Enforcement · SMV · 3 Dec 2020
Volcan Compañía Minera S.A.A. is fined 50 UIT for two infractions: failing to disclose as a material event its knowledge of Glencore's plans to acquire a significant stake (serious, Article 2.10, Annex I), and late disclosure of the share purchase agreement signed on 27 September 2017 (minor, Article 3.1, Annex I). The resolution details negotiations from 26 August to 20 September 2017 involving four shareholders and five directors, and the presumption of issuer knowledge under Article 9.2 of the Material Events Regulation.
No. 124-2020-SMV/11
| Lima, December 3, 2020 |
Summary: Sanction Volcan Compañía Minera S.A.A with a fine of 50 UIT, for having incurred in one (01) serious infraction typified in subsection 2.10, numeral 2 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation and in one (01) minor infraction typified in subsection 3.1, numeral 3 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation
| Administered entity | : | VOLCAN COMPAÑÍA MINERA S.A.A |
| Subject | : | Administrative Sanctioning Procedure |
| File No. | : | 2019035319 |
The Deputy Superintendent of Market Conduct Supervision
WHEREAS:
The administrative file No. 2019035319 and Report No. 474-2020-SMV/11.2 (hereinafter, the Report), issued by the General Intendancy of Conduct Compliance (IGCC) of the Deputy Superintendence of Market Conduct Supervision (SASCM);
CONSIDERING:
This charge was formulated in consideration that the Issuer did not communicate the ongoing negotiations that involved plans for a change in the control unit of the Issuer carried out from August 26 to September 20, 2017 by four (04) of the main shareholders and five (05) directors of the Issuer who negotiated the sale of common class "A" shares issued by the Issuer in favor of one of said shareholders.
Below are described the relevant facts of the referred negotiations carried out, and which subsequently led to the agreements reached with the sale of the common class "A" shares issued by the Issuer.
In this regard, according to the statements made by Mrs. Victoria Soyer in Annex B of her brief of January 24, 2018 submitted to the SMV, in addition to the statements of José Bayly[1] and Felipe Osterling[2]; in the negotiations of common class "A" shares issued by the Issuer, participated Mrs. Madeleine Osterling Letts, María Josefina Letts Colmenares widow of Osterling and Doris Letts Colmenares widow of Bayly (hereinafter, Selling Shareholders) who jointly represented 26.73% of said class of shares; and their respective representatives Felipe Osterling Letts and José Bayly Letts, with the following detail:
| Name | Situation in the negotiation | Position in Volcan |
| Madeleine Osterling Letts | Shareholder with 9.38% social participation in class A shares issued by Volcan. | Director of Volcan |
| María Josefina Letts Colmenares de Osterling | Shareholder with 8.91% social participation in class A shares issued by Volcan. | |
| Doris Letts Colmenares Vda. de Bayly; | Shareholder with 8.44% social participation in class A shares issued by Volcan. | |
| José Bayly Letts | Represented in the negotiation Mrs. Doris Letts, trustor of the DLB Trust Estate | Director of Volcan |
| Felipe Osterling Letts | Represented in the negotiation Mrs. Madeleine Osterling and María Josefina Letts | Director of Volcan |
Source: Annual Report 2016 of the Issuer submitted to the SMV.
On the other hand, Mrs. Victoria Soyer in Annex B of her brief of January 24, 2018 submitted to the SMV, indicated that as the purchasing counterparty participated Glencore and that the Directors of the Issuer who were aware of the negotiations were Daniel Maté Badenes and Cristopher Eskdale; additionally, at the time of the negotiation with the Selling Shareholders, Glencore was a shareholder with 18.1% participation of the common class A shares issued by the Issuer.[3]
It should be noted that Mrs. Victoria Soyer attended the Board meetings of the Issuer representing the directors Daniel Maté Badenes and Christopher Eskdale**, by virtue of a power of attorney granted by them, as recorded in the Board minutes of the sessions of February 16 and 28, March 24, April 25, July 08, August 14 and October 02, 2017**.
In this regard, according to the statements of Madeleine Osterling[4], the Bylaws of the Issuer establish that when directors reside outside the country they can be represented by persons who were not appointed as director.
From the statements provided that appear in the corresponding minutes, and detailed below, it is verified that there were negotiations carried out between the Selling Shareholders and Glencore, which subsequently led to the former transferring 436,659,163 common class "A" shares issued by the Issuer, equivalent to 26.73% of the total of said shares.
