Enforcement · SMV · 19 Apr 2021
The Superintendent of the Securities Market resolves an appeal by Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A. against a sanction resolution that imposed a fine of 700 UIT (S/ 2,765,000.00) for allegedly providing inaccurate information in a public purchase offer notice and failing to disclose a valuation report as a material event. The resolution recounts the factual background, the appellant's arguments challenging both the existence of the infractions and their instantaneous nature, and references a legal report. The document does not state the final decision on the appeal.
Superintendent's Resolution
No. 027-2021-SMV/02
Lima, April 19, 2021
The Superintendent of the Securities Market
WHEREAS:
File No. 2018014707 containing, among others, the appeal filed by Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A., formerly Compañía Minera Milpo S.A.A. (hereinafter "Nexa" or "Milpo", indistinctly), against Deputy Superintendent's Resolution SMV No. 042-2019-SMV/11 (hereinafter, the "Sanction Resolution"), Report No. 287-2021-SMV/06 issued by the Legal Advisory Office (hereinafter, the "Legal Report"), as well as Nexa's brief of arguments;
CONSIDERING:
That, by material event of July 23, 2015, Nexa informed the market of the agreement of its General Shareholders' Meeting held on that date, in which the decision to repurchase its own shares was taken, delegating to the Board of Directors the powers to determine the mechanisms to comply with the decision of said Meeting;
That, on October 27, 2016, Nexa, by material event, informed the market that its Board of Directors in the session of that date approved the launch of a purchase offer of common shares of its own issuance, using the "Purchase Order with Public Dissemination" modality, within the stock exchange mechanism of the Lima Stock Exchange – BVL (hereinafter, the Purchase Offer);
That, Nexa attached to the communication mentioned in the previous recital, the Notice of Purchase Offer with Public Dissemination (hereinafter, the Offer Notice). It is important to note that among the terms indicated in the Offer Notice, the following points stand out:
That, subsequently, by material event of November 28, 2016, Nexa informed the market that its Board of Directors agreed to extend the deadline for submitting acceptance letters for the Purchase Offer until December 7, 2016;
That, likewise, by material event of November 30, 2016, Nexa informed the market that its General Shareholders' Meeting held on that date agreed to delegate to its Board of Directors the evaluation, approval and implementation of, among others, the exclusion of its common and investment shares from the Public Registry of the Securities Market – RPMV and the BVL Securities Registry, including the eventual tender offer for exclusion (OPC);
That, next, by material event of December 1, 2016, and while the term for acceptance of the Purchase Offer was in force, due to the extension thereof mentioned above, Nexa informed the market that its Board of Directors decided to initiate the exclusion process for its common and investment shares, indicating that such processes would include the carrying out of an OPC;
That, by material event of December 9, 2016, Nexa informed that the company acquired as a result of the Purchase Offer, a total of 36,007,434 common shares, which represent 2.75% of the subscribed capital of the company;
That, after the initiation of the exclusion process of its securities by Nexa, the General Superintendency of Conduct Supervision (IGSC) issued General Intendancy Resolutions SMV No. 001-2017-SMV/11.1 and No. 023-2017-SMV/11.1, ordering the exclusion of its investment shares and common shares, respectively, conditioning such exclusion to the carrying out of the corresponding OPCs. At Nexa's request, the IGSC ordered, by General Intendancy Resolution SMV No. 029-2017-SMV/11.1, that a single valuation entity be responsible for determining the minimum prices of Nexa's common and investment shares, which would be taken into account in the OPCs carried out;
That, once the selection process was carried out, the Selection Committee for the Valuation Entity and Determination of Price on a Subsidiary Basis, in accordance with the provisions of Article 49 of the Regulation of Public Tender Offers and Purchase of Securities for Exclusion, approved by Conasev Resolution No. 009-2006-EF/94.10 (hereinafter, the "OPA Regulation"), declared SUMMA Asesores Financieros S.A. (hereinafter, "Summa") as the winning bidder, which, after two successive extensions, delivered its valuation report on May 19, 2017, calculating a minimum price for investment shares of S/ 2.94 (Two and 94/100 Soles) and for common shares of S/ 4.16 (Four and 16/100 Soles);
That, in the telephone communication of May 22, 2017, Nexa indicates to Summa, among others, that in the calculations related to the cash flow to be discounted to determine the equity value, both with respect to Milpo's cash flows and those corresponding to the Subsidiary Milpo Andina Perú S.A.C., the Special Mining Tax and the Special Mining Tax were omitted;
That, as a result of the aforementioned communication, Summa presents on May 22, 2017, to the IGSC, a new valuation report of Nexa's common and investment shares, with the adjusted values of the proposed minimum prices -S/ 2.83 (Two and 83/100 Soles) for investment shares and S/ 4.02 (Four and 02/100 Soles) for common shares-;
That, the IGSC, by Official Letter No. 3353-2017-SMV/11.1 of May 23, 2017, informed Summa that the deadline for submitting the valuation report expired on May 19, 2017, and consequently, the modifications presented by Summa to the valuation report were inadmissible, and the valuation report submitted on May 19, 2017 must be taken for all purposes in the OPCs of Nexa's common and investment shares;
That, by material event of May 25, 2017, Nexa informed that its Board of Directors, in a session held on that date, decided not to proceed with the OPCs, whose term expired on May 26, 2017, indicating that despite the error committed by the valuation entity, the IGSC had ordered the OPCs to be carried out with the valuation report of May 19, 2017 and not with the adjusted report of May 22, 2017. In said communication, Nexa also indicated that its Board of Directors had at its disposal a valuation report from Macroinvest S.A. (hereinafter, "Macroinvest"), which calculated a value for Milpo's common shares in a range between S/ 3.28 (Three and 28/100 Soles) and S/ 3.55 (Three and 55/100 Soles) per share;
That, after the occurrence of the aforementioned events, the General Intendancy of Conduct Compliance (IGCC), by Official Letter No. 2087-2018-SMV/11.2, imputed the following charges to Nexa:
That, after the defenses presented by Nexa, the IGCC presented its instruction report to the Deputy Superintendent of Conduct Supervision of Markets (hereinafter, the "Deputy Superintendent"), concluding that Nexa incurred in the infractions indicated in the previous numeral, and recommending that a fine of 100 UIT, amounting to S/ 395,000.00 (Three hundred ninety-five thousand and 00/100 Soles) be imposed on said company;
That, by Deputy Superintendent's Resolution SMV No. 042-2019-SMV/11 (hereinafter, the "Sanction Resolution"), the Deputy Superintendent determined that Nexa incurred in the two infractions indicated above, however, it departed from the evaluation of the sanction criteria contained in the instruction report, imposing a fine on Nexa of 700 (Seven hundred) UIT, amounting to 2,765,000.00 (Two million seven hundred sixty-five thousand and 00/100 Soles). Likewise, it determined the application of two corrective measures to be borne by Nexa:
That, by brief presented on April 30, 2019, Nexa filed an appeal against the Sanction Resolution;
That, on June 3, 2019 Nexa presented a complementary brief to its appeal brief;
That, on June 12, 2019 Nexa attached, as part of its defense, a report prepared by attorney Juan Carlos Morón;
That, on July 1, 2019 Nexa attached, as part of its defense, a report issued by attorney José Antonio Payet;
That, on August 15, 2019 Nexa attached, as part of its defense, a new report from attorney Juan Carlos Morón;
That, additionally, Nexa presented three complementary briefs on August 21 and 23 and October 15, 2019, respectively;
That, finally, on March 12, 2021, Nexa presented its arguments on the Legal Report issued by the Legal Advisory Office;
That, below are succinctly set forth the arguments contained in the appeal filed by Nexa, as well as in its other complementary briefs and in its brief of arguments:
A. REGARDING THE COMMISSION OF THE INFRACTIONS
Argument: Nexa did not disseminate inaccurate information in the Offer Notice
That, Nexa states that it is not true that it disseminated inaccurate information in the Offer Notice as the Deputy Superintendency of Conduct Supervision of Markets (SASCM) maintains. In that sense, it indicates that it cannot be maintained, as alleged in the Sanction Resolution, that merely by including in the Offer Notice the sections on "Context of the Offer" and "Compensation System", Nexa committed to making an OPC at a price higher than that of the Purchase Offer, and therefore, to paying the corresponding differential to investors who accepted the Purchase Offer;
That, Nexa indicates that the terms contained in the Offer Notice were clear in stating that the application of the compensation system to investors who sold their common shares in the Purchase Offer was subject to the eventual carrying out of a future purchase offer of said shares, in which a price higher than that offered in the Purchase Offer was offered:
"Compensation System: The Purchaser undertakes that in case it makes an offer, under any modality, aimed at acquiring, directly or indirectly, the Shares subject to this Offer, including a process of exclusion of said Shares from the RPMV and the BVL Securities Registry, and provided that the acquisition of said Shares is completed within a period of one year computed from the day of the beginning of the term of validity of this Offer, and in any case a price higher than that offered in this Offer is offered, delivering to them the sum equivalent to the difference between the price to be paid per share in said acquisition and that offered in this Offer, multiplied by the number of Shares acquired from them by the Purchaser in this last transaction (…)." (Underlining and bold added by Nexa)
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa states that, from a logical reading of said section of the Offer Notice, it cannot be concluded:
That, therefore, Nexa concludes that it could not be maintained, that it is inferred from the Compensation System section, that Nexa was obliged to pay a differential to investors who accepted the Purchase Offer, regardless of whether or not the conditions clearly indicated in said section of the Offer Notice were met;
That, Nexa indicates that it is inexplicable to it that the SASCM affirms that it has disseminated inaccurate information in the Offer Notice, when said notice was evaluated by the IGSC, an organ that depends hierarchically on the SACM, and which made various observations to said document, which were duly corrected by Nexa, so the document was in accordance with SMV standards;
That, Nexa adds that if the IGSC considered that Nexa was disseminating inaccurate information to the market and that it should expressly state that it could withdraw from carrying out the OPC, it should have indicated so along with the other observations it sent to Nexa regarding the Offer Notice;
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, Nexa states that including in the Offer Notice or in the material events of November 30 and December 1, 2016, specific information regarding the fact that Nexa could withdraw from carrying out the OPC was unnecessary, because the market and investors recognize perfectly that the offeror retains the right to withdraw from said offer, if, for example, the price determined by the valuation entity is excessively high, to the point of putting the company's solvency at risk;
That, likewise, Nexa states that even the carrying out of the OPC does not depend exclusively on the issuer, since it requires that the SMV previously approve the exclusion of the securities, that a valuation entity be appointed, that it comply with its duties, among others;
That, in that sense, Nexa states that a sensible investor[1] recognizes all the aforementioned factors, so it is unnecessary to reveal information that they already have. Because of this, when an issuer announces that it has approved initiating a delisting procedure, it is not required to warn that "just in case, it may not carry out the OPC". Nexa states that such a statement is never made and that it is not aware of any case in which the SMV has required such disclosure or has sanctioned an issuer for not including such a statement[2];
That, in relation to this point, Nexa adds that Article 33 of the OPA Regulation itself recognizes the possibility that the OPC may not be carried out, due to this, it states that once the corresponding term to carry out the OPC has expired, a new procedure should be initiated for the exclusion of the security;
That, in that sense, Nexa states that the Legal Report considers, from a reading of the section on the "Compensation System" of the Offer Notice, that Nexa did not commit to carrying out an OPC or another future offer on its securities, but that this was a possibility;
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa indicates that it agrees with the conclusion contained in the Legal Report, regarding the fact that, from the review of the Offer Notice, it follows that Nexa in no way assumed the commitment to carry out additional share purchases within the term indicated in said notice, nor at prices higher than that offered in the Purchase Offer, so that the compensation mechanism included in said offer would be activated;
That, regarding the material events of November 30 and December 1, 2016, Nexa states that their dissemination was carried out in compliance with the regulations on material events, so it is inexplicable to it that the SASCM finds in the compliance with a duty to communicate material events, a questionable act;
That, likewise, Nexa indicates, in relation to the Legal Report, that the analysis of the imputation of the first infraction must be restricted to the material event of October 27, 2016, since the imputation related to allegedly revealing inaccurate information refers exclusively to the material event of October 27, 2016, so, for the evaluation of said infraction, only the facts existing on that date should be taken into account, and not subsequent facts;
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa mentions that the investors who accepted the Purchase Offer knew and assumed the risk that the OPC would not be carried out, so it cannot be stated that Nexa disseminated inaccurate information. Because of this, Nexa states that the SMV violates the principle of reasonableness by concluding that Nexa has disseminated inaccurate information in the Offer Notice;
