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Superintendent Resolution No. 006-2024-SMV/02

Lima, 16 January 2024

The Superintendent of the Securities Market

WHEREAS:

File No. 2021025720, Report No. 1355-2023-SMV/06 issued by the Legal Advisory Office, the written arguments and the oral report heard from Mrs. Karla Lucia Aoki Kutsuma (hereinafter, MRS. AOKI) through her attorney, held on 2 November 2023; regarding the appeal filed against Deputy Superintendent Resolution No. 034-2021-SMV/01.

CONSIDERING:

That, by Deputy Superintendent Resolution SMV No. 034-2021-SMV/10 (hereinafter, the RESOLUTION), MRS. AOKI was sanctioned with a fine of thirty (30) UIT, equivalent to S/ 121,500.00 (One Hundred Twenty-One Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Soles), for having incurred a very serious infraction typified in Annex X, numeral 1, subsection 1.8 of the Sanctions Regulations, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10 (hereinafter, SANCTIONS REGULATIONS), in force at the time of the events, for not complying with article 16A of the Securities Market Law, Legislative Decree No. 861 (hereinafter, LMV) and with the conduct rules established in article 3, numerals b), c), f) and g) of the Intermediation Agents Regulations, approved by SMV Resolution No. 034-2015-SMV/01 (hereinafter, RAI), by not observing its duties towards clients and the market, as well as the principles related to care and diligence, honesty and neutrality, observance and prevention of conflicts of interest with respect to investors in its capacity as representative of a stock brokerage firm;

That, by brief presented on 30 September 2021 and by complementary brief1 of 1 October 2021, MRS. AOKI filed an appeal (hereinafter, the APPEAL) against the RESOLUTION;

That, through Report No. 1355-2023-SMV/06 of 10 October 2023 (hereinafter, the REPORT), the Legal Advisory Office issued an opinion;

That, on 2 November 2023, MRS. AOKI took the floor through her attorney and presented her written arguments;

That, below are succinctly set forth the arguments contained in the APPEAL filed by MRS. AOKI, in the use of the floor and her written arguments, and the evaluation thereof;

[1] The “complementary brief” is a new complete appeal brief

PERU Ministry of Economy and Finance
SMV
Superintendency of the Market of Securities
“Decade of Equal Opportunities for Women and Men” "Year of the Bicentennial, of the consolidation of our Independence, and of the commemoration of the heroic battles of Junín and Ayacucho"

I. Application of statute of limitations period

That, in the context of the health emergency caused by COVID 19, some norms with extraordinary measures were published that affected the computation of the terms applicable to the public administration; among these, Urgency Decree No. 029-2020 (hereinafter, DU), and its extensions2 ;

That, in relation to the aforementioned, MRS. AOKI indicates that she does not agree with the RESOLUTION when it states that the prescription of the facts is also extended, which would constitute an extensive interpretation, through which the scope of a legal norm is extended to situations not expressly included in its text;

That, in the present case, MRS. AOKI refers to the extensive interpretation of a norm that extraordinarily suspends the computation of the terms for the initiation and processing of administrative sanctioning procedures and of all kinds, and not of a norm that determines an infraction type, therefore, there is no congruence between her argument and the legal provision she cites;

That, in relation to the argument made by MRS. AOKI, it should be noted that the term for initiating the administrative sanctioning procedure is determined by the prescription period of the authority's power to determine whether certain facts constitute or not an infraction, so what is stated by the RESOLUTION in grounds 81, 82 and 96 - cited by MRS. AOKI - is reasonable, since it is reasoning based on premises that allow arriving at a logical conclusion, and not an extensive interpretation of the norm, which departs from its true purpose;

That, MRS. AOKI makes a comparison between the text of article 28 of the DU and the following text of the RESOLUTION: “Therefore, the referred norms provide for the extension of the computation of the term for the initiation of this administrative sanctioning procedure. Consequently, the prescription of the facts that had as a limit 5 May 2021 is also extended”, and She maintains that this would be the definition that doctrine uses to explain the concept of “extensive interpretation”, however, this comparison does not fit what doctrine defines as extensive interpretation, besides comparing the text of a norm with a fragment of the analysis carried out by the RESOLUTION on the defenses presented;

That, MRS. AOKI argues that the RESOLUTION considers that prescription is part of the administrative sanctioning procedure and that the legal rules established for these particular legal provisions apply to all administrative sanctioning procedures, without any exception, which does not mean that prescription is part of the sanctioning procedure, or a procedure in itself, or part of one, but rather it is a guarantee of the administered

[2] “Article 28.- Declare the suspension for thirty (30) business days counted from the day following the publication of this Urgency Decree, of the computation of the terms for the initiation and processing of administrative procedures and procedures of any kind, including those regulated by laws and special provisions, that are subject to a term, that are processed in entities of the Public Sector, and that are not included within the scope of the Second Final Complementary Provision of Urgency Decree No. 026-2020; including those that are in process at the entry into force of this Urgency Decree.”

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against the punitive power of the administration, which is constitutionally recognized;

That, in this regard, it can be observed that the prescription referred to in Article 252 of the TUO LPAG, besides being a guarantee, is a determining aspect within an administrative sanctioning procedure, since it sets the deadline for its initiation;

That, regarding what was stated by MRS. AOKI about the existence of actions prior to the initiation of the administrative sanctioning procedure, and that these would not be part of the procedure, but preliminary inquiries, although this is correct according to numeral 2 of Article 255 of the TUO LPAG, it must be remembered that, by virtue of these “prior actions”, the authority will decide whether or not to make the imputation of any charge, and initiate the procedure, and for this, as already mentioned, the administration has a maximum term, which corresponds to the prescription period, so it is seen that, since the initiation of the sanctioning procedure is subject to the prescription period, it was also suspended as provided by the DU;

That, MRS. AOKI points out that the term for the initiation of an administrative procedure depends on the type of procedure, and on whether it is a procedure initiated at the request of the administered or ex officio, although as a general rule, in request procedures it would begin with the presentation of an application in the Mesa de Partes or equivalent of an entity, the initiation term being automatic, since an application would be presented and the term would begin to count from that moment, and under normal situations this rule would have worked efficiently, but the COVID-19 emergency generated an interruption of said rule, due to the extraordinary and unforeseeable situation, which would have led to a scenario in which applications could continue to be presented by the administered, but the entities were not in such operational capacity that would have allowed them to evaluate said applications, and therefore, the DU would have broken the rule of an automatic initiation term of administrative procedures, suspending it for the duration of the emergency process, and all applications that could have been presented did not generate an initiation and computation of the administrative term, but rather said effects remained suspended by virtue of the DU;