In this regard, it should be noted that by brief of January 24, 2018, Mrs. Victoria Soyer sent a list of the negotiation meetings, indicating the persons who participated in each of them, as shown below:
| Date | Place | Participant |
| Saturday, August 26, 2017 (02:00 pm) | Bar Country Club | Victoria Soyer, Felipe Osterling |
| Thursday, August 31, 2017 (11:00 am) | Bar Country Club | Victoria Soyer, José Bayly |
| Monday, September 04 (10:30 am) | Hotel Atton | Victoria Soyer, Felipe Osterling, José Bayly |
| Sunday, September 17 (10:00 am) | Restaurante Perroquet | Victoria Soyer, Felipe Osterling |
| Monday, September 18 (approx. 07:00 pm) | Bar Country Club | Victoria Soyer, Felipe Osterling, José Bayly |
| Tuesday, September 19 (05:00 pm) | Offices Estudio Rebaza, Alcázar & De las Casas | Victoria Soyer, José Bayly, Felipe Osterling, Gonzalo De las Casas, Luis Miguel Elías |
| Wednesday, September 20, 2017 | Offices Estudio Rebaza, Alcázar & De las Casas | Luis Miguel Elías, Mario Ferrari |
| Friday, September 22, 2017 | Offices Estudio Osterling | Luis Miguel Elías, Gonzalo De las Casas, Mario Ferrari |
| Tuesday, September 26, 2017 | Trip to Switzerland | Alberto Rebaza, Gonzalo De las Casas, Victoria Soyer, Sellers |
| Wednesday, September 27, 2017 | Switzerland – Signing SPA | Alberto Rebaza, Gonzalo De las Casas, Sellers |
Meeting August 26 and 31, 2017
According to the statements provided by Mr. Felipe Osterling[5], José Bayly[6] and Victoria Soyer[7], said negotiations began on August 26, 2017 with the participation of Mr. Felipe Osterling (representing Mrs. Madeleine Osterling and María Josefina Letts) and Victoria Soyer (representative of Glencore).
From the statements provided by Mr. José Bayly[8], he states that he met on August 31 with Victoria Soyer at the restaurant of the Hotel Country in San Isidro, because he was previously traveling, in which he was informed of Glencore's interest in acquiring the package of shares that his mother had placed in the trust.
Meeting of September 19, 2017
In this regard, from the statements provided by Mr. Gonzalo de las Casas Salinas[9], in his capacity as legal representative of Glencore, he indicated that Mrs. Victoria Soyer summoned him on September 19, 2017 to review the contracts that could be entered into with the Selling Shareholders, and that meeting was held with their representatives, Mr. Felipe Osterling and José Bayly, to explain the terms of the contract that could be signed, receive the observations of the potential Sellers, and there was no reference regarding the price.
Meeting of September 20, 2017
On September 20, 2017, according to the statements of Mrs. Madeleine Osterling[10] and Felipe Osterling[11] they met with the representatives of Glencore (Gonzalo de las Casas) and Mr. Mario Ferrari (legal representative of the Selling Shareholders). According to Mrs. Madeleine Osterling, in said meeting the share purchase agreement was discussed and the transaction would be through a tender offer, form and date of payment.
Meeting of September 21, 2017
On September 21, 2017, according to the statement of Mr. Felipe Osterling[12] he met with the representatives of Glencore (Gonzalo de las Casas), Mario Ferrari, Madeleine Osterling, Josefina Letts and Jose Bayly at the Estudio Osterling to continue reviewing the share purchase agreement.
Meeting September 22, 2017
According to the statement of Mr. Gonzalo de las Casas[13], on September 22, 2017 the issue of the resignation letters of the directors, the purchase commitments of the rights and the participation in profits was discussed.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the Informative Prospectus submitted to the SMV on October 09, 2017[14] regarding the public tender offer formulated by Glencore, it is indicated that there is an agreement between Glencore and the directors Madeleine Osterling, Felipe Osterling and Jose Bayly for them to irrevocably resign their position, and Glencore will recognize and pay the total amount of economic rights for Board fees of 2017 that the Issuer must pay to each Director.
Likewise, according to the statement of Mr. Felipe Osterling[15], on September 22, 2017, Madeleine Osterling and Josefina Letts grant him power of attorney to represent them and to make any type of agreement.
According to the facts described above, it can be verified that at least, Madeleine Osterling (director and shareholder), Felipe Osterling (director), José Bayly (director and representative of Mrs. Doris Letts, trustor of the DLB trust estate), Cristopher Eskdale (director of the Issuer linked to Glencore) and Daniel Maté (director of the Issuer, linked to Glencore) were aware of the ongoing negotiations that involved plans for the acquisition of a significant stake by Glencore in the Issuer.
In this regard, it should be noted that Madeleine Osterling[16], shareholder and Director of the Issuer, indicated that five (5) of (9) directors of the Issuer knew of the negotiations, with two (2) directors being from Glencore, referring to Maté and Eskdale and the (3) directors came from the sellers, referring to Felipe Osterling, José Bayly and Madeleine Osterling, which coincides with what was indicated by Mrs. Victoria Soyer.
In this sense, it is observed that the presumption indicated in article 9, numeral 9.2 of the Regulation of Material Events and Reserved Information approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2014-SMV/01 (hereinafter, Regulation of Material Events) is met, which provides that*: "It is presumed that an issuer has knowledge of a material event referring to it when, among others, said event originates in its own organization or controlling shareholder (…) or originates in the controlling entity of its economic group, to the extent that there are reasonable indications that its main officers have become aware of the event or if the issuer could reasonably have known it*". (Underline added).
This charge was formulated against the Issuer because it would have presented in an untimely manner the material event regarding the signing of the share purchase agreement that occurred on September 27, 2017 (File No. 2017038275), and which should have been communicated on the same day of signing; however, it was sent to the SMV on October 03, 2017.
