SMV Deputy Superintendency Resolution
No. 019-2014-SMV/10
Summary: Larraín Vial Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. is sanctioned with a fine of three (03) UIT amounting to S/. 10,950.00 (Ten Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Nuevos Soles) for having incurred an infraction typified in subsection 1.14 of numeral 1 of Annex XIX of the Sanctions Regulations by transgressing provisions of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.
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| Administered entity | : | Larraín Vial Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. |
| Subject | : | Administrative sanctioning procedure |
| File No. | : | 2012026812 |
The Deputy Superintendent of Prudential Supervision
WHEREAS:
Administrative file No. 2012026812, Report No. 568-2013-SMV/10.3 issued by the General Intendancy of Prudential Compliance, as well as the defenses presented by Larraín Vial Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.; and,
CONSIDERING:
- Pursuant to Article 1 of Law No. 29782, Law for the Strengthening of Supervision of the Securities Market, the name of the National Supervisory Commission of Companies and Securities (CONASEV) is replaced by that of the Superintendency of the Securities Market (SMV), so that any reference in legal norms to CONASEV shall be understood as the SMV;
- Facts
- As a result of the supervisory actions carried out by this Superintendency of the Securities Market and under the provisions of the Law of General Administrative Procedure, Law No. 27444 and its amending norms (hereinafter, LPAG), through Official Letter No. 4394-2012-SMV/10.3, notified on October 26, 2012, an administrative sanctioning procedure was initiated against Larraín Vial Sociedad Agente de Bolsa (hereinafter, Larraín Vial SAB), insofar as it would have committed an infraction of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 033-2011-EF/94.10 (hereinafter, PLAFT Rules), since it would not have observed the provisions of Article 20, numeral 20.1, which provides that the compliance officer must be exclusively dedicated; as well as the provisions of numeral 20.2 of the aforementioned article, which establishes that the referred officer must have a direct employment relationship with the obligated subject;
- Given the above, on November 15, 2012, Larraín Vial SAB proceeded to submit its respective defenses;
- The charges formulated, as well as the defenses presented by Larraín Vial SAB, have been evaluated in Report No. 568-2013-SMV/10.3 of June 7, 2013, which has been submitted to the knowledge of this Deputy Superintendency;
- In observance of the Principle of Due Process contemplated both in Article IV, subsection 1, numeral 1.2 of the Preliminary Title and in Article 230, subsection 2 of the LPAG, through Official Letter No. 2666-2013-SMV/10 notified on June 11, 2013, the administrative file pertaining to this resolution was made available to Larraín Vial SAB for its corresponding review;
- Issues to be determined
- In this administrative procedure, in the opinion of this Deputy Superintendency, it corresponds to determine the following:
- Whether Larraín Vial SAB incurred or not in infraction of the provisions of Article 20, numerals 20.1 and 20.2 of the PLAFT Rules, by not having a compliance officer exclusively dedicated and by not maintaining the latter a direct employment relationship with the stock brokerage firm;
- Whether or not it corresponds to impose a sanction on Larraín Vial SAB;
- Analysis
- Of the applicable regulations
- Article 19 of the PLAFT Rules states that the Board of Directors and the General Manager of the obligated subjects to report, or their equivalent organs, in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of the Regulations of the Law that creates the Financial Intelligence Unit – Peru, Law No. 27693 (hereinafter, Law), shall be responsible for implementing in the companies they represent, the system to detect suspicious operations of money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as designating exclusively dedicated a compliance officer who will be responsible together with them, for overseeing compliance with the system;
- With regard to the aforementioned, Article 20, numeral 20.1 of the PLAFT Rules establishes that in accordance with the provisions of literal a. of numeral 10.2.1 of Article 10 of the Law, and numeral 20.1 of Article 20 of its regulations, the Compliance Officer is the exclusively dedicated official, designated by the Board of Directors and the General Manager of the obligated subject, responsible together with them, for overseeing compliance with the money laundering and terrorist financing system within the obligated subject. Likewise, numeral 20.2 of the aforementioned Article 20 provides that the Compliance Officer must have a direct employment relationship with the obligated subject;
- On the other hand, Article 22, numeral 22.3 of the PLAFT Rules establishes that among the assumptions for exclusion from the obligation to designate an exclusively dedicated Compliance Officer, there are the obligated subjects during the first six (06) months of having obtained the operating authorization, specifying that after said period they must adapt to the corresponding requirement, considering the criteria established in the regulations;
- The non-observance of the obligations described above is sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of Annex XIX, numeral 1, subsection 1.14 of the Sanctions Regulations, which describes, as an infraction of a serious nature: “Incurring in acts or omissions that constitute non-compliance with any of the provisions established in the norms on prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing”;
- Of the Formulated Charge
- Through Official Letter No. 4394-2012-SMV/10.3, notified on October 26, 2012, charges were formulated against Larraín Vial SAB for not having an exclusively dedicated compliance officer with a direct employment relationship;
- The imputed charge was based on the fact that Larraín Vial SAB obtained the operating authorization as a stock brokerage firm on July 6, 2011 (date on which CONASEV Resolution No. 052-2011-EF/94.01.1 granting the operating authorization entered into force). Therefore, the exclusion from the obligation to designate an exclusively dedicated Compliance Officer, established in Article 22, numeral 22.3, literal c) of the PLAFT Rules, for a period of 06 months from the operating authorization, expired on January 6, 2012, so that as of January 7, 2012, Larraín Vial SAB had to have an exclusively dedicated Compliance Officer;
- However, at the date of notification of charges, the Compliance Officer of Larraín Vial SAB was the one designated in the Board of Directors session of July 7, 2011 (hereinafter, Compliance Officer of July 2011) who also held the position of Corporate Risk Manager of the Larraín Vial economic group in Chile, according to the information presented by the stock brokerage firm, so that he would have been exercising the functions of Compliance Officer in a non-exclusive manner, thus failing to comply with the provisions of Article 20, numeral 20.1 of the PLAFT Rules;
- Likewise, taking into account that on October 1, 2011, the PLAFT Rules entered into force, the Compliance Officer of Larraín Vial SAB, as of that date, had to have a direct employment relationship with the company, however, from the information submitted by the stock brokerage firm, it was not evidenced that the Compliance Officer of July 2011 maintained a direct employment relationship with Larraín Vial SAB, consequently he would have failed to observe the provisions of Article 20, numeral 20.2 of the PLAFT Rules;
- Of the Defenses presented
- The right of Larraín Vial SAB to due administrative procedure - The imputed infraction does not comply with the principle of typicity
- Larraín Vial SAB makes an analysis of the principles that guide the administrative sanctioning procedure referring to the principles related to due process, as well as that of culpability, legality, typicity, as basic principles of sanctioning law; therefore, in that context, it states that said principles must be taken into account at the time of analyzing the facts and the imputations made, since their non-observance would imply a violation of the due sanctioning procedure;
- On the other hand, in order to delimit the scope of the principle of typicity, recognized in Article 230 of the LPAG, it states that “(…) the principle of typicity constitutes ‘the precise definition of the conduct that the law considers as a fault’. As indicated by the Constitutional Court, the principle of typicity constitutes a requirement of the general principle of legality, that is, a necessary complement of said principle that seeks to delimit the conducts susceptible to sanction;
- In accordance with the aforementioned, it states that “(…) this principle falls on the precise definition of the conducts susceptible to sanction, that is, on a detailed and complete description of the infracting conduct, which provides the administered with the necessary legal certainty to decide what conducts it can carry out and what would be the specific consequences of their realization, thus making possible a reasoned exercise of its right to freedom”;
- By virtue of the indicated, it states that the use of generic formulas allows an enormous margin of discretion when assessing the existence of illicit conducts. Likewise, on the matter it states that the Constitutional Court in the judgment issued in file No. 2192-2004-AA/TC stated the following:
“In the present case, the challenged resolution that establishes the maximum possible sanction in the administrative venue, that is, the dismissal of the appellants, has as legal support Article 28, subsections a) and b) of Legislative Decree No. 276, which establishes that: ‘(…) are disciplinary faults that, according to their gravity, can be sanctioned with temporary cessation or with dismissal, prior administrative process: a) the non-compliance with the norms established in this law and its regulations; and d) Negligence in the performance of functions.
