Enforcement · SMV · 10 Apr 2018
The resolution rejects Magot Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.C.'s appeal and confirms a fine of 8 UIT (S/ 27,200) for failing to send monthly account statements to clients and for not timely notifying the regulator of the opening and closing of offices. It finds that the obligation to provide account statements under the prior Article 70 of the RAI is maintained in Article 83 of the current RAI, so no retroactivity principle was violated. It also rejects the statute-of-limitations defense and the claim of a violation of the right of defense.
Superintendent Resolution
No. 038-2018-SMV/02
Lima, April 10, 2018
The Superintendent of the Securities Market
WHEREAS:
File No. 2014023892 (2006017127), Reports Nos. 1296-2017-SMV/06 and 358-2018-SMV/06, both issued by the Legal Advisory Office, as well as the brief of arguments submitted by Magot Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.C. on February 22, 2018;
CONSIDERING:
That, by Superintendent Resolution No. 034-2018-SMV/02 of March 23, 2018, the nullity of Superintendent Resolution No. 016-2018-SMV/02 was declared ex officio, with the administrative procedure being retroceded to the state prior to the issuance of the second-instance resolution;
That, likewise, the administrative act cited in the preceding recital ordered the Legal Advisory Office to proceed with the evaluation of the brief of arguments submitted by Magot on February 2, 2018, in order for it to issue its legal opinion thereon;
That, by Report No. 358-2018-SMV/06 of April 2, 2018, the Legal Advisory Office issued a legal opinion on the arguments referred to in the preceding recital, which was made available to Magot, in accordance with the provisions of Official Letter No. 1807-2018-SMV/03 of the Secretary General of the SMV;
That, according to the proceedings of this case, by CONASEV Resolution No. 085-2007-EF/94.01.1 of November 15, 2007, the appeal against Resolution of the Administrative Tribunal of CONASEV No. 017-2007-EF/94.12 was declared unfounded, which sanctioned Magot with a fine of 25.1 UIT equivalent to S/ 85,340 for infractions of securities market regulations, as follows:
That, against CONASEV Resolutions No. 085-2007-EF/94.01.1 and Resolution of the Administrative Tribunal of CONASEV No. 017-2007-EF/94.12, Magot judicially demanded their nullity through an administrative contentious action;
That the administrative resolutions cited in the preceding recital were declared null, and the Permanent Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, in the final jurisdictional instance, confirmed the first-instance judgment, ordering the Administrative Tribunal of CONASEV to issue a new resolution;
That, in compliance with what was resolved by the Judiciary, a new administrative act was issued, that is, Superintendence Resolution SMV No. 018-2014-SMV/10, and Magot was sanctioned with a fine of eight (8) UIT equivalent to S/ 27,200.00, for:
a) Having incurred one (1) infraction of a serious nature typified in Annex X, numeral 2, subsection 2.10 of the Sanctions Regulation, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10, that is, for not sending monthly account statements to its principals; and,
b) Having incurred an infraction of a minor nature typified in Annex X, numeral 3, subsection 3.9 of the aforementioned sanctions regulation for not timely notifying CONASEV of the opening and closing of offices;
That, with respect to the charges: (i) maintaining representatives who take orders from principals without being authorized to perform that function and (ii) having reported cancelled policies as valid and not having reported cancelled policies to the SMV, the cited resolution ordered their archiving;
That, against the sanction resolution Magot filed an appeal, specifically arguing the following:
That, with respect to Magot's argument that the sanction resolution affected the principle of non-retroactivity, it should be noted that the text of article 70 of the RAI in force at the time the events occurred established that:
(…)
"the agent must send monthly an account statement of operations to its clients who have carried out at least one operation in said period and who have balances in their favor in money or securities;
Said account statement shall be prepared for each type of account and shall contain at least the following information for each transaction carried out in the month:
(…)
That, from the reading of the cited article 70 of the RAI, the obligation of the intermediation agent to send monthly the account statement to the client who has carried out at least one operation in said period and who has balances in their favor in money or securities is clearly inferred;
That, for its part, article 83 of the RAI approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 045-2006-EF/94.10, provides:
"The Agent must make available to its clients, account statements of their movements and balances of securities, financial instruments and funds, by the means agreed with them, as recorded in the registration form of each client.
Within thirty (30) calendar days after the close of each month, the Agent must prove that it has sent or enabled account statements of movements to its clients, who have carried out some operation during that period, except when said movements are only placements. The Agent must keep a faithful copy of the account statements that were enabled to its clients in magnetic media.
