2022-12-08
Added · Updated
The Canadian Securities Administrators and IIROC issued this notice to provide an overview of the existing regulatory framework for short selling and to request public feedback on potential regulatory updates. The document details current requirements under securities legislation and IIROC rules, including short-marking, reporting of extended failed trades, and prohibitions on manipulative activities. It also addresses stakeholder concerns regarding the repeal of the tick test and pre-borrow requirements while summarizing responses to previous consultations on activist short selling.
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Joint CSA and IIROC Staff Notice 23-329
Short Selling in Canada
December 8, 2022
Background and Introduction
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC and, together with the CSA, we) are publishing Joint CSA and IIROC Staff Notice 23-329 Short Selling in Canada (Notice) to provide an overview of the existing regulatory landscape surrounding short selling, give an update on current related initiatives and request public feedback on areas for regulatory consideration. We believe that it is important and timely to review our regulatory framework to ensure it is current and appropriate given the way markets continue to evolve. This Notice reflects our commitment to do so, especially in light of public feedback we received with respect to short selling and international developments, described later in the Notice. The CSA are also publishing today a summary of comments and responses to the CSA Consultation Paper 25-403 Activist Short Selling (Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper).1 The Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper was published on December 3, 2020. Its purpose was to facilitate the discussion of concerns relating to activist short selling and its potential impact on capital markets. Some of the comments received in response to the Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper addressed topics broader than activist short selling activities and related to short selling and short selling regulation in general. Similar issues have also been raised by other stakeholders. These comments are summarized in the summary and responses to the Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper and published today in CSA Staff Notice 25-306 Activist Short Selling Update (Staff Notice 25-306). We discuss the broader comments related to short selling in this Notice. While this Notice does not directly cover the Canadian trade settlement regime, we also discuss, at a high level, failed trades and related initiatives, to provide additional context to the extent that they may relate to short selling. The Notice is organized as follows:
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Part 1. Background on short selling, failed trades, and the regulatory framework
A. Definition of Short Selling
IIROC’s Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) define a “short sale”2 as a sale of a security, other than a derivative instrument, which the seller does not own either directly or through an agent or trustee.3 It involves selling securities at the current market price either with the expectation of being able to cover the short position by purchasing later at a lower price, thus making a profit, or to lock in a profit arising from a difference in price between the securities sold short and a related security. Short selling is a legitimate trading practice that helps market participants manage risk, contributes to market liquidity and promotes price discovery. Short selling carries certain risks. For example, a short seller may incur potentially unlimited costs to close the short position if the price of the particular security rises. B. Definition of Failed Trades The term "failed trade" is not defined in securities legislation. However, a failed trade is generally understood to occur when a seller (whether short or long) fails to deliver securities or the buyer fails to pay the funds when delivery/payment is due, currently on the second business day after the trade date, unless a later settlement date is agreed to by all parties at the time of the trade. Failed trades may also occur when there are issues with instructions of the buyer and the seller regarding settlement (for example, when there are different instructions from the buyer and the seller, or one party of the trade has not provided instructions or provided them too late). In the context of this Notice, “failed trades”, “settlement fails or failures” and “fail to deliver”, all mean failure to deliver securities on the settlement date. UMIR Rule 1.1 defines “failed trade.”4 It includes a short sale by an account that has failed to make available the securities for settlement or has failed to make arrangements with a Participant or Access Person (as defined in UMIR)5 to borrow the securities in time to deliver on the settlement date.
C. Overview of the current short selling regulatory framework
Short selling is subject to a well-developed framework comprising Canadian securities legislation and IIROC requirements and is mostly overseen by IIROC. This framework includes a detailed reporting regime that provides IIROC with timely information which IIROC uses to monitor and supervise potentially inappropriate short selling practices. 2 Section 1.1 of UMIR; see also Policy 1.1 – Definitions, Part 3 – Definition of “Short Sale” of UMIR at https://www.iiroc.ca/rulesand-enforcement/umir-rules/11-definitions. 3 The term “short sale” is used in securities legislation but not defined. See e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990 as am. S.48, Securities Act (Québec), CQLR, c. V-1.1, section 194 and s. 54 of the Nova Scotia Securities Act, which requires declaration of a short position and describes what is a “short position”. 4 Section 1.1 of UMIR at https://www.iiroc.ca/rules-and-enforcement/umir-rules/11-definitions. 5 Section 1.1 of UMIR at https://www.iiroc.ca/rules-and-enforcement/umir-rules/11-definitions.
