMV to the issuer involved was an alleged omission to disclose, as a material event, 'complete' information regarding the acquisition of the company Quicorp that had just been completed".
In this regard, it is appropriate to reiterate what was previously stated, in the sense that it is neither possible nor correct to make a comparison because these are totally different facts and circumstances.
SERIOUSNESS OF THE HARM TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND/OR PROTECTED LEGAL INTEREST
"(…)
4.2. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA
(…)
*(vi) In the event that the existence of any of the following elements is proven: (i) serious affectation to protected legal interests; (ii) concrete harm to investors or associates; (iii) obtaining an illegal benefit; (iv) intent in the commission of the infraction; the amounts resulting from the application of the provisions in the preceding points may be increased up to the maximum permitted by the corresponding law, taking into account the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.
(…)" (Underline added).
ON THE NEED TO ISSUE A CORRECTIVE MEASURE
"Article 1. Definition, purpose and functions of the Superintendence of the Securities Market (SMV)
The Superintendence of the Securities Market (SMV) is a specialized technical body attached to the Ministry of Economy and Finance whose purpose is to ensure the protection of investors, the efficiency and transparency of the markets under its supervision, the correct formation of prices and the dissemination of all information necessary for such purposes, through regulation, supervision and promotion. It has legal personality under internal public law and enjoys functional, administrative, economic, technical and budgetary autonomy, constituting a budgetary unit. Its operation is governed by the provisions contained in this Law and its organization and functions regulations. The functions of the Superintendence of the Securities Market (SMV) are as follows: [...]"
Article 1 of the LMV establishes:
"Article 1.- Purpose and Scope of the Law.- The purpose of this law is to promote the orderly development and transparency of the securities market, as well as the adequate protection of the investor.
The following are included in this law: public offerings of securities and their issuers, publicly offered securities, brokerage agents, stock exchanges, securities clearing and settlement institutions, securitization companies, mutual investment funds in securities, investment funds and, in general, the other participants in the securities market, as well as the supervision and control body. Unless expressly stated otherwise, its provisions do not reach private offerings of securities. [...]"
"Article 7.- Control and Supervision.- The National Supervisory Commission of Companies and Securities (CONASEV) is the public institution entrusted with the supervision and control of compliance with this law. [...]"
"Article 358.- Precautionary, provisional and corrective measures
CONASEV is empowered to issue precautionary, provisional and corrective measures with respect to natural or legal persons under its competence, regardless of whether or not a sanctioning procedure has been initiated. [...]"
"Article 19.- DEFINITION.- Corrective measures are those mandates aimed at restoring, reversing, repairing, or restituting the situation altered by non-compliance with the regulations under the supervision of the SMV. These measures may be issued prior to the initiation of a sanctioning administrative procedure or at the time of determining administrative responsibility.
Corrective measures may consist of obligations to give, do and not do, and must precisely and undoubtedly establish the task incumbent on the administered party, identifying those obligated to comply. Corrective measures must be issued by a duly motivated decision and observing the principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness."
"Article 21.- CORRECTIVE MEASURES ISSUED BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENCES
Corrective measures established at the time of determining administrative responsibility are issued by the corresponding Deputy Superintendents.
Annex XX of the Regulation mentions by way of example the corrective measures that may be issued.
Deputy Superintendents may issue corrective measures, even for very serious infractions."
"Article 251. -Determination of responsibility
251.1 Administrative sanctions imposed on the administered party are compatible with the issuance of corrective measures aimed at ordering the restoration or repair of the situation altered by the infraction to its previous state, including that of the affected assets, as well as with compensation for damages and losses caused, which are determined in the corresponding judicial process. Corrective measures must be previously typified, be reasonable and adjust to the intensity, proportionality and needs of the legally protected interests that are intended to be guaranteed in each specific case. [...]"
"[...] ANNEX XX
On Corrective Measures
In accordance with the provisions of article 21 of the Regulation, the SMV, when determining administrative responsibility, may issue the following corrective measures:
[...]
2) The presentation as a material event of the information determined by the SMV."
"ARTICLE 43.- The specific functions of the Deputy Superintendence for Market Conduct Supervision are:
13. In the scope of its competence to impose sanctions in the first administrative instance for the commission of infractions whose compliance control corresponds to the Deputy Superintendence for Market Conduct Supervision, with the exception of infractions to the rules on timeliness in the presentation of periodic or occasional information. The respective sanction resolution may order the application of corrective measures aimed at reversing the situation altered by the commission of the infraction; [...]" (Underline added).
