Enforcement · SMV · 22 Aug 2019
The Superintendent of the Securities Market resolves the appeal filed by the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL) against Resolution No. 016-2017-SMV/10, which had imposed a fine of 6 Tax Units (S/ 22,800.00) for a serious infraction related to including securities in List 4 of the Referential Values Table without complying with the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Stock Exchange Operations Regulations. The resolution reviews the legal framework and the arguments presented by the BVL, including the powers of the Market Director and the methodology for List 4. It evaluates the appeal's admissibility and the applicable legal provisions.
No. 099-2019-SMV/02
Lima, August 22, 2019
The Superintendent of the Securities Market
WHEREAS:
File No. 2014032690, Report No. 644-2019-SMV/06 dated July 8, 2019 issued by the Legal Advisory Office (hereinafter, OAJ), the briefs of the Lima Stock Exchange S.A.A. (hereinafter, BVL) submitted on July 15 and August 19, 2019, and having heard the oral report made on August 12, 2019 at the premises of the Superintendency of the Securities Market (SMV) by Mr. Francis Stenning de Lavalle, General Manager of the BVL, Mrs. Magaly Martínez Matto, Corporate Legal and Institutional Relations Manager of the BVL, and the lawyer Mr. Jorge Melo Vega Layseca;
CONSIDERING:
That, by Deputy Superintendent Resolution SMV No. 016-2017-SMV/10 dated March 23, 2017 (hereinafter, RESOLUTION) issued by the Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision (hereinafter, SASP), it was resolved to sanction the BVL with a fine of six (6) Tax Units amounting to S/ 22,800.00 (Twenty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred and 00/100 Soles) for having incurred in one (1) infraction of a serious nature typified in Annex VIII, literal A), numeral 2, subsection 2.1 of the Sanctions Regulations approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 055-2001-EF/94.10 (hereinafter, Sanctions Regulations), for including securities in List 4 of the Referential Values Table (hereinafter, List 4), without observing the provisions of the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Stock Exchange Operations Regulations of the Lima Stock Exchange, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 021-99-EF/94.10, (hereinafter, Operations Regulations);
That, by brief submitted on April 17, 2017, the BVL filed an appeal against the RESOLUTION, requesting that it be revoked and that it be declared that the BVL has not incurred in a sanctionable infraction. The aforementioned appeal is based on the factual and legal grounds, which we summarize below:
1. The SMV considers that there is no technical basis for the Market Director to have included securities in List 4 without observing the provisions of the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations. However, there is no provision that requires the alleged technical basis from the Market Director.
2. The methodology for determining the securities with which repurchase operations can be carried out is established by the Board of Directors of the BVL. In this sense, it should be noted that the aforementioned board does not determine the exclusion or inclusion of securities in the different lists of the Referential Values Table (hereinafter, TVR).
3. As acknowledged in the RESOLUTION, in the methodology published on the BVL's website since 1999, it is established that the Market Director is the one who can determine the modifications, inclusions, and withdrawals of securities in lists 1, 2, 3, and 4, that he considers convenient. The aforementioned methodology has not been modified since Board Session No. 940/2013 of February 27, 2013, so it is applicable to the present case by mandate of Articles 27 and 34 of the Operations Regulations.
4. The Board of Directors of the BVL approved the methodology for selecting securities that make up the different lists of the TVR (hereinafter, BVL Methodology) within which the Market Director was empowered to determine the modifications, inclusions, and withdrawals thereof that he considers pertinent, in accordance with numeral 1.10 of the methodology. According to the BVL Methodology, the system generates a list of securities ordered according to the score obtained. The Market Director receives lists 1, 2, 3, and 4 and, using his powers, can modify, incorporate, or withdraw the securities he deems convenient according to market, stock exchange, and/or economic situation criteria.
5. List 4 contains shares from different sectors that can be used to carry out extended repurchase operations by reporting companies acting on behalf of an accredited investor. The requirements for certain shares to be included in List 4 are that they are not included in lists 1, 2, 3 of the TVR and that they have a minimum quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25% (hereinafter, List 4 Methodology).
1. However, lists 1, 2, 3, and 4 are not definitive, since the BVL Methodology allowed the Market Director, under his sole criteria and responsibility, to incorporate, withdraw, or modify securities from the aforementioned lists, disregarding one or some of the parameters previously established by the Board of Directors of the BVL; that is, they do not necessarily coincide with the parameters of number and amount of operations, frequency, or intervening brokerage firms. The foregoing is supported by Article 119 of the Securities Market Law, Legislative Decree No. 861 and its amendments (hereinafter, LMV), by establishing the powers of the Exchange Director[1], as well as in the BVL Methodology published on its website.