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i. Canadian securities legislation requirements
Canadian securities legislation requires a person who places an order for the sale of a security with a registered dealer to declare to the dealer at the time of placing the order if they do not own the security.6 Securities legislation7 and Regulation 23-101 respecting Trading Rules8 (Regulation 23-101) prohibit activities that are manipulative and/or deceptive, which could occur in connection with short selling.
ii. IIROC requirements
IIROC has several requirements relevant to short selling applicable to Participants9 or Access Persons10 including:
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UMIR also requires Participants and Access Persons to calculate and report to IIROC the aggregate short positions of each individual account twice a month. 16 IIROC consolidates and publishes a Consolidated Short Position Report showing the aggregate short positions on all listed securities as of the current reporting date and the net change in short positions from the previous reporting date, on a per security basis, on its website.17 IIROC also aggregates trades marked “short sale” from all marketplaces it monitors, consolidates that information, and publishes a semi-monthly report showing the total industry short sales for each security over the reporting period. 18 Like securities legislation, UMIR also prohibits activities that are manipulative and/or deceptive. In the context of short selling, these include entering an order for the sale of a security without, at the time of entering the order, having a reasonable expectation of settling any trade that would result from the execution of the order on the settlement date. As such, short selling without having a reasonable expectation to settle the resulting trades on settlement date, generally two days after trade date, is not permitted under UMIR. 19 On August 17, 2022, IIROC issued guidance confirming the existing obligation of a Participant to have a reasonable expectation to settle a resulting trade on the settlement date, rather than having the expectation to settle the trade on some future date, such as the date securities owned by the seller that are subject to resale restriction become freely tradeable. 20 IIROC also monitors for potentially abusive trading activity. In the context of short selling activity, IIROC uses algorithms to monitor for unusual levels of short selling coupled with significant price movements and reviews alerts to determine the cause of the price movement and whether there is an indication of abusive trading activities. IIROC may also review social media or chatrooms as well as Extended Failed Trades reports for indications of settlement issues. IIROC has additional alerts that detect changes in the historical pattern of short selling for a particular security. These alerts allow IIROC to determine if short selling is becoming concentrated within a particular dealer or client. If unusual levels of short selling are detected, IIROC can:
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If appropriate, IIROC may also refer the matter to the enforcement branch of the appropriate CSA jurisdiction for additional investigation and action. As noted above, IIROC requires Participants to mark all orders representing a short sale as either “short” or “short-marking exempt”. This is part of a broader requirement in UMIR that Participants use the correct identifier or designation on an order sent to a marketplace regulated by IIROC.21 Where there is a missing or erroneous marker or identifier on the order and that order has been executed at least in
part, the Participant is required to file a report to the Regulatory Marker Correction System.22 IIROC
reviews its Participants’ use of order markers during compliance reviews.
IIROC recently completed a study of failed trades. The study was based on five years (April 1, 2015 – March 31, 2020) of settlement data from the CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc. (CDS) related to continuous net settlement (CNS),23 outstanding positions, buy-ins and trade-for-trade (TFT) 24 settlement transactions. IIROC Notice 22-0190 includes the results of IIROC’s study and additional discussion of the CNS and TFT processes. In essence, the study identified several considerations:
6 | Page strategy used for mitigating portfolio risk by hedging short positions against long positions, so that losses are mitigated regardless of the direction of the market. Short sellers, particularly activist short sellers who publicly announce that they have a short position in a security, may provide new information about issuers that can assist in ensuring the price of their securities is more reflective of their underlying value. For example, short sellers identify securities they think could be overvalued. Often, after disclosure by activist short sellers, a correction occurs in the market price of these securities. As we described in the Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper, sometimes issuers pursue certain actions in response to short selling campaigns which may include a change in management or hiring a new auditor or private investigator. However, short selling is not without controversy and some stakeholders hold negative perceptions about short selling or certain aspects of short selling activities. A common theme of concerns expressed is that issuers perceive the Canadian regulatory regime as lax compared to other jurisdictions, especially the U.S., which makes it easier to conduct an activist campaign that unfairly targets Canadian issuers. As we indicated in the past, and explain in further detail in Appendix A, we believe that Canada’s regulatory regime governing short sales is generally consistent with the four principles for the effective regulation of short selling published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 2009. 26 Further, as we concluded in Staff Notice 25-306, we have not received evidence of specific issues arising from activist short selling campaigns that would justify a regulatory response. That said, we acknowledge the comments surrounding short selling in general, some of which have been raised more recently. We discuss the key themes below and invite further feedback from the public.
