Enforcement · SMV · 12 Oct 2022
The resolution sanctions Enel Generación Piura S.A. with a fine of 5 UIT for committing one serious infraction under numeral 2, subsection 2.10 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation, for failing to disclose as a material event the start date of the audit work for fiscal year 2020. The company expressly acknowledged responsibility, which constitutes a mitigating factor, and had no prior sanctions or recidivism. The fine was set at 5 UIT, below the statutory minimum of 25 UIT, applying the principle of reasonableness and the mitigating factor.
No. 101-2022-SMV/11
| Lima, October 12, 2022 |
Summary: Sanction Enel Generación Piura S.A. with a fine of 5 UIT, for having incurred in one (01) infraction of a serious nature typified in numeral 2, subsection 2.10, of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulation
| Administered entity | : | ENEL GENERACIÓN PIURA S.A. |
| Subject | : | Administrative Sanctioning Procedure |
| File No. | : | 2022002422 |
The Deputy Superintendent of Market Conduct Supervision
WHEREAS:
The administrative file No. 2022002422 and Report No. 507-2022-SMV/11.2 (hereinafter, the Report), issued by the General Intendancy of Conduct Compliance (hereinafter, the IGCC) of the Deputy Superintendency of Market Conduct Supervision (hereinafter, the SASCM);
CONSIDERING:
«Pursuant to the provisions of subsection a) of article 26 of the Sanctions Regulation of the Superintendency of the Securities Market approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV-01 (the “Sanctions Regulation”), in accordance with subsection a) of numeral 2 of article 257 of the Single Ordered Text of the Administrative Sanctioning Procedure Law, approved by Supreme Decree No. 004-2019-JUS (“TUO LPAG”), EGPIURA expressly acknowledges its responsibility with respect to the commission of the Imputed Infraction.» (Underlining and emphasis added);
«In this regard, without prejudice to what is stated in numeral 1 of this writing, making an evaluation of the sanction criteria provided in article 25 of the Sanctions Regulation, it is observed that there is no proportionality between the sanctions indicated above and the Imputed Infraction.»
«In line with the foregoing, at the time of resolving this sanctioning procedure, the SMV must take into consideration the principle of reasonableness, which serves as support for all administrative procedures. In this sense, not only the Imputed Infraction must be taken into account but also additional factors that lead to a better analysis of the circumstances in which such infraction would have been committed, as well as the characteristics of the offender and the magnitude of the repercussion of the infraction.»;
SANCTION CRITERIA
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE INFRACTION
THE EXTERNAL FINANCIAL AUDIT AND ITS ROLE AS A GENERATOR OF TRUST
That, with the aim of fostering and strengthening confidence in the financial information disseminated among stakeholders and the general public, financial statements are subject to external financial audits through which qualified independent professionals gather, analyze and structure an entity's information with the necessary rigor to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements, as a whole, are free from material misstatements, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue a professional opinion as to whether such financial statements are presented fairly in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework;
That, to achieve such objectives, it is necessary that audits be performed under international quality standards oriented to the public interest, such as the International Standards on Auditing (hereinafter, ISA), issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB);
That, in that regard, ISA 200 "Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with International Standards on Auditing" clearly establishes that the objective of an audit is to increase the degree of confidence of users in the financial statements by expressing a professional opinion on whether the financial statements have been prepared in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework. To achieve this objective, it is important that the engagement auditor complies with applicable ethical requirements;
That the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) includes among its objectives and principles of securities regulation the obligation that auditors be independent of the audited entity;
That, likewise, the Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2014 Edition, issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), in its Section 290 "Independence – Audit and Review Engagements" establishes that the independence an auditor must have implies having an independent mental attitude to issue an opinion without influences that compromise professional judgment and having an appearance of independence; this entails avoiding relevant facts and circumstances that a third party with judgment and well informed could probably conclude that the integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism of the firm or of the audit team member have been compromised;
That, in that order of ideas, in Peru, the Professional Code of Ethics for Public Accountants, in its article 42, states that an auditor and/or an audit firm in charge of an audit must have independence, which implies reaching a conclusion without influences that compromise professional judgment, allowing an auditor to act with integrity, objectivity and professional skepticism;
That, therefore, financial audits play a vitally important role in maintaining credibility in the veracity and integrity of financial information; however, to achieve an adequate level of confidence, auditors must conduct their audits at the highest level of quality and with a strong ethical and professional attitude. Consequently, it is necessary that audits be performed under international quality standards oriented to the public interest, such as the ISA issued by the IAASB;