For clients who have not carried out any operation within any of the quarters of each year, and provided they maintain balances of securities, financial instruments or funds, the Agent must prove, when applicable, that it sent or enabled their account statement within thirty (30) calendar days after the close of the quarter.
In no case may the Agent exempt itself from the obligation established in this article, to provide information to its clients regarding their operations, securities and financial instruments."
That, as inferred from the text of article 83 of the RAI approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 045-2006-EF/94.10, the intermediation agent must comply with the obligation to "make available" to its clients the account statements of their movements and balances of securities, financial instruments and funds;
That, the term "make available" to the client the account statement implies a responsibility for the SAB, hence article 83 itself expressly mentions that: "(…) within thirty (30) calendar days after the close of each month, the Agent must prove that it has sent or enabled account statements of movements to its clients, who have carried out some operation during that period, except when said movements are only placements. (…)";
That, there is no doubt that the cited article also establishes the obligation of the intermediation agent to prove that it has sent or made available the account statements of movements of its clients, who have carried out some operation during that period, except when said movements are only placements;
That, likewise, the cited article obliges the intermediation agent to send or enable the account statement, within thirty (30) calendar days after the close of the quarter, to clients who have not carried out any operation within any of the quarters of each year, provided they maintain balances of securities, financial instruments or funds;
That, in summary, it is legally possible to maintain that the cited article establishes that in no case may the intermediation agent exempt itself from the obligation to provide information to its clients regarding their operations, securities and financial instruments;
That, as can be seen from the analysis of articles 70 and 83, both articles regulate the obligation of the intermediation agent to send, deliver, enable or make available the account statements to its clients;
That, in that sense, it is concluded that the obligation contained in article 70 of the RAI in force at the time the events occurred is reflected in article 83 of the RAI approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 046-2006-EF/94.10; therefore, the amendment of the substantive norm did not imply that the stock brokerage firm should not keep its clients informed about the balances of their resources or securities for the operations carried out in the securities market, without prejudice to its obligation to prove said delivery or enabling. That being so, it cannot be argued that, in the present case, the principle of non-retroactivity has been violated;
That, with regard to what Magot stated about the seven (7) cases referred to in the resolution that correspond to clients who made a single sale operation for the total of their securities and, therefore, at the close of the respective month no longer had securities balances, the criterion that they not be enabled account statements was reasonable, since the obligation expressed in article 70 comprised that both conditions be met; it should be noted that, as indicated in recital 44 of the sanction resolution, Magot in the analyzed case has not proven compliance with the norm, since it has not documentary proven its statement of the seven (7) principals who made a single sale operation for the total of their securities, so that, at the close of the month, they would no longer have had securities or money balances;
That, in summary, in relation to the infraction discussed above, it should be noted that Magot clings to the argument that the obligation to deliver the account statements was not applicable to it because the sample obtained by the administrative authority in the present case did not consider, among others, that its clients did not have securities balances at the close of the respective month, however it has not sent documentation that supports its statements aimed at leaving without effect the charge imputed to it;
That, with regard to the infraction that Magot allegedly did not notify the SMV, within the established deadlines, of the opening of three offices and the closing of two of them, it should be noted that, in accordance with article 196 subsection g) of the LMV, it is an obligation of intermediation agents to notify the SMV with an anticipation of no less than 20 days of the decisions they adopt regarding the opening of new offices or the closing of those in operation;
That, article 16 of the RAI in force at the time the events occurred stated that when an agent decides to open a new office it must notify such fact to the SMV, indicating address, telephone number, services it intends to provide, as well as personal data of the representative responsible for it. Likewise, when it decides to close an office it must notify the SMV of such circumstance, accompanying a proof of having timely informed its clients, whether by mass or direct means;
That, in the analyzed case, as indicated in recital 63 of the challenged resolution, it has been proven that only with a brief of July 14, 2006, Magot notified the SMV of the opening of 3 offices and the closing of 2 offices; however, according to the announcement that Magot attached to its brief, it had informed the general public in the newspapers El Peruano and La República on July 16 and 17, 2005 about the opening and closing of offices[1], that is, it notified the SMV of said circumstance one (1) year after having informed the public, transgressing article 196 subsection g) and article 16 of the previous RAI in force at the time the events occurred;
