Rule · CBK · 27 Oct 2026
Banks in the Republic of Kosovo licensed by the CBK, excluding branches of foreign banks, must include contractual recognition clauses in liabilities and capital instruments governed by foreign law, report annually to the CBK on legacy contracts, and use best efforts to amend existing foreign-law contracts. After bail-in, the management body or CBK-appointed persons must submit a business reorganisation plan within one month, with at least quarterly milestones, and report progress every six months.
Pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.1 and Article 65, paragraph 1 and 2 of the Law No.
03/L-209 on Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No.77 / 16 August 2010), amended by Law No. 05/L-150 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo No. 10 / 03 April 2017), Article 8 and Article 111, paragraph 5 of the Law No. 08/L-304 on Banks (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No.2 / 27 January 2026), the Board of the Central Bank of Republic of Kosovo at the meeting held on 27 October 2026, approved the following:
1. The purpose of this Regulation is to establish the conditions related to the application of the bail in tool, for bank resolution purposes, in accordance with the Law on Banks.
2. This Regulation shall apply to all banks in the Republic of Kosovo that are licensed by the CBK, excluding branches of foreign banks.
1. All terms used in this Regulation shall have the same meaning assigned to them in Article 3 of the Law on Banks and/or the following meanings for the purposes of this Regulation:
1.1. Law on Banks – Law No. 08/L-304 on Banks.
1.2. CBK as supervisory authority – the CBK acting as supervisory authority or licensing authority.
1.3. Direct contagion – a situation where the direct losses of counterparties of the bank under resolution resulting from the write-down of the bank's liabilities lead to the default or likely default of those counterparties in the imminent future.
1.4. Indirect contagion – a situation where the write-down or conversion of the bank's liabilities causes a negative reaction by market participants that leads to a severe disruption of the financial system with potential to harm the real economy
1.5. Reorganisation period – the reasonable period between application of the bail-in tool and the time when the bank under resolution is expected to have restored its long-term viability, during which the measures in the business reorganisation plan are implemented.
1.6. Secured liability – a liability where the right of the creditor to payment or other form of performance is secured by a charge, pledge, lien or collateral arrangement, including liabilities arising from repurchase transactions and other title-transfer collateral arrangements.
1.7. Social security authorities – public authorities or bodies responsible for collecting compulsory social security contributions, including pension and health-insurance contributions, where the related liabilities are preferred under the applicable law
1.8. Eligible deposits – deposits that are not excluded from deposit insurance pursuant to Article 6 of Law No. 03/L-216 on the Establishment of a Deposit Insurance System for Financial Institutions in Kosovo, as amended and supplemented by Article 4 of Law No. 04/L-133; the aggregation of deposits and the treatment of accrued interest shall be determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of that Law.
1.9. Affected creditor – a creditor whose claim is reduced or converted into shares or other instruments of ownership through the exercise of the powers under Article 112 or subparagraph 1.6 of paragraph 1 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks.
1.10. Valuer – the independent person appointed to carry out a valuation under Article 102 of the Law on Banks or the CBK when it carries out a provisional valuation in accordance with that Article.
1.11. Capital instruments – mean Common Equity Tier 1 capital, Additional Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the CBK in this Regulation shall be construed as references to the CBK acting in its capacity as resolution authority.
1. The CBK may apply the bail in tool to banks that meet the applicable conditions for resolution as specified in Article 106 of the Law on Banks. This tool may be applied individually or in any combination with other resolution tools as specified in the Law on Banks.
2. Where the CBK decides to apply a bail in tool to a bank, and that resolution action would result in losses being borne by creditors or their claims being converted, the CBK shall exercise the power to write down and convert capital instruments in accordance with Article 112 of the Law on Banks immediately before or together with the application of the resolution tool.
3. In accordance with paragraph 8 of Article 102 of the Law on Banks, the CBK and the National Resolution Fund may recover any reasonable expenses properly incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools, resolution powers or government financial stabilisation tools in one or more of the following ways:
3.1. as a deduction from any consideration paid by a recipient to the bank under resolution or, as the case may be, to the owners of the shares or other instruments of ownership;
3.2. from the bank under resolution, as a preferred creditor; or
3.3. from any proceeds generated as a result of the termination of the operation of the bridge institution or the asset management vehicle, as a preferred creditor.
1. The CBK may apply the bail-in tool to meet the resolution objectives, in accordance with the resolution principles specified in the Law on Banks for any of the following purposes:
1.1. to recapitalise a bank that meets the conditions for resolution to the extent sufficient to restore its ability to comply with the conditions for licensing and to continue to carry out the activities for which it is licenced under the Law on Banks, and to sustain sufficient market confidence in the bank;
1.2. to convert to equity or reduce the principal amount of claims or debt instruments that are transferred:
1.2.1. to a bridge institution with a view to providing capital for that bridge institution; or
1.2.2. under the sale of business tool or the asset separation tool.
2. The CBK may apply the bail-in tool for the purpose referred to in subparagraph 1.1 of paragraph 1, of this Article, only if there is a reasonable prospect that the application of that tool together with other relevant measures including measures implemented in accordance with the business reorganisation plan required under Article 11 of this Regulation will, in addition to achieving relevant resolution objectives, restore the bank in question to financial soundness and long-term viability.
3. Where the condition set out in paragraph 2 of this Article is not met, the CBK may apply any of the other resolution tools, subject to the conditions governing the application of those tools, and may, where appropriate, apply the bail-in tool for the purposes specified in subparagraph 1.2 of paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. The CBK may apply the bail-in tool to all banks while respecting in each case the legal form of the bank concerned.
1. The bail-in tool may be applied to all liabilities of a bank that are not excluded from the scope of that tool pursuant to paragraphs 2 or 6 of this Article.