2. Recital 46 of the RESOLUTION suffers from an error in iudicando, since the SMV has not supported in accordance with law the alleged and denied lack of attributions on the part of the Market Director.
3. The SMV itself confirms what the BVL indicated; indeed, recitals 32 and 35 of the RESOLUTION state that SMV Resolution No. 008-2015-SMV/01 expressly included a new methodology that allows the Market Director to withdraw securities from the TVR lists, but does not authorize him to incorporate securities into any of the lists, if they were not included as a consequence of the application of the methodology. The foregoing demonstrates that between August 2013 and January 2014, the Market Director did have the express attributions to incorporate, withdraw, or modify securities from List 4.
4. SMV Resolution No. 008-2015-SMV/01, which establishes that the Market Director can only withdraw securities, has been in force since May 4, 2015. That is, the inclusions of securities in List 4 ordered by the Market Director and questioned by the SMV were fully valid, having applied the only methodology that governed repurchase operations, including extended repurchase operations.
1. According to Article 119 of the LMV, the Market Director has full discretion to resolve matters related to operations carried out on the exchange. Likewise, Article 5 of the Market Director's Regulations, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 098-2010-EF/94.01.1 (hereinafter, DM Regulations) grants functional and administrative autonomy to the aforementioned Market Director. In that order of ideas, in the case of securities BVLAC 1, BVLBC 1, and CAVALIC 1, these were incorporated into List 4 by express decision of the Market Director, with the purpose that they be used as principal in repurchase operations, also considering that the reporting investor is an accredited investor.
2. Therefore, recital 43 of the RESOLUTION transgresses the provisions of the LMV and the DM Regulations, since the Market Director was empowered to apply his discretion when including securities in List 4. For the BVL, at the time of inclusion in List 4 of the securities now questioned, there was no norm or provision that limited the exercise of the Market Director's discretion; the mere affirmation of the SMV, without positive foundation, cannot support the imposition of a sanction.
3. In recital 46 of the RESOLUTION, the Deputy Superintendent states that in the event that the Market Director has the power to enter the securities BVLAC1, BVLBC1, and CAVALIC1 into List 4, there is no technical basis for the aforementioned official to have included said securities in the cited list, since said securities had a quotation frequency of less than 25%. In this regard, the BVL states that, in use of the powers conferred by the BVL Methodology, the Market Director had broad discretion to enter securities in List 4, and no provision has been identified that required a certain technical basis to include a security in List 4.
4. Likewise, the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations, which entered into force on May 4, 2015, only establishes the power to withdraw securities, that is, as of that date the Market Director cannot incorporate securities into List 4.
5. According to Article 353 of the LMV and Article 2.1 of the Single Concorded Text of the Organic Law of the Superintendency of the Securities Market, approved by Legislative Decree No. 26126 (hereinafter, Organic Law), said public entity is empowered to typify and sanction, via regulation, infractions of the securities market. In this sense, according to Article 3 of the Sanctions Regulations, the respective infractions are typified in the annexes of the aforementioned regulation. Thus, the SMV may only sanction those conducts that are typified, clearly, certainly, and unequivocally, as an infraction in its Sanctions Regulations. Therefore, having included securities in List 4 by decision of the Market Director is not sanctionable, since it is not regulated in the cited Sanctions Regulations, nor in any other norm.
6. The imputed infraction does not clearly, certainly, and unequivocally describe what conduct is prohibited. For the BVL, the description of the conduct typified as an infraction in numeral 2.9 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulations uses ambiguous, indeterminate, and imprecise terms such as "diligence" or "regulation", which do not allow identifying what the prohibited conduct is.
Additionally, the BVL states that resorting to simple affirmations to give content to numeral 2.9 of Annex I of the Sanctions Regulations constitutes a violation of the principle of legality, since the LMV and the Organic Law (authoritative norms) have established that the Sanctions Regulations must provide clearly, certainly, and unequivocally what the prohibited conduct is.
The principle of legality is violated when indeterminate legal concepts are not reasonably feasible because they lack logical, technical, or experiential criteria that allow foreseeing, with sufficient certainty, the nature and essential characteristics of the assumption of the conduct typified as an infraction.
"On the contrary, it would not be contrary to the principle, by itself, the use of indeterminate legal concepts in the definition of the sanctionable conduct, as long as the concretion of such concepts is reasonably feasible by virtue of being referred to logical, technical, or experiential criteria, which allow foreseeing, with sufficient certainty, the nature and essential characteristics of the conducts constituting the typified infraction. The unity of solution that underlies the indeterminate legal concept makes its use in sanctioning norms, in principle, admissible, since by existing a single solution, the application does not entail a margin of discretion for the official in the definition of the sanctionable conduct."