This Court considers that the two provisions invoked in the resolution that establishes the dismissal from their jobs of the appellants are referral clauses that require, on the part of the municipal administration, the development of normative regulations that allow delimiting the scope of action of the sanctioning power, due to the degree of indeterminacy and imprecision of the same; consequently, the sanction imposed based on these generic provisions is unconstitutional, for violating the principle enshrined in Article 2, subsection 24, literal d) of the Constitution, in accordance with the criteria developed in the preceding grounds”.
- In that sense, it states that the scope of the conducts susceptible to sanction, such as those contained in the SMV Sanctions Regulations, must be precisely and clearly delimited, since only in this way the administered will be able to take into account the actions proscribed by the applicable regulations. Therefore, they consider that the infraction imputed to the company, contained in Annex XIX, numeral 1, subsection 1.14 of the Sanctions Regulations, is a case of a blank typifying norm, a modality, according to Larraín Vial SAB, proscribed by the doctrine, regulations and jurisprudence of administrative sanctioning law;
- denial by Larraín Vial SAB of having incurred in the imputed infraction
- Larraín Vial SAB states that it did not incur in the imputed infraction, insofar as the PLAFT Rules were not applicable to it, since the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as Corporate Compliance Officer of Larraín Vial SAB was made under the validity of the Rules for the Prevention of Money Laundering and/or Terrorist Financing, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 087-2006-EF/94.10 (hereinafter, Old NPLAFT);
- In this sense, it specifies that the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 was made correctly in accordance with the provisions of the Old NPLAFT, so that, based on the principle of non-retroactivity of norms, it cannot be required that said designation adapt to the requirements set forth in the PLAFT Rules;
- The principle of non-retroactivity of norms
- Larraín Vial SAB mentions that our legal system has adhered to the theory of fulfilled facts or immediate application of the norm, for which it cites Article 103 of the Political Constitution of Peru, which establishes that the law, from its entry into force, applies to the consequences of existing legal relations and situations and does not have retroactive force or effects; stating that the violation of said principle implies serious consequences for the development of due administrative procedure and that the retroactive application of a norm can modify the legal qualification of the infraction, or even sanction conducts that when carried out were legitimate;
- The Old NPLAFT were the applicable norms to the designation of the Compliance Officer of Larraín Vial SAB, not the PLAFT Rules
- Larraín Vial SAB states that since its operating authorization entered into force on July 6, 2011, the norm in force and therefore applicable was the Old NPLAFT; this insofar as the PLAFT Rules entered into force only as of October 1, 2011;
- In this sense, it states that the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 had to be subject to the norms in force at that time, that is, to those contained in the Old NPLAFT. Likewise, it indicates that the referred officer was designated correctly in accordance with the requirements of the Old NPLAFT. Therefore, it states that it cannot be alleged that it incurred in infraction for not having complied with the requirements of the compliance officer contained in the PLAFT Rules, since said norm was not in force at the date on which the Compliance Officer of July 2011 was designated;
- On the other hand, Larraín Vial SAB alleges that applying the requirements established in the PLAFT Rules to the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 would imply the retroactive application of the norm, which would constitute a violation of the general principle of non-retroactivity, which derives from the theory of fulfilled facts, according to which a new norm can only be applied immediately to those facts that occur after its entry into force, and not retroactively to those facts that occurred previously;
- It adds in that sense, that it is intended to impute the commission of an infraction because it did not adapt to the provisions of numerals 20.1 and 20.2 of Article 20 and numeral 22.3, literal c) of Article 22 of the PLAFT Rules regarding the designation of its compliance officer, despite the fact that such designation occurred on July 7, 2011, that is, when the requirements applicable to the compliance officer were those established in the Old NPLAFT; therefore, it is intended to apply retroactively to Larraín Vial SAB the requirements established in the PLAFT Rules;
- According to what was alleged by Larraín Vial SAB, it could not be required, on the basis of the principle of immediate application of norms, to adapt the designation of its compliance officer to the requirements established in the PLAFT Rules, since the referred principle would only determine that the aforementioned norms should be applicable at the time of designating a new Compliance Officer by it, and on the contrary, they should not be applied to an already consummated fact, such as the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 that observed the normative requirements of the Old NPLAFT;
- Likewise, it indicates that the only way in which it could have been obliged to adapt to the requirements established in the PLAFT Rules would be in the case that said norms had established a transitional provision that obliged the stock brokerage firm to make said adaptation within a determined period, which, according to Larraín Vial SAB, has not been established in the PLAFT Rules unlike the Old NPLAFT, in which it was expressly provided that the obligated subjects had to adapt to the requirements of the Compliance Officer provided in the referred Old NPLAFT;
- The designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as Corporate Compliance Officer was made in accordance with the requirements provided in the requirements provided in the Old NPLAFT
- Larraín Vial SAB states that the Compliance Officer of July 2011 was correctly designated as Corporate Compliance Officer in accordance with the following arguments:
c.1 Designation as Corporate Compliance Officer
- Insofar as the Compliance Officer of July 2011 was designated as Corporate Compliance Officer, it corresponded to apply Article 24 of the Old NPLAFT, according to which the Board of Directors of Larraín Vial SAB was empowered to designate a Corporate Compliance Officer, in case it was part of an economic group;
- In this sense, the stock brokerage firm adds that in its Board of Directors session of July 7, 2011, it was expressly stated that the Compliance Officer of July 2011 had the position of Corporate Risk Manager within the Larraín Vial economic group to which Larraín Vial SAB belongs, exercising the position of Compliance Officer within said economic group full-time. Likewise, Larraín Vial SAB states that in addition to having been correctly designated as Corporate Compliance Officer, the Compliance Officer of July 2011 complied with the requirements established in Article 23 of the Old NPLAFT;
- Finally, Larraín Vial SAB indicates that even though it timely communicated to the SMV the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as its Corporate Compliance Officer and attached the information required by Article 24 of the Old NPLAFT to obtain said authorization, the SMV did not rule at any time on the approval or disapproval of said designation, reason why it could not resort either to the UIF to obtain its respective conformity;
