Individual decision · CFTC · 25 Nov 2014 · CFTC Staff Letter 14-158
The Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight grants conditional no-action relief permitting a provisionally registered swap dealer to establish a Chief Compliance Officer reporting line to its governing body instead of the board of directors or senior officer. This relief allows the Chief Compliance Officer to satisfy consultation and annual meeting requirements under Commission Regulation 3.3 by interacting with the governing body, provided the board or senior officer retains authority over appointment, compensation, and removal. The governing body must observe corporate formalities, and the Chief Compliance Officer must concurrently provide the annual report and a summary of consultations to the board or senior officer.
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, NW, Washington, DC 20581
Telephone: (202) 418-5977
Facsimile: (202) 418-5407 gbarnett@cftc.gov
Division of Swap Dealer and
Intermediary Oversight
Gary Barnett
Director
CFTC Letter No. 14-158
No-action
November 25, 2014
Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight Re: Commodity Exchange Act § 4s(k)(2) and Commission Regulation 3.3 Dear :
This letter is in response to your correspondence, dated September 19, 2014, and multiple telephone conferences (the “Correspondence”) with the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight (“DSIO” or “Division”). In the Correspondence, [Firm X, a provisionally registered swap dealer,] requested that the Division issue a no-action letter stating that it will not recommend that the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) commence an enforcement action against [Firm X] for (i) establishing a reporting line for the chief compliance officer (“CCO”) to its governing body established pursuant to Commission regulation 23.600, (ii) providing that the CCO’s various consultations required under regulation 3.3 are being engaged in with the governing body instead of the board of directors or senior officer, and (iii) having the CCO meet at least annually, and upon his or her election, with the governing body, rather than with the board or senior officer as required under regulation 3.3(a), so long as the CCO is able to meet with the board or senior officer at his or her election, subject to the conditions described below.
I. Background
Section 4s(k) of the CEA and Commission regulation 3.3(a) require a registered swap
dealer (“SD”) or major swap participant (“MSP”) to designate an individual to serve as CCO. The statute provides that the CCO must “report directly to the board or to the senior officer of the [SD/MSP] . . . .”1 CEA Section 4s(k) also assigns the CCO with several duties and expressly provides that for one of those duties – resolving conflicts of interests – the CCO shall consult with the board of directors, a body performing a function similar to the board, or the senior 1 CEA Section 4s(k)(2)(A).
2 officer of the organization.2 Commission regulation 3.3(d) assigns these same duties to the CCO and requires that a number of these duties be accomplished in consultation with the board of directors or the senior officer. 3
Commission regulation 23.600 charges the SD/MSP’s governing body, which may be a body other than the SD/MSP’s board of directors, with the oversight of the SD/MSP’s risk management program.4 As part of that oversight, Commission regulations assign the governing body with certain duties, including without limitation: approving the risk management program,5 setting risk tolerance limits,6 receiving periodic risk exposure reports,7 reviewing the results of the annual review of the risk management program,8 and reviewing the quarterly written report on the SD/MSP’s compliance with position limits.9 Further, because the risk management program is required to be established pursuant to regulation 23.600, the CCO necessarily plays a significant role in the registrant’s compliance with that section. In addition, 2 CEA Section 4s(k)(2)(A)-(G). With the exception of the duty to resolve conflicts of interest, the other duties specifically enumerated under CEA Section 4s(k)(2) are assigned solely to the CCO and include:
3 the CCO’s enumerated duties under regulation 3.3 likely require the CCO to interact with the governing body and risk management unit.10
II. Relief Requested
[Firm X] asserts that given the size and structure of its business, having the CCO report to, and meet and consult with, its governing body, instead of the board of directors or senior officer, is appropriate because it better facilitates the role of the CCO and supports the risk governance and management functions of the swap dealer. Under the requested relief, the CCO would still retain the ability, in his or her discretion, to require a meeting with the board or senior officer. Lastly, the requested relief also provides that the board of directors or senior officer would still be responsible for appointing, approving the compensation of, and making any removal decisions regarding the CCO. In particular, in the Correspondence, [Firm X] made the following representations regarding its operation and structure:
4 dealing activities of the swap dealer and for the oversight of the risk management program would have the benefit of the CCO’s input. For example, in the event of a serious risk management non-compliance issue, the governing body, which oversees the risk management program, and the CCO, who is charged with administering policies and procedures for the handling, responding, remediation and closing of all non-compliance issues,14 would both benefit from each other’s involvement given their respective roles and responsibilities. In contrast, requiring the CCO to consult with the board of directors or senior officer under those circumstances would not yield the same benefits, because although the board and senior officer have overall responsibility for overseeing the firm’s operations, they do not have the same level of direct involvement with the swap dealing business as the governing body, which was established by the board for the purposes of directly overseeing the SD’s risk management program. Similarly, with respect to regulation 3.3’s meeting and consultation requirements, [Firm X] states that the CCO would be able to better contribute valuable insights to, and receive meaningful views from, the governing body, rather than the board of directors or senior officer, who do not have the governing body’s expertise or direct oversight of the firm’s swap dealing business. Accordingly, [Firm X] requests no-action relief to establish a CCO reporting line to the governing body that also retains the CCO’s ability, at his or her discretion, to meet with the board of directors or senior officer, and to provide that the CCO can satisfy the obligation to meet and consult with the board or senior officer under Commission regulations 3.3(a) and 3.3(d) through meeting and consulting with the governing body, rather than the board of directors or senior officer. 15 Importantly, under this reporting line structure, [Firm X] states that, to ensure sufficient CCO independence, the board of directors or senior officer would still be responsible for appointing, approving the compensation of, and making any removal decisions regarding the CCO. In addition, the board of directors or senior officer would continue to receive the CCO annual report and the CCO would continue to be able to meet with the board of directors or senior officer at his or her election.
III. Division No-Action Position
Based on the facts and circumstances as represented by [Firm X], and so long as the conditions stated below are satisfied, DSIO will not recommend that the Commission commence an enforcement action against [Firm X] for (i) establishing a CCO reporting line to the governing body, (ii) providing that the CCO’s various consultations required under regulation 3.3(a) and (d) are being engaged in with the governing body instead of the board of directors or senior officer, and (iii) having the CCO meet at least annually, and upon his or her election, with the governing body, rather than with the board or senior officer as required under regulation 3.3(a). The foregoing relief is subject to the following conditions:
14 See Commission regulation 3.3(d)(1), (4), (5).
15 DSIO notes that having the CCO consult with [Firm X’s] governing body is consistent with the statutory requirement under CEA Section 4s(k)(2)(C) to resolve any conflicts of interest in consultation with the “board of directors, a body performing a function similar to the board, or the senior officer of the organization” because the governing body under regulation 23.600(a)(4)(4) is a body “performing a function similar to the board.”
5
Gary Barnett, Director
Division of Swap Dealer and
Intermediary Oversight
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