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OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 4 November 2026 on the supervisory independence of the Bank of Greece and prevention of conflicts of interest of its members of staff and governance body (CON/2026/33)

Introduction and legal basis

On 15 October 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance for an opinion on a draft Article 4A1 (hereinafter the ‘first draft article’) to be inserted into Law 4261/20142 (hereinafter the ‘Law on banking’), which transposes into Greek law Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council3 (hereinafter the ‘CRD’) as introduced by Article 1(4) of Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council4 (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’). The ECB was also notified by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of a draft Article 191 of the draft law (hereinafter the ‘second draft article’, together with the first draft article, the ‘draft articles’)5, which recasts Article 20 of Law 3867/20106 on the establishment of a Systemic Stability Council.

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC7, as the draft articles relate to (a) the Bank of Greece, (b) the ECB's tasks concerning the prudential supervision of

[1] The first draft article is included in a draft bill entitled ‘Enhancing the supervision of serviced claims from lending activities, protecting borrowers of performing claims, strengthening collective investment schemes and the capital markets, enhancing risk management and the supervision of the financial system, transposing Directives (EU) 2024/1619, (EU) 2024/1640, (EU) 2024/2994, (EU) 2024/927, (EU) 2023/2864 and (EU) 2024/2811, provisions regarding tasks of the General Secretariat of the Financial Sector and of Private Debt, and other provisions’ (Ενίσχυση εποπτείας των υπό διαχείριση απαιτήσεων από δάνεια και πιστώσεις – Προστασία συνεπών οφειλετών – Ενίσχυση των συλλογικών επενδύσεων και της κεφαλαιαγοράς καθώς και της διαχείρισης κινδύνων και της εποπτείας του χρηματοπιστωτικού συστήματος – Ενσωμάτωση των Οδηγιών (ΕΕ) 2024/1619, (ΕΕ) 2024/1640, (ΕΕ) 2024/2994, (ΕΕ) 2024/927, (ΕΕ) 2023/2864 και (ΕΕ) 2024/2811, διατάξεις αρμοδιότητας της Γενικής Γραμματείας Χρηματοπιστωτικού Τομέα και Διαχείρισης Ιδιωτικού Χρέους – Συνταξιοδοτική ρύθμιση – και λοιπές διατάξεις) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).

[2] Law 4261/2014 on access to the activity of credit institutions and prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (transposing Directive 2013/36/EU), repeal of Law 3601/2007, and other provisions (Government Gazette A, 107/05.05.2014) (N. 4261/2014 «Πρόσβαση στη δραστηριότητα των πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων και προληπτική εποπτεία πιστωτικών ιδρυμάτων (ενσωμάτωση της Οδηγίας 2013/36/ΕΕ), κατάργηση του νόμου 3601/2007 και άλλες διατάξεις», ΦΕΚ Α, 107/05.05.2014.

[3] Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj).

[4] Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj).

[5] The second draft provision is also included in the draft law.

[6] Law No 3867 of 2010 on private insurance supervision, the establishment of a private life insurance guarantee fund, credit rating agencies and other provisions falling within the competence of the Ministry of Finance. Ν. 3867/2010 «Εποπτεία Ιδιωτικής Ασφάλισης, Σύσταση εγγυητικού κεφαλαίου ιδιωτικής ασφάλισης ζωής, οργανισμοί αξιολόγησης πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας και άλλες διατάξεις αρμοδιότητας του Υπουργείου Οικονομικών», ΦΕΚ Α 128/03.08.2010.

[7] Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty, and (c) the task of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the financial system pursuant to Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

1. Purpose of the draft articles

1.1 Purpose of the first draft article

1.1.1 The first draft article is inserted into the Law on banking to transpose Article 4a of the CRD, as introduced by the CRD6. The CRD6 aims to further harmonise the banking supervisory framework. Article 4a of the CRD requires Member States to ensure that the competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, act independently and objectively. In that context, it introduces minimum requirements to prevent conflicts of interest and limit ‘revolving doors’, providing, in particular, for cooling-off periods, a prohibition on trading instruments issued by supervised entities, and a maximum tenure period for relevant members of governance bodies8.