c.2 Exception to exclusive dedication in case of Corporate Compliance Officer
- Larraín Vial SAB states that Article 24 of the Old NPLAFT established that an obligated subject was empowered to designate a corporate compliance officer, when the designated person complies, among others, with the requirements established in Article 23 of the referred norms. Within the requirements established in the aforementioned Article 23, it is not included, according to what was stated by Larraín Vial SAB, that the corporate compliance officer has exclusive dedication, in the terms defined by said norm. Therefore, in the opinion of Larraín Vial SAB, it must be understood that when the Old NPLAFT referred to the designation of a Corporate Compliance Officer, it allowed that this could carry out other activities within the economic group to which it belonged, insofar as with respect to the entities subject to the provisions of the Old NPLAFT, its action was exclusively dedicated. Likewise, it affirms that the Law, when defining the Corporate Compliance Officer, does not include as one of the requirements of its designation being exclusively dedicated;
- It adds that said interpretation is confirmed when the PLAFT Rules modified the definition of “exclusive dedication”, since the current definition, unlike the Old NPLAFT, indicates that when the compliance officer is corporate, it must act with exclusive dedication with respect to its entire economic group. In this sense, they indicate that insofar as the Compliance Officer of July 2011 was designated as compliance officer under the provisions of the old norms, it was not necessary that it had exclusive dedication with respect to its other activities outside Larraín Vial SAB, insofar as with regard to said entity it did exercise the position exclusively;
- In this way, Larraín Vial SAB concludes that the Compliance Officer of July 2011 was correctly designated as corporate compliance officer;
c.3 The designated Compliance Officer did not require having a direct employment relationship with Larraín Vial SAB
- Larraín Vial SAB indicates that the Old NPLAFT did not contain any provision that established as a condition for the designation of compliance officer that it had a direct employment relationship with the obligated subject, unlike the provisions of numeral 20.2 of Article 20 of the PLAFT Rules; therefore, pretending to apply to the compliance officer designated by Larraín Vial SAB the requirement of having a direct employment relationship with the company would imply applying said norm retroactively to the designation of the compliance officer that was made under the Old NPLAFT;
- On the other hand, it reiterates that it could not be required to adapt the designation of the compliance officer already made to the requirements established in the PLAFT Rules since said norms do not establish transitional provisions that require the need to make said adaptation;
c.4 The term contemplated in Article 22.3, literal c) of the PLAFT Rules is not applicable with respect to the Compliance Officer designated by Larraín Vial SAB
- Larraín Vial SAB mentions that the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as corporate compliance officer was not made under the rule that allowed certain obligated subjects to be excluded from the obligation to designate a full-time compliance officer, but rather was designated as corporate compliance officer under Article 24 of the Old NPLAFT, a rule that, according to the stock brokerage firm, did not require full-time dedication of the corporate compliance officer;
- In that sense, it states that at no time did it avail itself of the assumption established in Article 22, paragraph 22.3, subparagraph c) of the AML/CFT Rules, so that attempting to apply the adaptation rule to obligated subjects that obtained their authorization to operate prior to the entry into force of the AML/CFT Rules would imply a retroactive application of the rule;
- Without prejudice to considering that they are not involved in the commission of an infraction, they request that the criteria set forth in Article 348 of the LMV and Article 230 of Law No. 27444, General Administrative Procedure Law, be taken into account, as well as the mitigating circumstances established in Article 236-A of the aforementioned law, which they develop in their brief;
- Evaluation of the Defenses
- Regarding Larraín Vial SAB's right to due administrative procedure - The imputed Infraction does not comply with the principle of typicity
- In administrative matters, the description of infraction conducts with rigorous precision is almost impossible; a fact recognized by doctrine[1], by establishing that typification is a requirement of legal certainty that is specified in the reasonable prediction of the legal consequences of the conduct, but does not imply a rigorous and perfect description of the infraction*;*
- In that sense, it should be noted that for Morón Urbina[2], "(…) it is considered contrary to the principle of typicity of infractions, to attempt to define punishable conducts, without providing the administered with sufficient information regarding the legal qualification of the infraction behavior; as well as imprecise and ambiguous qualifications, with open formulas, since their use entails the opening of an enormous margin of discretion when assessing the existence of unlawful conducts";
- That is, following Moron Urbina's comment "(…) the use of indeterminate legal concepts in the definition of the punishable conduct would not be contrary to the principle, in itself, as long as the concretion of such concepts is reasonably feasible by virtue of being referred to logical, technical or experience criteria, which allow foreseeing, with sufficient certainty, the nature and essential characteristics of the conducts constituting the typified infraction".
The unit of solution underlying the indeterminate legal concept makes its use in sanctioning norms, in principle, admissible, since when there is only one solution, the application of the norm does not entail a margin of discretion for the official in the definition of the punishable conduct" (Underlining added);
- From the foregoing it follows that the principle of typicity admits a certain degree of indeterminacy, lesser or greater depending on the case, as long as there exist in the legal system previously established criteria, such as legal provisions (as occurs in the present case), that provide clear and sufficient information about the behavior sought to be sanctioned, allowing to foresee with sufficient certainty the nature and characteristics of an infraction conduct, not leaving the administration a margin of discretion, since the collaboration of the aforementioned criteria allows only a single solution and not several possible solutions;
- It is in that sense that the Constitutional Court has ruled in File No. 2050-2002-AA/TTC, also cited by the stock brokerage firm, since it has recognized the possibility of resorting to regulatory collaboration in order to eliminate the risk of legal uncertainty, provided that independent regulations are not created and not clearly subordinate to the law, as expressed in the following text of the referred judgment:
"The principle of legality in sanctioning matters prevents attributing the commission of a fault if it is not previously determined in the law, and also prohibits applying a sanction if it is not also determined by law (…).