In accordance with the provisions of numerals 12, 14 and 36 of article 43 of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF and its amendments;
RESOLVES:
Register, communicate and publish.
Roberto Pereda Gálvez
Deputy Superintendent
Deputy Superintendence for Market Conduct Supervision
ANNEX 1
ANNEX 2
ANNEX 3
ANNEX 4
ANNEX 5
ANNEX 6
In this resolution, the boxes and underlines in color are added. ↑
"Article 9.- Timeliness to report material events
(...)
It is presumed that an Issuer has knowledge of a material event referring to it when said event originates in its own organization or controlling shareholder; when it is communicated or informed of the occurrence of the event or is an event that has been publicly disclosed or disseminated. Additionally, it is considered that an Issuer has knowledge of a material event referring to it that originates in the controlling entity of its economic group, when there are reasonable indications that its main officers have become aware of the event or if the Issuer could reasonably have known it.
(...)". ↑
"Article 3.- Definition of material event
Material event is any act, decision, agreement, fact, ongoing negotiation or information referring to the Issuer, its securities or its businesses that has the capacity to significantly influence:
3.1. The decision of a prudent investor to buy, sell or hold a security; or,
3.2. The liquidity, price or quotation of the issued securities.
Likewise, it includes information of the Issuer's economic group that it knows or should reasonably know, and that has the capacity to significantly influence the Issuer or its securities, in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation."
"Article 4.- Criteria to determine the capacity of significant influence of information
To evaluate the capacity of significant influence of information and its possible qualification as a material event, the Issuer must consider the significance of the act, agreement, fact, ongoing negotiation, decision or set of circumstances in its activity, assets, results, financial situation or business or commercial position in general; or in its securities or in the offering thereof; as well as in the price or negotiation of its securities." ↑
"Article 9.- Timeliness to report material events
(...)
It is presumed that an Issuer has knowledge of a material event referring to it when said event originates in its own organization or controlling shareholder; when it is communicated or informed of the occurrence of the event or is an event that has been publicly disclosed or disseminated. Additionally, it is considered that an Issuer has knowledge of a material event referring to it that originates in the controlling entity of its economic group, when there are reasonable indications that its main officers have become aware of the event or if the Issuer could reasonably have known it.
(...)" ↑
An issuer is any company that has securities registered in the RPMV. ↑
"Article 9.- PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF SUPERVISION ACTIONS
The General Intendancies of Supervision and the Deputy Superintendence of Risks carry out preliminary inquiries of possible infractions to the regulations under the competence of the SMV that they detect as part of their supervision functions.
When said bodies conclude that there are sufficient indications of possible administrative infractions, they refer the corresponding reports to the General Intendancies of Compliance, which determine whether or not to initiate a sanctioning administrative procedure. If applicable, the General Intendancies of Compliance may carry out additional inspections or investigations of the reported indications.
(...)" ↑
Article 245 of the TUO of the LPAG states as forms or modes in which the inspection activity could conclude the following: 1) Record of conformity of the activity carried out by the administered party; 2) Recommendation of improvements or corrections to the activity carried out by the administered party; 3) Warning of the existence of non-compliances not susceptible of meriting the determination of administrative responsibilities; 4) Recommendation of the initiation of a procedure in order to determine the corresponding administrative responsibilities; 5) Adoption of corrective measures and 6) Other forms as established by special laws. ↑
The text of said provision is: «Article 182.- Presumption of the quality of reports
182.1 Administrative reports may be mandatory or optional and binding or non-binding.
182.2 Opinions and reports shall be presumed optional and non-binding, with the exceptions of law.» ↑
Likewise, it should be noted that according to the TUO of the LPAG, the Report is not susceptible to being challenged or being subject to nullity through its own and specific route. ↑
Regarding compliance with laws, it should be noted that article 109 of the Political Constitution of Peru establishes: «Article 109.- The law is mandatory from the day following its publication in the
official gazette, unless otherwise provided by the same law that postpones its validity in whole or in part.» ↑
See link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={E04E9668-0000-C531-9531-4FF08259F5E6} ↑
See web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={7077CE72-0000-C010-9C1E-A1522C0B65F6} ↑
See web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={E0C3BB69-0000-C912-A5B7-5769947198BB} ↑
See web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={B0590078-0000-C433-AF37-36AA6243D0EB} ↑
Free translation: «Sempra Energy (NYSE:SRE) announced today that it has entered into an agreement to sell its equity interest in its Peruvian businesses, including its 83.6% interest in Luz del Sur S.A.A. (Luz del Sur), to China Yangtze Power International (Hongkong) Co., Limited (CYP). Sempra Energy's interests will be sold for $3,590 million in cash, subject to closing adjustments for working capital and net debt.» ↑
In the LexLatin publication titled «Peru approves the purchase of Luz del Sur by China Three Gorges», regarding this transfer of control, it is stated that: «(...) The transaction, which was signed between the parties on 30 September 2019, involves an amount of $3,590 million, subject to adjustments.