1.1.2 The CRD has been transposed into Greek law via the Law on banking, which designates the Bank of Greece as the competent authority responsible for the functions and duties under the CRD and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council9 with regard to credit institutions, including branches of third-country credit institutions operating in Greece, and certain financial institutions10. The Statute of the Bank of Greece11 also allocates supervisory responsibility to the Bank of Greece. It provides that these powers referred are to be exercised by acts of the Bank of Greece’s Executive Committee, comprising the Governor and the two Deputy Governors12, or bodies empowered by it to that effect. The Executive Committee entrusted the Bank of Greece’s Credit and Insurance Committee with supervisory tasks, in particular regulatory and individual decisions and recommendations, such as authorisations, withdrawals of authorisations, operational requirements, sanctions, and financial penalties13.

1.1.3 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the first draft article, the first draft article is intended to strengthen the institutional framework governing the exercise of the supervisory powers of the Bank of Greece by establishing rules that ensure its operational independence, objectivity and accountability in the performance of prudential supervisory tasks over credit institutions. To that end, the first draft article lays down specific safeguards concerning the status of

[8] See recital 2 of the CRD6.

[9] Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/575/oj).

[10] See Article 4(1) of the Law on banking.

[11] See Article 55A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece ratified by Law 3424/1927 (Government Gazette A, 298/7.12.1927) (Ν. 3424/1927 «Περί κυρώσεως του από 10 Νοεμβρίου 1927 ΝΔ/τος ''Περί κυρώσεως της από 27 Οκτωβρίου 1927 συμβάσεως περί παραιτήσεως της Εθνικής Τραπέζης της Ελλάδος από του προνομίου εκδόσεως τραπεζικών γραμματίων και περί συστάσεως νέας Τραπέζης υπό την επωνυμίαν «ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ» και του προσαρτωμένου τη συμβάσει Καταστατικού της Τραπέζης της Ελλάδος''», ΦΕΚ Α, 298/7.12.1927).

[12] See Article 28 of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.

[13] See Executive Committee Act No. 1 of 20 December 2012.

members of the governing bodies and staff of the Bank of Greece, introduces measures for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest, and establishes rules restricting certain investment activities and introducing post-employment restrictions (cooling-off periods).

1.1.4 More specifically, the first draft article transposes Article 4a of the CRD through the following measures. The first draft article defines the members of the Bank of Greece's governance body who fall within the scope of the new measures introduced by Article 4a of the CRD. These are natural persons who participate in the collegial decision-making bodies of the Bank of Greece at the highest level and who have been entrusted with the power to exercise executive tasks relating to supervisory responsibilities14, excluding the Governor of the Bank of Greece.

1.1.5 The first draft article requires the Bank of Greece, including its staff members and members of its governance body, to exercise its supervisory powers independently and objectively, without seeking or taking instructions from supervised entities or from any institution or body of the Union or from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The first draft article also specifies that the governance body of the Bank of Greece is functionally independent from other public and private bodies. However, this does not affect the public accountability to which the Bank of Greece is subject according to applicable law, but without prejudice to the provisions of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.

1.1.6 The first draft article caps the term of office of the members of the governance body of the Bank of Greece appointed after 11 January 2026 to 14 years in total, and requires that the appointment criteria be public announced, objective and transparent. It also provides that the members of the governance body may be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria for appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence, and that the reasons for dismissal are to be published, unless the member of the governance body objects to such publication.

1.1.7 The first draft article requires the Bank of Greece to publish its objectives, providing that the Bank of Greece is accountable for the performance of its tasks in relation to those objectives and subjecting the Bank of Greece to financial control in a manner that does not affect its independence.

1.1.8 The first draft article preserves the rights and obligations laid down in European or international systems of financial supervision and in particular in: (a) the European system of financial supervision established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council15; (b) the Single Supervisory Mechanism established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201316 and Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/17)17; and (c) the Single

[14] Falling under Article 55a of the Statute of the Bank of Greece, and as provided for in specific provisions of applicable Union and national legislation.