i. Tick test27
The “tick test” was a restriction on the price at which certain types of trades can occur. In the case of short sales subject to the tick test, the sale could not occur at a lower price than the previous trade, subject to limited exceptions. As explained in more detail in Appendix A, IIROC amended UMIR in March 2012 to repeal the tick test. This was supported by empirical evidence from short sales and failed trade studies in the Canadian market. These studies did not find a relationship between rapid price declines and unusual short selling activity and did not support adopting an alternative uptick rule similar to Rule 201 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 28 26 See: Regulation of Short Selling – Final Report, available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD292.pdf. The first principle: short selling should be subject to appropriate controls to reduce or minimise the potential risks that could affect the orderly and efficient functioning and stability of financial markets; the second principle: short selling should be subject to a reporting regime that provides timely information to the market or to market authorities; the third principle: short selling should be subject to an effective compliance and enforcement regime; and the fourth principle: short selling regulation should allow appropriate exceptions for certain types of transactions for efficient market functioning and development. 27 The tick test referred to a previous requirement in UMIR that a short sale not be made at a price which is less than the last sale price of the security. 28 Rule 201 generally requires marketplaces to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent the execution or display of a short sale at an impermissible price when a stock has triggered a circuit breaker by experiencing a price decline of at least 10 percent in one day (based on the prior day’s closing price). Once the circuit breaker in Rule 201 has been triggered, the price test restriction will apply to short sale orders in that security for the remainder of the day and the following day, unless an exception applies.
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Concerns have been expressed regarding a perceived negative impact that resulted from the repeal of the tick test. Several commenters that provided responses to the Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper recommended that the CSA review the impact that the removal of the tick test has had on the market. IIROC monitors the proportion of short selling relative to total sales, and the frequency of short sales that are executed on a downtick. Some results of this monitoring are included as Appendix C. These results show that:
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Access Persons must also make prior arrangements to borrow any security designated by IIROC as a “Pre-Borrow Security” before entering an order to sell short on a marketplace.32 Despite these requirements, views were expressed in response to the Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper that the current requirements in Canada are not stringent enough, especially when compared with those in the U.S. Some stakeholders noted that in the U.S, Regulation SHO requires a broker-dealer to not accept a short sale order in an equity security unless it has (i) borrowed the security or entered into a bona-fide arrangement to borrow the security; or (ii) reasonable grounds to believe that the security can be borrowed so that it can be delivered on the date delivery is due; and (iii) documented compliance with this requirement. 33 In Ontario, the Ontario Capital Markets Modernization Taskforce (CMM Taskforce) recommended that IIROC revise UMIR to require a Participant to confirm the ability to borrow securities prior to accepting a short sale order from another person or entering an order for its own account.34 We ask whether the market has changed to support the introduction of such requirements at this time. In particular, we have the following questions:
Questions:
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Some concerns have been raised by stakeholders about the ten-trading day threshold. The concern is that this timeline is too long for an unsettled trade to be reported and should be shortened. Questions:
3. Does the current definition of a “failed trade”, as described in Part 1, above, appropriately
describe a failed trade?