That, on this matter, it must be remembered that the administrative procedure subject of this analysis is an administrative sanctioning procedure, which, according to numeral 1 of Article 255 of the TUO LPAG, is always initiated ex officio, whether on its own initiative or as a consequence of a superior order, motivated request of other organs or entities, or by complaint;

That, regarding the lack of pronouncement issued by a constitutional organ that endorses the argumentation of MRS. AOKI and the interpretation of the SASP, it states that in recitals 86 and 87 of the RESOLUTION it is indicated that the argumentation and analysis carried out in its allegations3 would constitute a legal interpretation that has not been supported by any constitutional organ, which endorses its argumentation;

[3] The referred foundations 86 and 87 of THE RESOLUTION are not referred to the allegations, but to the defenses of MRS. AOKI. Later in THE RESOLUTION they evaluate the allegations presented by her.

That, in relation to this, this office disagrees with what is stated in the RESOLUTION, regarding that the text of the cited recitals could suggest that for the legal interpretation to be valid, there would have to be a constitutional organ that endorses what was argued by MRS. AOKI, without prejudice to this, the argumentative line of MRS. AOKI regarding the provisions of the DU and its amendments is also not considered admissible, as already mentioned in preceding paragraphs;

That, regarding the principle of legality and retroactivity as to prescription, MRS. AOKI indicates that administrative sanctioning prescription would be a legal institution that limits the power of the public administration to determine infractions or execute firm sanctions;

That, in this regard, article 252 of the TUO LPAG refers in subsection 252.1 to the following: “The authority's power to determine the existence of administrative infractions prescribes within the period established by special laws, without prejudice to the computation of the prescription periods with respect to the other obligations arising from the effects of the commission of the infraction. If this has not been determined, said power of the authority shall prescribe after four (4) years”, therefore, as stated by LADY AOKI, prescription limits the sanctioning power of the administration; however, this does not mean that the only function, implications or scope thereof are limited to that aspect;

That LADY AOKI adds that the suspension or interruption of the computation of the prescription period for infractions and sanctions should necessarily be expressly provided for in a norm of the same rank as the one that conferred on the administrative authority the power to pursue infractions and enforce sanctions;

That, in this regard, the DU that provides for the suspension of the computation of the period for the initiation and processing of all administrative procedures and of any kind has the rank of law, and is therefore applicable to the computation of the prescription period of this procedure from the perspective of the principle of legality, referred to by LADY AOKI;

That LADY AOKI states that the principle of non-retroactivity of norms applies to administrative sanctioning prescription, so that, considering that its suspension would cause the computation of the period established in the norm to be exceeded and this would affect the legal situation of the administered party, the retroactivity of the norm providing for such suspension would not be applicable;

That, on this point, it must be taken into account that the DU does not modify or repeal norms on prescription, that is, a new legal provision that may or may not be more favorable to the alleged offender is not being issued, but rather it provides an exceptional mandate for the suspension of the computation of periods, which likewise did not have as its purpose, nor could it, be prolonged over time, and must be subject to the effects of the exceptional and unforeseeable event that gave rise to it, namely, the health emergency as a consequence of the appearance of Covid-19;

That, thus, the explanatory memorandum of the aforementioned DU expressly mentions it in “Requirement f): on its transitoriness”, when it states: “In this case it is required that the extraordinary measures applied must not remain in force for a period longer than strictly necessary to reverse the adverse situation”;

That, with respect to what was stated by LADY AOKI REGARDING the Spanish experience, in which the computation of the prescription period would have been suspended through a norm with the rank of law, which would not apply retroactively to facts prior to its entry into force, it must be indicated that this cannot be taken into account because it concerns a legal system different from that of our country;

That, in relation to Resolution No. 001-2020/SERVIR/TSC (hereinafter, SERVIR RESOLUTION), LADY AOKI indicates that the SASP took it as a reference to establish that it would be aimed at ratifying that this is not a particular situation of the SMV, but rather at determining that the suspension of periods provided by the DU was understood in its full extent by other public entities;

That it is observed that the RESOLUTION does not assume the SERVIR RESOLUTION as a binding precedent, but rather, in response to LADY AOKI's defense regarding what was stated in the instruction report, analyzes whether this is indeed as she maintains; likewise, it mentions in its ground 166 that “…the inadmissibility of LADY AOKI's request for prescription is based on the simple verification of the prescription period observing the applicable regulations and not on Resolution No. 001-2020-SERVIR/TSC”;

That LADY AOKI specifies that the SMV would not have had a total stoppage of work, just like other entities linked to the financial sector, which continued operating insofar as the work they carried out was considered essential and they had the suitable systems to do so, especially since this would have been recognized by Superintendency Resolution No. 046-2020-SMV/02, published in May 2020;

That, in this regard, it must be specified that it is true that certain entities of the financial sector had to develop a contingency plan in order to continue operating in certain essential functions; however, this does not imply that all these institutions immediately had the possibility of fully deploying all their activities, and that all their personnel were enabled to, for example, carry out inspection, investigation, supervision activities, among others, within the framework of the declared state of emergency, which entailed mandatory social immobilization, and thus, this mandatory social immobilization, which in the face of the global health emergency, it was reasonable to establish without any prior notice, meant that there was no entity or body of the State, as is the case of the SMV, that could operate at one hundred percent of its capacities;

That, notwithstanding the foregoing, there is the counterpart, that is, the administered parties, and in the event that the entity had been able to act in accordance with its functions and at one hundred percent of its capacities, the administered parties did not necessarily have the same capacity to respond and attend to the possible requirements or imputations that the administration might have made; therefore, the provision suspending the computation of the periods for the initiation and processing of all administrative procedures and of any kind is reasonable and clear;

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That, LADY AOKI adds that the statute of limitations seeks to protect the administered party against the passage of time, given that it impairs the capacity for defense, since, after four (4) years, without having any prior notice, she learned that past acts generated an alleged infraction, the same that occurred when she worked for another employer, so that when trying to exercise her defense, she is limited by difficulties in accessing information, remembering events, finding those involved, among others;

That, on this matter, as can be seen from the file, the facts that support the present administrative sanctioning procedure were those that generated LADY AOKI's departure from Credicorp SAB, and notwithstanding this, in the present procedure she has had the possibility of exercising her defense, without any restriction, being able to access the content of the file and make her discharges in accordance with law;