The principle of legality should not be identified with the principle of typicity. The first, guaranteed by ordinal "d" of subsection 24) of Article 2 of the Constitution, is satisfied when the provision of infractions and sanctions in the law is complied with. The second, on the other hand, constitutes the precise definition of the conduct that the law considers as a fault. Such precision of what is considered unlawful from an administrative point of view (…) is not subject to an absolute reserve of law, but can be complemented through the respective regulations (…)";
- Consequently, in order to comply with the principle of legality and the principle of typicity, it is sufficient that from the norm, the one containing the general description of the factual assumption, it is reasonably possible to extract the infraction conduct. In this sense, for the present case, the infraction types established in Annex XIX of the Sanctions Regulation are validly complemented with the AML/CFT Rules, which contain provisions that regulate the general and specific guidelines, requirements and other aspects related to the asset laundering and/or terrorist financing prevention system, supported in accordance with the scope of the Law and its regulation;
- Therefore, in the present case it is reasonably feasible to know what the sanctionable conduct is, since it is based on a totally objective criterion, given that according to the provisions of Article 20, paragraph 20.1 of the AML/CFT Rules —as also established in Article 20, paragraph 20.1 of the Old NPLAFT— it is the obligation of obligated subjects to designate a full-time Compliance Officer, unless they fall within the exceptions established in Article 22 of the referred norms. Therefore, not having a full-time compliance officer implies a totally objective non-compliance, which will be subject to a sanction previously determined in the Sanctions Regulation, since it is classified as an infraction of a serious nature. The same occurs with the provisions of paragraph 20.2 of the AML/CFT Rules, so that it does not leave to the discretion[3] of the administration to determine either the infraction or the sanction to be imposed, since they are clearly established in the norms;
- Having thus clarified the scope of the norms under analysis, it is clearly appreciated that they present a sufficient degree of determination to delimit the scope of non-compliance and its consequence and, in this way, to communicate to obligated subjects its scope, so we are not in a case of violation of the principle of typicity and therefore neither of the principle of legality;
- On the other hand, regarding what was resolved by the Constitutional Court in the Judgment in File No. 2192-2004-AA/TC, cited by Larraín Vial SAB, it should be mentioned that the Constitutional Court, when evaluating the specific case, stated that:
"(…), the challenged resolution that establishes the maximum possible sanction at the administrative level, that is, the dismissal of the appellants, has as legal support Article 28, subsections a) and d) of Legislative Decree No. 276,(…);
This Court considers that the two invoked provisions (…) are referral clauses that require, on the part of the administration (…), the development of regulatory regulations that allow delimiting the scope of action of the sanctioning power, due to the degree of indeterminacy and imprecision of the same; consequently, the sanction imposed based on these generic provisions is unconstitutional, for violating the principle enshrined in Article 2, subsection 24, literal d) of the Constitution, (…)";
- From the foregoing, it follows, first, that the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the judgment issued in File No. 2050-2002-AA/TTC, has also recognized the possibility of resorting to regulatory collaboration, by stating that said provisions (literals a) and d) of Article 28 of Legislative Decree No. 276) require, on the part of the administration, the development of regulatory regulations that allow it to delimit the scope of action of its sanctioning power. In that sense, in the invoked case, unlike the present case under analysis, there were no norms containing a general description of the factual assumption, and regarding which it is reasonably possible to extract the infraction conduct;
- Second, it is necessary to highlight that, unlike the case under analysis, the norm referred to in the Constitutional Court's judgment (Article 28[4] of Legislative Decree 276), provided that disciplinary faults may be sanctioned with dismissal or temporary suspension, according to their seriousness, and when regulating the degrees of sanction in its Article 27[5], it states that these degrees of sanction correspond to the magnitude of the faults according to their lesser or greater seriousness*,* which clearly leaves to the discretion of the administration to establish the seriousness of each infraction assumption, since it does not establish the qualification of the nature of the sanction. This situation does not occur in the case of the present resolution, since Annex XIX of the Sanctions Regulation has clearly provided the degree of sanction corresponding to the infraction typified in paragraph 1.14 of the referred Annex;
- Thus, there are substantive differences between the cases cited by Larraín Vial SAB and the one that is the subject of this procedure, since as has been noted, as long as there is a reasonable and sufficient degree of determination to delimit the conduct that constitutes an infraction and the punitive response that such infraction will merit, as occurs in the present case, the principle of typicity is not violated;
- Regarding the claim that Larraín Vial SAB would not have incurred the imputed Infraction
a) On the principle of non-retroactivity of norms, and b) Regarding the fact that the Old NPLAFT were the norms applicable to the designation of Larraín Vial SAB's Compliance Officer and not the AML/CFT Rules
- In this regard, as Larraín Vial SAB has pointed out, Article 103 of the Political Constitution of Peru establishes that: "Special laws may be issued because the nature of things so requires, but not by reason of the difference of persons. The Law, from its entry into force, applies to the consequences of existing legal relations and situations and has no force or retroactive effects; except, in both cases, in criminal matters when it favors the accused. The law is repealed only by another law. It also becomes ineffective by a judgment declaring its unconstitutionality. (…)";
- On the other hand, Article III of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code provides that "The Law applies to the consequences of existing legal relations and situations. It has no force or retroactive effects, except for the exceptions provided in the Political Constitution of Peru.";
- As can be seen, both the Political Constitution of Peru and Article III of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code regulate the principle of non-retroactivity of norms and thus the immediate application of the same has been established, that is, a given norm will be applicable to present or future facts, relations and legal situations[6] that occur while said norm is in force;
- In this line of ideas, based on the provisions of the referred norms, our legal system has adopted the theory of fulfilled facts in matters of application of norms in time. That is, the new law will have effects for legal relations and situations existing at the time of its entry into force, even if they derive from acts or facts that occurred previously. In this sense, Marcial Rubio[7], commenting on Article III of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, states that "This norm establishes in its first part, as a general rule, the conception corresponding to the theory of fulfilled facts, since it indicates that the new law has immediate application to existing legal relations and situations (…). That is, the new law begins to govern the consequences of situations and relations that were pre-existing to it";
- According to what has been expressed in the preceding recitals, a legal situation, even if it began previously and exists at the entry into force of the new norm, will be subject to its provisions, but only from the entry into force of the mentioned norm, thus leaving safe the legal effects that have been generated under the scope of the previous norms;
- In the present case, the SMV issued the resolution authorizing the operation of the stock brokerage firm on June 30, 2011, which entered into force on July 6 of that year (resolution published in the Official Gazette El Peruano on July 5, 2011);
- On the other hand, on July 7, 2011, the Board of Directors of Larraín Vial SAB designated the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as compliance officer of the company; consequently, at that date the Old NPLAFT were applicable, so the designation of Larraín Vial SAB's compliance officer should have been made considering the provisions established in said norms, as the stock brokerage firm rightly affirms;