4. Should a timeline shorter than ten days following the expected settlement date be considered?
What would be an appropriate timeline? Please provide rationale and supporting data.
iv. Transparency of short selling positions
We described above how IIROC publicly discloses short positions by publishing the Consolidated Short Position Report twice monthly. In contrast to other jurisdictions (such as the European Union and Australia), there are no regulatory or public reporting requirements or obligations to disclose information on the short position of an individual account. Even so, it is not uncommon for an activist short seller to voluntarily disclose that they are short a particular security when they commence a campaign. As described in Appendix A, IIROC has conducted extensive consultations on transparency measures that would provide timely information to the market. The Short Sale Trading Statistics Summary Report36 was introduced in 2013, and in 2016, following additional consultation, IIROC also started publishing the Consolidated Short Position Report37, also described in Appendix A. IIROC also publishes the Short Sale Trading Corrections Report38 twice a month. This report aggregates trade marker corrections affecting short sale traded volume submitted through the Regulatory Marker Correction System. Comments provided in response to the Activist Short Selling Consultation Paper supporting additional transparency are summarized in Staff Notice 25-306 published today and include recommendations to require the reporting of the identity of short sellers and short positions to the regulator, the public or both. Other comments cautioned that additional transparency could have unintended consequences, such as promoting group behaviour that would drive down a target issuer’s stock price. We are reviewing international initiatives to enhance reporting and disclosure requirements, such as those described in Appendix B of this Notice. Questions:
5. Should additional public transparency requirements of short selling activities or short positions
be considered? Please indicate what such requirements should be and the frequency of any disclosure. Please also provide a rationale and empirical data to support your suggestions or to support why changes are not needed.
6. Should additional reporting requirements regarding short selling activities be considered by the
securities regulatory authorities? Please indicate what such requirements should be and the frequency of any disclosure. Please also provide a rationale and empirical data to support your suggestions or to support why changes are not needed.
7. As noted above, IIROC’s study of failed trades showed that correlations between short sales and
settlement issues in junior securities were more significant, and that junior securities experience 36 https://www.iiroc.ca/sections/markets/reports-statistics-and-other-information/short-sale-trading-statistics-and-reports 37 https://www.iiroc.ca/sections/markets/reports-statistics-and-other-information/short-sale-trading-statistics-and-reports 38 https://www.iiroc.ca/sections/markets/reports-statistics-and-other-information/short-sale-trading-statistics-and-reports
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v. Buy-in and close-out requirements
In Canada, eligible debt and equity securities are cleared and deposited through CDSX, the clearing and settlement system of the CDS. CDSX has a Continuous Net Settlement Service (CNS), which is designed to clear and settle primarily equity trades transacted on a Canadian marketplace. Within CNS, a “buy-in” process enables a buyer in a transaction to accelerate the settlement of outstanding, unsettled CNS positions from its seller(s) which are identified in CDS procedures as “toreceive”. Outstanding to-receive CNS positions are those quantities of shares which have failed to settle on the “value date” (the date on which the parties to a trade have agreed that it is to be settled). The buy-in process is initiated when a buyer (i.e. receiver) chooses to enter an “intent to buy-in” outstanding to-receive positions in CDSX against an outstanding quantity of shares owed to them. The participant owing the specified security is provided with a 48-hour notice that they may be held liable to deliver on some or all of their portion of the buy-in security. The CMM Taskforce, in its Final Report, 39 noted that, in contrast with the U.S.40 and the European Union41, there are no mandatory close-out or buy-in provisions in Canada. The CMM Taskforce recommended that, should a short sale fail to settle, the short seller be subject to a mandatory buy-in. To allow for fails due to administrative issues, the buy-in requirement would be triggered at settlement date +2 days. The CMM Taskforce recommended that the obligation to execute the buy-in rest with the investment dealer and that exemptions be considered for additional activities that may cause a legitimate settlement delay. Question:
8. Would mandatory close-out or buy-in requirements similar to those in the U.S. and the
European Union be beneficial for the Canadian capital markets? Please provide rationale and data substantiating the costs and benefits of such requirements on market participants. 39 Ibid 34. 40 In the U.S., Rule 204 Close-out requirement of Regulation SHO, at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/part-242/subjectgroup-ECFR1607681c7b4f78d, requires brokers and dealers that are participants of a registered clearing agency to take action to close out fail to deliver positions. The broker-dealer is required to purchase or borrow securities of like kind and quantity by no later than T+3 and, for bona-fide market making activities, by T+5. 41 This referred to the requirement in Article 15 Buy-in procedures of the EU Short Selling Regulation, at https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:086:0001:0024:en:PDF, that a central counterparty in a Member State that provides clearing services for shares ensure that, among others, where a natural or legal person who sells shares is not able to deliver the shares for settlement within four business days after the day on which settlement is due, procedures be automatically triggered for the buy-in of the shares to ensure delivery for settlement. It should be noted that this requirement was removed from the regulation in March 2022 until November 2, 2025. See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1930 . On November 10, 2022, the European Parliament published a draft report, at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/ECON-PR-736678_EN.pdf in which it is proposing to dispense with mandatory buy-ins.