That, LADY AOKI states that in the present case it would be intended to make the sanctioning power prevail over legal certainty, setting aside the principle of reasonableness that is also recognized by the LPAG;

That, in this regard, it should be remembered that the sanctioning power, besides being a prerogative, is a duty attributed to the administration, seeking that actions that violate legal precepts be sanctioned;

That, likewise, in accordance with what is indicated in the preceding recitals, it is not appreciated in what way the principle of reasonableness would be being violated by the RESOLUTION;

That, LADY AOKI states that, through SBS Resolution No. 1268-2020, it was expressly indicated that the terms were suspended, including the statute of limitations period, with which said administration would protect the legal certainty of the administered parties, this being the only valid way to generate a suspension of the statute of limitations period. She also states that the Judicial Branch would have expressly suspended the computation of the statute of limitations period through Administrative Resolution No. 177-2020-CE-P;

That, she adds that the principles of criminal law that inspire and guide those of the administrative sanctioning procedure would make necessary an express norm on the part of the SMV, in order to suspend the statute of limitations period, without affecting the principle of legal certainty, and that the interpretation of the SMV does not result in an arbitrary and indiscriminate application of the norm;

That, in the two cases referred to by LADY AOKI, it is observed that they are norms that do not have the rank of law, so that, in light of the arguments of LADY AOKI herself, they should have said rank to be enabled to issue such provisions. Notwithstanding this, it should be observed that SBS Resolution No. 1268-2020 does not expressly state that "the terms including the statute of limitations period are suspended";

That, for its part, Administrative Resolution No. 177-2020-CE-P in its first article expressly states "Specify that the suspension of procedural terms established by the Executive Council of the Judicial Branch..., includes the suspension of statute of limitations and expiration periods;..." (underlined highlighted

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aggregated), and not provide that they be suspended. Consequently, it is also not appreciated that said resolution has been issued to comply with the purpose raised by LADY AOKI;

II. Nullity of the RESOLUTION, lack of motivation and non-performance of relevant evidence

That, LADY AOKI denies that they accepted the commission of the facts (as stated in the RESOLUTION) and specifies that the SASP would not have carried out an investigation of the internal procedure nor of her discharges and those of Mr. Ernesto Javier Ferrand Salaverry (hereinafter, Mr. Ferrand), so that what was indicated by Credicorp SAB would have been taken as true, without carrying out evidence of what was stated by it, which would not only violate due process, but also harm her right of defense;

That, in this regard, although the reference in the RESOLUTION that LADY AOKI expressly admitted the commission of the facts is not correct, this does not invalidate the verification made by the SASP of the commission of the infraction through other means of evidence;

That, furthermore, what is stated in the RESOLUTION in the paragraphs preceding the citation made by LADY AOKI is relevant:

That, as observed in the RESOLUTION, it is not only taking into account the statement of Credicorp SAB, as already mentioned, but other means of evidence are being evaluated such as the audios of the calls, the detail of the sale of the bonds and the purchases of these, made by LADY AOKI, Mrs. Yong, Mr. Recarte and Mrs. Salaverry, mother of Mr. Ferrand, in addition to the sale order of Mrs. Alfaro, and the purchase order of Mrs. Salaverry;

That, LADY AOKI states that the complete documentation referring to her bond purchase process is not evidenced in the file, and therefore her right would have been restricted, by the SASP not having requested from Credicorp SAB evidence to assess the commission of the infraction, which would have been generated with the purchase of the bonds;

That, in this regard, as stated by MRS. AOKI, in the file of this proceeding there are not only the order registry of the Credicorp SAB system, where her purchase order for the five bonds is recorded, which is also recorded in CAVALI, but also the copy of the request for authorization of the transaction as a related person to the brokerage firm signed by her and the "authorizer".

That, through such documents, in addition to the recordings of the conversations held by MRS. AOKI with the Yong-Recarte spouses and Mr. Ferrand, it can be seen that the imputed and sanctioned infraction has been evidenced;

That, in that sense, it is not considered necessary for there to be "complete documentation regarding the purchase process" since it is not a matter of discussing the legal validity or nullity of a bond purchase, but rather whether or not MRS. AOKI complied with the established conduct rules; furthermore, MRS. AOKI herself in her defenses4 mentions said bond purchase, as seen below:

That, on the other hand, MRS. AOKI indicates that in recitals 200 to 208 of the RESOLUTION it is stated that she had access to the file, in order to divert attention from her request regarding the documents supporting the compensation to Mrs. Alfaro, and that although the letters sent by Credicorp SAB indicate the compensation and attach the proof of payment to Mrs. Alfaro for four hundred twenty-six with twenty-four United States Dollars (US$ 426.24), the documents supporting said payment would not be found, information that the brokerage firm should have in its possession, and that furthermore, in her arguments she requested that they be required from Credicorp SAB;

That, in this regard, it is observed that the grounds of the RESOLUTION cited by MRS. AOKI do not focus on stating that she always had access to the file in order to try to divert attention, which is seen from the RESOLUTION in its grounds 201 and 202:

[4] Writing of 14 July 2021, Page 1

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That, that is, THE RESOLUTION specifies how it becomes aware of the referred compensation, why it is made and the evidence thereof, which is the proof of payment that the agent company made in favor of Mrs. Alfaro -which MRS. AOKI herself refers to in the preceding paragraphs- and which is in the file, so MRS. AOKI's statement that there would be no documents supporting said payment is not true;

That, it must be kept in mind that the fact that for MRS. AOKI a certain document is not sufficient to support the payment does not invalidate what it objectively represents or what can be verified from it, that is, the compensation made by her employer to the person affected by her conduct and that of Mr. Ferrand;

That, MRS. AOKI points out that in the OFFICIAL LETTER OF CHARGES the generation of the compensation is not explained, which would be an important part in the analysis carried out in the instruction report to explain the economic damage caused and the repercussion in the market, which would then also be taken by the SASP to base the infraction and its sanction;

That, on this, the provisions on the administrative sanctioning procedure established in article 2555 of the TUO LPAG must be taken into account, in which different moments within the sanctioning procedure are appreciated, there being differentiated stages within the sanctioning procedure, with different elements that characterize them and that fulfill a specific purpose for each case, so pretending that the OFFICIAL LETTER OF CHARGES develops the same elements as the instruction report or the RESOLUTION is contrary to the nature of the procedure itself and the provisions that govern it;