That, on the other hand, it should be noted that the report of attorney José Antonio Payet supports the arguments made by Nexa in its appeal brief. In that sense, said report states that it cannot be maintained that Nexa disseminated inaccurate information or omitted to reveal information in the Offer Notice or in the material events of November 30 and December 1, 2016, nor that Nexa committed to carrying out an OPC, and even less to carrying out said offer at a price higher than that established in the Purchase Offer. Therefore, it is indicated that a sensible investor could recognize that the future carrying out of an OPC on Nexa's shares was a possibility, but not a commitment or obligation of Nexa;
Argument: The imputed infraction referring to the alleged "inaccuracy" is an infraction of an instantaneous nature
That, Nexa states that the Sanction Resolution, erroneously, concludes that it would have disseminated inaccurate information to the market because it contracted the financial advisory services of Macroinvest and that it did not reveal said fact in the Offer Notice, whereas the "valuation" report delivered by Macroinvest would have been decisive to compare the minimum price determined by Summa, and finally withdraw from carrying out the OPC. However, Nexa states that said argument is incorrect because: i) Macroinvest only provided a financial advisory service, which was not relevant to the decision taken by Nexa to withdraw from carrying out the OPC, and, ii) The contracting of Macroinvest was made on January 16, 2017, more than two months after the Offer Notice was disseminated;
That, Nexa indicates that the work performed by Macroinvest was only that of a financial advisor and that the report of this company, which was made available to its Board of Directors, was not relevant to decide to withdraw from the OPC, because said decision was due to the erroneous valuation report issued by Summa and the refusal of the IGSC to allow the correction of said report, despite the fact that Summa itself requested said correction;
That, Nexa affirms in its arguments that it was willing to carry out the OPC at a price higher than that determined by Macroinvest, which would confirm, from its point of view, the referential nature of said report and the good faith and seriousness of the company;
That, likewise, Nexa maintains that it is incorrect that the SASCM concludes that it disseminated inaccurate information in the Offer Notice, for not having indicated about the contracting and the report issued by Macroinvest, when Nexa at that date had not decided the contracting of Macroinvest to provide financial advisory services, since said contracting was made on January 16, 2017, that is, more than two months after the Offer Notice was disseminated;
That, in relation to this point, Nexa alleges that the imputation made by the SMV of disseminating inaccurate information falls on the information contained in the Offer Notice of October 27, 2016. In that sense, it states that it is evident that it is imputed the commission of an infraction of an instantaneous nature, whose consummation must be evaluated based on the reality existing at the time the allegedly inaccurate information is revealed, that is, October 27, 2016;
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa states that the only reality existing as of October 27, 2016, was its purpose to carry out the Purchase Offer under the terms and conditions indicated in the Offer Notice, as well as the agreements it had adopted in relation to the exclusion of its shares. Therefore, it is questionable that the SMV resorts to citing facts subsequent to the remission and publication of the Offer Notice, to conclude that it has disseminated inaccurate information, reasoning that is only appropriate for the case of continuing infractions and not for instantaneous infractions;
That, Nexa mentions that the error of the SASCM is summarized when, in the Sanction Resolution it states that, "*a comparative analysis of the communications of material events of October 27, 2016, May 25 and June 6, 2017, has been made to review whether in the material event of October 27, 2016 there has been incurred in the presentation of inaccurate information in the OCA[3]";
That, Nexa adds that said conclusion is erroneous, since the inaccuracy does not arise from comparing what Nexa stated on different occasions, much less with two supervening facts during the validity of the Purchase Offer, but from verifying that the content of the statement imputed to it is inaccurate; that is, the statement of October 27, 2016 corresponds to the material reality existing at that date. In that sense, it concludes that the SASCM has in no way demonstrated that the information contained in the material fact of October 27, 2016 or in the Offer Notice does not correspond to the reality existing at that time;
Argument: The IGSC is responsible for the OPC not being carried out, for not allowing the erroneous SUMMA report to be corrected
That, Nexa states that its intention was always to carry out the OPC on its common shares and its investment shares, as evidenced by the acts it carried out throughout said process, including requesting the SMV for an exception to extend the term to carry out the OPC, in light of delays in the valuation process; however, it was the occurrence of an event external to it, such as the erroneous report issued by Summa, and the IGSC's refusal to correct said report, despite the valuer's own request, that led to the eventual withdrawal from the OPC;
That, Nexa points out that carrying out the OPC at the erroneous price of the first report issued by Summa would have represented an action detrimental to the company and its shareholders, since a higher price than what actually corresponded would have been paid, which had been acknowledged by the valuer itself when issuing its second valuation report and requesting the IGSC to disregard the first report issued because it contained errors that made the calculated minimum price unduly higher than what corresponded;
That, in that sense, Nexa mentions that it was the IGSC's position not to accept correcting the valuation report issued by Summa, despite the multiple requests it made, which ultimately determined that the OPC was not carried out. Nexa adds that the IGSC's behavior is inexplicable to it, since a few months earlier, in a case similar to its own, it allowed a valuation report on the investment shares of Compañía Minera Raura S.A. to be corrected, which also involved carrying out an OPC. Therefore, the principles of legitimate expectation and legal certainty are infringed, in addition to demonstrating the existence of an illegitimate exercise of power;
That, Nexa indicates that subsequently, and in response to claims from investors who participated in the Purchase Offer and who could expect compensation from a higher price offered in the OPC, the SMV intends to build a case against it to shift its responsibility to said investors for the non-completion of the OPC[4]. Nexa alleges that, in this case, the SMV acts as judge and party, since it was the improper action of the IGSC in not allowing the valuation report to be corrected that ultimately caused Nexa to withdraw from carrying out the OPC, despite its intention always being to carry out said offer;
That, Nexa adds that it is highly questionable that the SASCM acted as the first-instance sanctioning body in this proceeding, since there is a clear conflict of interest, as the IGSC, which caused Nexa to withdraw from the OPC, is a body dependent on the SASCM;
That, due to this, Nexa points out that the SASCM hides in the Sanction Resolution all reference to the IGSC's requirement that the OPC be carried out at the erroneous price of the first report issued by Summa. Nexa states that said decision should have been evaluated by the SASCM, because it was the true cause of its withdrawal from the OPC;
That, in that sense, Nexa maintains that its Board of Directors was impeded from making a decision to continue with the OPC, since the SMV did not allow the correction of the minimum price at which the OPC should be carried out. Nexa indicates that said questionable attitude could be due to the SMV, in the Raura case, having received criticism from shareholders who would have felt "harmed" by allowing the valuation report to be corrected and reducing a price that was erroneous. However, it adds that the IGSC's decision not to allow the correction of the valuation report in its case was much worse;
That, due to the foregoing, Nexa adds that the SMV uses the existence of the Macroinvest report as an excuse to point out that the reason Nexa withdrew from carrying out the OPC was that it did not agree with the price determined by Summa in its valuation report (which, even if true, would not be questionable), when the true reason is, as stated, the IGSC's refusal to correct the valuation report;
That, Nexa points out that if its intention had been to withdraw from the OPC because Summa's valuation report determined a higher price than that indicated by Macroinvest, why would it have made various requests and petitions to the IGSC, which are in the record of this administrative sanctioning proceeding, for it to correct and accept the second valuation report. This clearly demonstrates that Nexa's intention was always to carry out the OPC, but that it could not carry out said offer at a price that was clearly erroneous, and that had been acknowledged by the valuer itself, since doing so would have meant its Board of Directors breached its fiduciary duties;
That, likewise, Nexa states that it is a fallacy for the SASCM to state that the non-completion of the OPC is not subject to sanction in this proceeding, since it imposes a corrective measure aimed at indemnifying the investors who accepted the Purchase Offer, precisely for not carrying out the OPC, and furthermore, it calculates the compensation precisely on the difference between the price paid in the Purchase Offer and the corrected price of the second valuation report issued by Summa, when Nexa was never allowed to carry out the OPC at said price;
That, Nexa mentions that this behavior demonstrates that the SASCM acts in a "covering" manner in favor of the supposed "harmed" investors and in order to shift the responsibility of its subordinate body - for not allowing the correction of the erroneous valuation report - to Nexa;
That, in its supplementary briefs, Nexa states that the SMV itself recognizes in the sanction it imposes on Summa, as a consequence of the erroneous valuation report it issued, that the true reason Nexa withdrew from the OPC was due to said error committed by Summa. In that sense, the sanction resolution against Summa states:
"The significance and repercussion of Summa's errors in its valuation report of May 19, 2017, are expressed in the events that triggered the non-completion of the public purchase offer process by exclusion in which Summa participated as valuer and the consequent withdrawal of Milpo, the intervention of the Lima Stock Exchange to suspend trading of the securities, and the reasonable expectation of Milpo's shareholders to accept the OPCs in process.
The impact and repercussion even reaches Milpo's shareholders who sold their shares in the "Purchase Offer with Prior Dissemination" that was the antecedent to the OPCs, and who had a reasonable expectation of benefiting from the compensation mechanism provided in case a subsequent offer at higher prices occurred." (Highlighted by Nexa).
That, in that sense, Nexa points out that it is questionable that, recognizing the SMV that the non-completion of the OPC was not due to its fault, but to Summa's, the SASCM imposes a fine vastly higher than the twenty (20) UIT imposed as a sanction on Summa;
That, on the other hand, in the report by attorney José Antonio Payet, it is concluded that the non-completion of the OPC did not generate damages to the investors who accepted the Purchase Offer, since they assumed said risk, as there was no obligation on Nexa's part to carry out an OPC, but only a possibility that said offer would be made. Likewise, it is indicated that if it is considered that there was damage to said investors, it was not a consequence of Nexa's behavior, but of third parties, such as the error committed by Summa in its first valuation report or the IGSC's refusal to correct said erroneous valuation report;
That, finally, Nexa argues that the correction of Summa's first erroneous valuation report was possible in accordance with the provisions of article 204 of the Civil Code, which states that, upon the commission of a calculation error, the correction of said error is appropriate. Nexa indicates that the Civil Code applies supplementarily to the LMV, in accordance with the provisions of article 9 of the latter norm;
That, Nexa adds that carrying out the OPC at the erroneous price - S/ 4.16 (Four and 16/100 Soles) per common share - instead of the corrected price - S/ 4.02 (Four and 02/100 Soles) - would have meant a minimum loss for Nexa of S/ 5 million (Five million and 00/100 Soles), for the amount payable as a consequence of the Compensation System to those who accepted the Purchase Offer, and up to approximately S/ 42.9 million (Forty-two million nine hundred thousand and 00/100 Soles), if all recipients of the OPC accepted it, which represented an unfair payment, considering that the valuer itself had acknowledged its error;
Argument: The imputed type, in any case, should not have been "inaccuracy" in the dissemination of information, but "omission" of information
That, without prejudice to the fact that Nexa denies having disseminated inaccurate information in the material fact of October 27, 2016 or in the Offer Notice, it points out that the type imputed by the SMV, referring to disseminating "inaccurate" information to the market, is incorrect, since the SMV alleges that Nexa would not have informed the market of the possibility that it could withdraw from carrying out the OPC, as well as that it would have the Macroinvest report, which clearly would constitute, in any case, an omission of information and not an inaccuracy. Due to this, the type imputed by the SMV infringes the principle of typicity in sanctioning matters;
That, Nexa indicates that the securities market regulations clearly distinguish between the action of incurring an inaccuracy in the preparation or presentation of information, and incurring the omission of the same. In that sense, Nexa cites, among others, article 60 of the LMV, which textually states:
"Article 60.- Responsibility for the Content of the Prospectus
They are jointly and severally liable with the issuer or offeror, before the investors, the persons referred to in subsection d) of Article 56 for the inaccuracies or omissions of the prospectus regarding the scope of their professional and/or functional competence." (Bold and underline by Nexa).
That, Nexa adds that such distinction fully corresponds to the qualities of truthfulness, sufficiency and timeliness, which, in accordance with the provisions of article 10 of the LMV, the information disseminated to investors must have:
"Article 10.- Quality of Information
All information that by provision of this law must be presented to CONASEV, to the stock exchange, to the entities responsible for centralized mechanisms or to investors, must be truthful, sufficient and timely. Once the information is received by said institutions, it must be immediately made available to the public." (Bold and underline by Nexa).