Taking into consideration the complete citation, the BVL concludes that there is no single solution or unity of solution. The text "Not executing with diligence the functions established by the regulation"[3] allows the administration the exercise of a discretion contrary to the principle of typicity;
That, by brief submitted on July 15, 2019, the BVL submitted additional allegations regarding Report No. 644-2019-SMV/06 issued by the OAJ, arguments that are summarily indicated:
The BVL highlights that the Constitutional Court ruled as unconstitutional those norms that establish infraction types without expressly determining and without meeting the characteristics of clarity, precision, and sufficient minimum standards to be understood by the citizen of basic formation. For the BVL, the infraction type used by the SMV lacks the same characteristics exposed by the Constitutional Court, and
That, by brief submitted on August 19, 2019, the BVL submitted additional allegations and documentation for better resolution, which we summarize below:
That, from the evaluation carried out, it is observed that the appeal meets the requirements established in Articles 218 and 220 of the Single Ordered Text of Law No. 27444, General Administrative Procedure Law, approved by Supreme Decree No. 004-2019-JUS[4] (hereinafter, TUO LPAG) since it was filed within the 15-day term of notification of the administrative act and is founded;
Before evaluating the arguments put forward by the BVL, we must gloss the first paragraph of Article 27, as well as the second, sixth, and seventh paragraphs of Article 34 of the Operations Regulations, according to the texts in force at the date of the commission of the facts imputed as an infraction, which stated:
"Article 27.- Selection of the securities subject to operations.
The Board shall establish the methodology to be used for the determination of the securities with which the operations provided for in this Title may be carried out, as well as those that may be delivered as margin of guarantee, in accordance with the provisions of the following article.
(…)
Article 34.- Repurchase Operation.
(…)
Repurchase operations may also be carried out with respect to a list of securities determined according to the methodology referred to in Article 27. In these cases, during the validity of the repurchase operation and in accordance with the procedure established by the Board, the reported party may substitute the securities subject to the operation with any other from the indicated group of securities or from a group of securities of lower risk.
(…)
Repurchase operations in which the reporting company acts on behalf of an accredited investor may be subject to particular conditions regarding the securities subject to the operations. Operations subject to said special conditions shall be called extended repurchase operations.
The board of directors shall determine the conditions that will be applicable to said operations, in accordance with the provisions of this regulation."
(Underlined by us)
Likewise, it is appropriate to cite the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations[5], according to the text in force at the time of the commission of the facts imputed as an infraction:
"Repurchase Market with shares and securities representing rights over shares
The current methodology for Calculating the Referential Values Table TVR will remain in force until the date indicated by the Board of Directors, which will be informed to the market with at least 10 (ten) Stock Exchange Days in advance.
Repurchase operations with securities subject to extraordinary situations may be renewed, provided that the expiration date of the new operation does not exceed the exchange date in cases of merger, spin-off, or IPO, or the settlement date of the offer, in cases of OPA or OPC.
Extended repurchase operations may be carried out with shares or securities representing rights over shares that make up List 4 of the Referential Values Table. This list is used only to carry out this type of operations and is made up of securities that are not part of Lists 1, 2, and 3 of the Referential Values Table and that present at least a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph are not applicable to preferential subscription certificates or any other security representing rights over shares that by their nature have temporary validity."
(Underlined by us)
Pursuant to Articles 27 and 34 cited above, it was for the BVL Board of Directors to approve the methodology for selecting the securities that could make up the different lists of the TVR, but not to determine the inclusion or propose the inclusion of specific securities in any of the lists. In turn, the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations, according to the text in force at the date of commission of the imputed acts, established a group of requirements and parameters for selecting the securities of List 4. The Operations Regulations and its complementary provisions use the terms Consejo Directivo and Directorio interchangeably to refer to the same governing body of the BVL;
On this point, the RESOLUTION mentions that even assuming that the Director of Markets had the powers to modify the securities making up List 4, no technical basis is observed for such modification, that is, for the SASP there is no economic and financial logic for the inclusion of the questioned securities in List 4. The SASP does not maintain that the Director of Markets had to comply with a regulatory framework requiring him to technically support his decisions; on the contrary, it clearly states that at the date of commission of the imputed acts there was no legal framework empowering the Director of Markets to modify the securities making up List 4.
First, we must note that the BVL Methodology was modified by SMV Resolution No. 016-2013-SMV/01, published on July 24, 2013, that is, before the commission of the imputed acts (publication of the TVR lists on 08.09.2013, 10.01.2013 and 01.02.2014).