That, in that sense, Magot's argument that it complied with the publications prior to the communication to the SMV, but that later it found itself unable to open the offices referred to in said publication, which is why it did not send the respective communication to the SMV, is not sustainable;
That, likewise, we disagree with what Magot stated regarding that qualifying its conduct as improper removes it from the punishable scope of the sanctionable assumption, since, as already indicated, in the present case, following the sense of recital 61 of the sanction resolution, there was a violation of the regulations;
That, with regard to the specific case of the office where Mr. Cabello attended, it should be mentioned that the argument presented by Magot is similar to that indicated in its defenses, in the sense that it is an erroneous reading of a control action by the respective official (Internal Auditor of the SAB). That being so, this office agrees with what is stated in recital 67 of the sanction administrative act regarding that Mr. Cabello acknowledged that in the mentioned premises he provided his services as a representative of Magot and that through the notices published on July 16 and 17, 2005, Magot notified the general public of the opening of the cited office;
That, in relation to the argument that the punitive power of the SMV is prescribed, the regulatory framework in force at the time the events occurred and the current legal framework regulated by the TUO of the LPAG, as well as the administrative actions of the sanctioning procedure, must be considered. This is due to the principle of benign non-retroactivity;
That, as a matter of primary importance, it should be noted that the legal institution of prescription in administrative law is "the supervening impossibility of sanctioning an administrative infraction (…) by the mere passage of a period of time[2]." (The highlighting is added);
That, in the case at hand, the administrative sanctioning procedure against Magot began with Official Letter No. 5100-2006-EF/94.55 of imputation of charges of November 14, 2006, notified on November 15, 2006;
That, according to what is stated in the imputation of charges letter, in relation to the non-sending of monthly account statements to Magot's principals, it is observed that said stock brokerage firm, in the period between December 2005 and May 2006, did not comply with sending the respective account statement of operations to its clients who carried out at least one operation in said period and who had balances in their favor in money or securities;
That, in that order of ideas, to determine whether the SMV's power prescribed with respect to said infractions sanctioned by Superintendence Resolution SMV No. 018-2014-SMV/10 of July 7, 2014, it must be verified whether the infraction of not sending the account statements of operations of its principals corresponding to the month of December 2005, being the oldest, is prescribed, since, through this we could evaluate the subsequent infractions of the same type to verify their prescription;
That, for the purposes cited in the preceding paragraph, article 342 of the Securities Market Law - Legislative Decree No. 861 (LMV), in force at the time the events occurred, established the following[3]:
"Article 342.- Subjects liable to sanction.- The persons included in the scope of application of this Law who incur infractions of its provisions and of the general provisions issued by CONASEV are subjects liable to sanction. CONASEV's power to determine the existence of infractions prescribes after three (3) years." (The underlining is added);
That, for its part, subsection 233.1 of article 233 of Law No. 27444 - General Administrative Procedure Law (LPAG) also in force at the time the events occurred established the following:
Article 233.- Prescription
233.1 The authority's power to determine the existence of administrative infractions prescribes within the period established by special laws, without prejudice to the periods for the prescription of the other responsibilities that the infraction could entail. If not determined, it shall prescribe in five years counted from the date on which the infraction was committed or from when it ceased, if it were a continuing action.
That, the subsection of the article cited in the preceding numeral was modified by article 1 of Legislative Decree No. 1029, published on June 24, 2008, according to the following text:
"233.1 The authority's power to determine the existence of administrative infractions prescribes within the period established by special laws, without prejudice to the computation of the prescription periods with respect to the other obligations derived from the effects of the commission of the infraction. If this has not been determined, said authority's power shall prescribe after four (4) years."
233.2 The prescription period is only interrupted with the initiation of the sanctioning procedure, resuming the period if the file remains paralyzed for more than one month for a cause not attributable to the administered.". (The underlining is added).
That, subsequently, the cited article was modified by article 2 of Legislative Decree No. 1272 of December 21, 2016, which has been reflected in article 250 of the TUO of the LPAG, whose full text is as follows:
"Article 233. Prescription
233.1 The authority's power to determine the existence of administrative infractions prescribes within the period established by special laws, without prejudice to the computation of the prescription periods with respect to the other obligations arising from the effects of the commission of the infraction. If this has not been determined, said power of the authority shall prescribe after four (4) years.