2. The CBK shall not exercise the write down or conversion powers in relation to the following liabilities whether they are governed by the national legislation or legislation of a foreign country:
2.1. insured deposits;
2.2. secured liabilities including covered bonds and liabilities in the form of financial instruments used for hedging purposes and which are secured in a way similar to covered bonds;
2.3. any liability that arises by virtue of the holding by the bank of client assets or client money including client assets or client money held on behalf of collective investment schemes, provided that such a client is protected under the regulations on normal insolvency proceedings;
2.4. any liability that arises by virtue of a fiduciary relationship between the bank (as fiduciary) and another person (as beneficiary) provided that such a beneficiary is protected under applicable insolvency or civil law;
2.5. liabilities to banks, excluding entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity of less than seven days;
2.6. liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than seven days, owed to systems or operators of payment and securities settlement systems or their participants and arising from the participation in such a system;
2.7. a liability to any one of the following:
2.7.1. an employee, in relation to accrued salary, pension benefits or other fixed remuneration, except for the variable component of remuneration that is not regulated by a collective bargaining agreement;
2.7.2. a commercial or trade creditor arising from the provision to the bank of goods or services that are critical to the daily functioning of its operations, including IT services, utilities and the rental, servicing and upkeep of premises;
2.7.3. tax and social security authorities, provided that those liabilities are preferred under the applicable law;
2.7.4. the Deposit Insurance Fund arising from contributions due.
3. All secured assets relating to a covered bond cover pool remain unaffected, segregated and with enough funding. Neither this requirement nor subparagraph 2.2 of paragraph 2 of this Article shall prevent the CBK, where appropriate, from exercising write down or conversion powers in relation to any part of a secured liability or a liability for which collateral has been pledged that exceeds the value of the assets, pledge, lien or collateral against which it is secured.
4. In exception of subparagraph 2.1 of paragraph 2 of this Article, CBK, where appropriate, may exercise write down or conversion powers in relation to any amount of a deposit that exceeds the coverage level provided by the Deposit Insurance Fund.
5. In order to provide for the resolvability of banks, the CBK shall limit, in accordance with the powers provided in Article 105 of the Law on Banks, the extent to which other banks hold liabilities eligible for the bail-in tool, save for liabilities that are held at entities that are part of the same banking group.
6. In exceptional circumstances, where the bail-in tool is applied and under Article 16 of this Regulation, the CBK may exclude or partially exclude certain liabilities from the application of the write-down or conversion powers where:
6.1. it is not possible to bail-in that liability within a reasonable time notwithstanding the efforts of the CBK for this purpose;
6.2. the exclusion is strictly necessary and is proportionate to achieve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines in a manner that maintains the ability of the bank under resolution to continue key operations, services and transactions;
6.3. the exclusion is strictly necessary and proportionate to avoid giving rise to widespread contagion, in particular as regards eligible deposits held by natural persons and micro, small and medium sized enterprises, which would severely disrupt the functioning of financial markets, including of financial market infrastructures, in a manner that could cause a serious disturbance to the economy; or
6.4. the application of the bail-in tool to those liabilities would cause a destruction in value such that the losses borne by other creditors would be higher than if those liabilities were excluded from bail-in.
7. Where the CBK decides to exclude or partially exclude an eligible liability or class of eligible liabilities under this paragraph, the level of write down or conversion applied to other eligible liabilities may be increased to take account of such exclusions, provided that the level of write down and conversion applied to other eligible liabilities complies with the principle that no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the bank had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
8. Where the CBK decides to exclude or partially exclude an eligible liability or class of eligible liabilities pursuant to this Article, and the losses that would have been borne by those liabilities have not been passed on fully to other creditors, the National Resolution Fund may be used to do one or both of the following:
8.1. cover any losses which have not been absorbed by eligible liabilities and restore the net asset value of the bank under resolution to zero in accordance with paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.1 of Article 6 of this Regulation;
8.2. purchase shares or other instruments of ownership or capital instruments in the bank under resolution, in order to recapitalise the bank in accordance with paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.2 of Article 6 of this Regulation.
9. The National Resolution Fund may make a contribution referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article, only where:
9.1. a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8% of the total liabilities including own funds of the bank under resolution, measured at the time of resolution action in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 102 of the Law on Banks, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other eligible liabilities through write down, conversion or otherwise; and
9.2. the contribution of the National Resolution Fund does not exceed 5% of the total liabilities including own funds of the bank under resolution, measured at the time of resolution action in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 102 of the Law on Banks.
10. The contribution of the National Resolution Fund referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article may be financed by:
10.1. the amount available to the National Resolution Fund which has been raised through contributions by banks;
10.2. the amount that can be raised through ex-post contributions in accordance with the relevant CBK Regulation on the National Resolution Fund; and
10.3. where the amounts referred to in subparagraphs 10.1 and 10.2 of this paragraph, are insufficient, amounts raised from alternative financing sources in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 107 of the Law on Banks.
11. In extraordinary circumstances, the CBK may seek further funding from alternative financing sources once the conditions set out in subparagraphs 11.1 and 11.2 of this paragraph have been met:
11.1. the 5% limit specified in paragraph 9, subparagraph 9.2 of this Article has been reached; and
11.2. all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities, other than eligible deposits, have been written down or converted in full.
11.3. As an alternative or in addition, where the conditions laid down in subparagraphs 11.1 and 11.2 of this paragraph are met, the National Resolution Fund may make a contribution from resources which have been raised through ex-ante contributions and which have not yet been used.
12. By way of derogation from subparagraph 9.1, of paragraph 9, of this Article, the National Resolution Fund may also make a contribution as referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article, provided that:
12.1. the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation referred to in subparagraph 9.1, paragraph 9 of this Article, is equal to an amount not less than 20% of the risk weighted assets of the bank concerned;
12.2. the National Resolution Fund has at its disposal, by way of ex-ante contributions (not including contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund), an amount which is at least equal to 3% of insured deposits of all the banks authorised by the CBK; and
12.3. the bank concerned has assets below EUR 900 billion on a consolidated basis.
13. When exercising the discretions under paragraph 6 of this Article, the CBK shall give due consideration to:
13.1. the principle that losses should be borne first by shareholders and next, in general, by creditors of the bank under resolution in order of preference;
13.2. the level of loss absorbing capacity that would remain in the bank under resolution if the liability or class of liabilities were excluded; and
13.3. the need to maintain adequate resources for resolution financing.
14. Exclusions under paragraph 6 of this Article, may be applied either to completely exclude a liability from write down or to limit the extent of the write down applied to that liability.
1. When applying the bail-in tool, the CBK assesses based on a valuation that complies with Article 102 of the Law on Banks, where relevant, the aggregate of the following:
1.1. the amount by which eligible liabilities must be written down in order to ensure that the net asset value of the bank under resolution is equal to zero; and
1.2. the amount by which eligible liabilities must be converted into shares or other types of capital instruments in order to restore the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of either:
1.2.1. the bank under resolution; or
1.2.2. the bridge institution.
