Investment Adviser Marketing

1Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to the Advisers Act, or any section of the Advisers Act, we are referring to 15 U.S.C. 80b, at which the Advisers Act is codified. When we refer to rules under the Advisers Act, or any section of those rules, we are referring to title 17, part 275 of the Code of Federal Regulations [17 CFR part 275], in which these rules are published. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 17 CFR Part 275 and 279 [Release No. IA–5653; File No. S7–21–19] RIN 3235–AM08 Investment Adviser Marketing AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’ or the ‘‘SEC’’) is adopting amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the ‘‘Advisers Act’’ or the ‘‘Act’’) to update rules that govern investment adviser marketing. The amendments will create a merged rule that will replace both the current advertising and cash solicitation rules. These amendments reflect market developments and regulatory changes since the advertising rule’s adoption in 1961 and the cash solicitation rule’s adoption in 1979. The Commission is also adopting amendments to Form ADV to provide the Commission with additional information about advisers’ marketing practices. Finally, the Commission is adopting amendments to the books and records rule under the Advisers Act. DATES:
Effective date: This rule is effective May 4, 2021. Compliance dates: The applicable compliance dates are discussed in
section II.K.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Juliet Han, Emily Rowland, Aaron Russ, or Christine Schleppegrell, Senior Counsels; Thoreau Bartmann or Melissa Roverts Harke, Senior Special Counsels; or Melissa Gainor, Assistant Director, at (202) 551–6787 or IM-Rules@sec.gov, Investment Adviser Regulation Office, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549–8549. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is adopting amendments to 17 CFR 275.206(4)–1 (rule 206(4)–1) and 17 CFR 275.204–2 (rule 204–2) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80b–1 et seq.],1 and amendments to 17 CFR 279.1 (Form ADV) under the Advisers Act. The Commission is rescinding 17 CFR 275.206(4)–3 (rule 206(4)–3) under the Advisers Act.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
Advertising and Solicitation Rules and Proposed Amendments Merged Marketing Rule
II. Discussion
A. Scope of the Rule: Definition of ‘‘Advertisement’’
1. Overview
2. Definition of Advertisement:
Communications Other Than Compensated Testimonials and Endorsements
3. Definition of Advertisement:
Compensated Testimonials and Endorsements, Including Solicitations
4. Investors in Private Funds
B. General Prohibitions
1. Untrue Statements and Omissions
2. Unsubstantiated Material Statements of
Fact
3. Untrue or Misleading Implications or
Inferences
4. Failure To Provide Fair and Balanced
Treatment of Material Risks or Material Limitations
5. Anti-Cherry Picking Provisions:
References to Specific Investment Advice and Presentation of Performance Results
6. Otherwise Materially Misleading
C. Conditions Applicable to Testimonials
and Endorsements, Including Solicitations
1. Overview
2. Required Disclosures
3. Adviser Oversight and Compliance
4. Disqualification for Persons Who Have
Engaged in Misconduct
5. Exemptions
D. Third-Party Ratings
E. Performance Advertising
1. Net Performance Requirement;
Elimination of Proposed Schedule of Fees Requirement
2. Prescribed Time Periods
3. Statements About Commission Approval
4. Related Performance
5. Extracted Performance
6. Hypothetical Performance
F. Portability of Performance, Testimonials, Endorsements, Third-Party Ratings, and Specific Investment Advice G. Review and Approval of Advertisements H. Amendments to Form ADV
I. Recordkeeping
J. Existing Staff No-Action Letters K. Transition Period and Compliance Date
L. Other Matters
III. Economic Analysis
A. Introduction
B. Broad Economic Considerations
C. Baseline
1. Market for Investment Advisers for the
Advertising Rule
2. Market for Solicitation Activity
3. RIA Clients
D. Costs and Benefits of the Final Rule and Form Amendments
1. Quantitative Estimates of Costs and
Benefits
2. Definition of Advertisement
3. General Prohibitions
4. Conditions Applicable to Testimonials
and Endorsements, Including Solicitations
5. Third-Party Ratings
6. Performance Advertising
7. Amendments to Form ADV
8. Recordkeeping
E. Efficiency, Competition, Capital Formation
1. Efficiency
2. Competition
3. Capital Formation
F. Reasonable Alternatives
1. Reduce or Eliminate Specific Limitations
on Investment Adviser Advertisements
2. Bifurcate Some Requirements
3. Hypothetical Performance Alternatives
4. Alternatives to the Combined Marketing
Rule
5. Alternatives to Disqualification
Provisions
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
A. Introduction
B. Rule 206(4)–1
1. General Prohibitions
2. Testimonials and Endorsements in
Advertisements
3. Third-Party Ratings in Advertisements
4. Performance Advertising
5. Total Hour Burden Associated With Rule
206(4)–1
C. Rule 206(4)–3
D. Rule 204–2
E. Form ADV
V. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
A. Reason for and Objectives of the Final Amendments
1. Final Rule 206(4)–1
2. Final Rule 204–2
3. Final Amendments to Form ADV
B. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
C. Legal Basis
D. Small Entities Subject to the Rule and Rule Amendments
1. Small Entities Subject to Amendments to
Marketing Rule
2. Small Entities Subject to Amendments to
the Books and Records Rule 204–2
3. Small Entities Subject to Amendments to
Form ADV
E. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements
1. Final Rule 206(4)–1
2. Final Amendments to Rule 204–2
3. Final Amendments to Form ADV
F. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
1. Final Rule 206(4)–1
2. Final Amendments to Form ADV
G. Significant Alternatives
1. Final Rule 206(4)–1
Statutory Authority
Appendix A: Changes to Form ADV
Appendix B: Form ADV Glossary of Terms
I. Introduction
We are adopting an amended rule, rule 206(4)–1, under the Advisers Act, which addresses advisers marketing their services to clients and investors (the ‘‘marketing rule’’). The marketing rule amends existing rule 206(4)–1 (the ‘‘advertising rule’’), which we adopted

2Advertisements by Investment Advisers, Release No. IA–121 (Nov. 1, 1961) [26 FR 10548 (Nov. 9, 1961)] (‘‘Advertising Rule Adopting Release’’). 3See Requirements Governing Payments of Cash Referral Fees by Investment Advisers, Release No. 688 (July 12, 1979) [44 FR 42126 (Jul 18, 1979)] (‘‘1979 Adopting Release’’). 4The advertising rule has been amended once, when the Commission revised the introductory text of paragraph (a) as part of a broader amendment of several rules under the Advisers Act to reflect changes made by the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. IA–1633 (May 15, 1997) [62 FR 28112, 28135 (May 22, 1997)] (‘‘Release 1633’’). We have not amended the solicitation rule since adoption. 5The final rule covers marketing activities by investment advisers to clients and prospective clients as well as investors and prospective investors in private funds that those advisers manage. See 15 U.S.C. 80b–2(a)(29) (defining a ‘‘private fund’’ as ‘‘an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act’’). Unless we specify otherwise, for purposes of this release, we refer to any of these persons generally as ‘‘investors,’’ and we refer specifically to investors in private funds managed by those advisers as ‘‘private fund investors.’’ 6While we traditionally referred to those who engaged in compensated solicitation activity under the current solicitation rule as ‘‘solicitors,’’ we use the term ‘‘promoter’’ in this release to refer to a person providing a testimonial or endorsement, whether compensated or uncompensated. We also use the term ‘‘provider’’ at times when discussing a person providing an uncompensated testimonial or endorsement. 7See Investment Adviser Advertisements; Compensation for Solicitations, Release No. IA– 5407 (Nov. 4, 2019) [84 FR 67518 (Dec. 10, 2019)] (‘‘2019 Proposing Release’’). in 1961 to target advertising practices that the Commission believed were likely to be misleading.2 The rule also replaces rule 206(4)–3 (the ‘‘solicitation rule’’), which we adopted in 1979 to help ensure clients are aware that paid solicitors who refer them to advisers have a conflict of interest.3 We have not substantively updated either rule since adoption.4 In the decades since the adoption of both rules, however, advertising and referral practices have evolved. Simultaneously, the technology used for communications has advanced, the expectations of investors shopping for advisory services have changed, and the profiles of the investment advisory industry have diversified. Our marketing rule recognizes these changes and our experience administering the advertising and solicitation rules. Accordingly, the rule contains principles-based provisions designed to accommodate the continual evolution and interplay of technology and advice. The rule also
contains tailored restrictions and requirements for certain types of advertisements, such as performance advertising, testimonials and endorsements, and third-party ratings. Compensated testimonials and endorsements, which include traditional referral and solicitation activity, will be subject to disqualification provisions. We believe the final marketing rule will allow advisers to provide existing and prospective investors with useful information as they choose among investment advisers and advisory services, subject to conditions that are reasonably designed to prevent fraud. Finally, we are adopting related amendments to Form ADV that are designed to provide the Commission with additional information about advisers’ marketing practices, and related amendments to the Advisers Act books and records rule, rule 204–2. Advertising and Solicitation Rules and Proposed Amendments Advertisements can provide existing and prospective investors with useful information as they contemplate whether to utilize and pay for investment advisory services, whether to approach particular investment advisers, and how to choose among their available options. At the same time, advertisements present risks of misleading investors because an investment adviser’s interest in attracting investors may conflict with the investors’ interests, and the adviser is in control of the design, content, format, media, timing, and placement of its advertisements. As a consequence, advertisements may mislead existing and prospective investors about the advisory services they will receive, including indirectly through the services provided to private funds.5 The advertising rule was designed to address the potential harm to investors from misleading advertisements. Advisers also attract investors by compensating individuals or firms to solicit new investors. Some investment advisers directly employ individuals to solicit new investors on their behalf, and some investment advisers arrange for related entities or third parties, such as broker-dealers, to solicit new investors. The person or entity compensated has a financial incentive to recommend the adviser to the investor.6 Without appropriate disclosure, this compensation creates a risk that an investor would mistakenly view the recommendation as being an unbiased opinion about the adviser’s ability to manage the investor’s assets and would rely on that recommendation more than the investor would if the investor knew of the incentive. The solicitation rule was designed to help expose to clients the conflicts of interest posed by cash compensation. The concerns that motivated the Commission to adopt the advertising and solicitation rules still exist today, but investment adviser marketing has evolved with advances in technology. In the decades since the adoption of both the advertising and solicitation rules, the use of the internet, mobile applications, and social media has become an integral part of business communications.
Consumers today often rely on these forms of communication to obtain information, including reviews and referrals, when considering buying goods and services. Advisers and third parties also rely on these same types of outlets to attract and refer potential customers. The nature and profiles of the investment advisory industry and investors seeking those advisory services have also changed since the Commission adopted the advertising and solicitation rules. Some investors today rely on digital investment advisory programs, sometimes referred to as ‘‘robo-advisers,’’ for investment advice, which is provided exclusively through electronic platforms using algorithmic-based programs. In addition, passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’) required many investment advisers to private funds that were previously exempt from registration to register with the Commission and become subject to additional provisions of the Advisers Act and the rules thereunder. Private funds and their advisers often hire promoters to obtain investors in the funds. Referral practices also have expanded to include, for example, various types of compensation, including non-cash compensation, in referral arrangements. In light of these developments, we proposed amendments to the advertising rule to: (i) Modify the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ to be more ‘‘evergreen’’ in light of ever￾changing technology; (ii) replace four per se prohibitions with general prohibitions of certain advertising practices applicable to all advertisements; (iii) provide certain restrictions and conditions on testimonials, endorsements, and third￾party ratings; and (iv) include tailored requirements for the presentation of performance results, based on an advertisement’s intended audience.7

8The comment letters on the 2019 Proposing Release (File No. S7–21–19) are available at https:// www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-19/s72119.htm. 9The feedback forms are available in the comment file at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7- 21-19/s72119.htm. 10See, e.g., Comment Letter of Wellington Management Company LLP (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Wellington Comment Letter’’); Comment Letter of Fidelity Management Research Company LLC (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Fidelity Comment Letter’’); 11See, e.g., Comment Letter of Investment Adviser Association (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘IAA Comment Letter’’); Comment Letter of the National Society of Compliance Professionals (Feb. 7, 2020) (‘‘NSCP Comment Letter’’). 12See, e.g., Comment Letter of LinkedIn Corporation (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘LinkedIn Comment Letter’’); Comment Letter of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘NASAA Comment Letter’’). 13See, e.g., Comment Letter of Financial Services Institute (Feb. 12, 2020) (‘‘FSI Comment Letter’’); Comment Letter of SIFMA Asset Management Group on proposed solicitation rule (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I’’). 14See, e.g., Comment Letter of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Fried Frank Comment Letter’’); Comment Letter of Sidley Austin LLP (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Sidley Austin Comment Letter’’). 15See, e.g., Comment Letter of Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Credit Suisse Comment Letter’’); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 16See, e.g., Comment Letter of the Small Business Investor Alliance (Feb. 7, 2020) (‘‘SBIA Comment Letter’’); Comment Letter of the Consumer Federation of America (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Consumer Federation Comment Letter’’). 17See, e.g., Comment Letter of SIFMA Asset Management Group on proposed advertising rule (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II’’); Comment Letter of Joseph H. Nesler (Jan. 15, 2020) (‘‘Nesler Comment Letter’’). 18See e.g., FSI Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 19See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Comment Letter of Mercer Advisors (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Mercer Comment Letter’’). See also FSI Comment Letter. 20See e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; FSI Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; Comment Letter of the Money Management Institute (Feb. 10,
2020) (‘‘MMI Comment Letter’’); Nesler Comment
Letter.
21The final rule will apply to all investment advisers registered, or required to be registered, with the Commission. Like the proposal, the final rule will not apply to advisers that are not required to register as investment advisers with the Commission, such as exempt reporting advisers or state-registered advisers. 22Hypothetical performance information that is provided in response to an unsolicited investor request or to a private fund investor in a one-on￾one communication is excluded from the first prong of the definition of advertisement. The proposed rule also would have required internal review and approval of most advertisements. Finally, we proposed amendments requiring each adviser to report additional information regarding its advertising practices in its Form ADV. Additionally, we proposed amendments to the solicitation rule to:
(i) Expand the rule to cover solicitation arrangements involving all forms of compensation, rather than only cash compensation; (ii) expand the rule to apply to the solicitation of current and prospective investors in any private fund, rather than only to ‘‘clients’’ (including prospective clients) of the investment adviser; (iii) eliminate requirements duplicative of other rules; (iv) include exceptions for de minimis payments and certain non-profit programs; and (v) expand the types of disciplinary events that would trigger the rule’s disqualification provisions. We received more than 90 comment letters on the proposal.8 The Commission also received feedback flyers from individual investors on investment adviser marketing and from smaller advisers on the proposal’s effects on small entities.9 Commenters generally supported modernizing these rules and agreed with our general approach. Many commenters, however, expressed concern that several aspects of the proposed amendments to the advertising rule would increase an investment adviser’s compliance burden.10 For example, some commenters suggested removing the proposed internal pre-use review and approval requirement and narrowing the proposed definition of ‘‘advertisement.’’ 11 Others requested that we provide additional guidance on various topics, such as how the general prohibitions will apply in certain scenarios.12 Commenters also expressed concern that the proposed amendments to the solicitation rule would significantly expand several aspects of the existing rule. For example, some commenters argued that the proposed definition of ‘‘solicitor’’ was too broad and suggested alternatives or limitations.13 Others disagreed with the proposed expansion of the rule to include non-cash compensation and solicitations of private fund investors.14 Commenters also recommended modifications to the disqualification provisions, such as aligning them with disqualification provisions in our other rules and limiting the scope of affiliate disqualification.15 Commenters generally supported our approach to permit testimonials and endorsements; 16 however, they highlighted the difficulty in assessing when compensated testimonials and endorsements under the proposed advertising rule would also trigger the application of the proposed solicitation rule.17 Commenters argued that applying both rules to the same conduct is duplicative and burdensome.18 Some commenters suggested that we regulate endorsements and testimonials only under the advertising rule,19 whereas others suggested various ways to limit the conduct that would be subject to both rules.20 Merged Marketing Rule After considering comments, we are adopting a rule with several modifications.21 We believe it is appropriate to regulate investment adviser advertising and solicitation activity through a single rule: The marketing rule. This approach is designed to balance the Commission’s goals of protecting investors from misleading advertisements and
solicitations, while accommodating current marketing practices and their continued evolution.

• The final marketing rule will
  include an expanded definition of ‘‘advertisement,’’ relative to the current advertising rule, that will encompass an investment adviser’s marketing activity for investment advisory services with regard to securities. We have determined not to expand the definition of advertisement to include communications addressed to one person as proposed, and instead will retain the current rule’s exclusion of one-on-one communications from the definition, except with regard to compensated testimonials and endorsements and certain communications that include hypothetical performance information.22 In addition, the definition will not include communications designed to retain existing investors. The final definition also will include exceptions for extemporaneous, live, oral communications; and information contained in a statutory or regulatory notice, filing, or other required communication.
• Largely as proposed, the final rule
  will apply to certain communications sent to clients and private fund investors, but will not apply to advertisements about registered investment companies or business development companies.
• A set of seven principles-based
  general prohibitions will apply to all advertisements. These are drawn from historic anti-fraud principles under the Federal securities laws and are tailored specifically to the type of communications that are within the scope of the rule.
• The final rule will permit an
  adviser’s advertisement to include testimonials and endorsements, subject generally to the following conditions:
  Required disclosures; adviser oversight and compliance, including a written

23See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i) and (ii). 24See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i). 25See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i)(A) and (B). 26See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii). As discussed below, uncompensated testimonials and endorsements that are included in certain adviser communications would meet the first prong of the definition of advertisement. See infra ‘‘Adoption and entanglement’’ section. 27See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii). 28See, e.g., SBIA Comment Letter; Consumer Federation Comment Letter; Comment Letter of the Institutional Limited Partners Association (Feb. 10,
2020) (‘‘ILPA Comment Letter’’).
29See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter; Pickard Djinis Comment Letter; Comment Letter of Managed Funds Association and Alternative Investment Management Association (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘MFA/ AIMA Comment Letter I’’). 30See, e.g., Fidelity Comment Letter; NSCP Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 31See, e.g., NYC Bar Comment Letter; Comment Letter of the Financial Planning Association (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘FPA Comment Letter’’). agreement for certain promoters; and, in some cases, disqualification provisions. We are adopting partial exemptions for de minimis compensation, affiliated personnel, registered broker-dealers, and certain persons to the extent they are covered by rule 506(d) of Regulation D under the Securities Act with respect to a securities offering.

• An adviser’s advertisement may
  include a third-party rating, if the adviser forms a reasonable belief that the third-party rating clearly and prominently discloses certain information.
• The final rule will apply to
  performance advertising and will require presentation of net performance information whenever gross performance is presented, and performance data over specific periods. In addition, the final rule will impose requirements on advisers that display related performance, extracted performance, hypothetical performance, and—in a change from the proposal— predecessor performance. We are not adopting, however, the proposed separate requirements for performance advertising for retail and non-retail investors.
• We are amending the recordkeeping
  rule and Form ADV to reflect the final rule and enhance the data available to support our staff’s enforcement and examination functions.
• In a change from the proposal, the
  final rule will not require investment advisers to review and approve their advertisements prior to dissemination.
• Finally, certain staff no-action
  letters will be withdrawn in connection with the final rule as those positions are either incorporated into the final rule or will no longer apply.
  II. Discussion
  A. Scope of the Rule: Definition of ‘‘Advertisement’’

1. Overview
   Under the final marketing rule, the definition of an advertisement includes two prongs.23 The first prong includes any direct or indirect communication an investment adviser makes that: (i) Offers the investment adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities to prospective clients or investors in a private fund advised by the investment adviser (‘‘private fund investors’’), or (ii) offers new investment advisory services with regard to securities to current clients or private fund investors.24 This prong will capture traditional advertising, and will not include one-on-one communications, unless the communication includes hypothetical performance information that is not provided: (i) In response to an unsolicited investor request or (ii) to a private fund investor. It also excludes (i) extemporaneous, live, oral communications; and (ii) information contained in a statutory or regulatory notice, filing, or other required communication, provided that such information is reasonably designed to satisfy the requirements of such notice, filing, or other required communication.25 The new second prong will cover compensated testimonials and endorsements, which will include a similar scope of activity as traditional solicitations under the current solicitation rule.26 This prong will include oral communications and one￾on-one communications to capture traditional one-on-one solicitation activity, in addition to solicitations for non-cash compensation. It will exclude certain information contained in a statutory or regulatory notice, filing, or other required communication.27
2. Definition of Advertisement:
   Communications Other Than Compensated Testimonials and Endorsements Proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(1) would have defined an advertisement as any communication, disseminated by any means, by or on behalf of an investment adviser, that offers or promotes the investment adviser’s investment advisory services or that seeks to obtain or retain one or more investment advisory clients or private fund investors, subject to certain enumerated exclusions. Although some commenters supported the proposed definition,28 most commenters stated that it was overly broad.29 Some commenters stated that the proposed definition would chill adviser communications to existing investors, increase compliance burdens for advisers, and complicate communications with various third parties.30 After considering comments, we are making several modifications to hone the scope of the rule to the communications that have a greater risk of misleading investors, ease compliance burdens that commenters suggested would result from the proposed rule’s scope, and facilitate communications with existing investors. a. Specific Provisions In a textual (but not substantive) change from the proposal, the final rule will not include the phrase ‘‘disseminated by any means’’ and instead will reference any direct or indirect communication the adviser makes. We believe these two formulations carry the same meaning, but understand from commenters that the phrase ‘‘direct or indirect’’ is more familiar to advisers. This reference to direct or indirect communications will replace the current advertising rule’s requirement that an advertisement be a ‘‘written’’ communication or a notice or other announcement ‘‘by radio or television.’’ We are deleting references in the current advertising rule to specific types of communications to ensure that the final rule reflects modern communication methods, rather than the methods that were most common when the Commission adopted the current rule (e.g., newspapers, television, and radio). Commenters generally did not oppose omitting the current rule’s references to specific methods of communication and supported such modernization of the current rule.31 This revision will expand the scope of the current rule to encompass all offers of an investment adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities regardless of how they are disseminated, with the limited exceptions discussed below. An adviser may disseminate such communications through emails, text messages, instant messages, electronic presentations, videos, films, podcasts, digital audio or video files, blogs, billboards, and all manner of social media, as well as by paper, including in newspapers, magazines, and the mail. We recognize that electronic media (including social media and other internet communications) and mobile communications play a significant role in current advertising practices. We also believe this revision will help the

32See infra ‘‘Adoption and entanglement’’
section.
33See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(1).
34See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; FSI Comment Letter; Comment Letter of the CFA Institute (Feb. 24, 2020) (‘‘CFA Institute Comment Letter’’); Comment Letter of ICE Data Pricing & Reference Data, LLC (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘ICE Comment Letter’’). 35See, e.g., LinkedIn Comment Letter; Comment Letter of Resolute Investment Managers (Feb. 10,
2020) (‘‘Resolute Comment Letter’’); IAA Comment
Letter.
36See, e.g., Comment Letter of the American Investment Council (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘AIC Comment Letter’’); Nesler Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 37Section 208 of the Advisers Act states that ‘‘[i]t shall be unlawful for any person indirectly, or through or by any other person, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do directly . . .’’ See, e.g., In the Matter of Profitek, Inc., Release No. IA–1764 (Sept. 29, 1998) (settled order) (The Commission brought an enforcement action against an investment adviser, asserting that it directly or indirectly distributed materially false and misleading advertisements, including by submitting performance information in questionnaires submitted to online databases that were made available to subscribers nationwide and by providing misleading performance information to a newspaper that reported the performance in an
article.).
38See infra ‘‘Adoption and entanglement’’
section.
39An adviser’s ‘‘related person’’ is defined in Form ADV’s Glossary of Terms as ‘‘[a]ny advisory affiliate and any person that is under common control with [the adviser’s] firm.’’ Italicized terms are defined in the Form ADV Glossary. See Form ADV Glossary. 40However, the adviser will remain responsible for the accuracy of the marketing material provided to and disseminated by the third party even if the third party makes formatting changes that do not affect the content of that marketing material or prominence of particular disclosures therein. 41See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter; Comment Letter of JG Advisory Services, LLC (Jan. 9, 2020) (‘‘JG Advisory Comment Letter’’). 42 In this discussion, the acquiring fund adviser (or the adviser to, or sponsor of, a feeder fund in a master-feeder structure) generally would be treated as an intermediary and not as an investor in the underlying fund (or the master fund in a master-feeder structure). definition remain evergreen in the face of evolving technology and methods of communication.
i. Any Direct or Indirect Communication
an Investment Adviser Makes The first prong of the final marketing rule’s definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ includes an adviser’s direct or indirect communications. In addition to communicating directly with prospective investors, we understand that investment advisers often provide intermediaries, such as consultants, other advisers (e.g., in a fund-of-funds or feeder funds structure), and promoters, with advertisements for dissemination. Those advertisements are indirect communications because they are statements provided by the adviser for dissemination by a third party. This aspect of the definition also will capture certain communications distributed by an adviser that incorporate statements or other content prepared by a third party.32 The final rule text reflects a change from the proposal, which would have applied to any communications ‘‘by or on behalf of’’ an adviser.33 Commenters generally suggested that we remove the ‘‘on behalf of’’ clause from the definition, citing concerns that advisers would not be able to collaborate with third parties to prepare and disseminate advertising materials and that it would stifle communications between advisers and certain third parties.34 Certain commenters requested safe harbors for communications with the press and removal of profane or illegal materials.35 Commenters also requested clarification on how the rule would apply to funds￾of-funds, model providers, solicitors, and employee use of social media.36 We believe communications that investment advisers use to offer their advisory services have an equal potential to mislead—and should be subject to the rule—regardless of whether the adviser communicates directly or indirectly through a third party, such as a consultant, intermediary, or related person.37 Likewise, an adviser should not be able to avoid application of the rule when it incorporates third-party content into its communications.38 To address commenters’ concerns about the clarity of the standard, however, we replaced ‘‘on behalf of’’ with ‘‘directly or indirectly.’’ Our view is that these phrases largely have the same meaning, but that ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ is more commonly used, broadly understood, and consistent with the language in the current rule. In addition, we believe that the phrase ‘‘direct or indirect communication an investment adviser makes’’ better focuses on an adviser’s participation in making a particular communication subject to the rule. Whether a particular communication is a communication made by the adviser is a facts and circumstances determination. Where the adviser has participated in the creation or dissemination of an advertisement, or where an adviser has authorized a communication, the communication would be a communication of the adviser. For example, if an adviser provides marketing material to a third party for dissemination to potential investors, the communication is a communication made by the adviser. In addition, we would generally view any
advertisement about the adviser that is distributed and/or prepared by a related person as an indirect communication by the adviser, and thus subject to the final rule.39 Although the final marketing rule will not require an adviser to oversee all activities of a third party, the adviser is responsible for ensuring that its advertisements comply with the rule, regardless of who creates or disseminates them. An adviser might collaborate with a third party to prepare marketing materials in other circumstances that would not constitute dissemination by an adviser. If an adviser provides comments on a marketing piece, but a third party does not accept the adviser’s comments or the third party makes unauthorized modifications, the adviser will not be responsible for the third party’s subsequent modifications that were made independently of the adviser and that the adviser did not approve.40 This analysis would be based on the facts and circumstances. Formal authorization of dissemination, or lack thereof, by the adviser is not dispositive, although it would be considered part of the analysis. Commenters sought clarification on how the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ would apply in the fund-of-funds and master-feeder contexts.41 If an adviser to an underlying fund provides marketing materials to the adviser of a fund-of￾funds (or a feeder fund) and the adviser to the fund-of-funds (or a feeder fund) provides those materials to investors, the underlying fund adviser would be responsible for the material it prepared or authorized for distribution.42 The underlying fund adviser would not be responsible for modifications the adviser of the fund-of-funds made to the underlying fund adviser’s original advertisement if the underlying fund adviser did not approve the adviser’s edits. Similarly, a third-party model provider would not be responsible for modifications the end-user adviser made to the third-party model used in an advertisement if done without the model provider’s involvement or authorization. Adoption and Entanglement Depending on the particular facts and circumstances, third-party information also may be attributable to an adviser under the first prong of the final rule. For example, an adviser may distribute information generated by a third party or a third party could include information about an adviser’s investment advisory services in the third party’s materials. In these scenarios, whether the third-party information is attributable to the adviser

43See Interpretive Guidance on the Use of Company websites, Release No. IC–28351 (Aug. 1,
2008) [73 FR 45862 (Aug. 7, 2008)] (‘‘2008 Release’’)
(‘‘[W]hether third-party information is attributable to a company depends upon whether the company has: (1) involved itself in the preparation of the information, or (2) explicitly or implicitly endorsed or approved the information.’’); Use of Electronic Media, Release No. 34–42728 (Apr. 28, 2000) [65 FR 25843 (May 4, 2000)] (‘‘2000 Release’’) at nn.52, 54; Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Release No. 34–36345 (Oct. 6, 1995) [60 FR 53458 (Oct. 13, 1995)] (‘‘1995 Release’’). 44See 2008 Release, supra footnote 43. 45See, e.g., In the Matter of BB&T Securities, LLC, Release No. IA–4506 (Aug. 25, 2016) (settled order) (The Commission brought an enforcement action against an SEC-registered investment adviser alleging that it negligently relied on a third party’s materially inflated, and hypothetical and backtested, performance track record in preparing advertisements that the adviser sent to advisory clients and prospective clients.). 46See infra section II.B. 47See 2000 Release, supra footnote 43 (‘‘[L]iability under the ‘entanglement’ theory would depend upon an issuer’s level of pre-publication involvement in the preparation of the information.’’). 48For example, an adviser could not have a policy to remove only negative comments about the adviser. 49We previously stated that an adviser should consider the application of rule 206(4)–1, including the existing prohibition of testimonials, before including hyperlinks to third-party websites on its website or in its electronic communications. See 2008 Release, supra footnote 43. 50Other content that offers or promotes the adviser’s services on an adviser’s own website or social media page would likely meet the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ under the final rule. 51See supra ‘‘Adoption and entanglement’’
section (discussing an adviser’s ability to edit third￾party material based on objective criteria).
52See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; LinkedIn Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. We believe that our modifications to the first prong of the definition of advertisement also will alleviate commenters’ concerns as there are now fewer scenarios in which communications on employee social media accounts would meet the definition of advertisement. will require an analysis of the facts and circumstances to determine (i) whether the adviser has explicitly or implicitly endorsed or approved the information after its publication (adoption) or (ii) the extent to which the adviser has involved itself in the preparation of the information (entanglement).43 An adviser ‘‘adopts’’ third-party information when it explicitly or implicitly endorses or approves the information.44 For example, if an adviser incorporates information it receives from a third party into its performance advertising, the adviser has adopted the third-party content, and the third-party content will be attributed to the adviser.45 An adviser is liable for such third-party content under the marketing rule just as it would be liable for content it produced itself.46 In addition, an adviser may have ‘‘entangled’’ itself in a third-party communication if the adviser involves itself in the third party’s preparation of the information.47 Nevertheless, we would not view an adviser’s edits to an existing third-party communication to result in attribution of that communication to the adviser if the adviser edits a third party’s communication based on pre￾established, objective criteria (i.e., editing to remove profanity, defamatory or offensive statements, threatening language, materials that contain viruses or other harmful components, spam, unlawful content, or materials that infringe on intellectual property rights, or editing to correct a factual error) that are documented in the adviser’s policies and procedures and that are not designed to favor or disfavor the adviser.48 In these circumstances, we would not view the adviser as endorsing or approving the remaining content by virtue of such limited editing. Guidance on Social Media Questions about whether a communication is attributable to an adviser may commonly arise in the context of an adviser’s use of websites or other social media. For example, an adviser might include a hyperlink in an advertisement to an independent web
page on which third-party content sits.
An adviser should consider the adoption and entanglement concepts discussed above to determine whether the hyperlinked third-party content would be attributed to the adviser.49 At the same time, an adviser’s hyperlink to third-party content that the adviser knows or has reason to know contains an untrue statement of material fact or materially misleading information would also be fraudulent or deceptive under section 206 of the Act and other applicable anti-fraud provisions. Whether content posted by third parties on an adviser’s own website or social media page would be attributed to the investment adviser also depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the adviser’s involvement.50 For example, permitting all third parties to post public commentary to the adviser’s website or social media page would not, by itself, render such content attributable to the adviser, so long as the adviser does not selectively delete or alter the comments or their presentation and is not involved in the preparation of the content.51 We believe such treatment of third-party content on the adviser’s own website or social media
page is appropriate even if the adviser
has the ability to influence the commentary but does not exercise this authority. For example, if the social media platform allows the investment adviser to sort the third-party content in such a way that more favorable content appears more prominently, but the investment adviser does not actually do such sorting, then the ability to sort content would not, by itself, render such content attributable to the adviser. In addition, if an adviser merely permits the use of ‘‘like,’’ ‘‘share,’’ or ‘‘endorse’’ features on a third-party website or social media platform, we would not interpret the adviser’s permission as implicating the final rule. Conversely, if the investment adviser takes affirmative steps to involve itself in the preparation or presentation of the comments, to endorse or approve the comments, or to edit posted comments, those comments would be attributed to the adviser. This would apply to the affirmative steps an adviser takes both on its own website or social media pages, as well as on third-party websites. For example, if an adviser substantively modifies the presentation of comments posted by others by deleting or suppressing negative comments or prioritizing the display of positive comments, then we would attribute the comments to the adviser (i.e., the communication would be an indirect statement of the adviser) because the adviser would have modified third-party comments with the goal of marketing its advisory business. However, as discussed above, we would not view an adviser’s merely editing profane, unlawful, or other such content according to a neutral pre-existing policy as the adviser adopting the content. Some commenters sought assurances that the definition of advertisement would not cover an adviser’s associated persons’ activity on their personal social media accounts.52 We have concerns that, under certain circumstances, it could be difficult for an investor to differentiate a communication of the associated person in his/her personal capacity from a communication the associated person made for the adviser. With respect to social media postings to associated persons’ own accounts, it would be a facts and circumstances analysis relating to the adviser’s supervision and compliance efforts. If the adviser adopts and implements policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the use of an associated person’s social media accounts for marketing the adviser’s advisory services, we generally would not view such communication as the adviser marketing its advisory

53An associated person who, notwithstanding these policies and procedures, engages in communications inconsistent with the rule may, depending on the facts and circumstances, be held responsible for violations of the rule. 54See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; AICPA Comment Letter. 55See, e.g., Comment Letter of Commonwealth Financial Network (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Commonwealth Comment Letter’’) (stating that the lack of complete overlap with FINRA rules would make compliance especially burdensome for dual registrants); Comment Letter of the National Regulatory Services (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘NRS Comment Letter’’). Commenters also noted that advisers have adopted long-standing practices in reliance on the existing exclusion of one-on-one communications. See, e.g., Comment Letter of the New York City Bar (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘NYC Bar Comment Letter’’). 56See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter (stating that the proposed rule ‘‘would blur the line between client servicing and marketing’’); Wellington Comment Letter; Fidelity Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 57See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter; Comment Letter of the Council of Institutional Investors (Feb. 11, 2020) (‘‘CII Comment Letter’’). 58See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 59As discussed below, we also have eliminated the element of the proposed rule that would apply to communications to retain investors. 60See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii). We proposed to exclude from the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ any communication by an investment adviser ‘‘that does no more than respond to an unsolicited request’’ for ‘‘information specified in such request about the investment adviser or its services’’ other than a communication to a retail person that includes performance results or a communication that includes hypothetical performance. 61See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter; MFA/ AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter. 62See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i)(A)–(C). 63See Prohibited Advertisements, Release No. IA–119 (Aug. 8, 1961) [26 FR 7552, 7553 (Nov. 15, 1961)]. 64 Id. 65See, e.g., section 206 of the Act; rule 206(4)– 8 under the Act. 66See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter (stating that the Commission should ‘‘make clear in the adopting release that the same communication to multiple natural persons representing a single institution or client/account counts as a communication to a single person’’). 67See, e.g., rule 30e–1(f) under the Investment Company Act. 68See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter (suggesting the more than 25 person threshold because FINRA rule 2210 uses this approach and stating that consistency would ease compliance burdens). 69See, e.g., FPA Comment Letter. services.53 To achieve effective supervision and compliance, an adviser may consider also prohibiting such communications, conducting periodic training, obtaining attestations, and periodically reviewing content that is publicly available on associated persons’ social media accounts.
ii. To More Than One Person
Consistent with the current rule’s exclusion of one-on-one communications, the first prong of the final definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ generally does not include communications to one person. While our proposed rule would have treated communications directed to ‘‘one or more’’ persons as advertisements, commenters generally opposed this expansion.54 In particular, commenters argued that subjecting one-on-one communications to the requirements of the proposed rule would create untenable burdens given the proposed review and approval obligation (including enhanced recordkeeping requirements).55 Commenters also stated that it would chill adviser/ investor communications.56 According to commenters, scoping a one-on-one communication into the rule would require advisers to review each communication to determine whether it is an advertisement, which could prevent an adviser from providing timely information to investors and satisfying its fiduciary obligations.57 We received comments that communications to existing investors are already subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act, and therefore communications to existing investors need not be subject to the final rule.58 After considering the comments, we have determined to exclude one-on-one communications from the first prong of the definition and retain the ‘‘more than one’’ language in the current advertising rule, unless such communications include hypothetical performance information that is not provided: (i) In response to an unsolicited investor request or (ii) to a private fund investor. We have made this change to avoid the possibility that the rule would impede typical communications between advisers and their existing and prospective investors. An adviser might have been dis-incentivized to communicate regularly with its investors if it believed it would have to analyze every communication for compliance with the proposed rule.59 Because we are excluding one-on-one communications from the first prong of the definition of advertisement under most circumstances, we are modifying the proposed exclusion for an adviser’s responses to unsolicited requests.60 Although commenters generally supported the exclusion and recommended expanding it,61 we believe excluding most one-on-one communications addresses commenter concerns in a more comprehensive manner than the unsolicited request exclusion would have addressed them. The definition will exclude an adviser’s responses to an unsolicited investor request for hypothetical performance information, as well as hypothetical performance information provided to a private fund investor in a one-on-one communication, as discussed below. Unless subject to this or another exclusion, the definition of advertisement will capture communications that include hypothetical performance information even in a one-on-one communication.62 We also recognize that advisers have one-on-one interactions with prospective investors and that prospective investors
may ask questions of an adviser or ask for additional information. In adopting the current advertising rule, the Commission limited the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ due to concerns that a broad definition could encompass even ‘‘face to face conversations between an investment counsel and his prospective client.’’ 63 The Commission stated that it would not include a ‘‘personal conversation’’ with a client or prospective client.64 We believe that the same concerns that influenced the Commission’s prior approach continue to exist. We also believe that the remaining provisions of the definition, as well as other provisions of the Federal securities laws, are adequate to satisfy our investor protection goals with respect to communications directed only to a single individual or entity.65 The one-on-one exclusion in the definition’s first prong applies regardless of whether the adviser makes the communication to a natural person with an account or multiple natural persons representing a single entity or account.66 The exclusion applies to a single adviser and a single investor. For example, if an adviser’s prospective investor is an entity, the exclusion permits the adviser to provide communications to multiple natural persons employed by or owning the entity without those communications being subject to the rule. For purposes of this exclusion, we also interpret the term ‘‘person’’ to mean one or more investors that share the same household. For example, a communication to a married couple that shares the same household would qualify for the one-on￾one exclusion.67 Some commenters advocated that we increase the ‘‘more than one’’ threshold from the current rule to communications with ‘‘more than ten’’ or ‘‘more than 25’’ persons.68 They argued that such a change would reduce compliance costs and better align with traditional concepts of advertising.69 We decline to make this change. The