233.2 The computation of the prescription period of the power to determine the existence of infractions shall begin on the day on which the infraction was committed in the case of instantaneous infractions or instantaneous infractions with permanent effects, from the day on which the last action constituting the infraction was carried out in the case of continuing infractions, or from the day on which the action ceased in the case of permanent infractions.
The computation of the prescription period is only suspended with the initiation of the sanctioning procedure through notification to the administered party of the facts constituting the infractions imputed to it as charges, in accordance with the provisions of Article 235, paragraph 3 of this Law. Said computation must be resumed immediately if the processing of the sanctioning procedure remains paralyzed for more than twenty-five (25) business days, for a cause not attributable to the administered party.
233.3 The authority declares prescription ex officio and considers the procedure concluded when it notices that the period to determine the existence of infractions has been met. Likewise, administered parties may raise prescription by way of defense and the authority must resolve it without further procedure than the verification of the periods.
If prescription is declared, the authority may initiate the necessary actions to determine the causes and responsibilities of the administrative inaction, only when it is noticed that situations of negligence have occurred."
That, considering the various amendments to the prescription period of the sanctioning power of the administrative authority indicated above, it is concluded that the period to be used in this case is three (3) years, established in the then Article 342 of the LMV, since this provision is more favorable to the administered party;
That, as regards the computation of the prescription period, it must be taken into account that, although the provisions of the LPAG have been subject to amendments, they conclude that the mere imputation of the charge suspends the prescription period of the sanctioning power until the procedure is paralyzed for more than 25 (twenty-five) business days for causes not attributable to the administered party, for which reason it must be resumed immediately;
That, taking into account the foregoing, an evaluation shall be made as to whether or not the prescription of the sanctioning power of the administrative authority has occurred in the present case;
That, as indicated above, the oldest infraction is the one linked to the failure to send the account statements of the operations of its principals corresponding to the month of December 2005. It should be noted that from the commission of said infraction to the initiation of the sanctioning procedure, 291 (two hundred ninety-one) days elapsed;
That, according to the actions of the administrative sanctioning procedure, it was initiated on November 15, 2006, after notification of Official Letter No. 5100-2006-EF/94.55 of December 14, 2007[4], the prescription period of the administrative authority therefore being suspended;
That, likewise, from the actions in the administrative file it is verified that since the sanctioning procedure was initiated it was not paralyzed for more than 25 (twenty-five) business days until after the then General Management elevated the administrative file containing Report No. 33-2007-EF/94.55 of January 12, 2007 to the Administrative Tribunal of the then CONASEV, that is, on January 17, 2007;
That, it should be indicated that the report cited in the preceding paragraph was brought to the attention of Magot by the Technical Secretariat of the said collegiate body, through Official Letter No. 893-2007-EF/94.12 of March 2, 2007, notified on that same date according to the MVNet System record. This means that the computation of the prescription period resumed on February 22, 2007, after 26 (twenty-six) days of inactivity in the procedure had elapsed. However, said computation of the prescription period concluded definitively on April 4, 2007, the date on which the sanction resolution of the Administrative Tribunal No. 017-2007-EF/94.12 of March 30, 2007 was notified;
That, in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, it can be stated that the duration of the prescription period of the administrative power to impose sanctions in the present case —counted from the commission of the oldest infraction of the procedure to the issuance of the administrative act of sanction— has comprised a total of 333 (three hundred thirty-three days);
That, against the sanction resolution, Magot filed an appeal, which was declared unfounded by CONASEV Resolution No. 085-2007-EF/94.01.1 of November 15, 2007, the administrative route being exhausted;
That, although it is true that Magot filed a contentious-administrative claim against the Resolution of the Administrative Tribunal No. 017-2007-EF/94.12 and against CONASEV Resolution No. 085-2007-EF/94.01.1, it should be noted that said situation did not alter in any way the culmination of the computation of the prescription period referred to in the preceding paragraph, since the sanction resolution put an end to this period. However, it resumed when the SMV was notified, on June 23, 2014, with Resolution No. 12 of June 3, 2014 of the 4th Contentious-Administrative Chamber, by which the SMV was required to comply within 10 (ten) days with what was executed in the judicial process, that is, to issue a new administrative resolution in accordance with what was resolved in the judgment with the quality of res judicata;
That, by Deputy Superintendency Resolution No. 018-20014-SMV/10 of July 7, 2014, notified to Magot on July 9, 2014, a definitive end was put to the computation of the prescription period of the sanctioning power of the administrative authority, for which reason, since its last resumption (June 3, 2014), 37 (thirty-seven) additional days elapsed;