[5] "Article 255.- Sanctioning procedure The entities in the exercise of their sanctioning power adhere to the following provisions: (...) 3. Once the initiation of the sanctioning procedure is decided, the instructing authority of the procedure formulates the respective notification of charges to the possible sanctioned party, which must contain the data referred to in numeral 3 of the preceding article so that they present their defenses in writing within a period that may not be less than five business days counted from the date of notification. (...) 5. Once the collection of evidence is concluded, if applicable, the instructing authority of the procedure concludes by determining the existence of an infraction and, therefore, the imposition of a sanction; or the non-existence of infraction. The instructing authority formulates a final instruction report in which it determines, in a reasoned manner, the conducts that are considered proven constituting an infraction, the norm that provides for the imposition of sanction; and, the proposed sanction or the declaration of non-existence of infraction, as appropriate. (...)" (underlining added)

That, furthermore, MRS. AOKI states that the instructor never requested the statements of the allegedly affected persons, a fact that would have been key to analyze the commission of the infraction and to determine the moment in which the orders were finalized;

That, in this regard, it is observed that, indeed, the statements of Messrs. Alfaro, Yong and Recarte were not required; however, this office does not consider that these are key to the analysis of the commission of the infraction, as indicated by LADY AOKI, since, as previously noted, other means of evidence are appreciated in the file that contribute to the identification of the commission of the infraction, it being necessary to reiterate that among these are the recordings of the conversations held between LADY AOKI, Mrs. Yong and Mr. Recarte, and from these the facts that have generated this sanctioning procedure are extracted, in addition to the results of the purchase and sale of bonds, which confirm the improper conduct of LADY AOKI;

That, it adds that, by the instructor failing to comply with his function of generating sufficient evidence that motivates the RESOLUTION, it would generate its nullity, since it would leave her in a state of defenselessness by not having broken the presumption of lawfulness, undermining due process, even more so if the alleged affected parties expressly acknowledge that the infraction would not have been committed, as would be appreciated from the sworn statements attached as annex 1 to the appeal brief;

That, in this regard, as already mentioned, the fact that the instructor does not require the evidence that in LADY AOKI's opinion should be requested does not imply per se that evidence has not been generated in the sanctioning procedure that is sufficient to rebut the presumption of lawfulness;

That, regarding the statements of the spouses, Mrs. Yong and Mr. Recarte, it is observed that they state that the first call held between LADY AOKI and Mrs. Yong was only a negotiation; however, from the content of the recordings in the file of this administrative sanctioning procedure, it could not be affirmed that it was only a negotiation;

That, likewise, LADY AOKI states that Mrs. Yong did not have power to intervene on behalf of her husband, as well as that they did not have a joint securities brokerage account; however, from the first audio it is not appreciated that these elements are an obstacle to taking the order, which is also confirmed by the recording of the second call;

That, LADY AOKI points out that the Yong-Recarte spouses also state that no harm has been caused to them and that LADY AOKI would have performed her duties with care, diligence and honesty; however, we disagree with such assertion, since it is appreciated from the calls of LADY AOKI that she was not truthful with her clients by indicating to Mrs. Yong that Mr. Ferrand won them “by a show of hands”, when in reality it is she herself –LADY AOKI– who buys part of the bonds offered, despite the fact that these were accepted for total purchase by Mrs. Yong in the first call;

That, likewise, the Yong - Recarte spouses are not the only people who could have been harmed by the actions of LADY AOKI and

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Mr. Ferrand, but rather, as the RESOLUTION refers in ground 287 “the infraction incurred by Mrs. AOKI has produced a concrete quantifiable harm for the client Mrs. ALFARO”, since Mrs. Alfaro did not receive the price of 106.57% that Mrs. Yong had accepted in the first call, but rather received the price of 105.8596%, which benefited LADY AOKI and Mr. Ferrand's mother, by having each acquired five (05) bonds at said price;

That, in this regard, what is stated by the RESOLUTION must also be appreciated, regarding the price of the bonds acquired by LADY AOKI and Mr. Ferrand's mother:

“It should be noted that during the month of May 2017, in the Money Market – Stock Exchange, in addition to the operation subject to charge, 5 additional operations were carried out with PACIF1BS1A; observing that of the 6 operations, the one of 05 May 2017 is the one executed at the lowest price, below the trend observed during said month. Likewise, the fact that the price at which the operation was originally going to be carried out, that is 106.57%, was a price in accordance with what the market quoted said value previously, that is 106.58% for an operation of 03 May 2017 and during April 2017 the average price at which the operations were executed was 106.6267%6 ; however, as previously noted, the operation was finally carried out at 105.8696%; as observed in the following graph7 ;”

That, in that sense, it is observed that LADY AOKI, and Mr. Ferrand's mother, benefited from the purchase, when Mrs. Yong had already accepted the purchase of all the bonds in favor of herself and her spouse, inducing her to make her purchase for an amount less than initially accepted;

III. Evaluation of substantive arguments set forth in the RESOLUTION

That, regarding LADY AOKI's statement that the instructing body has not complied with carrying out the respective corroborations to determine whether or not there was an order in the audio of the first conversation she had with Mrs. Yong, it must be taken into account that the recordings of the calls show that LADY AOKI knows of Mrs. Yong's willingness to buy all the bonds offered, since what the latter expressed is clear and does not require any type of interpretation; therefore, it is not necessary to carry out the additional corroborations that LADY AOKI mentions;

That, on the other hand, in the statement of Mrs. Yong attached to the appeal brief, she states “that the first call (…) was only a negotiation, it being my understanding and my will that no transaction would be concluded during the aforementioned call, as indeed happened”; however, from the content of the recordings it is evident that this does not conform to the reality of the facts;

[6] During 2017, operations began the year with transactions executed at 103.85%; the price showing a favorable evolution, thus the price of the last transaction executed in March 2017 was 105.20% and that of April 107.33%.

[7] On each date a single transaction was carried out. Source: CAVALI – BVL – Credicorp SAB.