- However, on October 1, 2011, the AML/CFT Rules entered into force, published in the Official Gazette El Peruano on May 22, 2011, which provided, among others, new requirements that obligated subjects must comply with;
- Therefore, although the designation of the compliance officer, as well as the other obligations in matters of asset laundering and/or terrorist financing prevention of Larraín Vial SAB, began under the validity of the Old NPLAFT, since the legal situation of the designation of the compliance officer, as well as other requirements made under the previous provisions, existed at the entry into force of the provisions of the AML/CFT Rules, these are applicable to said legal situations from their entry into force;
- In the sense expressed, it is about the immediate application of the norms to an existing situation derived from facts or acts that occurred previously, without altering the state that it maintained under the validity of the provisions of the old norms, as recognized by Article 103 of the Political Constitution of Peru and Article III of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code;
- On the other hand, it should be stated that both the Old NPLAFT and the AML/CFT Rules regulate procedures, obligations, among other aspects that all obligated subjects, such as stock brokerage firms, qualified as such in accordance with the Law, must comply with. The designation of the compliance officer being an obligation and not a right whose supervision and control is the responsibility of this Superintendency;
- Likewise, it should be specified that according to the charge imputation official letter, compliance with the requirements set forth by the AML/CFT Rules was observed for the designation of the compliance officer of the obligated subject, as of January 6, 2012, regarding full-time dedication, and as of October 1, 2011, regarding the direct employment relationship. Therefore, a retroactive application of the norms cannot be sustained in this case, since compliance with the requirements established in the AML/CFT Rules was not required in the period prior to the entry into force of said norms but rather to a situation existing at their entry into force, so it must be analyzed within the framework of the provisions of the referred norms, as has been specified throughout this analysis;
- On the other hand, Larraín Vial SAB states that it cannot be alleged, based on the principle of immediate application of norms, that it had to adapt the designation of its compliance officer to the requirements established by the AML/CFT Rules, since the referred principle would only determine that the aforementioned norms are applicable upon the designation of a new compliance officer, and not their application to an already consummated fact, such as the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as corporate Compliance Officer under the norms of the Old NPLAFT;
- As follows from the preceding recital, Larraín Vial SAB confuses the act of designating the compliance officer with the obligation to have a compliance officer who meets the requirements of the current regulations, in their capacity as such. In this sense, it should be noted that having a compliance officer designated before the entry into force of the AML/CFT Rules is a situation existing at the entry into force of said norms and not a consummated fact[8] as the company alleges, since it is not exhausted in itself but extends over time, therefore the requirements established in the current regulations are applicable to it, in accordance with the general rule of immediate application of norms;
- Regarding the argument by Larraín Vial SAB, in the sense that *"The only way in which LARRAIN VIAL could have been obliged to adapt its Compliance Officer to the new requirements established in the Current PLAFT would be if the Current PLAFT itself had established some transitional norm that obliged LARRAIN VIAL to make said adaptation within a determined period"; it should be noted that Article 109 of the Political Constitution of Peru provides that "The law is obligatory from the day following its publication in the official gazette, unless the law itself provides otherwise postponing its validity in whole or in part";
- From the foregoing, it can be seen that all norms enter into force obligatorily from the day following publication, unless the norm itself has provided to postpone or defer its validity in whole or in part. It should be noted that no mention is made of the obligation to establish provisions that expressly order adaptation to the new obligations, for them to enter into force;
- In that context, the AML/CFT Rules were issued on May 9, 2011, and published on May 22, 2011; however, according to the third article of CONASEV Resolution No. 033-2011-EF/94.10, which approves said norms, it was provided to postpone their validity in whole until October 1, 2011. Likewise, its fourth article provided for an express repeal as of October 1, 2011, of the Old NPLAFT. Consequently, as provided by the Political Constitution of Peru itself, the AML/CFT Rules entered into force obligatorily on October 1, 2011, so all obligated subjects are obliged to comply with their provisions as of that date;
- Additionally, it should be highlighted that since the validity of the AML/CFT Rules was postponed in its entirety until October 1, 2011, all obligated subjects were granted a period of more than four (04) months to adapt to the requirements established therein, without the need for an express provision in that regard, since the obligatory nature of the norms, as mentioned, is already provided by Article 109 of the Political Constitution of Peru;
- Likewise, it should be noted that unlike the AML/CFT Rules, the Old NPLAFT postponed the validity of part of their provisions, so it was necessary to expressly state regarding which provisions their validity had been deferred;
- As has been stated, the act of designating the compliance officer is not observed, but rather, since the supervisory body established provisions such as the AML/CFT Rules, these had to be complied with by all obligated subjects under its control and supervision, from their entry into force, which in the present case refers to the fact that from their validity, Larraín Vial SAB's compliance officer had to perform their functions on a full-time basis and have a direct employment relationship with the obligated subject in accordance with the provisions of said norms, so that in the present case the principle of non-retroactivity of norms has not been infringed as Larraín Vial SAB alleges;
- Without prejudice to the foregoing, it should be noted that the Old NPLAFT, in accordance with literal c) of Article 2, already established that for the compliance officer to comply with full-time dedication in the exercise of their functions, they could not hold another position in the obligated subject or in other companies of the economic group. This aspect will be analyzed later;
- Regarding the fact that the designation of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as Corporate Compliance Officer was made in accordance with the requirements provided in the Old NPLAFT
c.1 Regarding the designation as Corporate Compliance Officer
-
As has been stated, the act of designating the July 2011 Compliance Officer as compliance officer of Larraín Vial SAB is not observed; however, it is necessary to analyze what has been alleged in this regard, insofar as the company has stated that the July 2011 Compliance Officer "(…) was correctly designated as corporate compliance officer, in accordance with the former AML/CFT Rules" and that therefore article 24 of the former AML/CFT Rules was applicable to it;
-
On this point, as Larraín Vial SAB has correctly stated, paragraph 24.1 of article 24 of the Former AML/CFT Rules established that "When dealing with obligated subjects that form part of the same economic group, the Board of Directors of said companies may designate a natural person who serves as Corporate Compliance Officer (…) and has the approval of the CONASEV Line Management in charge of the supervision of the obligated subject and of the Executive Director of the UIF – Peru.";
-
Likewise, paragraph 24.2 of the aforementioned article provided that "In order to process the approval of the designation of the Corporate Compliance Officer, in the case of an obligated subject under the supervision of CONASEV that forms part of an economic group, the application must be accompanied by the following requirements (…)";
-