70See, e.g., NSCP Comment Letter.
71The fact that there may be some similarities in the information provided in one-on-one communications, however, will not result in the application of the rule to those communications. 72 In addition, the communication does not fall within the definition of advertisement because the purpose of the communication is not to offer services to a new investor or to provide new services to an existing investor. See infra section II.A.2.a.iv. 73See Resolute Comment Letter (seeking clarification on the treatment of ‘‘account statements and similar reports intended for Non￾Retail Persons, such as public entities, that are required to make such information publicly available’’). If the entity is an existing investor of the adviser, communications to the entity would not be considered an advertisement unless the communications offer or promote new advisory products or services of the adviser. 74See also supra section II.A.2.a.i for a discussion of an adviser’s direct or indirect communications. 75See infra section II.E.6. These communications would be eligible for the exclusions from the definition of advertisement for extemporaneous, live, oral communications and regulatory notices in final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i)(A) and (B). 76See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.2. (proposing that communications to any person that contain hypothetical performance would not qualify for the unsolicited request exclusion to the extent they contain such results); proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii)(B). 77See IAA Comment Letter; ILPA Comment Letter. 78See IAA Comment Letter; Comment Letter of Managed Funds Association and Alternative Investment Management Association (Sept. 11,
2020) (‘‘MFA/AIMA Comment Letter III’’). 79Any affirmative effort by the investment
adviser intended or designed to induce an investor to request hypothetical performance information would render the request solicited and thus not eligible for this exclusion. exclusion from the first prong of the definition of advertisement for one-on￾one communications will allow an adviser to engage in routine investor communications and have personal conversations with prospective investors, without subjecting those communications to the final marketing rule’s requirements. However, we continue to believe that the final rule should cover typical marketing communications, even if sent to a limited number of persons. Creating a higher threshold, as suggested by commenters, may incentivize advisers to limit communications to just below the threshold number of persons, and may defeat the purposes of our final rule. While the first prong of the final rule will generally not apply to communications to one person, changes in technology since the adoption of the existing rule permit advisers to create communications that appear to be personalized to single investors and are ‘‘addressed to’’ only one person, but are actually widely disseminated to multiple persons. While communications such as bulk emails or algorithm-based messages are nominally directed at or ‘‘addressed to’’ only one person, they are in fact widely disseminated to numerous investors and therefore would be subject to the final rule.70 Similarly, customizing a template presentation or mass mailing by filling in the name of an investor and/or including other basic information about the investor would not result in a one-on-one communication. Likewise, an adviser cannot use duplicate inserts in an otherwise customized communication in an effort to circumvent application of the rule.71 For example, if an adviser maintains a database of performance information inserts or tables that it uses in otherwise customized investor communications, the adviser must treat the duplicated inserts as advertisements subject to the rule. Of course, if the adviser provides an existing investor with performance information pertaining to the investor’s account, the rule would not apply because this is a one-on-one communication.72 One commenter expressed concern that the public dissemination of a seemingly one-on-one communication could subject the communication to the final rule.73 We believe that if, for example, an adviser responds to a request for proposal (‘‘RFP’’) from an entity and the entity subsequently makes such responses available to the public pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request or other public disclosure requirements, this would not be an advertisement merely by virtue of the entity’s disclosure.74 An adviser should consider adopting compliance policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to determine whether a communication nominally directed to a single person is actually a communication to more than one person, or contains duplicated inserts as
part of that communication. In these
circumstances, the duplicated information is an advertisement because it is sent to more than one person and would not qualify for the exclusion. Because of the specific concerns raised by hypothetical performance, hypothetical performance information would not qualify for the one-on-one exclusion unless provided in response to an unsolicited investor request or to a private fund investor.75 Hypothetical performance included in all other one￾on-one communications that offer investment advisory services with regard to securities must be presented in accordance with the requirements discussed below. We proposed a similar approach for hypothetical performance provided in response to an unsolicited request under the proposed definition of advertisement.76 Some commenters suggested that the Commission permit an adviser to provide hypothetical performance in response to unsolicited requests to eliminate the need to assess the requirements related to hypothetical performance.77 These commenters stated that the need to assess these requirements would slow down the flow of information to investors, require investors to provide more information earlier in the diligence process, or limit the hypothetical performance information shared in response to such an unsolicited request. Some commenters stated that private fund investors often seek hypothetical performance information, particularly targets and projections, to evaluate private fund investments.78 After considering these comments, we believe that, in most circumstances, the protections for hypothetical performance should be available to investors receiving communications that include offers of investment advisory services with regard to securities, to the extent such offers include hypothetical performance information. We believe our modifications to the first prong of the definition of advertisement and to the requirements for presenting hypothetical performance, discussed below, will reduce the associated compliance burdens for providing hypothetical performance information to investors and will, therefore, alleviate some of commenters’ concerns. However, where an investor affirmatively seeks hypothetical performance information from an investment adviser and the investment adviser has not directly or indirectly solicited the request, hypothetical performance information provided in response to the request will be excluded from the definition of advertisement under the final rule.79 In the case of an unsolicited request, an investor seeks hypothetical performance information for the investor’s own purposes, rather than responding to a communication disseminated by an adviser offering its investment advisory services with regard to securities. Similarly, where the hypothetical performance information is provided in a one-on-one communication to a private fund investor, we believe a private fund investor will have the ability and opportunity to ask questions and assess the limitations of this
information. In these limited circumstances, we do not believe it is necessary to treat the hypothetical performance information

80The hypothetical performance information would be subject to the Advisers Act’s anti-fraud provisions and rule 206(4)–8 under the Advisers Act. 81See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(1). 82See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Comment Letter of Association for Corporate Growth (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘ACG Comment Letter’’). 83Under the current advertising rule, an ‘‘advertisement’’ includes any written communication addressed to more than one person, or any notice or other announcement in any publication or by radio or television, which offers ‘‘any other investment advisory service with regard to securities.’’ See current rule 206(4)–1. 84See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.2. 85See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; FSI Comment Letter. 86See SEC v. C.R. Richmond & Co., 565 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1977) (‘‘Investment advisory material which promotes advisory services for the purpose of inducing potential clients to subscribe to those services is advertising material within [the current rule].’’). 87See NYC Bar Comment Letter; ACG Comment Letter. 88See section 206 of the Act; rule 206(4)–8 under the Act. See also Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, Release No. IA–5248 (June 5, 2019) [84 FR 33669 (July 12, 2019)] (‘‘Fiduciary Interpretation’’) (stating that ‘‘[t]he investment adviser’s fiduciary duty is broad and applies to the entire adviser￾client relationship.’’), at n.17 (citing SEC v. Lauer, 2008 WL 4372896, at 24 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2008) ‘‘ ‘Section 206 of the Advisers Act does not require that the activity be ‘in the offer or sale of any’ security or ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.’ ’ ’’). 89As discussed below, the definition of advertisement in the final rule also will not include communications designed to ‘‘retain’’ investors. See infra section II.A.2.a.iv. 90See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; JG Advisory Comment Letter (stating that ‘‘the rule should treat communications to existing investors differently from communications to prospective investors’’). 91See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II (discussing market commentary, investment outlooks, performance reviews); JG Advisory Comment Letter (seeking clarification on whether the proposed definition would scope in monthly or quarterly letters to existing investors where such letters discuss account performance and include market commentary). 92See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 93See, e.g., MMI Comment Letter. 94See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; Pickard Djinis Comment Letter. 95Our staff has indicated that it would not recommend enforcement action under the current rule with respect to written communications by an adviser to an existing investor about the performance of securities in the investor’s account because such communications would not be ‘‘offers’’ of advisory services, and instead are ‘‘part of’’ those advisory services (unless the context in
which the communication is provided suggests otherwise). See Investment Counsel Association of America, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Mar. 1,
2004) (‘‘ICAA Letter’’). Any staff guidance or no￾action letters discussed in this release represent the
views of the staff of the Division of Investment Management. They are not a rule, regulation, or statement of the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved their content. Staff guidance has no legal force or effect; it does not alter or amend applicable law, and it creates no new or additional obligations for any person. as an advertisement subject to the rule.80
iii. Offers Investment Advisory Services
With Regard to Securities to Prospective Clients or Investors in a Private Fund Advised by the Investment Adviser The marketing rule’s definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ includes communications that offer the investment adviser’s investment advisory services. As discussed in more detail below, we are implementing a number of changes from the proposal, which would have defined advertisements to include communications that offer or promote the investment adviser’s investment advisory services or that seek to obtain or retain one or more investment advisory clients or investors in any pooled investment vehicle advised by the investment adviser.81 First, we are limiting the application of this element of the definition to communications directed to prospective clients or prospective private fund investors, rather than existing clients or private fund investors to avoid an overbroad application of the rule. Accordingly, this aspect of the final rule will retain the current rule’s scope. Second, we also are not adopting the ‘‘or promote’’ wording from the proposed definition of advertisement. Commenters generally opposed including the term ‘‘promote,’’ suggesting that this term could expand the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ to cover certain materials not subject to the current rule,82 the text of which is limited to communications that ‘‘offer’’ advisory services.83 As we indicated in the proposal, the ‘‘offer or promote’’ clause reflects the current rule’s application and was designed to capture communications that are commonly considered advertisements.84 We added the ‘‘or promote’’ wording to the proposed definition for clarity, but after considering comments we realize this wording may instead cause confusion. For example, commenters sought clarification that statements about an advisory firm’s culture, philanthropy, or community activity would not fall within the definition of advertisement.85 We did not intend for our proposed definition and the inclusion of the term ‘‘promote’’ to include such communications. Accordingly, the final rule will not include the term ‘‘promote’’ as it is our intent to retain the current rule’s scope in this respect.86 Third, consistent with the current rule, we are limiting the application of the definition to offers about an investment adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities. We were persuaded by commenters who urged us to retain the current rule’s scope, arguing that expanding the definition to cover services that are not related to securities could result in an overbroad application of the rule.87 Importantly, however, the anti-fraud provisions of the Act and related rules continue to apply to an adviser’s advertisements and other communications about its other non￾securities related services.88 Finally, the definition will not include communications that seek to obtain one or more investment advisory clients or investors in any pooled investment vehicle advised by the investment adviser.
We determined that this clause was superfluous of the rest of the definition; we believe these communications are captured within an adviser’s offer of investment advisory services with regard to securities to prospective investors in a private fund advised by the adviser.89
iv. Offers New Investment Advisory
Services With Regard to Securities to Current Clients or Investors in a Private Fund Advised by the Investment Adviser The proposed definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ included communications that seek ‘‘to obtain or retain’’ investors. Commenters generally stated that the ‘‘or retain’’ clause would unnecessarily include communications made in the ordinary course of an adviser providing services to current investors as all communications with current investors are, at least in part, designed to both service and retain investors.90 Several commenters asked us to confirm the scope of the definition as applied to communications with existing investors.91 For example, some commenters suggested an exclusion for all communications with existing investors,92 while others supported a more limited exclusion for routine investor communications.93 Commenters generally agreed that the rule should treat communications with existing investors that offer new or additional advisory services as advertisements.94 Commenters that supported a complete or partial exclusion for communications to existing investors stated that such communications are part of the advisory service and not advertisements.95

96See, e.g., section 206 of the Advisers Act; rule 206(4)–8 under the Advisers Act. 97See Fiduciary Interpretation, supra footnote 88. See also IAA Comment Letter; Pickard Djinis Comment Letter. 98Their exclusion from the definition of advertisement will not prevent these account statements or transaction reports from being subject to the other provisions of the Federal securities laws, including section 17(a) of the Securities Act or section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (and rule 10b–5 thereunder), to the extent those provisions would otherwise apply. Likewise, regardless of whether a communication to an existing or prospective investor is an ‘‘advertisement’’ under the marketing rule, the communication is subject to the anti-fraud provisions of section 206 of the Act and the aforementioned provisions of the Federal securities laws. 99See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; JG Advisory Comment Letter; MMI Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 100See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 101See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Mercer Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; Wellington Comment Letter. 102See, e.g., MMI Comment Letter (emphasizing the importance of allowing general market commentary to provide investors with the tools to challenge the assumptions of those who counsel them on financial management). 103As discussed above, the rule also excludes from the first prong of the advertisement definition a communication that includes hypothetical performance that is provided in response to an unsolicited investor request for such information or to a private fund investor in a one-on-one communication. See final rule 206(4)– 1(e)(1)(i)(C)(1) and (2). 104See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; AIC Comment Letter (stating that ‘‘written materials prepared in conjunction with any live oral communications should not be considered ‘advertisements’ and should be able to rely on the exclusion if (i) they are in draft form, (ii) they are internal documents not created for distribution, or (iii) all or portions of their content may not be provided to any prospective or current investor.’’). 105See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II (arguing that it is not clear how to define communications that are broadcast and widely disseminated versus those that are not); AIC Comment Letter. 106See, e.g., NASAA Comment Letter; CFA Comment Letter; ILPA Comment Letter. We agree that the rule should treat only those communications that offer new or additional advisory services with regard to securities to current investors as advertisements because they raise the same concerns as other advertisements. Our intent is not to chill ordinary course communications with current investors. We believe that other protections prevent advisers from engaging in activities that mislead or deceive existing investors.96 For example, existing and prospective advisory clients receive the anti-fraud protections of the Advisers Act and an adviser’s fiduciary duty.97 Accordingly, under
the final rule a communication to a current investor is an advertisement when it offers new or additional investment advisory services with regard to securities. We believe that this modification will allow advisers to continue to provide current investors with timely information regarding their accounts and the market without subjecting those communications to the marketing rule.98 In summary, we view an adviser seeking to offer new or additional investment advisory services with regard to securities to current investors as posing the same risks to investors as an adviser seeking to offer such services to new investors and therefore we believe this activity warrants the same treatment under the final marketing rule.
v. Brand Content, General Educational
Material, and Market Commentary Other commenters asked us to confirm that brand content, general educational material, and market commentary are not advertisements under the rule.99 Whether a communication is an advertisement depends on the facts and circumstances (e.g., whether the communication ‘‘offers’’ the adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities). Generally, generic brand content, educational material, and market commentary would not meet the revised definition of an advertisement. Brand content. Determining whether a communication including ‘‘brand’’ content (e.g., displays of the advisory firm name in connection with sponsoring sporting events, supporting community service activities, or supporting philanthropic efforts) is an advertisement would depend on the facts and circumstances.100 If such a communication is designed to raise the profile of the adviser generally, but does not offer any investment advisory services with regard to securities, the communication would not fall within the definition of an advertisement under the rule. For example, a communication that simply notes that an event is ‘‘brought to you by XYZ Advisers’’ would not qualify as an advertisement, as it is not offering any advisory services with regard to securities. General educational information and market commentary. We believe that the same analysis applies for communications that provide only general educational information and market commentary.101 Educational communications that are limited to providing general information about investing, such as information about types of investment vehicles, asset classes, strategies, certain geographic regions, or commercial sectors, do not constitute offers of an adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities. Similarly, materials that provide an adviser’s general market commentary (including during press interviews) are unlikely to offer advisory services with regard to securities. Market commentary aims to inform current and prospective investors, including private fund investors, of market and regulatory developments in the broader financial ecosystem. These materials also help current investors interpret market and regulatory shifts by providing context when reviewing investments in their portfolios, and educate investors.102 In contrast, for example, we would view an
article or white paper that provides
general market commentary and concludes with a description of how the adviser’s securities-related services can help prospective investors invest in the market as offering the adviser’s services. Accordingly, that portion of the white paper would be an advertisement. b. Exclusions The rule will generally exclude two types of communications from the first prong of the definition of advertisement:
(i) Extemporaneous, live, oral communications; and (ii) information required by statute or regulation.103
i. Extemporaneous, Live, Oral
Communications
In a change from the proposal, the definition of advertisement will not include extemporaneous, live, oral communications, regardless of whether they are broadcast and regardless of whether they take place in a one-on-one context and involve discussion of hypothetical performance. We proposed an exclusion for live, oral communications that are not broadcast on radio, television, the internet, or any other similar medium. Commenters generally supported the exclusion, but had questions about certain aspects. For example, some commenters expressed concern about the treatment of written materials that accompany or are used to prepare for oral presentations, stating that treating such materials as advertisements would hamper an adviser’s ability to prepare for a presentation.104 Other commenters questioned the scope of the exclusion, with some arguing that it was too narrow 105 and others arguing that it was too broad.106 The goal of the exclusion for live, oral communications was to avoid treating extemporaneous statements as advertisements, in light of the difficulties in ensuring that they comply with the requirements of the rule, and to avoid chilling adviser communications with investors. If

107A communication need not be in-person to qualify for the exclusion so long as it is live and oral. For example, a phone call or live video communication between an adviser and an investor could qualify for this exclusion. 108As discussed in the recordkeeping section below, a live, oral communication by an adviser that is not extemporaneous (but that otherwise satisfies the definition of advertisement) would be an advertisement and a record of the advertisement must be maintained pursuant to rule 204– 2(a)(11)(i)(A). The record of the advertisement could be a copy of the prepared remarks, other written preparatory materials, or a recording of the oral communication. 109See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter (stating that live written communications (e.g., live text chats) should also qualify for the exclusion in order to reflect modern communication methods). 110We consider a communication to still be ‘‘oral’’ even if closed captioning is used, but not if the oral communication is transcribed and the transcription is then directly or indirectly redistributed by the adviser. See, e.g., Mercer Comment Letter (seeking clarification that closed captioning would not prevent a communication from qualifying for the exclusion). 111See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Fidelity Comment Letter. 112See, e.g., Fidelity Comment Letter (noting that (i) advisers may use various forms of technology to communicate with clients, including web chats or videos and (ii) further limiting the exclusion ‘‘would capture routine communications between advisers and their clients merely because of the medium in which they are being conducted.’’); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II (arguing that it is not clear how to define communications that are broadcast and widely disseminated versus those that are not). 113See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 114See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Fidelity Comment Letter. 115Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i)(B). As with the exclusion for extemporaneous, live, oral communications, the exclusion for regulatory notices will apply regardless of whether the notice includes a discussion of hypothetical performance. 116Proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(iv). 117See, e.g., Mercer Comment Letter; NRS Comment Letter. 118See, e.g., Comment Letter of Ropes & Gray LLP (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Ropes & Gray Comment Letter’’); (noting that the proposal raises questions as to what information is required in Commission filings, especially for publicly traded advisers); Comment Letter of BlackRock, Inc. (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘BlackRock Comment Letter’’) (same); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II (noting that advisers are already subject to legal duties and potential liability for information included in regulatory filings making it unlikely that advisers would include excess information in such filings). 119See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i)(B). 120See Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, Release No. IA–5247 (June 5, 2019) [88 FR 33573
(July 12, 2019)] (‘‘Form remarks are extemporaneous, they cannot be simultaneously monitored for regulatory compliance, and to require otherwise may simply cause advisers to cease extemporaneous speech to the overall detriment of investors. However, we believe that communications prepared in advance can and should be subject to the rule. Accordingly, the final exclusion will apply only to extemporaneous, live, oral communications.107 Extemporaneous communications do not include prepared remarks or speeches, such as those delivered from scripts.108 In addition, slides or other written materials that are distributed or presented to the audience would also be included as advertisements if they otherwise meet the definition. On the other hand, live, extemporaneous, oral discussions with a group of investors or interviews with the press that are not based on prepared remarks will be eligible for the exclusion. This approach aligns with the purpose of the exclusion, which is to avoid a chilling effect on extemporaneous, oral speech that might occur if such communications were required to comply with the requirements of the final rule. Some commenters recommended that we further expand the exclusion to apply to certain written communications.109 While we appreciate that other modern communication methods facilitate instantaneous written conversations (e.g., text messages, chat), this exclusion is limited to extemporaneous, live, oral communications, because in those circumstances a speaker often does not have sufficient time to edit and reflect on the content of the communication.110 Some commenters suggested that we exclude all broadcast communications and adopt an approach similar to FINRA.111 Commenters also sought guidance on the meaning of the following terms: ‘‘broadcast’’ 112 and ‘‘widely disseminated.’’ 113 In response to commenters’ concerns, we are not adopting the requirement that the live, oral communication is ‘‘not broadcast.’’ We believe the concerns that prompted this exclusion apply equally to extemporaneous, live, oral communications regardless of whether they are broadcast. We also believe that the exclusion should not allow an adviser to avoid application of the rule for a previously prepared live, oral communication in a non-broadcast setting, such as a luncheon seminar designed to attract new investors. In addition, commenters raised a variety of concerns with identifying whether a communication is broadcast in light of modern media tools, suggesting that line drawing as to when a communication is broadcast may be challenging in practice.114 As a result, the exclusion will apply to a broadcast communication, such as a webcast, that is an extemporaneous, live, oral communication. The exclusion will apply to ‘‘live’’ oral communications, as proposed. Accordingly, previously recorded oral communications disseminated by the adviser would not qualify as live because the adviser had time to review and edit the recording before such
dissemination and thus can ensure compliance with the marketing rule. In these circumstances, an adviser would need to treat its subsequent dissemination of the recording as an advertisement under the rule if the recording offers the adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities. However, we believe that an oral communication would be ‘‘live’’ even if there is a time lag (e.g., streaming delay), a translation program is used, or adaptive technology is used to create a personal transcription (e.g., voice to text technology or other tools that assist the deaf, hard-of-hearing, or hearing loss communities).
ii. Information Contained in a Statutory
or Regulatory Notice, Filing, or Other Required Communication The final rule excludes from the definition of advertisement ‘‘[i]nformation contained in a statutory or regulatory notice, filing, or other required communication, provided that such information is reasonably designed to satisfy the requirements of such notice, filing, or other required communication.’’ 115 In response to commenters, we have broadened the proposed exclusion, which would have applied to ‘‘[a]ny information required to be contained in a statutory or regulatory notice, filing, or other communication.’’ 116 Commenters generally supported the proposed exclusion,117 but recommended we expand it to ease compliance burdens and avoid duplicative regulation that would have resulted from applying another layer of review to mandatory filings.118 Specifically, commenters stated that compliance personnel would have difficulty determining exactly which information contained in a regulatory filing is strictly and explicitly required by applicable law versus which information is not (and would therefore be subject to the rule). In response to these comments, we broadened the exclusion to cover information in a statutory or regulatory, notice, filing or other required communication, provided the information is reasonably designed to satisfy the requirements, rather than information required to be contained in such a communication.119 For example, information reasonably designed to satisfy the requirements of Form ADV Part 2 or Form CRS will not be an advertisement.120

CRS Adopting Release’’) (noting that the relationship summary is designed to serve as disclosure, rather than marketing material). 121However, information that is required to be provided or offered by the final rule will not qualify for this exclusion. For example, final rule 206(4)– 1(d)(2) requires an adviser to provide performance results over one-, five-, and ten-year periods. This information is part of the advertisement and subject to the rule. 122Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii). 123See id. The definition of advertisement’s second prong includes a testimonial or endorsement for which an adviser directly or indirectly provides de minimis compensation (as defined below). However, these types of testimonials and endorsements will be exempt from some of the final rule’s prescribed conditions for testimonials and endorsements. See infra section II.C.5. 124Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(17)(i). We proposed to define ‘‘testimonial’’ as ‘‘any statement of a client’s or investor’s experience with the investment adviser or its advisory affiliates, as defined in the Form ADV Glossary of Terms.’’ See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(15). 125Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(5)(i). We proposed to define ‘‘endorsement’’ as ‘‘any statement by a person other than a client or investor indicating approval, support, or recommendation of the investment adviser or its advisory affiliates, as defined in the Form ADV Glossary of Terms.’’ See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(2). To align the definitions of testimonial and endorsement better, and address situations where an endorser who is not a client nevertheless provides statements about the endorser’s experience with the adviser, the final definition of endorsement includes any statement made by a non-investor that describes the endorser’s experience with the adviser or its supervised persons, like under the definition of testimonial. 126Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(5)(i) and (17)(i). Under the final rule, supervised person has the same meaning as in section 2(a)(25) of the Act. Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(16). See also proposed rule 206(4)– 1(e)(2) and (15) (referring to advisory affiliates). 127See Pickard Djinis Comment Letter. 128See Comment Letter of William A. Jacobson, Esq., Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Director, Cornell Securities Law Clinic (Feb. 3,
2020) (‘‘Prof. Jacobson Comment Letter’’).
129See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II.
130Complete or partial client lists that do no more than identify certain of the adviser’s clients or private fund investors will not be treated as testimonials. See also 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at 78. 131See Dan Gallagher, Staff No-Action Letter (pub. avail. July 10, 1995) (stating that the staff could not assure that it would not recommend enforcement action for a violation of rule 206(4)– 1 if the letter writer used client testimonials describing its character and skills in relation to matters other than the letter writer’s role as an investment adviser). See also Guidance on the Testimonial Rule and Social Media, Division of Investment Management Guidance Update No. 2014–04 (Mar. 2014) (‘‘IM Staff Social Media Guidance’’) (withdrawing staff position in the Gallagher Staff No-Action Letter). See infra section II.J. 132Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(5)(ii) and (iii), and (e)(17)(ii) and (iii). See also proposed rule 206(4)– 3(c)(4) (proposing to define ‘‘solicitor’’ as ‘‘any person who, directly or indirectly, solicits any client or private fund investor for, or refers any client or private fund investor to, an investment adviser’’). Both the proposal’s definition of ‘‘solicitor’’ and the final rule’s inclusion of solicitation and referral activities are drawn from the current cash solicitation rule’s definition of ‘‘solicitor,’’ with the exception that the current rule does not apply to solicitation of private fund investors. See rule 206(4)–3(d)(1). This exclusion will apply to information that an adviser provides to an investor under any statute or regulation under Federal or state law, including rules promulgated by regulatory agencies. We generally do not believe that communications that are prepared as a requirement of statutes, rules, or regulations should be viewed as advertisements under the final rule.121 However, if an adviser includes in such a communication information that is not reasonably designed to satisfy its obligations under applicable law, and such additional information offers the adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities, then that information will be considered an ‘‘advertisement’’ for purposes of the rule.
3. Definition of Advertisement:
Compensated Testimonials and Endorsements, Including Solicitations To reflect the merger of the two rules, the final rule’s definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ includes a new second prong that applies to ‘‘any endorsement or testimonial for which an investment adviser provides compensation, directly or indirectly’’ subject to an exclusion for certain regulatory notices, filings, and other required communications.122 A compensated testimonial or endorsement will meet the definition of advertisement’s second prong regardless of whether the communication is made orally or in writing, to one or more persons.123 By contrast, an uncompensated testimonial or endorsement would have to meet the elements of prong one in order to be considered an ‘‘advertisement.’’ a. Definitions of Testimonial and Endorsement The final definition of testimonial includes any statement by a current client or private fund investor about the client’s or private fund investor’s experience with the investment adviser or its supervised persons.124 The definition of endorsement includes any statement by a person other than a current client or private fund investor that indicates approval, support, or recommendation of the investment adviser or its supervised persons or describes that person’s experience with the investment adviser or its supervised persons.125 This scope of how these activities are defined is similar to the proposal, with a few changes described below, including adding solicitation and referral activities drawn from the proposed definition of solicitor. These definitions include statements about the adviser’s ‘‘supervised persons,’’ rather than the proposed inclusion of statements about the adviser’s ‘‘advisory affiliates.’’ 126 One commenter recommended this change, stating that an endorsement or testimonial regarding a supervised person is more likely to provide relevant information to an investor than a statement about an adviser’s advisory affiliate.127 We received a variety of comments about the statements these definitions would capture. One commenter supported a broad approach that would include statements about an adviser’s traits, such as trustworthiness, to reflect the commenter’s belief that prospective clients typically select an adviser based on emotion.128 Another commenter requested that we limit the definitions to include only statements that explicitly discuss the adviser’s services or capabilities as an adviser.129 Under the final marketing rule, testimonials and endorsements will include opinions or statements by persons about the investment advisory expertise or capabilities of the adviser or its supervised persons.130 Testimonials and endorsements also include statements in an advertisement about an adviser or its supervised person’s qualities (e.g., trustworthiness, diligence, or judgment) or expertise or capabilities in other contexts, when the statements suggest that the qualities, capabilities, or expertise are relevant to the advertised
investment advisory services. We believe that an investor would likely perceive these statements as relevant to the adviser’s investment advisory services.131 The definitions of testimonial and endorsement under the final rule also include solicitation and referral activities drawn from the proposed definition of solicitor.132 After considering comments on the overlapping scope of testimonials, endorsements, and solicitations under the proposed advertising and solicitation rules, we are adding solicitation activities to the definitions of testimonial and endorsement. The definition of testimonial includes any statement by a current client or private fund investor that directly or indirectly solicits any investor to be the adviser’s client or a private fund investor, or refers any investor to be the adviser’s client or a private fund investor. The definition of endorsement includes any such statements by a person other than a current client or private fund investor. This change will address compensated

133See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.4 and II.B.2 and text accompanying n.172. 134See id. at n.372. The proposed solicitation rule would have applied to an adviser’s direct and indirect compensation to a solicitor for any solicitation activities. See proposed rule 206(4)– 3(a). The current cash solicitation rule also covers direct and indirect cash compensation. See rule 206(4)–3(a). Similarly, our proposed advertising rule would have required disclosure, if applicable, that cash or non-cash compensation has been provided by or on behalf of the adviser in connection with obtaining or using the testimonial or endorsement. See proposed rule 206(4)– 1(b)(1)(ii). 135See Consumer Federation Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 136See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; MMI Comment Letter (stating that the rule should not apply to an adviser that sends a gift to a third-party adviser or broker-dealer with which it routinely does business, and such third party completely unrelatedly refers a client to the adviser, unless the third party has a reasonable expectation that it will receive some form of compensation from the adviser in exchange for that referral). 137See IAA Comment Letter (also recommending that the rule exclude refer-a-friend programs that involve a small amount of compensation per referral). While the final marketing rule will apply to all compensated refer-a-friend programs (regardless of the form of compensation), we expect that many advisers that engage in these programs will fall under the de minimis exemption, and be subject to fewer conditions than other compensated testimonials and endorsements. See infra footnote 481. 138See SIFMA AMG Comment Letters I & III; FSI Comment Letter. 139See infra section II.A.4. 140See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at nn.357 and 358 and accompanying text (discussing, for example, refer-a-friend programs). 141Advisers are currently required to disclose to clients in the Form ADV brochure if they consider, in selecting or recommending broker-dealers, whether they or a related person receives client referrals from a broker-dealer or third party. As proposed, broker-dealers or dual registrants that receive brokerage for solicitation of client accounts in wrap fee programs that they do not sponsor will be subject to the final marketing rule if they solicit those clients to participate in the wrap fee program. See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at
section II.B.2.
142Although commenters did not specifically address to what extent compensation paid to an adviser’s personnel, such as an employee, would implicate the proposed solicitation rule, we are clarifying that compensation for purposes of prong two of the definition of advertisement will not include regular salary or bonuses paid to an adviser’s personnel for their investment advisory activities or for clerical, administrative, support or similar functions. 143See, e.g., MMI Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I (discussing training for certain fund-of-funds arrangements); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter III (encouraging the Commission to draw from a FINRA 2016 proposal relating to non￾cash compensation, which the commenter states includes conditions such as prior approval, attendance not being preconditioned on the achievement of certain sales targets, appropriate location (whether an office or other facility) and no payment for additional guests). 144See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at n.360. 145See SIFMA AMG Comment Letters I & III (requesting alignment with FINRA’s 2016 non-cash compensation rule proposal); FSI Comment Letter. 146See, e.g., Regulation Best Interest, Release No. 34–86031 (June 5, 2019) [84 FR at 33400 (July 12, 2019)] (‘‘Regulation Best Interest Release’’) (adopting rule 15l–1 under the Exchange Act, testimonials and endorsements under one rule with one set of conditions. For example, a person providing an endorsement or testimonial under the final rule might be a firm that solicits for an adviser (such as a broker-dealer or a bank), an individual at a soliciting firm who engages in solicitation activities for an adviser (such as a bank representative or an individual registered representative of a broker￾dealer), or both. Other examples could be an unaffiliated fund-of-funds or a feeder fund that solicits investors in an underlying fund or a master fund, respectively. b. Cash and Non-Cash Compensation The second prong of the final marketing rule’s definition of advertisement is triggered by any form of compensation—whether cash or non￾cash—that an adviser provides, directly or indirectly, for an endorsement or testimonial. This mirrors the types of compensation that we stated would trigger the proposed solicitation rule and the proposed advertising rule’s compensation disclosure requirement in connection with a testimonial, endorsement, or third-party rating.133 As we stated about both proposed rules, compensation an adviser provides, directly or indirectly, for these activities can incentivize a person to provide a positive statement about, solicit an investor for, or refer an investor to, the investment adviser.134 Therefore, we believe that the marketing rule’s protections should apply. Some commenters agreed that non￾cash compensation creates the same conflicts of interest as cash compensation for solicitation.135 These commenters also agreed that investors should be made aware of the solicitor’s conflict of interest
regardless of the form of compensation. Other commenters, however, raised concerns about extending the rule to cover certain forms of non-cash compensation, such as gifts and entertainment,136 or non￾transferable advisory fee waivers in connection with refer-a-friend arrangements.137 Some commenters argued that the final rule should only apply to solicitations for which the adviser provides incentive-based compensation tied to the funding of an advisory account and the solicitation activities are directed at specific clients.138 Commenters generally opposed applying the proposed solicitation rule to communications to investors in private funds, which we address below.139 Forms of compensation under the final marketing rule will include fees based on a percentage of assets under management or amounts invested, flat fees, retainers, hourly fees, reduced advisory fees, fee waivers, and any other methods of cash compensation, and cash or non-cash rewards that advisers provide for endorsements and testimonials, including referral and solicitation activities.140 They also include directed brokerage that compensates brokers for soliciting investors,141 sales awards or other prizes, gifts and entertainment, such as outings, tours, or other forms of entertainment that an adviser provides as compensation for testimonials and endorsements. In addition, compensated endorsements and testimonials may or may not be contingent on the endorsement or testimonial resulting in a new advisory relationship or a new investment in a private fund. We believe that non-cash compensation, including forms of entertainment, can incentivize persons to provide a positive statement about an adviser, or make a referral or solicitation on an adviser’s behalf and should be included in the rule to make clients aware of such incentive. Whether an adviser provides cash or non-cash compensation in exchange for a testimonial or endorsement depends on the particular facts and circumstances.142 Some commenters requested that we exclude training or meetings that educate solicitors about the adviser’s services, even if there are some incidental benefits associated with such training.143 We continue to believe, as we stated in the 2019 Proposing Release, that attendance at training and education meetings, including company-sponsored meetings such as annual conferences, will not be non￾cash compensation, provided that attendance at these meetings or trainings is not provided in exchange for solicitation activities.144 Some commenters also raised concerns about potentially conflicting regulations for advisers dually registered as broker-dealers with respect to the inclusion of sales awards as non￾cash compensation under the proposed solicitation rule.145 While we acknowledge that other Commission rules for broker-dealers address concerns underlying non-cash compensation in the context of recommendations, the final marketing rule covers a broader range of activities and types of promoters.146
Thus, we do

requiring broker-dealers to establish written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and eliminate any sales contests, sales quotas, bonuses, and non-cash compensation that are based on the sale of specific securities or the sale of specific types of securities within a limited period of time, noting that these compensation practices create high-pressure situations for associated persons to increase the sales of specific securities or specific types of securities within a limited period of time and thus compromise the best interests of their retail customers). The policies and procedures required thereunder must also be reasonably designed to identify and mitigate any conflicts of interest associated with the broker￾dealer’s recommendations to retail customers that create an incentive for the broker-dealer’s associated persons to place their interest or the interest of the broker-dealer ahead of the retail customer’s interest. Id. 147See id. Regulation BI defines a retail customer as a ‘‘natural person, or the legal representative of such natural person.’’ See id., at 768. 148See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Fidelity Comment Letter; Fried Frank Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 149See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letters I & III; FSI Comment Letter. 150See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter III. 151See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Mercer Comment Letter. 152We would expect that, where required, the written agreement would be evidence of such a mutual understanding in most circumstances. See infra section II.C.3. 153For example, an adviser will be subject to the rule’s provisions for compensated testimonials and endorsements when the adviser’s parent company pays a third party to endorse the adviser to the third party’s network of members that are prospective clients. See final rule 206(4)–1(b). Such indirect compensation could include the adviser’s parent company providing representatives to the third party and compensating them to promote the adviser’s business. 154See, e.g., FSI Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Fried Frank Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 155See Commonwealth Comment Letter. This commenter stated that such operators typically offer to ‘‘match’’ an investor with an adviser. When an investor clicks on a link, the investor provides information to the operator (e.g., age, investable assets, and goals) and the operator matches the investor to one or more advisers participating in the service. Advisers generally pay a flat fee and/or a per-lead fee to receive matches of potential investors from the operator. 156See MMI Comment Letter (stating that in some cases, the operator charges an administrative or service fee to the investment advisers whose products and services are accessible through the operator). 157See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(5)(ii) and (iii) and (17)(ii) and (iii). 158See final rule 206(4)–1(5)(i) and (17)(i). 159See
final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii). not believe that an exemption for sales awards or contests from the final marketing rule would be appropriate on these grounds. As discussed further below, however, we are adopting a partial exemption for broker-dealers from the rule’s disqualification provisions. We are also adopting partial exemptions from the disclosure provisions when a broker-dealer provides a testimonial or endorsement to a retail customer that is a recommendation subject to Regulation Best Interest (‘‘Regulation BI’’) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘Exchange Act’’) and from certain disclosure requirements when a broker￾dealer provides a testimonial or endorsement to a person that is not a retail customer (as that term is defined in Regulation BI).147 Other commenters stated non-cash compensation could capture benefits that advisers provide in the ordinary course of business unrelated to any solicitation activity.148 Relatedly, some commenters considered our proposed view of ‘‘indirect’’ compensation overly broad, particularly with respect to non￾cash compensation.149 These commenters recommended that we apply the final rule only to compensation an adviser provides to a solicitor after its solicitation activities, unless the solicitation agreement between the adviser and solicitor specifically includes compensation provided prior to the solicitation; or replace the solicitation rule’s reference to compensation that an adviser provides ‘‘indirectly’’ with compensation that is direct or ‘‘in connection with solicitation activities.’’ 150 Others expressed concerns that, under our proposed solicitation rule, every mutually beneficial arrangement between an investment adviser and a potential facilitator of client relationships would be subject to scrutiny for indicia of quid pro quo solicitation.151 We believe the timing of compensation relative to an endorsement or testimonial is relevant in determining whether an adviser is providing compensation for the testimonial or endorsement. In addition, we believe that there will be a mutual understanding of a quid pro quo, whether explicit or inferred based on facts and circumstances, for most compensated endorsements or testimonials.152 However, we decline to draw bright lines around either the timing of the compensation or the establishment of a mutual understanding. We believe such bright lines would unnecessarily limit the final rule and would encourage advisers to structure their arrangements to avoid application of the rule in situations where it would otherwise apply. In addition, we believe that in many cases compensation will be in connection with testimonials and endorsements. We decline to remove the word ‘‘indirectly’’ from the rule for the same reasons discussed above.153
c. Activities That Constitute a
Testimonial or Endorsement Some commenters requested guidance on whether certain activities would constitute solicitation or referral activities under the proposed amendments to the solicitation rule.154 Since the combined marketing rule includes statements that solicit investors for, or refer investors to, an investment adviser as testimonials or endorsements, we are addressing these comments in the context of these definitions. For example, some commenters questioned whether lead-generation firms or adviser referral networks (collectively, ‘‘operators’’) would fall into the scope of the rule. One commenter described these operators as networks operated by non-investors where an adviser compensates the operator to solicit investors for, or refer investors to, the adviser.155 Another commenter described these operators as for-profit or non-profit entities that make third-party advisory services (such as model portfolio providers) accessible to investors, and stated that the operators do not promote or recommend particular services or products accessible on the platform.156 In both examples, the operator’s website likely meets the final marketing rule’s definition of endorsement. An operator may tout the advisers included in its network, and/or guarantee that the advisers meet the network’s eligibility criteria. In addition, because operators typically offer to ‘‘match’’ an investor with one or more advisers compensating it to participate in the service, operators typically engage in solicitation or referral activities.157 Similarly, a blogger’s website review of an adviser’s advisory service would be a testimonial or an endorsement under the final marketing rule because it indicates approval, support, or a recommendation of the investment adviser, or because it describes its experience with the adviser.158 If the adviser directly or indirectly compensates the blogger for its review, for example by paying the blogger based on the amount of assets deposited in new accounts from client referrals or the number of accounts opened, the testimonial or endorsement will be an advertisement under the definition’s second prong.159 Depending on the facts and circumstances, a lawyer or other service provider that refers an investor to an adviser, even infrequently, may