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa alleges that a systematic interpretation of the term "inaccuracy" or the sense of "the inaccurate", in securities market regulations, inevitably leads to the conclusion that it refers to that which lacks the quality of being truthful (lack of truthfulness). Likewise, it points out that a systematic interpretation of what it means to incur an omission in the disclosure of information leads to the conclusion that said action occurs when the information suffers from insufficiency, since relevant information is omitted;
That, in that sense, Nexa points out that the typification contained in numeral 1.4 of Annex 1 of the former Sanctions Regulation intends to sanction anyone who reveals information that does not have the quality of truthfulness, while for the case of omission of disclosure of relevant information, that is, failing to disclose complete and sufficient information to investors, the corresponding typification is that contained in numeral 1.5 of Annex 1 of the former Sanctions Regulation, consisting of: "1.5 Perform any act, omission, practice or conduct that undermines the integrity or transparency of the market." (Underline by Nexa). Therefore, Nexa indicates that one who omits to disclose relevant information does not incur an inaccuracy in the disclosure of information, but an omission of transparency;
That, Nexa maintains that said conclusion is in accordance with a literal interpretation of the term inaccurate. Thus, the Dictionary of the Spanish Language of the Royal Spanish Academy ("RAE Dictionary") defines the inaccurate as that which lacks exactness, in turn the RAE Dictionary describes exactness as "the quality of being exact", while "exact" for the RAE Dictionary has various meanings, depending on the context in which the term is used, of which, according to Nexa, for the present case, the appropriate meaning is that of "Rigorously true or correct";
That, Nexa alleges that said meaning is also used in the Sanction Resolution, so it concludes that there is acceptance regarding it. In that sense, Nexa adds that, the rigorously true or correct, according to the RAE Dictionary, can be understood as that which refers "with propriety and precision" to that which is "known as true, certain or indubitable". Therefore, Nexa concludes that, in the literal sense of the term, the inaccurate is that which does not refer with propriety and precision to what is known as true;
That, likewise, Nexa indicates that the foregoing on the systematic and literal interpretation of what constitutes the action of revealing inaccurate information is absolutely consistent with the interpretation and application that the SMV has been developing for some time regarding those it has imputed with incurring said infraction. In that sense, among others, Nexa cites Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 011-2012-SMV/10, in which it states that the Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision determined that a brokerage firm had incurred the infraction of revealing inaccurate information, by having revealed to the SMV and its clients that certain acquisitions of securities had been made with funds from "stock loans"; when in reality it had been made with another source;
That, Nexa also cites resolutions of the State Contracting Supervision Agency – OSCE, the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property – INDECOPI and the Supervisory Agency for Private Investment in Telecommunications – OSIPTEL, to conclude that not only the SMV, but in general, in public law, information is understood to be inaccurate when it does not correspond to the material reality existing at the time of its formulation or declaration;
That, regarding this point, it should be noted that the reports of attorneys José Antonio Payet and Juan Carlos Morón conclude, like Nexa, that the imputation made by the SMV does not consist of the disclosure of inaccurate information, but of the omission of information, which, according to the SMV, would consist of not revealing, supposedly, that Nexa could withdraw from carrying out the OPC and that it would have the Macroinvest report. In that sense, Juan Carlos Morón indicates in his report that, in any case, the SMV should have imputed the infraction typified in numeral 1.5 of Annex 1 of the former Sanctions Regulation, and not that indicated in numeral 1.4 of the same annex, since the principle of typicity prevents the SMV from making an analogical interpretation of the type referring to "inaccuracy" in the disclosure of information and including in the latter the "omission of information";
Argument: The Macroinvest report does not qualify as a material fact
That, regarding this point, Nexa states that it reiterates the arguments presented before the instructing body and the SASCM, in the sense that it has not breached its duty to report its material facts, since the analysis of the report presented by Macroinvest on May 25, 2017 did not contain information that had the capacity to significantly influence the price, quotation or liquidity of the securities or the investment decision of a sensible investor, so it does not qualify as a material fact;
That, Nexa indicates, in relation to the Legal Report, that it is not relevant whether Macroinvest's opinion was or was not a valuation, but its referential nature, which it considers undoubtable;
That, likewise, Nexa adds that the list of assumptions included in Annex I of the Regulation of Material Facts and Reserved Information, approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2014-SMV/01 (hereinafter, the "Regulation of Material Facts"), is merely referential;
That, in that sense, Nexa states that the SASCM and its dependent bodies insist on pointing out that Nexa itself would have qualified the analysis of the report issued by Macroinvest as a material fact, merely because it mentioned the existence of said report in the material fact of May 25, 2017. Nexa adds that it has already clarified that this is not the case, so for the sanction to be valid, the SMV must demonstrate:
That, Nexa indicates that neither of these two requirements was proven by the administration in the Sanction Resolution. Nexa adds that, although the SASCM pretends to ignore it, Macroinvest's opinion was referential and not binding for the company;
That, without prejudice to the foregoing, Nexa specifies that it did timely inform about the issuance of the Macroinvest Report and disclosed its conclusions, which is the most important part of said document;
B. REGARDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE SANCTION
That, in relation to the evaluation of the sanction criteria developed in the Sanction Resolution, Nexa points out that there is no harm to the public interest and/or protected legal right, because, as Nexa has demonstrated, it has not breached any norm;
That, regarding the harm caused, Nexa points out that it is measured by the SASCM on the basis of the price offered in the Purchase Offer and the minimum price determined by Summa, since, according to the SASCM, Nexa would have "promised" to pay the differential in favor of the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, which would amount to S/ 38.6 million (Thirty-eight million six hundred thousand and 00/100 Soles) in favor of the 385 (three hundred eighty-five) sellers, giving as valid, for this point, the valuation price of the corrected Summa report;
That, Nexa points out that it must be taken into account that it has not generated any harm to any investor, since it has not breached any norm. It also indicates that, if certain investors may consider that they suffered harm, it is a consequence of their own decisions, lacking sufficient analysis of the scope of the Purchase Offer or the risks associated with it. In that sense, Nexa points out that the investors decided to sell their shares at market price in the Purchase Offer, and wait for the possibility of receiving a bonus if the conditions of the "Compensation System" provided in the Offer Notice are met, which by definition are uncertain, and which were not met due to a cause attributable to third parties;
That, therefore, Nexa states that if it were possible to establish harm for such investors, it is not attributable to Nexa, but to the error committed by Summa in its valuation report and the SMV's refusal to allow said error to be corrected;
That, regarding the illegally obtained benefit, Nexa points out that the SASCM ignores that it has not benefited in any way from the occurrence of the facts mentioned in this proceeding; on the contrary, Nexa indicates that it would have suffered serious damages as a result of the arbitrariness in the SMV's actions. Likewise, regarding the probability of detection of the infraction, Nexa reaffirms that it has not committed any infraction, since there was no commitment to make a new offer or the OPC, because the only thing it committed to was to compensate the sellers, in case such offer was made;
That, on the other hand, Nexa points out that, in any case, the conduct questioned by the authority is a consequence of the SMV's own actions. In that sense, it points out that the supposed omission of not including an obvious fact, in the material fact and the Offer Notice of October 27, 2016, consisting of the fact that the OPC might not be carried out, was in any case caused by the IGSC, by not requesting that said information, which it now considers essential, be included;
That, Nexa adds furthermore that, for any reasonable investor, said information, whose absence the SMV questions, is found in the "Compensation System" section, which describes the carrying out of an OPC or another acquisition as a mere possibility. The foregoing, according to Nexa, would configure, in any case, the exemption from responsibility referred to in subsection e) of article 236-A of the General Administrative Procedure Law – LPAG;
That, likewise, Nexa indicates that in yet another example of the arbitrariness contained in the Sanction Resolution, the SASCM fails to state why, despite all the very special circumstances latent in this case, which would have caused it serious harm, it decides not only to increase seven (7) times the fine proposed by the instructing body, but also to apply the maximum fine permitted by the Securities Market legislation. This entails, according to Nexa, the nullity of what was decided, in accordance with the provisions of article 10 of the LPAG. Regarding this point, the report of attorney Juan Carlos Morón states, similarly to what was alleged by Nexa, that for the sanctioning authority to depart from the sanction recommendation of the instructing body and impose a higher fine, it must adequately justify the reasons and motives that lead it to make such a decision;
That, finally, Nexa maintains, in its supplementary brief of July 1, 2019, that the Sanction Resolution affects the principle of uniformity and predictability when evaluating the sanction criteria to determine the fine finally imposed on it, since in the sanction resolution for the Summa case, it is stated that it is not possible to calculate the existence of harm to investors, nor market repercussion, which, however, was determined for Nexa, even though the facts that led to the non-completion of the OPC are the same in both cases;
C REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF CORRECTIVE MEASURES
That, in relation to the application of corrective measures, Nexa points out that, as a general rule, the administrative sanctioning power requires the administration to determine the consequences of an alleged infraction by applying the rules in force at the time the administered party engages in the conduct typified as an infraction;
That, in that sense, Nexa mentions that the rules in force at the time it allegedly incurred the infractions imputed by the SMV were: i) Law No. 27444, General Administrative Procedure Law – LPAG, before the modifications set forth by Legislative Decree No. 1272 and, ii) the former SMV Sanctions Regulation, approved by Conasev Resolution No. 055-2011-EF/94.10;
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, Nexa points out that the Sanction Resolution invokes as normative support for the decision adopted: i) the definition of corrective measure in article 19 of the new Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01 (hereinafter, the “new Sanctions Regulation”) and, ii) article 251 of the TUO of the LPAG, approved by Supreme Decree No. 004-2019-JUS (hereinafter, the “TUO LPAG”), which includes the modifications set forth by Legislative Decree No. 1272, and subsequent modifications;
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa points out that the Sanction Resolution incurs defective reasoning, since it does not base its conclusions on the legal system, by applying rules that are impertinent, issued after the commission of the alleged infractions;
That, Nexa indicates that articles 31 and 32 of the former SMV Sanctions Regulation, in force at the time the alleged infractions were committed, only allowed the General Supervisory Intendancies to impose corrective measures, up until before the start of a sanctioning procedure, and for the occurrence of acts or omissions that qualify as minor offenses. In that sense, the regulations in force at the time of the events in no way recognized the SACM the power to impose corrective measures in cases of serious or very serious infractions. Nexa adds that, in accordance with the aforementioned articles 31 and 32, no body of the SMV had competence to impose corrective measures with respect to procedures already initiated for serious or very serious offenses;
That, therefore, Nexa concludes that by having invoked regulations issued after the commission of the alleged infractions to support the imposition of corrective measures, the Sanction Resolution incurs an insurmountable nullity defect;
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, Nexa points out that, even in the denied assumption that the erroneous criterion of the SASCM is accepted and the new Sanctions Regulation and article 251 of the TUO LPAG are applied, the corrective measures questioned would still not be applicable. Nexa indicates that regarding corrective measures, article 251 of the TUO LPAG states textually the following:
“Article 251. -Determination of responsibility
251.1 The administrative sanctions imposed on the administered party are compatible with the issuance of corrective measures conducive to ordering the restoration or reparation of the situation altered by the infraction to its previous state, including that of the affected goods, as well as with compensation for damages and losses caused, which are determined in the corresponding judicial process. Corrective measures must be previously typified, be reasonable and adjust to the intensity, proportionality and needs of the protected legal goods that are intended to be guaranteed in each specific case. (…).”. (Highlighted by Nexa).
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa states that it is evident that corrective measures must comply with the principles of typicity, proportionality and reasonableness, without prejudice to complying with the other principles of administrative law;
That, in relation to the principle of typicity, Nexa cites numeral 4 of article 248 of the LPAG, which enshrines the principle of typicity for the exercise of sanctioning power, stating that only conducts administratively sanctionable are infractions expressly provided for in norms with the rank of law through their typification as such. Nexa also cites various jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, indicating that, in accordance with it, prohibited conducts must be clearly delimited by law, prohibiting both analogical application and the use of general and indeterminate clauses in the typification of prohibitions;
That, due to this, Nexa points out that the imposition of a corrective measure that is not previously typified is illegal, since this is a requirement and expression of the fundamental right to punitive legality in administrative matters, provided for in literal d) of numeral 24 of article 2 of the Constitution;
That, likewise, Nexa refers that to impose the corrective measures in this procedure, the SASCM has invoked numeral 27 of Annex XX (Of Corrective Measures) of the new SMV Sanctions Regulation, which textually states:
“(…)
27) Other measures directly related to compliance with the infringed norms.”