Under the text of the BVL Methodology in force before July 2013, the selection of securities to make up lists 1, 2 and 3 of the TVR was carried out quarterly on the basis of the stock market movement recorded in the previous six (6) months, considering the evolution of 4 indicators: (i) quotation frequency, (ii) frequency of intermediaries, (iii) number of transactions; and (iv) traded volume for all securities traded in the aforementioned analysis period. According to this methodology, a total score had to be calculated for each security by adding the partial scores obtained for each indicator, scores that had a certain weighting, with quotation frequency being the indicator with the greatest weight in calculating the total score. In that sense, the securities with the highest score made up list 1, and so on, according to the total score obtained, the securities of list 2 and list 3 were completed.
Now, it should be highlighted that in various recitals of the RESOLUTION (for example, recital 31) it is clearly stated that by SMV Resolution No. 016-2013-SMV/01, Article 34 of the Operations Regulations was modified in order to establish a new modality of repurchase operations, called "extended repurchase operations" and that, likewise, the aforementioned resolution modified the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations, specifying that the new List 4 had to be made up of securities different from those incorporated in lists 1, 2 and 3, and that in turn, such securities had to present at least a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%, that is, it was established that quotation frequency was the only criterion for determining the securities making up List 4. At this point, we must highlight that the BVL Methodology did indeed contemplate in its numeral 1.9 that: "The results are delivered to the Director of Markets, so that he may determine the modifications, additions and withdrawals that he considers appropriate." However, that methodology, being unable to anticipate the future, did not contemplate a List 4 (the same one that was created by modifying the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations); in that sense, it lacks basis to affirm that the BVL Methodology granted powers to the Director of Markets to include or exclude securities from List 4 disregarding the criteria contemplated in the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations, when that methodology was approved before the existence of List 4 of the TVR and its scope was limited to the securities that were part of lists 1, 2 and 3 of the TVR.
On this point, we reiterate that at the date of commission of the imputed acts, neither the BVL Methodology nor the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations contemplated discretionary powers for the Director of Markets to modify the securities making up List 4.
At this point, it should be noted that, by communication GE-021/2013 received on March 11, 2013, the BVL requested modification of the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations. In that communication, the General Manager of the BVL forwarded the resolution of the Board session of February 27, 2013, where it had been approved to modify the Operations Regulations to establish that securities that are not part of lists 1, 2 and 3 of the TVR and that in turn present at least a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25% make up List 4 of the TVR for repurchase operations; we must highlight that, according to the documents submitted by the BVL in the file for modification of internal regulations, it was the BVL Board itself that opted for a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%, since the technical report of the BVL administration had recommended a quotation frequency of 10%.
In that sense, we must highlight that although the BVL Methodology empowered the Director of Markets to carry out additions and withdrawals of securities from the TVR lists, that power reached only lists 1, 2 and 3 of the TVR, for the simple fact that List 4 of the TVR was created after the approval of the BVL Methodology. Consequently, at the date of commission of the imputed acts, the Director of Markets was not empowered to disregard the limits and criteria established by the SMV to form List 4 of the TVR.
Furthermore, communication GE-043-13 of July 2013, by which the BVL responds to the observations made by the SMV regarding its aforementioned original request, is very clear in stating the mandatory nature of the new proposed parameters; thus, on page 1 of its brief, the BVL states that: "Additionally, in relation to the concern regarding the minimum quotation frequency of a security to be considered in List 4, it is reported that it must be 25%", as can be seen, the BVL uses the verb "must", which indicates that said parameter was conceived as mandatory. Likewise, on pages 2 and 3 of the aforementioned communication, the BVL states the reasons for establishing the aforementioned parameter as well as the role that the Director of Markets could play regarding the constitution of List 4 of the TVR. Below we quote the pertinent texts:
"Likewise, the quotation frequency indicator is proposed as a selection criterion, as it is the most representative of liquidity and has the greatest weight in the methodology for determining the securities that make up the TVR.
According to the procedure established for the selection of the securities that make up the TVR, the other criteria, without being so important, would be excluding attractive securities that could be accepted to guarantee the principal of a repurchase operation.
(…)
Attached (Annex II) is a list of securities and their indicators that meet the criterion of minimum quotation frequency greater than or equal to 25%, excluding securities from the venture capital segment. Said list could exclude additional securities at the discretion of the Market Director, in accordance with the provisions of the document for Calculation of the Referential Values Table (TVR), Article 27 of the operations regulations." (Our underlining)
As can be seen, the BVL itself considered that the Director of Markets could exclude a security from this list of high quotation frequency securities, but not include those securities that did not meet the aforementioned characteristics.