2. The assessment referred to in paragraph 1, of this Article, shall establish the amount by which eligible liabilities need to be written down or converted in order to restore the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of the bank under resolution, or where applicable, establish the target capital ratio of the bridge institution taking into account any contribution of capital by the National Resolution Fund and to sustain sufficient market confidence in the bank under resolution or the bridge institution and enable it to continue to meet, for at least one year, the conditions for licencing and to continue to carry out the activities for which it is licenced under the Law on Banks.
3. Where the CBK intends to use the asset separation tool, the amount by which eligible liabilities need to be reduced shall take into account a prudent estimate of the capital needs of the asset management vehicle as appropriate.
4. Where capital has been written down in accordance with Article 112 of the Law on Banks and bail-in has been applied and the level of write-down based on the preliminary valuation, according to Article 102 of the Law on Banks is found to exceed requirements when assessed against the definitive valuation according to the same article, a write-up mechanism may be applied to reimburse creditors and then shareholders to the extent necessary.
1. For the purpose of Article 113 of the Law on Banks, actions referred thereto shall also be taken by the CBK in respect of shareholders and holders of other instruments of ownership where the shares or other instruments of ownership in question were issued or conferred in the following circumstances:
1.1. pursuant to conversion of debt instruments to shares or other instruments of ownership in accordance with contractual terms of the original debt instruments on the occurrence of an event that preceded or occurred at the same time as the assessment by the CBK that the bank met the conditions for resolution;
1.2. pursuant to the conversion of relevant capital instruments to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments pursuant to the Regulation on write down or conversion of capital instruments issued by the CBK.
2. When considering which action to take in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the CBK shall take into consideration:
2.1. the valuation carried out in accordance with Article 102 of the Law on Banks;
2.2. the amount by which the CBK has assessed that Common Equity Tier 1 items must be reduced and relevant capital instruments must be written down or converted; and
2.3. the aggregate amount assessed by the CBK in the context of applying the bail-in tool.
3. Where the application of the bail-in tool would result in the acquisition of or increase in a significant interest in a bank as referred to in the Law on Banks, the CBK, as supervisory authority, shall carry out the approval of the request for acquisition required thereunder in a timely manner that does not delay the application of the bail-in tool, or prevent resolution action from achieving the relevant resolution objectives. If the CBK, as supervisory authority, has not completed the approval of the acquisition of or increase of significant interest on the date of application of the bail-in tool, any acquisition of or increase in a significant interest by an acquirer resulting from the application of the bail-in tool shall be subject to the following provisions:
3.1. such a transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership to the acquirer shall have immediate legal effect;
3.2. during the assessment period and during any divestment period provided by subparagraph 3.6 of this Article, the acquirer’s voting rights attached to such shares or other instruments of ownership shall be suspended and vested solely in the CBK, which shall have no obligation to exercise any such voting rights and which shall have no liability whatsoever for exercising or refraining from exercising any such voting rights;
3.3. during the assessment period and during any divestment period provided by subparagraph 3.6 of this Article, the penalties and other measures for infringing the requirements for acquisitions or disposals of significant interests shall not apply to such a transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership;
3.4. promptly upon completion of the assessment by the CBK as a supervision authority, this shall notify the CBK (as resolution authority) and the acquirer in writing of whether the CBK as supervision authority approves or opposes such a transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership to the acquirer;
3.5. if CBK as the supervision authority approves such a transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership to the acquirer, then the voting rights attached to such shares or other instruments of ownership shall be deemed to be fully vested in the acquirer immediately upon receipt of such an approval notice from the CBK as the supervision authority;
3.6. if CBK as the supervision authority opposes such a transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership to the acquirer, then:
3.6.1. the voting rights attached to such shares or other instruments of ownership as provided by subparagraph 3.2 of this Article shall remain in full force and effect;
3.6.2. the CBK may require the acquirer to divest such shares or other instruments of ownership within a divestment period determined by the CBK having taken into account prevailing market conditions; and
3.6.3. if the acquirer does not complete such a divestment within the divestment period established by the CBK, then the CBK as the supervision authority, with the consent of the CBK as resolution authority, may impose on the acquirer administrative measures for infringing the requirements for acquisitions or disposals of significant interests.
1. When applying the bail-in tool, the CBK shall exercise the write-down and conversion powers in the following sequence, subject to the exclusions from bail-in under paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation:
1.1. Common Equity Tier 1 items are reduced in accordance with the CBK Regulation on Write-down and Conversion of Capital Instruments;
1.2. if, and only if, the total reduction under subparagraph 1.1 of this paragraph is less than the sum of the amounts referred to in subparagraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of this Regulation, the CBK shall reduce the principal amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments to the extent required and to the extent of their capacity;
1.3. if, and only if, the total reduction under subparagraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of this paragraph is less than the sum of the amounts referred to in subparagraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of this Regulation, the CBK shall reduce the principal amount of Tier 2 instruments to the extent required and to the extent of their capacity;
1.4. if, and only if, the total reduction of shares or other instruments of ownership and relevant capital instruments under subparagraphs 1.1 to 1.3 of this paragraph is less than the sum of the amounts referred to in subparagraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of this Regulation, the CBK shall reduce, to the extent required, the principal amount of subordinated debt that does not qualify as Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital, in accordance with the hierarchy of claims in normal insolvency proceedings;
1.5. if, and only if, the total reduction of shares or other instruments of ownership, relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities under subparagraphs 1.1 to 1.4 of this paragraph is less than the sum of the amounts referred to in subparagraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of this Regulation, the CBK shall reduce, to the extent required, the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, the remaining eligible liabilities in accordance with the hierarchy of claims in normal insolvency proceedings, including the ranking of deposits under Article 135 of the Law on Banks.
2. When applying the write-down or conversion powers, the CBK shall allocate losses equally among shares or other instruments of ownership and eligible liabilities of the same rank by reducing the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, those shares, instruments or liabilities to the same extent pro rata to their value, except where a different allocation of losses among liabilities of the same rank is permitted under paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation. This paragraph shall not prevent liabilities excluded from bail-in from receiving more favourable treatment than eligible liabilities of the same rank in normal insolvency proceedings.