That, thus, under the scope of the considerations set forth in the preceding paragraphs, it is a fact that such information —the start date of the external audit of an issuer— is of utmost necessity for the stakeholders of an issuer, so that they can know with certainty and disclosed by the issuer's own transparency what the start date of the external audit work was. Such knowledge of that date together with the date of the respective external audit report is extremely useful, among other things, because it allows measuring or estimating with a certain degree of objectivity or at least having an idea about the period of time during which the external audit was executed, which could be days, weeks or months; and from that estimate one could also derive the obtaining of other information or other types of information also useful for the securities market;
That, in addition, it must be indicated that the dissemination of such information —the start date of the external audit of an issuer— also has the character of a prudential rule or for prudential purposes, since its purpose is that the start of the external audit of an issuer be on a date such that, in relation to the end date of the same external audit, it determines a period of execution of the external audit that is reasonable or sufficient, including for the issuer itself, in the sense that it may have a reasonable period, for example, so that, if cases arise, it can appropriately address the requirements of the external audit; to make clarifications of audit findings or their clearance; to address key audit matters; to perform the due diligence required by the external audit contracted by the issuer itself; and to be able to have an audit report on time considering the maximum periods established in the regulations for presenting its audited annual financial statements. As noted, the need to have this date disseminated allows the issuer itself to better manage its risks related to the financial information that will be the main object of the financial audit. In short, it is clearly established that the knowledge and dissemination of the start date of the external audit by the issuer is not only a regulatory need and requirement, but also generates a series of benefits, risk management and value, including for the issuer itself that contracts the external audit, and which we understand must always privilege the quality of an external audit —which is also a regulatory requirement due to the application of the ISA issued by the IAASB— rather than merely complying with a regulatory requirement, and in that sense, we consider that referring only to the duration factor of an annual external audit, it is certainly an indicator of its quality, the effective duration of said annual external audit. Thus, for example, taking this indicated duration factor to extremes, it is reasonable to maintain that with respect to the same issuer or comparable issuers, an external audit whose duration is one (01) day or a few days is highly likely to be of lower quality than, for example, another annual external audit whose duration is more than one (01) day or more than a few days.
In the specific case of this PAS, since the Issuer did not comply with its obligation to disseminate the information on the start date of the annual external audit, it is not possible to know or estimate the duration it would have had, and consequently the securities market or the general public, including the Issuer's stakeholders, have not been allowed access to all this indicated information related to its annual external audit;
THE EXTERNAL AUDIT AND THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
In this regard, in section "V. Disclosure and transparency" of said document it is expressly stated:
"C. An independent, competent and qualified auditor should carry out an annual audit in accordance with high quality standards, in order to provide the board and shareholders with an external and objective assurance that the financial statements adequately reflect the financial position and results of the company in all material respects.
In addition to certifying that the financial statements fairly reflect the financial position of the company, the audit report will assess the manner in which they have been prepared and presented. This will favor better control of the company. In some countries, external auditors are also required to address the company's corporate governance.
Auditors will be independent and accountable to shareholders. The designation of a regulatory authority for auditing that is not linked to the profession, in accordance with the Core Principles of the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR), constitutes an important factor in improving audit quality.
It is considered good practice that external auditors have been recommended by an independent audit committee of the Board of Directors or an equivalent body, and that they have been appointed by it or by shareholders directly. Furthermore, according to the IOSCO Principles for Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate Governance in Monitoring Auditor Independence, "the rules on auditor independence shall provide a framework of principles, supported by a combination of prohibitions, restrictions, other policies and procedures, together with disclosure requirements, that addresses at least the following threats to independence: self-interest, self-review, advocacy, close relationships and intimidation."
The audit committee, or an equivalent body, will oversee the internal audit activities, as well as the overall relationship with the external auditor, including the nature of non-audit services that the latter may provide to the company. The provision of other types of tasks for the company may impair the independence of the external auditor and could imply that the latter has to supervise its own work. To deal with the biased incentives that may arise, payments to external auditors for non-audit services will be required to be made public. Among other standards designed to contribute to auditor independence, mention may be made of the total prohibition of performing other types of tasks for their audit clients or a great restriction on the nature of these, the mandatory rotation of these professionals (among partners or, in some cases, among audit firms), the establishment of a determined duration for their appointment, joint audits, the temporary impossibility for the company to hire a former auditor and the prohibition that auditors and those dependent on them have financial interests or hold management positions in the companies they supervise. In some countries, a strategy of direct regulation is chosen and the percentage of revenue that an auditor can obtain from non-audit services provided to a client is limited, or the total percentage of an auditor's profits that can come from one company is restricted.