Finally, Article 119 of the LMV[6], which regulates the figure of the Director of the Trading Floor, also does not empower said official to disregard mandatory rules.
On this point, we must reiterate that by SMV Resolution No. 016-2013-SMV/01, the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations was modified, expressly establishing that List 4 had to be made up of securities different from those incorporated in lists 1, 2 and 3 and that in turn, such securities had to present at least a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%, that is, a mandatory minimum requirement was established for the formation of List 4. Under the text of the aforementioned Complementary Provision, the Director of Markets was not empowered to modify the selection of the securities making up List 4.
Without prejudice to the foregoing, it should be noted that, by Resolution No. 008-2015-SMV/01, in force since May 4, 2015 (a date after the commission of the acts imputed as an administrative infraction), the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations was modified, incorporating in said rule the parameters and criteria necessary to form the different TVR lists (hereinafter, New Methodology); through this modification, the BVL Methodology and the List 4 Methodology, which until May 2015 had been included in different provisions, were incorporated into a single rule. However, the foregoing does not mean that only with the issuance of the New Methodology (in force since May 2015) were express parameters and criteria established to determine the securities that could make up List 4, since by SMV Resolution No. 016-2013-SMV/01, in force at the date of commission of the imputed acts, the necessary parameters to form List 4 had already been established, a methodology that did not recognize powers for the Director of Markets to incorporate securities into List 4 that did not comply with the two parameters already indicated: not belonging to any of the other TVR lists (1, 2 and 3) and having a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%, and therefore could not be disregarded by the BVL itself.
Consequently, these arguments of the BVL also lack legal basis.
Regarding the foregoing, the SMV has not questioned the functional and administrative autonomy of the Director of Markets; the subject matter of this proceeding has been to determine whether the BVL breached the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations, but not whether the Director of Markets complied with his duties of surveillance of operations carried out in a Centralized Negotiation Mechanism.
Once again the BVL disregards the validity of SMV Resolution No. 016-2013-SMV/01, which modified Article 34 of the Operations Regulations in order to establish a new modality of repurchase operations, called "extended repurchase operations" and which, likewise, modified the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of said regulation. In that sense, it is incorrect to affirm that at the date of commission of the imputed acts there was no regulation limiting the powers of the Director of Markets; on the contrary, the SASP bases the sanction imposed on rules of public order approved by the SMV prior to the occurrence of the questioned acts and that did not grant any power to the Director of Markets to modify List 4, disregarding the parameters approved by the SMV at the request of the BVL itself.
On this point, we reiterate that the List 4 Methodology did not grant the Director of Markets powers to modify the composition of List 4. We must highlight that the powers of the Director of Markets contemplated in the BVL Methodology applied only to the formation of lists 1, 2 and 3 of the TVR (applicable to repurchase operations) and not to the formation of the new List 4 (applicable only to extended repurchase operations), for the simple fact that the BVL Methodology predates the creation of List 4.
The BVL concludes this section arguing that the principle of legality is violated when indeterminate legal concepts are not reasonably feasible because they lack logical, technical or experiential criteria that allow foreseeing, with sufficient certainty, the nature and essential characteristics of the assumption of the conduct classified as an infraction.
Regarding the above arguments, it is appropriate to gloss Annex VIII, numeral 2, subsection 2.1 of the Sanctions Regulations, in force at the time of commission of the imputed acts, a rule that stated:
"ANNEX VIII
On the Infractions of the Exchange and other Entities Responsible for the Conduct of Centralized Negotiation Mechanisms, the Promoting Agent and the Market Director
A) The following are infractions of the Exchange and other entities responsible for the conduct of Centralized Mechanisms:
(…)
2.- Serious
2.1 Failure to comply with its internal regulations or complementary provisions"
As can be seen, the glossed infraction type does not use indeterminate legal concepts (such as the concept of "diligence", to which the BVL refers); on the contrary, the text is precise in stating that if the BVL breaches its own internal regulation or complementary provision it will have incurred the factual assumption contained in the cited numeral 2.1.
On this point, we must note that the infraction type has a clear material content; if the BVL breaches the mandatory rules contained in its internal regulations and complementary provisions, it incurs a sanctionable infraction. In this case, it cannot be argued that the BVL is unaware that its economic activity is regulated by mandatory provisions, since the BVL itself proposes the approval or modification of its internal regulations and complementary provisions.
Finally, it should be noted that the citation of Juan Carlos Morón Urbina questioned by the BVL is not particularly relevant for this evaluation, since, as we have stated, the imputed infraction type does not contain indeterminate legal concepts and the complete citation does not change the meaning of this point.