3. Before applying the write-down or conversion referred to in subparagraph 1.5 of paragraph 1 of this Article, the CBK shall convert or reduce the principal amount of instruments referred to in subparagraphs 1.2 to 1.4 of paragraph 1 of this Article where those instruments contain the following terms and have not already been converted:
3.1. terms providing for the principal amount of the instrument to be reduced on the occurrence of an event relating to the financial situation, solvency or level of own funds of the bank;
3.2. terms providing for conversion of the instruments into shares or other instruments of ownership on the occurrence of such an event.
4. Where the principal amount of an instrument has been reduced, but not to zero, in accordance with terms referred to in subparagraph 3.1 of paragraph 3 of this Article before application of bail-in under paragraph 1 of this Article, the CBK shall apply the write-down and conversion powers to the residual principal amount in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
5. When deciding whether liabilities are to be written down or converted into equity, the CBK shall not convert one class of liabilities while a class of liabilities subordinated to that class remains substantially unconverted or not written down, unless otherwise permitted under paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation.
6. Where eligible liabilities are converted into shares or other instruments of ownership, the CBK shall apply, with the necessary modifications, the conversion-rate principles laid down in CBK Regulation on Write-down and Conversion of Capital Instruments.
1. This Article applies only where the CBK exercises the power under subparagraph 1.6 of paragraph 1 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks in respect of liabilities arising from derivatives.
2. The CBK shall exercise the bail-in power in relation to a liability arising from a derivative only upon or after closing out the derivative. Upon entry into resolution, the CBK may terminate and close out any derivative contract for that purpose under subparagraph 1.9 of paragraph 1 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks. Where a derivative liability has been excluded from bail-in under paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation, the CBK shall not be required to terminate or close out the derivative contract.
3. Where derivative transactions are subject to a netting agreement, the CBK or the valuer shall determine, as part of the valuation under Article 102 of the Law on Banks and the relevant CBK Regulation on Valuation, the liability arising from those transactions on a net basis in accordance with the terms of that agreement.
4. The CBK shall determine the value of liabilities arising from derivatives in accordance with Article 102 of the Law on Banks and the relevant CBK Regulation on Valuation, using the following:
4.1. appropriate methodologies for determining the value of classes of derivatives, including transactions subject to netting agreements;
4.2. principles for establishing the relevant point in time at which the value of a derivative position is to be established; and
4.3. appropriate methodologies for comparing the destruction in value that would arise from the close-out and bail-in of derivatives with the amount of losses that would be borne by derivatives in a bail-in.
5. Before exercising the bail-in power in relation to liabilities arising from derivative contracts, the CBK shall communicate to the counterparties concerned its decision to terminate and close out those contracts. The decision shall take effect immediately or at a later date and time specified in the communication. The communication shall also specify the date and time by which counterparties may submit evidence, together with a summary, of replacement transactions concluded on commercially reasonable terms. The CBK may specify the criteria that it will apply in assessing whether replacement transactions are commercially reasonable and may amend the deadline specified in the communication, provided that any amendment is communicated to the counterparties concerned.
6. The detailed methodologies and principles for the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article shall be laid down in the Regulation on Valuation for Resolution Purposes. Those methodologies and principles shall cover at least:
6.1. the comparison, before the decision to close out is taken, between the destruction in value expected to arise from the close-out of derivative contracts and the amount of losses that would be borne by derivative liabilities in bail-in;
6.2. the determination of a single net amount that the bank under resolution has the legal right to receive or the legal obligation to pay as a result of the close-out of all derivative contracts within a netting set;
6.3. the determination of the early termination amount, including unpaid amounts, collateral and other amounts due between the bank under resolution and the counterparty, and the applicable close-out amount;
6.4. the determination of the close-out amount by reference to replacement transactions concluded on commercially reasonable terms or, where such transactions are unavailable or are not commercially reasonable, by reference to reliable market data, valuation models and other relevant information;
6.5. the valuation of centrally cleared derivative contracts, including the use of valuations provided by a central counterparty and the circumstances in which the CBK or the valuer may use its own estimates;
6.6. the relevant date and time at which the value of derivative liabilities shall be established; and
6.7. the early determination of derivative liabilities as part of a provisional valuation and the subsequent updating of that determination in a later provisional valuation or in the ex post definitive valuation.
1. Where CBK applies the bail-in tool to recapitalise a bank in accordance with paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.1 of Article 4 of this Regulation, arrangements are adopted to ensure that a business reorganisation plan for that bank is drawn up and implemented in accordance with Article 11 of this Regulation.
2. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may include the appointment by the CBK of a person or persons appointed to operate and conduct the activities and services of the bank under resolution with all the powers of its shareholders and management body, with the objective of drawing up and implementing the business reorganisation plan required by Article 11 of this Regulation.
1. Within one month after the application of the bail-in tool to a bank in accordance with paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.1 of Article 4 of this Regulation, the management body, or the person or persons appointed by the CBK to operate and conduct the activities and services of the bank under resolution with all the powers of its shareholders and management body, shall draw up and submit to the CBK, a business reorganisation plan that satisfies the requirements of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article.
2. In exceptional circumstances, and if it is necessary for achieving the resolution objectives, the CBK may extend the period specified in paragraph 1, of this article, up to a maximum of two months since the application of the bail-in tool.
3. A business reorganisation plan shall set out measures aiming to restore the long-term viability of the bank or parts of its business within a reasonable timescale. Those measures shall be based on realistic assumptions as to the economic and financial market conditions under which the bank will operate. The business reorganisation plan shall take account, inter alia, of the current state and future prospects of the financial markets, reflecting best-case and worst-case assumptions, including a combination of events allowing the identification of the bank’s main vulnerabilities. Assumptions shall be compared with appropriate sector-wide benchmarks. The business reorganisation plan shall include specific, appropriate and at least quarterly implementation milestones and performance indicators.