(...)
For Muñiz, it is the largest transaction in the history of the Peruvian electric market.
Baker McKenzie commented that, in terms of contract value, this agreement is the largest mergers and acquisitions transaction abroad carried out by a Chinese company in 2019 and to date (...)". See web link: https://lexlatin.com/noticias/indecopi-aprueba-compra-distribuidora-electrica-peruana-luz-del-sur-china-three ↑
17. See web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={B075CE68-0000-CE10-BF10-6821C48E74CA} ↑
18. See web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={1043EE68-0000-CD14-8FCD-4DC775168381} ↑
19. See web links: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={60982669-0000-C71D-9E74-329CE309347D} and https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={50982669-0000-C511-B7AF-A0BA00EFE4CE} ↑
20. See web links: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={00CB2669-0000-C919-86C0-1760E4E86D99} and https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={00CB2669-0000-C63B-ACFA-0995DEF28B89} ↑
21. SEMPRA 2018 annual report: https://www.sempra.com/sites/default/files/microsites/2018_annualreport/ ↑
22. SEMPRA 2019 annual report: https://www.sempra.com/sites/default/files/content/files/node-page/file-list/2020/sempra_energy_2019_annual_report.pdf ↑
23. See web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={B075CE68-0000-CE10-BF10-6821C48E74CA} ↑
24. See web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={1043EE68-0000-CD14-8FCD-4DC775168381} ↑
25. In the public information available and disseminated by the Issuer, as well as in the Statement of Charges and Report, it is stated that the SEMPRA economic group is the controlling shareholder of the Issuer (83.65%) ↑
26. See link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={E04E9668-0000-C531-9531-4FF08259F5E6} ↑
27. The emphases, underlining and red boxes are additions. ↑
28. See Official Letter No. 561-2019-SMV/11 of File No. 2019004048, contained in this file. ↑
29. According to articles 188 and 190 of the General Corporations Law, Law No. 26887; the attributions and responsibility of the Manager are:
*"Article 188.- Attributions of the manager*
*The attributions of the* ***manager*** *shall be established in the bylaws, at the time of appointment or by subsequent act.*
*Unless otherwise provided by the bylaws or express agreement of the general meeting or the board of directors, it is presumed that the general manager enjoys the following attributions:*
*1. To enter into and execute the ordinary acts and contracts corresponding to the corporate purpose;*
*2. To represent the company, with the general and special powers provided for in the Civil Procedure Code and the powers provided for in the Arbitration Law.*
*3. To attend, with voice but without vote, the sessions of the board of directors, unless the latter agrees to meet in a reserved manner;*
*4. To attend, with voice but without vote, the sessions of the general meeting, unless the latter decides otherwise;*
*5. To issue records and certifications regarding the content of the company's books and records; and,*
*6. To act as secretary of the shareholders' meetings and of the board of directors.*
*(...)*
*Article 190.- Responsibility*
*The manager is liable to the company, the shareholders and third parties for the damages caused by the breach of his obligations, fraud, abuse of powers and gross negligence.*
*The manager is particularly responsible for:*
*The existence, regularity and truthfulness of the accounting systems, the books that the law requires the company to keep and the other books and records that an orderly merchant must keep;*
*The establishment and maintenance of an internal control structure designed to provide reasonable assurance that the company's assets are protected against unauthorized use and that all operations are carried out in accordance with established authorizations and are properly recorded;*
*The truthfulness of the information provided to the board of directors and the general meeting;*
*The concealment of irregularities observed in the company's activities;*
*The safekeeping of corporate funds in the name of the company;*
*The use of corporate resources in businesses other than the corporate purpose;*
*The truthfulness of the records and certifications issued regarding the content of the company's books and records;*
*To comply in the manner and at the times indicated by law with the provisions of articles 130 and 224; and,*
*Compliance with the law, the bylaws and the resolutions of the general meeting and the board of directors.* [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. By means of a material event dated April 24, 2020 (File No. 2020014047), the Issuer reported that on that date it had received a letter sent by SEMPRA and a letter sent by China Yangtze Power International (Hong Kong) Co., Limited, by means of which it was informed that on the same day the closing of the sale of the shareholding that SEMPRA held indirectly in the Issuer had taken place and the consequent transfer of the shareholding that SEMPRA held indirectly in the Issuer in favor of China Yangtze Power International (Hong Kong) Co., Limited, a subsidiary of China Yangtze Power Co. Ltd. ↑
31. "1.8. Principle of procedural good faith.- The administrative authority, the administered parties, their representatives or attorneys and, in general, all participants in the procedure, carry out their respective procedural acts guided by mutual respect, collaboration and good faith. (...)" ↑