The BVL's statement lacks basis, because, although at the date of commission of the imputed acts, the text of the first paragraph of the Complementary Provision to Article 27 of the Operations Regulations stated that the BVL Methodology remained in force until the date set by the BVL Board, two paragraphs later, the same provision established express limits and criteria to define the securities that could make up List 4. In that sense, it is clear that at the date of the imputed acts, lists 1, 2 and 3 of the TVR were formed in accordance with the BVL Methodology and for that purpose, the Director of Markets was empowered to add or exclude securities from the aforementioned lists; however, regarding the formation of List 4, the BVL Methodology did not establish any regulation, since it was approved before the creation of List 4; therefore, for the formation of List 4 of the TVR, the Director of Markets had a different role, insofar as the List 4 Methodology contemplated as a mandatory parameter that the securities making up this last list had to have a quotation equal to or greater than 25%.
The BVL's statement lacks basis, because the fact that SMV Resolution No. 008-2015-SMV/01 incorporated into the same regulatory body the criteria contemplated in the BVL Methodology and the List 4 Methodology does not deny that the criteria of the List 4 Methodology had been in force since 2013 when they were approved by the SMV, that is, prior to the commission of the imputed acts.
What the BVL states lacks foundation. Firstly, it should be noted that before July 2013, the BVL Methodology indicated that the selection of securities to integrate lists 1, 2, and 3 of the TVR was carried out quarterly based on the stock market movement registered in the previous six (6) months, considering the evolution of 4 indicators: (i) quotation frequency, (ii) intermediary frequency, (iii) number of operations; and, (iv) traded volume for all securities traded in the aforementioned analysis period. According to this methodology, a total score had to be calculated for each security by summing partial scores obtained for each indicator, scores that had a specific weighting, with quotation frequency being the indicator with the greatest weight in the calculation of the total score. In this sense, the securities with the highest score integrated list 1, and so on, according to the total score obtained, the securities for lists 2 and 3 were completed.
However, SMV Resolution N° 016-2013-SMV/01 (published in July 2013) stipulated that List 4 should only be composed of securities that were not part of lists 1, 2, and 3 of the TVR and that presented a minimum quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%. It would make no sense to approve specific criteria to form List 4, if these only were referential and the Director of Markets could modify the composition of the said list at any moment. The interpretation outlined by the BVL would imply that the regulator had been asked to approve imperative regulations whose observance was left to the free will of those obliged to comply, which is evidently not admissible.
Additionally, as referred to above, it follows from the documents presented by the BVL to modify article 27 of the Operations Regulation and its respective Complementary Provision, that the proposed quotation frequency criterion was not referential and, on the contrary, responded to the purpose of the modification proposal itself.
The BVL highlights that the Constitutional Court ruled as unconstitutional those norms that establish infringing types without expressly determining them and without meeting the characteristics of clarity, precision, and sufficient minimum standards to be understood by a citizen of basic education. In this vein, for the BVL, the infringing type used by the SMV lacks the same characteristics set forth by the Constitutional Court.
What the BVL states lacks foundation because it inadequately applies the Constitutional Court's judgment. We must highlight that the resolution of said Tribunal expressly states that broad factual assumptions that lack minimum standards of precision do not guarantee their recipients a minimum degree of security regarding the set of conducts for which they could be sanctioned. In the present case, the BVL cannot argue that the infringing type imputed by the SMV was so broad and imprecise that it did not allow it to know the conducts for which it could be sanctioned, for the following reasons: (i) the internal regulations and internal provisions of stock exchanges are prepared by the stock exchanges themselves; in the present case, the BVL proposed to establish in the Complementary Provision to article 27 of the Operations Regulation, special parameters to define the securities integrating List 4 of the TVR; (ii) the norms that regulate the preparation of the various lists of the TVR are exclusively addressed to the BVL itself; in this sense, the specialized technicians of the BVL could not be unaware of the existence of the new parameters to determine the securities integrating List 4 of the TVR. We must highlight that the Constitutional Court's judgment in File N° 0020-2015-AA/TC mentions that sanctioning norms (including infringing types) must be sufficiently precise for a citizen of basic education to understand their scope; in the present case, it cannot be argued that BVL officials are citizens of basic education who could not understand the scope of the imputed infringing type, when it is these officials who prepare the internal regulations and subsequently apply them.