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That, MRS. AOKI states that the RESOLUTION in its ground 235 indicates that “(…) at no point during the first conversation does Mrs. AOKI point out to Mrs. YONG that the latter cannot decide on behalf of her husband, because she does not have the powers to do so, they do not have a joint account(…)”, and that “(…) in the case of clients who are spouses, the amount to be purchased by each of them had to be specified immediately in the conversation and thus would be recorded and registered in the ‘Negotiation System’ of CREDICORP SAB”, and that in this regard, the SASP would not have carried out any legal analysis on representation between spouses, when it is clear that for acts of disposal consent is required, which would not be evidenced by the first call with Mrs. Yong, until Mr. Recarte enters in the last conversation to express his willingness to purchase;

That, in this regard, it is not observed that a legal analysis was necessary as to whether there was representation of one spouse with respect to the other, as referred to in the citation made by MRS. AOKI, since in the first conversation held between her and Mrs. Yong it does not appear to be a matter that could hinder compliance with Mrs. Yong's will, which can be confirmed by the second conversation, in which Mr. Recarte intervenes without objection in the call to ratify what had already been established by his spouse;

That, likewise, it should be highlighted that, in the first conversation, MRS. AOKI only interrupts the conversation with Mrs. Yong due to an apparent operational problem, which ultimately leads her to the conversation with Mr. Ferrand, and as a result, she tells Mrs. Yong that she will call her back so as not to keep her waiting;

That, MRS. AOKI adds that the instructing body points out that “the spouses had a joint bank account registered with CREDICORP SAB, so much so that it charges Mr. RECARTE's purchase to the joint bank account” and specifies that the spouses would not have a joint securities brokerage account registered with Credicorp SAB to carry out securities transactions, and that there would be no document accrediting it, and what could be inferred from the conversation is that the spouses have a joint bank account and the lack of representation of Mrs. Yong, also lacking authorization to generate orders on behalf of her husband, which could be corroborated by the statement in Annex 1 of the appeal brief, so the brokerage contract of Mrs. Yong and her husband should have been requested, to rule out or corroborate that representation existed;

That, in this regard, the RESOLUTION refers to a joint bank account, and not to a joint securities brokerage account, which, as pointed out by the SASP, is drawn from the recordings of the second conversation, and it is also not observed that the RESOLUTION states that there is representation between the spouses, so, in line with what was maintained by MRS. AOKI, it would not have been necessary to request their brokerage contract;

That, MRS. AOKI argues that the RESOLUTION states that “Mr. Ferrand did have access, as of the date of the events, to the trading screens, so he could see market prices”, which would be supported by Official Letter No. 1125-2014-SMV/10.2, which authorized Mr. Ferrand as a representative of Credicorp SAB to “participate in the stages of the brokerage process referring to the reception and registration of orders on behalf of third parties, as well as the transmission and execution of orders on behalf of third parties, so since he could participate in the execution of orders on behalf of third parties, then he participated in the operating procedures that the manual assigns to the sales desk trader; consequently, Mr. FERRAND had access, as of the date of the events, to the trading screens, so he could see market prices”;

That, she adds that she would not have had access to the aforementioned Official Letter cited by the SASP, which would limit her right of defense, and that the fact of having authorization to perform various functions would not have to mean in practice that Mr. Ferrand performs them or that internally he is empowered to perform them, so it cannot be presumed that because he had authorization, Mr. Ferrand had access to the trading screens, even more so when there would be no evidence of the functions or responsibilities that he and MRS. AOKI had on that date, which could have been requested from Credicorp SAB in a timely manner;

That, in this regard, it is noted that it has not been proven that it was Mr. Ferrand who changed the price offered by MS. AOKI, but rather that she herself made such a change; furthermore, it is observed that with the modification in price, MS. AOKI and Mr. Ferrand's mother benefit, and Ms. Alfaro is harmed;

That, notwithstanding the foregoing, account must be taken of what the RESOLUTION states when it specifies: “following what the manual8 indicates, they carried out the process of contacting counterparties willing to buy the securities, so the procedure used was to negotiate with both parties the required conditions in order to reach an agreement and define the price and rate to be able to close the transaction; therefore, the manual does not state that the price is set or modified by the Fixed Income Manager, Sales Desk Trader or another specific area or position(…)”

That, on the other hand, regarding Official Letter No. 1125-2021-SMV/10.2, although we agree with MS. AOKI that it is not part of the file of this proceeding, in that communication Mr. Ferrand is authorized as representative of Credicorp SAB, that being the sole purpose of such document; therefore, it could not be asserted that failure to access it could determine a limitation of her right of defense;

That, MS. AOKI states that, according to the SASP, the reliable evidence to determine the infraction is the order record of the Credicorp SAB system; therefore, if we were to rely solely on this record, it would not be clear how she would have coordinated with Mr. Ferrand for the purchase order, if those orders, except hers, preceded the sale order, or how Mr. Ferrand and MS. AOKI would have known that a sale order existed and what its characteristics were, it being necessary and essential to support the SASP's version, that is, to prove that the coordination occurred, the time and day of the audios sent by Credicorp SAB, of which there would have been no record or evidence;

That, in this regard, it is not observed that the RESOLUTION relied solely on the aforementioned record, much less that it qualified it as “reliable evidence” to determine the infraction, as MS. AOKI claims; rather, it is observed in the RESOLUTION that the conversations held

[8] Credicorp SAB Operating Procedures Manual

between her and Ms. Yong, as well as the one in which Mr. Ferrand intervenes, which is ultimately reflected in the aforementioned operations record; thus, what the SASP states must be considered when it says: “According to what Ms. AOKI herself stated in her arguments, the practice at CREDICORP SAB was to enter orders into the system only when there was a buyer; that is why the times of the orders appearing in CREDICORP SAB's records are the times that were registered in CREDICORP SAB's ‘Negotiation System’ so that the ‘Sales Desk Traders’ place the corresponding proposals in the BVL system”, that is, the same explanation given by MS. AOKI allows a correct assessment of what the operations record shows, and in turn, responds to the questions raised by her in the preceding paragraphs;

That, MS. AOKI states that the SASP concludes, in recitals 256 and 257, that there is an infraction on the part of MS. AOKI and Mr. Ferrand based on the statement made by Credicorp SAB, without having corroborated its statements or produced evidence to determine the alleged infraction committed, especially if it were considered that there is a conflict of interest between the accused and Credicorp SAB;