160However, such a communication would be an advertisement under the first prong of the definition of ‘‘advertisement.’’ See supra section II.A.2. 161See Nesler Comment Letter. 162See IAA Comment Letter (alternately requesting, in the absence of an exclusion, clarification as to status under the proposed solicitation rule). This commenter stated that these agents facilitate submissions by investment advisers in the RFP process and prepare reports for prospective investors regarding investment advisers under consideration. Furthermore, in many cases the adviser must enter into an agreement with the agent to participate in the RFP process. 163We understand that the consultant is typically not an advisory client of the advisers it selects to participate in the RFP process, and therefore the final rule’s testimonial provision would usually not apply. 164Though a quid pro quo is not always determinative of whether the compensation element of this prong of the definition of advertisement is satisfied, these facts suggest a lack of quid pro quo and, without more, would not implicate the second prong of the definition. The adviser in this scenario will likely also not implicate the first prong of the definition of advertisement because the adviser is not making a direct or indirect communication to more than one person that offers the investment adviser’s investment advisory services with regard to securities to investors. See final rule 206(4)– 1(e)(1)(i). See also supra section II.A.2. 165See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii). 166See Credit Suisse Comment Letter (citing the ‘‘robust regulatory framework’’ already applicable to SEC-registered broker-dealers); MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 167See infra section II.C.5. 168See id. 169See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at n.346. Two commenters argued that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, solicitors fall within the Act’s definition of ‘‘person associated with an investment adviser.’’ See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Credit Suisse Comment Letter. 170 Depending on the facts and circumstances, a promoter may also be acting as an investment adviser under applicable state law. 171Commission staff previously stated that a person providing advice to a client as to the selection or retention of an investment manager or managers also, under certain circumstances, would be deemed to be ‘‘advising’’ others within the meaning of section 202(a)(11) of the Act. See Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Release No. IA–1092 (Oct. 8, 1987) [52 FR 38400 (Oct. 16, 1987)], at footnote 6 and accompanying text. However, solicitation of clients may not involve providing investment advice on behalf of an adviser. See Release 1633, supra footnote 4, at text accompanying n.123. See also Commission Interpretation Regarding the Solely Incidental Prong of the Broker-Dealer
Exclusion to the Definition of Investment Adviser, Release No. IA–5249 (June 5,
2019) [84 FR 33669 (July 12, 2019)].
also meet the rule’s definition of testimonial or endorsement. On the other hand, where an adviser pays a third-party marketing service or news publication to prepare content for and/or disseminate a communication, we generally would not treat this communication as an endorsement under the second prong of the definition of ‘‘advertisement.’’ 160 Similarly, a non￾investor selling an adviser a list containing the names and contact information of prospective investors typically would not, without more, meet the definition of endorsement.161 This activity typically would not fall within the plain text of the definition of endorsement (e.g., the seller does not indicate approval, support, or recommendation of the investment adviser, or describe its experience with the adviser, or engage in the solicitation or referral activities described therein). One commenter requested an exclusion from the definition of solicitor under the proposed solicitation rule for an investment consultant that administers a RFP to aid one or more investors in selecting an investment adviser or a private fund investment vehicle.162 The commenter stated that the investor typically hires the consultant (the ‘‘agent’’), subject to the understanding that the investor will only enter into a transaction with an investment adviser that agrees to pay the expenses of the agent for providing this service.163 In these circumstances, we do not believe the adviser typically compensates the agent to endorse the adviser because the investor engages the agent to evaluate the adviser based on criteria that the investor provides.164 d. Exclusion for Regulatory Communications; Inclusion of One-on￾One and Extemporaneous, Live, Oral Communications The second prong of the definition of advertisement excludes any information contained in a statutory or regulatory notice, filing, or other required communication, provided that such information is reasonably designed to satisfy the requirements of such notice, filing, or other required communication.165 As with the same exclusion in the first prong of the definition, this exclusion reflects our belief that communications that are prepared as a requirement of statutes, rules, or regulations should not be viewed as advertisements under the rule. Unlike the first prong of the definition of advertisement, however, this prong does not exclude extemporaneous, live, oral communications or one-on-one communications. These types of communications are precisely what the second prong of the definition seeks to address, along with other types of endorsement and testimonial activities. The current solicitation rule has also addressed these types of communications. In addition, the second prong does not exclude communications that include hypothetical performance information. Compensated testimonials and endorsements have the potential to mislead given a promoter’s financial incentive to recommend the adviser. Without appropriate safeguards, a compensated
testimonial or endorsement creates a risk that the investor would mistakenly view the promoter’s recommendation as being an unbiased opinion about the adviser’s ability to manage the investor’s assets and would rely on that recommendation more than the investor otherwise would if the investor knew of the promoter’s incentive. Finally, some commenters requested an exclusion from the proposed solicitation rule for persons registered with the Commission as broker-dealers under the Exchange Act.166 We continue to believe that the final rule’s investor protections should apply to compensated endorsements and testimonials by any person, including a registered broker-dealer. However, we are adopting a partial exemption from the rule’s disqualification provisions for certain compensated testimonials and endorsements made by a registered broker-dealer.167 We also are adopting a partial exemption from the rule’s disclosure provisions when a broker￾dealer provides a testimonial or endorsement to a retail customer that is a recommendation subject to Regulation BI.168 e. Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer Status and Registration for Persons Who Provide Endorsements or Testimonials We proposed to withdraw our position that a solicitor who engages in solicitation activities in accordance with paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of the cash solicitation rule will be, at least with respect to those activities, an associated person of an investment adviser and therefore will not be required to register individually under the Advisers Act solely as a result of those activities (the ‘‘1979 position’’).169 Although the 1979 position will no longer apply upon the rescission of the current solicitation rule, we are not adopting a similar position with respect to endorsements and testimonials under the final marketing rule. A promoter may, depending on the facts and circumstances, be acting as an investment adviser within the meaning of section 202(a)(11) of the Act.170 Investment adviser status and registration questions require analysis of the applicable facts and circumstances, including, for example, whether a person is ‘‘advising’’ others within the meaning of section 202(a)(11) of the Act.171 A promoter also may be acting as a broker or dealer within the meaning

172An adviser’s registration with the Commission covers its supervised persons, provided that their advisory activities are undertaken on the adviser’s behalf. 173Most states impose registration, licensing, or qualification requirements on investment adviser representatives who have a place of business in the state, regardless of whether the investment adviser is registered with the Commission or the state. See Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers As Required by Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Jan. 2011), available at https:// www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf, at 86. See also rule 203A–3(a)(1) (definition of ‘‘investment adviser representative’’). In some states, a third-party solicitor will be subject to state qualification requirements to the extent state investment adviser statutes apply to solicitors. See Release 1633, supra footnote 4, at text accompanying n.125. 174See Nesler Comment Letter (arguing that an SEC-registered adviser should be entitled to treat a non-employee solicitor as an ‘‘associated person’’ as long as the adviser exercises control and supervision over such solicitor in connection with the performance of its solicitation activities). 175See Pickard Djinis Comment Letter (describing that solicitors that perform paid unscripted media campaigns on behalf of advisers, may not be under the adviser’s control). Such a paid solicitor may not be a ‘‘person associated with the investment adviser,’’ depending on the facts and circumstances. 176See rule 204A–1(a) (requiring adviser codes of ethics that, among other things, require supervised persons to comply with applicable Federal securities laws). 177See proposed rule 206(4)–3(c)(2). 178See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(9). See also definition of ‘‘pooled investment vehicle’’ in rule 206(4)–8 under the Act. 179Commenters recommended that the final rule exclude all communications to investors in RICs and BDCs because the statutory anti-fraud provisions and other Commission rules apply to these communications. See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; Comment Letter of the European Fund and Asset Management Association (Feb. 13, 2020) (‘‘EFAMA Comment Letter’’) (suggesting that the final rule also exclude non-U.S. funds that are publicly offered (including UCITS)); ICI Comment Letter (recommending that the Commission exclude all registered fund communications from the scope of the rule, including sales literature subject to rule 34b–1 under the Investment Company Act and generic advertisements subject to rule 135a under the Securities Act). Given the regulatory framework applicable to communications to investors in RICs and BDCs, we do not believe the additional protections of the Advisers Act marketing rule are necessary. 180See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.; proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(9). 181See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at
section II.B.3. 182See Item 8 of Form N–1A. See also FINRA rule 2341(l)(4) (generally prohibiting member firms from accepting any cash compensation from an investment company, an adviser to an investment company, a fund administrator, an underwriter or any affiliated person (as defined in section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act) of such entities unless such compensation is described in a current prospectus of the investment company). 183See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Comment Letter of the National Venture Capital Association (Feb. 14, 2020) (‘‘NVCA Comment Letter’’); IAA Comment Letter. 184See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter (citing rule 206(4)–1(a)(5) and rule 206(4)–8 under the Advisers Act); NVCA Comment Letter (citing rule 156(b)(3)(ii) under the Securities Act). 185See, e.g., ILPA Comment Letter; SBIA Comment Letter. See also Consumer Federation Comment Letter; EFAMA Comment Letter (supporting additional protections for investors in pooled investment vehicles, but seeking an exception for certain non-U.S. domiciled funds). 186Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act authorizes the Commission to adopt rules and regulations that ‘‘define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.’’ 15 U.S.C. 80b–6(4). See rule 206(4)– 8(a)(1). We are adopting this rule under the same authority of section 206(4) of the Advisers Act on which we relied in adopting rule 206(4)–8. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Release No. IA–2628 (Aug. 3,
2007) [75 FR 44756 (Aug. 9, 2007)].
of section 3(a)(4) or 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act, for example, when soliciting investors for, or referring investors to, an adviser or a private fund advised by the adviser. Any promoter must determine whether it is subject to statutory or regulatory requirements under Federal law, including the requirement to register as an investment adviser pursuant to the Act and/or as a broker-dealer pursuant to section 15(a) of the Exchange Act, respectively. If the promoter is a supervised person of the adviser for which it is providing a testimonial or endorsement, the promoter does not need to separately register with the Commission as an investment adviser solely as a result of his or her activities as a promoter.172 A promoter also must determine whether it is subject to certain state law and certain FINRA rules, including any applicable state licensing requirements applicable to individuals.173 To be clear, we are not making a presumption that a person providing an endorsement or testimonial meets the definition of investment adviser or broker-dealer and must register under the Act or the Exchange Act, respectively. Nor are we making a presumption that such person may or may not be an associated person of a registered investment adviser. Indeed, we agree that some promoters may meet the definition of associated person of an investment adviser depending on the facts and circumstances.174 Others may not.175 Under the final marketing rule, if an adviser determines that a person providing an endorsement or testimonial is an associated person, the adviser should have requisite control of such person.176
4. Investors in Private Funds
Both prongs of the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ will expressly include marketing communications to private fund investors. The term ‘‘private fund’’ is defined in section 202(a)(29) of the Advisers Act and means an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (‘‘Investment Company Act’’), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act. This is consistent with the scope of the proposed amendments to the solicitation rule.177 We are not adopting the broader scope of the proposed amendments to the advertising rule, which generally would have applied to advertisements sent to investors in ‘‘pooled investment vehicles,’’ as defined in rule 206(4)–8 under the Act.178 In connection with these changes, we have eliminated the need for the proposed exclusion for advertisements, other sales materials, and sales literature of registered investment companies (‘‘RICs’’) and business development companies (‘‘BDCs’’) that are within the scope of rule 482 or 156 under the Securities Act of 1933 (‘‘Securities Act’’).179 Although we used different terms in each proposal, the scope of the proposals effectively would have covered only certain communications to private fund investors. In our advertising rule proposal, we included all pooled investment vehicles and then excepted RIC or BDC advertisements that were subject to rule 482 or 156 under the Securities Act.180 We did not seek to apply the proposed solicitation rule to promotional activity involving RICs and BDCs because we believed that the primary goal of the proposal was already satisfied by other regulatory requirements.181 Most notably, prospective investors in RICs and BDCs sold through a broker-dealer or other financial intermediary already receive disclosure about the conflicts of interest that may be created due to the fund or its related companies paying the intermediary for the sale of its shares and related services.182 Commenters generally opposed applying the two rules to communications to private fund investors.183 They stated that existing, general anti-fraud provisions provide sufficient protection and any additional regulation would be unnecessary and duplicative.184 Other commenters supported explicitly including private funds in the scope of the rules, arguing that doing so would provide important protections to investors in these funds.185 We recognize that rule 206(4)–8 prohibits advisers to private funds from making misstatements or materially misleading statements to investors in those vehicles.186 An adviser’s general anti-fraud obligations to investors in private funds under rule 206(4)–8 parallel an adviser’s general anti-fraud

187For example, rule 206(4)–8 prohibits investment advisers to pooled investment vehicles from engaging in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle. The final rule will include more specific provisions in the context of advertisements. See final rule 206(4)–1(b) through (d). To the extent that an advertising practice would violate a specific restriction imposed by the final rule, rule 206(4)– 8 may already prohibit the practice. 188We recognize that a single investor could invest in both private funds managed by the adviser and other products (e.g., separately managed accounts) managed by the adviser. The final rule would ensure that advisers apply the same principles-based framework across products and services, which could reduce advisers’ compliance burdens. 189See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter III. But see supra footnotes 183–184. 190See SBIA Comment Letter; NRS Comment Letter. 191These communications also are subject to various statutory and regulatory anti-fraud provisions, such as section 17(a) of the Securities Act, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and rule 10b–5 thereunder. 192See infra sections II.E. and II.G. See also NYC Bar Comment Letter (discussing the administrative and compliance burdens and costs associated with applying the standards for Retail Advertisements and Non-Retail Advertisements (each as defined below) for private funds under the proposed advertising rule). 193See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; AIC Comment Letter; Proskauer Comment Letter. 194PPMs are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. See also supra footnote 88 (discussing an adviser’s fiduciary duties). Whether particular information included in a PPM constitutes an advertisement of the adviser depends on the relevant facts and circumstances. For example, if a PPM contained related performance information of separate accounts the adviser manages, that related performance information is likely to constitute an advertisement. 195See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter; ILPA Comment Letter (seeking clarification that non-promotional material contained in a data room would not be subject to the rule). 196See, e.g., EFAMA Comment Letter (supporting the Commission’s proposal to increase protections to investors in collective investment schemes, but recommending that the Commission exclude (i) non-U.S. domiciled publicly offered, closed-end and open-end investment funds, including UCITS, and (ii) alternative investment funds and other non￾U.S. domiciled funds that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act, but for sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act); ILPA Comment Letter (recommending expanding to funds excluded from the definition of investment company by reason of section 3(c)(5) or 3(c)(11) of the Investment Company Act). 197See Sidley Austin
Comment Letter; see also Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Release No. IA–2333 (Dec. 2,
2004) [69 FR 72054, 72072 (Dec. 10, 2004)] (‘‘Hedge
Fund Adviser Release’’).
198See IAA Comment Letter; EFAMA Comment Letter. 199See Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Release No. IA–3222 obligations to all clients and prospective clients under section 206 of the Act. Accordingly, although the final marketing rule overlaps with the prohibitions in rule 206(4)–8 in certain circumstances, just as it overlaps with
section 206 with respect to an adviser’s
clients and prospective clients, we believe it is important from an investor protection standpoint to delineate these obligations to all investors in the advertising context and provide a framework for an adviser’s advertisements to comply with these obligations. By including marketing communications to private fund investors, the final rule will provide more specificity (and certainty) regarding what we believe to be untrue or misleading statements that advisers must avoid in their advertisements.187 The general prohibitions, for example, will provide advisers with a principles￾based framework to assess private fund advertisements and will provide greater clarity, compared to the anti-fraud provisions of the Act, on marketing practices that are likely misleading.188 This approach is consistent with some commenters who stated that the Commission should finalize rules in a manner that provides guidance to advisers on how to comply with a principles-based approach without creating overly prescriptive requirements that can be difficult to apply in practice.189 We understand that many private fund advisers already consider the current staff positions related to the current advertising rule when preparing their marketing communications.190 As a result, we believe that our application of the final rule to advertisements to private fund investors would result in limited additional regulatory or compliance costs for many of these advisers. We also believe that the modifications from the proposal will reduce potential costs and alleviate commenters’ concerns regarding the application of the final rule to an adviser’s advertisements to private fund investors. For example, the first prong of the definition of advertisement will not include one-on-one communications to private fund investors or communications with existing investors; as such, those communications will be subject to rule 206(4)–8 and not the advertising rule.191 The first prong of the definition of advertisement also excludes live, oral, extemporaneous communications. Further, we are not adopting a requirement for an adviser to pre-review all advertisements prior to dissemination or requirements for retail versus non-retail advertisements, as discussed below.192 Collectively, we believe these changes appropriately scope advertisements that would be subject to the rule. Not all communications to private fund investors would be advertisements under the final rule. Most commenters stated that private placement memoranda (‘‘PPMs’’) should not be treated as advertisements.193 We agree that information included in a PPM about the material terms, objectives, and risks of a fund offering is not an advertisement of the adviser.194 Private fund account statements, transaction reports, and other similar materials delivered to existing private fund investors, and presentations to existing clients concerning the performance of funds they have invested in (for example, at annual meetings of limited
partners) also would not be considered advertisements under the final rule. However, pitch books or other materials accompanying PPMs could fall within the definition of an advertisement. Some commenters sought clarification that due diligence rooms and their contents would not be considered advertisements.195 While due diligence rooms themselves are not advertisements, it is possible that some of the information they contain could qualify as an advertisement if the materials satisfy the requirements of the advertisement definition. Some commenters recommended expanding the final rule to other types of unregistered pooled investment vehicles, and one commenter specified which other types of unregistered pooled investment vehicles should be subject to the rule.196 While these commenters generally supported the idea of extending the scope of the rule, they did not explain why. Accordingly, we believe that the scope of the final rule is appropriate at this time. A commenter specifically sought confirmation that the proposed rules would not apply to an adviser whose principal office and place of business is outside the United States (offshore adviser) with regard to any of its non￾U.S. clients even if the non-U.S. client is a fund with U.S. investors.197 This commenter and others also asked the Commission to clarify the application of the proposals to communications with non-U.S. investors in funds domiciled outside of the United States.198 We have previously stated, and continue to take the position, that most of the substantive provisions of the Advisers Act do not apply with respect to the non-U.S. clients (including funds) of a registered offshore adviser.199 This

(June 22, 2011) [76 FR 39645 (July 6, 2011)] (Most of the substantive provisions of the Advisers Act do not apply to the non-U.S. clients of a non-U.S. adviser registered with the Commission.); Hedge Fund Adviser Release, supra footnote 197 (stating that the following rules under the Advisers Act would not apply to a registered offshore adviser, assuming it has no U.S. clients: Compliance rule, custody rule, and proxy voting rule and stating that the Commission would not subject an offshore adviser to the rules governing adviser advertising [17 CFR 275.206(4)–1], or cash solicitations [17 CFR 275.206(4)–3] with respect to offshore clients); American Bar Association, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Aug. 10, 2006) (confirming that the substantive provisions of the Act do not apply to offshore advisers with respect to those advisers’ offshore clients (including offshore funds) to the extent described in those letters and the Hedge Fund Adviser Release); IM Information Update No. 2017–03. 200See Hedge Fund Adviser Release, supra footnote 197 (noting that U.S. investors in an offshore fund generally would not expect the full protection of the U.S. securities laws and that U.S. investors may be precluded from an opportunity to invest in an offshore fund if their participation would result in full application of the Advisers Act and rules thereunder, but that a registered offshore adviser would be required to comply with the Advisers Act and rules thereunder with respect to any U.S. clients it may have). 201See, e.g., Hedge Fund Adviser Release supra footnote 197. 202See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992). As we noted when we adopted rule 206(4)–8, the court in Steadman analogized section 206(4) of the Advisers Act to section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, which the Supreme Court had held did not require a finding of scienter (citing Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)). See also Steadman at
643, n.5. In discussing section 17(a)(3) and its lack of a scienter requirement, the Steadman court observed that, similarly, a violation of section 206(2) of the Advisers Act could rest on a finding of simple negligence. See also Fiduciary Interpretation, supra footnote 88, at n.20. 203See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter; ILPA Comment Letter; IAA Comment; NRS Comment Letter; and NAPFA Comment Letter. 204See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Comment Letter of Managed Funds Association and Alternative Investment Management Association (May 8, 2020) (‘‘MFA/AIMA Comment Letter II’’). One commenter also argued that withdrawing the SEC staff no-action letters would create confusion and lack of guidance. NYC Bar Comment Letter (citing, for example, Clover Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Oct. 28, 1986) (‘‘Clover Letter’’), Stalker Advisory Services, SEC Staff No￾Action Letter (Jan. 18,1994) (Stalker Letter’’), F. Eberstadt & Co., Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 2, 1978) (‘‘Eberstadt Letter’’), TCW Group, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Nov. 7, 2008) (‘‘TCW Letter’’), and Franklin Management, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Dec. 10, 1998) (‘‘Franklin Letter’’). However, we do not view the principles of the general prohibitions to be substantive departures from the positions in existing staff no￾action letters and guidance. 205The nature of the audience would be relevant if an adviser chooses to tailor the content of an advertisement to a specific audience because the content is not appropriate for a broader audience. FINRA has a similar requirement under its General Standards regarding Communications with the Public. See FINRA rule 2210(d)(1)(E) (‘‘Members must consider the nature of the audience to which the communication will be directed and must provide details and explanations appropriate to the audience.’’). 206Final rule 206(4)–1(a)(1). approach was designed to provide appropriate flexibility where an adviser has its principal office and place of business outside of the United States.200 We believe it is appropriate to continue to apply this approach in this context. For an adviser whose principal office and place of business is in the United States (onshore adviser), the Advisers Act and rules thereunder apply with respect to the adviser’s U.S. and non￾U.S. clients.201 B. General Prohibitions We are adopting, largely as proposed, the general prohibitions of certain marketing practices as a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts. We believe these practices are associated with a significant risk of being false or misleading. We therefore believe it is in the public interest to prohibit these practices, rather than permit them subject to specified conditions. The general prohibitions will apply to all advertisements to the extent that an adviser directly or indirectly disseminates such advertisement. Specifically, in any advertisement, an adviser may not:
(1) Include any untrue statement of a material fact, or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, not misleading; (2) Include a material statement of fact that the adviser does not have a reasonable basis for believing it will be able to substantiate upon demand by the Commission; (3) Include information that would reasonably be likely to cause an untrue or misleading implication or inference to be drawn concerning a material fact relating to the investment adviser; (4) Discuss any potential benefits to clients or investors connected with or resulting from the investment adviser’s services or methods of operation without providing fair and balanced treatment of any material risks or material limitations associated with the potential benefits; (5) Include a reference to specific investment advice provided by the investment adviser where such investment advice is not presented in a manner that is fair and balanced; (6) Include or exclude performance results, or present performance time periods, in a manner that is not fair and balanced; or (7) Otherwise be materially misleading. As noted in the proposal, to establish a violation of the rule, the Commission will not need to demonstrate that an investment adviser acted with scienter; negligence is sufficient.202 Many commenters supported the prohibitions’ principles-based framework.203 However, other commenters found the proposed general prohibitions confusing and redundant and suggested streamlining them into fewer standards (or eliminating them altogether) and relying on the general anti-fraud standard instead.204 After considering comments, we are making certain modifications, as discussed below. We continue to believe that prohibiting certain marketing practices is appropriate and that the final provisions provide important requirements for investment advisers and protections for investors. In our view, the general prohibitions provide greater clarity on marketing practices that are likely misleading compared to just relying on the anti-fraud provisions of the Act. We also believe that the general prohibitions we are adopting provide appropriate flexibility and regulatory certainty for advisers considering how to market their investment advisory services. In applying the general prohibitions, an adviser should consider the facts and circumstances of each advertisement. The nature of the audience to which the advertisement is directed is a key factor in determining how the general prohibitions should be applied.205 For instance, the amount and type of information that may need to be included in an advertisement directed at retail investors may differ from the information that may need to be included in an advertisement directed at sophisticated institutional investors. We discuss below each of the general prohibitions and the comments we received.

1. Untrue Statements and Omissions
   As proposed, the final rule will prohibit advertisements that include any untrue statements of a material fact, or that omit a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, not misleading.206 One commenter argued that this prohibition would be duplicative of sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act, which prohibit advisers from ‘‘employ[ing] any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client’’ and ‘‘engag[ing] in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective

207NYC Bar Comment Letter. This commenter also noted that section 206(4) prohibits investment advisers from ‘‘engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.’’ 208While we acknowledge there may be circumstances that are covered by both the anti￾fraud prohibitions and this provision, we believe that this provision helps provide specificity when addressing an adviser’s marketing activities. In addition, to the extent possible, this rule can serve as a resource for identifying an adviser’s obligations with respect to marketing generally, and thus we believe that retaining this general prohibition will serve to assist advisers in meeting their compliance obligations. 209Current rule 206(4)–1(a)(5) prohibits an advertisement that contains any untrue statement of a material fact and uses similar wording as other anti-fraud provisions in the Federal securities laws. See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.10b–5; 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(2); 17 CFR 230.156(a); rule 206(4)–8. 210When we use the phrase ‘‘false or misleading statements’’ in this release, we are referring to this general prohibition against advertisements that include any untrue statements of a material fact, or omissions of a material fact necessary in order to make a statement, in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, not misleading. 211Although one commenter stated that an adviser should be required to show returns of an appropriate benchmark for the same periods as presented for the adviser’s performance, we do not believe that it is necessary to prescribe such disclosures and that such decisions should be left at the discretion of the adviser, subject to the general prohibitions of the final rule and the general anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. See CFA Institute Comment Letter. Accordingly, we are not requiring the inclusion of a relevant index or benchmark to avoid making any presentation of performance misleading. 212See current rule 206(4)–1(a)(4); see also Dow Theory Forecasts, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (May 21, 1986) (‘‘Dow Theory Letter’’) (staff declined to provide no-action recommendation where an offer for ‘‘free’’ subscription was subject to conditions). 213An adviser’s use of graphs, charts, or formulas to represent, directly or indirectly, that such graphs, charts, or formulas can in and of themselves be used to determine which securities to buy or sell, or when to buy or sell them, is explicitly prohibited in the current rule. See current rule 206(4)–1(a)(3) (also prohibiting an advertisement from representing, directly or indirectly, that any graph, chart, formula or other device being offered will assist any person in making his own decisions as to which securities to buy, sell, or when to buy or sell them, without disclosing the limitations and difficulties with respect to the use of such a graph, chart, formula or other device). 214See proposed rule 206(4)–1(a)(2). 215See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment
Letter I (stating that this requirement would greatly increase cost and operational burdens and curb the flow of information to clients and investors); FPA Comment Letter; NVCA Comment Letter; Fried Frank Comment Letter. 216See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Fried Frank Comment Letter. 217See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; FPA Comment Letter; Fried Frank Comment Letter. 218For example, we would view performance returns included in an advertisement to be material statements of fact that an adviser would need a reasonable basis for believing that it will be able to substantiate. Because current rule 204–2(a)(16) already requires the maintenance of records ‘‘to support the basis for or demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of return of any or all managed accounts or securities recommendations in any . . . advertisement,’’ we believe that any recordkeeping burden related to performance information included in an advertisement will not be significantly new or altered. See current rule 204–2(a)(16). Final rule 204–2(a)(16) will similarly require advisers to retain records or documents necessary to form the basis for or demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of return of any or all managed accounts, portfolio or securities recommendations presented in any advertisement. See final rule 204–2(a)(16). 219Final rule 206(4)–1(a)(2). Demand by the Commission includes demand by the Commission’s client.’’ 207 However, we view this prohibition as complementary to, rather than duplicative of, the statutory anti￾fraud prohibitions cited by the commenter.208 We continue to believe that this prohibition, together with the other general prohibitions under the rule, is appropriately designed to prevent fraud under the Act, specifically in the context of marketing. Moreover, this provision retains the substance of current rule 206(4)–1(a)(5).209 As with similar anti-fraud provisions in the Federal securities laws, whether a statement is false or misleading depends on the context in which the statement or omission is made.210 For example, as under the current rule, advertising that an adviser’s performance was positive during the last fiscal year may be misleading if the adviser omitted that an index or benchmark consisting of a substantively comparable portfolio of securities experienced significantly higher returns during the same period. To avoid making a misleading statement, the adviser in this example could include the relevant index or benchmark or otherwise disclose that the adviser’s performance, although positive, significantly underperformed the market.211 Under the final rule, it would be misleading for an adviser to compensate a person to refer investors to the adviser by stating that the person had a ‘‘positive experience’’ with the adviser when such person is not a client or private fund investor of the adviser for its advisory services. To avoid making such a statement misleading, the adviser could disclose that the
experience does not relate to any advisory services. It would also be misleading for an adviser to use a promoter’s testimonial or endorsement that the adviser knows or reasonably should know to be fraudulent, misleading, or untrue, regardless of whether the adviser compensates the promoter. For instance, an adviser may not provide a testimonial on its website where a client falsely claims that the client has worked with the adviser for over 20 years when the adviser has only been in business for five years. The current rule contains an explicit prohibition on advertisements that contain statements to the effect that a report, analysis, or other service will be furnished free of charge, unless the analysis or service is actually free and without condition.212 We continue to believe that this practice will be captured by the final rule’s prohibition on untrue statements or omissions. As a result, the final rule will not contain separate explicit prohibitions of such statements. In addition, depending on the disclosures provided and the extent to which an adviser in fact does provide investment advice solely based on such materials, it may be false or misleading under this provision to represent, directly or indirectly, in an advertisement that any graph, chart, or formula can by itself be used to determine which securities to buy or sell.213
2. Unsubstantiated Material Statements
of Fact
The proposed rule would have prohibited advertisements that include any material claim or statement that is unsubstantiated.214 Commenters argued that the proposed ‘‘substantiation’’ requirement would be overly burdensome.215 For example, two commenters argued that it would require advisers to obtain evidence to support every claim or statement in an advertisement out of uncertainty as to what might be ‘‘material.’’ 216 Commenters also found the requirement unclear, questioning whether, for example, such a prohibition would effectively foreclose any statements of opinion.217 We are sensitive to commenters’ concerns regarding the burdens and lack of clarity of this proposed provision. As a result, we are making two changes to the requirement. First, we are limiting the substantiation requirement to matters of material fact rather than any material claim or statement. We do not believe that this would be unduly burdensome for advisers as such material statements of fact, as opposed to opinions, should be verifiable. For instance, material facts might include a statement that each of its portfolio managers holds a particular certification or that it offers a certain type or number of investment products. Claims about performance would also be statements about material facts.218 Conversely, statements that clearly provide an opinion would not be statements of material fact. Second, we are requiring advisers to have a reasonable basis to believe that they can substantiate material claims of fact upon demand by the Commission.219 This change is designed

examiners or other representatives. The adviser’s obligation to produce such materials on demand will last as long as the relevant advertisement needs to be retained under the recordkeeping rule. See current rule 204–2(e)(1). 220See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; NVCA Comment Letter. 221Some advisers likely will (and some already do) maintain records to substantiate non￾performance material statements of fact included in an advertisement when the advertisement is created; however, this is not required as long as the adviser has a reasonable basis for believing it will be able to substantiate the information upon demand by the Commission. 222See proposed rule 206(4)–1(a)(3). 223See Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter II. 224Final rule 206(4)–1(a)(3). An adviser’s statements in an advertisement also are subject to
section 208(a) of the Act, which generally states that
it is unlawful for a registered investment adviser to represent or imply that it has been sponsored, recommended, or approved by any agency of the United States. Section 208(b) of the Act generally states that Section 208(a) shall not be construed to prohibit a person from stating that he is registered with the Commission as an investment adviser if the statement is true and if the effect of his registration is not misrepresented. Nevertheless, an adviser’s use of the phrase ‘‘registered investment adviser’’ (or the initials ‘‘RIA’’ or ‘‘R.I.A.’’) to state or imply that it has a level of professional competence, education or other special training could be misleading under the final rule. 225CFA Institute Comment Letter. 226See, e.g., Clover Letter (stating the use of performance results in an advertisement in the staff’s view would be false or misleading if it implies, or a reader would infer from it, something about the adviser’s competence or about future investment results that would not be true had the advertisement included all material facts); Stalker Letter (stating that copies of articles printed in independent publications that contain performance information of an adviser would be prohibited if they implied false or misleading information absent additional facts); Eberstadt Letter (stating that advertisements could be misleading if they imply positive facts about the adviser when additional facts, if also provided, would cause the implication not to arise). 227See In the Matter of Spear & Staff, Inc., Release No. IA–188 (Mar. 25, 1965) (settled order) (the Commission brought an enforcement action against an investment adviser asserting, in part, that the adviser’s advertisements, which recounted a number of factually accurate stories highlighting the outstanding investment success of certain selected clients collectively created ‘‘illusory hopes of immediate and substantial profit’’). 228See AIC Comment Letter (‘‘The Proposing Release does not suggest how an adviser may ascertain whether a testimonial is representative of that adviser’s investors. Such a determination may require that an adviser poll or survey a material sample of its investors.’’); IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; Comment Letter of Truth in Advertising, Inc. (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘TINA Comment Letter’’). 229See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II and IAA Comment Letter. 230See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Commenter Letter I. to reduce burdens on advisers and allow them to avoid the need to develop and maintain a file of substantiating materials for every advertisement.220 Advisers would be able to demonstrate this reasonable belief in a number of ways. For example, they could make a record contemporaneous with the advertisement demonstrating the basis for their belief.221 An adviser might also choose to implement policies and procedures to address how this requirement is met. However, if an adviser is unable to substantiate the material claims of fact made
in an advertisement when the Commission demands it, we will presume that the adviser did not have a reasonable basis for its belief. We believe that the burden on advisers to have a reasonable basis for believing they will be able to substantiate a material statement of fact upon demand by the Commission is justified by the importance of ensuring that advisers do not advertise material claims of fact that cannot be substantiated and the need to facilitate our staff’s examination of advisers.
3. Untrue or Misleading Implications or
Inferences
The proposed rule would have prohibited any advertisement that includes an untrue or misleading implication about, or is reasonably likely to cause an untrue or misleading inference to be drawn concerning, a material fact relating to an investment adviser.222 After considering comments, we are adopting this prohibition but modifying it to add the reasonableness standard to ‘‘implication,’’ and not only to ‘‘inference.’’ 223 Accordingly, the final rule will prohibit an adviser from including, in any advertisement, information that would reasonably be likely to cause an untrue or misleading implication or inference to be drawn concerning a material fact relating to an investment adviser.224 One commenter suggested eliminating this prohibition altogether and instead relying on the prohibition against untrue statements or omissions, stating that it is difficult to enforce when something is ‘‘implied’’ or ‘‘inferred.’’ 225 However, we continue to believe that this prohibition appropriately addresses certain activities that would not be subject to the first prohibition, such as those raised in previous staff no-action letters.226 For example, this provision will prohibit an adviser from making a series of statements in an advertisement that literally are true when read individually, but whose overall effect is reasonably likely to create an untrue or misleading inference or implication about the investment adviser.227 For instance, if an adviser were to state accurately in an advertisement that it has ‘‘more than a hundred clients that have stuck with me for more than ten years,’’ we believe it may create a misleading implication if the adviser actually has a very high turnover rate of clients. Additionally, this provision will prohibit an adviser from stating that all of its clients have seen profits, even if true, without providing appropriate disclosures if it only has two clients, as it may be reasonably likely to cause a misleading inference by potential clients that they would have a high chance of profit by hiring the adviser as well. Commenters requested more guidance regarding when advertised testimonials would comply with this general prohibition.228 Two commenters argued that it would effectively eliminate an adviser’s ability to use testimonials if advisers had to present negative testimonials alongside positive ones, particularly in the context of online and social media platforms.229 We do not believe that the general prohibition requires an adviser to present an equal number of negative testimonials alongside positive testimonials in an advertisement, or balance endorsements with negative statements in order to avoid giving rise to a misleading inference, as certain commenters suggested.230 Rather, the general prohibition requires the adviser to consider the context and totality of information presented such that it would not reasonably be likely to cause any misleading implication or inference. General disclaimer language (e.g., ‘‘these
results may not be typical of all investors’’) would not be sufficient to overcome this general prohibition. However, one approach that we believe would generally be consistent with the general prohibitions would be for an adviser to include a disclaimer that the testimonial provided was not representative, and then provide a link to, or other means of accessing (such as oral directions to go to the relevant parts of an adviser’s website), all or a representative sample of the testimonials about the adviser. As discussed in further detail in
section II.B.5. below, we believe this
provision (along with the other provisions discussed below) will prohibit ‘‘cherry picking’’ of past investments or investment strategies of the adviser—that is, including favorable results while omitting unfavorable ones in a manner that is not fair and balanced.
4. Failure To Provide Fair and Balanced
Treatment of Material Risks or Material Limitations The proposed rule would have prohibited advertisements that discuss