That, Nexa indicates that the aforementioned norm constitutes a typical open and indeterminate reference that is far from complying with the requirements of the principle of typicity, regarding which there is no possibility of predictability or certainty on the part of the administered party. Nexa adds that even the corrective measure imposed on it does not relate to the vague statement indicated in the aforementioned numeral, since it refers to measures directly related to compliance with the infringed norms, and the corrective measure imposed against it seeks compensation for an alleged contractual breach;
That, therefore, Nexa concludes that, even if the erroneous criterion of applying the norms invoked by the SASCM were assumed, the SMV must reject the application of the challenged corrective measures, since they were not previously typified, through a detailed and certain description of their content in the new Sanctions Regulation, as required by article 251 of the TUO LPAG. In relation to this point, the report of attorney Juan Carlos Morón states, in line with what Nexa maintains, that numeral 27 of Annex XX of the new SMV Sanctions Regulation does not comply with the mandate of typification of corrective measures contained in article 251 of the TUO LPAG, as it is a clear case of empty or blank typification;
That, regarding the first corrective measure, Nexa adds that it would have an indemnity nature, which is prohibited by the regulations on the matter. In that sense, Nexa cites part of numeral 232.1 of article 232 of the LPAG, to conclude that from said norm it follows, with utmost clarity, the following: i) the purpose of corrective measures is to restore things to the state prior to the commission of the infraction and, ii) any compensatory claim must be channeled through the corresponding jurisdictional venue;
That, Nexa cites various doctrine and jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, to conclude, in accordance with the foregoing, that the object of corrective measures is to return to the status quo existing at the time of the commission of the administrative infraction, but not to compensate the alleged damages generated by the conduct attributed as an infraction, a matter over which the administrative authority is incompetent and, in any case, the affected party must resort to the Judicial Power;
That, regarding this last point, Nexa points out, in its brief of October 15, 2019, that it has maintained various conciliations with investors who have claimed the existence of alleged damages due to the non-completion of the OPC, which demonstrates that the investors themselves recognize that any alleged indemnity claim must be ventilated in judicial and not administrative venue;
That, therefore, Nexa concludes that the SASCM has improperly arrogated to itself the power to impute and calculate an alleged economic “harm” caused to the 385 (three hundred eighty-five) sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, ordering that Nexa assume compensation for said harm under the modality of a corrective measure, which as indicated by Nexa, becomes illegal and must be declared null for having been issued by an incompetent body and, in turn, its object does not conform to the current legal system;
That, in relation to the application of corrective measures, both in the report of attorney José Antonio Payet and in that of Juan Carlos Morón, it is questioned that the SMV has imposed corrective measures without having previously granted Nexa the right of defense. In that sense, they point out that the letter of charges at no time indicated the possibility that corrective measures could be applied, so this is only determined in the Sanction Resolution itself, without having previously allowed the possibility for Nexa to present defenses against the imposition of said measure, which infringes the right to due procedure;
That, on the other hand, in both reports it is mentioned that the former Sanctions Regulation only contemplated the possibility of imposing corrective measures for acts or omissions that qualify as minor offenses and before the start of the administrative sanctioning procedure. As stated in said reports, it is only with the entry into force of the new Sanctions Regulation that articles 19 and 21 allow the possibility of imposing corrective measures for serious or very serious infractions and at the time of determining administrative responsibility. However, it is indicated that the new Sanctions Regulation is not applicable to Nexa's case, but only insofar as it is more favorable to it (benign retroactivity);
That, regarding the first corrective measure, in both reports it is concluded that it has an indemnity nature, which does not correspond to be determined in administrative venue but, in any case, in judicial venue, as indicated by article 251 of the LPAG;
That, on this last point, in the report of attorney José Antonio Payet it is stated that the Sanction Resolution is clear in indicating that the infraction for which Nexa is sanctioned does not consist of having launched or not the OPC, but in allegedly having disseminated inaccurate information. Therefore, a corrective measure in accordance with said infraction would have been to require Nexa to publish a material fact with the information omitted according to the SMV's criteria;
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, it is added in the referred report that the first corrective measure consisting of Nexa delivering to the 385 (three hundred eighty-five) sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, the difference between the price determined in the second valuation report delivered by Summa, amounting to S/ 4.02 (Four and 02/100 Soles), minus the price paid in the Purchase Offer, amounting to S/ 2.95 (Two and 95/100 Soles), multiplied by the number of Nexa shares that each investor sold in said Purchase Offer, is imposed as if the infraction for which Nexa had been sanctioned had consisted of not launching the OPC;
That, likewise, it is argued that since said corrective measure seeks to compensate the damages that the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer allegedly suffered, it would have a compensatory or indemnity nature, for which it has been issued in violation of the provisions of article 251 of the LMV, which establishes that damages and losses derived from an administrative infraction can only be ordered by the Judicial Power;
That, finally, it should be noted that Nexa indicated in its appeal brief that the corrective measures imposed in the Sanction Resolution cannot be executed, in any extreme, before its appeal is resolved in administrative venue, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 2 of article 258 of the TUO LPAG;
That, in its arguments brief, Nexa has stated regarding the second corrective measure, referring to disclosing the valuation report issued by Macroinvest, that its issuance is also not appropriate, due to the scarce relevance of the information contained in said document, compared to its conclusions that were revealed in the material fact of May 25, 2017. Without prejudice to the foregoing, Nexa states that it has no objections to disseminating said report;
That, from the evaluation carried out, it is appreciated that the appeal filed by Nexa complies with the requirements established in articles 124, 218, 220 and 221 of the TUO LPAG[5], given that it was filed within the term of fifteen (15) days of notification of the administrative act, indicates the act it challenges and is founded;
EVALUATION OF NEXA'S ARGUMENTS
That, first, it should be noted that the Sanction Resolution has determined that Nexa incurred the commission of two infractions: i) Disseminating inaccurate information to the market in the material fact of October 27, 2016, referring to the Purchase Offer, and ii) Not communicating as a material fact the content of the Macroinvest valuation report. In this sense, in this Resolution the legality of the factual and legal grounds indicated in the Sanction Resolution regarding the commission of both aforementioned infractions will be evaluated, taking into account the defense arguments indicated by Nexa in its appeal and in its other supplementary briefs;
That, therefore, Nexa's decision to have withdrawn or refused to carry out an OPC will not be evaluated, since no charges have been imputed to Nexa for said decision, in accordance with the provisions of page 14 of the Sanction Resolution:
“Likewise, it should be noted that in this PAS, the procedure followed by NEXA for the realization of the OPC on its common and investment shares NEXA has not been the subject of charges, nor is NEXA's decision to have withdrawn or refused to formulate the OPC after having carried out various acts related to the launch of the OPC under observation. (…).” . (Our underline);
That in that sense, this recursive stage is framed, solely, within the analysis of the infractions that were imputed and evaluated in the first administrative instance. This does not mean that Nexa's arguments regarding that in the Sanction Resolution its decision to withdraw from carrying out the OPC would have been taken into account and evaluated, for the imposition of the sanctions and corrective measures issued against it, will not be evaluated;
A. Regarding the infraction of disseminating inaccurate information to the market
That, the Sanction Resolution determines that Nexa disseminated inaccurate information to the market by not having indicated in the Offer Notice that: i) the OPC could or could not be carried out and, ii) it would have the Macroinvest valuation report;
That, for its part, Nexa states that it did not disseminate inaccurate information to the market in its Offer Notice, since a sensible investor was able to realize that the realization of a future offer on its shares, at a price higher than that offered in the Purchase Offer, was only a possibility and in no way a commitment assumed by Nexa;
That, in relation to this point, from a reading of the Offer Notice, regarding the section referred to the Context of the Offer, it is appreciated that it indicates that the Board of Directors of Nexa had convened its General Shareholders' Meeting – JGA, to submit to its consideration the delegation to the Board of Directors of the evaluation, approval and implementation of the exclusion of Nexa's common and investment shares from the RPMV and the Lima Stock Exchange Securities Registry (hereinafter, “RBVL”). As can be appreciated, in said section it is not stated that the delegation to the Board of Directors for the exclusion of Nexa's shares had already been made, and even less, that the Board of Directors had decided, in use of said faculties, to agree to the aforementioned exclusion;
That, likewise, regarding the “Compensation System” section, it is appreciated that Nexa commits that, i) in case it formulates an offer under any modality, which has as its purpose to acquire, directly or indirectly, the shares object of the Purchase Offer, including the realization of an OPC, ii) provided that said acquisition is made within the period of one year computed from the start of the validity term of the Purchase Offer and, iii) it is offered to pay a price higher than in said offer; to compensate those who have accepted the Purchase Offer, delivering to them the differential between the sum paid in said new offer and that offered in the Purchase Offer;
That, in that sense, as can be appreciated from the reading of the aforementioned information in the Offer Notice, Nexa did not commit to carry out an OPC or another future offer on its securities, but that this was a possibility. Likewise, information was provided on the convening of the JGA to decide on the delegation of faculties to the Board of Directors for the evaluation, approval and implementation of the exclusion of Nexa's shares from the RPMV and the RBVL, but not that said decision had already been made or that the Board of Directors had agreed to said exclusion;
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that after the dissemination of the Offer Notice, and within the validity term of the Purchase Offer that had been extended by Nexa until December 7, 2016, Nexa disseminates two additional material facts: i) the first on November 30, 2016, in which it informs that its JGA agreed to delegate to its Board of Directors the evaluation, approval and implementation of the exclusion of Nexa's shares from the RPMV and the RBVL, and ii) the second on December 1, 2016, in which it informs that its Board of Directors has agreed to the exclusion of its shares from the RPMV and the RBVL. Therefore, it can be appreciated that with these last two (2) material facts, Nexa revealed to the market, while the acceptance term of the Purchase Offer was still in force, that it would exclude its shares from the RPMV, and that therefore, an OPC would have to be carried out for these purposes;
That, in accordance with the foregoing, Nexa cannot ignore the relevance that these last two material facts have in relation to its Purchase Offer, since they generate valid and legitimate expectations in the investors who accept said Purchase Offer, that in the future they may receive compensation for the sale of their securities, in accordance with the provisions of the “Compensation System” section of the Offer Notice. In this regard, it is important to take into account that a total of 385 (three hundred eighty-five) sellers accepted the Purchase Offer. Of this total, a group of 168 (one hundred sixty-eight) sellers accepted the Purchase Offer between October 28 and November 29, 2016, while, after the dissemination of the two aforementioned material facts, between November 30 and December 7, a validity term of the offer significantly shorter than the aforementioned, a total of 217 (two hundred seventeen) sellers accepted;
That, for a better understanding of the relevant facts that occurred between the dissemination of the Offer Notice and the culmination of the term of the Purchase Offer, the following timeline is presented:
TIMELINE 1
11/29/16 12/07/16
Expiration of original term Expiration of extended term
of Offer of Offer
10/27/16 11/28/16 11/30/16 12/01/16
Offer Notice Extension of term of Delegation of Board approves
Offer faculties to exclusion of
Board shares
That, as can be appreciated from Timeline 1, the material facts of November 30 and December 1, 2016, were informed after the expiration of the original term and within the validity of the extended term of the Purchase Offer, and are closely related to it, since they are related to the “Compensation System” indicated in the Offer Notice, by involving a future delisting of Nexa's shares and the realization of an OPC. This evidences Nexa's intention that the Purchase Offer be in force at the time of informing the market of the aforementioned agreements, through material facts of the aforementioned dates;
That, therefore, regarding what Nexa states, that the analysis of the first infraction should only be limited to the information disseminated in the material fact of October 27, 2016, and not to the material facts of November 30 and December 1, 2016, it should be indicated that this argument is not shared, since the material facts of November 30 and December 1, 2016, are closely linked to the Offer Notice disseminated on October 27, 2016, since in them, information was provided on the delisting agreement of Nexa's common and investment shares by its Board of Directors and the consequent realization of the OPCs to proceed with said exclusion, which, in the case of common shares, would activate the “Compensation System” indicated in the Offer Notice;
Que, in relation to Nexa's arguments stating that even in the denied case that it had committed to carrying out an OPC, it could not be concluded that said offer would necessarily be at a price higher than the one offered in the Purchase Offer, it must be pointed out that both the first and second valuation reports from Summa, as well as the report requested by Nexa from Macroinvest, showed in all cases a price higher than the S/ 2.95 (Two and 95/100 Soles) offered in the Purchase Offer;
That, due to the foregoing, it agrees with what is stated in the Sanction Resolution regarding the fact that the Offer Notice must be read jointly with the material facts of November 30 and December 1, 2016, since both are related to Nexa's commitments stated in the "Compensation System" section of the Offer Notice. However, we disagree regarding whether Nexa should have indicated in the Offer Notice that the OPC could or could not take place, due to the following reasons:
*“(…) It should be noted that these exclusion processes will include the realization of Public Purchase Offers of Securities by Exclusion ("OPC"), according to applicable regulations[6]; *"
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be considered that although, after the publication of these last two material facts, there was a valid agreement from the competent body of Nexa to initiate the process of exclusion of its shares and the consequent realization of the OPC, it was not necessary for Nexa to report in this regard whether the OPC could or could not take place, due to the following considerations:
Regarding this, as has been stated, the reasons that can lead to the withdrawal of a delisting agreement and the corresponding realization of the OPC must be exceptional, taking into account the seriousness and diligence that any issuer must have to make an agreement of this type, which must be duly disseminated to the market, and which, therefore, may influence the negotiation of the securities to be excluded;
That, in this regard, regarding what Nexa indicated that the Legal Report would state that it was never obligated to make future purchase offers on its shares and that the realization of the OPC was only a possibility, it must be pointed out that said assertion is not accurate, because said Legal Report states that, with the material facts of November 30 and December 1, 2016, Nexa informed the market, among other things, the agreement of its Board of Directors to delist its shares, and the consequent realization of the OPC to proceed with said exclusion, which, in the case of common shares, would activate the "Compensation System" indicated in the Offer Notice;
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, although it has been stated that it was not necessary for Nexa to inform the market that the OPC could not take place, it must be taken into account that if said withdrawal ended up causing damages to the sellers who participated in the Purchase Offer, they have the right to request civil reparation for the damages they consider they suffered, in the corresponding judicial instances. Regarding this, as has been stated, in this appeal stage, Nexa's decision to desist from realizing the OPC will not be analyzed, since no charges have been imputed to Nexa in the present sanctioning procedure related to said event, as expressly indicated in the Sanction Resolution;
That, on the other hand, the Sanction Resolution also concludes that Nexa disseminated inaccurate information to the market by not having informed that it would have the Macroinvest valuation report, so it is appropriate to evaluate Nexa's arguments regarding this aspect of the sanction;