That, on this point, it is important to note that ground 256 of the RESOLUTION begins by stating the following: “From the information provided by CREDICORP SAB, it is evident that this brokerage firm states the following (…)” (underlining and highlighting added). As can be seen, the RESOLUTION is only listing what the brokerage firm stated, without issuing judgment; and in the following ground, cited by MS. AOKI, it adds “all of the foregoing has been stated in the instructing report and the determination of the infraction committed by Ms. AOKI and Mr. FERRAND is based on those facts and the others indicated in this resolution” (underlining and highlighting added); that is, although what Credicorp SAB stated has been taken into account to determine the infraction, it is also true that these are not the only elements on which the RESOLUTION is based to reach the decision taken; therefore, it is not appropriate to accept as true MS. AOKI's assertion that “the only evidence and reasoning” that could be observed throughout the RESOLUTION would be based on the statement made by Credicorp SAB;

IV. On the infraction type

That, MS. AOKI states that the SASP concludes that she incurred one (1) infraction classified as very serious, typified in Annex X, numeral 1, subsection 1.8 of the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS; however, since the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS was not in force at the date of the sanction, it would qualify as a serious infraction in Annex I, numeral 2, subsection 2.25 of the Sanctions Regulations, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01 (hereinafter CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATIONS);

That, in this regard, the application of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATIONS to this case is not a result of the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS not being in force at the date of the sanction, but, as the RESOLUTION states, it must

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to the application of the exception to the principle of non-retroactivity9, in view that it is more favorable to the administered than the infraction being established as serious in the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION, and not very serious as in the SANCTIONS REGULATION;

That, MRS. AOKI adds that the infraction type would be explicitly open, and to specify which are the rules of conduct that were infringed, the SASP would have had to cite not only article 16A of the LMV, but also subsections b), c), f) and g)10 of the RAI, clearly carrying out an extensive interpretation;

That, the reference to the LMV and the RAI does not constitute an extensive interpretation, but rather these rules previously determine the obligations that the representative of a stock brokerage firm must observe and comply with regarding its clients, and thus, in the present case they are specifically referred to in article 16-A of the LMV11 and to the following general rules of conduct set forth in article 3° of the RAI in its literals: b) Care and Diligence, c) Honesty and Neutrality, f) Observance of the rules that regulate its activities, and g) Prevention of Conflicts of Interest, which are seen to have been developed in the RESOLUTION, and therefore, it is also not accurate to affirm that a generic or blank formula has been established as an infraction, based on which the non-compliance with rules or regulations is stipulated as punishable without specifying which specific act is the one typified as an infraction;

That, MRS. AOKI indicates that it would be important to carry out the analysis of the infraction type, since by verifying that the conducts prescribed by it have been complied with, one could reach the conclusion of the existence of the infraction, which would not have been carried out by the SASP, which would outright generate the nullity of the RESOLUTION;

That, in this regard, it is seen that from ground 14 to 36 of the RESOLUTION, the SASP analyzes the charge formulated, for which it is finally sanctioned; in said part of the RESOLUTION it can be observed that the facts are analyzed, in contrast with the duties and rules of conduct that would have been breached by it, in its capacity as representative of the stock brokerage firm;

That, MRS. AOKI maintains that the infraction type, established in numeral 2.25 Annex I of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION, would present two parts, the first would establish as punishable conducts the verbs not having, not approving or not implementing, however, she considers that the realization of any of said conducts would not be enough to have incurred in infraction, given that the second part of the infraction type would indicate that the conduct must additionally concur

[9] TUO LPAG Article 248° 5.- Non-retroactivity.- The sanctioning provisions in force at the moment the administered incurs the conduct to be sanctioned are applicable, unless the later ones are more favorable to them. The sanctioning provisions produce retroactive effect insofar as they favor the presumed infringer or the infringer, both in regard to the typification of the infraction and the sanction and its prescription periods, even with respect to sanctions in execution upon the entry into force of the new provision 10 Does not specify the article. Given the present case, it should be referring to article 3 of the RAI 11 According to the TUO of the LMV approved by Supreme Decree No. 020-2023-EF: Article 17.- Duties toward Clients

[11] and the Market.- Persons registered in the Registry who act in the securities market, both receiving or executing investment orders as well as advising or managing investments in securities on behalf of third parties or autonomous patrimonies, must behave with diligence and transparency in the interest of their clients and in defense of the integrity of the market. Likewise, they must organize themselves in such a way as to minimize the risks of conflicts of interest and, in a situation of conflict, give priority to the interests of their clients, without privileging any of them. These persons must manage their activity in an orderly and prudent manner, caring for the interests of clients as if they were their own, ensuring that they have all the necessary information about their clients and keeping them always adequately informed.

of failing to comply with the rules of conduct or the internal rules of conduct, among others; this would respond to the fact that “ni” is a copulative conjunction, which would have as its function to coordinate words in an additive manner, functioning equivalently to “and”, inseparably linking the two conducts described in the type; thus, since it cannot incur any of the conducts indicated in the first part of the infraction type, because it is not its function nor is it within its scope of control, nor does the establishment, approval or implementation of the rules of conduct depend on its will, the infraction type cannot be configured with respect to MRS. AOKI and there would be no commission of the infraction;

That, it adds that one could seek to disregard the copulative use of the conjunction “ni”, arguing that the use of the preceding comma makes it independent from the prior conducts; however, the use of the comma in conjunctions has been regulated by the Real Academia de la Lengua Española; and the use of the comma before a copulative conjunction would not undermine its meaning as an inseparable link between two terms, so it would not be valid to argue that the preceding comma changes the copulative sense of “ni” or that it makes the verb “cumplir” independent with respect to the necessary and concurrent occurrence of the verbs “contar, aprobar, implementar” for the configuration of the infraction type, and that if the legislator had intended the infraction type to be configured with the occurrence of only one of the verbs, it would not have used the copulative conjunction “ni” since it would have been enough to add a comma;

That, in this regard, it is observed from the content of the infraction type that it seeks to describe different situations that constitute an infraction, which may be applicable to intermediation agents, and in others, to their representatives; thus, in numeral 2.2512 of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION different infraction types are developed, which in some cases will fall on an entity, such as Credicorp SAB, in its capacity as a stock brokerage firm, as would be that of approving conduct rules, and in others, will fall on the representatives of a stock brokerage firm, such as, for example, not complying with conduct rules, as is the case of MRS. AOKI;

That, MRS. AOKI adds that the immediate precedent of the type provided in numeral 2.25 of Annex I of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION is numeral 1.1713 of Annex I and numeral 3.2014 of Annex X of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, therefore, the type provided in numeral 1.8 of Annex X of the SANCTIONS REGULATION would not find a correlate in any of the current infraction types, and thus, it would have been repealed, with the imputed infraction lacking the element of typicity;

That, the infraction type typified in subsection 1.1715 states “Not having or not implementing or infringing the issuer's conduct rules with respect to the information it provides to the SMV” (underlining added), so it is clear that this other infraction type does not refer to the conduct rules that the representative of a stock brokerage firm must observe, as is the case of MRS. AOKI,

[12] “2.25 Not having, approving, implementing, nor complying with or modifying them without notifying the SMV, within the corresponding period, the conduct rules, the internal conduct rules, or code of conduct, in accordance with the regulations on the matter, or not approving a control procedure for said rules.”