231Proposed rule 206(4)–1(a)(4).
232See final rule 206(4)–1(a)(4).
233See, e.g., Ropes & Gray Comment Letter and MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 234See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 235CFA Institute Comment Letter. 236See, e.g., Fidelity Comment Letter; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; Comment Letter of T. Rowe Price (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘T. Rowe Price Comment Letter’’); LinkedIn Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 237See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; LinkedIn Comment Letter; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter. 238Final rule 206(4)–1(a)(4). For the sake of clarity, the materiality standard will explicitly apply to both the risks and the limitations. 239As we discussed in the proposal, this general prohibition was drawn from FINRA rule 2210’s general standards. See FINRA rule 2210(d)(1)(D). The final rule’s use of ‘‘fair and balanced’’ is more closely aligned with FINRA 2210, and accordingly, we believe that advisers that are familiar with those standards may be able to use that experience as a guide in complying with this requirement. 240For example, if an adviser states that it will reduce an investor’s taxes through its tax-loss harvesting strategies, the adviser should also discuss the associated material risks or material limitations, including that any reduction in taxes would depend on an investor’s tax situation. 241 In addition to hyperlinks, advisers may use other tools to provide investors with layered disclosure, including QR codes or mouse-over windows. 242See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 243See rule 156(b)(3)(i); FINRA rule 2210(d)(1). 244See final rule 206(4)–1(a)(5). or imply any potential benefits connected with or resulting from the investment adviser’s services or methods of operation without clearly and prominently discussing associated material risks or other limitations associated with the potential benefits.231 We are generally retaining this requirement with some modifications in response to comments.232 Some commenters suggested eliminating this prohibition, arguing that it is redundant since Form ADV
Part 2 already requires the disclosure of
material risks.233 Commenters also expressed concern that this prohibition would expand the amount of required disclosures, dramatically lengthen advertisements, and overwhelm the content included in the advertisement.234 One commenter recommended removing ‘‘or imply’’ from this prohibition, stating that it would be difficult for the Commission staff to prove something is implied.235 Several commenters requested that the Commission permit the use of hyperlinks and layered disclosures to satisfy the requirement that the necessary disclosures be made ‘‘clearly and prominently,’’ arguing that such an approach would be consistent with the Commission’s stated goal of modernizing the advertising rule.236 Commenters also suggested that requiring an adviser to include detailed risk disclosures required under the proposed general prohibition in a clear and prominent manner may not be feasible in certain formats without the use of hyperlinks.237 In response to these concerns, we have modified this provision to prohibit advertisements that discuss any potential benefits connected with or resulting from the investment adviser’s services or methods of operation without providing fair and balanced treatment of any material risks or material limitations associated with the potential benefits.238 We continue to believe that advertisements should provide an accurate portrayal of both the risks and benefits of the adviser’s services. However, as proposed, the prohibition may have led advisers to provide overly voluminous disclosure of associated material risks, as well as overly inclusive disclosure of ‘‘other limitations.’’ We believe this could have resulted in lengthy, boilerplate disclosure that could reduce the salience of the risk and limitation information for investors. Because we are requiring fair and balanced treatment of material risks or material limitations associated with the benefits advertised, we no longer believe the requirement to ‘‘clearly and prominently’’ provide material risk disclosures is necessary.239 The proposed prohibition was designed to mitigate the risk that an adviser’s advertisement might discuss only the benefits of its services but not include sufficient information about the material risks that the client may face. We believe that the requirement to provide benefits and material risks in a fair and balanced manner similarly achieves this goal. In addition, it will promote a more digestible discussion for investors by making clear that advisers need not discuss every potential risk or limitation in detail, but must instead discuss the material risks and material limitations associated with the benefits in a fair and balanced manner.240 We expect that this approach will help facilitate layered disclosure. For example, an advertisement could comply with this requirement by identifying one benefit of an adviser’s services, accompany the discussion of the benefit with fair and balanced treatment of material risks associated with
that benefit within the four corners of that advertisement, and then include a hyperlink 241 to additional content that discusses additional benefits and additional risks of the adviser’s services in a fair and balanced manner. So long as each layer of a layered advertisement complies with the requirement to provide benefits and risks in a fair and balanced manner, providing hyperlinks to additional content would meet the requirement of this general prohibition. However, an adviser should not use layered disclosure or hyperlinks to obscure important information. For instance, it would not be sufficient to advertise only an adviser’s past profits on a web page and then include a hyperlink to another page that included all material risks and material limitations as that would violate the fair and balanced presentation requirement. We are also removing the term ‘‘imply’’ from this general prohibition, which a commenter found unclear.242 Removing the term imply will make this provision more consistent with similar requirements with which many advisers are already familiar.243 In addition, we believe that the other general prohibitions (including the prohibition on information that could cause a misleading implication or inference to be drawn), address the concerns that led us to include the term imply in this general prohibition at proposal. We believe this prohibition differs in scope from the disclosures required by Form ADV. For example, Item 8 of Form ADV Part 2A requires material risk disclosures more specifically with respect to investing in securities and certain investment strategies and risks involved. Moreover, an investment adviser must provide its brochure prepared in accordance with Form ADV to its clients, but not to investors in private funds it manages. The marketing rule’s prohibition requires risk disclosures related to any potential benefits advertised to both clients and private fund investors. We believe that providing such disclosures in advertisements is necessary in order to avoid misleading potential investors as well as existing investors in connection with new services or investments.
5. Anti-Cherry Picking Provisions:
References to Specific Investment Advice and Presentation of Performance Results The final rule contains, as proposed, two other provisions designed to address concerns about investment advisers presenting potentially cherry￾picked information in advertisements. a. References to Specific Investment Advice As proposed, the final rule will prohibit a reference in an advertisement to specific investment advice that is not presented in a fair and balanced manner.244 Commenters supported

245See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter; T. Rowe Price Comment Letter. 246NRS Comment Letter. 247See, e.g., ILPA Comment Letter (requesting clarification in the context of private equity funds); NASAA Comment Letter; Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 248See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; T. Rowe Price Comment Letter (noting that an adviser could mention security selections in a fair and balanced manner without complying with past staff positions). 249See NASAA Comment Letter. The phrase ‘‘fair and balanced’’ is used in FINRA rule 2210, which requires, among other things, that broker-dealer communications ‘‘must be fair and balanced and must provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts in regard to any particular security or type of security, industry, or service.’’ See FINRA rule 2210(d)(1)(A). 250For selecting and presenting performance information, these factors are in addition to the requirements and restrictions on presentation of performance discussed in section II.A.5. See final rule 206(4)–1(c). In addition, other provisions of the general prohibitions may prohibit a reference to specific investment advice, depending on the facts and circumstances. See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7. 251As stated in the proposal, an adviser may consider the current rule’s required disclosures when furnishing a list of all past specific recommendations made by the adviser within the immediately preceding period of not less than one year. See rule 206(4)–1(a)(2). However, the final rule will not require that an adviser include such disclosures, and such disclosures will not be the only way of satisfying paragraph (a)(4). 252An investment adviser should be mindful of the general prohibitions when selecting the measurement periods as well. 253Our staff has previously stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under rule 206(4)–1 relating to an advertisement that includes performance-based past specific recommendations based on certain representations, including that the adviser would use objective, non-performance based criteria to select the specific securities that it lists and discusses in the advertisement. See Franklin Letter. Although an adviser may find such staff positions helpful in complying with the final rule, the final rule does not include requirements corresponding to the specific representations in the Franklin letter. 254See AIC Comment Letter; ILPA Comment Letter. 255See final rule 206(4)–1(d). 256See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; T. Rowe Price Comment Letter. 257For example, our staff has stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under the Continued replacing the current rule’s per se prohibition against past specific recommendations with this principles￾based restriction on the presentation of specific investment advice.245 One commenter also supported the new fair and balanced standard.246 However, some commenters requested more guidance on how to satisfy the fair and balanced standard.247
Other commenters requested clarification that the principles from certain staff no￾action letters would not be the sole means to comply with the fair and balanced standard.248 One commenter asked whether we intend to incorporate the body of judicial or administrative decisions regarding FINRA rule 2210 and other similar provisions.249 We continue to believe this limitation requiring advertisements to have only fair and balanced inclusions of, or references to, specific investment advice is appropriate. The factors relevant to when an advertisement’s presentation of specific investment advice is fair and balanced will vary depending on the facts and circumstances. We provide examples of such factors below to illustrate the principles.250 While in some cases advisers may wish to consider FINRA’s interpretations related to the meaning of ‘‘fair and balanced’’ for issues we have not specifically addressed, FINRA Rule 2210 and its body of decisions are not controlling or authoritative interpretations with respect to our final rule.
i. Examples Regarding the Presentation
of Past Specific Investment Advice An advertisement that references favorable or profitable past specific investment advice without providing sufficient information and context to evaluate the merits of that advice is not fair and balanced. For example, an adviser may wish to share a ‘‘thought piece’’ to describe the specific investment advice it provided in response to a major market event. This would be permissible under the final rule, provided the advertisement included disclosures with appropriate contextual information for investors to evaluate those recommendations (e.g., the circumstances of the market event, such as its nature and timing, and any relevant investment constraints, such as liquidity constraints, during that time). One practice currently used by advisers is to provide unfavorable or unprofitable past specific investment advice in addition to the favorable or profitable advice.251 An adviser also may consider listing some, or all, of the specific investment advice of the same type, kind, grade, or classification as those specific investments presented in the advertisement. As an example, an investment adviser might provide a list of certain investments it recommended based upon certain selection criteria, such as the top holdings by value in a given strategy at a given point in time. The criteria investment advisers use to determine such lists in an advertisement, as well as how the criteria are applied, should produce fair and balanced results. We continue to believe that consistent application of the same selection criteria across measurement periods limits an investment adviser’s ability to reference specific investment advice in a manner that unfairly reflects only positive or favorable results.252 For example, in deciding what to include in an advertisement, an adviser may wish to apply non-performance related selection criteria across portfolio holdings, such as listing them on an alphabetical or rotational basis.253 Some commenters questioned whether this aspect of the final rule would permit case studies, which are popular in the private equity industry.254 We believe that case studies and any other similar information about the performance of portfolio companies are specific investment advice, subject to this general prohibition. For example, it would not be fair and balanced for an adviser to present, in an advertisement, case studies only reflecting profitable investments (when there are also similar unprofitable investments). To meet the fair and balanced standard, an adviser may, for example, disclose the overall performance of the relevant investment strategy or private fund for at least the relevant period covered by the list of investments. Case studies that include performance information also will be subject to the final rule’s restrictions and requirements for performance advertising.255 In determining how to present information in a fair and balanced manner, advisers should consider the facts and
circumstances of the advertisement, including the nature and sophistication of the audience. For example, in an advertisement intended for a retail investor, an adviser may include certain disclosures to help the investor understand that past specific investment advice does not guarantee future results such as an explanation of the particular or unique circumstances of the previous investment advice and how those circumstances are no longer relevant. Less detailed disclosure may be needed in an advertisement solely for sophisticated institutional investors, who more likely understand the risks associated with past specific investment advice. In response to the commenters who asked for clarification that the methods described in past staff no-action letters on presenting past specific recommendations would not be the only way to meet the fair and balanced standard,256 we are not prescribing any of the factors in those letters under the final rule. While advisers may wish to refer to these letters for examples, we agree with commenters that an adviser may satisfy the fair and balanced standard in other ways.257

current rule with respect to charts in an advertisement containing an adviser’s best and worst performers in certain circumstances. See the TCW Letter. Our staff has also stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under current rule 206(4)–1 relating to an advertisement that includes performance-based past specific recommendations if the adviser uses objective, non￾performance based criteria to select the specific securities that it lists and discusses in the advertisement in certain circumstances. See Franklin Letter. 258We understand there has been confusion under the current advertising rule’s prohibition against past specific ‘‘recommendations’’ as to whether an adviser makes a ‘‘recommendation’’ when it implements its strategy in a discretionary account because an adviser would not contact its client to make a recommendation that the client then either chooses to implement or decline. We believe an adviser’s recommendation, or investment advice, is implicit in the exercise of discretion. 259See final rule 206(4)–1(a)(6). 260See Ropes & Gray Comment Letter. 261Consumer Federation Comment Letter; NASAA Comment Letter. 262CFA Institute Comment Letter; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter; NASAA Comment Letter; ILPA Comment Letter. 263An advertisement that includes only favorable performance results or excludes only unfavorable performance results may also be ‘‘misleading’’ to the extent that such an advertisement would reasonably be likely to cause an untrue or misleading implication or inference to be drawn concerning the investment adviser that would not be implied or inferred were certain additional facts—i.e., any performance results excluded from the advertisement—disclosed. See final rule 206(4)– 1(a)(3). 264See Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, Release No. IC–26195 (Oct. 3,
2003) [68 FR 57760 (Oct. 6, 2003)].
265Final rule 206(4)–1(a)(7).
266See final rule 206(4)–1(a)(1).
267Statements made by an adviser that would be prohibited under the final rule’s general prohibitions of certain marketing practices would also be prohibited in an adviser’s advertisement if made by a third party in a covered testimonial or endorsement. For example, as we stated in the Proposing Release, we would generally view an advertisement as unlikely to be presented in a manner that is fair and balanced if it contains a testimonial, endorsement, or third-party rating that references performance information or specific investment advice provided by the adviser that was profitable but is not representative of the experience of the adviser’s investors. 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.2.e. 268Final rule 206(4)–1(b). 269See, e.g., Consumer Federation Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; LinkedIn Comment Letter; Fidelity Comment Letter; TINA Comment Letter. The final rule applies to any reference in an advertisement to specific investment advice given by the investment adviser, regardless of whether the investment advice is current or occurred in the past. This provision will apply regardless of whether the advice was acted upon, or reflected actual portfolio holdings, or was profitable. In addition, the provision applies to discretionary investments because the adviser is implementing its recommendation or advice in such a context.258 We continue to believe that including current as well as past references to specific investment advice in the final rule is appropriate because it avoids questions about when a current recommendation becomes past, which arise under the current advertising rule. In addition, we continue to believe that selective references to current investment recommendations in advertisements could mislead investors in the same manner as selective references to past recommendations. b. Presentation of Performance Results As proposed, the final rule will prohibit an investment adviser from including or excluding performance results, or presenting performance time periods, in a manner that is not fair and balanced in an advertisement.259 One commenter supported the proposed prohibition,260 while two others argued that the fair and balanced standard is subjective and difficult to enforce in this context.261 Some commenters requested more guidance by way of example to demonstrate how performance advertising could comply with the fair and balanced standard.262 We continue to believe that this prohibition appropriately addresses the concern that an adviser may ‘‘cherry￾pick’’ the periods used to generate performance results in advertisements.263 As with specific investment advice, the factors that are relevant to whether an advertisement’s reference to performance information is presented in a fair and balanced manner will vary based on the facts and circumstances. For example, presenting performance results over a very short period of time (e.g., two months), or over inconsistent periods of time, may result in
performance portrayals that are not reflective of the adviser’s general results and thus generally would not be fair and balanced. Additionally, an advertisement that highlights one period of extraordinary performance with only a footnote disclosure of unusual circumstances that have contributed to such performance may not be fair and balanced, depending on whether there are other sufficient clear and prominent disclosures, as discussed below.264 In cases where additional information is necessary for an investor to assess performance results, failure to provide such information in an advertisement is not consistent with the fair and balanced standard. For example, in order to provide investors with a fair and balanced portrayal of its performance results, an adviser should consider providing information related to the state of the market at the time, any unusual circumstances, and other material factors that contributed to such performance. In section II.E, we discuss further specific requirements and conditions for portrayals of certain types of performance in advertisements that we are also adopting as part of this final rule.
6. Otherwise Materially Misleading
Finally, we are adopting a catch-all provision, as proposed, that will prohibit any advertisement that is otherwise materially misleading.265 We did not receive any comments on this catch-all provision. We continue to believe this prohibition will help ensure that materially misleading practices not specifically covered by the other prohibitions will be addressed. For example, if an adviser provided accurate disclosures, but presented them in an unreadable font, such an advertisement would be materially misleading and prohibited under this provision. Because we are prohibiting a variety of specific types of advertisement practices within the general prohibitions, most of which include an element of materiality, as discussed above, we are focusing the catch-all provision on only those advertisements that are otherwise materially misleading. We continue to believe that limiting the catch-all to materially misleading advertisements will be more appropriate within the overall structure of the prohibitions while still achieving our goal of prohibiting misleading conduct that may affect an investor’s decision-making process. We also continue to believe that, in light of the rule’s prohibition on making untrue statements and omissions of material fact, including ‘‘false’’ is unnecessary in the catch-all provision as it is already covered by another prohibition.266
C. Conditions Applicable to
Testimonials and Endorsements, Including Solicitations

1. Overview
   Consistent with the proposal, the final rule permits advisers to include testimonials and endorsements in an advertisement, subject to the rule’s general prohibitions and additional conditions.267 These conditions differ depending on whether the testimonial or endorsement is compensated or uncompensated, which is similar to the framework we proposed.268 Numerous commenters supported the proposed expansion from the current advertising rule to permit advisers to include testimonials and endorsements in advertisements.269 Commenters

270See Consumer Federation Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 271See Comment Letter of TABR Capital Management, LLC (Jan. 6, 2020); Comment Letter of the Institute for the Fiduciary Standard (Feb. 10,
2020) (‘‘Fiduciary Institute Comment Letter’’).
272See NAPFA Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter (arguing that permitting paid endorsements will lead to largest advisers vying for endorsements from celebrities and popular ‘‘financial gurus’’). 273See supra section II.A.3. 274Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(6) and (16). 275See final rule 206(4)–1(b) (imposing disclosure, adviser oversight, and disqualification conditions). This approach derives from the current solicitation rule. See also final rule 206(4)– 1(b)(4)(i). 276Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). We proposed the final disclosure requirements separately under the proposed amendments to the advertising rule and solicitation rule. The proposed advertising rule amendments would have required disclosures that:
(1) The testimonial was given by a client or investor, and the endorsement was given by a non￾client or non-investor, as applicable; and (2) if applicable, cash or non-cash compensation has been provided by or on behalf of the adviser in connection with obtaining or using the testimonial or endorsement. See proposed rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). The proposed amendments to the solicitation rule would have required disclosure of the terms of the compensation arrangement and description of any material conflicts of interest. See proposed rules 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii)(D) and (E). 277See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii)(F). 278See NAPFA Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 279MMI Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 280FINRA’s rule 2210(d)(6) requires, among other things, that a testimonial disclose the following: (i) The fact that it may not be representative of the experience of other customers; (ii) the fact that the testimonial is no guarantee of future performance or success; and (iii) if more than $100 in value is paid for the testimonial, the fact that it is a paid testimonial. FINRA rule 2210(d)(6)(B). 281For example, unlike under FINRA rule 2210, an adviser would be required to disclose the material terms of compensation for a testimonial, even where a person receives de minimis compensation, under the final marketing rule. 282See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i). If the promoter provides the disclosures, the investment adviser Continued explained that consumer preferences have shifted to rely increasingly on third-party resources to inform purchasing decisions.270 Other commenters opposed permitting any testimonials or endorsements, paid or unpaid, in adviser advertisements.271 These commenters were concerned that permitting advisers to advertise paid testimonials and endorsements would increase puffery and cause a ‘‘race to the bottom’’ for advisers seeking paid endorsements.272 As discussed above, we have expanded the definitions of both testimonial and endorsement to include certain solicitation activity.273 This expansion recognizes the overlap between our approach to solicitation under the proposal and compensated testimonials and endorsements.274 It is also designed to capture solicitation activities that previously have been subject to the cash solicitation rule and subject them to the marketing rule. The final rule includes conditions for an adviser’s use of testimonials and endorsements designed to address concerns raised by commenters. These conditions include disclosure requirements to make prospective clients and investors aware of the conflicts of interest associated with testimonials and endorsements and a requirement that an investment adviser have a reasonable basis to believe that the testimonial or endorsement complies with the marketing rule. In addition, because we believe compensated testimonials and endorsements present a heightened risk for conflicts and misleading investors, the final rule will prevent advisers from using certain
compensated testimonials and endorsements made by certain ‘‘bad actors’’ and other ineligible persons. The final rule will also require that an investment adviser have a written agreement with certain persons giving a testimonial or endorsement for compensation above the de minimis threshold.275
2. Required Disclosures
The final rule will require advertisements that include any testimonials or endorsements to provide disclosures of certain information similar to what was proposed under each of the advertising and solicitation rules, subject to certain exceptions, as discussed below. Specifically, the final rule will require that the investment adviser disclose, or reasonably believe that the person giving the testimonial or endorsement discloses, the following at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated:
(i) Clearly and prominently:
(A) That the testimonial was given by a current client or private fund investor, and the endorsement was given by a person other than a current client or private fund investor, as applicable; (B) That cash or non-cash compensation was provided for the testimonial or endorsement, if applicable; and (C) A brief statement of any material conflicts of interest on the part of the person giving the testimonial or endorsement resulting from the investment adviser’s relationship with such person; (ii) The material terms of any compensation arrangement including a description of the compensation provided or to be provided, directly or indirectly, to the person for the testimonial or endorsement; and (iii) A description of any material conflicts of interest on the part of the person giving the testimonial or endorsement resulting from the investment adviser’s relationship with such person and/or any compensation arrangement.276 We are not adopting the proposed requirement under the solicitation rule to disclose the amount of any additional cost to the investor as a result of solicitation for the reasons discussed below.277 We believe that disclosures are needed to inform and protect investors effectively when they are presented with testimonials and endorsements. We also share the concerns raised by some commenters that permitting paid testimonials and endorsements would increase the likelihood that personal bias will mislead investors.278 To address these issues in particular, we are adopting two disclosure requirements that we proposed under the solicitation rule— the disclosure of compensation arrangements and material conflicts of interest—under the final rule. We believe that these disclosures will benefit investors by providing them with a fuller context when presented with a testimonial or endorsement, without overly burdening those providing the testimonial or endorsement. Some commenters suggested that we should align our disclosure approach with FINRA’s rule 2210 to ease the compliance burdens of investment advisers that are registered broker￾dealers or affiliated with broker￾dealers.279 However, instead of aligning our disclosures with FINRA’s, such as FINRA’s specific, standardized disclosures in rule 2210(d)(6),280 we believe the final rule should provide advisers with a broad framework within which to determine how best to present testimonials and endorsements so they are not false or misleading. Accordingly, we are not adopting standardized disclosure requirements under our final rule. As a result, dually registered advisers and broker-dealers, that are not subject to the exemptions discussed below, that provide testimonials and endorsements with the disclosures required by FINRA should consider what additional or different disclosures they would need to make to comply with the final marketing rule.281 a. Clearly and Prominently The final rule will require that particular disclosures with respect to testimonials and endorsements be made
clearly and prominently.282 The

must reasonably believe that the promoter provides such disclosures clearly and prominently. See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). 283See proposed rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). 284See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii). 285We believe this will help reduce the risk of having misleading testimonials or endorsements in addition to the general prohibitions, which prohibit advertisements from being materially false or misleading. See 206(4)–1(a). 286See infra section II.C.2.f. (discussing oral testimonials and endorsements). The discussion in this section also applies to other parts of the final rule that include a clear and prominent disclosure standard, including the required disclosures related to third-party ratings and predecessor performance. Accordingly, such required disclosures should be included within the advertisement. 287See section II.B.4. (discussing commenters’ concerns with respect to the clear and prominent standard). See, e.g., MMI Comment Letter; T. Rowe Price Comment Letter; Fidelity Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 288See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i)(A) through (C). 289Accordingly, in the case of a compensated oral testimonial or endorsement, the adviser may, instead of recording and retaining the entire oral testimonial or endorsement, make and keep a record of the disclosures provided to investors. See final rule 204–2(a)(11)(i)(A)(2). See also infra
section II.C.2.f and II.I. (discussing oral testimonials
and endorsements). If an adviser or promoter provides an investor with written disclosures in connection with an oral testimonial or endorsement, instead of delivering the disclosures orally, the adviser or promoter should alert the investor to the importance of the disclosures, particularly with respect to the disclosures that must be provided clearly and prominently. See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i). If an adviser did not inform the investor about the importance of such disclosures, it would violate the general prohibition against false or misleading statements. See final rule 206(4)–1(a)(1). 290An advertisement intended to be viewed on a mobile device, for example, may meet the standard in a different way than one intended to be seen as a print advertisement (e.g., a person viewing a mobile device could be automatically redirected to the required disclosure before viewing the substance of an advertisement). 291See infra section II.C.2.a.i. through iii. (discussing status as a client or non-client, fact of compensation, and statement of material conflicts of interest). 292See, e.g., Fidelity Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II (suggesting that we adopt, or adopt an approach consistent with, the FTC approach to hyperlinks). See also Federal Trade Commission, Dot Com Disclosures Guidance Update (Mar. 2013). While the FTC guidance permits the use of hyperlinks, it generally allows the use of hyperlinks to provide disclosures that are ‘‘not integral to the triggering claim’’ and places a number of conditions on the ability to provide hyperlinks. 293Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i)(A). See proposed rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i). The promoter may be an entity or a natural person. 294Client status will be assessed at the time that a testimonial or endorsement is disseminated. However, depending on the facts and circumstances, a former client may be considered a client for these purposes. For example, if a person is giving a statement about his or her recent prior experience with the adviser, the communication could be treated as a testimonial. proposed advertising rule would have required clear and prominent disclosure of: (1) Whether the testimonial or endorsement was given by a client or investor or a non-client or investor; and (2) if applicable, that compensation was provided by or on behalf of the adviser in connection with the testimonial or endorsement.283 The proposed solicitation rule would have required that, under the terms of the written agreement, the solicitor or adviser provide the investor at the time of solicitation activities with a separate disclosure that includes, among other matters, the terms of any compensation arrangement, including a description of the compensation provided or to be provided to the solicitor, and a description of any potential material conflicts of interest on the part of the solicitor resulting from the investment adviser’s relationship with the solicitor and/or the compensation
arrangement.284 In merging the two rules under the final rule, we have determined to preserve that testimonials and endorsements must provide for certain concise disclosures to be made clearly and prominently as well as for certain additional disclosures to be made at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated. We continue to believe that certain required disclosures should be made clearly and prominently to help prevent misleading testimonials and endorsements.285 In addition to the two disclosures required under the proposed advertising rule, we also are requiring that a brief statement of any material conflicts of interest on the part of the person giving the testimonial or endorsement be made clearly and prominently. In order to be clear and prominent, the disclosures must be at least as prominent as the testimonial or endorsement. In other words, we believe that the ‘‘clear and prominent’’ standard requires that the disclosures be included within the testimonial or endorsement, or in the case of an oral testimonial or endorsement, provided at the same time.286 As discussed above, many commenters requested more flexibility with respect to hyperlinked disclosures under the clear and prominent standard.287 With respect to the disclosures for testimonials and endorsements that are subject to the clear and prominent standard, we believe such disclosures must be provided clearly and prominently within the testimonial or endorsement.288 Specifically, we believe such disclosures should appear close to the associated statement such that the statement and disclosures are read at the same time, rather than referring the reader somewhere else to obtain the disclosures. In cases in which an oral testimonial or endorsement is provided, it would be consistent with the clear and prominent standard if the disclosures are provided in a written format, so long as they are provided at the time of the testimonial or endorsement.289 The requirement to provide the disclosures with respect to testimonials and endorsements ‘‘clearly and prominently’’ may necessitate formatting and tailoring based on the form of the communication.290 However, after considering comments, we are requiring advisers to provide only certain disclosures regarding testimonials and endorsements clearly and prominently, as discussed in more detail below.291 We believe that the disclosures required to be provided clearly and prominently are integral to the concerns associated with testimonials and endorsements in an advertisement. Our approach is consistent with the Federal Trade Commission’s (‘‘FTC’’) guidance, which also requires disclosures that are integral to the claim to accompany the claim to prevent deception.292 We also believe that these disclosures can be provided succinctly within the testimonial or endorsement such that advisers may advertise their services using modern technology and platforms that limit the size or characters of an advertisement. Moreover, we expect
that succinctly providing these disclosures will promote their salience and impact. Other required disclosures, which provide investors with additional useful information but that are not integral to the concerns related to these advertisements, may be provided through hyperlinks, in a separate disclosure document or any other similar methods.
i. Status as a Client or Non-Client
Similar to what we proposed under the advertising rule, the final rule will require clear and prominent disclosure that a testimonial was given by a current client or investor, and that an endorsement was given by a person other than a current client or investor.293 We believe that this disclosure will provide investors with important context for weighing the relevance of the testimonial or endorsement. For example, an investor might reasonably give more weight to a statement made about an adviser by a current investor rather than someone who was never an investor.294 Additionally, without clearly attributing an endorsement to someone other than an investor, the advertisement could mislead investors who may assume the

295Testimonials and endorsements are subject to the rule’s general prohibitions. Whether a testimonial or endorsement would reasonably be likely to cause an untrue or misleading implication or inference to be drawn concerning a material fact relating to the investment adviser would depend on the facts and circumstances. For instance, it would be misleading for an adviser to provide investors with a testimonial claiming a positive experience with the adviser by a former client, without mentioning that the person has not been a client for 20 years. 296See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii)(B). The proposed rule would have also required disclosure of the adviser’s name. Proposed rule 206(4)– 3(a)(1)(iii)(A). 297Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i) through (ii). The proposed advertising rule would have only required disclosure of the client or non-client status of the person providing the testimonial or endorsement and whether compensation has been provided for the testimonial or endorsement. See proposed rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). 298 In the case of testimonials and endorsements where compensation paid is above the de minimis threshold, advisers are required to maintain a written agreement with a promoter. See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(2)(ii) and (b)(4)(i). In such cases, the agreement would provide a record of the name of such promoter. See rule 204–2(a)(10), which currently requires that advisers retain ‘‘[a]ll written agreements (or copies thereof) entered into by the investment adviser with any client or otherwise relating to the business of such investment adviser as such.’’ 299Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i)(B). See proposed rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(ii). 300Consumer Federation Comment Letter; SBIA Comment Letter. 301Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 302Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i)(C). 303We expect this brief statement of any material conflicts of interest to be substantially shorter than the description of any material conflicts of interest that is required, as discussed below. See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(ii). 304See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(iii). 305Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(ii). 306See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii)(D). 307See, e.g., Comment Letter of Flexible Plan Investments, Ltd. on proposed solicitation rule (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter I’’); Comment Letter of Proskauer Rose LLP (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Proskauer Comment Letter’’). 308Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter I. 309This is consistent with the Commission’s position regarding the disclosure requirements under the existing cash solicitation rule. See 1979 Adopting Release, supra footnote 3, at text accompanying nn.15 and 16. 310This is similar to the Commission’s position under the existing cash solicitation rule. See 1979 Adopting Release, supra footnote 3, at text accompanying nn.15 and 16. endorsement reflects the endorser’s experience as an investor.295 The proposed solicitation rule would have required disclosure of the name of the solicitor.296 However, similar
to the proposed advertising rule, the final rule will not require the disclosure of the name of the promoter.297 We did not receive any comments on the requirement under the proposed solicitation rule to disclose the name of the solicitor. We expect that advisers may still choose to disclose the full name of the promoter because disclosing the name of the promoter could help an investor assess the reputation or other qualifications of the person. However, we believe our final approach is appropriate for privacy reasons and takes into account cases where a promoter may not wish to give his or her name.298 We also believe that in cases where a name is not provided, the rule’s general prohibitions will protect investors from fraudulent or misleading testimonials or endorsements. An investor may also give less weight to that particular testimonial or endorsement.
ii. Fact of Compensation
Similar to what we proposed under the advertising rule, the final rule will require clear and prominent disclosure that cash or non-cash compensation was provided for the testimonial or endorsement, if applicable.299 Similar to the disclosure of a promoter’s status as a current investor or person other than a current investor, we continue to believe that this disclosure will provide investors with important context for weighing the relevance of the testimonial or endorsement. Two commenters specifically supported requiring advisers to disclose whether they paid for testimonials or endorsements under the proposed advertising rule.300 One of these commenters stated that without requiring clear and prominent disclosure that a particular testimonial or endorsement is effectively a ‘‘paid-for advertisement,’’ investors would not be able to determine whether they are consuming an authentic, unbiased review of the adviser.301 We agree, and we believe that this simple but clear disclosure is one that is both beneficial for investors and easy to implement for advisers, including on space￾constrained platforms. For example, when providing a testimonial or endorsement on a social media platform, an adviser must clearly and prominently label the testimonial or endorsement as being a paid testimonial or endorsement.
iii. Statement of Material Conflicts of
Interest
The final rule will require clear and prominent disclosure of a brief statement of any material conflicts of interest on the part of the promoter resulting from its relationship with the investment adviser.302 Similar to the other disclosures subject to the clear and prominent standard, we expect this disclosure to be succinct. For example, it would be sufficient for an adviser to simply state that the testimonial or endorsement was provided by an affiliate of the adviser, or that the promoter is related to the adviser, if this relationship is the source of the conflict.303 We believe the required disclosures result in information that informs and protects investors, yet can be provided succinctly within the testimonial or endorsement. We also believe this form of layered disclosure enhances the salience of this information and may help investors better focus on the presence of conflicts of interest than requiring potentially more lengthy disclosures. We require a fuller description of any material conflicts of interests resulting from the promoter’s relationship with the adviser and/or the promoter’s compensation arrangement with the adviser as part of the disclosures provided with respect to testimonials or endorsements, but this is not subject to the clear and prominent standard.304 b. Material Terms of Compensation Arrangement The final rule will require disclosure of the material terms of any compensation arrangement, including a description of the compensation provided or to be provided, directly or indirectly, to the person for the testimonial or endorsement.305 This provision is based on the disclosure requirement of the proposed solicitation rule. The proposed solicitation rule would have required the disclosure of the terms of any compensation arrangement, including a description of the compensation provided or to be provided to the solicitor.306 Some commenters stated that the disclosure requirement was overbroad and unclear.307 For instance, one commenter stated that it is unclear whether an adviser should disclose reimbursing a solicitor for third-party expenses in the solicitation process under this requirement.308 The final rule requires disclosure of compensation provided, directly or indirectly, for the testimonial or endorsement. If payment of third￾party expenses is part of the compensation arrangement for the testimonial or endorsement, then such payment should be disclosed under the final rule. If a specific amount of cash compensation is paid, the advertisement should disclose that amount.309 If the compensation takes the form of a percentage of the total advisory fee over a period of time, then the advertisement should disclose such percentage and time period.310 With respect to non-cash