From the reading of both provisions it is clearly inferred that obligated subjects under the scope of supervision and control of the SMV that formed part of an economic group and considered themselves to have a corporate compliance officer had to submit the corresponding application accompanied by certain requirements in order to obtain, after evaluation, the respective authorization. Thus, without said authorization a corporate compliance officer could not have been validly designated;
-
In the present case, the July 2011 Compliance Officer, as stated by Larraín Vial SAB, held the position of Corporate Risk Manager within the Larraín Vial economic group in Chile;
-
Likewise, without prejudice to the analysis to be carried out later, it should be noted that from the review of the file submitted on July 20, 2011 by Larraín Vial SAB[9], it can be observed that although from the initial part of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of Larraín Vial SAB it is noted that the designation of the July 2011 Compliance Officer as corporate compliance officer was proposed, at the end of the same it is stated that the members of the Board of Directors agreed to the designation of the July 2011 Compliance Officer only as compliance officer, and not as corporate compliance officer*. * Now, if the text throughout the board meeting minutes generated any doubt, this was clarified by what the company itself expressed in the letter with which they communicate said designation, whose relevant part states that by means of the Board of Directors meeting of Larraín Vial SAB of July 7, 2011, the July 2011 Compliance Officer was designated as Compliance Officer of the company;
-
From the foregoing, it is observed that the same brokerage firm confirms that the designation of the July 2011 Compliance Officer was as compliance officer of the obligated subject and not of the economic group, especially since the application for the designation of a corporate compliance officer is not observed;
-
By way of complement, it should be added that as companies subject to the scope of supervision of the SMV, only Larraín Vial S.A. SAFI, as well as Larraín Vial SAB, were at that date and are currently, and both communicated the designation of their own compliance officer effective as of July 7, 2011; that is, the brokerage firm designated the July 2011 Compliance Officer as compliance officer; and the fund management company appointed a different person as compliance officer[10]; it not being specified in said communications that they were applications to have a corporate compliance officer;
-
In this sense, with regard to the argument that even though Larraín Vial SAB timely communicated to the SMV the designation of the July 2011 Compliance Officer " (…) as Corporate Compliance Officer of the company and attached the information required by article 24 of the Former AML/CFT Rules to obtain said authorization, the SMV did not rule (…) on the approval or disapproval of said designation, which is why the company could not resort to the UIF to obtain the respective conformity";
-
According to what has been stated, we were not and are not faced with a case established in article 24 of the Former AML/CFT Rules, relating to the designation of the Corporate Compliance Officer, so this institution could not have ruled on the matter;
c.2 Regarding exclusive dedication in the case of a Corporate Compliance Officer
-
According to the analysis carried out in the preceding recitals, it has been determined that we are not faced with a case of designation of a Corporate Compliance Officer; however, in order to clarify the content of the exclusive dedication of the compliance officer, whether corporate or not, it is necessary to evaluate what Larraín Vial SAB has argued in this regard;
-
According to Larraín Vial SAB, under the Former AML/CFT Rules an obligated subject was empowered to designate a corporate compliance officer when, among others, it complies with the requirements established in article 23 of said rules and that, "(…) among the requirements for the exercise of the functions of the Compliance Officer contemplated in article 23 of the Former AML/CFT Rules, the requirement that the Compliance Officer have exclusive dedication is not included; in the terms defined by said rule. We must understand, therefore, that the Former AML/CFT Rules, when referring to the designation of a corporate Compliance Officer, allowed the latter to carry out other activities within the economic group to which it belonged, to the extent that with respect to the entities subject to the provisions of the Former AML/CFT Rules, its performance was on an exclusive dedication basis. In the same sense, article 10.2.1. c) of Law No. 27693, (…), when defining the corporate Compliance Officer, does not include as one of the requirements of its designation that of exclusive dedication.";
-
In this regard, according to article 19 of the Former AML/CFT Rules[11], as well as the AML/CFT Rules, in accordance with the provisions of article 10, paragraph 10.2.1, subparagraph a. of the Law, as well as with article 19 of its Regulation, all companies that have the status of obligated subjects in accordance with the provisions of the Law, such as brokerage firms, have the obligation to designate a compliance officer with exclusive dedication.
-
Given the foregoing, the aforementioned obligation translates into a general rule that not only emanates from the Former AML/CFT Rules or the AML/CFT Rules but has its origin in the Law. The general rule of having exclusive dedication only admits as an exception being within the parameters established in subparagraph b. of paragraph 10.2.1 of article 10 of the Law[12]. Thus, only in those cases expressly established in the Law, which have been regulated both in article 22 of the Former AML/CFT Rules and in the AML/CFT Rules, is it possible for an obligated subject to have a compliance officer whose functions may be exercised on a non-exclusive basis, and as can be verified from said rules, the case relating to the corporate compliance officer is not among these exceptions;
-
Therefore, the Former AML/CFT Rules (as well as the AML/CFT Rules) could not have released obligated subjects from an obligation set forth in the Law, except in the cases of exception referred to in the preceding paragraph;
-
On the other hand, it should be noted that article 23 of the Former AML/CFT Rules, as well as article 23 of the AML/CFT Rules, do not refer to "exclusive dedication" as a requirement of the compliance officer, whereas exclusive dedication refers to the exercise of the functions and responsibilities required of the compliance officer, as established in subparagraph c) of article 2 of the Former AML/CFT Rules[13] and established in subparagraph f) of article 2 of the AML/CFT Rules;
-
In this sense, with regard to what was stated by Larraín Vial SAB, regarding the fact that "(…) under the Former AML/CFT Rules it was not required that the corporate Compliance Officer necessarily have exclusive dedication with respect to its activities within the economic group to which it belonged, (…)", it should be noted that, as stated in the preceding paragraphs, the performance of the functions of the compliance officer on an "exclusive dedication" basis is a requirement of the Law established as a general rule for all obligated subjects and only in the cases indicated by the same is it possible to exclude the subject from said obligation, so that subparagraph f) of article 2 of the AML/CFT Rules has only specified an obligation already established in the Law;
-
Consequently, as analyzed so far, in the present case, we are not faced with a case of a corporate compliance officer, but rather with the case of a compliance officer of an obligated subject such as Larraín Vial SAB, who both on the basis of the Former AML/CFT Rules as well as the AML/CFT Rules had to exercise its functions with exclusive dedication as regulated in subparagraph c) of article 2 of the Former AML/CFT Rules and in subparagraph f) of article 2 of the AML/CFT Rules; that is*,* to carry out its functions or responsibilities excluding the performance of any other function or position in the obligated subject or in other companies of the economic group*. * It should be highlighted that even in the case of the designation of a corporate compliance officer, the latter also had to exercise its functions with exclusive dedication as has been specified;
c.3 Regarding the fact that the designated compliance officer did not require a direct employment relationship with Larraín Vial SAB
-
In this regard, as analyzed above, as of October 1, 2011, the provisions established in the AML/CFT Rules entered into force and in that sense as of said date the compliance officer of all companies qualified as obligated subjects in accordance with the Law under the scope of supervision and control of the SMV had to comply with having a direct employment relationship with them, on the basis of the immediate application of the rules, which does not imply the retroactive application of the rules;