It should be noted that, according to statements provided by Mr. José Bayly and Felipe Osterling, they traveled to Switzerland, as attorneys-in-fact of the Selling Shareholders, with powers for the negotiation and signing of the share transfer agreement of the Selling Shareholders. Likewise, Mr. Felipe Osterling indicated that the negotiation of the price of said shares was carried out with Mr. Daniel Maté, Mrs. Victoria Soyer and José Bayly in Switzerland, and in an office next door were the lawyers, who were as back office in case an agreement was reached to sign the contract. In this sense, having reached an agreement on the price of the class A share owned by the Selling Shareholders, the "Share Purchase Agreement" was signed on September 27, 2017.
In this regard, through said contract it was agreed that the transfer of shares, negotiated by the Selling Shareholders and Glencore, would be carried out within a prior and voluntary Public Tender Offer, which is described in the letter sent by Glencore to the Issuer on October 03, 2017, and attached in the material event presented the same day by the Issuer to the SMV, which indicates:
"According to the terms of the agreement signed with the Shareholders, they undertake to accept the Tender Offer to be made by Glencore and, in turn, Glencore undertakes to acquire any remainder of the Shares owned by the Shareholders, in case the number of acceptances exceeds the maximum number to be acquired in the Offer. Said acquisition will be made at the same price per share as that to be paid in the Tender Offer.
If the Tender Offer is successful, Glencore will increase its participation in the Shares by an amount equivalent to at least 26.73% and at most 48.2%, without considering the shares of the Company that are already owned by Glencore and/or its affiliates."
It should be noted that the BVL and the General Intendancy of Conduct Supervision (IGSC) formulated an information request to the Issuer, through Letter EMI No. 627/2017 of September 27, 2017 and Official Letter No. 6075-2017-SMV/11.1 of September 28, 2017[17], respectively, inquiring about relevant information that could be affecting the price and/or quotation of VOLCAAC1 on the Stock Exchange of the BVL, given the atypical variations that the quotation of said security was presenting.
In response to said requests, through material events of September 27 and 28, 2017, the Issuer stated that it was unaware of the existence of any fact that could have influenced the quotation of the shares VOLCAAC1 and VOLCABC1.
In this regard, it should be noted that the securities VOLCAAC1 and VOLCABC1 had an atypical behavior in their price from 09/27/17 to 10/03/17, a period in which they increased by 60% and 32.32%, respectively.
On the other hand, on October 03, 2017, the Issuer communicated as a material event (File No. 2017038275) that, on that date, at 11:12 hours, it had received via MVNet, the letter EMI-634/2017 from the Bolsa de Valores de Lima S.A.A. (hereinafter, BVL) by which it was communicated the suspension of trading on the Stock Exchange of the common class "A" shares (VOLCAAC1) and the preferred class "B" shares (VOLCABC1) issued by said company, because Glencore had disseminated that same day information regarding an agreement it had reached with certain shareholders of the Issuer for the acquisition of 26.73% of the total class "A" shares issued by said company.
Likewise, the Issuer informed, at 11:45 hours, that on October 03, 2017 it had received a letter from Glencore informing about the agreements reached with the Selling Shareholders to acquire, through a Prior Public Tender Offer process (hereinafter, OPA).
According to the above, the signing of the referred Share Purchase Agreement of September 27, 2017 was known by the directors of the Issuer, Madeleine Osterling, Felipe Osterling, José Bayly, Cristopher Eskdale and Daniel Maté; consequently, the presumption indicated in article 9, numeral 9.2, of the Regulation of Material Events is met*: "It is presumed that an issuer has knowledge of a material event referring to it when, among others, said event originates in its own organization or controlling shareholder (…) or originates in the controlling entity of its economic group, to the extent that there are reasonable indications that its main officers have become aware of the event or if the issuer could reasonably have known it*". (Underline added);
In this regard, it indicates that there is no legal definition of "organization", neither in the LMV, nor in the Regulation of Material Events and that the term "organization" would be made up of its corporate bodies: General Shareholders' Meeting, Board of Directors, General Management, line managements, among others. Likewise, in its analysis of numeral 9.2 of the Regulation of Material Events, shareholders are not part of said organization.
Based on the information published by the GLENCORE group, it is possible to conclude that Glencore is a global player and would qualify as an Institutional Investor under the terms of Peruvian legislation.
Indeed, institutional investors are persons who, by their nature, characteristics or knowledge, adequately understand, manage and evaluate the risks associated with their investment decisions, as established in Article 3 of the Regulation of the Institutional Investors Market, approved by SMV Resolution No. 021-2013-SMV/01, which was in force at the time the negotiations that led to the acquisition of a significant stake by Glencore in the Issuer took place.
In this particular case, it is considered that the provision can be understood by the Issuer and by the persons who govern it, and more specifically by the five (05) Directors of the Issuer mentioned previously.
Likewise, it is considered that such provision can be understood by whoever was interested in acquiring a significant stake in the Issuer, that is, by Glencore or its representatives or its legal advisors.
Such interpretation lacks legal basis, seeks to deny reality or objective facts that show that the Issuer did have knowledge of the facts because five (05) of its (09) Directors participated in or knew of the plans for significant acquisition by Glencore in the Issuer. With this argument, the Issuer seeks to open a front of confusion or lack of clarity of the referred provision to exempt itself from liability.
As can be seen, the document disseminated by Glencore is dated October 3, 2017, records the time 10:11:25 a.m., probably European time, and Glencore states, among others, that a Tender Offer will be carried out, and that at the end of it, depending on the level of acceptances in the Tender Offer, it would have between 44.84% and 66.30% of the total class A shares of the Issuer.