311This is also similar to the Commission’s position under the existing cash solicitation rule. See 1979 Adopting Release, supra footnote 3, at text accompanying nn.15 and 16. 312See Proskauer Comment Letter. 313See Investment Adviser Marketing Feedback Form. 314As stated in our proposal, the materiality of the incentive to solicit investors to an investor’s evaluation of the referral depends on the type and magnitude of the compensation. We believe that the description of a compensation arrangement will be helpful for investors to consider the types and levels of incentives present. 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.B.4. 315 If the amount of increased fees for the investor is known or could reasonably be obtained, then such amount should be disclosed as part of this requirement. 316Proskauer Comment Letter (stating that this requirement would result in ‘‘very extensive’’ disclosures, particularly if an adviser has multiple arrangements with multiple solicitors). 317Such activities will fall under the definition of endorsement. 318See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(ii). 319See also Fiduciary Interpretation, supra footnote 88, at 23 (‘‘an adviser must eliminate or at least expose through full and fair disclosure all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.’’). compensation, if the value of the non￾cash compensation is readily ascertainable, the disclosures should include that amount. Moreover, if all or
part of the compensation, cash or non￾cash, is payable upon dissemination of
the testimonial or endorsement or is deferred or contingent on a certain future event, such as an investor’s continuation or renewal of its advisory relationship, agreement, or investment, then the advertisement should disclose those terms.311 In response to this requirement under our proposed solicitation rule, one commenter argued that requiring detailed disclosures about compensation arrangements would result in lengthy disclosures that would be confusing for, and irrelevant to, investors.312 The commenter suggested that the rule require solicitors to disclose only that they are receiving compensation for the solicitation. This commenter stated that this disclosure would adequately alert investors to the inherent conflict of interest associated with such compensation. At the same time, several commenters considered additional compensation information about a compensated solicitor’s referral, including the amount paid to the solicitor for referring the adviser, whether there would be any additional cost to the investor, and the solicitor’s relationship to the adviser, ‘‘very important.’’ 313 Although we believe that a simple disclosure that compensation was provided is sufficient for purposes of the clear and prominent disclosures, we continue to believe that the disclosure related to the terms of the compensation arrangement help convey to the investor the nature and magnitude of the person’s incentive to refer the investor to the adviser.314 The incentive might vary based on the structure of the compensation arrangement. A promoter that receives a flat or fixed fee from an adviser for a set number of referrals might have a different incentive in referring to the adviser than another that receives a fee, such as a percentage of the investor’s assets under management, for each investor that becomes a client of, or a private fund investor with, the adviser. Furthermore, trailing fees (i.e., fees that are continuing) that are contingent on the investor’s relationship with the adviser continuing for a specified period of time present additional considerations in evaluating the promoter’s incentives. It would be relevant to an investor to know that a promoter continues to receive compensation after the investor becomes a client of, or private fund investor with, the adviser, as well as the period of time over which the promoter continues to receive compensation for such solicitation. A longer trailing period can present a greater incentive to solicit the investor. In addition, if, as
part of the compensation arrangement
between the adviser and promoter, an investor would pay increased advisory fees for becoming a client as a result of the promoter’s testimonial or endorsement, then this information would be relevant so that the investor can make such considerations when choosing an adviser.315 After considering comments, we are requiring that the disclosures only include the material terms of any compensation arrangement. Accordingly, these disclosures need not include immaterial aspects of a compensation arrangement. These disclosures also need not include detailed information about the calculation of the compensation payable to each person giving a testimonial or endorsement; they need not be lengthy to convey the magnitude and nature of the conflict. In addition, these disclosures should not include all compensation arrangements that an adviser has with any and all promoters, as one commenter suggested, but rather should include only information about the relevant compensation arrangement between an adviser and a specific promoter in order for the disclosure to be effective.316 As modified, this provision will require disclosures about any compensation arrangement with a promoter for its testimonial or endorsement. An adviser may arrange to compensate a third-party marketing company to advertise and refer potential clients to the adviser. If the compensation arrangement calls for a percentage of fees collected from the referred clients, then the disclosures should state so and describe what that percentage is. An adviser may also have a directed brokerage arrangement with a third-party brokerage firm, in which the adviser will direct brokerage to the firm as compensation for the firm’s solicitation of clients for, or referral of clients to, the adviser.317 In these cases, the adviser or firm should disclose the material terms of this arrangement, including a brief description of the compensation provided or to be provided to the firm. As part of the disclosure of the material terms of the compensation, the disclosure should state the range of commissions that the firm charges for investors directed to it by the adviser. Furthermore, if the solicitation or referral is contingent upon the firm receiving a particular threshold of directed brokerage (and other services, if applicable) from the adviser, the disclosure should say so. Additional disclosure would be required, for example, if the firm and the adviser agree that as compensation for the firm’s endorsement of the adviser, the adviser’s directed brokerage activities would extend to other clients such as the solicited client’s friends and family. The final rule will require the advertisement to disclose compensation that the adviser provides directly or indirectly to a person for a testimonial or endorsement.318 For example, if an individual solicits an investor and the adviser compensates a related person of that individual for such solicitation (such as an employer or another entity that is associated
with the individual), the adviser or individual will need to include this compensation in its disclosures. If a person, such as a broker-dealer, refers clients to advisers that recommend the broker-dealer’s or its affiliate’s proprietary investment products or recommend products that have revenue sharing or other pecuniary arrangements with the broker-dealer or its affiliate, the disclosures must say so.319 Regardless of whether the adviser’s arrangement is with an individual or the individual’s firm, compensation to the firm for any testimonial or endorsement will constitute compensation under the rule, as it would be likely to affect the

320Proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii)(E). 321Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(iii). The materiality standard applies to the investor(s) being solicited by the promoter. In other words, if an investor would consider a particular conflict of interest on the part of the promoter to be material to his or her decision to choose an investment adviser, then such conflict of interest should be disclosed. 322See TINA Comment Letter. 323See Proskauer Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 324See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 325See, e.g., Fidelity Comment Letter. 326See, e.g., Fidelity Comment Letter, which also stated that Form CRS would be an additional place where investors may find similar information. 327Such persons would also have disclosure obligations under the anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. If a person meets the definition of ‘‘investment adviser,’’ as defined under section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, such person has a fiduciary duty to clients, regardless of whether the adviser is registered or required to be registered, and is thus liable under the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act and other Federal securities laws for failure to disclose conflicts of interest. 328See, e.g., Item 4.A. of Form ADV, Part 2 (requires disclosure if a relationship between adviser and supervised person’s other financial industry activities creates a material conflict of interest with clients); Item 5.E of Form ADV, Part 2 (requires disclosure of conflict of interest to the extent that the adviser or any of its supervised persons accepts compensation for the sale of securities or other investment products); Item 10.C. of Form ADV, Part 2 (requires description of material conflict of interests with related persons, as defined in Form ADV, and only if the relationship or arrangement with the related person creates a material conflict of interest with clients); Item 10.D. of Form ADV, Part 2 (requires disclosure of material conflict of interest if the adviser receives compensation from or has other business relationships with other advisers). 329The Disclosure Obligation requires that a broker-dealer disclose in writing all material facts about the scope and terms of its relationship with a retail customer, including the material fees and costs the customer will incur as well as all material facts relating to its conflicts of interest associated with the recommendation, including third-party payments and compensation arrangements. See Regulation Best Interest Release, supra footnote 146, at 14. See also infra section II.C.5. (discussing exemptions). 330See infra section II.C.5. (discussing exemptions). To the extent that a broker-dealer’s testimonial or endorsement under rule 206(4)–1 is a recommendation to a retail customer of a securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities by a broker-dealer, the Disclosure Obligation under Regulation BI would apply to the broker-dealer’s testimonial or endorsement. 331This will be a
change from the current solicitation rule’s requirement that the solicitor state whether the client will pay a specific fee to the adviser in addition to the advisory fee, and whether the client will pay higher advisory fees than other clients (and the difference in such fees) because the client was referred by the solicitor. See current rule 206(4)–3(b)(6). 332See section II.C.2.b. (discussing material terms of compensation arrangement disclosure). individual’s salary, bonus, commission or continued association with the firm.
c. Material Conflicts of Interest
The proposed solicitation rule would have required a description of any potential material conflicts of interest on the part of the solicitor resulting from the investment adviser’s relationship with the solicitor and/or compensation arrangement.320 We have slightly modified this proposed requirement by removing the word ‘‘potential’’ from ‘‘potential material conflicts of interest,’’ as discussed in detail below. Accordingly, the final rule will require a description of any material conflicts of interest on the part of the person giving the testimonial or endorsement resulting from the investment adviser’s relationship with such person and/or any compensation arrangement.321 One commenter to the proposed advertising rule requested that we broaden the disclosure provision and require disclosure of all ‘‘material connections,’’ stating that there are types of connections besides the fact of compensation that could ‘‘materially affect the weight or credibility’’ of a testimonial or endorsement.322 With respect to the proposed solicitation rule requirement, some commenters supported making clear to investors that a conflict of interest may result from an adviser’s relationship with the solicitor and/or their compensation arrangement.323 Others stated that the disclosure of potential material conflicts of interest would likely be redundant with the required disclosure of the terms of any compensation arrangement.324 Commenters also argued that such a requirement would result in disclosure that is too lengthy without much benefit.325 These commenters stated that registered investment advisers and broker-dealers who act as solicitors are already subject to similar disclosure obligations under Form ADV Part 2 and Regulation BI, respectively.326 We believe our modification of removing the word ‘‘potential’’ from the proposed requirement will help reduce the burden on advisers as well as the length of the disclosures without eliminating any material information provided to investors. We do not believe the compensation arrangement disclosure alone is sufficient as it merely implies the conflict. Rather, there should be explicit disclosure that the promoter, due to such compensation, has an incentive to recommend the adviser, resulting in a material conflict of interest. Additionally, we believe a promoter could have other material conflicts of interest based on a relationship with the investment adviser that could affect the credibility of the testimonial or endorsement. Accordingly, to the extent that there is any material conflict of interest, the rule will require a description of such material conflict of interest. We recognize that persons who are also registered as investment advisers or broker-dealers have other disclosure obligations relating to conflicts of interest, such as the requirements of Form ADV.327 We do not believe that disclosures provided in Form ADV would sufficiently satisfy this provision. For example, although Form ADV Part 2
requires disclosure of material conflicts of interest, the disclosure required by the form is limited to conflicts related to relationships with specific personnel such as the adviser’s supervised persons and related persons.328 Moreover, we do not believe that an adviser that is acting as a promoter would be required to deliver its Form ADV Part 2 to a person the adviser was soliciting to become a client of another investment adviser. On the other hand, in circumstances where Regulation BI applies to a broker￾dealer’s activity as a promoter, we believe the Disclosure Obligation under Regulation BI is sufficiently similar to satisfy the disclosure provisions under our final rule.329 Accordingly, as discussed below, we are adopting a partial exemption from the final rule’s required disclosures in certain circumstances.330 We had proposed under the solicitation rule to require disclosure of the amount of any additional cost to the investor as a result of the testimonial or endorsement. We did not receive any comments on this proposed requirement. After further contemplation, we believe that such a requirement under the final rule, which would apply to all testimonials and endorsements, would create burdens that are not commensurate with the benefits of the disclosure and are accordingly eliminating this requirement.331 Such costs could vary by client and over time, making it difficult for advisers to disclose concisely in an advertisement. Moreover, to the extent that an adviser knows or reasonably should know that an investor would pay increased advisory fees as a result of its compensation arrangement or relationship with a promoter, then such disclosures would be made under another provision of the rule as discussed above.332 d. Reasonable Belief Under the final rule, an adviser that does not provide the required

333See proposed rule 206(4)–1(b)(1) and (2) (each requiring a reasonable belief standard for investment advisers). See also proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(2) (requiring a reasonable basis for believing that solicitor has complied with the written agreement requirement). 334See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(2)(ii). To the extent that the promoter’s testimonial or endorsement falls under the de minimis exemption, advisers would not be required to, but may choose to, enter into a written agreement and include such provisions. Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(2)(ii) and (b)(4)(i). 335Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). This is similar to the existing cash solicitation rule, which requires that the solicitor disclosure be delivered at the time of any solicitation activities. See current rule 206(4)– 3(a)(2)(iii)(A). 336Proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii). 337The timing for several aspects of the proposed solicitation rule was ‘‘at the time’’ of solicitation. See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at
section II.B.4 (discussing solicitor disclosure),
section II.B.5. (discussing written agreement),
section II.B.6. (discussing adviser oversight and
compliance) and section II.B.7 (discussing disqualification). 338The current solicitation rule requires that the solicitor deliver the solicitor disclosure ‘‘at the time of any solicitation activities.’’ Rule 206(4)– 3(a)(2)(ii). 339See IAA Comment Letter; Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter I (‘‘. . . delivery should simply be required before the recipient of the solicitation or referral becomes a client of the adviser.’’); Nesler Comment Letter. 340The exemption for broker-dealers subject to Regulation BI would allow for the related disclosures to be provided prior to or at the time of a recommendation, which may, in some cases, precede a particular testimonial or endorsement for private fund investors. However, unless the broker￾dealer had made previous recommendations subject to Regulation BI to the investor, the testimonial or endorsement would likely be the first time the investor is receiving the disclosure. See Regulation Best Interest Release, supra footnote 146 (‘‘Broker￾dealers could meet the Disclosure Obligation by making certain required disclosures of information regarding conflicts of interest to their customers at the beginning of a relationship, and this form of disclosure may be standardized. However, if standardized disclosure, provided at such time, does not sufficiently identify the material facts relating to conflicts of interest associated with any particular recommendation, the disclosure would need to be supplemented so that such disclosure is tailored to the particular recommendation.’’). 341See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(iii). The current solicitation rule also requires delivery of a separate disclosure. 342See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i). See also
section II.C.2.a. (discussing clear and prominent
standard).
343See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I (responding to our request for comment in the Proposing Release as to whether the disclosure should be separate, as proposed). 344See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter. 345See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). This is also similar to the proposed advertising rule, which required that the investment adviser clearly and prominently disclose or reasonably believe that the testimonial or endorsement clearly and prominently disclosed certain information. See proposed rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). disclosures must reasonably believe that the promoter discloses the required information. We proposed a reasonable belief standard under the advertising rule and continue to believe that the standard is appropriate in ensuring that the required disclosures are provided.333 To have a reasonable belief, an adviser may provide the required disclosures to a promoter and seek to confirm that the promoter provides those disclosures to investors. For example, if a blogger or social media influencer is endorsing and referring clients to the adviser through his or her website or platform, the adviser may provide such blogger or influencer with the required disclosures and confirm that they are provided appropriately on his or her respective pages. The adviser may choose to include provisions in its written agreement with the promoter, requiring the promoter to provide the required disclosures to investors.334 The aforementioned ways are only examples of how an adviser may demonstrate that it has a reasonable belief. e. Timing of Disclosures Under the final rule, the required disclosures with respect to testimonials and endorsements must be delivered at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated.335 The proposed solicitation rule would have required delivery of a separate solicitor disclosure at the time of any solicitation activities (or in the case of a mass communication, as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter).336 Given that the final rule requires certain disclosures to be included within the testimonial or endorsement per the clear and prominent standard, rather than delivered separately, as discussed below, we are not adopting the proposed alternative to provide the disclosures as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter in the case of mass communications. We continue to believe the timing of disclosures is important.337 If the disclosures are not provided at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated, many of the disclosures may not have the same impact on investors.338 Some commenters to the proposed solicitation rule suggested that the rule require delivery of solicitor disclosure after a prospective client expresses interest in the adviser’s services or becomes a client of the adviser, rather than at the time of solicitation.339 We decline to make this change as we continue to believe these disclosures should be provided at the time of dissemination of
the testimonial or endorsement to protect against investor confusion.340 f. No Separate Disclosure Requirement We are not adopting the proposed requirement for a separate solicitor’s disclosure.341 In light of the merger of the advertising and solicitation rules, we believe that requiring certain disclosures be provided clearly and prominently within the testimonial or endorsement, and other disclosures be otherwise provided, is a more practical and effective approach to informing investors and clients.342 For example, if an adviser compensates a podcast host for endorsing the adviser in its podcast or as an advertisement during the podcast, including certain of the required disclosures in the podcast itself would give greater prominence to these disclosures and have a greater impact on the potential investor than a separate disclosure document with all of the required disclosures. Commenters raised concerns about separate solicitor disclosure, noting that the extra documentation would burden investment advisers and overwhelm clients.343 These commenters also suggested providing flexibility to include the disclosures within other solicitation materials or incorporating the solicitor disclosure into other required disclosures, such as the Form ADV Part 2A. We believe that it would reduce the effectiveness of the disclosures for testimonials and endorsements to allow them all to be included within other solicitation materials given our view that particular disclosures should be provided clearly and prominently. In a change from the proposal, the final rule will not permit the delivery of the solicitor disclosure as soon as reasonably practicable after the time of any solicitation activities in the case of a mass communication. We believe that the changes under the final rule, such as the elimination of a separate disclosure requirement, eliminate the need to provide a different delivery requirement for the required disclosures. In fact, as noted above, we believe that the required disclosures should be provided at the time that such testimonial or endorsement is disseminated in all cases in order to have a meaningful impact on investors. Under the proposed solicitation rule, either the adviser or the solicitor would have been able to give the disclosures. Commenters generally supported this flexibility.344 Accordingly, under the final rule, either the adviser or the promoter may provide the required disclosures, subject to the other conditions of the rule.345 We do not believe the impact of the disclosures will be undermined by permitting either

346 If the disclosures are made in writing, we have stated that an ‘‘in writing’’ requirement could be satisfied either through paper or electronic means consistent with existing Commission guidance on electronic delivery of documents. See Regulation Best Interest Release, supra footnote 146, at text accompanying nn.499–500. If delivery of the required disclosure is made electronically, it should be done in accordance with the Commission’s guidance regarding electronic delivery. See Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents, and Investment Advisers for Delivery of Information; Additional Examples Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Investment Company Act of 1940, Release No. 34–37182 (May 9, 1996) [61 FR 24644 (May 15, 1996)]; see also 2000 Release, supra footnote 43; and see also 1995 Release, supra footnote 43. 347See NASAA Comment Letter (‘‘Emails, text messages, instant messages, electronic presentations, videos, podcasts, and other modern methods of communications . . . do not adequately ensure that the investor will read, hear, or understand the importance of the disclosures. Furthermore, these and similar electronic communications are ill-suited to allowing the client to retain a copy of the disclosure in a form and location that can easily be recalled when necessary.’’). 348To the extent that a testimonial or endorsement is disseminated by an adviser indirectly through a third party, an adviser should retain such records as well. See final rule 204– 2(a)(11)(i)(A), which requires that advisers retain a copy of each advertisement. 349 In addition to the disclosures that are required to be provided clearly and prominently within the testimonial or endorsement, an adviser may choose to provide the other disclosures that are not subject to the clear and prominent standard within the testimonial or endorsement. See supra section II.C.2.a. (discussing clear and prominent standard). In circumstances in which an adviser does not provide the other disclosures within the advertisement, an adviser would be required to maintain such disclosures under the recordkeeping rule. See final rule 204–2(a)(15)(i). 350See final rule 204–2(a)(11)(i)(A)(2). If the required disclosures are provided in a written format, then only the written disclosures would need to be maintained. If the required disclosures are provided orally, however, this record need not necessarily be an actual recording of the oral disclosures provided, but must contain the fact that the oral disclosures were provided, the substance of what was provided, and when. 351See Nesler Comment Letter (asking the Commission to clarify that if disclosures are provided orally, such disclosure in oral form needs to be recorded prior to being provided to a client, and not at the time it is provided to the client). 352 In order to avoid duplicative records, advisers may maintain records of a script or reading of a script of disclosures provided orally.
353Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(2) and (4). 354Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(2). 355See current rule 206(4)–3(a)(2)(iii)(C) (requiring that the investment adviser make a bona fide effort to ascertain whether the solicitor has complied with the agreement, and have a reasonable basis for believing that the solicitor has so complied.). 356See rule 206(4)–3(a)(2)(iii)(C). 357 1979 Adopting Release, supra footnote 3, accompanying nn.14 and 15. 358However, the oversight requirement contains two prongs with separate obligations. Although certain mechanisms in the written agreement, if implemented, could lead the adviser to have a reasonable basis for believing that any testimonial or endorsement complies with the requirements of the rule, having a written agreement by itself would not satisfy the first prong of the oversight requirement. the adviser or the promoter to provide the disclosures. Our final rule does not require an adviser or promoter to present the required disclosures in paper.346 One commenter stated that an investor would not grasp the importance of the disclosure if it is not in a paper document.347 We disagree that electronic or oral communication cannot be effective. We believe that providing flexibility regarding disclosure format is necessary to allow the disclosures to be provided at the time of dissemination of a testimonial or endorsement. We also believe that our adopted disclosure requirements will be adaptable to different types of testimonial and endorsement arrangements. Because disclosures must be clear and prominent, the final rule mitigates concerns that investors will not read or hear electronic disclosures. Regardless of the format, the adviser will be required, under the Act’s books and records rule, to make and keep true, accurate, and current copies of the advertisement.348 In some circumstances, a copy of the advertisement (i.e., the testimonial or endorsement) may include all of the required disclosures with respect to the testimonial or endorsement.349 In the case of a compensated oral testimonial or endorsement, the adviser may, instead of recording and retaining the entire oral testimonial or endorsement, make and keep a record of the disclosures provided to investors.350 Additionally, in response to one commenter,351 we are clarifying that if an adviser disseminates the required disclosures orally in connection with an oral testimonial or endorsement, the adviser may choose, consistent with applicable law, to record the oral disclosures either prior to or at the time of the dissemination of the testimonial or endorsement.352
3. Adviser Oversight and Compliance
All testimonials and endorsements, including those that are compensated and those that are uncompensated and meet prong one of the definition of advertisement, will be subject to an adviser oversight and compliance provision under the final rule.353 The final rule will require the investment adviser to have: (i) A reasonable basis for believing that any testimonial or endorsement complies with the requirements of the rule, and (ii) a written agreement with any person giving a compensated testimonial or endorsement that describes the scope of the agreed upon activities and the terms of the compensation for those activities when the adviser is providing compensation for testimonials and endorsements that is above the de minimis threshold.354 The oversight requirement we are adopting is similar to the proposed oversight requirement and the current solicitation rule’s oversight requirement, but differs in several respects to address commenters’ concerns and to reflect the merger of the two rules.355 First, the adviser oversight condition will require that the adviser have a reasonable basis for believing that the testimonial or endorsement complies with the requirements of the final rule, rather than the terms of a written agreement as proposed. The proposal would have replaced the solicitation rule’s current requirement that the written agreement contain an undertaking by the solicitor to perform its duties under the agreement in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder with the requirement that the solicitor agree to perform its solicitation activities in accordance with sections 206(1), (2), and (4) of the Act.356 We believe that explicitly requiring advisers to oversee third-party advertisements for compliance with the specific restrictions and requirements in the marketing rule, rather than the broader anti-fraud provisions, more appropriately and precisely addresses the risks posed by such advertisements. The question of what would constitute a reasonable basis for believing that the testimonial or endorsement complies with the requirements of the final rule would depend upon the facts and circumstances. For instance, in the context of solicitation or referral activity, we believe that, as under the solicitation rule, a reasonable basis could involve periodically making inquiries of a sample of investors solicited or referred by the promoter in order to assess whether that promoter’s statements comply with the rule.357 An adviser could implement policies and procedures to form a reasonable basis for believing the testimonial or endorsement complies with the rule. An adviser also could include terms in its written agreement with the promoter to help form such a reasonable belief. Such agreements could provide mechanisms, for example, to enable advisers to pre￾review testimonials or endorsements, or otherwise impose limitations on the content of those statements.358 Second, the final rule will require that an
adviser pay any compensation over

359See rule 206(4)–3(a)(2)(iii); see proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1). 360See supra section II.C.2.f. 361For example, the written agreement requirement could be met through a written private placement agreement that describes the scope of the agreed upon activities and the terms of the compensation for those activities. 362See rule 206(4)–3(a)(2)(iii)(B). 363Under the compliance rule, each adviser that is registered or required to be registered under the Act is required to adopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the adviser and its supervised persons from violating the Advisers Act and the rules thereunder. Rule 206(4)–7. See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.B.6. Advisers should address their marketing practices in their policies and procedures under the compliance rule. 364MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 365Mercer Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Nesler Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 366Mercer Comment Letter. 367MFA/AIMA Commenter Letter I; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 368Mercer Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 369SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 370Mercer Comment Letter. 371Rule 206(4)–7. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Release No. IA–2204 (Dec. 17, 2003) [68 FR 74714 (Dec. 24, 2003)] (‘‘Compliance Program Adopting Release’’). 372 In addition, any endorsements and testimonials by third parties that are advertisements, or are part of an advertisement, will be subject to the recordkeeping obligations of rule 204–2, as discussed below. See infra section II.I. 373Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(3). 374Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(9). See final rule 206(4)– 1(e)(3) and (4) for the defined terms ‘‘disqualifying Commission action’’ and ‘‘disqualifying event.’’ the de minimis threshold for a testimonial or endorsement pursuant to a written agreement with the person (aside from certain affiliates) giving the testimonial or endorsement. As proposed, the final rule will require that the written agreement describe the scope of the agreed upon activities and the terms of the compensation for those activities. Also as proposed, the final rule will not require that the written agreement require the promoter to deliver the adviser’s brochure. We continue to believe that this requirement is duplicative of an adviser’s delivery obligation under rule 204–3, the Act’s brochure rule. The final rule, however, will not require that the written agreement require the promoter to deliver a separate written disclosure document as proposed (and as required under the current solicitation rule).359 Instead we are requiring advertisements that include testimonials or endorsements to provide certain disclosures at the time they are disseminated. Thus, we do not believe the rule should also prescribe in the written agreement that these disclosures are delivered in a separate document.360 In many cases, we believe the adviser itself will be providing the disclosures.
Therefore, this approach will provide the adviser with flexibility in determining whether and how to address these disclosures in its written agreement with a promoter. Consistent with the final rule’s principles-based approach, this streamlined requirement provides more flexibility for an adviser to determine how to tailor its written agreement with its promoters.361 We believe that advisers are better situated to tailor their oversight approach based on the types of testimonials and endorsements used and the risks in their particular arrangements. For the same reasons, as proposed, the final rule will not incorporate the current solicitation rule’s requirement for the adviser to obtain a signed and dated acknowledgment from the client that the client has received the required disclosure.362 This principles-based approach is consistent with the Act’s compliance rule, which requires advisers to adopt and implement compliance policies and procedures, but does not mandate specific elements of such policies and procedures.363 One commenter supported a flexible and principles-based approach to adviser oversight.364 Several commenters supported our proposed approach to streamline the required provisions of the written agreement, such as by removing the provision requiring the solicitor to deliver the adviser’s brochure.365 Another commenter opposed the proposed requirement that the written agreement require the adviser to oversee the solicitor for compliance with the Act’s anti-fraud provisions, arguing that this is a regulatory function, not an advisory function.366 Some commenters also specifically supported removing the current rule’s requirement that an adviser obtain a signed and dated acknowledgment.367 Two commenters, however, opposed the proposed oversight requirement, arguing that it would be burdensome and overbroad to require the adviser to oversee compliance with a written agreement.368 One commenter argued that it would impose a new monitoring cost on advisers, which they will ultimately pass along to investors.369 Another commenter claimed that requiring advisers to contact a sample of clients to ascertain whether solicitors were complying with the written solicitation agreement would be awkward and burdensome.370 We believe the modifications to the adviser oversight condition discussed above address commenters’ concerns. These changes are consistent with our overall approach to shift to a principles￾based rule and leverage the Act’s existing compliance rule.371 We disagree with commenters’ assertion that this oversight requirement imposes a novel burden on advisers or is not an advisory function, considering the current solicitation rule’s oversight provision and the Advisers Act compliance rule. We continue to believe that the oversight provision will protect investors’ interests by requiring advisers to monitor third-party statements that constitute adviser advertisements (whether compensated or uncompensated) for compliance with the
rule’s requirements, especially when the adviser does not disseminate the testimonials or endorsements directly.372
4. Disqualification for Persons Who
Have Engaged in Misconduct The final marketing rule prohibits an adviser from compensating a person, directly or indirectly, for a testimonial or endorsement if the adviser knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the person giving the testimonial or endorsement is an ineligible person at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated.373 Under the final rule, an ‘‘ineligible person’’ is a person who is subject either to a ‘‘disqualifying Commission action’’ or to any ‘‘disqualifying event,’’ 374 and, as discussed below, certain of that person’s employees and other persons associated with an ineligible person. The final marketing rule’s disqualification provisions follow a structure similar to the proposed solicitation rule’s disqualification provisions, with the following changes. First, to reflect the incorporation of solicitation and referral activities into the final marketing rule’s definitions of endorsements and testimonials, the final rule applies the disqualification provisions to persons providing compensated testimonials and endorsements (i.e., compensated promoters). Second, under the final rule, certain Commission cease and desist orders will be disqualifying events (rather than disqualifying Commission actions, as proposed), and compensated promoters subject thereto may be eligible for the final rule’s conditional carve-out applicable to disqualifying events. Third, the final rule conforms the proposed ten-year lookback period across all disqualifying events, aligning to advisers’ disciplinary

375Commenters’ requests for not applying the proposed rule to certain existing solicitation arrangements are addressed in a separate section, below. 376See rule 506(d) of Regulation D under the Securities Act (‘‘rule 506(d) of Regulation D’’). Consistent with the approach discussed below, the final rule’s disqualification provision, paragraph (b)(3), will not disqualify any broker-dealer or any covered person for purposes of the final rule for any matter(s) that occurred prior to the effective date of the rule, if such matter(s) would not have disqualified such person under rule 206(4)– 3(a)(1)(ii), as in effect prior to the effective date of the rule. See infra section II.C.4.f. 377See NAPFA Comment Letter; NRS Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; MMI Comment Letter; Consumer Federation Comment Letter. Some commenters, however, disagreed with particular aspects of the proposed disqualification provisions, discussed below. 378See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at text accompanying nn.26–27. 379See e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Sidley Austin Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. See also infra section II.C.5, which discusses commenters’ concerns about overlapping requirements for broker-dealers, particularly with respect to disclosures. One commenter stated that most solicitors who place private fund interests are broker-dealers already subject to the statutory disqualifications in section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act, but did not comment on the comparability of the statutory disqualification provisions. See IAA Comment Letter. 380See rule 506(d) of Regulation D. 381See MMI Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I & III; FSI Comment Letter; Credit Suisse Comment Letter. Another alternative that commenters suggested was codification of existing no-action letters for broker-dealers and other solicitors. See infra section II.C.4.e (discussing the final rule’s conditional exception from the definition of disqualifying event). 382See infra section II.C.5.c. (discussing that broker-dealers are subject to disqualification for a variety of misconduct under the Exchange Act
section 3(a)(39), that the Exchange Act is
particularized to broker-dealer activity, and that we believe such disqualification provisions will serve the same policy goal as the disqualification provisions under this rule). 383See id. (discussing that these covered persons are subject to disqualification for a variety of misconduct under rule 506(d) of Regulation D, that rule 506(d) of Regulation D is particularized to activities in connection with certain securities offerings, and that we believe such disqualification provisions will serve the same policy goal as the disqualification provisions under this rule). 384Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iv). See rule 506(d)(1) of Regulation D. See also infra section II.C.5. 385For example, the final rule’s disqualification provisions and rule 506 of Regulation D apply to certain Commission orders that restrict a person’s activities (e.g., supervisory or compliance bars or suspensions), whereas the Exchange Act’s disqualification provisions do not. See, e.g., final rule 206(4)–1(e)(3); rule 506(d)(1)(ii); section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act. In addition, the Exchange Act disqualification provisions are triggered by activities of employees and other associated persons, similar to the final rule’s application to ‘‘ineligible persons,’’ but rule 506 of Regulation D is triggered by events involving partners, directors, and certain officers, but not other employees or associated persons. See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(9)(i)(A); rule 506(d)(1); section 3(a)(39)(E) of the Exchange Act. As another example, while the look-back periods under the final rule and the Exchange Act’s statutory disqualification extend for ten years, some of the look-back periods under rule 506 of Regulation D extend for ten years, and others extend only for five Continued disclosure reporting on Form ADV Part 1A.375 Fourth, the final rule’s definition of ineligible person will not apply to certain control affiliates of the ineligible person. Fifth, the final rule will exempt from the disqualification provisions compensated promoters that are broker￾dealers registered with the Commission in accordance with section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, provided that they are not subject to statutory disqualification as defined in the Exchange Act. It will also exempt any person covered by rule 506(d) of Regulation D with respect to a rule 506 securities offering, provided the person’s involvement would not disqualify the offering under that rule.376 Commenters generally supported the disqualification of compensated promoters that are ‘‘bad actors,’’ noting the importance of protecting investors from their influence in soliciting clients or investors for investment advisers.377 We believe compensated testimonials and endorsements raise the same concerns about misleading investors as compensated solicitations, and the final rule treats solicitations within the scope of the terms testimonial and endorsement. We are therefore adopting a final rule that prohibits advisers from compensating bad actors for
testimonials and endorsements, including solicitations. We did not propose, and we are not adopting, disqualification provisions for providers of uncompensated testimonials and endorsements. It has been, and continues to be, our view that the disqualification provisions are needed most where there are financial incentives for a promoter to engage in fraudulent conduct to persuade an investor to hire an investment adviser or invest in an investment adviser’s private fund.378 For testimonials and endorsements that lack financial incentives, we believe the burden of assessing whether a promoter is disqualified would likely not be justified by the risk that the promoter would engage in fraudulent conduct. We believe that the final rule’s other provisions applicable to testimonials and endorsements (i.e., required disclosures and adviser oversight and compliance), in combination with the final marketing rule’s general prohibitions, are sufficient to address the risks that uncompensated testimonials and endorsements may present in misleading investors. Some commenters recommended that the proposed solicitation rule exempt registered broker-dealers altogether, stating that applying the rule to broker￾dealers would result in duplicative regulation.379 Some also recommended that the Commission conform the final rule to the disqualifying events set forth in rule 506(d) of Regulation D under the Securities Act 380 for solicitors of investors in private funds who would be newly subject to the solicitation rule, or that we provide an exemption from the final rule’s disqualification provisions for persons that are subject to rule 506 of Regulation D.381 They stated that having one set of disqualifying events for solicitors that are subject to both the final solicitation rule and rule 506 of Regulation D would streamline compliance processes for such solicitors. As discussed below, we agree that registered broker-dealers acting as compensated promoters need not be subject to the disqualification provisions of both the Advisers Act marketing rule and the Exchange Act.382 Accordingly, the final rule contains an exemption from the disqualification provisions for registered broker-dealers, provided they are not subject to a statutory disqualification under the Exchange Act’s disqualification provisions. We similarly agree that persons covered by rule 506(d) of Regulation D with respect to a rule 506 securities offering need not be subject to both the disqualification provisions of the Advisers Act marketing rule and the bad actor disqualification provisions of rule 506 of Regulation D with respect to their participation in the offering.383 Accordingly, the final rule also contains an exemption from the disqualification provisions for any person that is covered by rule 506(d) of Regulation D with respect to a rule 506 securities offering, provided the person’s involvement would not disqualify the offering under that rule.384 This exemption applies to persons covered
by rule 506(d) of Regulation D only to the extent they are acting thereunder in a rule 506 securities offering. For example, a broker-dealer acting as a placement agent for a private fund in a rule 506 securities offering that is covered by this exemption will only be covered with respect to the broker￾dealer’s testimonials and endorsements made in its capacity under rule 506(d) of Regulation D as part of the offering. While we believe these exemptions will avoid regulatory overlap that would yield little benefit, we recognize that each disqualification regime is unique and will apply differently to compensated promoters regulated thereunder.385 Because each

years. See, e.g., final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4); rule 506(d)(1)(i) and (ii); section 3(a)(39)(F) of the Exchange Act. 386See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at text accompanying n.456. Under the proposed solicitation rule, an adviser could not compensate a solicitor, directly or indirectly, for any solicitation activity if the adviser knows, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, that the solicitor is an ineligible solicitor. See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(3). 387See NRS Comment Letter. 388See NAPFA Comment Letter; FSI Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. Under the proposed solicitation rule, the definition of ‘‘ineligible solicitor’’ meant, in part, ‘‘[a] person who at the time of the solicitation is subject to a disqualifying Commission action or is subject to any disqualifying event.’’ Proposed rule 206(4)– 3(a)(3)(ii)(A). 389See NAPFA Comment Letter. 390See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I (stating that a requirement to make an assessment at the time of solicitation would exceed the ‘‘reasonable care’’ standard). 391See FSI Comment Letter. 392The proposed solicitation rule defined ‘‘ineligible solicitor’’, in part, as a person who ‘‘at the time of the solicitation’’ is subject to a disqualifying Commission action or is subject to any disqualifying event. See proposed rule 206(4)– 3(a)(3)(ii)(A). 393See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(3). The final marketing rule also moves the timing of the reasonable care requirement to the operative disqualification provision, instead of including it within the definition of ‘‘ineligible person.’’ See id. 394Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). See supra section II.C.2. 395Under the final marketing rule, an adviser may pay trailing compensation for solicitations that were made prior to the marketing rule’s effective date, provided the adviser complied with rule 206(4)–3 as in effect at the time. For example, if a solicitor was not disqualified under rule 206(4)–3 at the time of a solicitation, but the solicitor would have been an ineligible person at the time of solicitation under the final marketing rule solely because of a change in the scope of events that trigger disqualification, the adviser may provide trailing compensation. Commenters advocated for this approach. See IAA Comment Letter; MMI Comment Letter. 396Registered investment advisers ascertain their supervised persons’ disciplinary history in order to report disciplinary events on Form ADV, which advisers must update by filing additional amendments promptly if the disciplinary information becomes inaccurate in any way. See Form ADV: General Instructions. Instruction 4. Certain registered investment advisers are also required to deliver to retail investors a relationship summary disclosing information about the firm. See rule 204–5. Form ADV, Part 3 requires that an adviser state ‘‘Yes’’ if it or any of its financial professionals currently disclose, or are required to disclose, disciplinary information in its Form ADV, and that the adviser
take certain steps to update its relationship summary and inform the Commission and its retail investors whenever any information in the relationship summary becomes materially inaccurate. See Form ADV, Part 3: Instructions to Form CRS, General Instruction 8 and Item 4. In addition, if a person is subject to certain disciplinary events and the Commission has issued an order that, for example, censures or places limitations on the activities of that person, it is unlawful for any investment adviser to permit such a person to become, or remain, a person associated with the investment adviser without the consent of the Commission, if such investment adviser knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of such order. See section 203(f) of the Act. 397Advisers should address such methods in their policies and procedures under the Act’s compliance rule. See rule 206(4)–7. 398However, this adviser would have to conduct its inquiry more often than annually if there is information or other indicators suggesting changes in circumstance that would be disqualifying under the rule. disqualification regime is particularized to the activity thereunder, our final rule’s exemptions defer to these other disqualification provisions where applicable. a. Knowledge or Reasonable Care Standard No commenters objected to the proposed solicitation rule’s introduction of a knowledge or reasonable care standard for the disqualification provisions, which we proposed to replace the current solicitation rule’s strict liability standard.386 One commenter specifically supported the proposed standard.387 Others commented on the proposal’s requirement that an adviser make the assessment about a solicitor’s eligibility status ‘‘at the time of solicitation.’’ 388 One commenter supported this timing,389 while another commenter stated that this timing would present an undue burden on advisers that may interpret the provision as requiring continuous monitoring of their solicitors.390 Another commenter agreed with the Commission’s approach in the proposal to not prescribe the level, method, or frequency of required due diligence.391 We continue to believe that including a reasonable care standard preserves the benefits of a disqualification provision, while reducing the likelihood that advisers will inadvertently violate the provision (i.e., due to disqualifying events that they would not, even in the exercise of reasonable care, have known existed). Our final marketing rule generally maintains the proposed solicitation rule’s knowledge or reasonable care standard with one modification to reflect its application to compensated testimonials and endorsements.392 Instead of tying the standard to the ‘‘time of solicitation,’’ the final marketing rule ties it to the time the compensated endorsement or testimonial is disseminated.393 We believe this timing is appropriate because it mirrors the timing of the final marketing rule’s required disclosures for testimonials and
endorsements.394 Furthermore, we believe that the time of dissemination is often when a compensated testimonial or endorsement by a bad actor could mislead a client or investor. For example, if a person provides a compensated testimonial or endorsement of an adviser in a face-to￾face meeting with a potential advisory client, the time of dissemination (i.e., the meeting) is the point at which the client could be misled. In some instances, an adviser may be obligated to compensate the promoter for a period after the dissemination of a testimonial or endorsement. For example, a promoter may continue to receive trailing compensation as a percentage of a client’s assets under management with the adviser for the duration of time that client continues to use the adviser. If a compensated promoter was subject to a disqualifying event or disqualifying Commission action at the time of dissemination, but the adviser did not know, or have reason to know, of such event, then the adviser may make trailing payments resulting from such dissemination.395 The final marketing rule will not require an adviser to monitor the eligibility of compensated promoters on a continuous basis, as one commenter suggested. The frequency with which an adviser must monitor eligibility and the steps an adviser must take in making this assessment will vary depending on what constitutes the exercise of reasonable care in a particular set of facts and circumstances. Advisers could likely take a similar approach to monitoring promoters as they take in monitoring their own supervised persons, though advisers may assess the eligibility of their supervised persons more frequently in light of their obligations to report promptly certain disciplinary events on Form ADV.396 The frequency of inquiry could vary depending upon, for example, the risk that a person could become an ineligible person and the impact of other screening and compliance mechanisms already in place.397 In some cases where an endorsement or testimonial is posted on a public website and disseminated over a long period, it may not be practical for an adviser to update its inquiry continuously. In this case, we would expect an adviser to update its inquiry into the compensated promoter’s eligibility at least annually while the endorsement or testimonial is available to clients and investors in order to demonstrate that it did not know, or have reason to know, that the promoter was ineligible at the time of dissemination.398 If the adviser has reason to believe that the compensated promoter is an ineligible person, then the exercise of reasonable care would require the adviser to inquire promptly