Regarding this matter and before evaluating what the BVL states, we must indicate that the appellant is a legal entity authorized by the SMV and as such, must manage its organization and execute its functions with special responsibility and diligence, taking into consideration that it and its businesses are subject to various imperative regulations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is responsible for determining how it internally complies with the general regulations to which it is subject, in the analyzed case, the Operations Regulation. In this vein, it is up to the BVL, acting with ordinary diligence, to foresee and assign tasks, approve internal policies and procedures to safeguard that its internal regulations and complementary provisions are observed.
Regarding the BVL's questioning of numeral 2.6 of the OAJ report, it should be noted that the OAJ does not impute charges, nor does it establish administrative responsibility, because said office is an advisory and not a decision-making body. In this vein, the present pronouncement is limited to referring to data and facts that are in the file or are of public knowledge and that have drawn the attention of this office. Specifically, it should be highlighted that the number of extended repo operations carried out with BVL and CAVALI securities, as well as the name of the stock brokerage firms that participated as intermediaries in said extended repo operations, are contained in Annex 1 of Report N° 347-2014-SMV/10.2, recorded as document N° 5 of the present administrative file. On the other hand, information about the BVL directors who were majority shareholders of the aforementioned stock brokerage firms in July 2013 constitutes public information previously reported to the market by the authorized entities themselves. In conclusion, we consider that its elimination is not appropriate.
Firstly, we must highlight that, through communication dated April 7, 2014, the BVL acknowledged that its Board of Directors had decided to incorporate BVLAC1, BVLBC1, and CAVALIC1 shares into List 4; however, subsequent to said communication, the BVL itself retracted said affirmation and stated that its letter contained a material error and that, in reality, the Director of Markets had ordered the inclusion of the questioned securities in the present procedure, an argument that was dismissed by the SASP.
At this point, we must note that during the speaking session on Monday, August 12, 2019, the General Manager of the BVL, in a transparent attitude that we recognize and commend, and in order to demonstrate that the BVL Board of Directors did not order the inclusion of the questioned securities in List 4, exhibited a simple copy of Board of Directors Meeting Minutes N° 946.13 of July 15, 2013. Subsequently, by means of a letter dated August 19, 2019, and in compliance with what was requested at said hearing, it submitted a copy of the aforementioned minutes, which states that the BVL Board of Directors' Investment Committee informed said collegiate body about the measures and agreements taken at its last session, highlighting the following agreement: “to propose the incorporation of BVLB and CAVALI securities into the new extended repo List 4. However, it was agreed that the BVL would for now maintain its investment policy in repo operations with securities included only in List 1 or 2 of the TVR.”
Now, additionally, the BVL submitted a copy of Investment Committee minutes N° 04-2013 of July 15, 2013; however, said minutes refer only to an agreement to postpone to the next Investment Committee the decision to invest in extended repo operations with CAVALI and/or BVL shares and in case said securities are included in List 4, a list for accredited investors, not coinciding with the text of the Board of Directors meeting minutes of July 15, 2013, previously alluded to.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the aforementioned securities were indeed included in List 4 published on August 9, 2013, even though weeks earlier the BVL Board of Directors itself had proposed that the fundamental parameter for integrating said list be a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%. On the date of the first infraction, the questioned securities showed the following quotation frequency: BVLAC1: 26.4%, BVLBC1: 10.4%, and CAVALIC1: 1.6% (as can be seen, on that date, only the BVLAC1 security showed a quotation frequency greater than 25%, a minimum requirement it would cease to meet on the next two dates when List 4 was published).
It is demonstrated that, in the present case, BVL and CAVALI securities were entered into the new List 4 without taking into consideration that, according to the criteria approved by the BVL Board of Directors itself, the new List 4 could only be composed of securities with a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25% in the previous 6-month period.
In this order of things, we must cite numeral 8 of article 248 of the TUO LPAG, which regulates the principle of causality as follows:
“Article 248.- Principles of administrative sanctioning power
The sanctioning power of all entities is additionally governed by the following special principles:
(...)
8. Causality.- Responsibility must fall on whoever carries out the omissive or active conduct constituting a sanctionable infraction.”
As can be seen, in order to impose an administrative sanction, there must be a causal link between the omissive or active conduct constituting the infraction and the alleged responsible party.
At this point, we must take into account that the BVL is a legal entity that necessarily makes decisions and acts through its competent bodies, for example, in the case of the board of directors, it is composed of natural persons, who decide the course and future of the company. In the present case, the BVL was sanctioned for having infringed what was stipulated in its own internal regulation and the Complementary Provision to article 27 of the Operations Regulation, whose text in force on the date of the commission of the infraction had been proposed by the BVL Board of Directors itself.