[15] Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/1093/oj).

[16] Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj).

[17] Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ L 141, 14.5.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/468/oj).

Resolution Mechanism established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council18.

1.1.9 The first draft article requires that the Bank of Greece adopt the necessary arrangements to prevent conflicts of interest of its staff members and members of its governance body, including trading restrictions and cooling-off periods.

1.1.10The first draft article prohibits staff members and members of the Bank of Greece’s governance body from at least the following: (a) trading in financial instruments issued by, or referencing, institutions supervised by the Bank of Greece, as well as financial instruments issued by, or referencing, the direct or indirect parent undertakings, subsidiaries, affiliates or entities of those institutions, with the exception of specific types of instruments; (b) concluding, during the cooling-off period, any type of contract for the provision of professional services with, or appointment by, any of the following: (i) institutions in relation to which the staff member or the member of the governance body of the Bank of Greece has directly exercised professional functions related to supervision, or has been involved in decision-making, including the direct or indirect parent undertakings, subsidiaries, associated companies or entities of those institutions, (ii) entities providing services to any of the entities referred to in point (i), unless the staff member or the member of the governance body of the Bank of Greece is prohibited from participating in the provision of such services during the cooling-off period, or (iii) entities carrying out lobbying and advocacy activities related to the Bank of Greece on matters for which the staff member or the member of the governance body of the Bank of Greece was responsible during that member’s employment or term of office.

1.1.11The first draft article sets the duration of the cooling-off period to at least six months for staff members directly performing professional tasks related to supervision and at least 12 months for members of the governance body of the Bank of Greece in respect of recruitment or appointment by: (a) institutions in relation to which the staff member or the member of the governance body of the Bank of Greece has directly exercised professional functions related to their supervision or has been involved in decision-making, including the direct or indirect parent undertakings, subsidiaries, associated companies or entities of those institutions (hereinafter ‘supervised institutions’) and (b) entities providing services to any of those entities, unless the staff member or the member of the governance body of the Bank of Greece is prohibited from participating in the provision of such services during the cooling-off period. The first draft article sets the duration of the cooling-off period to at least three months for both staff members and members of the governance body of the Bank of Greece in respect of the recruitment or appointment by entities carrying out lobbying and advocacy activities related to the Bank of Greece on matters for which the staff member or member of the governance body of the Bank of Greece was responsible during that member’s employment or term of office. The first draft article also requires that the Bank of Greece ensure that its staff members and the members of its governance body do not have access to confidential or sensitive information regarding supervised entities during the cooling-off period.

[18] Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/806/oj).

1.1.12The first draft article introduces additional rules to prevent conflicts of interest, including shorter cooling-off periods, compensation during the cooling-off period, declarations of interests and disposal of financial instruments.

1.2 Purpose of the second draft article

1.2.1 The second draft article establishes the Systemic Stability Council within the Ministry of National Economy and Finance, with the purpose of analysing the interaction between the sectors of the financial system and the economy and continuously examining the preventive handling of extraordinary or extreme situations and crises. The second draft article provides that the Council performs a coordinating and advisory role, without substituting the powers of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) or of the Bank of Greece, including as macroprudential authority. The second draft article clarifies that the Council’s guidance and recommendations are addressed exclusively to the Ministry, and that they are without prejudice to the independence of the Bank of Greece and are subject to specific provisions applicable to the Bank of Greece19.

1.2.2 The second draft article assigns to the Systemic Stability Council monitoring tasks covering the interrelation of financial sectors (with emphasis on capital markets, the banking sector and the insurance sector), the economy (with emphasis on public debt and state guarantees), preparedness for crises, the Ministry’s financial policy, and developments arising from European institutions, subject to the independence of the Bank of Greece and other supervisory authorities.

1.2.3 The second draft article provides for the exchange of information between the Ministry of National Economy and Finance and national independent supervisory authorities and financial sector bodies, which is to be provided at sector or system level rather than at the level of individual institutions unless otherwise provided by law, and is to comply with the applicable professional secrecy and confidentiality framework.