399 If a promoter notifies an adviser that it is subject to a disqualifying event or disqualifying Commission action, the adviser would have knowledge of the promoter’s status as an ineligible person and the final rule would prohibit the adviser from compensating the promoter. 400See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(9). See also proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(3)(ii). 401See NAPFA Comment Letter. 402See Credit Suisse Comment Letter; MFA/ AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter. 403Section 208(d) of the Act. 404See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(3). This principle also applies if the entity is a partnership, to all general partners; and if the entity is a limited liability company managed by elected managers, to all elected managers. 405Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(9) (defining ineligible person, in part, as ‘‘[a] person who is subject to a disqualifying Commission action or is subject to any disqualifying event,’’ and ‘‘[a]ny employee, officer, or director of the ineligible person and any other individuals with similar status or functions within the scope of association with the ineligible person.’’) 406Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(9). See also proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(3)(ii). 407Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(3). The imposition of a bar, suspension, or prohibition may appear in an opinion of the Commission or in an administrative law judge initial decision that has become final pursuant to a Commission order. In both cases, such a bar, suspension, or prohibition is a disqualifying Commission action under the final rule. In addition to associational bars or suspensions, these include, for example, officer and director bars imposed in Commission cease and desist orders, limitations on activities imposed under section 203(e) or 203(f) of the Advisers Act that prevent persons from acting in certain capacities, penny stock bars imposed under section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, and investment company prohibitions imposed under
section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act. In
addition, under the final rule, if the Commission prohibits or suspends an individual from acting in a specific capacity under the Federal securities laws (e.g., as a supervisor or compliance officer), such prohibition will be a disqualifying Commission action, even if the Commission has not barred or suspended the individual from association with an investment adviser, broker-dealer or other registrant. 408See Mercer Comment Letter; Credit Suisse Comment Letter. See infra section II.C.4.e (discussing the final marketing rule’s conditional carve-out). into the promoter’s eligibility under the rule.399 Like the proposed solicitation rule, the final marketing rule will require that an adviser inquire into the relevant facts; however, it does not specify what method or level of due diligence or other inquiry is sufficient to exercise reasonable care. For example, advisers generally have an in-depth knowledge of their own personnel gained through the hiring process and in the course of the employment relationship. In such circumstances, further steps generally would not be required in connection with a compensated endorsement or testimonial by such personnel. Factual inquiry by means of questionnaires or certifications, perhaps accompanied by contractual representations, covenants and undertakings, may be sufficient in other circumstances, particularly if there is no information or other indicators suggesting bad actor involvement. b. Ineligible Person Like the proposed solicitation rule, the final marketing rule applies the definition of ineligible person not only to the person subject to the disqualifying event or disqualifying Commission action, as both terms are discussed below, but also to certain persons associated with an ineligible person.400 An ineligible person includes a person who is subject to a disqualifying Commission action or is subject to any disqualifying event. It also includes any employee, officer, or director of an ineligible person and any other individuals with similar status or functions within the scope of association with an ineligible person. If the ineligible person is a partnership, the definition includes all general partners. If the ineligible person is a limited liability company managed by elected managers, the definition includes all elected managers. Unlike the proposed rule, the definition does not include persons that directly or indirectly control, or are controlled by, an ineligible person. One commenter supported the proposed definition of ineligible solicitor.401 Some commenters, however, expressed concern that the proposed solicitation rule would disqualify solicitors solely because their affiliates are ineligible solicitors, when their affiliates are not involved with or connected to the solicitation.402 These commenters stated that such potential disqualification would disadvantage larger, more established solicitors that have multiple affiliated entities, and that smaller standalone solicitors would
therefore have a competitive advantage. They also stated that disqualification by affiliation, as proposed, would disadvantage investors through lack of choice. After considering comments, we agree that the final rule should not apply to a disqualified person’s control affiliates. These affiliates may operate independently from the person providing the compensated testimonial or endorsement, and may be uninvolved with an adviser’s arrangement to compensate that person for the testimonial or endorsement. However, any compensation arrangement structured to avoid the final rule’s restrictions, depending on the facts and circumstances, would violate section 208(d) of the Act’s general prohibitions against doing anything indirectly which would be prohibited if done directly.403 Under the final rule’s definition of ineligible person, an entity that is not an ineligible person will not become an ineligible person solely because its employee, officer, or director (or an individual with a similar status or functions) is an ineligible person. However, any employee, officer, director, or person with similar status or functions that is an ineligible person may not directly or indirectly receive compensation for a testimonial or endorsement (e.g., by receipt of a share of profits the entity receives from the testimonial or endorsement, or as a bonus tied to the entity’s overall profits without setting aside revenue from testimonials and endorsements).404 In addition, we are clarifying that, in the case of an entity that is an ineligible person, the final rule’s definition of ineligible person will apply to that entity’s employees, officers, and directors (and persons with similar status or functions) associated with the ineligible person, but only within the scope of that association.405 In some cases, for example, an employee may be associated with two different firms, one of which is an ineligible person and the other is not. Under the final rule, if the employee is not herself an ineligible person, she may conduct compensated testimonial and endorsement activity on behalf of the firm that is not an ineligible person, because she would not be conducting that activity within the scope of her association with the ineligible person. The final marketing rule adopts, without change from the proposal, the provisions of the definition applying to general partners and elected managers of a partnership and limited liability company, respectively.406 Commenters did not respond to these aspects of the definition.
c. Disqualifying Commission Action
Under the final rule, like the proposed rule, a disqualifying Commission action is any Commission opinion or order barring, suspending, or prohibiting a person from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws.407 Commenters stated that advisers have historically engaged solicitors that are subject to Commission actions or orders that address disqualifying events under the cash solicitation rule, but that do not bar, suspend, or prohibit the solicitor from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws.408 These commenters requested that we continue to permit advisers to engage solicitors subject to these types of Commission actions to avoid disturbing the existing

409See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(v). See also proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(3)(iii)(A)(1). 410See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at text accompanying n.467. 411But see supra footnote 381 (discussing that some commenters advocated for conforming the rule’s disciplinary provision with rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act, which includes similar cease and desist orders, in connection with the proposed rule’s new application to broker-dealers soliciting investors in private funds). 412Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4). 413Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(i). 414Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(ii). 415Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(iii). We made a non￾substantive change from the proposal to cross reference the Advisers Act statutory provision rather than repeat the wording of the statutory provision in the final rule. 416Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(iv). 417Rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(v). 418Rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(vi). 419See section 203(e) and (f) of the Act. 420See Form ADV Part 1A, Item 11 (requiring disclosure of certain actions related to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and self-regulatory organizations). 421The term advisory affiliates is defined in the Form ADV Glossary of Terms, in part, as (1) all of your officers, partners, or directors (or any person performing similar functions); (2) all persons directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by you; and (3) all of your current employees (other than employees performing only clerical, administrative, support or similar functions). Form ADV Part 2 also requires information about the disciplinary history of the adviser and its personnel. See e.g., Form ADV Part 2A, Item 9. 422See Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 423See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(3)(iii)(B)(3). 424See the Form ADV Glossary of Terms (defining Self-Regulatory Organization as ‘‘[a]ny national securities or commodities exchange, registered securities association, or registered clearing agency.’’). 425See Exchange Act section 3(26). The Form ADV definition also aligns with the definition of self-regulatory organization used in Form BD for broker-dealers. See Form BD, Explanation of Terms. balance between protecting investors and aiding market efficiency. We agree with commenters that the final rule should permit advisers to engage compensated solicitors and other compensated promoters that are subject to certain Commission orders, provided that the Commission has not barred, suspended, or prohibited the compensated promoter from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws, and subject to conditions under the final rule. We are therefore relocating within the rule— from the definition of disqualifying Commission action, as proposed, to the definition of disqualifying event— Commission cease and desist orders from committing or causing a violation or future violation of any scienter-based anti-fraud provision of the Federal securities laws, and Section 5 of the Securities Act.409 This change will subject these orders to
the final rule’s conditional carve-out, if available, which aligns the rule’s treatment of these orders with the final rule’s other disqualifying events. We believe that these cease and desist orders could call into question a person’s trustworthiness or ability to act as a compensated promoter,410 and that the final rule’s conditional carve-out, discussed below, will address the risks of compensating a promoter subject to such an order. No one commented specifically on the proposed inclusion of this provision.411 d. Disqualifying Event The final rule’s disqualifying events are substantially similar to what we proposed, except for conforming the look-back period across all disqualifying events to ten years prior to the time the person disseminates the testimonial or endorsement. In addition, as noted above, we are including Commission cease and desist orders from committing or causing a violation or future violation of any scienter-based anti-fraud provision of the Federal securities laws, and Section 5 of the Securities Act as disqualifying events (rather than disqualifying Commission actions). Under the final marketing rule, therefore, a disqualifying event generally includes a finding, order, or conviction by a United States court or certain regulatory agencies that a person has engaged in any act or omission referenced in one or more of the provision’s five prongs. A disqualifying event is any of five categories of events that occurred within ten years prior to the person disseminating an endorsement or testimonial.412 The first is a conviction by court of competent jurisdiction within the United States of any felony or misdemeanor involving conduct described in paragraph (2)(A) through (D) of section 203(e) of the Act.413 The second is a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction within the United States of engaging in, any of the conduct specified in paragraphs (1), (5), or (6) of section 203(e) of the Act.414 The third is the entry of any final order by any entity described in paragraph (9)
section 203(e) of the Act,415 or by the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission or a self-regulatory organization (as defined in the Form ADV Glossary of Terms), of the type described in paragraph (9) of section 203(e) of the Act. The fourth is the entry of an order, judgment or decree that is described in paragraph (4) of section 203(e) of the Act, and that is in effect at the time of such dissemination by any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.416 The fifth is a Commission order that a person cease and desist from committing or causing a violation or future violation of (i) any scienter-based anti-fraud provision of the Federal securities laws, including without limitation section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, and section 206(1) of the Act, or any other rule or regulation thereunder, or (ii) Section 5 of the Securities Act.417 A disqualifying event does not include any of these events with respect to a person that is also subject to: An order pursuant to section 9(c) of the Investment Company Act with respect to such event; or a Commission opinion or order with respect to such event that is not a disqualifying Commission action, provided in each case that certain conditions are met.418 The disqualifying events in the final rule incorporate a familiar framework for advisers evaluating promoters. As proposed, the rule’s disqualifying events are drawn from section 203(e) of the Act, which is a basis for Commission action to censure, place limitations on the activities, or revoke the registration of any investment adviser or its associated persons.419 The final rule also includes actions of two types of regulatory entities not referenced in
section 203(e) of the Act—specifically,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and self-regulatory organizations—as we had proposed. Certain disciplinary actions by these organizations are included in Form ADV
Part 1A’s disciplinary history
disclosures,420 which all registered investment advisers must complete for themselves and for their advisory affiliates.421 Only one commenter commented specifically on the addition of disciplinary actions by the CFTC, and supported it.422 No one commented specifically on the inclusion of disciplinary events by self-regulatory organizations. However, the final rule refers to self-regulatory organization as defined in the Form ADV Glossary of Terms, rather than the term defined in the Exchange Act, as proposed.423 We believe that compensated promoters that are advisers must be familiar with the Form ADV definition,424 which is the same as the Exchange Act definition except that the Form ADV definition includes commodities exchanges and excludes the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.425 The inclusion of commodities exchanges also aligns with the final rule’s inclusion of the CFTC in the disciplinary events provisions. As discussed above, we are including in this definition a Commission cease and desist order from committing or

426See NRS Comment Letter. A person subject to a regulatory action by a foreign court or regulatory or self-regulatory organization may become be an ineligible person under the final rule, to the extent that the Commission uses its authority to bar, suspend, or prohibit that person from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws. See the final rule’s definition of disqualifying Commission action. 427Sections 203(e)(2) and (3) of the Act (containing a ten-year look-back period for convictions for certain felonies and misdemeanors). 428Form ADV Part 1A, Item 11. 429See section 203(e)(4) of the Act. 430See supra sections II.C.2 (discussing the disclosure requirements for testimonials and endorsements) and II.C.4.a (discussing the reasonable care knowledge standard). 431Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(vi). The conditions apply to each applicable type of order, and opinion or order, described in paragraphs (A) and (B) therein. See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(vi). 432 Id. causing a violation or future violation of scienter-based anti-fraud provision of the Federal securities laws or of Section 5 of the Securities Act, which we had proposed to be disqualifying Commission actions. We continue to believe that including violations or future violations of these provisions protects investors from compensated promoters’ bad acts that are likely to have the most effect on investors’ review of a promoter’s compensated testimonial or endorsement. Like those in the proposed rule, the final marketing rule’s ‘‘disqualifying events’’ are limited to actions of courts of competent jurisdiction within the United States, and of certain regulatory and self-regulatory organizations within the United States. Only one commenter commented on this aspect of the proposed rule, and supported it.426 In a change from the proposed rule, the final rule’s look-back period will apply to all of the rule’s ‘‘disqualifying events,’’ rather than only to some. We received no comments on the proposed look-back period, but we are conforming the period across the definition to ease advisers’ compliance with the rule by providing a consistent framework for compliance. A ten-year look-back period is included in section 203(e) of the Advisers Act.427 Advisers also apply this look-back period when reporting to the Commission their disciplinary history and the disciplinary history of all of their advisory affiliates.428 In addition, we are making a change to the fourth prong of the definition of disqualifying event to specify that this prong applies only to any order, judgment, or decree described therein that is in effect at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated. This change aligns this prong of the definition of disciplinary event with the provision of the Advisers Act that it references.429 In addition, we are making a change from the proposed solicitation rule’s look-back period to tie it to the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated, rather than to the
time of solicitation. As discussed above, this change in timing will not result in a substantive change in timing for solicitations delivered orally, for which the time of solicitation and the time of dissemination are generally the same. This change conforms the look-back period to other aspects of the final marketing rule.430 Specifically, we believe that the same rationale for tying the final rule’s reasonable care knowledge requirement to the dissemination of a compensated testimonial or endorsement applies here. Therefore, a disqualifying event is any of the final rule’s enumerated disciplinary events that occurred within ten years prior to dissemination of an endorsement or testimonial. e. Conditional Exception From Definition of ‘‘Disqualifying Event’’ The final rule provides a conditional carve-out from the definition of disqualifying event, adapted from the proposed solicitation rule. The carve￾out permits an adviser to compensate a promoter that is subject to certain disqualifying actions, when the Commission has issued an opinion or order with respect to the promoter’s disqualifying action, but not barred or suspended the promoter or prohibited the promoter from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws, subject to conditions. Specifically, the carve-out applies to a person that is subject to (A) an order pursuant to
section 9(c) of the Investment Company
Act with respect to a disciplinary action that would otherwise be a disciplinary event; or (B) a Commission opinion or order with respect to such action that is not a disqualifying Commission action, provided that, for each type of order or opinion described therein, certain conditions are met.431 The conditions are that: (1) The person is in compliance with the terms of the order or opinion including, but not limited to, the payment of disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil or administrative penalties, and fines; and (2) for a period of ten years following the date of each order or opinion, the advertisement containing the testimonial or endorsement must include a statement that the person providing the testimonial or endorsement is subject to a Commission order or opinion regarding one or more disciplinary action(s), and include the order or opinion or a link to the order or opinion on the Commission’s website.432 This conditional carve-out is substantively similar to the proposed solicitation rule’s carve-out from the definition of ineligible solicitor, with two changes The first change is that the final rule requires that the promoter be ‘‘in compliance with,’’ rather than, as proposed, that a solicitor ‘‘has complied with,’’ the terms of the order or opinion. The final rule will therefore permit a compensated promoter to apply the conditional carve-out if the promoter has complied with all of the terms of the applicable opinion or order that are required to be completed at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated, even if there are additional terms of the applicable order or opinion that are, at that time, not yet required to be completed. We believe that the carve-out should not benefit promoters that are not in good standing under the terms of their Commission opinion or order. Second, we revised the disclosure requirement of the conditional carve￾out. The final rule’s disclosure condition is designed to provide investors with notice that the promoter has disciplinary action(s) and direct the investor to additional information. We revised the disclosure condition to reflect that the final rule does not require a separate solicitor disclosure, as proposed for compensated solicitations. It also reflects that the final rule’s disqualification provisions apply to a broader population of promoters than solicitors and that advisers may advertise compensated testimonials and endorsements through space￾constrained media. Accordingly, because there is no longer a separate solicitor disclosure requirement, the final rule requires the disclosure about disciplinary action(s) as part of the advertisement, rather than included in a separate solicitor disclosure. Further, because a testimonial or endorsement may appear in space-constrained media, the required disclosure is more concise than proposed. Instead of requiring a separate description of the acts or omissions that are the subject of, and the terms of, the opinion or order, the
advertisement containing the testimonial or endorsement under the final rule must include a statement that the promoter is subject to a Commission opinion or order regarding one or more disciplinary action(s), and include the order or opinion or a link to the order or opinion on the Commission’s

433 Id. See also proposed rule 206(4)– 3(a)(3)(iii)(C)(2)(ii). 434See Credit Suisse Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. See also Dougherty & Co., LLC, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Mar. 21, 2003), revised by Dougherty & Co., LLC, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 3, 2003) (collectively, the ‘‘Dougherty Letter’’). In the Dougherty Letter, Commission staff stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under section 206(4) and rule 206(4)–3 if an investment adviser pays cash solicitation fees to a solicitor who is subject to an order issued by the Commission under section 203(f) of the Advisers Act, or who is subject to a ‘‘Rule 206(4)–3 Disqualifying Order,’’ based on certain representations. The staff described a Rule 206(4)– 3 Disqualifying Order as an order issued by the Commission in which the Commission has found that the solicitor: (a) Has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving conduct described in section 203(e)(2)(A) through (D) of the Advisers Act; (b) has engaged, or has been convicted of engaging, in any of the conduct specified in paragraphs (1), (5), or (6) of section 203(e) of the Advisers Act; or (c) was subject to an order, judgment, or decree described in section 203(e)(4) of the Advisers Act. Representations included that no Rule 206(4)–3 Disqualifying Order bars or suspends the solicitor from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws, and that, for a period of ten years following the date of each Rule 206(4)–3 Disqualifying Order, the solicitor or the investment adviser with which it has a solicitation arrangement subject to the cash solicitation rule discloses the order to each person whom the solicitor solicits. 435See Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 436See Credit Suisse Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 437See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I (‘‘The ten year time period is significant, and may have the effect of forcing such persons out of business rather than making them come into compliance.’’). 438See supra footnotes 427 and 428 (discussing the ten-year lookback). 439As discussed below, the staff is also stating its view that it will not object if certain third parties that have been operating in a manner consistent with certain staff no-action letters under the existing cash solicitation rule, which will be nullified due to the rescission of the solicitation rule, provide compensated testimonials and endorsements under the new rule notwithstanding otherwise disqualifying events. See infra section II.J. 440Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(3). Such a person will not be an ‘‘ineligible person’’ due to that conduct. 441Compare current rule 206(4)–3(a)(1)(ii), with final rule 206(4)–1(e)(5)(iii). 442See IAA Comment Letter; Credit Suisse Comment Letter. 443See, e.g., FSI Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 444However, see supra footnote 395 and accompanying text for a discussion of trailing compensation. 445The proposed rule would have provided four exemptions under the
solicitation rule for: (1) Impersonal investment advice; (2) advisers’ in￾house solicitors and other affiliated solicitors; (3) de minimis compensation; and (4) nonprofit programs. Proposed rule 206(4)–3(b). website.433 We believe the final rule’s disclosure will make salient the fact that the promoter is subject to disciplinary action(s), while directing the investor to the facts and circumstance in the Commission opinion or order. An advertisement containing testimonial or endorsement disseminated electronically should include the opinion or order or an electronic link directly to the opinion or order on the Commission’s website. Some commenters requested we adopt a carve-out that aligns with advisers’ long-established practice of engaging solicitors subject to Commission actions where the Commission order or opinion does not bar, suspend, or prohibit a person from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws.434 One commenter did not oppose the proposed carve-out, but urged the Commission to use its authority to issue non-disqualifying Commission actions only in the most exceptional of circumstances.435 We believe that when the Commission has issued an opinion or order with respect to a person’s disqualifying conduct but not barred or suspended the person or prohibited the person from acting in any capacity under the Federal securities laws, it is appropriate to likewise permit such person to engage in activities related to compensated testimonials and endorsements. This approach obviates the need for the Commission to consider how to treat under the final rule a person with these disciplinary events. However, in the event that the Commission has not previously evaluated the disqualifying event and neither the promoter nor any person on its behalf has previously sought a waiver under the Investment Company Act with respect to the disqualifying event, such person may contact the Commission to seek relief. Commenters that addressed this provision generally supported it, noting the appropriateness of disclosure as a remedy for solicitors subject to non￾disqualifying Commission actions.436 One commenter, however, stated that the ten-year disclosure period is overly punitive, and requested that we reduce the disclosure period to five years.437 We are adopting a ten-year look-back, however, because that period is consistent with the look-back period for the rule’s disqualifying events, which is based on the look-back in the certain of the Act’s statutory disqualification provisions and the rules for reporting to the Commission disciplinary history of advisers and their advisory affiliates.438 We believe that this period provides for a sufficient period after the disqualifying event that the past actions of the ineligible person may no longer pose as significant a risk. f. Application to Existing Events The final rule will not apply to pre￾effective date conduct that would otherwise trigger the disqualification provisions, as we
proposed.439 The final rule’s disqualification provision, paragraph (b)(3), will not disqualify any person for purposes of the final rule for any matter(s), that occurred prior to the effective date of the rule, if such matter(s) would not have disqualified such person under rule 206(4)– 3(a)(1)(ii), as in effect prior to the effective date of the rule.440 As discussed above, the final rule’s disqualifying events are slightly broader than those under the current solicitation rule. For example, the solicitation rule’s disqualification provisions do not include the entry of a final order of the CFTC or a self-regulatory organization, whereas the final rule includes such conduct.441 We agree with commenters that it would be inappropriate to apply the final rule’s broader disqualification provisions retroactively to prior conduct—such as a pre-effective date CFTC order—when such conduct had not disqualified that solicitor under the solicitation rule.442 In this case, the rule will not disqualify a person for prior conduct that did not cause disqualification at that time under the solicitation rule. However, we disagree with some commenters who requested that we grandfather all ongoing solicitation arrangements entered into prior to the final rule’s effective date. Commenters argued that without a broad grandfathering provision, the final rule would require firms to renegotiate agreements with solicitors that had not been subject to the current rule when executed.443 Commenters’ approach would effectively provide a blanket exemption that permits solicitation activities to continue indefinitely without complying with the final rule, if a solicitor performs such activity pursuant to a pre-effective date solicitation arrangement.444 Unlike the scenario discussed above, we believe this would exempt post-effective date solicitation activity that we explicitly intend to capture in the final rule.
5. Exemptions
Under the final rule, we are adopting exemptions from certain conditions for compensated testimonials and endorsements by an adviser’s affiliated personnel and for de minimis compensation.445 We are also adopting a partial exemption from certain conditions for testimonials and endorsements by a registered broker￾dealer. The final rule will not exempt testimonials and endorsements related to the provision of impersonal investment advice or nonprofit

446See final rule 206(4)–1(b). 447See IAA Comment Letter. 448See IAA Comment Letter. 449MMI Comment Letter. 450For ease of reference, we refer to these persons in the release as ‘‘affiliated persons’’ or ‘‘affiliated personnel.’’ 451Final rule 206(4)–1(b). The proposed solicitation rule would have provided a partial exemption for an adviser’s in-house solicitors and other affiliated solicitors. See proposed rule 206(4)– 3(b)(2). 452However, an adviser’s affiliated persons will not be required to comply with the written agreement requirement under the adviser oversight and compliance provision. See final rule 206(4)– 1(b)(4)(ii). See also proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(2). The proposed rule would have created an exemption from the disclosure requirements by virtue of the exemption from the written agreement requirement. 453See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; Proskauer Comment Letter. 454Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(ii). 455See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; Proskauer Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 456SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; Fidelity Comment Letter. 457Fidelity Comment Letter. 458Such persons could be employees or independent contractors. 459Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(ii). 460See Fidelity Comment Letter. 461SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. We requested comment on whether we should define ‘‘employee’’ to include an adviser’s independent contractors or provide that this partial exemption for in-house personnel applies to an adviser’s independent contractors. 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.B.7. 462See Mercer Comment Letter. 463See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; Proskauer Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 464See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(3). See also proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(2). programs.446 Although some commenters suggested that we adopt additional exemptions for participants in refer-a-friend programs,447 publishers (e.g., bloggers),448 and those who refer clients from networking relationships,449 we do not believe general exemptions for these categories are appropriate. We believe that the final exemptions appropriately balance the risks of the use of compensated testimonials and endorsements with the benefits and protections of the final rule. a. Affiliated Personnel Similar to the proposed solicitation rule, the final rule will partially exempt a testimonial or endorsement by an adviser’s partners, officers, directors, or employees, or a person that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the investment adviser, or is a partner, officer, director or employee of such a person.450 For this exemption to apply, the affiliation between the investment adviser and such person must be readily apparent to or disclosed to the client or investor at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated and the investment adviser must document such person’s status at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated.451 This is a partial exemption because the testimonial or endorsement will be exempt
from the final rule’s disclosure requirements, but it still will be necessary to comply with the adviser oversight and disqualification provisions.452 Commenters were generally supportive of retaining this current partial exemption under the solicitation rule.453 As proposed under the solicitation rule, we are modifying the current rule to permit an adviser to rely on the exemption not only when the affiliated status is disclosed to the investor, but also when such relationship is readily apparent to the investor.454 We continue to believe that, in such cases, a requirement to disclose a person’s status as an affiliated person would not result in a benefit to the investor, and would create compliance burdens for the adviser and person giving the testimonial or endorsement. Commenters generally agreed with our approach, noting that disclosures regarding status are unnecessary because of the obvious and close relationship of some affiliates.455 However, commenters also suggested more guidance on the meaning of ‘‘readily apparent.’’ 456 What constitutes ‘‘readily apparent’’ will depend on the facts and circumstances. The relationship between an affiliated person and the adviser may be readily apparent to an investor, such as when an in-house solicitor shares the same name as the advisory firm or a person operates under the same name brand as the adviser. An affiliated relationship also may be readily apparent when a person is clearly identified as related to the adviser in its communications with the investor at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated. For example, the person’s affiliation would be readily apparent if a business card distributed to investors at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated clearly and prominently states that the person is a representative of the adviser. There may be other situations where the relationship between the adviser and its affiliated personnel is well known. One commenter suggested that there be a presumption that an adviser and its affiliated person’s relationship is readily apparent to an investor if the adviser has disclosed the affiliation in its Form ADV brochure.457 However, we are not adopting such a presumption because the client may not have read the Form ADV brochure at the time the testimonial or endorsement is disseminated. In certain situations, the adviser’s relationship with an affiliated person is not readily apparent, such as when the person is a representative of the adviser but operates its marketing activities through its own DBA name or brand, and the name of the adviser is omitted or less prominent.458 If an adviser’s and its affiliated person’s relationship is not readily apparent, the adviser or affiliated person must disclose the affiliation in order to avail itself of the rule’s partial exemption. As proposed under the solicitation rule, we are expanding the current partial exemption for affiliated persons to cover any person that controls, is controlled
by, or is under common control with, the investment adviser that is compensating the person pursuant to the final rule.459 One commenter explicitly supported this expansion.460 We continue to believe that the rule should treat a person that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the investment adviser, similarly to any partners, officers, directors or employees of such affiliated person. One commenter suggested that we include an adviser’s independent contractors under this partial exemption.461 However, another suggested that we limit the exemption to an adviser’s supervised persons.462 We believe that the supervision and control an adviser exercises over an endorsing independent contractor may vary among different advisers and independent contractors. If the adviser exercises substantially the same level of supervision and control over an independent contractor as the adviser exercises over its own employees with respect to its marketing activities, the partial exemption would be available. We continue to believe, and commenters generally agreed, that when an investor is aware that a person endorsing the adviser is affiliated with the adviser, disclosures are not necessary to inform the investor of the person’s bias in recommending such adviser. 463 An investor is on notice that an in-house solicitor has a stake in soliciting the investor for its own firm. In these instances, the policy goals underlying the disclosure element of the final rule would already be satisfied. As proposed under the solicitation rule, the final rule’s disqualification provisions will apply to affiliated personnel.464 One commenter expressed

465SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I.
466See Investment Adviser Marketing Feedback Form. Question 15 asks ‘‘How important is it to know the following information about a paid salesperson’s referral?’’ and lists among other things, ‘‘Whether the solicitor has been disciplined for financial-related misconduct.’’ Commenters were given the option to answer on a scale of 1– 5, with 1 meaning ‘‘Very Important’’ and 5 meaning ‘‘Not Important.’’ There was also an option to answer ‘‘Don’t Know.’’ More than two-thirds of the respondents indicated that this disciplinary information was ‘‘Very Important.’’ 467See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(2)(i)). 468See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(ii). 469Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(2). The proposed solicitation rule would have required that ‘‘the adviser documents such solicitor’s status at the time the adviser enters into the solicitation arrangement.’’ Proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). 470MMI Comment Letter. 471Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(i). 472See supra footnote 123 (stating that a testimonial or endorsement for which an adviser provides de minimis compensation will be an advertisement under the second prong of the definition of advertisement). 473Proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(3). Under the proposed de minimis compensation exemption, the solicitation rule would not have applied if the solicitor complied with certain conditions. 474See, e.g., Comment Letter of Wealthfront Corp. (Mar. 3, 2020); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; MMI Comment Letter; and Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter I. 475See, e.g., Comment Letter of MarketCounsel (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘MarketCounsel Comment Letter’’); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter. 476NAPFA Comment Letter. concern that this approach would be overly restrictive and suggested that the rule also should exempt certain affiliated personnel from the disqualification provisions.465 This commenter stated that there is greater control and opportunity to train and rehabilitate affiliated personnel. We do not believe that the availability of training justifies exempting affiliated personnel from the disqualification provisions, and in other circumstances under the Federal securities laws the availability of such training does not affect affiliated personnel’s disqualification. Some affiliated persons with disciplinary events under the final rule will be disqualified from association with an investment adviser independent of the final rule, if the Commission has barred or suspended those persons from association with an investment adviser under section 203(f) of the Act. However, other affiliated persons with such disciplinary events may not be subject to such Commission action and, absent the application of the rule’s disqualification provisions, would be permitted to endorse an adviser as an affiliated person, notwithstanding their disqualifying event. After considering comments, including those from our Investor Feedback Flyers, we believe that the disqualification provisions should apply to compensated testimonials
and endorsements, regardless of whether the marketing activity is conducted by a person affiliated or unaffiliated with the adviser.466 Unlike the proposed solicitation rule, however, the final rule will subject affiliated persons to a part of the adviser oversight and compliance provision, which will require that the investment adviser have a reasonable basis for believing that the testimonial or endorsement complies with the requirements of the rule.467 We believe that this part of the oversight and compliance provision will help reduce the risk that any testimonials or endorsements do not comply with the final rule, particularly with respect to certain affiliates that may not be subject to the adviser’s compliance policies and procedures. However, similar to the proposed solicitation rule, the final rule will not subject affiliated personnel to the written agreement requirement under the adviser oversight and compliance provision.468 Although we did not receive any comments on this particular modification under the proposed in-house and other affiliated personnel exemption, we continue to believe that advisers should not be required to enter into written agreements with their own affiliated persons in order to avail themselves of this partial exemption. We also continue to believe that such a requirement under the current rule creates additional compliance obligations for the adviser and its affiliated persons that are not justified by any corresponding benefit. Finally, we are adopting a new requirement, largely as proposed under the solicitation rule, that in order to avail itself of this partial exemption, an adviser must document an affiliated person’s status contemporaneously with disseminating the testimonial or endorsement.469 One commenter criticized this requirement as unnecessary and unduly burdensome, stating that the Commission should either remove it or clarify the form and type of documentation expected.470 We are not requiring a specific form of documentation to record an affiliated person’s status. We continue to believe that this approach affords advisers the flexibility to develop their own policies and procedures or use existing records to document such status. Advisers may wish to document this status through various means. For example, an adviser’s policies and procedures regarding affiliated personnel may require that the adviser document a person’s status on an internal form at the time that the adviser or affiliated person disseminates the testimonial or endorsement. However, an adviser does not need to create a new form of separate documentation to satisfy this requirement. For example, to the extent that an affiliated person’s status is notated through corporate records, employee payroll records, Central Registration Depository (‘‘CRD’’), or any other similar records and licensing for investment adviser representatives, then such records would suffice so long as such records are kept current. Similar to our approach
under the disqualification provisions applicable to testimonials and endorsements, we believe that the time of dissemination is the most appropriate time for an adviser to know about, or exercise reasonable care to determine, whether personnel is affiliated. The rule does not require an adviser to monitor the affiliated status of a person on a continuous basis. Instead, an adviser could conduct periodic inquiries to confirm that any testimonials or endorsements provided in reliance on this exemption are by affiliated personnel. b. De Minimis Compensation The final rule will have a partial exemption for the use of testimonials or endorsements that are for zero or de minimis compensation.471 Specifically, a testimonial or endorsement that is disseminated for no compensation or de minimis compensation will not be subject to the disqualification provisions or the written agreement requirement, but must comply with the disclosure and oversight provisions.472 The proposed solicitation rule would have provided a full exemption for solicitation activities performed for de minimis compensation, which we proposed as $100 or less.473 Commenters generally supported the proposed de minimis exemption. However, commenters also suggested modifications to increase the utility of the exemption.474 For example, some commenters suggested raising the proposed de minimis threshold amount, arguing that $100 would be too low.475 One commenter, while generally supporting the idea of a de minimis exemption, stated that tracking the exemption would be difficult in certain situations where advisers may make donations on behalf of clients who refer new prospective clients.476 Another commenter stated that the exemption would only offer a superficial benefit