-
Regarding the mandatory nature of a transitional rule requiring the adaptation of the AML/CFT Rules, what was stated in recitals 67 to 73 of this resolution must be reiterated;
c.4 Regarding the term contemplated in article 22.3, subparagraph c) of the AML/CFT Rules
According to what has been set forth in the preceding recitals, the compliance officer designated by the obligated subject must perform its functions with exclusive dedication, unless it has obtained authorization for exclusion from said obligation, in accordance with the provisions of article 22 of both the Former AML/CFT Rules and the AML/CFT Rules; it being specified that subparagraph c) of article 2 of the Former AML/CFT Rules, as well as subparagraph f) of article 2 of the AML/CFT Rules, understand exclusive dedication as the "performance of functions or responsibilities required of the Compliance Officer excluding the performance of any other function or position in the obligated subject or in other companies of the economic group";
- In that order of ideas, Larraín Vial SAB did not have an exclusion authorization to which reference is made in the previous consideration; consequently, according to the Old NPLAFT (such as the Normative Rules for AML), in force on the date of appointment of the Compliance Officer of July 2011 as compliance officer of Larraín Vial SAB, it had to fulfill its functions with exclusive dedication, which not only implied not holding another position in the obligated subject but also not holding a position in another or other companies of the economic group. Therefore, the Compliance Officer of July 2011, by also serving as Corporate Risk Manager of the Larraín Vial economic group in Chile, was not fulfilling this obligation;
- In this context, on October 1, 2011, the Normative Rules for AML entered into force, which through its Article 22, numeral 22.3, literal c), granted to the obligated subjects under the supervision of the SMV, the authorization for temporary exclusion, for six (06) months from the issuance of the operating authorization, of the obligation to designate a compliance officer with exclusive dedication; that is, the obligated subjects who were within this assumption could have a compliance officer with non-exclusive dedication without the need for a requirement from the obligated subject. Thus, under the same basis of immediate application of the rules, this benefit was applied to Larraín Vial SAB as it was within the period established in the aforementioned article. Therefore, once the six (06) month period expired, Larraín Vial SAB had to comply with the requirement of exclusive dedication;
- Larraín Vial SAB states that at no time did it adopt the exception contemplated in literal c) of article 22.3 of the Normative Rules for AML, but rather, the designation of its corporate compliance officer was made under the scope of article 24 of the Old NPLAFT. It also specifies that it did not adopt this assumption, as the Compliance Officer of July 2011 was designated as the Corporate Compliance Officer of the company.
- Regarding the aforementioned, first of all, we are not in this case and even if this were the situation, the corporate compliance officer was not and is not exempt from the obligation to exercise his functions with exclusive dedication, as has been stated in the preceding considerations;
- Secondly, if Larraín Vial SAB did not adopt this exception, it should have had a compliance officer with exclusive dedication, and since this did not happen, it implies that the brokerage company society did not comply with having a compliance officer with exclusive dedication, according to what is established in both the Old PLAFT and the Normative Rules for AML, from July 7, 2011, to October 29, 2012, since a new Compliance Officer was designated on October 30 of that year, regarding which has not been evaluated in this procedure;
- According to the foregoing, it has been proven that Larraín Vial SAB did not comply with the provisions of article 20, numeral 20.1 and numeral 20.2 of the Normative Rules for AML, since the Compliance Officer of July 2011 in his capacity as compliance officer of Larraín Vial SAB had performed functions as Corporate Risk Manager of the Larraín Vial group in Chile, and since no support has been presented to prove the direct link with the brokerage company, it has incurred in the commission of one (01) serious infraction, typified in Annex XIX, numeral 1, subsection 1.14 of the Sanctions Regulations;
- Evaluation of the sanction
- From the foregoing, it has been determined that Larrain Vial SAB incurred in one (01) infraction typified in Annex XIX, numeral 1, subsection 1.14 of the Sanctions Regulations, which describes, as a serious infraction: “Incurring in acts or omissions that constitute non-compliance with any of the provisions established in the rules on the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing”;
- Regarding the criteria to be taken into account for imposing the sanction, we must point out that article 6 of the Sanctions Regulations establishes that the administrative sanctions imposed must take into account the criteria established in article 348 of the LMV and numeral 3 of article 230 of the Lpag, as well as the voluntary declaration of the commission of the infraction, the infractor's contribution to its clarification, and the attenuating factors of responsibility established in article 236°-A of the LPAG;
- Within this framework, the evaluation of the sanction must consider: a) Background of the offenders; b) The gravity of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal good, understood within the criterion of the LMV regarding the impact on the market and the damage caused; c) Any economic damage caused; d) Repetition and/or continuity in the commission of the infraction; e) The circumstances of the commission of the infraction; f) Any illegally obtained benefit; g) The existence or not of intentionality in the offender's conduct; h) The voluntary declaration of the commission of the infraction and the infractor's contribution to its clarification; i) The voluntary remediation of the act or omission constituting the infraction prior to the notification of the corresponding charges; and j) The error induced by the administration by a confused or illegal administrative act or provision;
- Regarding the background of the offender, in accordance with the provisions of article 17 of the Sanctions Regulations, in force at the time the evaluated infractions were committed, backgrounds constitute the sanctions imposed and that have become final during the three (03) years prior to the date on which the infractions were detected;
- On the other hand, according to article 17 of the Sanctions Regulations, in force, modified by SMV Resolution No. 006-2012-SMV.10.1, final sanctions imposed within the four (04) years prior to the commission of the infraction constitute backgrounds;
- After evaluating the background, it was determined that applying any of the previously mentioned hypotheses, Larraín Vial SAB does not present any infraction background;
- Regarding the gravity of the damage to the public interest and/or protected legal good, which includes the damage caused and the impact on the market, it has not been possible to prove that the action of Larraín Vial SAB in the commission of the evaluated infractions in the present procedure caused damage to the public interest, however, it is necessary to point out that as the securities market constitutes an important means of investment and financing, it is essential that the obligated subjects comply with all preventive measures against money laundering and terrorism financing;
- In this sense, it must be protected that no conduct, activity, or omission of compliance with any obligation can threaten the proper development and integrity of the market, as well as the protection of the investor and therefore the trust of its participants, legal goods protected by the securities market rules;
- Given the foregoing, it must be pointed out that the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing prevention system aims to allow obligated subjects to detect unusual operations and the timely prevention or detection of suspicious operations, carried out or intended to be carried out, with the objective of preventing and avoiding that the products and/or services they offer to the public are used for illicit purposes, linked to money laundering and/or terrorism financing;
- Therefore, under the guidelines of the Law and its regulations, norms have been issued that obligated subjects must comply with to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing, allowing obligated subjects to manage their money laundering risks through the establishment of procedures, policies, and controls detailed in the norms, as well as those linked to the timely detection and reporting of suspicious operations, such as the case of the Normative Rules for AML. In this sense, non-compliance with the aforementioned norms implies that the purpose of the anti-money laundering prevention system is not fully met, which does not allow for adequate prevention that must exist to safeguard the integrity of the market;