1.2.4 The second draft article sets the composition of the Systemic Stability Council at eight members, including the Minister for National Economy and Finance, who chairs, the Deputy Minister responsible for fiscal policy, two Secretaries General of the Ministry, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, the competent Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece, the Chair of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission, and the Chair of the Public Debt Management Agency.

1.2.5 The second draft article requires the Systemic Stability Council to meet at least once a year. The second draft article establishes two sub-committees, on crisis management and on systemic stability, composed of the Head of the Directorate for Financial Policy of the Ministry's General Secretariat for the Financial Sector and Private Debt Management and representatives designated by the Bank of Greece, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission and the Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, meeting at least every six months and reporting to the Chair of the Council after each meeting.

[19] In particular, Law 4261/2014 and Articles 2, 5A, 55A and 55C of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.

2. General observations

2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) address the independence of central banks in the ESCB20, stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank (NCB), nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and the Bank of Greece, as an NCB, by primary law21.

2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of the NCBs, such as the Bank of Greece, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials22 (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49)23, which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs24.

2.3 The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB25. Hence, national legislation is without prejudice to the ethics framework, which the ECB has established in order to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis.

2.4 Furthermore, Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201339 (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the

[20] Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to the independence and its ramifications, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

[21] See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/27, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/32, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/33, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/36 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2026/2. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

[22] Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3).

[23] Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj).

[24] See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/27, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/32, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/33, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/36 and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2026/2.

[25] See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.

application of stricter national rules26. The legal basis for those provisions of the SSM Regulation is Article 127(6) of the Treaty.

2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as the Bank of Greece, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a highlevel ECB body, and Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50)27, which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM28, the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50)29.

2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on the supervisory independence of competent authorities30, is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European Union31 that the different legal bases, namely Article 53(1) and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB32.

[26] See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/27, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/32, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/33, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/36 and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2026/2.

[27] Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj).

[28] See Article 6(1) of the SSM Regulation.

[29] See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/27, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/32, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/33, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/36 and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2026/2.

[30] See Article 4a of the CRD, as inserted by Article 1, point (4), of the CRD6. See also paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/27, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/32, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/33 and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2026/2.

[31] See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council, C-338/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council, C-178/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60.

[32] See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/27, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/32, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/33, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/36 and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2026/2.

2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework, which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to the CRD, which provide that Article 4a(2) of the CRD is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation33. For the avoidance of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the first draft article. From an ECB perspective, the provisions from the CRD6 may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation34.

3. Specific observations

3.1 Definition of governance body

The ECB understands that, under the first draft article, read in conjunction with the Statute of the Bank of Greece35, the relevant collegial decision-making bodies of the Bank of Greece at the highest level consist of the Executive Committee and the Credit and Insurance Committee. For reasons of legal certainty, the ECB suggests that the Bank of Greece’s decision-making bodies that are subject to the provisions of the first draft article should be explicitly identified in the text.

3.2 Term of office of members of decision-making bodies

3.2.1 The ECB highlights that, in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of NCBs must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons36. The application of the same rules regarding the minimum term of office to both the Governor and the members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks37, as is the case in the Bank of Greece Monetary Policy Council, of which the two Deputy Governors are also members38, 39.

3.2.2 Regarding the first draft article’s proposal to limit the term of office of members of the Bank of Greece’s governance bodies appointed after 11 January 2026 to 14 years in total40, the ECB

[33] See Article 4a(2), fourth subparagraph, of the CRD, as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, of the CRD, as inserted by the CRD6.

[34] See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/27, paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/32, paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/33, paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/36 and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2026/2.

[35] See Articles 24 and 55A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.

[36] Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2025/27 and paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion CON/2026/2.

[37] See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26.

[38] See paragraphs 1.3, 3.1 and 3.2 of Opinion CON/2025/27.

[39] Article 35A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.

[40] See first draft article: Article 4A(3).

understands that each term of office of the two Deputy Governors of the Bank of Greece may not exceed six years41. Based on this, the ECB understands that the two Deputy Governors may not be appointed if, during the term of office for which they would be appointed, the performance of their duties would exceed 14 years in total, taking into account the combined duration of all previous terms of office served after 11 January 2026. For the sake of legal clarity, the Greek authorities might wish to explicitly confirm this understanding in the text of the first draft article. Based on this understanding, the ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the first draft article42 are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB43.

