Rule · SFC · 20 Nov 2026
Licensed corporations, SFC-licensed virtual asset service providers (licensed firms) and their associated entities must apply enhanced due diligence to high-risk jurisdictions, and effective countermeasures on Iran and greater vigilance and enforcement of countermeasures against the DPRK; for Myanmar, enhanced due diligence proportionate to risk has applied since October 2022. They must check the FATF website for updated statements and give particular attention and extra care to business relationships and transactions associated with higher-risk jurisdictions, applying the special requirements in high risk situations as appropriate.
Circular to Licensed Corporations, SFC-licensed Virtual Asset Service Providers and Associated Entities - Anti-Money Laundering / Counter-Financing of Terrorism (1) FATF Statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action (2) FATF Statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring (3) Outcomes from the FATF Plenary, 28-30 October 2026
2026-11-20
Further to our circular issued on 14 July 20261, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued a statement on High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action on 30 October 2026, which can be found at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/call-for-action-october-2026.html. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from those countries.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The FATF reiterates its concerns over the DPRK’s continued failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing.
While the FATF has continually reiterated since 2011 the need for all countries to robustly implement the targeted financial sanctions in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and apply countermeasures2 to protect their financial systems from the ML/TF/PF threat emanating from DPRK, DPRK has increased connectivity with the international financial system which raises proliferation financing risks3. The FATF therefore calls for greater vigilance and renewed implementation and enforcement of countermeasures against the DPRK, and also urges countries to adequately assess and account for the increased proliferation financing risk given the reported increase in financial connectivity.
Iran
In September 2026, Iran provided an update to the FATF on its efforts to address various items of its FATF action plan. The FATF considers that Iran’s AML/CFT regime continues to have fundamental deficiencies. In particular, Iran’s legal framework does not adequately criminalise terrorist financing and fails to establish a targeted financial sanctions regime in line with the FATF Standards.
The FATF also reiterates its previous assessment and called on Iran to address its deficiencies regarding its ratification of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Conventions). However, in June 2026, the FATF considered that several of Iran’s reservations to these Conventions were overly broad, that Iran’s domestic compliance with these Conventions was not in line with the FATF standards. The FATF also notes that Iran has failed to address the majority of its action plan since 2016.
In addition, the FATF remains concerned with the ongoing terrorist financing and proliferation financing threats emanating from Iran, and reminds all jurisdictions of their obligations under the FATF standards to address the risks emanating from Iran. The FATF also reiterates its call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective countermeasures4 on Iran.
Myanmar
Given Myanmar’s limited progress over the past few years in addressing its strategic deficiencies, the FATF has called on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures5 proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar since October 2022. If no further progress is made by February 2027, the FATF will consider countermeasures.
The FATF has issued an updated statement on Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring6 with the removal of Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Monaco from the list. The statement can be found at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2026.html.
The FATF will closely monitor and continue to assess the progress made by these jurisdictions in addressing the identified strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes and encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented in the statement in their risk analysis. Licensed corporations, SFC-licensed virtual asset service providers (licensed firms) and their associated entities are reminded to visit the website of the FATF for the relevant information, including any updated statements issued by the FATF from time to time.
The FATF also published various outcomes of its recent FATF Plenary which may be relevant to licensed firms and their associated entities. They include:
(a) the agreement to launch a new targeted review and accelerated follow-up processes to support jurisdictions to address gaps in implementation of the FATF Standards on virtual assets and virtual asset service providers more rapidly.7 The results of the targeted review will be published in June and October 2027;
(b) the approval of the publication of a report which examines the end-to-end illicit financial flows linked to scam compounds, which are among the most rapidly expanding forms of organised crime globally, and contribute significantly to rising levels of fraud and associated proceeds. The report was published on 5 November 20268; and
(c) the discussion of its ongoing work to enhance implementation of the risk-based approach by the private sector and public authorities as one of the key FATF priorities to ensure anti-money laundering, counter-financing of terrorism and counter-proliferation financing efforts globally are focused on the greatest risks and outcomes.
Further information on the FATF Plenary’s outcomes can be found at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-october-2026.html.
In addition to the jurisdictions identified by the FATF as highlighted in (1) and (2) above, licensed firms and their associated entities are reminded to give particular attention to, and exercise extra care in respect of, business relationships and transactions associated with jurisdictions posing a higher risk, and to apply the special requirements in high risk situations as appropriate9.
Should you have any queries regarding the contents of this circular, please contact Ms Kiki Wong at 2231 1569 who will assist in referring your queries to the relevant officer.
Intermediaries Division Securities and Futures Commission
End
SFO/IS/048/2026
1 Please refer to our circular issued on 14 July 2026 (https://apps.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/circular/intermediaries/supervision/doc?refNo=26EC39). 2 The countermeasures listed by the FATF include terminating correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, closing any subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks in their countries, and limiting business relationships and financial transactions with DPRK persons. 3 The FATF highlighted that as set out in UNSCR 2270, DPRK frequently uses front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating sanctions. 4 The countermeasures listed by the FATF include: (i) refusing the establishment of subsidiaries or branches or representative offices of financial institutions and virtual asset service providers from the country concerned or otherwise taking into account the fact that the relevant financial institution or virtual asset service provider is from a country that does not have adequate AML/CFT systems; (ii) prohibiting financial institutions and virtual asset service providers from establishing branches or representative offices in the country concerned, or otherwise taking into account the fact that the relevant branch or representative office would be in a country that does not have adequate AML/CFT systems; (iii) limiting business relationships or financial transactions, including virtual asset transactions, with the identified country or persons in the country concerned on a risk basis; and (iv) prohibiting financial institutions and virtual asset service providers from establishing new correspondent relationships and requiring them to undertake a risk-based review of existing correspondent relationships with financial institutions and virtual asset service providers in the country concerned. 5 The FATF requires that as part of enhanced due diligence, financial institutions should increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. 6 The statement sets out the list of jurisdictions that have committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter ML/TF/PF within agreed timeframes and are subject to increased monitoring. 7 The details can be found at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/launch-targeted-review-strengthen-standards-virtual-assets.html. 8 The details can be found at
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/combating-illicit-financial-flows-linked-to-scam-compounds.html. 9 Paragraphs 4.9 and 4.13 of the Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (For Licensed Corporations and SFC-licensed Virtual Asset Service Providers)
Note from RegAlert. AI assistants can read this document in full, and search 70,000+ more, through the RegAlert MCP connector (https://mcp.regalert.today/mcp). Free with an account. How to connect ChatGPT, Claude or Cursor.
More like this from SFC
SFC published 5 documents in the last 30 days. We email you each new one the day it's published.
Source: Securities and Futures Commission Hong Kong — original document · Summary generated with machine assistance and checked by an AI reviewer before publication; the authoritative text is the regulator's original document. How RegAlert works
In RegAlert: added