That, on this particular matter, Nexa states that the hiring of Macroinvest implied only that this company would provide it with a reference financial advisory service, which was not binding on its decision to carry out or not the OPC. Likewise, it states that the hiring of Macroinvest was done more than two (2) months after the dissemination of the Offer Notice, so that the SMV cannot use a subsequent fact (January 16, 2017) to conclude that Nexa disseminated inaccurate information in the Offer Notice (October 27, 2016);
That, first of all, it must be indicated that we do not agree with what the appellant stated regarding the hiring of Macroinvest being done solely for this company to provide Nexa with a general "financial advisory" service; on the contrary, Nexa's material fact of May 25, 2017, does not evidence such assertion. In it, Nexa refers to its Board of Directors having reviewed a valuation report delivered by Macroinvest that determines a lower price for its shares than that indicated by Summa. In this sense, the work provided by Macroinvest to Nexa was, as appreciated and verified from the received information, to value the price of Nexa's shares, a service that in that regard was similar to that provided by Summa, so we disagree with the appeal's argument that qualifies it as a simple "financial advisory" service, in order to differentiate it from the service provided by Summa, and thus reduce its relevance;
That, furthermore, to evaluate Nexa's argument that the Sanction Resolution uses events subsequent to the date the Offer Notice was disseminated to conclude that it revealed inaccurate information to the market in said notice, it is important to determine, first of all, up to what date Nexa disseminated notices related to the Purchase Offer and which were of interest to the sellers or potential investors of said offer;
That, in this regard, as has been stated, the Offer Notice cannot be read in isolation from the material facts of November 28, 2016, by which the validity of the Purchase Offer is extended until December 7, 2016[8], and the material facts of November 30 and December 1, 2016, which are closely linked to the commitments assumed by Nexa in the section referred to as the "Compensation System" in the Offer Notice, since in said material facts it is reported: The delegation of powers and the use thereof by the Board of Directors of Nexa to initiate the procedure for the exclusion of its shares from the RPMV and the corresponding realization of the OPC;
That, furthermore, from the evidence in the file regarding Nexa's hiring of Macroinvest, the following is known: i) Nexa states in its various defense writings that the hiring of Macroinvest was done on January 16, 2017, and ii) Macroinvest in its writing of April 5, 2018, as a response to a questionnaire sent by the IGCC, indicated that the negotiations for the subscription of the contract with Nexa began on January 5, 2017, as a result of a telephone call made by Nexa. It also confirms that the contract was finally signed on January 16, 2017[9];
That, to have a better understanding of the relevant facts that occurred between the dissemination of the Offer Notice and the hiring of Macroinvest, the following timeline is presented:
TIMELINE 2
29/11/16 07/12/16
Original Offer Expiration Extended Offer Expiration
27/10/16 28/11/16 30/11/16 01/12/16 05/01/17 16/01/17 Offer Notice Delegation of Approval Start of Subscription of Exclusion of Shares Negotiation Contract Directors Macroinvest Macroinvest
That, as can be seen from Timeline 2, the start of negotiations for the hiring of Macroinvest would have begun on January 5, 2017, which is more than a month after the last material fact of December 1, 2016, related to the Purchase Offer. In this sense, from the documents and statements in the file, no material evidence is appreciated that could lead to the conclusion that Nexa had decided or intended to hire Macroinvest to provide it with the valuation service during the period between the dissemination of the Offer Notice and the end of the deadline to subscribe to the Purchase Offer. Therefore, Nexa's defense argument that the Sanction Resolution is retroactively applying a future fact to conclude that Nexa disseminated inaccurate information in the Offer Notice, or in the other material facts linked to the Purchase Offer, is founded;
That, it is important to note that, for the purpose of determining the occurrence of an infringement, it is up to the administrative authority to prove, based on material evidence, the statements or premises on which its conclusions are based. In the present case, as has been stated, only material evidence exists to conclude that the start of negotiations for the hiring of Macroinvest began on January 5, 2017, which is twenty-nine (29) days after the expiration of the deadline to subscribe to the Purchase Offer. Therefore, we consider that the administration cannot infer that Nexa had decided, prior to January 5, 2017, to hire Macroinvest and that, therefore, it would not have informed the market of this fact during the validity of the Purchase Offer, without evidence to support such an inference;
That, without prejudice to the foregoing, it must be indicated that we do consider that Nexa did not act with due transparency regarding the hiring of Macroinvest, due to the following reasons:
That, Nexa has stated in its allegations that it was not imputed as an infringement for not informing about the hiring of Macroinvest, so it considers it not appropriate to elaborate on this point;
That, without prejudice to the foregoing, Nexa mentions that the hiring of Macroinvest could not have generated an expectation that would guide the decision of the subscribers of the Purchase Offer, since said hiring was done after the validity period of the Purchase Offer;
That, although it is true that Nexa has not been imputed with the decision not to inform about the hiring of Macroinvest, it is necessary to develop an analysis on said point, since it is related to the context of the second infringement imputed to Nexa, which refers precisely to not informing the content of the valuation report issued by Macroinvest, which will be evaluated later in the present resolution;
That, finally, in relation to the hiring of Macroinvest by Nexa, it must be indicated that in the present resolution, this matter has only been analyzed regarding the transparency duties incumbent upon Nexa as a result of said hiring, as well as the disclosure of the final report issued by said company;
That, additionally, it is relevant to keep in mind that in relation to these types of operations carried out by issuers on the stock exchange (regarding the repurchase of their shares and others), Superintendency Resolution No. 007-2021-SMV/02, effective since January 27, 2021, modified subsection b) of article 16 of the Regulations for Stock Exchange Operations of the Lima Stock Exchange, approved by Conasev Resolution No. 021-99-EF/94.10, prohibiting "the dissemination of any type of information or notice about the proposals, the clients or the Companies, even when said proposals derive from or are a consequence of corporate agreements or others." In this sense, except for some exceptions, the dissemination of information about purchase proposals such as that contained in the Offer Notice is currently prohibited;
B. Regarding Nexa's statements about responsibility for the non-realization of the OPC
That, taking into account what has been developed in the previous considerations, it would be unnecessary to analyze the other arguments of Nexa regarding the alleged infringement for inaccurate information; however, it is considered important and necessary to make some remarks regarding what Nexa alleged regarding the responsibility for the non-realization of the OPC resting with the SMV and that this entity would be trying to shift its responsibility onto Nexa; this is because the impartiality and objectivity with which some bodies of the SMV would have acted is questioned;
That, in relation to this point, it must be pointed out that although Nexa has the right to question the decisions issued by the bodies of the SMV, such questions must be made respecting, among others, the principle of procedural good faith[10], in order to guarantee the proper mutual respect between the public administration and the administered;
That, in this sense, in Nexa's appeal, as well as in its complementary writings to it, statements such as are apparent:
"This statement does not withstand the slightest analysis and surprises us that it is formulated by an entity that supposedly acts or should act reasonably or professionally." (Page 50 appeal writing).
"(…) We do not understand why the Adjunct Superintendency – which is in such an unusual situation of conflict of interest – insists on maintaining something so devoid of sense." (Page 52 appeal writing).
"As we stated, the Adjunct Superintendency has been adopting unusual positions lacking legal basis or contrary to the very legal order. We want to believe that it does so by mistakenly believing that it must assume a caretaker role in front of all the investors who come to it with complaints (…)" (Page 62 appeal writing).
"There is no doubt, therefore, that the reason for the decision not to carry out the OPC is attributable solely to the fact of not having a valid price due to the stubborn refusal of the first instance to accept the correction of Summa's valuation. (Complementary writing presented on August 21, 2019)."
That, as can be seen, expressions such as the SMV acting in a "caretaker" manner in front of investors, with "stubbornness" or with an "unusual conflict of interest," are unacceptable and a clear breach of the principle of procedural good faith. It should be noted that it is even more questionable that such statements are slipped with total lightness and without major arguments, simply questioning the internal structure of the SMV, which is public knowledge of the market and is established in its Organization and Functions Regulations - ROF, or for having a different interpretation of the facts than the competent bodies of the SMV;
That, Nexa has maintained in its statement of allegations that it does not consider having used adjectives that violated the principle of procedural good faith when exposing its defense arguments, since the discussion of the matters of the procedure has been conducted with elevated discourse and with absolute respect from the parties. In this sense, it maintains that pointing out the errors regarding the realization of the OPC and the sanction decision of the lower instance did not aim to disrespect the authority or act in bad faith, since as an administered, it has the right to expose what it considers to be excesses of the administration, which has been recognized in the Legal Report itself. Nexa adds that in any case, it offers "satisfactions" if the lower instance felt affected by such remarks;
That, regarding what is indicated in the preceding consideration, in the opinion of this administrative authority, the adjectives expressed by Nexa cited above did transgress the principle of procedural good faith, since such expressions cannot be qualified as part of a discussion with absolute respect, as Nexa indicates. They also cannot be justified under an approach of legitimate argumentation of the right to defense against the first instance decision, because although, as an administered, it has the right to expose arguments aimed at questioning administrative actions that may be considered harmful to its interests or rights, this does not enable it to transgress the mutual respect and good faith that must always guide both the administered and the administrative authorities during the processing of the administrative procedure;
That, it must be pointed out that the bodies of the SMV act with professionalism, impartiality, and ethics, so a different point of view or interpretation of the facts or the law does not justify, in any way, the use of the expressions and adjectives used by the appellant, which do not contribute any greater elements of substantiation of the administered's positions, but simply seek to subjectively question the conduct of the SMV officials, which could even lead to the assumption that it would be an "improper strategy" aimed at intimidating the administrative authority, in order to induce it to a decision favorable to Nexa;
That, although, as has been indicated, Nexa's decision to desist from the OPC will not be analyzed in the present appeal stage, the reasons why, instead of using these types of offensive expressions and adjectives, Nexa did not appeal the decision of the IGSC, which for Nexa, was the one that caused its withdrawal from the OPC, and which it considers to be supposedly arbitrary, are not understood.
Whereas, it must be taken into account that, in accordance with the relevant part of Article 120 of the TUO of the LPAG, against an act that is supposed to violate, affect, disregard or impair a right or a legitimate interest, its contradiction in the administrative venue proceeds in the manner provided in said Law, so that it may be revoked, modified, annulled or its effects suspended;
Whereas, indeed, the decision of the IGSC not to accept Summa's second corrected report, because it was submitted outside the deadline established by current regulations, was a first-instance decision, and therefore an appeal could be filed against it[11];
Whereas, regarding the foregoing, Nexa has stated in its brief of arguments that it was impossible for it to prepare and file an appeal that could be elevated to the higher instance and resolved before the expiration of the term indicated by the SMV Board of Directors for the OPC to be carried out;
Whereas, this Office does not share the allegations of Nexa indicated in the preceding recital, because, as already mentioned, the TUO of the LPAG provides mechanisms aimed at reversing or annulling decisions or administrative acts that are supposed to violate, transgress, disregard or impair a right or a legitimate interest, through their contradiction by means of administrative appeals (reconsideration or appeal);
Whereas, in accordance with the foregoing, if Nexa considered that the IGSC's decision was contrary to its rights or interests, it could have challenged it, as well as used other mechanisms provided by the administrative system, and not allow, as was done in the present case, the decision that it now questions to become final, and which, according to Nexa, was what motivated its withdrawal from the OPC;
Whereas, notwithstanding the foregoing, it can be seen that, in the present case, this Office has a different evaluation of the facts related to the determination of the infraction imputed to Nexa, regarding the alleged dissemination of inaccurate information to the market, which in no way can lead to the conclusion that the first-instance instructing or sanctioning body acted arbitrarily or "cover-up". In this case, as has been indicated, only a different criterion is observed in the evaluation of the facts related to the commission of an infraction, which does not mean that the first instance acted or resolved influenced by an unusual conflict of interest or in an unprofessional manner, as the appellant suggests, and is evidenced in the record of this case;
Whereas, it must be taken into account that in the very definition of the appeal, contained in Article 220 of the TUO LPAG, it is stated that it shall be filed "when the challenge is based on a different interpretation of the evidence produced or when it involves questions of pure law". As can be seen, the regulations themselves recognize that there may be a different interpretation of the evidentiary elements or of the applicable law, among the different participants in an administrative procedure, which is logical and cannot in any way lead to personal disqualification, which, in the present case, Nexa has evidenced in writing;
Whereas, therefore, it is considered necessary to exhort Nexa and its legal defense so that in the future, without renouncing their right to question the decisions of the public administration and to file appeals against them, they take care with the language with which they address any authority of the State, observing respect and compliance with the principle of procedural good faith;
C. Regarding the failure to report the content of the Macroinvest report as a material event
Whereas, in relation to this point, it must be indicated that we agree with what is stated in the Sanction Resolution, regarding the fact that it was not the IGCC that classified the Macroinvest valuation report as a material event, but rather Nexa itself that gave it such classification. In that sense, in the material event of May 25, 2017 disclosed by Nexa, the following is stated:
"4*. Given the foregoing, the Board of Directors of Milpo, in its session held today, has decided not to proceed with the OPCs, whose term expired tomorrow, May 26. It should also be mentioned that as part of the information necessary for the decision adopted by the Board of Directors, and as an element of comparison with the SUMMA valuation report, it had at its disposal a valuation commissioned from Macroinvest. As presented to the Board of Directors today, Macroinvest calculated a value for Milpo's common shares in a range between S/. 3.28 and S/. 3.55 per share*." (Our underlining);
Whereas, in this sense, it is disconcerting that Nexa states in its appeal that the services provided by Macroinvest consisted only of "financial advisory", when in its own statement in the aforementioned material event, it indicates that its Board of Directors "had at its disposal a valuation commissioned from Macroinvest". Likewise, Nexa alleges that the Macroinvest report delivered to its Board of Directors was only referential in nature, when in its aforementioned statement, it rather classifies it as "information necessary for the decision adopted by the Board of Directors (…) had at its disposal a valuation commissioned from Macroinvest". Therefore, the defense arguments raised by Nexa in its appeal contradict its own statement made in the material event of May 25, 2017, when, among others, it informs the market of the existence of the Macroinvest report, classified by itself as a valuation;
Whereas, regarding Nexa's statement in its arguments that it was willing to carry out the OPC at a price higher than that indicated in the Macroinvest report, and that this would prove that said report was only referential, it must be indicated that such affirmation is not considered to undermine in any way the fact that the Macroinvest report was part of the necessary information that Nexa's Board of Directors took into account to withdraw from carrying out the OPC, as stated by Nexa itself in the material event of May 25, 2017;
Whereas, it must be taken into account that valuation reports are included, as events or information that could qualify as material events, in subsection 24 of Annex I of the Regulation on Material Events:
"Annex I
(…)
Offers of value
(…)
24. Valuation reports prepared by specialized companies, audit firms, banks, investment banks or persons on the occasion of or within the framework of public offers of securities or a due diligence."