In some countries, the pressing need has arisen to ensure that audit professionals are competent. As good practice, there may be a registration procedure for auditors that allows verifying their qualification. However, this measure will be complemented by continuous training and monitoring of work experience in order to ensure an adequate level of professional competence and skepticism.
D. External auditors will be accountable to shareholders and will commit to the company to act with due professional diligence during the performance of the audit.
It is considered good practice that external auditors have been recommended by an independent audit committee of the Board of Directors, or by an equivalent body, and that the external auditors are appointed either by this body or committee or by the Shareholders' Meeting directly, since this emphasizes that these professionals will be accountable to shareholders. Likewise, it is emphasized that external auditors acquire a commitment to act with due professional diligence before the company, and not with one or several of the directors with whom they interact during the performance of their work."[7]
That, continuing with the evaluation of the other Sanction Criteria, it should be noted that with regard to the seriousness of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal interest, this refers to the seriousness of the damage that is directly linked to the impairment of market transparency, a protected legal interest, which when transgressed affects the public interest. In the present case, the Issuer, by not communicating as a material event the start date of the audit work for fiscal year 2020, affected said protected legal interest;
That, with respect to the harm caused and impact on the market, due to the nature of the infringement committed, it has not been possible to have elements or evidence that allow affirming that the non-compliance in effect produced a quantifiable harm, understood as an economic damage caused to one or several investors. However, we must highlight that this does not exclude the configuration of a qualitative or reputational harm for the securities market regarding the degree to which participants comply with established rules, and especially those rules clearly and directly related to market transparency and investor protection;
That, as for the illegally obtained benefit, in the present case it has not been possible to obtain evidence or elements that allow indicating whether the infringement committed by the Issuer generated or not an illicit benefit;
That, with regard to the probability of detection of the infringement, we must indicate that the verification of the communication as a material event of the start date of the audit work is carried out through the reports and analysis of controls that are the result of the systematization of the monitoring processes of material events of issuers that are disseminated in the securities market; and therefore, the probability of detection of this type of non-compliance cannot be measured reliably;
That, as for the intentionality in the offender's conduct, it has not been possible to obtain evidence or elements that allow concluding that in the commission of the infringement, the Issuer acted with malice or intentionality. On the other hand, in accordance with the Issuer's acceptance of responsibility, a lack of due diligence is evidenced, since it is aware, first, that the start date of the audit work must be communicated as a material event; and second, that the deadline for doing so is as soon as such event occurs or is known;
That, in light of the Sanction Criteria, that is, that the Issuer has no prior record or repeat offender status, no economic harm and serious market repercussion could be measured, no illegal benefit could be determined and there was no malice in the commission of the infringement; and in addition, taking into account the fact that the Issuer in its writing of May 3, 2022 has acknowledged the commission of the infringement imputed in the Charge Letter; it has been considered that in this PAS, by exception, the provisions of the second paragraph of article 25 of the Sanctions Regulation[8] apply; since, in this case, it is noted that there would be no proportionality between the sanction to be imposed (fine of not less than twenty-five (25) UIT and up to fifty (50) UIT); therefore, all these elements must be taken into account in order to impose a sanction corresponding to a lower classification than the one provided;
That, it is considered that in application of the principle of reasonableness and in accordance with what is indicated in the Report, in the present specific case of the Issuer, it corresponds to impose a fine sanction of the range corresponding to minor infractions, which according to article 35 of the Sanctions Regulation are punishable with a warning or a fine of not less than one (1) UIT and up to twenty-five (25) UIT;
That, finally, in light of said principle of reasonableness referred to above, which states that the measure imposed (sanction) be proportional, the IGCC through its Report has recommended that a fine of five (5) UIT, equivalent to S/ 21,500.00 (Twenty-One Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Soles), be imposed for the non-compliance committed that was the subject of the Charge Letter, it being necessary to reiterate that the Report is not binding on this Deputy Superintendency[9];
That, regarding the recommendations of the Report, although we share the essence of the analysis carried out by the IGCC regarding the configuration of the non-compliance of the charge developed in the Report and that the sanction to be imposed should be a fine corresponding to the level of minor infractions (from one (1) to twenty-five (25) UIT), we do not share it regarding the amount of the fine initially proposed by the IGCC for this PAS before applying the fifty percent (50%) reduction of the sanction for having acknowledged the commission of the infringement as indicated in the Report;