Now, regardless of the BVL body that decided to incorporate BVL and CAVALI securities into the new List 4, it is clear that it was the BVL, as a legal entity authorized by the SMV, that included the BVLBC1 and CAVALIC1 securities in List 4, published on August 9, 2013, October 1, 2013, and January 2, 2014, and the BVLAC1 security in the same List 4, published on October 1, 2013, and January 2, 2014, securities that on said dates did not meet the requirement of maintaining a quotation frequency equal to or greater than 25%, thus failing to comply with what was required by the Complementary Provision to article 27 of the Operations Regulation, which had been modified on July 24, 2013, at the request of the BVL itself.
The BVL considers that the responsibility of the infraction falls exclusively on the Director of Markets, as it asserts that, on the date of the commission of the imputed facts, said official had the necessary powers to modify List 4 and that, in this sense, the requirements and parameters contained in the Complementary Provision to article 27 of the Operations Regulation, were only referential, which is not correct, as we have previously indicated; and,
In accordance with the provisions of the Consolidated Text of the Organic Law of the Superintendency of Securities Market, Legislative Decree N° 26126, numeral 26 of article 12 of the Regulations of Organization and Functions of the Superintendency of Securities Market, approved by Supreme Decree N° 216-2011-EF, as well as numeral 2 of article 7 of the “Policy on dissemination of normative projects, general legal norms, regulatory agenda and other administrative acts of the SMV”, approved by SMV Resolution N° 014-2014-SMV/01;
RESOLVES:
Article 1.- Declare the appeal filed by Bolsa de Valores de Lima S.A.A. against Deputy Superintendency Resolution SMV N° 016-2017-SMV/10 of March 23, 2017, unfounded.
Article 2.- Declare the administrative process exhausted.
Article 3.- Transcribe the present resolution to Bolsa de Valores de Lima S.A.A.
Article 4.- Order the dissemination of the present resolution on the Portal of the Superintendency of Securities Market - SMV.
Register, communicate and publish.
José Manuel Peschiera Rebagliati
Superintendent of Securities Market
216.1 Administrative appeals are:
a) Reconsideration appeal
b) Appeal
Only if expressly established by law or legislative decree, is the administrative appeal for review admissible.
216.2 The term for filing appeals is fifteen (15) peremptory days, and they must be resolved within thirty (30) days.
Article 220.- Appeal
An appeal shall be filed when the challenge is based on a different interpretation of the evidence produced or when it concerns purely legal issues, and must be addressed to the same authority that issued the challenged act so that it may elevate the proceedings to the superior hierarchical authority.
5. Text cited in accordance with the modification introduced by SMV Resolution N° 016-2013-SMV/01, published on July 24, 2013.
6. Article 119. Trading Floor Director.- The trading floor is conducted by an official of the exchange, called the Trading Floor Director, whose main function is to ensure that trading in said centralized mechanism is carried out in an orderly, transparent manner and in accordance with the specific regulations on operations and other applicable norms.
In order to perform his functions, the Trading Floor Director has the following powers:
The Trading Floor Director must have functional and administrative autonomy and independence, reports to and exposes to the board of directors or governing council of the respective exchange.
7. Article 5.- Conditions for market management
Market management must comply with the following conditions:
5.1. Have functional and administrative autonomy and independence, reporting or exposing only to the board of directors or governing council of the respective Exchange, when required. Each request made to the Director of Markets must be reported to CONASEV on the next business day after it has been made.
5.2. Have the necessary resources to perform its functions effectively and quickly, including sufficient and competent personnel and adequate technological support.
It is the responsibility of the board of directors or governing council of the respective Exchange to establish the mechanisms and grant the necessary resources to comply with this provision. The Director of Markets must communicate to CONASEV any situation contrary to the conditions established in this article.
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The documents this one cites, and the documents that cite it.
“approved by SMV Resolution N° 014-2014-SMV/01”
“Article 5 of the Market Director's Regulations, approved by CONASEV Resolution No. 098-2010-EF/94.01.1 (hereinafter, DM Regulations)”
“Regulation of the Director of Markets of Stock Exchanges, approved by CONASEV Resolution N° 095-2010-EF/94.01.1”
“Regulations of Organization and Functions of the Superintendency of Securities Market, approved by Supreme Decree N° 216-2011-EF”
“That, by Deputy Superintendent Resolution SMV No. 016-2017-SMV/10 dated March 23, 2017 (hereinafter, RESOLUTION) issued by the Deputy Superintendency of Prudential Supervision (hereinafter, SASP), it was resolved to sanction the BVL”
“SMV Resolution No. 008-2015-SMV/01 expressly included a new methodology that allows the Market Director to withdraw securities from the TVR lists”
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