Whereas, in addition to the foregoing, in the present case, the Macroinvest report was even more important, not only because an OPC was in progress, but also because, as has been stated, there were legitimate expectations for the sellers – minority shareholders – who accepted the Purchase Offer that Nexa would act with transparency and good faith in the delisting procedure of its shares, so it was essential that Nexa disclose to the market the content of a report that, according to the appellant itself, was "necessary" information for the decision adopted by its Board of Directors to withdraw from carrying out the OPC;
Whereas, therefore, we agree with what is referred to in recital 47 of the Sanction Resolution regarding the fact that, although Nexa, in the material event of May 25, 2017, communicated the existence of the Macroinvest valuation report on the day that Nexa's Board of Directors became aware of it, it did not comply with attaching the content of the Macroinvest valuation report to said communication;
D. Determination of the sanction to be imposed
Whereas, in the appealed Resolution the sanction to be imposed on Nexa was determined solely in attention to the very serious infraction referring to disseminating inaccurate information to the market, because the serious infraction referring to not reporting the content of the Macroinvest valuation report was subsumed by the aforementioned very serious infraction, since it was considered that the provisions of numeral 6 of Article 248 of the TUO LPAG were applicable, regarding the concurrence of infractions:
"Article 248.- Principles of administrative sanctioning power
The sanctioning power of all entities is additionally governed by the following special principles:
(…)
6. Concurrence of Infractions.- When the same conduct qualifies as more than one infraction, the sanction provided for the most serious infraction shall be applied, without prejudice to any other responsibilities established by law."
Whereas, due to the foregoing, and because it has been considered that Nexa has only incurred in the serious infraction referring to not disclosing as a material event the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, it is appropriate to carry out an analysis of the evaluation made in the Sanction Resolution on said sanction criteria, only with respect to what is indicated about the aforementioned serious infraction[12]. It must be taken into account that the sanction criteria are established in Article 348 of the LMV, numeral 3) of Article 248 of the TUO of the LPAG, as well as in the provisions of Article 6 of the former Sanction Regulation, in force at the time of the commission of the facts (hereinafter "Sanction Criteria");
Whereas, in that sense, the Sanction Criteria refer to: (1) the offender's antecedents, (2) the circumstances of the commission of the infraction, (3) the seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest, (4) the economic harm caused and its repercussion on the market, (5) the illicit benefit obtained, (6) the existence or not of intent in the offender's conduct, (7) recidivism for the commission of the same infraction, and, (8) the probability of detection of the infraction. It should be noted that Nexa's arguments regarding the determination of the sanction will be analyzed to the extent they are pertinent to the analysis of the sanction to be imposed for the infraction consisting of not disclosing as a material event the content of the Macroinvest valuation report;
Offender's antecedents
Whereas, in relation to this point, the Sanction Resolution states that Article 17 of the former Sanction Regulation provides that the offender's antecedents are the sanctions imposed by the SMV that became final within the four years prior to the commission of the infraction to be sanctioned;
Whereas, in that sense, the Sanction Resolution indicates that Nexa has the following antecedents: i) Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 103-2013-SMV/11 of March 25, 2013, with a fine of 4.33 UIT for the late presentation of material events (minor infraction), and, ii) Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 096-2014-SMV/11 of September 29, 2014, with a warning and fine of 4.43 UIT, for late presentation of material events and financial information (minor infraction);
Whereas, it should be noted that Nexa has not contradicted what is stated in the Sanction Resolution regarding its infraction antecedents;
Circumstances of the commission of the infractions
Whereas, in the Sanction Resolution it is stated that Nexa's investment shares (at that time labor shares) have been registered in the RPMV since September 1979, while on October 27, 2003, the registration of common shares in the RPMV and the RBVL was ordered, so Nexa has been an issuer in the Peruvian securities market for many years, and therefore knows the regulatory framework applicable and enforceable to such issuers;
Whereas, likewise, among other relevant elements, the Sanction Resolution indicates that, at the date of launch of the Purchase Offer, Nexa had as a shareholder with the capacity to exercise control 80.24% of its shares held by companies of the Votorantim Group, according to the material event of April 12, 2016 and Nexa's 2016 Annual Report;
Whereas, on the other hand, it must be taken into account that on October 27, 2016, as mentioned, Nexa, through a material event, made public its Purchase Offer, which was directed to 18.54% of common shares outstanding at a price of S/ 2.95 (Two and 95/100 Soles);
Whereas, subsequently, Nexa extended the term of the Purchase Offer until December 7, 2016, and then informed, through material events of October 30 and November 1, 2016, the delegation of powers to its Board of Directors for the evaluation, approval and implementation of the exclusion of its shares from the RPMV and the RBVL, as well as the decision of its Board of Directors to, in use of those powers, approve said exclusion;
Whereas, as previously stated, these last two material events are clearly linked to the Purchase Offer, in attention to the commitments assumed by Nexa in the "Compensation System" section, and therefore generated a legitimate expectation in the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, so that Nexa would act with transparency and good faith in the procedure for excluding its shares from the RPMV and the RBVL;
Whereas, it is important to note that the Sanction Resolution indicates that, neither in the Purchase Offer, nor in the material events of November 30 and December 1, 2016, did Nexa inform regarding the manner in which it had determined the price of the Purchase Offer of S/ 2.95 (Two and 95/110 Soles) per common share, nor did it include information explaining Nexa's need, or the basis of Nexa or its controller, to formulate the Purchase Offer during the same period in which it had been disclosing to the market information regarding the exclusion of its shares and the corresponding OPC on them;
Whereas, on the other hand, it must be indicated that we do not agree with the calculations made in the Sanction Resolution regarding the amount that Nexa would have had to pay to the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, if it had carried out the OPC, as a result of the commitments indicated in the "Compensation System" section of the Offer Notice; this, because, as we have stated, it is not appropriate to rule on Nexa's decision not to carry out the OPC, nor to make calculations on the damages that said sellers could have suffered;
Whereas, notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be taken into account, as mentioned in the Sanction Resolution, that regarding the services provided by Macroinvest to Nexa, said company delivered various reports to Nexa dated March 27, 2017, April 27, 2017, May 2, 2017 and May 25, 2017, all while an OPC was in progress that was linked to an economic compensation in favor of the selling shareholders who accepted the Purchase Offer;
Whereas, likewise, it is taken into account that Nexa did not comply with disseminating the content of the Macroinvest report together with the material event of May 25, 2017, despite the importance of said report and the legitimate expectations that had been generated in the sellers who accepted its Purchase Offer, as developed above;
Whereas, it should also be highlighted, as stated in the Sanction Resolution, that Nexa has reported in its Annual Report on compliance with the Corporate Governance Code, both for 2016 and 2017, that information on the matters to be discussed in Board sessions is delivered to the company's directors more than five (5) days in advance. However, Nexa has indicated that the last report delivered by Macroinvest and made available to its Board of Directors was delivered on May 25, 2017, that is, the same day on which said body of its company made the decision not to continue with the OPC;
Whereas, in that sense, regarding the circumstances of the commission of the infraction referring to not disclosing as a material event the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, we agree with what is mentioned in the Sanction Resolution, regarding the fact that Nexa acted in a non-transparent manner and harming the integrity of the securities market;
Whereas, Nexa has stated in its brief of arguments that the Legal Report considers elements unrelated to the circumstances of the commission of the infraction referring to not disclosing the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, such as the reference to the material events of November 30 and December 1, 2016, the factors that would have motivated Nexa to launch the Purchase Offer at the price of S/ 2.95 (Two and 95/100 Soles) or why said offer was launched during the delisting process of Nexa's shares;
Whereas, in this regard, it must be indicated that this Office considers that, in order to determine the sanction to be imposed on Nexa, it is necessary to establish the context in which the Purchase Offer was made, taking into account that, as indicated, the agreement to delist Nexa's shares by its Board of Directors generated a legitimate expectation in the persons who accepted the Purchase Offer, that Nexa would act in compliance with the transparency rules in the securities market during said delisting process, which has not been fully complied with, precisely because the content of the Macroinvest report was not disseminated, which, as Nexa itself has stated, was part of the necessary information that its Board of Directors took into account to withdraw from carrying out the OPC;
Whereas, likewise, Nexa has mentioned in its arguments that the information that was ultimately not included in the material event is marginal, given that it was diligent and transparent in reporting the conclusions of the Macroinvest report, which is the main part of said document;
Whereas, in this regard, it must be indicated that the charge imputed to Nexa refers specifically to not having reported the content of the Macroinvest report, and not to not having reported its existence or the conclusions of said report;
Whereas, it must be taken into account that, in order to fully comply with the duties of transparency regarding valuation reports, it is not enough to report the existence or conclusions thereof, but it is necessary to disseminate the document completely, so that the market and investors can evaluate, among others, the methodology and the information taken into account for its preparation;
Seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest
Whereas, in relation to this sanction criterion, Nexa argues that there is no damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest because it has not breached any rule. In this regard, Nexa's statement is not shared, because it is considered that it did incur in the infraction referring to not disclosing as a material event the content of the valuation report delivered to it by Macroinvest;
Whereas, likewise, we agree with what is stated in the Sanction Resolution, regarding the fact that this infraction damages in a very serious and direct manner the public interest, since it harms the transparency and integrity of the securities market, which are legal interests protected by the rules and for which the SMV is the authority responsible for safeguarding them. In the same way, we share what is stated in the Sanction Resolution, regarding the fact that the infraction damages the confidence of local and foreign investors and potential investors, and that such damage can hardly be repaired. Indeed, it is considered that the confidence and legitimate expectation of the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, that Nexa would act transparently and in good faith during the delisting procedure of its shares, was not fully complied with;
Damage caused and its repercussion on the market
Whereas, Nexa states that it has not generated any harm to any investor, since it has not breached any rule. Likewise, it indicates that if it were possible to establish a harm for the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, it is not attributable to Nexa but to the error made by Summa in its valuation report and to the SMV's refusal to not allow correction of said error;
Whereas, in this regard, as has been stated, it is not appropriate to evaluate at this appeal stage Nexa's decision not to carry out the OPC, nor to determine the damages that such conduct could have generated. In that sense, although it is considered that Nexa's conduct could have generated damages in the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, it is not the SMV's competence to determine or calculate the amount of such damages, as it corresponds to the personal sphere of each investor who participated in said Purchase Offer;
Illegitimately obtained benefit
Whereas, in relation to this point, Nexa states that the SASCM ignores that it has not benefited in any way from the occurrence of the facts indicated in this procedure, on the contrary, that it has suffered serious damages as a result of the arbitrariness of the SMV's action;
Whereas, on the particular, regarding the infraction referring to not disclosing as a material event the content of the valuation report, it is not appreciated that Nexa has obtained an illicit benefit resulting from the commission of this infraction, without prejudice to the fact that it must be taken into account that said report was part of the "necessary" information that Nexa's Board of Directors took into account to withdraw from the OPC, and whose content was not disclosed to the market, so the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, who consider that such action ended up causing them some harm, have the right to resort to judicial channels for the reparation of said harm;
Existence or not of intent in the offender's conduct
Whereas, in relation to this sanction criterion, regarding the commission of the infraction referring to not disclosing as a material event the content of the Macroinvest report, we agree with what is stated by the Sanction Resolution that there are not sufficient elements to determine that said infraction was committed with malice or with absence of intent on the part of Nexa. In any case, a serious negligence on the part of the appellant is appreciated, since Nexa was aware of the importance of the Macroinvest valuation report, by stating itself that it was part of the "necessary" information that was made available to its Board of Directors, however, it only presented the conclusions thereof, obviating the responsibility to disseminate the content of said report for the knowledge of the market and especially of the sellers who accepted its Purchase Offer;
Recidivism for the commission of the same infraction