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Conclusion
As we noted in the past, we are of the view that Canada’s regulatory regime governing short sales is generally consistent with the four IOSCO principles for the effective regulation of short selling. However, we are aware of the comments raised by various stakeholders, including the expression of a number of concerns. In this Notice, we seek input on the items discussed above. In addition to answers to the questions set out above, we also seek general comment on other aspects of short selling where stakeholders believe there is room for regulatory initiatives.
Part 3. Comments
Please submit your comments in writing, on or before March 8, 2023. Please send your comments in writing to the following addresses:
Me Philippe Lebel
Corporate Secretary and Executive Director, Legal Affairs Autorité des marchés financiers Place de la Cité, tour Cominar 2640, boulevard Laurier, bureau 400 Québec (Québec) G1V 5C1 Fax: 514 864-63811 consultation-en-cours@lautorite.qc.ca The Secretary Ontario Securities Commission 20 Queen Street West, 22nd floor, Toronto, Ontario M5H 3S8 comments@osc.gov.on.ca
Part 4. Questions
Please refer your questions to any of the following CSA and IIROC staff:
Serge Boisvert
Senior Policy Advisor
Autorité des marchés financiers
Serge.boisvert@lautorite.qc.ca
Roland Geiling
Derivatives Analyst
Autorité des marchés financiers
Roland.geiling@lautorite.qc.ca
Timothy Baikie
Senior Legal Counsel, Market Regulation
Ontario Securities Commission tbaikie@osc.gov.on.ca Hanna Cho Legal Counsel, Market Regulation Ontario Securities Commission hcho@osc.gov.on.ca Ruxandra Smith Senior Accountant, Market Regulation Ontario Securities Commission ruxsmith@osc.gov.on.ca Jesse Ahlan Regulatory Analyst, Market Structure Alberta Securities Commission Jesse.ahlan@asc.ca
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Michael Grecoff
Securities Market Specialist
British Columbia Securities Commission mgrecoff@bcsc.bc.ca H. Zach Masum Manager, Legal Services British Columbia Securities Commission zmasum@bcsc.bc.ca Tyler Ritchie Investigator Manitoba Securities Commission Tyler.Ritchie@gov.mb.ca Doug Harris General Counsel, Director of Market Regulation and Policy and Secretary Nova Scotia Securities Commission doug.harris@novascotia.ca Theodora Lam Senior Policy Counsel, Market Regulation Policy Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada tlam@iiroc.ca Kevin McCoy Vice-President, Market Compliance and Policy Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada kmccoy@iiroc.ca
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APPENDIX A
HISTORY OF SHORT SELLING REGULATION IN CANADA
There has been a steady evolution of short selling regulation in Canada. Beginning in 2002, Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS), a predecessor organization to IIROC, imposed UMIR requirements on Participants42 to:
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A. Review of Regulatory Regime on Short Selling and Failed Trades in Canada To ensure the overall effectiveness of regulation of equity trading in Canada, IIROC took the following steps which culminated in the 2008 amendments to UMIR:
i. Strategic Review of the Short Selling Regime in UMIR
IIROC launched a strategic review that included looking at the short selling regime in UMIR47 by:
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As a result of this work, IIROC questioned whether the benefits of a US-style “fail list” for Canadian markets in 2007 would be commensurate with the costs due to:
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Findings from the 2008 Trends Study did not support the need in Canada to follow actions on short selling taken at the time by the SEC, including the Regulation SHO proposal.55 B. 2008 UMIR Amendments Results from the body of work described above led to IIROC’s decision to amend UMIR with respect to short selling and failed trades in 2008 (2008 UMIR Amendments), which included:
i. Additional restrictions in short selling
IIROC amended UMIR to provide for the ability to prohibit short selling in particular securities or class of securities in real-time (Short Sale Ineligible Security56) and respond to developments in trading where rates of failed trades had become excessive.57 IIROC also clarified requirements that must be met for a seller to be considered the owner of securities at the time of a sale, including that if a seller has not taken all necessary steps to become legally entitled to the security, the seller would be considered to be making a short sale and the order must be identified accordingly.58
ii. Enhanced monitoring of Failed Trades