That, from the analysis of the Sanction Criteria detailed in the preceding recitals and from the evaluation carried out by this Deputy Superintendency developed and set forth in this Resolution, it has been possible to determine the responsibility of the Issuer for not communicating as a material event the start date of the audit work for fiscal year 2020; and having verified that in this PAS, as a result of the non-communication of the information subject of the Charge Letter, a serious impairment has occurred to the legal interests protected by the securities market rules (market transparency, investor protection, public interest, confidence of market participants), it has been determined that it corresponds to impose on the Issuer, for not communicating the material event, a total fine of 10 UIT[10], equivalent to S/ 43,000.00 (Forty-Three Thousand and 00/100 Soles);
That, in this regard, it should be noted that article 26 of the Sanctions Regulation[11] provides that the following constitute mitigating conditions: (i) the offender's acknowledgment of responsibility expressly and in writing, once the administrative sanctioning procedure has begun; (ii) the offender's contribution to the clarification of the infringement; and (iii) the remediation carried out after its requirement or the beginning of the administrative sanctioning procedure;
That, as indicated above, the Issuer stated in its writing of February 3, 2022 that it assumed its responsibility expressly and in writing regarding the imputed charge. Thus, since its request was submitted within the period granted for the submission of defenses, a reduction of fifty percent (50%) of the sanction corresponds to be applied, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 1 of literal a) of article 26 of the Sanctions Regulation;
That, in that sense, the fine initially determined in this Resolution is reduced by up to 50%, which represents five (5) UIT equivalent to S/ 21,500.00 (Twenty-One Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Soles);
That, therefore, this Deputy Superintendency considers that it corresponds to impose on the Issuer as a sanction a fine amounting to five (5) UIT equivalent to S/ 21,500.00 (Twenty-One Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Soles), for not having communicated as a material event the start date of the audit work for fiscal year 2020;
ON THE NEED TO ISSUE A CORRECTIVE MEASURE
That, in the evaluation of this PAS it has been determined that the serious infringement committed by the Issuer, referring to the fact that it did not comply with communicating the start date of activities of its audit firm for fiscal year 2020, has generated harm to the public interest, to the transparency of information and to investor protection, as set forth in this Resolution;
That, it is the duty of the Superintendency of the Securities Market – SMV to do what is necessary so that the market knows the consequences that have been generated for the Issuer regarding the infringement it has incurred. Thus, it corresponds to the Superintendency of the Securities Market – SMV to apply a measure that prevents more time from passing without the market knowing the consequences that have been generated for the Issuer. This is for the purpose of respecting the principle of timeliness. In addition, it corresponds to reinforce the transparency of information and investor protection, which are two (02) of the fundamental principles of the securities market that the Superintendency of the Securities Market – SMV must safeguard;
That, it must be reiterated that this PAS refers to the fact that the Issuer did not comply with communicating the start date of the activities of its audit firm for fiscal year 2020; therefore, in light of what is set forth in this Resolution, it is necessary and timely for the market to know about the result of the evaluation of said infringement, even if it is the pronouncement of the first administrative instance of the Superintendency of the Securities Market – SMV;
That, in that line of reasoning, having determined in this PAS that the Issuer has affected the transparency of information of the securities market and the protection of its investors, it is necessary to issue an administrative measure, in addition to the imposition of a sanction for the determined infringement. Said additional measure must have the purpose of correcting, repairing or attempting to repair the altered situation;
That, in accordance with article 1 of both the LOSMV and the LMV, it is the purpose and duty of the Superintendency of the Securities Market – SMV "to ensure the adequate protection of investors". Thus, article 1 of the LOSMV provides:
"Article 1. Definition, purpose and functions of the Superintendency of the Securities Market (SMV)
*The Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV) is a specialized technical body attached to the Ministry of Economy and Finance whose purpose is to safeguard investor protection, the efficiency and transparency of the markets under its supervision, the correct formation of prices and the dissemination of all information necessary for such purposes, through regulation, supervision and promotion. It has legal personality under internal public law and enjoys functional, administrative, economic, technical and budgetary autonomy, constituting a budget unit. Its operation is governed in accordance with the provisions contained in this Law and its organization and functions regulations. The functions of the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV) are the following: (...)" (Underlining and emphasis added)
"Article 1.- Purpose and Scope of the Law.- The purpose of this law is to promote the orderly development and transparency of the securities market, as well as the adequate protection of the investor.