That, in relation to this sanction criterion, regarding the commission of the infraction referred to as not disclosing as a material fact the content of the Macroinvest report, it is agreed with the Sanction Resolution that there is no recidivism of Nexa in the commission of said infraction;
Probability of detection of the infraction
That, in relation to this sanction criterion, Nexa reaffirms that it has not committed any infraction. Likewise, Nexa states in its arguments brief that it disagrees with what is mentioned in the Legal Report, regarding that the probability of detection of the serious infraction referred to as the non-presentation of the Macroinvest valuation report is low, because Nexa timely informed regarding the receipt and existence of said report, from which it follows directly that it had not been disclosed;
That, notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be indicated that it is agreed in this regard with what is stated in the Sanction Resolution regarding that the serious infraction referred to as the non-presentation of the Macroinvest valuation report has a low probability of detection because such information is mentioned tangentially in a material fact and the report or document referred to in such communication is omitted from being presented. Likewise, it must be taken into account that Nexa only informed about the contracting of Macroinvest with the material fact of May 25, 2017, when it decided not to continue with the OPC, despite the fact that the contract with said company had been signed on January 16, 2017, which was not informed to the market at the time;
That, in relation to the existence of mitigating circumstances, referred to in the second paragraph of article 6 of the former Sanction Regulations and numeral 2 of article 257 of the TUO LPAG, it is agreed with what is referred to in the Sanction Resolution, regarding that they are not applicable in the present case, because Nexa has not expressly acknowledged the commission of the infraction, having, on the contrary, denied its existence;
That, likewise, it is agreed with what is stated in said resolution regarding that, in the present case, none of the exempting circumstances of responsibility established in numeral 1 of article 257 of the TUO LPAG are configured, since it is appreciated that Nexa was clearly aware of the importance of the Macroinvest valuation report, taking into account that regarding it, it states, in its material fact of May 25, 2017, that it was "necessary" information that its Board of Directors had at its disposal to adopt the decision to withdraw from the OPC; however, it did not comply with disseminating to the market the content of said report;
That, in that order of ideas, it coincides with the conclusions of the Sanction Resolution regarding that, in attention to what is stated in numeral 5) of article 248 of the TUO LPAG, it is appreciated that the sanction criteria established in the new Sanction Regulations do not modify the analysis carried out to determine the sanction to be imposed, taking into account that they are similar to those indicated in article 348 of the LMV, numeral 3) of article 248 of the TUO of the LPAG, as well as the provisions of article 6 of the former Sanction Regulations, which have been subject to evaluation;
That, it must be taken into account that article 21 of the former Sanction Regulations, in force at the time of the commission of the facts subject to sanction, allows the imposition, among others, of a fine greater than 25 (twenty-five) UIT and up to 50 (fifty) UIT, in the case of the commission of serious infractions. In this sense, after carrying out the analysis of the sanction criteria, and in attention mainly to the serious damage to the transparency and integrity of the securities market, especially to the trust of the sellers –minority shareholders- who accepted Nexa's Purchase Offer, it is considered that the fine to be imposed should be greater than 50 (fifty) UIT. However, taking into account the legal limit indicated above, it corresponds to sanction Nexa for the serious infraction referred to as not disclosing as a material fact the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, with a fine amounting to 50 (fifty) UIT, in force at the time the facts occurred;
E. Regarding the corrective measures imposed
That, the Sanction Resolution has imposed on Nexa the compliance with two (2) corrective measures, aimed at reversing the effects generated by the commission of the infractions for which it is sanctioned. The first of them orders that Nexa deliver to each of the 385 (Three hundred eighty-five) sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, the amount in soles resulting from multiplying the number of common shares of Nexa —which they sold in the execution operation of the Purchase Offer— by the difference of the price determined by Summa of S/ 4.02 (Four and 02/100 Soles) minus the Purchase Offer price amounting to S/ 2.95 (Two and 95/100 Soles). Likewise, the second corrective measure orders that Nexa disseminate, as a material fact, the content of the Macroinvest valuation report;
That, in relation to the non-sanctioning nature of corrective measures, Boulangger-Atoche states that:
“Doctrine is unanimous in stating that the corrective measure does not have a sanctioning nature, since the afflictive purpose is alien to it. (…)[13].”
That, the aforementioned author states, citing Lozano Cutando, that although the mere constraint of the offender to restore the violated legality would already cause him an economic detriment, to be qualified as a sanction, it is necessary that:
“the detriment caused responds to a retributive sense, which translates into the infliction of an evil added to that which in itself implies the forced fulfillment of an obligation already due or the impossibility of continuing to develop an activity to which one was not entitled. (…) The character of criminal or administrative punishment only appears when, aside from the reparative will, an added detriment is inflicted with which the offender is affected in the circle of goods and rights that he legitimately enjoyed[14].”. (Underlined by us);
That, in that sense, it can be appreciated that corrective measures do not have a sanctioning nature, because they do not seek to punish the transgressor for the commission of the infraction, but to repair the effects generated by said infraction, so that an obligation already due is fulfilled or the impossibility of continuing to develop an activity to which one is not entitled. In that sense, Carreras Schabauer, in relation to the imposition of corrective measures, states that:
“This second possibility is fully founded not on a specific typification, but on the prescriptive-imperative content of a legal norm. The administration, as manager and guardian of the public interest, must be empowered to enforce legal obligations on the administered. That mandate, unlike the sanction, seeks the material fulfillment of what is established in the norm.[15]”
That, due to the existing distinction between sanctions and corrective measures, Morón Urbina states that the latter have, among others, the following characteristics:
“- The principles of the sanctioning power (e.g. Causality, culpability or presumption of innocence) are not applicable to corrective measures, nor are their existence and execution subject to the prescriptive term of sanctions, and they can be applied and executed even if the sanction is extinguished for any cause.
Furthermore, due to its non-sanction nature, the corrective measure is not limited by the principle of “non bis in idem.[16]”. (Underlined by us)*.
That, in attention to the foregoing and the cited doctrine, it is agreed with what is stated on page 55 of the Sanction Resolution regarding that:
“As can be seen in the cited provisions, corrective measures are of a different nature, have different characteristics and purpose than sanctions. (…)
By way of reference, it should be indicated that being different from sanctions, it is valid to maintain that the rules and principles of the administrative sanctioning procedure are not applicable to corrective measures. This is verified, among others, by the fact that some of the cited provisions expressly recognize that corrective measures can be issued prior to the initiation of a PAS or that they can be issued regardless of whether a PAS has been initiated or not.”
That, having as a conceptual framework all of the above, it corresponds to evaluate Nexa's defense arguments on the imposition of the two corrective measures. In relation to the first corrective measure, Nexa argues, among others, that: i) Its imposition contradicts what is stated in the Sanction Resolution, regarding that Nexa's decision to withdraw from the OPC would not be analyzed, and, ii) The corrective measure is illegal because it has an indemnificatory or compensatory nature, so its issuance exceeds the competence of the SMV. This last argument is shared and supported in the reports of lawyers José Antonio Payet and Juan Carlos Morón, presented by Nexa;
That, in this regard, it is considered that Nexa's arguments indicated above regarding the imposition of the first corrective measure are founded, for the following reasons:
“Corrective measures have their antecedents in the interdicts of publicis locis prohibitory and restitutory, issued in administrative venue, which only sought to protect the status quo, restoring the affected public legal good to the situation prior to its violation; while indemnifications have had their origin in the search for compensation of damage caused by one citizen to another, which had already produced negative effects without the possibility of reversing them (…).”
Therefore, corrective measures cannot (be) considered indemnifications, since they do not compensate the damage that may have been caused to the consumer, but are limited only to restoring what was affected to the extent possible.[17]” (Underlined by us).
That, the doctrine cited above clearly matches what is stated in numeral 251.1 of article 251 of the TUO LPAG, regarding that compensation for damages and losses caused by an infraction must be determined in the corresponding judicial process and not in administrative venue:
“Article 251. -Determination of responsibility
251.1 The administrative sanctions imposed on the administered are compatible with the issuance of corrective measures conducive to ordering the restoration or reparation of the situation altered by the infraction to its previous state, including that of the affected goods, as well as with compensation for damages and losses caused, which are determined in the corresponding judicial process. Corrective measures must be previously typified, be reasonable and adjust to the intensity, proportionality and needs of the protected legal goods that are intended to be guaranteed in each specific case.
(…).”. (Underlined by us).
That, in accordance with the foregoing, it is appreciated that the first corrective measure that orders Nexa to compensate the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer, for the non-realization of the OPC, does not have a restorative or restitutive character, but an indemnificatory one, since what it orders does not seek to restore or restitute a situation to its previous state, because the compensation referred to in the “Compensation System” section of the Offer Notice was never generated because the OPC was not finally carried out, which was the necessary condition for said “Compensation System” to be activated;
That, in that sense, what the first corrective measure would really seek is to compensate the damages suffered by the sellers who accepted the Purchase Offer for the non-realization of the OPC that would have finally activated the “Compensation System”, which, as indicated, not only exceeds the nature of corrective measures, but also the competences of the administrative authority, as it is a judicial matter;
That, in relation to the second corrective measure issued, it corresponds, first, to evaluate Nexa's arguments referring to the fact that norms that were not in force at the time the facts occurred are being used to base its issuance, such as the new Sanction Regulations, which entered into force on December 19, 2018;
That, on the particular, it must be indicated that it is not agreed with what is argued by Nexa, as well as with what is indicated in the legal reports on this point, due to the following reasons:
“Article 358.- Precautionary, provisional and corrective measures
CONASEV is empowered to issue precautionary, provisional and corrective measures with respect to natural or legal persons under its competence, regardless of whether or not a sanctioning procedure has been initiated.
(…)”. Added result.
That, it must be taken into account that article 358 of the LMV was in force at the time of the serious infraction referred to as not disclosing the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, so the SMV is not imposing on Nexa the compliance with any measure regarding which it did not have legal competence at the time the facts occurred;
That, Nexa states that the former Sanction Regulations, in force at the time the facts occurred, only recognized the possibility of imposing corrective measures in the case of minor offenses and before the administrative sanctioning procedure is initiated, so the SMV could not impose corrective measures outside of such cases. In this regard, and without prejudice to the foregoing, what is indicated by Nexa is not shared, because the fact that a specific case of application of corrective measures is considered does not mean that the SMV renounces for all other cases a power that has been attributed to it in the LMV and even less when said competence is consubstantial for the fulfillment of the norms infringed by the supervised;
That, indeed, as doctrine maintains, corrective measures are consubstantial to the competences that the public administration must have, as manager and guardian of the public interest, because, with their application, it seeks to reverse the effects of a regulatory non-compliance or prevent the continuation of an activity to which one is not entitled. In that sense, as indicated, the fact that the former Sanction Regulations developed a specific case for the application of corrective measures, this in no way can lead to the conclusion that the SMV has renounced, for other cases, the application of measures that are consubstantial to its functions, as protector of the transparency and integrity of the securities market and that is a power that has been granted to the SMV by the LMV itself[18];
That, finally, regarding Nexa's arguments referring to that numeral 27 of Annex XX of the new Sanction Regulations does not comply with the requirements of the principle of typicity in accordance with what is stated in numeral 251.1 of article 251 of the LMV, we must indicate, without prejudice to the foregoing, that what is indicated by Nexa is not shared, because it is appreciated that it is intended to apply the same conceptualization and rigor of the principle of typicity in sanctioning matters to the case of the application of corrective measures. In this regard, said conceptual development is not correct, since, as indicated, doctrine considers that the principles of the sanctioning regime are not applicable to corrective measures;
That, likewise, it must be taken into account that numeral 27 of Annex XX of the new Sanction Regulations textually states the following:
“[…] ANNEX XX
Of Corrective Measures
In accordance with the provisions of article 21 of the Regulation, the SMV, when determining administrative responsibility, may issue the following corrective measures:
[…]
27) Other measures that are directly related to compliance with the infringed norms.”