4. A business reorganisation plan shall include at least the following elements:
4.1. a detailed diagnosis of the factors and problems that caused the bank to fail or to be likely to fail, and the circumstances that led to its difficulties. In this regard, the plan shall include a historic and financial account of the factors that contributed to the difficulties of the bank, including the relevant performance indicators that deteriorated in the period preceding the resolution and the reason for their deterioration;
4.2. a description of the measures aiming to restore the long-term viability of the bank. In this regard, the plan shall include:
4.2.1. a short description of crisis prevention and crisis management measures, where such measures have been applied by the CBK or the bank before the submission of the business reorganisation plan;
4.2.2. a description of the business reorganisation strategy and the measures intended to restore the long-term viability of the bank during the reorganisation period including a description of each of the following:
4.2.2.1. the reorganised business model;
4.2.2.2. the measures implementing the business reorganisation strategy at banking group, bank and business line level;
4.2.2.3. the target duration of the reorganisation period and important milestones;
4.2.2.4. the interaction with the CBK;
4.2.2.5. the strategy regarding the involvement of relevant external stakeholders such as labour unions or relevant organisations;
4.2.2.6. the internal and external communication strategy for the business reorganisation measures;
4.3. a timetable for the implementation of those measures;
4.4. where parts of the bank are to be wound down or sold, the reorganisation strategy shall identify all of the following:
4.4.1. the relevant entity or business line, the method for the winding down or sale, including the underlying assumptions and any possible expected losses;
4.4.2. the expected timescale;
4.4.3. any financing or services provided by or to the remaining bank;
4.5. for the parts of the bank that will not be wound down or sold, the business reorganisation plan shall indicate ways to remedy any shortcomings in their operation or performance that may have an impact on their long-term viability, even if these shortcomings are not directly related to the failure of that bank.
4.6. the projected financial performance of the bank during the reorganisation period and demonstrate how long-term viability will be restored. It shall set out in particular:
4.6.1. the costs and the impact of the reorganisation on the profit and loss statement and the balance sheet of the bank;
4.6.2. a description of the funding requirements during the reorganisation period and potential sources of funding;
4.6.3. the way the bank will be able to operate covering all its costs, including depreciation and financial charges and provide an acceptable financial return by the end of the reorganisation period;
4.6.4. a post-resolution balance sheet reflecting the new debt and capital structure and the writedown of assets based on the valuation conducted pursuant to Article 102 of the Law on Banks or the ex-post definitive valuation;
4.6.5. a projection of the key financial metrics at banking group, bank and business line level, relating to liquidity, loan performance, funding profile, profitability and efficiency.
5. Measures aiming to restore the long-term viability of a bank may include:
5.1. the reorganisation of the activities of the bank;
5.2. changes to the operational systems and infrastructure within the bank;
5.3. the withdrawal from loss-making activities;
5.4. the restructuring of existing activities that can be made competitive;
5.5. the sale of assets or of business lines.
6. The reorganisation strategy may include measures previously identified in the recovery plan or in the resolution plan, provided that the resolution plan is accessible to the bank and when such measures remain valid following resolution.
7. Within one month of the date of submission of the business reorganisation plan, the CBK shall assess the likelihood that the plan, if implemented, will restore the long-term viability of the bank. The assessment shall be completed in agreement with the supervision function of the CBK. If the CBK (as supervision and resolution authority) is satisfied that the plan would achieve that objective, the CBK (as resolution authority) shall approve the plan.
8. If the CBK is not satisfied that the plan would achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, the CBK, in agreement with the CBK as the supervision authority, shall notify the management body, or the person or persons appointed by the CBK to operate and conduct the activities and services of the bank under resolution with all the powers of its shareholders and management body of its concerns and require the amendment of the plan in a way that addresses those concerns.
9. Within two weeks from the date of receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article, the management body or the person or persons appointed by the CBK, shall submit an amended plan to the CBK for approval. The CBK shall assess the amended plan and shall notify the management body or the person or persons appointed by the CBK within one week whether it is satisfied that the plan, as amended, addresses the concerns notified or whether further amendment is required.
10. The management body or the person or persons appointed by the CBK shall implement the reorganisation plan as approved by the CBK and shall submit a report to the CBK at least every six months on progress in the implementation of the plan. The progress report of this plan shall include a review and assessment of the progress of the implementation of business reorganisation plan, covering at least the following elements:
10.1. the milestones that are met, the measures that are realised and how their impact compares to that envisaged by the business reorganisation plan;
10.2. the performance of the bank and a comparison with the forecasts of the business reorganisation plan and previous progress reports;
10.3. the reasons why any milestones or performance indicators have not been achieved and proposals to remedy the delays or shortfalls;
10.4. any other issues arising in the execution of the business reorganisation plan that may prevent the restoration of the long-term viability of the bank;
10.5. the upcoming measures and milestones and an assessment of how likely they are to be met;
10.6. updated financial performance projections;
10.7. where necessary and justified, a proposal for adjustments to individual measures, milestones or performance indicators.
11. The CBK may at all times require the management body or the person or persons appointed by the CBK to provide information relating to the implementation of the business reorganisation plan.
12. The management body or the person or persons appointed by the CBK shall revise the plan if, in the opinion of the CBK with the agreement of the CBK as supervision authority, it is necessary to achieve the aim referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article. Such revision of the plan shall be submitted to the CBK for approval.
13. Any proceeds from the divestment of assets, entities or business lines envisaged by the business reorganisation plan shall be calculated prudently and with reference either to a reliable benchmark or valuation, such as an expert valuation, or the market value of similar business lines or entities. The calculation shall take into account the likelihood of loss realisation.
14. The business reorganisation plan shall provide for the possibility for the management body or any person or persons appointed by the CBK to adjust the reorganisation strategy or individual measures where their implementation is no longer expected to contribute to the restoration of the long-term viability within the contemplated timescale. Such adjustments shall be communicated to the CBK in the progress report on the implementation of the business reorganisation plan. Where necessary for reasons of urgency, such adjustments may also be communicated through extraordinary reports. The management body or the person or persons appointed by the CBK shall not deviate from the implementation of the business reorganisation plan unless such deviation is approved by the CBK.
1. When exercising powers under Article 112 or Article 121 paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.6 of the Law on Banks, the reduction of principal or outstanding amount due, conversion or cancellation shall take effect and shall be immediately binding on the bank under resolution and on affected creditors and shareholders.
2. The CBK may complete or require completion of all administrative and procedural tasks for the implementation of paragraph 1 of this Article, including:
2.1. amendment of all relevant registers;
2.2. delisting or removal from trading of shares, other instruments of ownership or debt instruments;
2.3. listing or admission to trading of new shares or other instruments of ownership;
2.4. relisting or readmission of debt instruments that have been written down.