IIROC required Participants and Access Persons to report “failed trades” where the failure was not resolved within ten trading days following the original settlement date of the trade (EFTR).59 IIROC also implemented a new web-based reporting system for EFTRs to identify “problem” fails so that IIROC would be able to assess the reasons for the failure and monitor the steps taken to resolve the problem.60 IIROC also included an anti-avoidance provision to prohibit Participants and Access Persons from entering into a transaction or series of transactions in an attempt to “re-age” the default in order to avoid filing an EFTR, which would be a violation of the requirement to trade openly and fairly in UMIR 2.1. 55 See for example, the T+3 close-out requirement introduced by the SEC in 2008 (SEC Release No. 34-58572 (September 17, 2008)). 56 IIROC Notice 08-0143 Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades (October 15, 2008). 57 For example, IIROC may become aware of systemic failures to settle trades in a particular security or class of securities through its monitoring of failed trade reports, issuances of “buy-in” notices by CDS, increasing proportion of short selling on the marketplace, or unusual price or volume movements, etc. (see IIROC Notice 08-0143 Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades (October 15, 2008) at p11). 58 For example, with respect to the exercise of options, rights or warrants – all necessary steps include: made any payment required; submitted to the appropriate person any required forms or notices; and submitted, if applicable, to the appropriate person any certificates for securities to be converted, exchanged or exercised. (IIROC Notice 08-0143 at p12-13). 59 IIROC implemented EFTR requirements for all trades executed on a marketplace and settle through:
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iii. Enhanced monitoring of Cancelled or Varied Trades
IIROC prohibited the cancellation or variation61 of a trade unless the variation or cancellation was made by IIROC or with notice to IIROC (TVCR). 62 TVCR reports allowed IIROC to review these changes and ensure that the variation or cancellation is for a bona fide reason and not part of a manipulative or deceptive manner of trading.63 IIROC continued to monitor short selling and failed trades and enhanced its surveillance regime to see if further regulatory action would be required. The following measures adopted by IIROC and further studies ultimately led to further amendments in UMIR in 2012:
iv. New Surveillance Alerts
IIROC introduced additional alerts that detected changes in the historic pattern of short selling for a particular security. These alerts allowed IIROC to determine if short selling was becoming concentrated within particular dealers or clients.64 If unusual levels of short selling were detected, IIROC would also have the ability to:
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The Short Prohibition Study compared rates of trade failure of Restricted Financials to those of other issuers in the financial sector that were only listed on the TSX (Non-Restricted Financials). The analysis covered the periods before, during, and after the Orders were in effect68. IIROC published its findings in February 2009 which indicated the issuance of the Orders:
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iv. Short Sale Circuit Breaker Study74
To determine whether IIROC should consider similar short sale circuit breaker requirements as the SEC at the time, IIROC monitored and reviewed short selling activity on Canadian marketplaces from February 28 to April 29, 2011 in inter-listed securities where a short sale circuit breaker had been triggered in the U.S. Based on IIROC’s empirical studies, IIROC did not find a relationship between rapid price declines and unusual short selling activity, and did not find there was evidence of a systemic migration of short selling activity of inter-listed securities to Canadian markets when short sale circuit breakers were in effect in the U.S. IIROC concluded that Canada did not need to adopt the same short sale circuit breaker system and alternative uptick rules similar to the SEC’s Rule 201. 75 D. 2012 UMIR Amendments Supported by the empirical evidence from the above studies on short sales and failed trades in the Canadian market, IIROC amended UMIR in March 2012 to repeal the tick test (2012 UMIR Amendments). 76 This amendment paralleled the SEC’s repeal of price restrictions on short sales that became effective on July 7, 2007, following a multi-year “pilot project” which concluded that price restrictions had no effect on market prices.77 Before the 2012 UMIR Amendments, IIROC had to provide an exemption from the price restrictions on short sales with respect to securities that were inter-listed on an exchange in the U.S.78 Based on IIROC’s studies, IIROC believed there were better mechanisms than the tick test to detect and address abusive short selling,79 and implemented the following new initiatives on short selling and failed trades as part of the 2012 UMIR Amendments:
i. Pre-Borrow Requirements in certain circumstances
While short selling with no reasonable expectation to settle on settlement date was already prohibited as a type of manipulative and deceptive activity under UMIR 2.280, IIROC introduced the following limited pre-borrow requirements in March 2012 that would apply even if there was a reasonable expectation to settle:81 Participants or Access Persons must make arrangements to borrow the securities 74 IIROC, Review of Trading on Canadian Equity Marketplaces of Inter-listed Securities Subject to the US Short Sale Circuit Breaker (February 2012). 75 Under Rule 201 of Regulation SHO, if the price of a security declines at least 10% from the closing price on the primary listing market on the previous trading day, a circuit breaker would be triggered and any short sale executed during the balance of that trading day and the next trading day would have to be entered at a price which was at least one trading increment above the current national best bid. 76 IIROC Notice 12-0078 – Notice of Approval – Provisions Respecting Regulation of Short Sales and Failed Trades (March 2, 2012). 77 IIROC Notice 11-0075– Request for Comments – Provisions Respecting Regulation of Short Sales and Failed Trades (February 25, 2011) and IIROC Notice 12-0078 – Notice of Approval – Provisions Respecting Regulation of Short Sales and Failed Trades (March 2, 2012). 78 MIN 2007-014 - Guidance – Exemption of Certain Inter-listed Securities from Price Restrictions on Short Sales (July 6, 2007). 79 IIROC Notice 12-0078 – Notice of Approval – Provisions Respecting Regulation of Short Sales and Failed Trades (March 2,
2012) at p5.
80 Once a Participant or Access Person becomes aware of difficulties in obtaining particular securities to settle a short sale, the Participant would no longer have a “reasonable expectation” of being able to settle a resulting trade and therefore would not be able to enter further short sale orders. Participants or Access Persons who do not have the ability to borrow that security may be precluded from entering short sales. (Ibid. at p10). 81 Ibid.
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21 | Page concluded that additional measures were not needed or desirable at that time but monitoring of domestic and international developments should continue.84 b. Ongoing Review and Surveillance As part of IIROC’s overall strategy on the regulation of short selling and failed trades, IIROC believes in providing greater transparency regarding short selling in a way that would provide timely information to the market. As a result, IIROC began publishing the Short Sale Trading Summary Report in 2013 on its website on a semi-monthly basis.85 This report sets out the proportion of short sales in the total trading activity of each listed security across all equity marketplaces for each period.86 While no one data source can provide a “complete” picture of short sale activity or positions, these semi-monthly trading summaries provided timely information in a cost efficient manner and supplemented the information available through the semi-monthly short position reports.87 To further understand and explore issues affecting small-cap issuers, IIROC hosted roundtables in 201488 and 201689. In order to facilitate discussions at the 2014 roundtable, IIROC reviewed trading data during January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014 and found that:
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APPENDIX B
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY INITIATIVES
REGARDING DISCLOSURE AND REPORTING OF SHORT SELLING POSITIONS In Europe, existing disclosure requirements are under review. Specifically, the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) published a Consultation Paper – Review of certain aspects of the Short Selling Regulation91 in which, among other things, they seek comment on the existing framework for transparency and publication of net short positions. ESMA published its final report to the European Commission on March 22, 2022. This final report proposed amendments to improve ESMA’s operation, focused on clarifying the procedures for the issuance of short and long-term bans, ESMA’s intervention powers and proposes to enhance its rules against uncovered short sales by introducing record keeping requirements and harmonization of sanctions. It also includes a review of the framework for transparency and the publication of net short position reports. 