In Peru, the Issuer, after the communication from the Lima Stock Exchange, disclosed the material event of ANNEX 1 at 02:08:05 p.m.
In said material event, the Issuer states that on October 3, 2017, at 11:45 hours, it had received the letter sent by Glencore International AG of Switzerland, whose content is shown in ANNEX 1.
Thus, the Issuer's defense or allegations that it did not know about the referred plans for acquisition of significant stake by Glencore, to communicate them as a material event, and that the presumption established in numeral 9.2 of Article 9 of the Material Events Regulation cannot be applied to it, as the Issuer states because there is no legal definition of "organization", lack truthfulness and basis in light of all the facts and elements set forth.
Indeed, as previously detailed, it has been objectively demonstrated, among others, that the majority of the persons who make up the highest governing body of the Issuer (05 out of a total of 09 Directors) had knowledge of and participated in the facts related to the plans for acquisition of significant stake by Glencore in the Issuer, and that said plans materialized, such that Glencore indeed acquired a significant stake, and even exercises control of the Issuer.
Therefore, the facts indicate that the Issuer did have knowledge of Glencore's acquisition plans, and the presumption established in numeral 9.2 of Article 9 of the Material Events Regulation does apply to this case, since the facts set forth exist, the most notable of which is that 05 out of a total of 09 Directors of the Issuer had knowledge of the existence of the negotiations and some of them participated in them.
The referred plans of Glencore qualify as a material event that should have been communicated to the market by the Issuer, and the principle of transparency of information in the securities market should have been observed, which is an indispensable element to increase or maintain confidence in said market and its participants.
On the other hand, regarding the Issuer's argument that the shareholder/director is placed at a disadvantage by reducing business opportunities in the sale of their shares, it is not admissible because the directors and officers of an issuer have the duty, like the issuer, to observe and ensure that information that qualifies as a material event is reported to the SMV, in accordance with Article 18, numeral 18.1 of the Material Events Regulation; which states the following:
"The Issuer, as well as its directors and officers, must observe and ensure that information that qualifies as a material event is reported to the SMV, and simultaneously when applicable, to the Exchange or the entity administering the respective centralized trading mechanism, and necessarily before any other natural or legal person, or media."
In this regard, Alberto Montoya states that "directors incur administrative liability when they are obliged to comply with certain acts typical of the regulated regime in which the company operates, which requires such administrators to conduct themselves respecting the regulatory rules, or in the case of tax liability. There is then not only a management responsibility before the company, its shareholders and its creditors, which we can qualify within the scope of purely civil liability, but they are also required to respect rules of conduct of the regulatory regime in which they perform in business activity"[26].[27]
In that sense, directors who hold shares of an issuer are not prohibited from trading their shares, and may carry out any negotiation respecting the rules that regulate the securities market and also their duties as directors.
In that sense, when there is a takeover operation, the director cannot ignore their role as such using the excuse of their status as shareholder, since as can be inferred, their duty of care regarding corporate interests obliges them to communicate matters of influence in the securities market, such as the negotiation of shares in favor of Glencore.
Finally, it should be noted again that the SMV's purpose is to ensure market transparency and not particular interests, replicating said duty to its issuers and their directors.
(…)
(…)
(…)
(…)
It is necessary to specify that it has been verified that said NICs were in force until October 2017, in accordance with what was reported by the Issuer through a material event of October 9, 2017 (File No. 2017038893) in which it states:
(…)
(…)
(…)
In sum, regarding CHARGE 1 and based on the foregoing, it has been objectively demonstrated that the Issuer did not comply with its obligation to communicate as a material event the information on the plans for acquisition of significant stake by Glencore in the Issuer.
In this regard, it is appropriate to take into consideration the grounds, analysis, evaluation developed and conclusion regarding CHARGE 1.
In that order of ideas, it is concluded that the Issuer has incurred an infraction by presenting late the material event regarding the signing of the Share Purchase Agreement that occurred on September 27, 2017, and which should have been communicated on the same day it was signed; however, it was communicated on October 3, 2017.
In the absence of an express legal definition and given the materiality of said concept, the Issuer states that organization can be defined as an organized and structured set of bodies and/or areas oriented to a specific purpose. Said definition, applied to a corporation, must be understood as the set of corporate bodies, line bodies and any other body within the framework of the legal personality of the Company. That is, any concept of organization must necessarily be delimited by the legal personality of the Company, thus differentiating itself from any other external entity or body.
Analyzing numeral 9.2 of the Material Events Regulation, it states that this postulate makes sense with its text, since it indicates that there are two assumptions in which the Issuer's knowledge can be presumed: (a) When the event, related to the Issuer, originates in its own organization, that is, within the bodies that integrate and make up the legal personality of the Issuer, and (b) When the event, related to the Issuer, originates in its controlling shareholder.
From these definitions, the Issuer states that it can be seen that the rule (i) considers that shareholders are not part of the Issuer's organization, since it is including them in a different assumption from that applicable to the "Issuer's organization"; (ii) the rule considers that there is only a presumption of knowledge when it comes to the controlling shareholder and not, of any shareholder. The Issuer indicates that, on the date on which the facts giving rise to the imputation occurred, none of the persons indicated in the Instructive Report as sellers and buyers were controlling shareholders.