32. See web link: https://dle.rae.es/plan?m=form ↑
33. See link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={703DFF6A-0000-CC14-A970-6CB4FDCB5A8E} ↑
34. See link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={C0DE8C7E-0000-CC10-BA6F-537A3ED4B900} ↑
35. See web links: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={30D13569-0000-C559-AB46-97B623037192} and https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={20C4BB69-0000-CD19-AF33-44F5960878D9} ↑
36. See link: https://www.sempra.com/sites/default/files/microsites/2018_annualreport/ ↑
37. See web links: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={606E826D-0000-CA1D-B734-D1DD4507856C}; https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={606E826D-0000-C95F-814A-2520F19E0656} ; https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={606E826D-0000-C53F-8020-3A4F5DD8BB3A} ↑
38. Article 5 of the Material Events Regulation establishes:
*"Article 5.- Information that by its nature may qualify as a material event*
*5.1. The Annex that forms part of this Regulation includes an illustrative list of facts, acts, agreements and decisions, whose purpose is to facilitate the Issuer's identification, qualification and classification of information that could qualify as a material event.*
*5.2. The assumptions in the Annex must be reported as material events when they have the capacity to significantly influence as defined in articles 3 and 4. If any act, decision, agreement, fact or negotiation in progress does not appear in said Annex, it does not necessarily imply that it does not qualify as a material event, and it must be reported as such if it complies with the provisions of the aforementioned articles.*
*The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to the specific assumptions contained in the current regulations approved by the SMV that qualify certain assumptions as material events.*
*5.3. In all cases the Issuer must act diligently to report its material events, and in case of doubt as to whether information qualifies as a material event, it must choose to disclose it as such.*
*Any reference to Annex in this article shall be understood as referring to Annex 1."* [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. In this text the emphases and underlining are additions by this Deputy Superintendency. ↑
40. Link: https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html
*The free translation is: "In addition to filing annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, public companies must report certain material corporate events on a more current basis. Form 8-K is the 'current report' that companies must file with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders should know about."* [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. "subject to customary closing conditions, including approval of the Peruvian antitrust authority and the Bermuda Monetary Authority". (Free translation). ↑
42. PAYET PUCCIO, José Antonio. Reflections on the business purchase and sale agreement and the seller's liability. IUS ET VERITAS, 19(39), 2009, p. 74. ↑
43. PAYET PUCCIO, José Antonio. Op. cit., p. 85. José Antonio Payet states that "The declarations and warranties, or representations and warranties, are assertions about various circumstances pertaining to the seller, the company subject to the purchase and sale and the buyer, which the parties make in the contract for the purpose of ensuring and holding themselves responsible, one before the other, for the reality of the facts they affirm". ↑
44. PAYET, PUCCIO. José Antonio. Op. cit., p. 77. ↑
45. The text of the rule is:
***"4.1. CRITERIA***
***First criterion:***
***The seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest***
*This criterion takes into consideration that any breach of the regulations on the timely presentation of periodic or eventual information affects transparency in the market, and therefore each breach of said deadlines must be sanctioned.*
*Transparency in the securities market and in the collective funds system safeguards the right of potential investors or associates to access periodic and eventual information in a timely manner, as well as other relevant information that such entities must present in accordance with the applicable regulations.* [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. In this regard, it should be noted that in recital 49 of Superintendent Resolution No. 083-2021-SMV/02 of August 24, 2021 (File No. 2018044191), which is a resolution of second and final administrative instance, it is stated: "49. That, although the instructing body may make recommendations on the gradualness of the sanction to be imposed, it is the sanctioning body that ultimately weighs the facts that constitute the alleged infractions, qualifies them and graduates them, according to the assessment made, and the recommendation of the instructing body cannot be considered binding on the sanctioning body" ↑
47. Value of the UIT (2019): S/ 4,200 (Supreme Decree No. 298-2018-EF). ↑
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The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01 (hereinafter, Sanctions Regulation)”
“Regulation of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF”
“Regulation of Material Events and Reserved Information, approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2014-SMV/01”
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