That, as can be seen, the cited norm establishes that other corrective measures that are directly related to compliance with the infringed norms may be applied. In the present case, the corrective measure issued is that Nexa disseminate as a material fact the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, which is a logical and direct consequence of having failed, at the time, to disseminate said report as a material fact;
That, in that sense, it is considered that the typification in this point is very clear and direct with the non-compliance imputed to Nexa, so the typification requirement indicated in numeral 251.1 of article 251 of the TUO LPAG is met, within the proper nature of corrective measures. A contrary interpretation would lead to the conclusion that, there being responsibility in Nexa for failing to disseminate a material fact, only a pecuniary sanction could be imposed, without being able to require compliance with what it should have done at the time, which would be contrary, not only to the legal system, but to the transparency and integrity of the securities market;
That, due to the reasons indicated above, it is considered that the imposition of the second corrective measure must be maintained, so Nexa must comply with disseminating as a material fact the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, in accordance with what is stated in the Sanction Resolution;
Of the requests of third parties to be incorporated into the sanctioning procedure
That, it must be indicated that during the processing of the administrative sanctioning procedure - in the recursive stage - various requests have been presented to the SMV by persons[19] outside said administrative procedure, requesting their incorporation into it as part of the procedure;
That, in this regard, it must be indicated that to determine the admissibility of the requests referred to in the preceding paragraph, the nature of the administrative sanctioning procedure, the administrative actions produced by the parties, the Sanction Resolution, the corrective measures issued, as well as the administrative appeal filed against the cited administrative act of sanction, must previously be evaluated;
That, it must be taken into account that Nexa presented on August 23, 2019 a complementary brief, indicating that the requests of third parties that sought their incorporation into this sanctioning procedure were inadmissible, because both article 7 of the former Sanction Regulations and article 6 of the new Sanction Regulations expressly state that the parties to an administrative sanctioning procedure are the SMV and the person to whom the regulatory infraction is imputed, not admitting the participation of third parties;
That, Nexa adds that the third parties requesting their incorporation into this administrative procedure also do not have a legitimate interest, because the imposition of a sanction only competes to the administrative authority, even if the third parties wish to benefit from accessory measures to it, which the authority may or may not issue. In that sense, Nexa states that if the third parties consider that they have any right or indemnificatory claim against it, what would correspond is that they assert it in the corresponding legal venue and not in an administrative sanctioning procedure, whose processing does not compete to them;
That, in relation to the aforementioned requests presented by various persons to be incorporated into the administrative sanctioning procedure, the following must be indicated:
Therefore, as can be seen, both in the former and the new Sanctions Regulation, it is expressly stated that the administrative sanctioning procedure concerns only the SMV and the person against whom said procedure is being conducted, not allowing the participation of a third party unrelated to that relationship.
In accordance with the provisions of numeral 26 of Article 12 of the SMV's Regulation of Organization and Functions, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF;
RESOLVES:
Article 1.- To declare partially granted the appeal filed by Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A. against Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 042-2019-SMV/11, regarding: i) the commission of the very serious infraction classified in Annex I, numeral 1, subsection 1.4 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10, in force at the date of the commission of the events, for having communicated inexact information in the material fact of October 27, 2016, referring to the purchase notice in the Stock Exchange of the Lima Stock Exchange, and, ii) the first corrective measure, indicated in Article 3 of the aforementioned Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 042-2019-SMV/11, leaving both extremes without effect.
Article 2.- To confirm Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 042-2019-SMV/11 in the extreme that determines that Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A. incurred the serious infraction classified in Annex I, numeral 2, subsection 2.14 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10, in force at the time the events occurred, for not having complied with disseminating as a material fact the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, mentioned in the material fact of May 25, 2017.
Article 3.- To reform the provisions of Article 2 of Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 042-2019-SMV/11, taking into account the evaluation of the sanction criteria developed in this resolution, sanctioning Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A. with a fine of 50 (Fifty) UIT, equivalent to S/ 202,500.00 (Two hundred two thousand five hundred and 00/100 Soles), for the commission of the infraction indicated in Article 2 of this resolution.
Article 4.- To confirm Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 042-2019-SMV/11 in the extreme referring to the second corrective measure, ordering that Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A. comply with disseminating the content of the Macroinvest valuation report, mentioned in the material fact of May 25, 2017, within five (5) days of notification of this resolution, in accordance with the provisions of the first instance resolution.
Article 5.- To exhort Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A. and its legal defense to henceforth adjust their conduct to the requirements of procedural good faith, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 1.8 of Article IV of the Preliminary Title of the TUO of the General Administrative Procedure Law, approved by Supreme Decree No. 004-2019-JUS.
Article 6.- To declare inadmissible the requests of the persons who have requested their incorporation into this administrative sanctioning procedure, as they are not part of it, in accordance with the provisions of this resolution and the regulations on the matter.
Article 7.- To consider the administrative avenue exhausted.
Article 8.- To transcribe this resolution to Nexa Resources Perú S.A.A., to the Lima Stock Exchange S.A.A. and to CAVALI S.A. I.C.L.V.
Article 9.- To order the publication of this resolution on the Portal of the Superintendency of the Securities Market (https://www.smv.gob.pe).
Register, communicate and publish.
José Manuel Peschiera Rebagliati
Superintendent of the Securities Market
It is important to highlight that, at this point, Nexa develops the concept of the sensible investor, as the paradigm of the investor protected by the LMV and the regulations derived from it. For these purposes, among others, Nexa cites Resolution of the former Administrative Tribunal of Conasev No. 032-2002-EF/94.12, in which said concept is developed. ↑
Nexa states that in the past the competent bodies of the companies Fima S.A. and Unión de Cervecerías Peruanas Backus y Johnston withdrew their requests for delisting of their investment shares before the SMV. ↑
It should be noted that in the Sanction Resolution the term OCA is used for the Purchase Offer. ↑
However, Nexa indicates that said supposed "responsibility" also does not exist, because as stated above, a sensible investor recognized that the future realization of an OPC at a price higher than that of the Purchase Offer was only a possibility and not a commitment or obligation. ↑
"Article 124.- Requirements of writings
Every writing submitted before any entity must contain the following:
1. Full names and surnames, domicile and number of National Identity Document or foreigner's card of the administered, and where applicable, the capacity of representative and of the person represented.
2. The concrete expression of what is requested, the factual grounds supporting it and, when possible, the legal grounds.
3. Place, date, signature or digital fingerprint, in case of not knowing how to sign or being impeded.
4. The indication of the body, entity or authority to which it is addressed, understood as such, as far as possible, the authority closest to the user, according to the hierarchy, with competence to hear and resolve it.
5. The address of the place where notifications of the procedure are to be received, when different from the real domicile stated under numeral 1. This designation of domicile takes effect from its indication and is presumed subsistent, unless its change is expressly communicated.
6. The list of documents and annexes accompanying it, indicated in the TUPA.
7. The identification of the file of the matter, in the case of procedures already initiated.
Article 218. Administrative appeals
(...)
218.2 The term for filing appeals is fifteen (15) peremptory days, and they must be resolved within thirty (30) days.
Article 220.- Appeal
The appeal shall be filed when the challenge is based on a different interpretation of the evidence produced or when it involves questions of pure law, and must be addressed to the same authority that issued the act being challenged so that it elevates the proceedings to the hierarchical superior.
Article 221.- Requirements of the appeal
The writing of the appeal must state the act being appealed and comply with the other requirements provided in Article 124." ↑
It should be noted that, although the Board of Directors' agreement of Nexa included both its common shares and its investment shares for their exclusion from the RPMV, for the present case the relevance focuses on the exclusion process of the common shares, taking into account that the Purchase Offer was directed to said shares. ↑
"Regulation of Material Facts and Reserved Information – SMV Resolution 005-2014-SMV/01
(…)
ANNEX 1
(…)
26. The registration, suspension or exclusion of the Issuer's securities in the registry of the market supervisory entity or in the Exchange where its securities are registered.
(…)". ↑
It should be noted that even in this material fact, in which the validity of the offer is extended, the Offer Notice is again attached updating the sections related to the extension of the term of the Purchase Offer. ↑
It should be indicated that said response sent by Macroinvest is in the file of this administrative sanctioning procedure. ↑
"Article IV. Principles of the administrative procedure
1. The administrative procedure is fundamentally based on the following principles, without prejudice to the validity of other general principles of Administrative Law:
(…)
1.8. Principle of procedural good faith.-The administrative authority, the administered, their representatives or lawyers and, in general, all participants in the procedure, perform their respective procedural acts guided by mutual respect, collaboration and good faith. The administrative authority cannot act against its own acts, except in the cases of ex officio review contemplated in this Law.". (Underlining ours). ↑
"Article 220.- Appeal
The appeal shall be filed when the challenge is based on a different interpretation of the evidence produced or when it involves questions of pure law, and must be addressed to the same authority that issued the act being challenged so that it elevates the proceedings to the hierarchical superior.". (Underlining ours). ↑
It should be noted that, although the Sanction Resolution only takes into account the very serious infraction for the imposition of the sanction, it does not deny the existence of the serious infraction, also performing an analysis of it with respect to the sanction criteria. ↑
BOULANGGER-ATOCHE, Lourdes. The non-compensatory nature of corrective measures and their legal regime in Peruvian Administrative Law. Special reference to the Code of Protection and Defense of the Consumer. Faculty of Law, University of Piura. PIRHUA Institutional Repository. Piura. 2015. p. 45. ↑
Op. Cit. p. 46. ↑
CARRERAS SCHABAUER, Noelia. Administrative police measures and legal regime of public service: use of corrective measures in Peru. Revista Derecho PUCP No. 67. Lima. 2011. p. 496. ↑
MORÓN URBINA, Juan Carlos. Acts-measures (corrective, provisional and security measures) and the sanctioning power of the Administration. Revista de Derecho Administrativo No. 9. Circle of Administrative Law. Lima, 2010. p. 152. ↑
Op. Cit. pp. 53 and 54. ↑
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that Article 2 of SMV Resolution No. 006-2012-SMV/01, published on April 16, 2012, modified various articles of the former Sanctions Regulation, including its Article 13, with the following wording:
"Article 13.- SANCTIONING PHASE
The sanctioning phase is in charge of the respective Deputy Superintendent. Exceptionally and if deemed necessary, said official may order the performance of complementary actions and/or reports, as well as take statements from persons deemed convenient.
The corresponding Deputy Superintendent may issue, modify or revoke precautionary, corrective and/or provisional measures ex officio or upon request in cases submitted to its knowledge.
The final resolution must rule on the commission of the infraction and the applicable sanction; likewise, it may order precautionary, provisional or corrective measures. The Deputy Superintendent may order the execution of guarantees granted by legal entities under the SMV's competence.
(…).". (Underlining ours). ↑
Mrs. Parodi Fernández, OPALO S.A., among others. ↑
PEREZ GONZALES, Jesús. Comments to the Administrative Procedure Law. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid 1991. p. 1272. ↑
MORON URBINA, Juan Carlos. Comments to the General Administrative Procedure Law. Gaceta Jurídica. Fourth Edition. p. 618. ↑
"Article 115 of the TUO of the LPAG.- Initiation ex officio
115.1 For the ex officio initiation of a procedure, there must be a disposition of a superior authority that grounds it in that sense, a motivation based on compliance with a legal duty or the merit of a complaint.
115.2 The ex officio initiation of the procedure is notified to the determined administered whose protected interests or rights may be affected by the acts to be executed, except in the case of subsequent inspection of requests or their documentation, covered by the presumption of veracity. The notification includes information on the nature, scope and, if foreseeable, the estimated duration, as well as their rights and obligations in the course of such action.
115.3 The notification is made immediately after the decision is issued, unless the regulations authorize it to be deferred due to its confidential nature based on public interest." ↑
"Article 62.- Content of the concept of administered
The following are considered administered with respect to a specific administrative procedure:
1. Those who promote it as holders of individual or collective legitimate rights or interests.
2. Those who, without having initiated the procedure, possess legitimate rights or interests that may be affected by the decision to be adopted."
"Article 71.- Third-party administered
71.1 If during the processing of a procedure the existence of determined non-appearing third parties is noticed whose legitimate rights or interests may be affected by the resolution to be issued, said processing and the proceedings must be communicated to them by summons to the known domicile, without interrupting the procedure.
71.2 With respect to undetermined third-party administered, the summons is made by publication or, when appropriate, by conducting the public information or public hearing process, in accordance with this Law.
71.3 Third parties may appear at any stage of the procedure, having the same rights and obligations as the participants in it." ↑
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The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“in accordance with the provisions of Article 49 of the Regulation of Public Tender Offers and Purchase of Securities for Exclusion, approved by Conasev Resolution No. 009-2006-EF/94.10”
“In accordance with the provisions of numeral 26 of Article 12 of the SMV's Regulation of Organization and Functions, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF”
“Regulation of Material Facts and Reserved Information, approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2014-SMV/01”
“the new Sanctions Regulation (approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01) similarly states”
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