477SBIA Comment Letter.
478NASAA Comment Letter.
479We stated in our proposal that we recognize that the solicitor disqualification may pose major challenges, especially for smaller advisers. See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.B.7. 480See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter (‘‘This will help alleviate the compliance burden on investment advisers where incentives are inherently limited, and thus risks to prospective clients are low.’’); Mercer Comment Letter. 481See, e.g., MarketCounsel Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 482See NASAA Comment Letter (arguing against the proposed de minimis exemption under the solicitation rule); Prof. Jacobson Comment Letter (supporting no de minimis exemption for testimonials and endorsements from the proposed advertising rule’s disclosure requirements). 483See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(i). However, testimonials and endorsements for zero or de minimis compensation will not be required to have a written agreement under the adviser oversight provision. See id. See also section II.C.3. (discussing the written agreement requirement under the adviser oversight and compliance provision). 484 IAA Comment Letter. 485Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(2). 486We would measure the initial date of the 12- month period to begin at the time that a promoter’s testimonial or endorsement is initially disseminated. 487MarketCounsel Comment Letter. 488Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iii)(C). 489Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iii)(A). 490Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iii)(B). 491 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at 38 and 211. We also considered the recently proposed exemption for certain ‘‘finders’’ involved in exempt offerings. See Notice of Proposed Exemptive Order Granting Conditional Exemption from the Broker Registration Requirements of
Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
for Certain Activities of Finders, Release No. 34– 90112 (Oct. 7, 2020) [85 FR 64542 (Oct. 13, 2020)]. because compensation paid to a solicitor would trigger required disclosure under the advertising rule since solicitor referrals often involve testimonials or endorsements.477 One commenter suggested eliminating the exemption altogether, arguing that small dollar values still create conflicts between a solicitor and the solicited investor.478 After considering comments, we believe a partial exemption is necessary because it could be overly burdensome for advisers and persons providing testimonials or endorsements for de minimis compensation to comply with the rule’s disqualification provisions. We do not believe the same level of incentive or risk to defraud investors exists when a de minimis fee is involved.479 In supporting our proposed de minimis exemption, commenters agreed that a solicitor’s incentives are reduced significantly when receiving de minimis compensation and that the need for heightened safeguards is likewise reduced.480 We also believe that many solicitation and referral programs would benefit from this exemption. Commenters confirmed our observation that there is a recent trend towards the use of programs that involve de minimis compensation, such as refer-a-friend programs.481 However, we agree with commenters to both the proposed advertising rule and solicitation rule who expressed concern that minimal compensation may still create conflicts.482 We believe disclosure of any conflicts is paramount to mitigate the risks that an investor would mistakenly view the promoter as unbiased and rely on a testimonial or endorsement more than the investor otherwise would have if the investor knew of any incentive or conflict. Even when there is no compensation involved, we believe these conflicts of interest create an incentive or bias on the part of the promoter. For instance, if the adviser and the promoter are participants in a referral network, it is important that these investors fully understand that the provider expects to benefit from its endorsement of or testimonial about the adviser. Although this will create some burden for promoters who are not already subject to the existing cash solicitation rule, we believe that the benefits of fully informing and protecting investors justify any such burden. Moreover, with respect to advisers, providing such disclosures is consistent with an adviser’s duty to disclose all conflicts of interest and thus will not be unduly burdensome for advisers. In addition, we believe that subjecting testimonials and endorsements that are for no or de minimis compensation to the adviser oversight requirement is a reasonable benefit that justifies any burdens. Accordingly, unlike the proposed de minimis exemption under the solicitation rule, the final marketing rule will subject testimonials and endorsements for zero or de minimis compensation to the required disclosure and adviser oversight provisions
and exempt such testimonials and endorsements only from the disqualification provisions.483 We also believe the exemption from the disqualification provisions will help ease the burden of compliance in many situations where the testimonials or endorsements are limited in scope, such as in refer-a-friend programs. To illustrate, if the disqualification provisions were to apply, one commenter stated that firms with ‘‘thousands of retail clients,’’ not knowing who will participate in the refer-a-friend programs, would have to inquire into each client’s disciplinary history.484 We agree that such an undertaking would be a major compliance challenge that is disproportionate to the limited scope and magnitude of such non-professional refer-a-friend programs. We accordingly believe that our approach appropriately balances the need for protections of the final rule with the burdens placed on the advisers complying with the rule. After considering comments and various thresholds, however, we are increasing the proposed de minimis threshold amount to $1,000.485 Accordingly, the disqualification provisions will not apply if an investment adviser provides compensation to a promoter of a total of $1,000 or less (or the equivalent value in non-cash compensation) during the preceding twelve months. We consider $1,000 to more appropriately capture referrals from both professional and non-professional types of testimonials and endorsements than the $100 amount we proposed. We also continue to believe that adopting an aggregate limit over a trailing 12-month period is consistent with our goal of providing an exception for small or nominal payments.486 One commenter supported our approach in requiring a trailing period, agreeing that it would not overly burden advisers because adviser should be keeping records of such payments.487
c. Registered Broker-Dealers
Under the final rule, we are providing an exemption from the rule’s disqualification provisions for promoters that are brokers or dealers registered with the Commission in accordance with section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, provided they are not subject to statutory disqualification under the Exchange Act.488 In addition, we are providing an exemption from the rule’s disclosure provisions when a broker-dealer is providing a testimonial or endorsement to a retail customer that is a recommendation subject to Regulation BI.489 Finally, we are providing an exemption from certain disclosure requirements when a broker￾dealer provides a testimonial or endorsement to an investor who is not a retail customer as defined in Regulation BI.490 While the proposed amendments to the solicitation rule would have applied the rule to all broker-dealer solicitations, we had contemplated whether to exempt certain advertisements or solicitation activities in some fashion from each of the proposed rules because we recognized some overlap in requirements applicable to broker-dealers.491 We received several comments suggesting that we eliminate the application of the

492See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter; Fidelity Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter; Credit Suisse Comment Letter: SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 493 Id. 494 IAA Comment Letter. 495As stated in the proposal, we recognize that there may be some overlap between the prohibition in rule 206(4)–8 and the final rule. However, the final rule provides more specificity regarding what we believe to be false or misleading statements that advisers to private funds must avoid in their advertisements. We also continue to believe that any additional costs to advisers to private funds as a result of potential overlap between the final rule and rule 206(4)–8 with respect to advertisements will be minimal, as an advertisement that would raise issues under rule 206(4)–8 might also raise issues under a specific provision of the final rule as well as other anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at 35–36. 496See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Sidley Austin Comment Letter; SIFMA Comment Letter I. 497See section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act. Among other things, a person is subject to ‘‘statutory disqualification’’ under the Exchange Act if such person (i) is subject to an order of the Commission denying, suspending for a period not exceeding 12 months, or revoking the person’s registration as a broker or dealer or barring or suspending for a period not exceeding 12 months the person’s being associated with a broker or dealer; (ii) is subject to an order of the CFTC denying, suspending, or revoking his registration under the Commodity Exchange Act; and (iii) has been convicted of any specified offense or other felony within 10 years of the date of filing of an application for membership of a self-regulatory organization. See also final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4). 498 In this case, we agree with commenters that certain statutory or regulatory requirements applicable to registered broker-dealers will satisfy the policy goals of some of the conditions. See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Sidley Austin Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 499Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iii)(C). See also supra
section II.C.4.f. (discussing grandfathering for
broker-dealers and covered persons with respect to the disqualification provisions). Advisers must have a reasonable basis for believing that the broker￾dealer is not subject to such statutory disqualification, consistent with the adviser oversight and compliance provision applicable to testimonials and endorsements. Final rule 206(4)– 1(b)(2)(i). 500Although Regulation BI does not explicitly require disclosure related to whether or not the broker-dealer is a current client or investor of the adviser, the Disclosure Obligation under Regulation BI requires the broker-dealer firm or representative to disclose that it is acting in a broker-dealer capacity, which we believe investors will generally understand to imply that the broker-dealer is not a client or investor of the adviser. Given this, we do not believe we need to separately require such a broker-dealer to disclose its status as a client or non-client. 501See Regulation Best Interest Release, supra footnote 146, at 14. Regulation BI applies when a broker-dealer makes a recommendation to a ‘‘retail customer.’’ See id. 502Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iii)(A). 503Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iii)(B). 504 Id. However, the broker-dealer must clearly and prominently disclose: (A) That the testimonial was given by a current client or investor, or the endorsement was given by a person other than a current client or investor; (B) that cash or non-cash compensation was provided for the testimonial or endorsement, if applicable; and (C) a brief statement of any material conflicts of interest on the part of the person giving the testimonial or endorsement resulting from the investment adviser’s relationship with such person. See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i). 505See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1)(i). 506See, e.g., Exchange Act section 10(b) and rules 10b–5, 10b–10(a)(2), 12b–20, 15c1–5, and 15c1–6 as well as FINRA rules 2010, 2020, 2262, 2269, and 5123. 507See, e.g., FINRA rule 2210(d)(6). 508See FINRA rule 2210(a)(1). Although FINRA rule 2210(f) separately covers public appearances, proposed advertising rule to advertisements related to potential investors in pooled investment vehicles, and that we exempt registered broker￾dealers that solicit private fund investors from the proposed solicitation rule.492 These commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendments would result in unnecessary and overlapping layers of regulation, including with respect to disclosures provided to investors, when a registered broker-dealer is involved in the sale of interests in a pooled investment vehicle.493 One commenter also stated that broker-dealers already are subject to the statutory disqualifications in section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act.494 We continue to believe that certain provisions of the final rule, such as the general prohibitions and performance provisions, should apply to all advertisements, regardless of whether the advertisement is provided to potential clients of an investment adviser or potential
investors in a private fund.495 However, we recognize that regulatory overlap would yield little benefit. Specifically, we agree with commenters that certain statutory or regulatory requirements applicable to registered broker-dealers will satisfy the policy goals of some of the conditions.496 Broker-dealers are subject to disqualification for a variety of misconduct under the Exchange Act, many of which we believe are sufficiently similar to the misconduct that would trigger a disqualification under the marketing rule, but the Exchange Act is particularized to broker-dealer activity.497 We are confident these disqualification provisions will serve the same policy goal as the disqualification provisions under this rule.498 As a result, the final rule will exempt from the disqualification provisions any testimonial or endorsement by a broker￾dealer registered with the Commission under section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, if the broker-dealer is not subject to statutory disqualification under section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act.499 Likewise, we recognize that the requirements under Regulation BI include conflicts of interest and compensation disclosures.500 For instance, under the Regulation BI Disclosure Obligation, when making a recommendation to a retail customer, a broker-dealer must disclose all material facts about the scope and terms of its relationship with the retail customer, such as the material fees and costs the customer will incur, as well as all material facts relating to its conflicts of interest associated with the recommendation, including third-party payments and compensation arrangements.501 In addition, all of the other Regulation BI obligations would apply when the broker-dealer is making a recommendation to a retail customer. Accordingly, we believe that the robust, protective framework of Regulation BI renders the disclosure requirements of the final marketing rule unnecessary when a broker-dealer provides a testimonial or endorsement to a retail customer that is a recommendation subject to Regulation BI.502 In addition, we are providing a partial exemption in cases where a registered broker-dealer provides a testimonial or endorsement to an investor who is not a retail customer as defined in Regulation BI.503 Specifically, under the final rule, a broker-dealer that provides a testimonial or endorsement to such an investor will not be required to disclose the material terms of any compensation arrangement or a description of any material conflicts of interest.504 We believe that the clear and prominent disclosures such a broker-dealer will be required to provide under our final rule are sufficient to alert an investor that is not a retail customer that a testimonial or endorsement is a paid solicitation.505 We also believe that these investors will be able to request from the broker-dealer other information about the solicitation. Aside from this partial exemption from the disclosure provisions, the disclosure obligations of
the final marketing rule will apply when a broker-dealer provides a testimonial or endorsement that is not a recommendation subject to Regulation BI. While registered broker-dealers may be subject to other disclosure obligations in these circumstances, these obligations generally do not align with the disclosure obligations for testimonials and endorsements under our final rule.506 In addition, although broker-dealers must comply with FINRA rule 2210, we do not believe that FINRA rule 2210 requires the same substantive disclosures that we require under the final rule.507 Moreover, communications for purposes of FINRA rule 2210 are ‘‘written’’ communications, whereas our final rule would apply to written and oral advertisements.508 Accordingly,

‘‘communications’’ consist of ‘‘correspondence, retail communications, and institutional communications,’’ all of which are defined as written communications. See FINRA rule 2210(a)(2), (3), and (5). 509See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(1). 510See supra footnote 361 and accompanying text. 511See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iv). 512See rule 506(d)(1) under the Securities Act. 513See, e.g., Credit Suisse Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I; MMI Comment Letter. 514 Id. 515We believe that the two sets of provisions are sufficiently similar to help realize our policy goal of reducing the risk that certain ineligible persons should not be acting as promoters. For example, an offering is disqualified under rule 506(d) if a covered person is subject to any order of the Commission entered within five years before such sale that, at the time of such sale, orders the person to cease and desist from committing or causing a violation or future violation of: (i) Any scienter￾based anti-fraud provision of the Federal securities laws; or (ii) section 5 of the Securities Act. See
section 506(d)(1)(v) of the Securities Act. See also
final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4)(v).
516Final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(iv).
517Proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(1). Specifically, such solicitors would not have had to enter into a written agreement and provide the solicitor disclosure and would not have been subject to the adviser oversight and compliance provision. However, such solicitors would have been subject to the disqualification provisions under the proposed rule. 518Final rule 206(4)–1(b). 519SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. absent any exemption under the final rule, the rule will require the disclosures of compensation arrangements and material conflicts of interest associated with a testimonial or endorsement.509 The final rule does not provide an exemption for registered broker-dealers from the adviser oversight and compliance condition applicable to testimonials and endorsements, including the written agreement requirement. We continue to believe that advisers should reasonably ensure that a registered broker-dealer providing a testimonial or endorsement for the adviser is complying with the rule’s applicable conditions. We believe that many advisers would already have an incentive to oversee any broker-dealers operating as their promoters and accordingly believe that this provision will provide an additional benefit to investors without being unduly burdensome. As noted above, in the context of private placements of private fund shares, we believe that a written private placement agreement would meet the final rule’s written agreement requirement, further reducing the compliance burdens associated with this aspect of the rule.510 d. ‘‘Covered Persons’’ Under the final rule, similar to the partial exemption for registered broker￾dealers, we are providing an exemption from the rule’s disqualification provisions for ‘‘covered persons’’ under rule 506(d) of Regulation D with respect to a rule 506 securities offering, provided the person’s involvement would not disqualify the offering under that rule.511 With respect to rule 506 of Regulation D, ‘‘covered persons’’ include the issuer, its predecessors and affiliated issuers; directors, general partners, and managing members of the issuer; executive officers of the issuer, and other officers of the issuer that participate in the offering; beneficial owners of 20 percent or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting equity securities, calculated on the basis of voting power; promoters connected to the issuer in any capacity at the time of sale; for pooled investment fund issuers, the fund’s investment manager and any general partner, managing member, director, executive officer or other officer participating in the offering of any such investment manager; and persons compensated for soliciting investors, including any general partner, managing member, director, executive officer or other officer participating in the offering of any such solicitor.512 Commenters expressed concern that issuers and solicitors conducting private fund offerings in reliance on Regulation D would face increased compliance burdens in observing two
sets of overlapping disqualification regulations.513 Stating that a majority of private placements are carried out under rule 506, these commenters suggested we conform the rule’s disqualification provisions to the provisions under rule 506 of Regulation D for solicitors of investors in private funds who would be newly subject to the solicitation rule, or that we provide an exemption from the final rule’s disqualification provisions for persons that are subject to rule 506 of Regulation D.514 We agree with commenters that having one set of disqualifying events for promoters with respect to offerings conducted in reliance on rule 506 of Regulation D would streamline compliance processes and reduce the burden for such promoters. Additionally, similar to the statutory disqualification provisions under the Exchange Act, we believe that the disqualification provisions, or ‘‘bad actor’’ provisions, under Regulation D will serve the same policy goal as our final rule’s disqualification provisions.515 While we recognize that the two sets of disqualification provisions are not identical and that there are certain categories of disqualifying events that do not overlap, we do not believe that the differences justify having more than one set of disqualification provisions for compliance. Moreover, this exemption is narrowly limited to testimonials and endorsements that are in connection with a sale of securities under rule 506 of the Securities Act. Accordingly, in cases where a covered person’s activity with respect to a rule 506 securities offering would be considered a testimonial or endorsement under our final rule, such covered person will not be subject to the disqualification provisions under our final rule so long as his or her involvement would not disqualify the offering under rule 506(d) under the Securities Act.516 Given that Regulation D does not have any similar provisions that are sufficient to replace our final rule’s disclosure or adviser oversight and compliance provisions, covered persons under rule 506(d) of Regulation D will not be exempt from our rule’s disclosure and adviser oversight and compliance obligations for testimonials and endorsements. Accordingly, similar to the exemption for registered broker￾dealers, persons covered by rule 506(d) of Regulation D with respect to a rule 506 offering will still be subject to all other provisions of the final rule, to the extent that their activity falls within the scope of the rule, including the general prohibitions, performance provisions, and conditions applicable to testimonials and endorsements except the disqualification provisions. e. No Exemptions for Impersonal Investment Advice and Nonprofit Programs
i. Impersonal Investment Advice
The proposed solicitation rule would have provided a partial exemption for solicitation activities for investment advisory services that do not purport to meet the objectives or needs of specific individuals or accounts.517 The proposed advertising rule did not provide any similar exemption. As a result of the merger of the two rules, the final rule will not have an exemption for promoters that refer investors for the provision of impersonal investment advice.518 One commenter supported our proposal to retain and modify the current exemption under the solicitation rule for solicitation activities related to the provision of impersonal investment advice.519 This commenter stated that the exemption is a ‘‘long-standing feature of the regime covering solicitation,’’ and that our proposed

520See current rule 206(4)–1. The current advertising rule does not have any exemptions for advertisements related to impersonal investment advice. 521See TINA Comment Letter. 522See Mercer Comment Letter; NAPFA Comment Letter. 523Some solicitors have, from time to time, requested that the staff not recommend enforcement action under the cash solicitation rule for referral programs with some, or all, of these features. See National Football League Players Association, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Jan. 25, 2002) (‘‘NFLPA Letter’’); Excellence in Advertising, Limited, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Nov. 13, 1986) (‘‘EIA Letter’’); International Association for Financial Planning, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (June 1, 1998) (‘‘IAFP Letter’’). These staff no-action letters will be nullified following the rescission of the solicitation rule. 524See final rule 206(4)–1(b). The proposed solicitation rule would not have applied to an adviser’s participation in a program when the adviser had a reasonable basis for believing that the solicitor is a nonprofit program, participating advisers compensated the solicitor only for the costs reasonably incurred in operating the program, and the solicitor provided clients a list, based on non-qualitative criteria, of at least two advisers. See proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(4). There is no special exception made for nonprofit programs under the current advertising rule. 525 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at
section II.B.7.
526SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I.
527See proposed rule 206(4)–3(a)(1). 528See proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(4), which would have required that: (i) The adviser have a ‘‘reasonable basis for believing’’ that among other things, the solicitor is a nonprofit program and that the solicitor (or adviser) ‘‘prominently discloses to the client, at the time of any solicitation activities,’’ certain information; and (ii) solicitor or adviser disclose: (1) The criteria for inclusion on the list of investment advisers; and (2) that investment advisers reimburse the solicitor for the costs reasonably incurred in operating the program. 529See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(i). The proposed nonprofit program exemption would have required that the client receive certain disclosures. See proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(4)(ii). The exemption would have also had a ‘‘reasonable basis’’ standard for the adviser’s reliance on the exemption. See proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(4)(i). As with the de minimis exemption, nonprofit programs would not have been subject to the disqualification provisions under the proposed rule. See proposed rule 206(4)– 3(b)(4). Since a person or program would be unlikely to demonstrate bias in referring one adviser over another when neither adviser provides compensation based on the number of referrals made or any other indicator of the potential to earn the adviser profit, we believed, and continue to believe, that an exemption from the disqualification provisions in such cases is appropriate. 530The proposed exemption would have required that the solicitor or adviser disclose to the client that investment advisers reimburse the solicitor for the costs reasonably incurred in operating the client. Proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(4)(ii)(B). 531Such a program within the de minimis exemption will not be subject to the written agreement requirement under the adviser oversight and compliance provision. Final rule 206(4)– 1(b)(2)(ii) and (b)(4)(i). 532See proposed rule 206(4)–3(b)(4)(i). modifications such as removing the requirement to enter into a written agreement would improve aspects of the exemption. However, in the context of advertising, and testimonials and endorsements in particular, we do not believe that there should be any distinction made between personal and impersonal investment advice.520 Many testimonials and endorsements, by their nature, will be used to promote and advertise an adviser’s services, without taking into account a particular investor’s objectives or needs. Accordingly, in such cases, we believe that investors should be afforded all protections of the final rule. A testimonial or endorsement serving as an advertisement for an adviser should not be exempt from providing disclosures when there is a material conflict of interest simply because the advertisement is related to the provision of impersonal investment advice instead of personal investment advice. We stated in the proposal that the current and proposed solicitation rule provided a partial exemption for impersonal
advisory services because we understood that ‘‘prospective clients normally would be aware that a person selling such services was a salesman who was paid to do so.’’ However, with respect to the proposed advertising rule, one commenter argued against regulations built on any underlying assumption that consumers are skilled at evaluating testimonials.521 Other commenters argued against permitting testimonials and endorsements, raising concerns about investor confusion and inadvertent investor harm.522 Although we continue to recognize that a potential investor may be aware of a promoter’s incentive to sell, after considering comments, we believe that any use of testimonials or endorsements, subject to the final exemptions, needs certain protections. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that an adviser may offer impersonalized services, if an adviser’s advertisement includes a testimonial or endorsement, then such advertisement will be subject to the final rule’s provisions.
ii. Nonprofit Programs Exemption
The proposed solicitation rule would have exempted certain types of nonprofit programs from the substantive requirements of the rule, codifying the positions taken in previous staff no￾action letters.523 The proposed advertising rule provided no such exemption for testimonials or endorsements. The final marketing rule will not have an exemption for nonprofit programs.524 We proposed this exemption because we believed that the potential for the solicitor to demonstrate bias towards one adviser or another when there is no profit motive made the protections of the solicitation rule unnecessary.525 One commenter supported the proposed exemption and suggested that the same type of approach could be helpful for for-profit entities that provide matching of investors and advisers based on objective criteria.526 However, given the merger of the advertising and solicitation rules and our final rule’s requirements, we no longer believe that an exemption for nonprofit programs would be appropriate or necessary. Instead, we believe the requirements of the final rule are important for investors even when the advertisement take the form of a testimonial or endorsement by a nonprofit program. Among other things, our proposed solicitation rule would have required a separate solicitor disclosure that provided investors with certain information including the terms of compensation, and a written agreement between the adviser and solicitor describing the solicitation activities and requiring solicitor compliance with
section 206 of the Act.527 The proposed
nonprofit programs exemption would have exempted advisers and solicitors from the requirements of the proposed solicitation rule including the written agreement and disclosure requirements, provided that the adviser and solicitor still met a number of conditions including some advisory oversight and different disclosures.528 Under the final rule, though we are not providing an exemption for nonprofit programs per se, we took into account that, if there is no or minimal compensation involved, the nonprofit program would fall under the de minimis exemption. As a result, many nonprofit programs may effectively be subject to the required disclosures and a part of the adviser oversight provision under the final rule, similar to the proposed exemption under the solicitation rule.529 Under the final rule, the nonprofit program would need to disclose that it is not a current client of the adviser, the material terms of compensation, which, if any, would be similar to the disclosure under the proposed exemption,530 and any material conflicts of interest. With respect to the adviser oversight provision, if the nonprofit program falls under the de minimis exemption,531 advisers would only need to have a reasonable basis for believing that the nonprofit program complies with the final rule, rather than a number of specific items as proposed under the solicitation rule.532 We believe that the disclosure and advisory oversight requirements under

533See, e.g., Blackrock Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 534See NASAA Comment Letter. 535Rule 206(4)–1(e)(17). An adviser’s ‘‘related person’’ is defined in Form ADV’s Glossary of Terms as ‘‘[a]ny advisory affiliate and any person that is under common control with your firm.’’ Italicized terms are defined in the Form ADV Glossary. We believe that a rating by a person under common control with the adviser could present the same bias towards the adviser as a rating by an adviser’s other advisory affiliates. 536See final rule 206(4)–1(c). 537See id. 538Commenters claimed that a ‘‘clearly and prominently’’ disclosure standard would pose challenges for certain advertisements, including advertisements on certain social media or internet platforms, if hyperlinking is not permitted. See, e.g., Fidelity Comment Letter; LinkedIn Comment Letter; MMI Comment Letter. As discussed above, we continue to believe that it would not be consistent with the clear and prominent standard to use a hyperlink to include the disclosures required under the final rule. See supra section II.C.2.a. Instead, such required disclosures should be included within the advertisement. 539See, e.g., Blackrock Comment Letter (suggesting that firms might not be willing to provide proprietary survey methodology information to advisers); MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter. 540See, e.g., Blackrock Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter. 541See IAA Comment Letter. the final rule are more appropriate than, and preferable to, the more tailored disclosures and conditions that were proposed under the nonprofit program exemption. Accordingly, we believe eliminating the proposed nonprofit program exemption is appropriate, and the final rule will subject advisers participating in any referral program, whether nonprofit or for profit, to the rule in order to provide investors with sufficient and necessary information when presented with a testimonial or endorsement of an adviser by such a program. Absent the de minimis or other exemption, the rule will subject all referral programs that provide testimonials or endorsements to the required disclosures, adviser oversight and disqualification provisions. D. Third-Party Ratings As proposed, the final rule will prohibit including third-party ratings in an advertisement, unless they comply with the rule’s general prohibitions and additional conditions. An investment adviser may not include a third-party rating in its advertisement unless the adviser has a reasonable basis for believing that any questionnaire or survey used in the preparation of the third-party rating meets certain criteria and provides certain disclosures. Several commenters supported the proposed rule’s approach of expressly permitting the inclusion of third-party ratings in advertisements.533 However, one commenter requested that we prohibit third-party ratings in retail advertisements, arguing that advisers will be incentivized to purchase only positive
third-party ratings and aggressively market them to mislead investors.534 We believe that the final rule’s conditions for including third￾party ratings in an advertisement, discussed in more detail below, in conjunction with the rule’s general prohibitions, mitigate any such incentives and safeguard investors from misleading third-party ratings. The final rule will, as proposed, define ‘‘third-party rating’’ as a ‘‘rating or ranking of an investment adviser provided by a person who is not a related person (as defined in the Form ADV Glossary of Terms), and such person provides such ratings or rankings in the ordinary course of its business.’’ 535 This definition is intended to permit advisers to use third￾party ratings, subject to conditions, when the ratings are conducted in the ordinary course of business. We continue to believe that the ordinary course of business requirement would largely correspond to persons with the experience to develop and promote ratings based on relevant criteria. It would also distinguish third-party ratings from testimonials and endorsements that resemble third-party ratings, but that are not made by persons who are in the business of providing ratings or rankings. The requirement that the provider not be an adviser’s related person will avoid the risk that certain affiliations could result in a biased rating. The final rule also will subject advertisements that include third-party ratings to additional tailored conditions, as proposed. For such advertisements, the final rule will require that the investment adviser have a reasonable basis to believe that any questionnaire or survey used in the preparation of the third-party rating is structured to make it equally easy for a participant to provide favorable and unfavorable responses, and is not designed or prepared to produce any predetermined result (the ‘‘due diligence requirement’’).536 The final rule also will require that an investment adviser clearly and prominently disclose, or the investment adviser reasonably believes that the third-party rating clearly and prominently discloses: (i) The date on which the rating was given and the period of time upon which the rating was based; (ii) the identity of the third￾party that created and tabulated the rating; and (iii) if applicable, that compensation has been provided directly or indirectly by the adviser in connection with obtaining or using the third-party rating (the ‘‘disclosure requirement’’).537 In order to be clear and prominent, the disclosure must be at least as prominent as the third-party rating.538 While we are adopting the conditions required for including any third-party rating in an advertisement largely as proposed, we are providing additional clarification on how advisers can comply with such conditions. Several commenters requested guidance on how an adviser can satisfy the due diligence requirement.539 We continue to believe that an adviser could satisfy the requirement by accessing the
questionnaire or survey that was used in the preparation of the rating. We are persuaded by commenters’ concerns, however, that third-party rating agencies may be reluctant to share proprietary survey or questionnaire information to advisers, such as their calculation methodology.540 Accordingly, we are clarifying that obtaining the questionnaire or survey used in the preparation of the rating is not the only means to satisfy this requirement. We also do not believe that this condition requires an adviser to obtain complete information about how the third-party rating agency collects underlying data or calculates a rating, as one commenter suggested.541 Nevertheless, we continue to believe that an adviser relying solely on the results of a survey or questionnaire—i.e., the rating itself— without conducting some due diligence into the underlying methodology and structure, could give rise to advertisements that include misleading ratings. To satisfy the due diligence requirement, an adviser could seek representations from the third-party rating agency regarding general aspects of how the survey or questionnaire is designed, structured, and administered. Alternatively, a third-party rating provider may publicly disclose similar information about its survey or questionnaire methodology. In either case, the adviser could obtain sufficient information to formulate a reasonable belief as required by the due diligence requirement without obtaining proprietary data of third-party rating agencies. The first provision of the disclosure requirement—the date on which the rating was given and the period of time upon which the rating was based—will assist investors in evaluating the relevance of the rating. Ratings from an earlier date, or that are based on information from an earlier period, may not reflect the current state of an

542 In addition, an adviser would be required to provide contextual disclosures of subsequent, less￾favorable performance in the rating, if applicable. See final rule 206(4)–1(a). 543 In many cases, third-party ratings are developed by relying significantly on questionnaires or client surveys and involve different compensation models. For example, some investment advisers compensate the third-party ratings firm for the right to include the ratings or rankings that are calculated as a result of the survey in their advertisements. Other investment advisers compensate the third-party ratings firm to be included in the initial pool of advisers from which the rating or ranking is determined. 544See supra section II.A. 545See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at text accompanying n. 181. 546For example, investors may rely particularly heavily on advertised performance results in choosing whether to hire or retain an investment adviser or invest in a private fund managed by the adviser. This reliance may be misplaced to the extent that an investor considers past performance achieved by an investment adviser to be predictive of the results that the investment adviser will achieve for the investor. 547See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; AIC Comment Letter I. 548Proposed rule 206(4)–1(c)(1). 549We proposed to define clients and investors that are ‘‘qualified purchasers’’ or ‘‘knowledgeable employees’’ as ‘‘Non-Retail Persons’’ and to define all other clients and investors as ‘‘Retail Persons.’’ See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(8) and (14). Similarly, the proposed rule distinguished between advertisements for which an adviser has adopted and implemented policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the advertisements are disseminated solely to Non￾Retail Persons as ‘‘Non-Retail Advertisements’’ and all other advertisements as ‘‘Retail Advertisements.’’ See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(7) and (13). 550Proposed rule 206(4)–1(c)(2). 551Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(1). 552 Id. 553See Consumer Federation Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter; Proskauer Comment Letter. The majority of commenters who responded via the Investor Feedback Flyer marked net performance results as ‘‘Very Important.’’ investment adviser’s business. An advertisement that includes an older rating would be misleading without clear and prominent disclosure of the rating’s date.542 The second provision of the disclosure requirement—the identity of the third party that created the rating— is important because it will provide investors with the opportunity to assess the qualifications and credibility of the rating provider. Investors can look up a third party by name and find relevant information, if available, about the third party’s qualifications and can form their own opinions about credibility. The final provision of the disclosure requirement—that compensation has been provided directly or indirectly by the adviser in connection with obtaining or using the third-party
rating—provides consumers with important context for weighing the relevance of the statement in light of the compensation incentive.543 Although the final rule uses the term ‘‘compensation,’’ this term continues to refer to cash and non-cash compensation, as proposed. Similarly, the final rule replaces the phrase ‘‘by or on behalf’’ with ‘‘directly or indirectly.’’ As discussed above, this reflects a non￾substantive change to use a phrase that we believe is commonly understood in the industry.544 While the final rule explicitly requires these three disclosures, they would not cure a rating that could otherwise be false or misleading under the final rule’s general prohibitions or under the general anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. For example, where an adviser’s advertisement references a recent rating and discloses the date, but the rating is based upon on an aspect of the adviser’s business that has since materially changed, the advertisement would be misleading. Likewise, an adviser’s advertisement would be misleading if it indicates that the adviser is rated highly without disclosing that the rating is based solely on a criterion, such as assets under management, that may not relate to the quality of the investment advice. E. Performance Advertising The final rule’s general prohibitions apply to advertisements that include performance results (‘‘performance advertising’’), as proposed. We are adopting specific requirements and restrictions for performance advertising, with some changes from the proposal as described below. We continue to believe that performance advertising raises special concerns that warrant additional requirements and restrictions under the final marketing rule.545 In particular, the presentation of performance could lead reasonable investors to unwarranted assumptions and thus would result in a misleading advertisement.546 Some commenters objected to the proposed rule’s specific performance advertising provisions, favoring relying only on the rule’s general prohibitions for non-retail investors.547 However, commenters generally did not advocate for the removal of the performance advertising provisions as a whole. After considering comments, we remain convinced that additional protections should apply to advertisements that include performance results. We proposed several requirements for all advertisements that include performance advertising. Specifically, under our proposal, an advertisement could not: (i) Include gross performance, unless the advertisement provided or offered to provide a schedule of fees and expenses deducted to calculate net performance (the ‘‘proposed schedule of fees requirement’’); (ii) contain any statement that the performance results have been approved or reviewed by the Commission (the ‘‘Commission approval requirement’’); and (iii) provide related, extracted, or hypothetical performance without meeting specific conditions.548 For Retail Advertisements,549 our proposal also
would have required that:
(i) Any presentation of gross performance also include net performance, subject to conditions (the ‘‘net performance requirement’’); and (ii) any performance results of a portfolio or composite aggregation of related portfolios include performance results for one-, five-, and ten-year periods, subject to conditions (the ‘‘time period requirement’’).550 As discussed in more detail below, the final rule substantially adopts the proposed rule’s requirements, and applies them to all advertisements that include performance advertising. Unlike the proposed rule, the final rule does not provide separate requirements for performance advertising in Retail Advertisements and Non-Retail Advertisements and will not include the proposed schedule of fees requirement.