3. Where the CBK reduces to zero the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, a liability, that liability and any obligations or claims arising in relation to it that have not accrued when the power under Article 112 or subparagraph 1.6 of paragraph 1 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks is exercised shall be treated as discharged and may not be claimed in any subsequent proceedings, including normal insolvency proceedings relating to the bank under resolution or any successor entity.
4. Where the CBK reduces in part, but not fully, the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, a liability:
4.1. the liability shall be discharged to the extent of the reduction;
4.2. the instrument or agreement that created the original liability shall continue to apply to the residual principal amount or outstanding amount payable, subject to any modification of interest payable to reflect the reduction of principal and any further modification of terms made by the CBK.
1. Following the assessment under paragraph 2 of this Article, the CBK shall, where appropriate, require a bank to maintain at all times a sufficient amount of authorised share capital or other Common Equity Tier 1 instruments. The amount maintained shall be sufficient to enable the bank to issue new shares or other instruments of ownership so that liabilities can be converted effectively into shares or other instruments of ownership where the CBK exercises the power under Article 112 or under Article 121 paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.6 of the Law on Banks.
2. When developing or updating the resolution plan for a bank, the CBK shall assess whether it is appropriate to impose the requirement under paragraph 1 of this Article, taking into account, in particular, the resolution actions contemplated in the plan. Where the resolution plan provides for possible application of the bail-in tool, the CBK shall verify that the authorised share capital or other Common Equity Tier 1 instruments are sufficient to cover the sum of the amounts referred to in subparagraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of this Regulation.
3. The CBK shall ensure that there are no procedural impediments to converting liabilities into shares or other instruments of ownership arising from instruments of incorporation or statutes, including shareholders' pre-emption rights or requirements for shareholder consent to an increase in capital.
1. Banks shall include a contractual clause in any liability or capital instrument governed by the law of a jurisdiction outside the Republic of Kosovo, whereby the creditor or party to the agreement:
1.1. acknowledges and accepts that the liability or instrument may be subject to the exercise by the CBK of write-down and conversion powers in accordance with this Regulation and the Law on Banks of the Republic of Kosovo;
1.2. agrees to be bound by any reduction of the principal amount or outstanding amount due, conversion into equity, transfer, modification, or cancellation of the liability or instrument that results from the exercise of such powers by the CBK; and
1.3. agrees that neither the exercise of those powers by the CBK nor any consequential reduction, conversion, transfer, modification, or cancellation shall constitute an event of default, a termination event, or a trigger for the enforcement of security or for close-out netting under any agreement to which the bank is a party.
2. The obligation set out in Paragraph 1 of this Article applies to:
2.1. liabilities that, if governed by the law of the Republic of Kosovo, would constitute eligible liabilities for the purposes of this Regulation;
2.2. capital instruments that, if governed by the law of the Republic of Kosovo, would qualify as Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments; and
2.3. any other liabilities or instruments issued or entered into after the entry into force of this Regulation that are governed by foreign law, unless an exemption applies pursuant to Paragraph 4.
3. The contractual clause required under Paragraph 1 shall be included in the relevant contract or instrument as a binding and enforceable condition. The absence of such a clause shall not prevent the CBK from exercising its write-down and conversion powers in respect of the relevant liability or instrument, but shall be taken into account by the CBK in assessing the resolvability of the bank and in determining appropriate measures to address or remove impediments to resolvability.
4. A bank shall be exempt from the obligation under Paragraph 1 in respect of a specific liability or instrument where:
4.1. the law of the jurisdiction governing the liability or instrument already provides for the recognition and enforceability of write-down and conversion powers exercised by the CBK to an equivalent effect; or
4.2. the CBK determines, upon the reasoned written request of the bank, that it is legally or practically impracticable to include the contractual clause having regard to the nature of the instrument, the terms of the relevant contract, or the requirements of the governing law, and that the omission of the clause would not materially impair the resolvability of the bank. Any exemption granted under this subparagraph shall be documented in writing, shall set out the specific grounds for the determination.
5. The obligation under paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to liabilities that are excluded from the scope of bail-in pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 5 of this Regulation.
6. Banks shall report to the CBK on an annual basis on the progress made in incorporating contractual recognition clauses into legacy contracts and shall identify any contracts where inclusion has not been achieved and the reasons therefore.
7. The CBK may issue guidelines specifying:
7.1. standard form contractual language that is deemed to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1 of this Article;
7.2. the categories of liability and instrument to which the obligation applies, including any clarifications regarding complex instruments, securities issued under program documentation, or master agreements;
7.3. the process and criteria for requesting and granting exemptions under subparagraph 4.2 of paragraph 4 of this Article; and
7.4. the content and format of the reporting obligation under paragraph 6 of this Article.
8. Where a bank fails to include the contractual clause required under paragraph 1 of this Article in a liability or instrument within its scope, the CBK may:
8.1. require the bank to take remedial action within a specified timeframe;
8.2. restrict or prohibit the issuance of further liabilities or instruments governed by foreign law until compliance is achieved; or
8.3. treat the non-compliant liabilities or instruments as an impediment to resolvability and require the bank to address such impediment in accordance with the applicable resolvability provisions of the Law on Banks.
1. Without prejudice to Article 14 of this Regulation, banks shall include a contractual recognition term meeting the requirements of paragraph 2 of this Article in any financial contract governed by the law of a foreign country where the contract:
1.1. creates a new obligation, or materially amends an existing obligation, after the entry into force of this Regulation; and
1.2. provides for the exercise of one or more termination rights or rights to enforce security interests to which Article 115 or Article 121 of the Law on Banks would apply if the financial contract were governed by the law of the Republic of Kosovo.