92 In the U.S., the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) published a request for comment on potential enhancements to its short selling program, which would include modifications to its short interest reporting requirements.93 The public comment period, initially set at August 4, 2021, was extended to September 30, 2021. If implemented, such changes would change the frequency and content of information reported to FINRA and the information that would be made publicly available. Also in the U.S., on November 18, 2021, the SEC published for a 30-day comment period proposed new Exchange Act Rule 10c-1 (proposed Rule 10c-1), which would increase transparency of securities lending transactions. The proposal is to require lenders of securities to provide the material terms of securities lending transactions to a registered national securities association, such as FINRA. FINRA would make some of the information available to the public.94 On February 25, 2022, the SEC indicated that it reopened the comment period for this proposed Rule 10c-1. The comment period for this proposal ended on April 1, 2022. On February 25, 2022, the SEC proposed new Exchange Act Rule 13f-2 (proposed Rule 13f-2) 95 and amendments to Regulation SHO and to the national market system plan governing the consolidated audit trail to increase market transparency regarding short selling. The proposed Rule 13f-2 and Form SHO would require that institutional money managers file on the SEC’s EDGAR system, on a monthly basis, certain short sale related data, some of which would be aggregated and made public. The proposed Form SHO would be filed within 14 calendar days after the end of each calendar month for equity securities that exceed certain thresholds. Such information would include the name of the security, end of month gross short position and daily trading activity that affects a manager’s reported 91 Available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-156-
3914_consultation_paper_on_the_review_of_certain_aspects_of_the_short_selling_regulation.pdf. 92 See: Review of certain aspects of the Short Selling Regulation – Final Report, available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-448-10_final_report_-_short_selling_regulation_review.pdf. 93 See: Regulatory Notice 21-19 FINRA Requests Comments on Short Interest Position Reporting Enhancements and Other Changes Related to Short Sale Reporting, available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/21-19. 94 Fact sheet available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2021/34-93613-fact-sheet.pdf. 95 See: Short Position and Short Activity Reporting by Institutional Investment Managers – Proposed Rule, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/34-94313.pdf.
23 | Page gross short position for each settlement date during the calendar month reporting period. The SEC would publish certain information for the securities, including the aggregated gross short position across all reporting institutional money managers. The extended comment period for proposed Rule 13f-2 ended on April 26, 2022.
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APPENDIX C
SELECTED RESULTS OF IIROC MONITORING OF SHORT SELLING ON DOWNTICKS The vertical line indicates when the tick restrictions were removed Fig 1 - Short Sale Volume Composition by Market Ticks - TSX, All Securities Fig 2 – Long Sale (excluding SME) Volume Composition by Market Ticks - TSX, All Securities Fig 1 shows the short sale volume composition by market ticks for TSX listed securities. The percentage of short sales of TSX listed securities executed on a down-tick was about 10% between 2012 - 2022. This was only slightly higher than prior to the repeal of the tick-test. Fig 2 shows the long sale (excluding SME) volume composition by market ticks for TSX listed securities. The percentage of TSX listed securities long sales executed on a down-tick was about 15% between 2012 - 2022.
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Fig 3 - Short Sale Volume Composition by Market Ticks - TSXV, All Securities Fig 4. - Long Sale (excluding SME) Volume Composition by Market Ticks - TSXV, All Securities The TSX and TSXV data is provided as a proxy for marketplaces that list junior securities and marketplaces that list senior securities. At the time the tick restriction was moved CSE had limited listings and market activity and NEO had not yet launched. As a result, the data from both CSE and NEO was less informative. Fig 3 shows the short sale volume composition by market ticks for TSXV listed securities. The percentage of short sales of TSXV listed securities executed on a down-tick was about 8% between 2012 - 2022. This was higher than prior to the repeal of the tick-test. Fig 4 shows the long sale (excluding SME) volume composition by market ticks for TSXV listed securities. The percentage of TSXV listed securities long sales executed on a down-tick was about 12% between 2012 - 2022.
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Source: Autorite des marches financiers Quebec — original document · Summary generated with machine assistance and reviewed before publication; the authoritative text is the regulator's original document. How RegAlert works
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