Public offerings of securities and their issuers, publicly offered securities, brokerage agents, stock exchanges, securities clearing and settlement institutions, securitization companies, mutual investment funds in securities, investment funds and, in general, the other participants in the securities market, as well as the supervision and control body, are included in this law. Unless expressly stated otherwise, its provisions do not reach private offerings of securities. (...)"
"Article 7.- Control and Supervision.
The Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y Valores (CONASEV) is the public institution entrusted with the supervision and control of compliance with this law. (...)" (Underlining and emphasis added)
"Article 358.- Precautionary, provisional and corrective measures
CONASEV is empowered to issue precautionary, provisional and corrective measures with respect to natural or legal persons under its competence, regardless of whether or not a sanctioning procedure has been initiated. (...)" (Underlining and emphasis added)
"Article 19.- DEFINITION.- Corrective measures are those mandates aimed at restoring, reversing, repairing, or restituting that situation altered by the breach of the regulations under the supervision of the SMV. These measures may be issued prior to the initiation of an administrative sanctioning procedure or at the time of the determination of administrative responsibility.
Corrective measures may consist of obligations to give, do and not do, and must precisely and indubitably establish the task incumbent upon the administered party, identifying those obliged to comply with it. Corrective measures must be issued by means of a duly reasoned decision and observing the principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness." (Underlining and emphasis added)
"Article 251. -Determination of responsibility
251.1 Administrative sanctions imposed on the administered party are compatible with the issuance of corrective measures conducive to ordering the restoration or repair of the situation altered by the infraction to its previous state, including that of the affected goods, as well as with compensation for the damages and losses caused, which are determined in the corresponding judicial process. Corrective measures must be previously typified, be reasonable and adjust to the intensity, proportionality and needs of the legally protected interests that are intended to be guaranteed in each specific case. (...)" (Underlining and emphasis added).
"ANNEX XX
On Corrective Measures
In accordance with the provisions of article 21 of the Regulation, the SMV, when determining administrative responsibility, may issue the following corrective measures:
(...)"
2) The presentation as a material event of the information determined by the SMV."
"ARTICLE 43.- The specific functions of the Superintendencia Adjunta de Supervisión de Conductas de Mercados are:
(...)
12. To issue, modify or revoke precautionary, corrective and/or provisional measures, ex officio or at the request of a party, in the cases submitted to its knowledge; (...)". (Underlining and emphasis added)
"ARTICLE 43.- The specific functions of the Superintendencia Adjunta de Supervisión de Conductas de Mercados are:
(...)
13. Within the scope of its competence, to impose sanctions in the first administrative instance for the commission of infractions whose compliance control corresponds to the Superintendencia Adjunta de Supervisión de Conductas de Mercados, with the exception of infractions of the rules on the timeliness of the presentation of periodic or occasional information. The respective sanction resolution may order the application of corrective measures aimed at reversing the situation altered by the commission of the infraction; (...)" (Underlining and emphasis added);
In accordance with the provisions of numerals 12, 13 and 36 of article 43 of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF;
RESOLVES:
Register, communicate and publish.
Roberto Pereda Gálvez
Deputy Superintendent
Superintendencia Adjunta de Supervisión de Conductas de Mercados
In article 245 of the TUO of the LPAG, the following are indicated as forms or modes in which the inspection activity could be concluded: 1) Constancia de conformidad de la actividad desarrollada por el administrado; 2) Recomendación de mejoras o correcciones de la actividad desarrollada por el administrado; 3) La advertencia de la existencia de incumplimientos no susceptibles de ameritar la determinación de responsabilidades administrativas; 4) La recomendación del inicio de un procedimiento con el fin de determinar las responsabilidades administrativas que correspondan; 5) La adopción de medidas correctivas y 6) Otras formas según lo establezcan las leyes especiales. ↑
"Article 9.- PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF SUPERVISION ACTIONS
(...)
When such bodies conclude that there are sufficient indications of possible administrative infractions, they refer the corresponding reports to the Intendencias Generales de Cumplimiento, which determine whether or not it is appropriate to initiate an administrative sanctioning procedure. If so, the Intendencias Generales de Cumplimiento may conduct additional inspections or investigations of the reported indications.
(...)". ↑
"Article 26.- MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR INFRACTIONS
The following constitute mitigating conditions of responsibility for infractions:
a) Recognition of responsibility by the offender expressly and in writing, once the administrative sanctioning procedure has been initiated.
When the applicable sanction is a fine, it is reduced, taking into account the following:
1. If the recognition of the infraction is presented within the period granted for the presentation of defenses, the reduction amount will be fifty percent (50%).