- Therefore, although no concrete damage to the public interest has been proven, the integrity of the market and the trust that investors have in it have been affected, as protected legal goods;
- Regarding the economic damage caused, it has not been possible to evidence that the infractions committed by Larraín Vial SAB caused concrete economic damage to the market participants;
- Regarding the repetition and/or continuity in the commission of the infraction under the subject of the present resolution, in accordance with what is determined in numeral 7 of article 230 of the Lpag, it is not observed that in the present case the hypotheses that could configure a repetition and/or continuity of the infractions under the subject of the present administrative sanctioning procedure are present;
- As for the circumstances of the commission of the infraction, it must be mentioned that Larraín Vial SAB in its capacity as a brokerage company society and therefore an obligated subject according to the norms regulating the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing, knew these norms, as well as their mandatory compliance according to the provisions of the aforementioned norms;
- Regarding the illegally obtained benefit, it has not been proven in the present procedure that Larraín Vial SAB obtained any benefit by committing the mentioned infractions;
- Regarding the existence or not of intentionality in the offender's conduct, it must be specified that intentionality in the conduct committed by Larraín Vial SAB has not been evidenced;
- Furthermore, regarding the voluntary declaration of the commission of the infractions and the contribution of the offenders to their clarification, Larraín Vial SAB has not recognized the commission of the infraction;
- Additionally, regarding the evaluation of the attenuating factors of responsibility established in article 236-A of the Lpag, it is necessary to specify that although at the date of notification of charges, Larraín Vial SAB did not have a compliance officer according to the requirements demanded in the Normative Rules for AML, it complied with this obligation on October 30, 2012;
- Furthermore, in the present case, it has not been evidenced that the infringing conduct by Larraín Vial SAB was generated by an error induced by the administration by a confused or illegal administrative act or provision;
- Consequently, taking into account the analyzed sanction criteria, and applying the principle of reasonableness contemplated in numeral 1.4 of article IV and in numeral 3 of article 230 of the Lpag, which state that the sanctions to be applied must be proportional to the non-compliance qualified as an infraction, as well as what is provided for in the third paragraph of article 6 of the Sanctions Regulations, it is appropriate to impose on Larraín Vial SAB a sanction applicable to minor infractions according to article 22 of the Sanctions Regulations;
Being subject to the provisions of article 32, numeral 16, of the Regulations of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF.
RESOLVES:
- To declare that Larraín Vial Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. has incurred in one (01) serious infraction typified in Annex XIX, numeral 1, subsection 1.14 of the Sanctions Regulations, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/9.10 and its modifying norms, for not having a compliance officer with exclusive dedication and for the same not having a direct employment link with the obligated subject.
- To sanction Larraín Vial Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A. with a fine of three (03) UIT, in force at the time the facts occurred, amounting to S/. 10,950.00 (Ten Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty and 00/100 New Soles), for the commission of the infraction mentioned in the preceding article.
- This resolution does not exhaust the administrative route, unless consented to, and may be challenged before the Adjunct Superintendency of Prudential Supervision by filing a reconsideration or appeal, within fifteen (15) business days counted from the day following its notification.
- In the event that this resolution is not subject to challenge through reconsideration or appeal within fifteen (15) business days of notification and remains consented to, it must be published on the Portal of the Securities Market Superintendency, in observance of the provisions of article 3, numeral 1, of the Normative Rules regarding the publication and dissemination of resolutions issued by the decision-making bodies of the SMV, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 073-2004-EF/94.10. and by the provisions of article 10°-A of the Sanctions Regulations.
- To transcribe this resolution to Larraín Vial Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.
Register, communicate, and publish.
Omar Gutiérrez Ochoa
Adjunct Superintendent
Adjunct Superintendency of Prudential Supervision
- Alejandro Nieto García, Administrative Sanction Law, fourth edition, 2005, p. 305. “The sufficiency of the typification is, ultimately, a requirement of legal certainty and is concrete, not in absolute certainty, but in the reasonable prediction of the legal consequences of the conduct. (..) the typification is sufficient when the norm contains an intelligible predetermination of the infraction, of the sanction, and of the correlation between one and the other (…).
The rigorous and perfect description of the infraction is, except in exceptions, practically impossible. The detail of the type has its limit, Maximalist requirements only lead, therefore, to normative paralysis or the nullity of a large part of the existing sanctioning provisions or by dictating”. ↑
2. Juan Carlos Morón Urbina, Comments on the General Administrative Procedure Law, Fifth Edition, Page 629. ↑
3. The Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy defines “discretion”: First conception: That which is done freely and prudently. A second conception: It is said of governmental power in the functions of its competence that are not regulated. ↑
4. Legislative Decree No. 276
“DISCIPLINARY NATURE FAULTS: DISCIPLINARY INFRACTIONS
Article 28.- Are disciplinary faults that, according to their gravity, can be sanctioned with temporary suspension or dismissal, subject to administrative process: (…)”. ↑
5. “GRADES OF SANCTION:
Article 27.- The grades of sanction correspond to the magnitude of the faults according to their lesser or greater gravity; however, their application will not necessarily be correlative or automatic, it must be contemplated in each case, not only the nature of the infraction but also the background of the servant, constituting recidivism as a serious aggravating factor.(…)”. ↑
6. According to Marcial Rubio, p. 58 and 59 “By legal situation we understand the set of attributions, rights, duties, obligations, and legal qualifications that a person receives upon adopting a certain status before the Law.” “By legal relationship, we understand the various legal links that exist between two (or more) interrelated situations.” ↑
7. Marcial Rubio Correa, “Preliminary Title”, PUCP, fifth edition 1989, p. 66 ↑
8. According to the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, a completed fact is understood as: Action that has been carried out. ↑
9. File No. 2011023934. ↑
10. File No. 2011024090. ↑
11. Old NPLAFT:
“Article 19.- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEM TO DETECT SUSPICIOUS OPERATIONS
The Directory and General Manager of the Obligated Subjects to report, or their equivalent bodies, according to article 19 of the Regulation, will be responsible for implementing in the companies they represent, the system to detect suspicious operations of money laundering and/or terrorism financing, as well as designating a compliance officer with exclusive dedication who will be responsible together with them for monitoring the compliance of the system.”* ↑
12. Article 10, 10.2, 10.2.1 Compliance Officer
“b. In obligated subjects that, due to the size of their organization, complexity or volume of transactions and operations, it is not justified to have a functionary with exclusive dedication for such responsibility and functions, they will designate a functionary with a manager level as compliance officer. (…)”. ↑
13. Old Normative Rules:
“Article 2.- DEFINITIONS
(…)
c) Exclusive dedication: performance of functions or responsibilities required of the Compliance Officer excluding the performance of any other function or position in the obligated subject or in other companies of the economic group”.* ↑