In this case, the Issuer states, the IGCC assumes that the facts originate in the Issuer's organization, but has not developed any legal argument that leads to sustaining that the conducts of shareholders and/or directors (in their personal capacity) of the Issuer, constitute facts that can be understood as related to the Issuer's organization. The SMV alleges this based on the fact that some of the persons involved in the negotiations of the Glencore CV Contract were also directors of the Issuer, without taking into account that neither the Board of Directors, as a collegiate body, nor any other body of the Company, knew or ruled on such negotiations.
The IGCC supports its position by resorting to general definitions (taken from non-legal publications but rather linked to other disciplines such as business administration) stating, for example, a two-dimensional definition of organization (formal and informal) and, based on said definition, they go on to state that the fact that several members of the board knew of the negotiation of the shareholders means that the "informal organization" of the Issuer knew of the information and, therefore, we are within the presumption of Article 9.2 of the Material Events Regulation.
In this regard, the Issuer argues that, by: (i) using a definition of "organization" taken from sources outside the law and (ii) based on it, extending the definition of "informal organization" to this case, constitutes a clear example of extensive interpretation, an assumption that is prohibited in the administrative sanctioning procedure, by express provision of the Principle of Typicality, recognized in the Preliminary Title of the TUO of the LPAG.
Therefore, by express application of said principle, the argument constructed by the IGCC cannot be upheld since it would imply imposing a sanction on an administered party based on extra-legal definitions and sources that do not qualify as a source of law, since they do not constitute legal doctrine and are also in direct opposition to the Principle of Typicality established in the TUO of the General Administrative Procedure Law.
If the IGCC's position were to be validated, in this case, we would not only contradict the logic of numeral 9.2 of the Material Events Regulation, but we would also be placing at a clear disadvantage the shareholder who, in turn, has the status of director (hereinafter, "shareholder/director"), since they would be obliged to inform the market every time they are within a negotiation for the sale of their shares, which would have as a consequence that (i) they have to assume the risk that other shareholders compete and sell their shares before them; and/or, (ii) restricts the universe of possible buyers of their shares, since a third party may prefer to negotiate with anyone else who does not have said condition in order to avoid publicity of their negotiation. Clearly this disadvantage position would be improper, since it is not based on any legal or regulatory norm and, nevertheless, it would be limiting the rights of a shareholder and imposing additional obligations -only because of their status as director- versus other shareholders who do not have said status, generating a scenario of unjustified inequality.
The Issuer also states that, if a shareholder wishes to sell its stake, it is disposing of its property; and, therefore, unless it is a controlling shareholder, there is no legal rule that obliges it to disclose to the market the negotiations it carries out for such sale. The fact that this shareholder is or is not a director does not change its rights, much less do its acts in its individual capacity as shareholder become acts of the company. In that sense, it is not valid to state that the negotiations such shareholders may have carried out qualify as a fact generated in the Issuer's own organization.
It also states that the presumption established in numeral 9.2 of the Material Events Regulation is not applicable because neither the negotiations nor the signing of the Glencore SPA were generated within the Issuer's organization. The obligation to communicate the material event must be understood to arise on the date the Issuer became aware of the transaction, that is, only on October 3, 2017.
That is why, in order to use the presumption contained in said rule based on the facts described in this Resolution, as well as the documentation in this file, and in accordance with the evaluation of the defenses carried out, we consider that the Issuer did have knowledge of the existence of the negotiations, since five (5) of nine (9) directors knew about the plans for the acquisition of a significant stake by Glencore in the Issuer, information that qualified as a material event and should have been reported. In addition, there are the other facts set forth in the evaluation of CHARGE 1.
Such directors are part of the Issuer's organization and in that framework, as part of the Issuer's Board of Directors, they should have informed through the internal channels of said company about the information that qualified as a material event so that it be disclosed to the market, observing the principle of transparency of information.
In that framework, the material event referring to plans for a significant acquisition by Glencore was known by the Issuer from the participation of five (5) of nine (9) directors, who knew about said plans, and they, being part of the Issuer's organization and in compliance with the fiduciary and legal duties contained in the LMV, the Material Events Regulation and the LGS, should have informed the Issuer so that the company comply with its duty to report the respective material event.
At this point it is important to mention that while said negotiations were taking place, Messrs. Madeleine Osterling, Felipe Osterling, José Bayly, Cristopher Eskdale and Daniel Maté —persons who became aware of such negotiations— were members of the Board of Directors[29] of the Issuer, that is, five (05) of the nine (09) directors of said company knew about the referred negotiations.
In that sense, the business organization scheme, which incorporates among others the directors and/or main officers, determines the existence of internal processes within the company, therefore, the non-observance of these delimits the diligence of the company; indeed, the existence of management personnel and internal protocols of the company seek to accredit the duty of diligence that must be had for compliance with the regulations.
In the case of the regulatory rules of the securities market, the duty of diligence of issuers must be measured based on the actions taken within the company to mitigate possible risks, which must be set out in the internal rules of conduct, as provided in article 19 of the Material Events Regulation, or other regulations that the company may require.