3.3 Grounds for dismissal of members of decision-making bodies

3.3.1 In addition, pursuant to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, Governors who no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of their duties or have been guilty of serious misconduct may be relieved from office. In this context, the ECB highlights that applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks will also safeguard the personal independence of those persons44. As noted in paragraph 2.1, Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically. The application of the same rules regarding appointment and dismissal to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks45, as is the case in the Bank of Greece. Based on this, the members of the Bank of Greece’s Monetary Policy Council, including the two Deputy Governors, may be relieved from office only if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct.

3.3.2 The ECB understands that first draft article provides that the two Deputy Governors of the Bank of Greece may be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria for appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. This formulation is in line with the wording of the CRD646. As concerns the Deputy Governors, the Statute of the Bank of Greece contains a separate provision which sets out the grounds for dismissal applicable to the Governor, the two Deputy Governors and members of other decision-making bodies of the Bank of Greece. The formulation under the Statute of the Bank of Greece provides that the Governor, any Deputy Governor and any member of the General Council may be relieved from office by the General Meeting of Shareholders if they are no longer capable of performing their duties or are guilty of serious misconduct, including, in particular, cases where they have violated the Statute, disclosed confidential information about the affairs of the Bank of Greece, or abused their position for their own benefit or for business purposes.

[41] Article 29 of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.

[42] See first draft article: Article 4A(3).

[43] See paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of Opinion CON/2025/33.

[44] See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2025/23.

[45] See ECB Convergence Report, June 2025, p. 26.

[46] Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, of the CRD, as inserted by the CRD6, provides that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body other than Governors can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence.

3.3.3 Against this backdrop, the first draft article would result in a situation where there would be three parallel provisions setting out the grounds for dismissal of the two Deputy Governors of the Bank of Greece, each with overlapping, but different, formulations. The ECB would make two suggestions in this respect. First, to avoid any interpretation issues arising, including a possible conflict with the provisions of the Statute of the Bank of Greece, and, taking into account that the Governor is already exempt from the ‘members of the governing body’ of the Bank of Greece, the ECB would suggest the exclusion of the two Deputy Governors from the scope of application of the provision concerning the grounds of removal of the members of the governing body of the Bank of Greece, so that the dismissal of the Deputy Governors is not mentioned in the first draft article and is governed by the Statute of the Bank of Greece. Second, the grounds for removal under the Statute of the Bank of Greece should be fully aligned with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.

3.4 Conflicts of interest

3.4.1 The ECB welcomes that the first draft article delegates to the Bank of Greece the duty to adopt the minimum necessary arrangements required by Article 4a of the CRD to prevent conflicts of interest of its staff members and of the members of its governance bodies47. This leaves the Bank of Greece sufficient discretion to extend these minimum requirements where necessary to meet the requirements of the ECB’s Ethics Framework.

3.4.2 The first draft article lays down a minimum 12-month cooling-off period applicable to the establishment of post-employment relationships by members of the Bank of Greece’s governance bodies, including the two Deputy Governors. During this period, the conclusion of any type of contract for the provision of professional services, or the appointment of these persons by supervised entities, is prohibited48. The minimum 12-month cooling-off period applicable to the two Deputy Governors is in line with the requirements of the Single Code. The ECB understands that, under the first draft article, the Bank of Greece may impose a longer cooling-off period of a maximum of two years where such an extended period is applied based on the Single Code49. In any event, the first draft article must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time.

3.4.3 In addition, the Single Code limits the establishment of post-employment relationships not only with significant or less significant institutions, but also with other financial institutions and with any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any supervised institution50. By contrast, the first draft article applies the cooling-off period only to employment with supervised institutions, service providers and lobbying and advocacy entities. It does not extend to the broader category of other financial institutions or entities engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any supervised institution. The ECB understands that the Bank of Greece may extend the categories of entities to which these limits on post-employment relationships apply. The limits under the first draft article therefore do not

[47] See first draft article: Article 4A(6).