[13] “1.17 Not having or not implementing or infringing the issuer's internal conduct rules with respect to the information it provides to the SMV.”

[14] “3.20 Not having duly approved Internal Conduct Rules, or not approving a control procedure for said rules, in accordance with the provisions of the corresponding regulations”

[15] MRS. AOKI mistakenly refers to subsection 1.16, which does not correspond to the infraction type she cites. It says 1.16 It should say 1.17, as referred to in this paragraph.

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but to the issuer's conduct rules when it transmits information to the SMV, and as regards subsection 3.20 of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, it refers, not to the actions of the representative, but to the actions of the institution, since it refers to functions or obligations that do not fall on the latter, such as having Internal Conduct Rules or not approving a control procedure; furthermore, the type clearly refers to internal conduct rules, which are not the subject of this proceeding, but rather conduct rules; therefore, it also does not constitute an immediate precedent of subsection 2.25 of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION;

That, it must be reiterated that subsection 2.25 of Annex I of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION contains other infraction types that are applicable to intermediation agents, and not to their representatives; therefore, they are not applicable to this case;

That, regarding the principle of care and diligence, MRS. AOKI states that the RESOLUTION in its recital 266 states that she did not act with the due diligence that every Representative must have in the exercise of her functions, when she was directly carrying out the purchase of the bonds, conversing with Mrs. YONG and knew of her decision and that of her husband, and only a technical inconvenience remained to be overcome in order to register the orders and transmit them for execution, and that based on this, it can be concluded that there was an erroneous typification, given that if it was considered that she did not perform her functions with diligence, the specific type that would be numeral 2.916 of Annex I of the SANCTIONS REGULATION should have been imputed to her;

That, in this regard, it should be noted that the imputation and sanction concern the violation of conduct rules, which in the case of intermediation agents and their representatives are detailed in Article 3 of the RAI in accordance with Article 16 A of the LMV, and which should be known by the SABs and their representatives, it being further noted that said conduct rules are linked to the fiduciary duty of every intermediary towards its clients, or in other words, with the investors of the securities market, which implies the legal responsibility to act in their best interest, beyond the due performance of their functions; thus, it is not observed that numeral 2.9 of Annex I of the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS constitutes the specific type since it merely refers to the execution “with diligence of the functions established by the regulations”, which does not necessarily imply improper conduct towards clients and the market, therefore, it is not observed that there is an erroneous classification or that the infraction type indicated by MRS. AOKI constitutes a specific infraction type applicable to this proceeding;

That, regarding the principle or conduct rule of prevention of conflicts of interest, MRS. AOKI cites the infraction type provided in numeral 2.717 of Annex X of the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS, which she considers is the specific type for this case, so when the RESOLUTION states in its recital 270 that this violated the conduct rules of prevention of conflicts of interest, since it prioritized

[16] MRS. AOKI begins the argument by citing the following infraction type “2.9 Not executing with diligence the functions established by the regulations”

[17] MRS. AOKI places numeral 2.6, but from the content accompanying it, it is observed that it corresponds to subsection 2.7 which refers: “Preferring the purchase or sale of securities for its own account, when a request for purchase or sale of securities from a client is made regarding the same security under equal or better conditions or giving preference to a particular client when there is a conflict of interest among its clients”

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its own interest and that of another Representative over those of its clients, because it did not act with neutrality and transparency towards the clients involved and prioritized itself in its own-account operation and the mother of another Representative, there would have been an erroneous classification, since if this had been considered, the infraction type cited above should have been imputed;

That, in this regard, as previously stated, the charge imputed and sanctioned refers to the breach of the principles or conduct rules, which as the RESOLUTION rightly mentions, implies that the protected legal interest consisting of investor protection is affected, because the duties that the representatives of an agent company have towards their client and the market are breached, with the purpose of preventing the impairment of said interests, through requirements that seek that the clients of intermediaries be treated with honesty, neutrality, care and diligence, and that in situations of conflicts of interest, the investor's interests prevail for the benefit of the investor and the market, since non-observance of the aforementioned creates insecurity and distrust in investors regarding the fiduciary role fulfilled by stock brokerage companies and their representatives, and this distrust may be transferred to the other participants of the securities market;

That, notwithstanding the aforementioned, it should also be noted that the infraction type cited by MRS. AOKI, by specifying “for its own account”, refers to an action of the intermediation agent and not of its representative;

That, on the other hand, MRS. AOKI states that ground 313 of the RESOLUTION establishes that “the exception to the principle of non-retroactivity contained in numeral 5 of Article 248 of the TUO LPAG corresponds to be applied, and consequently, to apply the sanctions corresponding to the serious infractions set forth in said regulation”, and that, despite this, in the operative part, it indicates “Article 2.- Declare that Mrs. Karla Lucia Aoki Kutsuma has incurred an infraction of a very serious nature classified in Annex X, numeral 1, subsection 1.8 of the Sanctions Regulations, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001- EF/94.10 and its amending norms,…”; that is, although the SASP recognizes the exception to the principle of non-retroactivity in the recitals, in the operative part it sanctions her for an infraction of a very serious nature, which would generate a tangible detriment, since it would result in the impediment of subsection h), Annex B of the RAI18;

That, in this regard, this office observes that there is indeed no correspondence between the recitals and the operative part, and in effect, although the SASP takes as legal basis the provisions of numeral 3 of Article 248 of the TUO LPAG, to determine that the SANCTIONS REGULATIONS in force at the time of the commission of the infraction will not be applied, but rather the infraction type of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATIONS will be applied for the determination of the sanction, it has not contemplated in its entirety the provisions of such disposition, which establishes the following:

[18] “Impediments: The following cannot be organizers, or hold the position or function of director, manager, legal representative, person responsible for internal audit, person in charge of regulatory compliance, representative, those who are in any of the following situations: (…) h) Those who have received sanctions that are administratively final by the SMV, or equivalent foreign institutions, corresponding to: i) serious infractions in the last ten (10) years counted from when the sanction became final; or ii) very serious infractions”.