As indicated above, the stock indices reported an atypical variation in the price of the Issuer's shares between September 27 and October 3, 2017, a situation that was reported to the Issuer, however this issuer reported that it was not aware of the fact that could have generated the referred atypical variation.
At said hearing, the Issuer's representatives stated, among others, that there was no lack of diligence by the Issuer, that Glencore and the shareholders reviewed the issues, that there was no presumption case applicable to them since none of them was a controlling shareholder, so they had no obligation to report it as a material event.
Likewise, said representatives indicated that, in addition, they made a legal consultation to the SMV on other unclear issues, which was answered and taken into account for the transaction, and said consultation was made on behalf of Glencore and was annexed to the Informative Prospectus of Glencore's OPA.
Notwithstanding the foregoing and what has been demonstrated, it should be noted, in relation to the mentioned consultation, the following:
Said consultation is part of the documentation presented with the Informative Prospectus of the referred OPA formulated by Glencore. It is available at the web link https://www.smv.gob.pe/Frm_Opas?data=B0BAD43B72085E6947D724B1B24FA334D125F9653C and at the path "Home > ISSUERS > Main Market > Public Acquisition Offers – OPAS" of the Securities Market Portal (www.smv.gob.pe).
The consultation is mentioned on page 5 of Glencore's brief called "Subsanación Brief" of October 19, 2017, indicating:
As stated by the Issuer's representatives at the hearing for the use of the floor, it is appreciated that the referred consultation was presented to the SMV on July 4, 2017 under File No. 2017026260 and by Glencore's representatives, in accordance with what was indicated by Mrs. Soyer in her letter of January 24, 2018. As can be seen in said consultation (See ANNEX 4) no mention is made of Glencore, however, a series of aspects referring to the OPA and its regulation are consulted, it being necessary to take into account that the response to said consultation was presented as part of the subsanations in the process of the OPA in question.
We reiterate that, notwithstanding the foregoing, the formulation of a consultation directly linked to the OPA that was subsequently carried out is striking. The consultation was formulated on July 4, 2017 and Mrs. Soyer —an employee of Glencore and who represented two (02) Directors of the Issuer— has stated that the negotiations or conversations with the 03 mentioned shareholders of the Issuer or with their representatives began on August 26, 2017.
Principles 16, 17, 22 and 23 of the 2013 Code of Good Corporate Governance for Peruvian Companies indicate:
"(...) It is the function of the Board of Directors to supervise good corporate governance practices and establish the policies and measures necessary for their best application.
(...)
Directors must carry out their work with good faith, diligence, high standards of ethics, due care and confidentiality, always acting with loyalty and in the interest of the company.
(...)
Members of the Board of Directors have the right to request from the Board the support or contribution of experts, to participate in induction programs on their powers and responsibilities, to be informed in a timely manner about the organizational structure of the company, as well as to receive remuneration for the work performed.
The company has a Code of Ethics that is enforceable for its directors, managers, officers and other collaborators of the company, which includes ethical and professional responsibility criteria, including the management of potential cases of conflicts of interest. The company adopts measures to prevent, detect, manage and disclose conflicts of interest that may arise.
The Board of Directors establishes policies and procedures for the valuation, approval and disclosure of certain operations between the company and related parties, including intra-group operations, as well as to know the commercial or personal relationships, direct or indirect, that directors maintain among themselves, with the company, with its suppliers or clients, and other stakeholders."
Indeed, in the part "II. Disclosure of information and transparency", of said document it is stated:
A demanding information disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a crucial feature for market supervision of companies and is essential for shareholders to exercise their rights in an informed manner. Experience shows that publicity of information can also be a powerful instrument to influence corporate behavior and protect investors. A demanding disclosure regime can help attract capital and keep markets confident. Conversely, a lax regime and practices lacking transparency can encourage unethical behavior and lead to a loss of market integrity at a high cost, not only for a company and its shareholders but also for the economy as a whole. Shareholders and potential investors need access to periodic, reliable, verifiable, and sufficiently detailed information that allows them to evaluate management's performance and make informed decisions about the valuation, ownership, and voting of shares. Insufficient or confusing information could impair the functioning capacity of markets, increase the cost of capital, and lead to a misallocation of resources.
Transactions involving large shareholders (or their immediate family members, relatives, etc.), whether directly or indirectly, are potentially the most complicated. In some countries, shareholders with a stake above a threshold as low as five percent of capital are required to report their transactions. Data disclosure requirements include the nature of the relationship that allows control to be obtained and the nature and amount of related-party transactions, grouping them appropriately. Given the opacity that characterizes many transactions, it may be necessary for the obligation to inform the Board of Directors about them to fall on the beneficiary, so that this body, in turn, communicates them to the market. This will not exonerate the company from continuing to carry out its own monitoring, which is an important task of the Board of Directors.