That, by reason of the foregoing, the total computation of the prescription period of the oldest infraction of the present case, and therefore of the other infractions linked to the failure to send the account statements of the operations of its principals corresponding to the period December 2005 – May 2006 subject to imputation of charges, culminated on the date on which Magot was notified with the new sanction resolution in compliance with what was resolved by the Judicial Branch. Consequently, the total computation of the prescription period reached 370 days. That being so, the argument indicated by Magot referring to the fact that in the present case the aforementioned infractions would have prescribed must be dismissed;
That, as regards the prescription of the punitive power of the SMV in relation to the infraction referring to the failure to timely communicate the opening and closing of offices, it should be indicated that said infraction would have occurred in May 2005, since it has been verified that from that date the office located at Jr. Miró Quesada No. 247 - Office 203 was operating. This conclusion follows, as stated in the Charge Official Letter of November 14, 2006, from Requirement No. 1-05 of May 2005 made by Mr. Pablo Varillas Basurto (Mr. Varillas), internal control officer of Magot, addressed to Mr. Jaime Cabello Jaramillo (Mr. Cabello), who performed his duties as representative of the stock brokerage firm in the aforementioned office;
That, in the requirement referred to in the preceding recital, explanations were requested from Mr. Cabello for certain letters he had sent, in which the address of the aforementioned office was recorded. Likewise, in the Internal Control Report of June 3, 2006, submitted by Mr. Varillas to the Board of Directors, he stated, as a result of Requirement No. 1-05: "This resulted in the office of said representative being registered as an office of the SAB and determining that all procedures and registration of principals were carried out in the SAB's offices";
That, the computation of the prescription period from the occurrence of the facts to the notification of the charge official letter, with respect to the infraction referring to the failure to timely communicate the closing or opening of offices, was 370 (three hundred seventy) days. However, after the resumption of the computation of the prescription period it was 615 (six hundred fifteen) days; that is, 1 year and 250 days. Therefore, in this infraction the prescription alleged by Magot has also not occurred, for which reason the administrative appeal must be dismissed;
That, with respect to the argument that in the present case Magot's right of defense was affected, because, since the Supreme Court judgment and Superintendency Resolution No. 081-2014-SMV/02 had not been published on the SMV portal, as provided in the Policy on publicity of regulatory projects, general legal norms and other administrative acts of the SMV, approved by SMV Resolution No. 014-2014SMV/01; this would have allowed it to know that, in the present case, the Deputy Superintendency was going to issue a new resolution;
That, regarding what was indicated by Magot in the preceding recital, it should be indicated that such affirmations are not correct, since Superintendency Resolution No. 081-2014-SMV/02 provides, as read from its text, that the competent area comply with what was judicially ordered, an administrative act of mere procedure, which contains no assessment or judgment regarding the case under discussion, to which must be added the fact that Magot had full knowledge, being part of the judicial process, that the SMV was going to issue a new administrative resolution resolving the merits of the matter, which once issued was notified to it, giving rise to the filing of the appeal, the subject of analysis in this resolution;
That, on the other hand, it must be borne in mind that, through Official Letter No. 8048-2017-SMV/03, notified to MAGOT on December 14, 2017, the report of the Legal Advisory Office was made available to MAGOT and it was informed that the administrative file was in the Superintendency's office for resolution, and through Official Letter No. 403-2018-SMV/03, notified on January 23, 2018, in response to its brief of December 20, 2017, it was granted the right to speak so that it could report orally before this office, the attorney not appearing on the scheduled date;
That, as indicated above, Magot submitted on February 2, 2018 arguments stating, specifically, the following:
That, in relation to the argument of the prescription of the punitive power of the SMV, it should be indicated that, as already developed in the preceding recitals, it is not possible to grant the argument that in the present case the administrative punitive power was lost;
That, regarding what was alluded to by Magot in its arguments brief regarding the presumed variation of the infraction in the report of the Legal Advisory Office, it should be noted that this is not correct, since the analysis carried out in the referred report adhered at all times to evaluating the failure to communicate the account statements to the clients of the appellant. This can be evidenced in what is mentioned in numeral 3.1 of the "Evaluation" section of the report, which states the following:
"In that sense, it is concluded that the obligation contained in Article 70 of the RAI in force at the time of the events is reflected in Article 83 of the RAI approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 046-2006-EF/94.10, therefore the amendment of the substantive norm did not imply that the stock brokerage firm should not keep its clients informed about the balances of their resources or the securities for the operations carried out in the stock market, without prejudice to its obligation to prove said delivery or enablement."