2. The contractual recognition term in a relevant financial contract governed by the law of a jurisdiction outside the Republic of Kosovo shall include the following:
2.1. the acknowledgement and acceptance by the parties that:
2.1.1. the financial contract may be subject to the exercise by the CBK of the power to suspend payment or delivery obligations under paragraph 2 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks, subject to paragraphs 3 to 5 of that Article;
2.1.2. the financial contract may be subject to the exercise by the CBK of the power to restrict the enforcement of security interests under subparagraph 6.1 of paragraph 6 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks;
2.1.3. termination, acceleration, close-out, set-off and netting rights under the financial contract may be suspended by the CBK under subparagraph 6.2 of paragraph 6 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks; and
2.1.4. the conditions and effects set out in Article 115 of the Law on Banks shall apply;
2.2. a description of, or reference to:
2.2.1. the powers of the CBK set out in paragraph 2 and subparagraphs 6.1 and 6.2 of paragraph 6 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks; and
2.2.2. the conditions and effects set out in Article 115 of the Law on Banks;
2.3. the acknowledgement and acceptance by the parties:
2.3.1. that they are bound by the effect of the exercise of the powers referred to in subparagraph 2.2.1 of this paragraph, including:
2.3.1.1. the suspension of any payment or delivery obligation under paragraph 2 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks, subject to paragraphs 3 to 5 of that Article;
2.3.1.2. the restriction of the enforcement of any security interest under subparagraph 6.1 of paragraph 6 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks; and
2.3.1.3. the suspension of any termination, acceleration, close-out, set-off or netting right under the financial contract pursuant to subparagraph 6.2 of paragraph 6 of Article 121 of the Law on Banks; and
2.3.2. that they are bound by the conditions and effects set out in Article 115 of the Law on Banks; and
2.4. the acknowledgement and acceptance by the parties that the contractual recognition term is exhaustive in relation to the matters described therein, to the exclusion of any other agreement, arrangement or understanding between the parties concerning those matters.
3. Failure to include the contractual terms required by this Article shall not prevent the CBK from exercising a resolution power under the Law on Banks. The failure may be taken into account when assessing resolvability and determining measures to address or remove impediments to resolvability.
1. The decision of the CBK to exclude a liability or class of liabilities from the application of the bail-in tool pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation shall be based on a case-by-case analysis of the bank under resolution and shall not be automatic.
2. When considering exclusions and before completely excluding a liability or class of liabilities from bail-in, the CBK shall first consider the option to partially exclude that liability by limiting the extent of their write-down wherever possible.
3. In its determination as to whether a liability should be excluded, the CBK shall assess whether the conditions therein are met at the time of the application of the bail-in tool to the bank. That assessment shall be without prejudice to the obligation of the CBK to follow the resolution plan.
4. The decision to exclude a liability or class of liabilities from the application of bail-in shall be based on at least one of the resolution objectives.
5. The decision to exclude or partially exclude a liability or class of liabilities from the application of the bail-in tool which would imply the use of the National Resolution Fund, shall be duly justified, taking into account the need for expedience as warranted by the circumstances of the specific case.
6. Where the CBK has assumed that a liability or class of liabilities would credibly and feasibly contribute to loss absorption and recapitalisation, and that those liabilities would not meet the requirements for exclusion under paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation, the CBK shall explain each of the following if it then decides to exclude or partially exclude a liability or class of liabilities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article 5, of this Regulation, which would involve passing losses onto the National Resolution Fund:
6.1. the exceptional circumstances which differ from those at the moment of resolution planning to the effect that those liabilities need to be excluded from bail-in at the moment of taking resolution action;
6.2. why the need for exclusion and, in particular, the exceptional circumstances leading to it could not be foreseen in the course of resolution planning;
6.3. if the need for exclusion was provided for in the resolution plan, how the CBK addressed this need to avoid it constituting an impediment to resolvability.
7. When deciding whether to exclude or partially exclude a liability or class of liabilities pursuant to subparagraph 6.1 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation, if the exclusion would involve passing losses onto the National Resolution Fund, the CBK shall also explain:
7.1. how the requirements laid down in Articles 17 and 18 of this Regulation are satisfied; and
7.2. why the need for exclusion could not be addressed by an appropriate method of valuation pursuant to Article 102 of the Law on Banks.
8. When deciding whether to exclude or partially exclude a liability or class of liabilities in order to preserve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines pursuant to subparagraph 6.2 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation, if the exclusion would involve passing losses onto the National Resolution Fund, the CBK shall also explain:
8.1. whether and how the requirements laid down in Article 19 of this Regulation are satisfied;
8.2. why the liabilities to be excluded are more relevant for the continuity of clearly specified critical functions or core business lines than liabilities which are not to be excluded.
9. Where the CBK excludes or partially excludes a liability or class of liabilities in order to avoid widespread contagion pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph 6.3 of Article 5 of this Regulation, if the exclusion would involve passing losses onto the National Resolution Fund, the CBK shall also explain:
9.1. whether and how the requirements laid down in Article 20 of this Regulation are satisfied;
9.2. the reasons why the excluded liabilities have a higher likelihood of causing widespread contagion of the type described in subparagraph 6.3 of paragraph 6 of Article 5, of this Regulation, than those not excluded.
10. Where the CBK excludes or partially excludes a liability or class of liabilities pursuant to subparagraph 6.4 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation, if the exclusion would involve passing losses onto the National Resolution Fund, the CBK shall also explain whether and how the requirements laid down in Article 21 of this Regulation are satisfied.
1. The CBK may exclude a liability or class of liabilities from the exercise of the bail-in tool only where the obstacles invoked for such exercise do not allow for it to take place within a reasonable time, despite every best effort of the CBK.
2. With regard to paragraph 1 of this Article, the CBK shall, in particular, satisfy the following requirements before making a determination as to the exclusion referred to therein:
2.1. the obligation of the CBK, to provide in the resolution plan, a description of the processes for ensuring availability within an appropriate time frame of the information required for the purposes of valuation pursuant to Article 102 of the Law on Banks;
2.2. the obligation of the CBK to address any impediments to resolvability of the bank including the circumstances resulting in a potential exclusion which could be foreseen in the resolution planning process when those potential exclusions amount to impediments to resolvability.
3. This Article shall apply only in cases of exclusion due to the impossibility of applying the bail-in tool pursuant to subparagraph 6.1 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation.
1. When seeking to exclude a liability or class of liabilities from bail-in under paragraph 6, subparagraph 6.1 of Article 5 of this Regulation, and in order to determine what constitutes ‘reasonable time’, the CBK shall determine the following:
1.1. when the write-down amount has to be ultimately determined;
1.2. by when all the tasks needed to bail-in those liabilities would need to be performed in order to meet the resolution objectives taking into account the situation at the time of the resolution action.