[48] See first draft article: Article 4A(7).

[49] See Article 17.3, point (b), of the Single Code; see also paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/19, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2025/23 and paragraph 3.5 of Opinion CON/2025/32.

[50] Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Single Code.

conflict with the requirements of the Single Code. In addition, the first draft article must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time51.

3.4.4 The prohibition on the trading in certain financial instruments by designated persons, as set out in the first draft article, is less restrictive as regards the relevant entities than the requirements of the Eurosystem52 and SSM53 Ethics Frameworks and the Single Code54. The first draft article limits the prohibition to financial instruments issued by, or referencing, institutions supervised by the Bank of Greece, as well as financial instruments issued by, or referencing, the direct or indirect parent undertakings, subsidiaries, affiliates or entities of those institutions, subject to exceptions for specific types of instruments55, save for some exceptions. It does not extend to instruments issued by other regulated entities56. The ECB understands that the Bank of Greece may extend the categories of financial instruments to which these limits on trading apply. The limits on trading under the first draft article therefore do not conflict with the requirements of the Single Code. In addition, the first draft article must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time57.

3.4.5 Pursuant to the first draft article, staff members and members of the governance body of the Bank of Greece must submit an annual declaration of absence or disclosure of conflict of interest. The declaration must include information on holdings in shares, equities, bonds, mutual funds, investment funds, mixed-type funds, hedge funds and exchange-traded funds that raise, or may raise, conflict of interest concerns in relation to their professional duties at the Bank of Greece, without prejudice to any requirement to submit a declaration of assets58. In addition, the first draft article must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time.

3.5 Systemic Stability Council

3.5.1 The ECB was already consulted and adopted an opinion on an earlier version of the second draft article59. The second draft article now explicitly states that the Systemic Stability Council exercises a coordinating and advisory role, without replacing the responsibilities of the ESRB or of the Bank of Greece, including those responsibilities of the Bank of Greece in its capacity as the macroprudential authority60. The second draft article also provides that the guidelines and recommendations of the Council are addressed exclusively to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, without prejudice to the independence of the Bank of Greece, including in the latter’s capacity as macroprudential authority, and are also without prejudice to more specific provisions governing the Bank of Greece’s operation61.

[51] See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2025/23 and paragraph 3.6 of Opinion CON/2025/27.

[52] See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49).

[53] See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50).

[54] See Article 16 of the Single Code.

[55] See draft Article: Article 4A(6), point (a).

[56] See paragraph 3.7 of Opinion CON/2025/32.

[57] See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2025/23 and paragraph 3.6 of Opinion CON/2025/27.

[58] See draft Article 4A(11).

[59] See Opinion CON/2026/19.

[60] See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2026/19.

[61] See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2026/19.

3.5.2 The second draft article also sets out the tasks and powers of the Systemic Stability Council in a much clearer way, clarifying that its monitoring of issues arising in the context of the operation of the European institutions, are without prejudice to the independence of the Bank of Greece and the other supervisory authorities. In addition, the second draft article provides that the participation of members in both the Council and its subcommittees must be without prejudice to the autonomy, competences and independence of the bodies they represent62.

3.5.3 The second draft article also stipulates that the exchange of information between the Ministry of National Economy and Finance and the national independent supervisory authorities of the financial sector must be carried out in compliance with the applicable framework of professional secrecy and confidentiality, and in particular with regard to information obtained by the Bank of Greece in the exercise of its powers, without prejudice to its independence63. In addition, the second draft article provides that such information must be provided in aggregated form per sector or system, and not in individualised form per credit institution, unless otherwise provided for in the applicable legislation.

3.5.4 The ECB welcomes the changes introduced by the second draft article, and considers that the observations it made in Opinion CON/2026/19 have been duly taken into account.

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 4 November 2026.

[signed]

The President of the ECB
Christine LAGARDE

[62] See paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of Opinion CON/2026/19.

[63] See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2026/19.