In addition, in the section "VI. The responsibilities of the board of directors" of said document, it is stated:
This principle sets out two fundamental elements of the fiduciary duty of Board members: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The first obliges them to act with full knowledge, good faith, and with due diligence and care. In some places, the behavior that a reasonably prudent person would show in a similar circumstance is taken as a reference. In almost everywhere, the duty of care does not extend to errors of judgment in business activities, provided that, among other things, the directors do not commit gross negligence and the decision is adopted with due diligence. Furthermore, it urges directors to act with all necessary information. From the point of view of good practice, it means that they must ensure that fundamental corporate information and compliance monitoring systems are substantially sound and that they support the main oversight function of the Board that the Principles promote. In many countries, all of this is considered inherent to the duty of care, while in many others, it is a requirement of securities regulation, accounting standards, etc. The duty of loyalty is of central importance, as it supports the effective application of other Principles contained in this document, relating, for example, to the equitable treatment of shareholders, oversight of related-party transactions, and the definition of the remuneration policy of senior executives and directors. Within this last group, it is a key element for those who work within the structure of a corporate group: even if the company is controlled by another, the director owes the duty of loyalty to the former and not to the one that controls the group.
The Board plays a leading role in defining the company's ethical message, not only through its own actions but also by appointing and overseeing the work of senior executives and, therefore, of management in general. Being governed by strict ethical values benefits the company in a lasting way, as it grants it credibility and reliability both in daily operations and in long-term commitments. For the Board's objectives to be clear and functional, many companies find it useful to develop codes of conduct based, among others, on professional standards and, sometimes, broader codes of this type, and disseminate them throughout the organization. The latter may include a voluntary commitment by the company (including its subsidiaries) to comply with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which reflect the four principles contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Similarly, in more and more countries, the Board is obliged to oversee the tax and financial planning strategies that management may adopt, discouraging actions that do not redound to the long-term interest of the company and its shareholders, such as active tax avoidance practices, which can also entail legal and reputational risk.
Codes applicable to the entire company stand as a standard of conduct for both the Board and senior executives, establishing the framework for making value judgments when dealing with different groups of shareholders, which are often in conflict. At a minimum, they must clearly delimit the defense of particular interests, including the negotiation of company shares. A general framework of ethical conduct transcends compliance with the law, which, in turn, must always be a basic requirement.
In accordance with the provisions of numerals 13 and 14 of article 43 of the Regulations of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF.
RESOLVES:
Register, communicate and publish.
Roberto Pereda Gálvez
Deputy Superintendent
Deputy Superintendency of Market Conduct Supervision
ANNEX 1
Material Fact disclosed by the Issuer on October 3, 2017 at 02:08 p.m. and its annexes
File No. 2017038275
ANNEX 2
Internal Conduct Standards of the Issuer
File No. 2014033333
ANNEX 3
Material Fact of October 20, 2017 File No. 2017040713
Code of Ethics and Conduct of the Issuer
ANNEX 4
Consultation on the OPA Regulations
File No. 2017026260
Consult from 00:04:30 hours to 00:05:08 hours and from 00:35:07 hours to 00:35:23 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. José Bayly dated December 20, 2017 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 00:50:53 hours to 00:51:43 hours of the audio that was part of the appearance record of Mr. Felipe Osterling dated January 10, 2018 at the SMV. ↑
Material fact of October 3, 2017. See File No. 2017038275. ↑
Consult from 00:59:20 hours to 00:59:37 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mrs. Madeleine Osterling dated December 11, 2017 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 01:27:20 hours to 01:29:10 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. Felipe Osterling dated January 10, 2018 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 00:04:00 hours to 00:05:00 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. José Bayly dated December 20, 2017 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 00:21:15 hours to 00:24:00 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mrs. Victoria Soyer dated December 20, 2017 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 00:04:08 hours to 00:04:50 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. José Bayly dated December 20, 2017 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 00:07:41 hours to 00:08:15 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. Gonzalo de las Casas Salinas dated December 13, 2017 at the SMV ↑
Consult from 00:04:56 hours to 00:05:15 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mrs. Madeleine Osterling dated December 11, 2017 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 01:23:49 hours to 01:24:02 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. Felipe Osterling dated January 10, 2018 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 01:06:32 hours to 01:06:44 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. Felipe Osterling dated January 10, 2018 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 00:59:04 hours to 01:00:14 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. Gonzalo de las Casas Salinas dated December 13, 2017 at the SMV ↑
File No. 2017038988 ↑
Consult from 00:51:10 hours to 00:51:35 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. Felipe Osterling dated January 10, 2018 at the SMV. ↑
Consult from 00:59:45 hours to 01:00:31 hours of the audio that is part of the appearance record of Mr. Madeleine Osterling dated December 11, 2017 at the SMV. ↑
Through Official Letter No. 6075-2017-SMV/11.1, the IGSC required the Issuer to communicate knowledge of any information related to the issuer or its businesses that could be influencing the 15.12% increase in the price of VOLCAAC1 securities on September 28, 2018. ↑
The text of the Sanctions Regulations is: “2.14 Not communicating material facts that have significant impact on the market.” ↑
The text of the New Sanctions Regulations is: “2.10 Not communicating material facts or not presenting audited individual or consolidated financial information, interim individual or consolidated financial statements, management report or special audit report and annual reports.” ↑
The text of the Sanctions Regulations is: “3.1. Not providing in a timely manner, or doing so incompletely, or, without observing the technical specifications approved by the SMV or without communicating the approval by the corresponding corporate body, to the SMV, the Exchange, the products exchange, the entity in charge of the centralized negotiation mechanism or any other entity or subject of the securities or products market, the audited individual or consolidated financial information, interim individual or consolidated financial statements, management report, additional audit report, material facts, annual reports.” (Underline and emphasis added). ↑
The text of the New Sanctions Regulations is: “3.1 Presenting outside the established period, or doing so incompletely, or, without observing the technical specifications approved by the SMV or without communicating the approval by the corresponding corporate body, to the SMV, the Exchange, the entity in charge of the centralized negotiation mechanism or any other entity or subject of the securities market, the audited individual or consolidated financial information, interim individual or consolidated financial statements, management report, special audit report, material facts and annual reports”. (Underline and emphasis added). ↑
In numerals 1 and 16 of article 2 of the ROPA, the following 2 fundamental definitions related to Glencore's significant acquisition plans in the Issuer are set: ACQUIRER AND SIGNIFICANT STAKE
3.1. Acquirer: Person or group of persons who have acquired a significant stake. When it is a group of persons, the obligation to make a OPA is joint and several among all of them.