That, from the foregoing, it can be observed that the subject of analysis was circumscribed to what was the object of charge, that is, the matter relating to the failure to send the monthly account statements to Magot's principals, for which it was necessary to present sufficient evidence of documents or other physical supports demonstrating the existence or not of communication or enablement to its clients of the account statement information, since in that way the imputed sanction could be ruled out. Precisely this is what the Report questioned by Magot's argument conveys; since it states: (i) with respect to the 7 cases observed on sales operations of all the securities, the obligation to communicate the account statements would not correspond, however, what is questioned is the lack of proof regarding the delivery, remission or making available of the cited information; (ii) with respect to the other cases observed, neither the delivery nor the enablement of the account statements to the respective clients has been proven;
That what is expressed in the preceding recital is confirmed when Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 018-2014-SNV/10, by which Magot is sanctioned, among others, for the commission of the infraction of Article 70 of the RAI states that: "JUAN MAGOT Y ASOCIADOS in its capacity as intermediation agent must prove compliance with its obligations as provided in Article 70 of the FORMER RAI and, on the contrary, has not presented attached to its defenses, the delivery receipts of account statements provided by the Courier nor has it sent information proving its assertion that seven (07) principals made a single sale operation for the total of their securities, so that at the close of the month they would no longer have balances of securities or money. In that sense, it has not proven compliance with the aforementioned norm as it affirms in its defenses, since it has not proven what it alleges";
That in relation to what was alleged by Magot regarding the supposed subsumption of infracting types not stipulated in the Stock Brokerage Firm Regulation nor in the sanctioning procedure, it is worth clarifying that this cannot be concluded from the reading of the Report of the Legal Advisory Office, since -following the line of what is indicated in the previous numeral- in said document it has clearly been expressed that the matter subject to evaluation in the case followed against Magot is the existence or not of communication or enablement of the account statements of its clients. In that sense, in the interest of clarifying the case, it is necessary to prove the actions alluded to by the appellant, a situation that has not been able to be verified up to now; therefore, we reiterate that the failure to prove the communications or enablements made is not being included as part of the infraction, but rather this is an immediate consequence of the need to prove what was affirmed during the procedure and therefore discredit the imputation made therein;
That, regarding Magot's questioning about the infraction referring to the failure to timely communicate the opening and closing of offices, it should be indicated that this non-compliance has been corroborated in the present sanctioning procedure, through the information sent by Magot to the Inspection Commission on July 26, 2006, as well as the brief sent to the SMV –formerly CONASEV– dated July 14, 2006. From said information it has been concluded that the appellant would not have timely communicated the opening of three (3) offices located at Pasaje Acuña No. 147, Office 212; and Jirón Miró Quesada No. 247, Offices 203 and 302; nor would it have communicated the closing of two (2) offices located at Calle Emilio Cavenecia No. 140 (Miraflores) and at Jirón Miró Quesada No. 247, Office 501 (Cercado de Lima);
That, in effect, in the brief sent by Magot to the SMV, on July 14, 2006, the intermediary communicated the opening of the three offices and the closing of the two offices mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In said brief, the announcement published in the newspapers El Peruano and La República of July 16 and 17, 2005, respectively, was attached, through which the public was informed of the occurrence of said circumstances;
That, regarding the presumed contravention of the principle of non-retroactivity of norms, we must point out that this did not occur; since, in the Report the infraction typified in numeral 3.9 of Annex X of the Stock Brokerage Firm Regulation has been evaluated, taking into consideration the text before its amendment in 2007, which indicated as infracting conduct the «opening or closing offices without complying with the periods and communications established in the regulations». That is why, to be certain of the commission or not of the mentioned infraction, it was necessary for this body to analyze the norms in force at the date on which the acts occurred. In that sense, consideration was given –as can be observed in numeral 3.2 of the "Evaluation" section of the Report of the Legal Advisory Office– to subsection g) of Article 196 of the Stock Market Law -Legislative Decree No. 861- from whose text it follows that it is an obligation of intermediation agents to "Communicate to CONASEV with anticipation of no less than twenty (20) days, the decisions they adopt regarding the opening of new offices or the closing of those in operation, complying for this purpose with the requirements established by general provisions"; and Article 16 of the Stock Brokerage Firm Regulation in force at the time of the events, whose text states that "When an agent decides to open a new office it must communicate such fact to CONASEV indicating address, telephone number, services it intends to provide, as well as personal data of the representative responsible for it. Likewise, when it decides to close an office it must communicate such circumstance to CONASEV, accompanying a record of having timely informed its clients, whether by mass or direct means";