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“5.- Non-retroactivity.- The sanctioning provisions in force at the time the administered party incurred the conduct to be sanctioned are applicable, unless subsequent ones are more favorable to them.

Sanctioning provisions produce retroactive effect insofar as they favor the presumed offender or the offender, both in relation to the classification of the infraction and the sanction and its prescription periods, even with respect to sanctions in execution when the new provision enters into force.” (underlining added)

That, by virtue thereof, in addition to imposing a fine sanction corresponding to the serious infraction, it should also have been declared that it incurred in said infraction, that is, the one classified in numeral 2.25 of Annex I of the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION, of a serious nature;

That, this situation generates a defect in the RESOLUTION, as there is an inconsistency between its content and the issues raised in the motivation; despite this, upon observing that it would be a non-transcendent defect related to the validity requirements of the administrative act, as mentioned above, the RESOLUTION must be corrected and preserved, as provided in subsection 14.2.1 of numeral 14.2 of article 14 of the TUO LPAG19; also taking into account that, in essence, this situation does not alter the meaning of what was analyzed and resolved in the RESOLUTION, which is that the imputed infraction was incurred and that the corresponding sanction should be applied;

V. Evaluation of written arguments and oral report

That, through her oral report made on 2 November 2023 and her written arguments, MS. AOKI reiterates the arguments developed in her appeal brief and supplementary brief, which have already been considered in the preceding points, and expands on some aspects of these, to which this office refers below;

That, regarding prescription, MS. AOKI states in her ARGUMENTS that the Ministry of Justice clearly does not have the powers to interpret the DU, and additionally, that there is an incorrect supplementary application when referring to the Civil Code;

That, in this regard, the fact cannot be overlooked that the Ministry of Justice, through its legal opinions, is the one that establishes criteria that must be taken into account by State entities, and although it has an advisory character, it is valid to consider it, a criterion, moreover, that concurs with the position adopted by the SMV;

That, as to the possibility of an incorrect supplementary application in the referred opinion, it must be considered that article VIII of the Preliminary Title of the TUO LPAG on deficiency of sources does not make an express or direct referral to norms of a criminal nature, which also does not occur in the

[19] “Article 14.- Conservation of the act (…) 14.2 The following are administrative acts affected by non-transcendent defects: 14.2.1 The act whose content is imprecise or inconsistent with the issues raised in the motivation (…)

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doctrine when such aspect is analyzed, so although there may be important compatibilities between administrative and criminal law, it does not make it exclusive of using other supplementary sources as occurs in the present case;

That, on the other hand, MS. AOKI states that the evidence evaluated is that delivered by Credicorp SAB, which would not have been verified by the SMV; however, it must be observed that the fact that these were requested from Credicorp SAB by the instructing body and received from it, as appears in the file of the present case, does not eliminate the evidence obtained from them, such as the audios, which contain the conversations between MS. AOKI and Mrs. Yong, as well as the intervention of Mr. Ferrand, which allow appreciating how the facts generating the infraction developed, as well as the request signed by MS. AOKI to receive the operation authorization of “close persons”, the report and record of operations of the agent company, among others indicated and evaluated above, which have not been questioned as to their legitimacy, but as to whether they would not be sufficient from the point of view of MS. AOKI, aside from the fact that in MS. AOKI's own defenses it is appreciated that she mentions the purchase she makes of part of the bonds that had already been offered and accepted by Mrs. Yong in their entirety, which would evidence the infraction of the conduct rules.

VI. Sanction Criteria

That, it must be considered that, in the present case, this is a single (01) infraction of a serious nature, in application of the exception to the principle of non-retroactivity, as it is classified in that manner in the CURRENT SANCTIONS REGULATION, which is more beneficial for MRS. AOKI;

That, the aforementioned infraction was committed by a natural person who served as a representative of a stock brokerage firm, without holding any other management position;

That, MRS. AOKI, at the time of the imposition of the sanction by the first instance, had no prior record nor did she report any incidence in the commission of the infraction;

That, although the events that occurred and the infraction committed are deeply serious, as they undermine the integrity of the market, also harming the protected legal interest consisting of investor protection, the concrete quantifiable damage and the illicit benefit generated and obtained, respectively, by MRS. AOKI, does not amount to one (01) UIT, so this office considers that there would be no proportionality between the sanction imposed and the situation generated, and it is appropriate to impose a sanction corresponding to a lower classification than the one provided;

That, by virtue of the aforementioned, in this case, in application of the principle of proportionality, considering the provisions of the fourth paragraph of article 6 of the SANCTIONS REGULATION, it is considered appropriate to graduate the sanction to one of a minor nature; and,

In accordance with the provisions of numeral 26 of article 12° of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the SMV, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF;

RESOLVES:

Article 1°.- To declare partially founded the appeal filed by Mrs. Karla Lucia Aoki Kutsuma against Deputy Superintendency Resolution No. 034-2021-SMV/10, regarding the incongruity between its content and its motivation, on the application of the principle of benign retroactivity for the imposition of the sanction, and unfounded in the other extremes.

Article 2°.- To correct Deputy Superintendency Resolution No. 034-2021-SMV/10, in its articles 2° and 3°, specifying that a serious infraction was incurred, classified in numeral 2.25 of the Annex of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by SMV Resolution No. 035-2018-SMV/01, in application of the exception to the principle of non-retroactivity.

Article 3°.- To graduate the fine imposed by Deputy Superintendency Resolution No. 034-2021-SMV/10 to 25 (twenty-five) UIT equivalent to the sum of S/ 101,250.00 (One hundred one thousand two hundred fifty and 00/100 Soles).

Article 4°.- To consider the administrative route exhausted.

Article 5°.- To transcribe this resolution to Mrs. Karla Lucia Aoki Kutsuma, to the Lima Stock Exchange S.A. and to CAVALI S.A. I.C.L.V.

Article 6°.- To order the dissemination of this resolution on the Institutional Page of the Superintendency of the Securities Market on the Single Digital Platform of the Peruvian State (www.gob.pe/smv).

Lorena Masías Quiroga
Superintendent of the Securities Market

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PERÚ Ministry of Economy and Finance
SMV
Superintendency of the Market of Securities
“Decade of Equal Opportunities for Women and Men” "Year of the Bicentennial, of the consolidation of our Independence, and of the commemoration of the heroic battles of Junín and Ayacucho"