3.2. Significant stake: A significant stake is considered any direct or indirect ownership of voting shares that represents a percentage equal to or greater than 25% of the share capital of a company that has at least one class of voting shares representing its share capital registered on a stock exchange. Also considered a significant stake is the power that a person or group of persons has to, without having direct or indirect ownership, exercise the right to vote of voting shares that represents a percentage equal to or greater than twenty-five percent of the share capital of a company or, entails that the acquirer reaches a number of shares or has the power to exercise the political rights of shares, in an amount such that in either of the last two cases allows it to: i) remove, or appoint the majority of the directors, ii) modify the company's bylaws. ↑
Regarding the term CONTROL, in article 6 of the Regulations on Indirect Ownership, Linkage, and Economic Groups, approved by SMV Resolution No. 019-2015-SMV-01, it is established:
“Article 6.- Control
Control is called the preponderant and continuous influence in decision-making of the governing bodies of a legal person or bodies that fulfill the same purpose in the case of a legal entity.
For the application of this article, the following must be taken into account:
6.1 There is control when there is ownership of rights that allow, directly or indirectly, exercising the vote with respect to more than fifty percent (50%) of the shares or participations representing the share capital, and in the case of legal entities through those modalities of contributions that grant similar rights.
6.2 It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that persons who control an economic group also control an entity when the majority of the members of the board of directors of the latter are linked to those.
6.3 It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, in the case of legal persons incorporated abroad and that have bearer shares that those who exercise the positions of attorneys, legal representatives, directors or managers of said legal person exercise control over it.
6.4 It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that a person, legal entity or group of persons exercises control over an entity even when more than half of the voting power is not exercised when it can:
i) Adopt, directly or indirectly, agreements in the general meetings of shareholders or assembly of partners or equivalent bodies of an entity;
ii) Direct, directly or indirectly, the administration or the main policies of an entity, through any legal act, or;
iii) Appoint or remove the majority of the members of the board of directors of an entity.
The SMV, for prudential reasons, may establish, through a general rule, additional presumptions to those considered in this article.” ↑
In relation to this topic, the General Corporations Law, Law No. 26887, states:
“Article 156.- Alternate or substitute directors
The bylaws may establish that alternate directors be elected by fixing their number or that one or more alternates be elected for each titular director. Unless the bylaws provide otherwise, the substitutes or alternates replace the corresponding titular director, definitively in case of vacancy or temporarily in case of absence or impediment. At the request of the shareholders who elect titular directors by minority or by classes of shares, the substitutes or alternates shall be elected in the same manner as the titulars.
(…)
Article 159.- Personal position and representation
The position of director, whether titular, substitute or alternate, is personal, unless the bylaws authorize representation.” ↑
The informative prospectus and complementary documentation of the OPA formulated by Glencore International AG, on the class A voting shares of the Issuer, is available at the web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/Frm_Opas?data=B0BAD43B72085E6947D724B1B24FA334D125F9653C ↑
Montoya U. (2008) "The Civil Liability of Administrators", Lima. Peru. ↑
The underline is added. ↑
The same that is consistent with the provisions of article 15 of the Sanctions Regulations, in force at the time the events occurred. ↑
According to information from the Public Registry of the Securities Market of the SMV. ↑
OECD and G20 Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Editions, Paris. Available at web link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264259171-es ↑
Tax Unit – UIT (2017) corresponds to S/ 4,050, approved by Supreme Decree No. 353-2016-EF ↑
Note from RegAlert. AI assistants can read this document in full, and search 70,000+ more, through the RegAlert MCP connector (https://mcp.regalert.today/mcp). Free with an account. How to connect ChatGPT, Claude or Cursor.
The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“...Sanctions Regulation approved by Resolution SMV N° 035-2018-SMV/01 (hereinafter, New Sanctions Regulation)...”
“...SMV Resolution No. 014-2014-SMV/01 and by the provisions of the last paragraph of article 14 of SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01.”
“...SMV Resolution No. 014-2014-SMV/01 and by the provisions of the last paragraph of article 14 of SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01.”
“...Regulation of Material Events and Reserved Information approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2014-SMV/01...”
“sanctioned through ... Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 124-2020-SMV/11 of December 3, 2020”
More like this from SMV
SMV published 22 documents in the last 30 days. We email you each new one the day it's published.
Source: Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (Peru) — original document · Summary generated with machine assistance and checked by an AI reviewer before publication; the authoritative text is the regulator's original document. How RegAlert works
In RegAlert: added