That, from the reading of the described normative provisions, it can be concluded that, effectively, Magot's conduct is subsumed in the infraction determined in the text of numeral 3.9 of Annex X of the Sanctions Regulation;
That, in accordance with what is indicated and evaluated in the previous reports and the sanction determination Resolution, the commission of the infraction for not timely communicating the opening of 3 (three) offices and the closing of 2 (two) has been proven, since having made publications on July 16 and 17, 2005 in the newspapers El Peruano and La República, certainty can be had of the date on which these facts occurred. From this, Magot's infraction is corroborated, since it did not timely communicate to the SMV the occurrence of the same, on the contrary, communication about these facts was only sent on July 14, 2006; contravening the provisions of subsection g) of Article 196 of the LMV and Article 16 of the Stock Brokerage Firm Regulation; and,
In accordance with the provisions of numeral 26 of Article 12 of the Regulation of Organization and Functions of the Superintendency of the Stock Market, approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF;
RESOLVES:
Article 1.- Declare unfounded the appeal filed by Magot Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.C. against Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV No. 018-2014-SMV/10
Article 2.- Consider the administrative route exhausted.
Article 3.- Transcribe this resolution to Magot Sociedad Agente de Bolsa S.A.C. and to the Lima Stock Exchange S.A
Article 4.- Order the publication of this resolution on the Portal of the Superintendency of the Stock Market (www.smv.gob.pe).
Register, communicate and publish.
José Manuel Peschiera Rebagliati
Superintendent of the Stock Market
The announcements indicated the opening of three new offices located at Pasaje Acuña No. 147 - Office 212 and at Jr. Miró Quesada 247 Offices 203 and 302 - Cercado de Lima; and informing the closure of its offices located at Calle Emilio Cavenecia No. 140 Miraflores and at Jr. Miró Quesada No. 247 Office 501, in the Cercado de Lima. ↑
Administrative Sanctioning Law – Manuel Rebollo Puig, Manuel Izquierdo Carrasco, Lucía Alarcón Sotomayor and Antonio Bueno Armijo. Editorial Lex Nova – Page 863. ↑
The aforementioned Article was modified by the First Complementary Modifying Provision of Law No. 29782, published on July 28, 2011, the text of which is as follows:
"Article 342. Subjects liable to sanction
Persons included within the scope of application of this Law who incur infractions of its provisions and of the general provisions issued by the SMV are subjects liable to sanction by the Superintendency of the Securities Market (SMV). The power to determine the existence of administrative infractions with respect to all natural and legal persons under its competence prescribes after four years." (Underlining added). ↑
The aforementioned official letter was notified through the MVNet System. ↑
(…)
"And finally the aforementioned article establishes that in no case may the brokerage agent exempt itself from the obligation to provide information to its clients regarding its operations, securities and financial instruments.
(...)
In this sense, it is concluded that the obligation contained in article 70 of the RAI in force at the time the events occurred is reflected in article 83 of the RAI approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 046-2006-EF/94.10, therefore the modification of the substantive rule did not imply that the stock brokerage company should not keep its clients informed about the balances of their resources or the securities for operations carried out in the securities market, without prejudice to its obligation to prove such delivery or enablement. That being so, it cannot be maintained that in the present case the principle of non-retroactivity has been violated." (highlighting and underlining added) SIC. ↑
3.9.- (R.C. No. 055-2001-EF/94.10).- Opening or closing offices, without complying with the deadlines and communications established in the regulations.
3.9 (R.C. No. 017-2007-EF/94.10).- Not communicating to CONASEV within the deadlines established by the regulations, the decision to open or close offices, or not informing CONASEV of the name of the responsible representative of each of its offices. ↑
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The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“approved by Supreme Decree No. 216-2011-EF”
“by Superintendent Resolution No. 034-2018-SMV/02 of March 23, 2018, the nullity of Superintendent Resolution No. 016-2018-SMV/02 was declared ex officio”
“SMV Resolution No. 014-2014SMV/01”
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