2. If the recognition is presented after the expiration of the period granted for the presentation of defenses and before the expiration of the period granted to formulate allegations to the instruction report, the reduction amount will be thirty percent (30%).
3. If the recognition is presented after the expiration of the period granted to formulate allegations to the instruction report and up to before the issuance of the sanction resolution, the reduction amount will be ten percent (10%).
(...)." (Underlining and emphasis added). ↑
File No. 2020025334.
Web link: https://www.smv.gob.pe/ConsultasP8/documento.aspx?vidDoc={00078373-0000-CB1D-BC00-42C234410037} ↑
Files Nos. 2021011255, 2021007378 and 2021011258. ↑
See: OECD and G20 Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Editions, Paris. Available at web link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264259171-es ↑
The underlinings are added. ↑
"Article 25.- SANCTION CRITERIA
(...)
When, from the evaluation of the aforementioned criteria, it is noted that there is no proportionality between the sanction to be imposed and the imputed facts, by exception and by reasoned resolution, a sanction corresponding to a lower classification than that provided may be imposed." ↑
In this regard, it is necessary to point out that in recital 49 of Superintendent Resolution No. 083-2021-SMV/02 of August 24, 2021 (File No. 2018044191), which is a second and final administrative instance resolution, it is indicated: "49. That, although the instructing body may make recommendations on the graduality of the sanction to be imposed, it is the sanctioning body that finally weighs the facts that constitute the presumed infractions, qualifies them and grades them, according to the assessment made, and the recommendation of the instructing body cannot be considered binding for the sanctioning body" ↑
Value of the UIT (2020): S/ 4 300 (Supreme Decree No. 380-2019-EF). ↑
"Article 26.- MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR INFRACTIONS
The following constitute mitigating conditions of responsibility for infractions:
a) Recognition of responsibility by the offender expressly and in writing, once the administrative sanctioning procedure has been initiated.
When the applicable sanction is a fine, it is reduced, taking into account the following:
1. If the recognition of the infraction is presented within the period granted for the presentation of defenses, the reduction amount will be fifty percent (50%).
2. If the recognition is presented after the expiration of the period granted for the presentation of defenses and before the expiration of the period granted to formulate allegations to the instruction report, the reduction amount will be thirty percent (30%).
3. If the recognition is presented after the expiration of the period granted to formulate allegations to the instruction report and up to before the issuance of the sanction resolution, the reduction amount will be ten percent (10%).
The recognition of responsibility regarding an infraction must be made precisely, concisely, clearly, expressly and unconditionally, and must not contain ambiguous or contradictory expressions; otherwise, it will not be understood as a recognition. If defenses are presented, despite having made a recognition of responsibility, it will be understood as a non-recognition, and the authority will proceed to evaluate the defenses.
b) Contribution of the offender to the clarification of the infraction.
c) The correction made after its requirement or the initiation of the administrative sanctioning procedure." ↑
"Article 45.- The Intendencia General de Supervisión de Conductas depends hierarchically and functionally on the Superintendencia Adjunta de Supervisión de Conductas de Mercados, and has under its supervision scope the entities mentioned in article 42 of this Regulation, with respect to which it has competence for their supervision, evaluation and for the granting of authorizations and registrations, with the exception of those reserved for other bodies, as well as for the detection and investigation of practices and conducts that threaten the integrity or transparency of the markets.
Likewise, this organic unit is competent for the supervision of public offerings and the information presented by issuers, as well as with respect to actions linked to the registrations and exclusions of securities and programs in the Public Registry of the Securities Market and, if applicable, their registration in the centralized negotiation mechanism. Such attributions are not exercised with respect to those entities under the competence of the Intendencia General de Supervisión de Entidades". (Underlining and emphasis added). ↑
"Article 46.- The specific functions of the Intendencia General de Supervisión de Conductas are:
(...)
17. To conduct and carry out the supervision and monitoring of the entities under its competence with a risk-based approach;
(...)
43. Others that are delegated or entrusted to it by the Superintendent, the Board of Directors, the Superintendencia Adjunta de Supervisión de Conductas de Mercados or are assigned to it by substantive legislation." ↑
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The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01 (hereinafter, Sanctions Regulation)”
“Regulation of Organization and Functions of the Superintendency of the Securities Market, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF”
“modified by SMV Resolution No. 016-2015-SMV/01”
“Material Events Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 005-2014-SMV/01”
“Policy on Dissemination of Regulatory Projects... approved by SMV Resolution No. 014-2014-SMV/01”
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