2. When determining the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article, the CBK shall assess the following:
2.1. the need to publish a bail-in decision and to determine the bail-in amount and its final allocation to the various classes of creditors;
2.2. the consequences of delaying such a decision for market confidence, potential market reactions, such as liquidity outflows, and the effectiveness of resolution action, taking into account both of the following:
2.2.1. whether the distress and risk of failure of the bank is known to market participants;
2.2.2. the visibility of the consequences of the distress or potential failure of the bank to market participants;
2.3. the opening times of markets in as much as they may impact continuity of critical functions and contagion effects;
2.4. the reference date(s) when capital requirements have to be complied with;
2.5. the dates when payments of the bank are due, and the maturity of the liabilities concerned.
1. The CBK may exclude liabilities or a class of liabilities on the basis of it being necessary and proportionate to preserve certain critical functions where it considers that liability or class of liabilities to be linked to a critical function for whose continuity that liability or class of liabilities should not be bailed-in, where either of the following elements is satisfied:
1.1. the bail-in of the liability or class of liabilities would undermine the function due to the availability of funding or to a dependence on counterparties, such as hedging counterparties, on infrastructure or on service providers to the bank, which may be prevented from or unwilling to continue transactions with the bank following a bail-in;
1.2. the critical function in question is a service provided by the bank to third parties which depends on the uninterrupted performance of the liability.
2. The CBK may only exclude liabilities which are required for risk management (hedging) purposes in the context of critical functions where both of the following conditions are satisfied:
2.1. the risk management (hedging) is recognised for prudential purposes and is essential for maintaining operations related to critical functions;
2.2. it would be impossible for the bank to replace an unwound risk management measure on reasonable terms within the time required for maintaining the critical function.
3. The CBK may only exclude liabilities for the purposes of maintaining a funding relationship where both of the following conditions are satisfied:
3.1. the CBK assesses that the funding is essential for maintaining a critical function;
3.2. in view of Article 18 of this Regulation, it would be impossible for the bank to replace the funding within the time required for maintaining the critical function.
4. The CBK shall not exclude a liability or class of liabilities solely on the basis of any of the following:
4.1. its maturity;
4.2. the expectation of an increase in funding costs which does not jeopardise the continuity of the critical function;
4.3. the expectation of a future potential profit.
5. The CBK may exclude liabilities or a class of liabilities on the basis of it being necessary and proportionate to preserve a core business line where the exclusion of that liability is critical to maintaining the ability of the bank under resolution to continue key operations, services and transactions, and to achieve the resolution objectives.
6. This Article shall apply only in cases of exclusion due to the impossibility of applying the bail-in tool pursuant to subparagraph 6.2 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation.
1. When considering exclusions based on the risk of direct contagion pursuant to subparagraph 6.3 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation, the CBK shall assess, to the maximum extent possible, the interconnectedness of the bank under resolution with its counterparties. Such an assessment shall include all of the following:
1.1. consideration of exposures to relevant counterparties with regard to the risk that bail-in of such exposures might cause knock-on failures;
1.2. the systemic importance of counterparties which are at risk of failing, in particular with regard to other financial market participants and financial market infrastructure providers.
2. When considering exclusions based on the risk of indirect contagion pursuant to subparagraph 6.3 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation, the CBK shall assess, to the maximum extent possible, the need and proportionality of the exclusion based on multiple objective relevant indicators. Indicators which may be relevant to the case include the following:
2.1. number, size and interconnectedness of banks with similar characteristics as the bank under resolution, insofar as that could give rise to widespread lack of confidence in the banking sector or the broader financial system;
2.2. the number of natural persons directly and indirectly affected by the bail-in, visibility and press coverage of the resolution action, insofar as that has a significant risk of undermining overall confidence in the banking or broader financial system;
2.3. the number, size, interconnectedness of counterparties affected by the bail-in, including market participants from the non-banking sector, and the importance of critical functions performed by these counterparties;
2.4. the ability of the counterparties to access alternative service providers for functions which have been assessed as substitutable, given the specific situation;
2.5. whether a significant number of counterparties would withdraw funding or cease making transactions with other institutions following the bail-in, or whether markets would cease functioning properly as a consequence of the bail-in of such market participants, in particular in the event of generalised loss of market confidence or panic;
2.6. widespread withdrawal of short-term funding or deposits in significant amounts;
2.7. the number, size or significance of banks which are at risk of meeting the conditions for early intervention, or meeting the conditions of failing or likely to fail under the Law on Banks;
2.8. the risk of a significant discontinuance of critical functions or a significant increase in prices for the provision of such functions (as evident from changes in market conditions for such functions or their availability), as well as the expectation of counterparties and other market participants;
2.9. widespread significant decreases in share prices of banks or in prices of assets held by banks, in particular where they can have an impact on the capital situation of banks;
2.10. general and widespread significant reduction in short or medium term funding available to banks;
2.11. significant impairment to the functioning of the interbank funding market, as apparent from a significant increase of margin requirements and decrease of collateral available to banks;
2.12. widespread and significant increases in prices for credit default insurance or deterioration in credit ratings of banks or other market participants which are relevant for the financial situation of banks.
3. This Article shall apply only in cases of exclusion due to the impossibility of applying the bail-in tool pursuant to subparagraph 6.3 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation.
1. The CBK may exclude a liability or class of liabilities from a bail-in where such exclusion would avoid value destruction so that the holders of the non-excluded liabilities would be better off than they would be if the former were bailed-in.
2. In order to assess whether the condition in paragraph 1 of this Article is met, the CBK shall compare and evaluate the outcome for all creditors resulting from a potential bail-in and non-bail-in.
3. This Article shall apply only in cases of exclusion due to the impossibility of applying the bail-in tool pursuant to subparagraph 6.4 of paragraph 6 of Article 5 of this Regulation.
For liabilities and instruments issued or entered into prior to the entry into force of this Regulation, banks shall use their best efforts to amend existing contracts governed by foreign law to incorporate the contractual clause required under Paragraph 1 of Article 14 of this Regulation at the earliest practicable opportunity, in particular upon any amendment, renewal, or rollover of the relevant contract.
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 2027.
Dr. Sc. Bashkim Nurboja
Chairman of the Board of the Central Bank of Kosovo
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“Pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1.1 and Article 65, paragraph 1 and 2 of the Law No. 03/L-209 on Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No.77 / 16 August 2010)”
“Article 8 and Article 111, paragraph 5 of the Law No. 08/L-304 on Banks (Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No.2 / 27 January 2026)”
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