1. Net Performance Requirement;
   Elimination of Proposed Schedule of Fees Requirement The final rule will prohibit any presentation of gross performance in an advertisement unless the advertisement also presents net performance (i) with at least equal prominence to, and in a format designed to facilitate comparison with, the gross performance; and (ii) calculated over the same time period, and using the same type of return and methodology as, the gross performance.551 The final rule applies the net performance requirement to all advertisements, not only to Retail Advertisements and, in turn, eliminates the proposed schedule of fees requirement.552 We discuss below the benefits of expanding the net performance requirement to all performance advertisements in light of the removal of the proposed schedule of fees requirement, and the anticipated effects on advisers. Some commenters supported our proposal to require advisers that present gross performance in Retail Advertisements to present net performance.553 They agreed that presentations of net performance help demonstrate the effect that fees and expenses will have on future performance. One commenter also stated that providing net performance information to Non-Retail Persons alerts

554See NYC Bar Comment Letter (expressing this idea in the context of its overall argument that the rule should not require an adviser to provide (or offer to provide) a schedule of fees and expenses to Non-Retail Persons when also presenting net performance). 555See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; Proskauer Comment Letter (stating that for Non-Retail Persons, disclosure that gross performance is gross and not net is sufficient); CFA Institute Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Blackrock Comment Letter. 556See ILPA Comment Letter. 557See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter; Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 558See, e.g., NYC Bar Comment Letter; NSCP Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter I; NAPFA Comment Letter; ACG Comment Letter. 559See, e.g., NSCP Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter (stating that prospective investors typically do not provide information about their retail or non-retail status at the marketing stage, and stating that in the case of non-U.S. investors, this information is generally not gathered at any stage). 560See Ropes & Gray Comment Letter; Association for Corporate Growth Comment Letter. For example, a private fund that relies on section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act may have investors that qualify as Retail and Non-Retail Persons under the proposed amendments to the advertising rule. Retail Persons would receive different disclosures under the proposal, raising the possibility of unequal treatment and potential questions about fair disclosure. See proposed rule 206(4)–1(c)(1) and (2). 561See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 562See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter (stating that they do not believe it is feasible for an adviser that presents gross returns to provide the proposed fee schedule, but that advisers should disclose certain information about fees a client will pay). 563See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; NYC Bar Comment Letter. 564See ILPA Comment Letter. 565See, e.g., NAPFA Comment Letter (opposing additional disclosure requirements); NRS Comment Letter (supporting additional disclosure requirements). See also ILPA Comment Letter (requesting that the Commission incorporate specific disclosures for non-retail investors reviewing private equity fund performance advertising). 566See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at nn.191–195. 567Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(11). See also proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(10). them to the fact that fees and expenses may significantly reduce performance.554 Some commenters also supported our proposal to allow advisers to exclude net performance in Non-Retail Advertisements, stating that Non-Retail Persons are often not at risk of being misled by gross performance.555 However, another commenter stated that many Non-Retail Persons investing in private funds prefer to receive both net and gross performance results in advertisements because it provides an opportunity to cross check the investors’ net performance calculations against
advisers’ calculations.556 In addition, while some commenters supported permitting different performance presentations in Retail and Non-Retail Advertisements,557 other commenters stated that it could create operational, administrative, and compliance burdens for advisers, and significant potential for errors.558 Some commenters stated that advisers would face difficulties in controlling the distribution of Non-Retail Advertisements pursuant to policies and procedures that would be required under the proposal.559 A few commenters also raised concerns that in some cases Retail and Non-Retail Persons may invest in the same fund, but may receive different types or levels of information because of the proposed rule’s bifurcated approach.560 After considering comments, we believe that the net performance requirement is reasonably designed to prevent all types of prospective clients and private fund investors from being misled by the presentation of gross performance in an advertisement. Presenting gross performance alone in this context may imply that investors received the full amount of the presented returns, when the fees and expenses paid in connection with the investment adviser’s investment advisory services would reduce the returns to investors. Presenting gross performance alone also may be misleading to the extent that amounts paid in fees and expenses are not deducted and thus not compounded in calculating the returns. In addition, we believe that presenting net performance in all advertisements will help illustrate for investors the effect of fees and expenses on the advertised performance results and allow all investors to compare the adviser’s performance presentation with their own calculations, if applicable. We do not believe the burden will be considerable given that many advisers already present net performance.561 Given the operational complexity and challenges that commenters noted, as well as changes we are making to the final rule to streamline the performance presentation requirements for all advisers, we are persuaded that the rule should no longer provide different flexibility for advertisements to Non￾Retail Persons. Accordingly, the final rule implements changes from the proposed rule that we believe, when viewed as a whole, simplify the rule’s compliance for all advisers, while preserving and promoting protection for all investors. In particular, we are eliminating the proposed schedule of fees requirement. Commenters stated that this requirement could be overly burdensome for advisers and may not provide relevant information to investors.562 Some commenters also stated that Non-Retail Persons are in a position to negotiate for appropriately tailored disclosures based on their particular needs.563 While one commenter disagreed, arguing that investors in private funds (including Non-Retail Persons) sometimes have difficulty obtaining information regarding fees and expenses for complex products,564 we believe requiring net
performance for all advertisements with appropriate disclosures will alert investors to the effect of fees on an adviser’s performance results. As proposed, the final rule will not prescribe disclosure requirements for net and gross performance presentations. Instead, an adviser would need to comply with the final rule’s general prohibitions. Comments were mixed on this aspect of the proposal.565 We continue to believe, however, that advisers should evaluate the particular facts and circumstances that may be relevant to investors, including the assumptions, factors, and conditions that contributed to the performance, and include appropriate disclosures or other information such that the advertisement does not violate the prohibitions in paragraph (a) of the final rule or other applicable law. Depending on the facts and circumstances, disclosures may include: (1) The material conditions, objectives, and investment strategies used to obtain the results portrayed; (2) whether and to what extent the results portrayed reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings; (3) the effect of material market or economic conditions on the results portrayed; (4) the possibility of loss; and (5) the material facts relevant to any comparison made to the results of an index or other benchmark.566 a. Definition of Gross Performance Similar to the proposal, both ‘‘gross performance’’ and ‘‘net performance’’ will be defined by reference to a ‘‘portfolio,’’ which is defined as ‘‘a group of investments managed by the investment adviser’’ and can include ‘‘an account or private fund.’’ 567 Under the final rule, ‘‘gross performance’’ is defined to mean the performance results of a portfolio (or portions of a portfolio that are included in extracted performance, if applicable) before the deduction of all fees and expenses that a client or investor has paid or would have paid in connection with the investment adviser’s investment advisory services to the relevant

568Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(7).
569See CFA Institute Comment Letter. See infra
section II.E.5 (discussing extracted performance).
570See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at text accompanying nn.235–236. 571See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 572See IAA Comment Letter (recommending for all cases where an investment adviser has discretion and is responsible for the execution of client transactions); CFA Institute Comment Letter (recommending for all presentations of gross returns other than those the adviser describes as ‘‘pure gross returns’’). 573CFA Institute Comment Letter (‘‘Pure gross returns are commonly used when transaction costs are bundled with investment management fees, such as in a wrap fee arrangement.’’). This commenter also requested that we clarify whether returns of accounts that pay zero commissions are gross returns or pure gross returns. 574See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter. 575See, e.g., supra section II.B; infra section II.E. 576Even though we are not adopting a definition of ‘‘pure gross performance,’’ as one commenter suggested, we believe that any adviser that presents such performance results in addition to gross performance and net performance should identify pure gross returns and disclose that pure gross returns do not reflect the deduction of transaction costs, to avoid misleading recipients of the advertisement. 577Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(10). 578See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(6). 579See IAA Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; NRS Comment Letter. 580See Consumer Federation Comment Letter (stating that the Commission should require advisers to comply with a uniform set of principles when calculating performance). See also CFA portfolio.568 We are adopting the definition of gross performance as proposed, with one change to require, as a commenter requested, that advisers that show extracted performance in accordance with the final marketing rule must show net and gross performance for the applicable subset of investments extracted from a portfolio.569 This change clarifies that gross performance applies not only to an entire portfolio but also to a portion of a portfolio that is included in extracted performance. Gross performance does not show the impact of all fees and expenses that the adviser’s existing investors have borne or that prospective investors would bear, which can be relevant to an evaluation of the investment experience of the adviser’s advisory clients and/or investors in private funds advised by the investment adviser.570 While commenters generally supported the proposed definition of gross performance, some requested that we clarify the types of fees and expenses advisers must deduct in calculating gross performance.571 For example, some commenters requested we specify that gross returns should reflect the deduction of transaction costs, if any exist.572 One of these commenters also requested that we add a definition for ‘‘pure gross returns’’ (i.e., returns that do not reflect the deduction of any transaction costs), and require advisers to make additional disclosures when
presenting pure gross returns in advertisements.573 The same commenter requested that we clarify that advisory fees paid to underlying investment vehicles must be deducted from gross performance. Like the proposed rule, the final rule does not prescribe any particular calculation of gross performance. For example, many private funds use money-weighted returns instead of time￾weighted returns.574 Under the final rule, advisers may use the type of returns appropriate for their strategies provided that the usage does not violate the rule’s general prohibitions, and, if applicable, subject to the requirements discussed below.575 We continue to believe that, because of the variation among types of advisers and investments, prescribing the calculation could unduly limit the ability of advisers to present performance information that they believe would be most relevant and useful to an advertisement’s audience. However, if an investment adviser calculates the performance of a portfolio in part by deducting transaction fees and expenses, but deducts no other fees or expenses, then such performance would be ‘‘gross performance.’’ If an investment adviser’s calculation of performance reflects the deduction of advisory fees paid to an underlying investment vehicle before the deduction of all fees and expenses that a client or investor has paid or would have paid in connection with the investment adviser’s investment advisory services to the relevant portfolio, then such performance would be ‘‘gross performance.’’ It would be misleading to present gross performance information without providing appropriate disclosure about gross performance, taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of the advertised performance. Advisers generally should describe the type of performance return presented in the advertisement. For example, an advertisement may or may not present the performance of a portfolio using a return that accounts for the cash flows into and out of the portfolio. In either case, under the final rule, an adviser generally should disclose what elements are included in the return presented so that the audience can understand, for example, how it reflects cash flow and other relevant factors. Similarly, if an adviser’s presentation of gross performance does not reflect the deduction of transaction fees and expenses, an adviser should disclose that fact to avoid being misleading, if it would not be clear to the investor from the context of the advertisement.576 b. Definition of Net Performance We are adopting the definition of net performance as proposed, with some modifications. First, as with gross performance and for the same reasons, the final rule provides that net performance applies not only to an entire portfolio but also to a portion of a portfolio that is included in extracted performance. Second, we are specifying when advisers may exclude certain custodian fees paid to third parties. Third, we are prescribing some aspects of the
calculation of net performance using model fees. The final rule defines ‘‘net performance’’ to mean, in part, the performance results of a portfolio (or portions of a portfolio that are included in extracted performance, if applicable) after the deduction of all fees and expenses that a client or investor has paid or would have paid in connection with the investment adviser’s investment advisory services to the relevant portfolio.577 Once an adviser establishes the ‘‘portfolio’’ for which performance results are presented, the adviser must determine the fees and expenses borne by the owner of the portfolio and then deduct those to establish the ‘‘net performance.’’ The final rule includes a non￾exhaustive list of the types of fees and expenses to be considered in preparing net performance that is identical to the proposal.578 This list includes, if applicable, advisory fees, advisory fees paid to underlying investment vehicles, and payments by the investment adviser for which the client or investor reimburses the investment adviser. It illustrates fees and expenses that clients or investors bear in connection with the services they receive. In addition, ‘‘net performance’’ may exclude custodian fees paid to a bank or other third-party organization for safekeeping funds and securities. Finally, the final rule permits the use of a model fee in calculating net performance in an advertisement, subject to conditions. A few commenters supported the proposed definition of net performance.579 Some commenters, however, requested we prescribe additional requirements for net performance calculations, including specific requirements for certain private funds.580 For example, one commenter

Institute Comment Letter; ILPA Comment Letter (both letters discussing particular concerns regarding private equity funds). 581See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 582See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; NRS Comment Letter. 583See Resolute Comment Letter. 584See ILPA Comment Letter. 585See Resolute Comment Letter. 586Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(10). 587Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(10)(i). See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(6)(iii). 588See CFA Institute Comment Letter. See also IAA Comment Letter (supporting permitting the exclusion of custodian fees, generally). 589Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(10)(ii)(A). 590 If the fee to be charged to the intended audience is anticipated to be higher than the actual fees charged, the adviser must use a model fee that reflects the anticipated fee to be charged in order not to violate the rule’s general prohibitions. See id. See also final rule 206(4)–1(a). recommended that, when clients cannot ‘‘opt out’’ of custody or other administrative costs, the rule should expressly require the adviser to deduct these fees and costs when presenting net returns of a specific pooled investment vehicle.581 This commenter requested that we clarify that when presenting net performance of a specific pooled fund, advisers must deduct administrative fees, as required when complying with the CFA Institute’s Global Investment Performance Standards (‘‘GIPS standards’’). Some commenters supported our proposal not to prescribe specific calculations, stating that there is no single correct way to calculate returns.582 Some of these commenters also requested we clarify that net performance calculations in advertisements must reflect the deduction of any transaction costs and investment advisory fees (including any performance-based fees or carried interest). One commenter requested clarification that net performance fees exclude taxes on gains generated in a portfolio.583 As proposed, the final rule does not prescribe any particular calculation of net performance. We believe that prescribing the calculation of net performance could unduly limit the ability of advisers to present performance information that they believe would be most relevant and useful to an advertisement’s audience. Therefore, the final rule’s definition continues to include a non-exhaustive list of the types of fees and expenses to be considered in preparing net performance. We decline, however, to enumerate all potential private fund fees and expenses, as one commenter suggested.584 Instead, the final rule’s definition of net performance requires the deduction of private fund fees and expenses that the investor has paid or would have paid in connection with the investment adviser’s investment advisory services to the relevant fund. However, we are clarifying in response to some commenters that any adviser that deducts applicable transaction fees and expenses, or advisory fees paid to an underlying investment vehicle, when calculating gross performance should also do so for net performance. We are
also clarifying that, under the final rule’s definition of net performance, advisory fees include performance-based fees and performance allocations that a client or investor has paid or would have paid in connection with the investment adviser’s investment advisory services to the relevant portfolio. With respect to administrative fees and expenses that a commenter raised, whether a client or investor pays them in connection with the investment adviser’s advisory services (and therefore they must be deducted) depends on the facts and circumstances. For example, if an adviser agrees to bear certain administrative fees as a result of negotiations with investors in the private fund, or if an investor agrees to directly bear them, we do not believe that those fees should be included in the calculation of net performance. In response to a commenter discussed above, we believe that capital gains taxes paid outside of the portfolio are not fees and expenses that a client or investor has paid or would have paid in connection with the investment adviser’s investment advisory services (and are therefore not required to be deducted in the calculation of net performance).585 In addition, as proposed, the definition of net performance refers to the deduction of all fees that an investor ‘‘has paid or would have paid’’ in connection with the services provided. That is, where hypothetical performance is permissibly advertised under the final rule, net performance should reflect the fees and expenses that ‘‘would have’’ been paid if the hypothetical performance had been achieved by an actual portfolio.586
c. Deduction of Custodian Fees Paid to
a Bank or Other Third-Party Organization Under the final rule, presentation of ‘‘net performance’’ in an advertisement may exclude custodian fees paid to a bank or other third-party organization for safekeeping funds and securities, as proposed.587 We understand that advisory clients commonly select and directly pay custodians, and in such cases, advisers may not have knowledge of the amount of such custodian fees to deduct for purposes of establishing net performance. One commenter supported this treatment for non-pooled investment vehicles, stating that the rule should not require an adviser to reflect the deduction of custodian fees when clients select their custodians.588 However, this commenter also recommended that the rule expressly require custody fee deduction if a client cannot ‘‘opt-out’’ of paying those fees. After considering comments, we continue to believe that the final rule should allow an adviser to exclude custodian fees paid to third parties given a client may control custodian selection (and accompanying fees). We believe that this approach is appropriate even where advisers know the amount of custodian fees—e.g., where the adviser recommended the custodian. However, to the extent a client or investor pays an adviser, rather than a third party, for custodial services, then the adviser must deduct the custodial fee in calculating net performance for purposes of the advertisement. This will be the case, for example, when an adviser provides custodial services with respect to funds or securities for which the performance is presented and charges a separate fee for those services, or when custodial fees are included in a single fee paid to the adviser, such as if they are included in wrap fee programs. This would also be the case when a client or investor reimburses the investment adviser for third-party custodian fees. d. Deduction of Model Fees Under the final rule, presentation of ‘‘net performance’’ in advertisements may reflect the deduction of a model fee when doing so would result in performance figures that are no higher than if the actual fee had been deducted, as proposed.589 This will result in performance that is no higher than if the adviser deducted actual fees. For example, in a private fund with multiple series or classes where each series or class has different fees, an adviser may display the performance of the highest fee class. We did not receive any comments on this aspect of the proposal. Advisers may choose this modification to ease calculating net performance. When an adviser advertises net performance that is no higher than if deducting actual fees, there appears to be little chance of misleading the audience into believing that investors received better returns than they actually did.590

591Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(10)(ii)(B). The final rule reflects one change from the proposal, in response to a commenter that requested that we conform the phrase ‘‘relevant audience’’ in the proposed rule’s model fee provision, to other parts of the rule. See CFA Institute Comment Letter. We agree, and have revised the provision to refer to the ‘‘intended audience to whom the advertisement is disseminated.’’ 592See MMI Comment Letter. 593See supra footnote 590 (discussing the final rule’s first model fee provision and the general prohibitions). As discussed above, net performance that reflects a model fee that is not available to the intended audience is not permitted under the final rule’s second model fee provision. 594See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 595See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(10) (referring, in the definition of net performance, to the deduction of all fees and expenses that a client or investor ‘‘would have paid’’). An adviser could use such a model fee pursuant to the second model fee provision. Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(10)(ii)(B). 596See Wellington Comment Letter. 597See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 598See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at text following footnote 288. 599See IAA Comment Letter. 600Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(1)(i) and (ii). 601See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 602Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(2). See proposed rule 206(4)–1(c)(2)(ii). 603See id. 604See id. The rule also will allow net performance to reflect the deduction of a model fee that is equal to the highest fee charged to the intended audience to whom the advertisement is disseminated, similar to as proposed.591 We continue to believe that allowing advisers to present net performance that reflects the deduction of this type of model fee may be useful for advisers who manage a particular strategy for different types of investors. For example, under the final rule, an adviser managing several accounts, each using the same investment strategy, could present in an advertisement the gross and net performance of all such accounts. For net performance, the adviser may deduct a model fee equal to the highest fee charged to retail investors (assuming an intended retail audience). This provision of the definition of net performance does not permit net performance that reflects a model fee that is not available to the intended audience. One commenter requested that we permit advisers to deduct model fees that reflect either the highest fee that was charged historically or the highest potential fee that it will charge the investors or clients receiving the particular advertisement, provided the performance is accompanied by appropriate disclosure.592 Under the final rule, an adviser does not have discretion to choose the model fee to use in calculating net performance—it must use the higher of these two model fees.593 Another commenter supported this provision, but stated that where an adviser has not yet managed an actual account for clients or investors similar to the
relevant audience, the rule should permit the adviser to deduct a model fee that is equal to the highest fee to be charged to relevant audience.594 We agree, and the final rule requires the use of such a model fee.595 Another commenter expressed concern that the proposed rule would require an adviser to overstate its normal fee, when deducting a model fee, because the adviser had previously charged a client a higher fee for unique relationship servicing requirements.596 If an adviser charged a higher fee for unique services that it does not intend to provide in the future to the intended audience for the advertisement, the portfolio may be outside of the scope of the adviser’s performance calculation. For example, it may not meet the criteria for a related portfolio and, in that case, should not be included in the calculation of related performance. Similarly, one commenter stated that the rule should not require an adviser to deduct a model fee when presenting performance of a portfolio of a non-fee paying client.597 This commenter requested that we instead permit such adviser to calculate net performance returns using actual investment management fees (i.e., zero fees) and disclose the percentage of assets under management represented by non-fee paying portfolios. Further, this commenter stated that the GIPS standards do not require the application of a model fee to non-fee-paying portfolios to calculate net returns, and that requiring it in the final rule may result in many advisers being required to restate historical performance. We believe this presentation could mislead investors to believe that they could receive returns as high as non-fee paying clients, even with the commenter’s proposed disclosure. In the 2019 Proposing Release, we expressed similar concerns with presenting related performance of accounts with fee waivers or reduced rates unavailable to unaffiliated clients of the adviser.598 Accordingly, to satisfy the final rule’s general prohibitions, an adviser generally should apply a model fee that reflects either the highest fee that was charged historically or the highest potential fee that it will charge the investors or clients receiving the particular advertisement. One commenter requested clarification that model fees also may exclude custodian fees that would be paid to a bank or other third-party organization.599 We agree that an adviser that uses a model fee in accordance with the final rule may also exclude custodian fees if otherwise permitted under the final rule. e. Conditions for Presentation As proposed, the final rule will require that net performance be presented in the advertisement with at least equal prominence to, and in a format designed to facilitate comparison with, the gross performance, and calculated over the same time period, and using the same type of return and methodology as, the gross performance.600 These conditions are designed to help ensure that net performance effectively conveys to the
audience information about the effect of fees and expenses on the relevant performance. A calculation of net performance over a different time period or using a different type of return or methodology would not necessarily provide information about the effect of fees and expenses. Only one commenter discussed this condition and recommended that the Commission encourage advisers to be certain that the layout of the information presented is not misleading.601 As described above, advertisements containing any performance presentation will be subject to the rule’s general prohibitions.
2. Prescribed Time Periods
Our final rule also adopts the proposed one-, five-, and ten-year time period requirement for the presentation of performance results in an advertisement, with some modifications from the proposed rule. First, the final rule applies the time period requirement to all advertisements (with a new exception for private funds), rather than only to Retail Advertisements, as proposed.602 Second, prescribed time periods must end on a date that is no less recent than the most recent calendar year-end, rather than the most recent practicable date, as proposed.603 As proposed, this time period requirement will apply to all performance results, including gross and net performance, and including any composite aggregation of related portfolios. Also, as proposed, if the relevant portfolio did not exist for a particular prescribed period, then an adviser must present performance information for the life of the portfolio.604 For example, if a portfolio has been in existence for seven years, then the adviser must show

605For example, an adviser may present performance results for three-year periods, which is a requirement for advisers that claim compliance with the GIPS standards. See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter. We are not requiring a three-year period, however, because we believe the time periods required under the final rule already provide investors with sufficient information regarding performance over varying time periods. 606Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(2). 607See Consumer Federation Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter; Fried Frank Comment Letter. 608See AIC Comment Letter I; Fried Frank Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter; NYC Bar Comment Letter. 609See, e.g., AIC Comment Letter; Fried Frank Comment Letter; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 610See Fried Frank Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 611Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(2). See also final rule 206(4)–1(e)(13) (defining private fund). 612See Fried Frank Comment Letter; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter (discussing that when not using time-based performance, there is a potential for investment advisers to cherry-pick only recent performance results or strong performance years, or otherwise mislead investors by using ‘‘not meaningful’’ to show performance information). 613See CFA Institute Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 614CFA Institute Comment Letter. Cf. MMI Comment Letter (requesting that our final rule permit advisers to present quarterly performance results). 615See, e.g., final rule 206(4)–1(a)(6) (an advertisement may not include or exclude performance results, or present performance time periods, in a manner that is not fair and balanced). performance results for one- and five￾year periods, as well as for the seven￾year period. An investment adviser is free to include performance results for other periods as long as the advertisement also presents results for the prescribed time periods, and otherwise complies with the requirements of the final rule.605 The final rule also adopts the proposed requirement that the prescribed time periods be presented with equal prominence in the advertisement, so that an investor can observe the history of the adviser’s performance on a short-term and long￾term basis.606 An adviser may not highlight the single one-, five-, or ten￾year period that shows the best performance, instead of showing them in relation to each other. We believe this standardized presentation provides the audience with insight into the experience of the investment adviser over set periods that are likely to reflect how the advertised portfolio(s) performed during different market or economic conditions. For portfolios in existence for at least ten years, performance for that period could provide investors with more complete information than only performance over the most recent year. That performance may prompt investors to seek additional information from advisers regarding the causes of significant
changes in performance over longer periods. Some commenters supported this aspect of the proposal for this reason.607 These commenters also stated that this information would aid investors in comparing different performance advertisements and reduce the risk that advisers would present performance based on cherry-picked periods. Several commenters stated that the proposed time period requirement for closed-end private funds, however, would be inappropriate and confusing for investors, in part, because such performance (especially five- and ten￾year periods) may not exist for the fund advertised, since private funds are often advertised to investors at early stages.608 In addition, commenters stated that the performance of private equity funds can vary substantially over the term of the fund (with early years often negatively affected by organizational expenses of the ‘‘J-curve’’), and that the presentation of performance over prescribed time periods is therefore not useful to investors.609 Similarly, commenters noted that the presentation of performance using an internal rate of return, as is typical with private equity funds, is often not meaningful in the early years of the fund because the fund is not fully invested, no investments have been harvested, and the new investments likely have not changed in value.610 In light of our decision not to distinguish the treatment of Retail and Non-Retail Advertisements, and after considering comments, we agree that requiring advisers to provide performance results of private funds over one-, five-, and ten-year periods in advertisements will not provide investors with useful insight into how the advertised portfolio(s) performed during different market or economic conditions. Our final rule therefore applies the time period requirement to all performance advertisements, except for performance of a private fund.611 An adviser may rely on this exception when displaying performance advertising of any type of private fund, rather than only when displaying performance advertising of private equity funds or other closed-end private funds. We believe that it is appropriate to except any private fund because there may be additional types of private funds than those identified by commenters for which displaying this information could be misleading. We decline to allow only certain defined types of private funds to rely on this exception, given the varied limitations that private funds may place on redemptions now and in the future. We also do not believe the benefit of having advisers parse the rule’s requirements based on specific fund types would justify the complexity. Further, although we are not mandating presentation of performance for any specific time periods for these funds, presentations of private fund performance are subject to the general anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws and the general prohibitions in the final rule, including the prohibition of including or excluding performance
results, or presenting performance time periods, in a manner that is not fair and balanced.612 Other commenters stated that our proposal would create operational difficulties for advisers that present annual returns as of the most recent calendar year-end.613 A commenter stated that, for these advisers, the proposal’s requirement to present one-, five-, and ten-year returns as of the ‘‘most recent practicable date’’ would require that they continuously update their performance presentations throughout the year.614 This commenter requested we permit annual returns presented through the most recent calendar year-end. This commenter also requested that the final rule align with the GIPS standards by allowing advisers to present annual returns for the past ten years (or since inception if the track record exists for less than ten years) as of the most recent calendar year end, instead of one-, five-, and ten-year annualized returns. We understand that, for some advisers, the most recent calendar year￾end may be the most recent practicable date. Our final rule therefore requires that the prescribed time period end on a date that is no less recent than the most recent calendar year-end. In selecting time periods for purposes of an advertisement, an adviser may not select the periods that show only the most favorable performance—e.g., presenting a five-year period ending on a particular date because that five-year period showed growth while presenting a ten￾year period ending on a different date because that ten-year period showed growth. Depending on the facts and circumstances, an adviser may be required to present performance results as of a more recent date than the most recent calendar year-end to comply with the rule’s general prohibitions.615 For example, it could be misleading for an adviser to present performance returns as of the most recent calendar year-end if more timely quarter-end performance is available and events have occurred

616Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(3).
617Final rule 206(4)–1(a)(3).
618See, e.g., Mercer Comment Letter (supporting this aspect of the proposed rule). 619Similarly, section 208(a) of the Act, states that it is unlawful for a registered investment adviser to represent or imply in any manner whatsoever that it has been sponsored, recommended, or approved, or that his abilities or qualifications have in any respect been passed upon by the United States or any agency or any officer thereof. 620See also section 208(a) of the Act. 621Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(4). The presentation must also comply with the rule’s general prohibitions. See final rule 206(4)–1(a). 622Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(14). 623Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(11). A portfolio also includes, but is not limited to, a portfolio for the account of the investment adviser or its advisory affiliate (as defined in the Form ADV Glossary of Terms). See id. 624Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(15). 625See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Proskauer Comment Letter; Comment Letter of Loan Syndications and Trading Association (Feb. 10,
2020) (‘‘LSTA Comment Letter’’); MMI Comment
Letter.
626See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I (supporting the conditions generally, but requesting that we also permit advisers to present representative accounts that would not meet the proposed rule’s conditions); LSTA Comment Letter. 627See IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter. 628See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 629See CFA Institute Comment Letter. since that time that would have a significant negative effect on the adviser’s performance. If more recent quarter-end performance data is not available, the adviser should include appropriate disclosure about the performance presented in the advertisement. We are also clarifying that, for an adviser that provides performance results in advertisements for periods other than one, five, and ten years, the adviser is free to include such results as long as the advertisement presents results for the final rule’s required time periods. Thus, an adviser that complies with the GIPS standards may present annual returns for the past ten years (or since inception if the track record exists for less than ten years) as of the most recent calendar year end, in addition to performance results for the final rule’s required periods.
3. Statements About Commission
Approval
As proposed, the final rule prohibits any statement, express or implied, that the calculation or presentation of performance results in the advertisement has been approved or reviewed by the Commission in any advertisement containing performance results.616 This approval prohibition is intended to prevent advisers from representing that the Commission has approved or reviewed the performance results, even when the adviser is presenting performance results in accordance with the rule. Furthermore, the final rule’s general prohibitions have the effect of prohibiting an adviser from stating or implying that any part of an advertisement, and the advertisement as a whole, has been approved or reviewed by the Commission.617 Our final rule prescribes this condition specifically for advertisements containing performance results because of the particular weight an investor would likely give to performance results that it believes the Commission has reviewed or vetted. We received few comments on this aspect of the proposed rule, with one commenter supporting it and the other requesting clarification as to whether this provision would prohibit advertisements that combine performance results with summary information about an adviser’s recent SEC examination.618 We continue to believe that performance results may lead to a heightened risk of creating unrealistic expectations in an advertisement’s audience. An express or implied statement that the Commission has reviewed or approved the performance results could advance such unrealistic expectations. For example, while potentially true, a statement that ‘‘performance results are prepared in compliance with the Commission’s requirements on performance presentations in advertisements’’ may mislead an investor into thinking that the Commission has approved the results portrayed.619 Such a statement could also be misleading to the extent it suggests that the Commission has reviewed or approved more generally the investment adviser, its services, its personnel, its competence or experience, or its investment strategies and methods. Therefore, under the final rule, advisers may not represent that the Commission has approved or reviewed the performance results.620
4. Related Performance
The final rule will condition the use of ‘‘related performance’’ in adviser advertisements, on the inclusion of all ‘‘related portfolios.’’ 621 Under the final rule, however, an adviser may exclude related portfolios if the advertised performance results are not materially higher than if all related portfolios had been included, and the exclusion does not alter the presentation of any applicable prescribed time period. The final rule defines ‘‘related performance’’ as ‘‘the performance results of one or more related portfolios, either on a portfolio-by-portfolio basis or as a composite aggregation of all portfolios falling within stated criteria.’’ 622 It defines ‘‘portfolio’’ as ‘‘a group of investments managed by the investment adviser,’’ and includes in the definition that ‘‘[a] portfolio may be an account or a private fund.’’ 623 It defines ‘‘related portfolio’’ as ‘‘a portfolio with substantially similar investment policies, objectives, and strategies as those of the services being offered in the advertisement.’’ 624 The final rule’s treatment of related performance, including the conditions and definitions, is largely the same as the proposal. We discuss the few differences from the proposal below. Commenters broadly supported allowing advisers to present related performance in adviser advertisements.625 They generally agreed that related performance can be a valuable tool to assist an investor in evaluating a particular investment adviser or investment strategy, and that its use is consistent with industry practice. A few commenters also generally supported the proposed rule’s conditions for the presentation of related performance.626 Others, however, described the proposed conditions as overly prescriptive and stated that we should address cherry￾picking related portfolios solely through the rule’s general prohibitions, such as the ‘‘fair and balanced’’ provision.627 Another commenter stated that we should remove the conditions and permit advisers to identify (and document) objective criteria that they can apply on a consistent basis to exclude certain types of accounts.628 Conversely, one commenter said we should require composite performance without any exclusions of related portfolios because allowing exclusions from composites would be different from the GIPS standards that require composites to include all portfolios that are managed in the composite’s strategy.629 We continue to believe that conditioning the presentation of related performance in advertisements on the presentation of all related portfolios (with limited exceptions) is necessary to prevent investment advisers from including only related portfolios that have favorable performance results or otherwise ‘‘cherry-picking.’’ We believe our approach will provide advisers some flexibility in presenting related portfolios, without permitting exclusion because of poor performance. We believe this approach strikes the right balance between commenters that advocated for relying
solely on the rule’s general prohibition (and/or an adviser’s own objective criteria), on the

630See IAA Comment Letter (‘‘A firm may seek to exclude an account that has a superior five-year return, but a poor one-year return, or present the performance of a representative account that has a superior one-year return, but a poor five-year return. In this scenario, the advertised performance over five and ten years would be lower, but the 1- year return would be higher. This practice may be prohibited by the proposed rule because the 1-year return does not satisfy the rule’s requirements, even though the longer term returns do satisfy the rule’s requirements.’’). See also CFA Institute Comment Letter (noting the same issue but making a different recommendation). 631See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 632We are not prescribing a specific numerical or percentage threshold for materiality or immateriality as part of this requirement. Instead, based on the facts and circumstances, if the results of excluding the related portfolio would be material to a reasonable client or investor, the portfolio should not be excluded. 633See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(4)(ii). 634See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter; Wellington Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 635See Wellington Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. See also MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I (discussing their view that ‘‘investment advisers need some flexibility to recognize a ‘flagship’ fund for a given strategy and to treat that ‘flagship’ fund as the sole related portfolio in many instances.’’). 636See IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 637See IAA Comment Letter. 638See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Wellington Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 639Under our final rule, advisers may include performance returns of a single portfolio (without also providing the performance of other related portfolios) if the performance is not materially higher than if all related portfolios had been included, and the performance does not violate the rule’s general prohibitions. 640See Wellington Comment Letter. one hand, and requiring advisers to present all related performance, on the other hand. Under the final rule, although we are permitting an adviser to exclude related portfolios subject to conditions in the final rule, an adviser may nonetheless present performance without the exclusion of any related portfolios to comply with both the GIPS standards and the final marketing rule. In a change from the proposed rule, the final rule will allow an investment adviser to exclude from the presentation of related performance in the advertisement one or more related portfolios so long as the advertised performance results are ‘‘not materially higher than’’—rather than ‘‘no higher than’’—if all related portfolios had been included. One commenter recommended this change, stating that it will not necessarily be clear whether performance is ‘‘no higher’’ because performance results may vary based on the time period presented.630 Another commenter cautioned that, even
with such conditions, an adviser would have difficulty demonstrating compliance for each period in its track record.631 Furthermore, this commenter stated that an adviser would incur the burden of calculating performance including all related portfolios in order to show that the performance presented was ‘‘no higher than’’ or ‘‘not materially higher than’’ if all related portfolios had been included. We understand that an adviser will likely be required to calculate the performance of all related portfolios to ensure that the exclusion of certain portfolios from the advertisement meets the rule’s conditions. Because of the special concerns that performance advertising raises, however, we believe that this burden is warranted to prevent related performance advertising from misleading investors. We believe that the modified condition we are adopting will achieve the same policy goal as our proposed rule, but give advisers additional flexibility to present related performance when there may be immaterial differences in performance results depending on the methods of calculation of returns or as between the different prescribed time periods.632 Under the final rule, an adviser may meet this condition if the results for one prescribed time period are no higher than if all related portfolios had been included for that time period, and the results for another prescribed time period are higher, but not materially higher, than if all related portfolios had been included for that time period. It may also meet this condition if the results for any and all prescribed time periods are not materially higher than if all related portfolios had been included for each time period. As proposed, the exclusion for related portfolios is also subject to the final rule’s time period requirement for the presentation of performance in advertisements.633 We did not receive any comments on this condition. Related performance therefore cannot exclude any related portfolio if doing so would alter the presentation of the proposed rule’s prescribed time periods. Some commenters recommended that we permit advisers to advertise one ‘‘representative account,’’ such as a flagship fund, without any prescribed conditions or in addition to providing the performance results of all related portfolios.634 Commenters generally describe representative accounts as those that most closely resemble, or are most representative of, the advertised portfolio’s specific strategy.635 A few commenters stated that permitting representative accounts would provide flexibility to advisers that manage separate accounts and may not maintain composites that cover all portfolios managed to a specific strategy, and to smaller advisers that do not have the resources to calculate the performance of a composite that includes all those portfolios.636 One such commenter stated that smaller advisers would therefore face challenges under the proposed rule in demonstrating that the performance of a representative
account is no higher than if all related portfolios had been included.637 Others stated that permitting representative accounts would provide investors with more pertinent information than under our proposed rule, because they believe that prospective fund investors are generally less interested in the results of the ancillary funds around that flagship fund, and could find the additional information to be confusing.638 We are not convinced that the benefits of an adviser presenting in an advertisement a single representative account that is not subject to prescribed conditions would justify the risks of cherry-picking related portfolios with higher-than-usual returns.639 We also believe the materiality standard we are adopting helps to alleviate the burden on advisers to present all related performance (subject to a conditional exception). We therefore decline to make this suggested change to the rule. An adviser, however, may present the results of a single representative account (such as a flagship fund) or a subset of related portfolios alongside the required related performance so long as the advertisement would otherwise comply with the general prohibitions.640 In these circumstances, where the required related performance is also presented in the advertisement, we believe the concerns regarding cherry-picking a particular portfolio are mitigated. In addition, as proposed, advisers may present related performance on a portfolio-by-portfolio basis under the final rule. Advisers that manage a small number of related portfolios may find a portfolio-by-portfolio presentation to be the clearest way of demonstrating related performance in their advertisements. Presenting related performance on a portfolio-by-portfolio basis may illustrate for the audience the differences in performance achieved by the investment adviser in managing portfolios having substantially similar investment policies, objectives, and strategies. A portfolio-by-portfolio presentation also may best illustrate the differences in performance between a flagship fund and other related portfolios in some cases. As in the proposal, presenting related performance on a portfolio-by-portfolio

641See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; AIC Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 642A portfolio with substantially similar investment policies, objectives, and strategies as those of the services being offered in the advertisement is a related portfolio. See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(15). Any performance presented in the advertisement, whether or not related, must not violate the final rule’s general prohibitions, and the applicable requirements for the presentation of performance. See final rule 206(4)–1(a) and (d). 643See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 644See final rule 206(4)–1(a). 645See AIC Comment Letter I. 646See Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 647See AIC Comment Letter I; Ropes & Gray Comment Letter. 648One commenter requested that we add a definition of ‘‘composite’’ that matches a commonly accepted industry term. See CFA Institute Comment Letter. The final rule does not include a definition for composite, because we understand that many investment advisers already have criteria governing their creation and presentation of composites. 649See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at n.280 (discussing that, for GIPS purposes, a composite is an aggregation of portfolios managed according to a similar investment mandate, objective, or strategy). 650See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 651To simplify the definitions, the final rule includes this wording within the definition of ‘‘portfolio,’’ rather than within the definition of ‘‘related portfolio,’’ as proposed. 652See CFA Institute Comment Letter. basis will be subject to the general prohibitions, including the prohibition on omitting material facts necessary to make the presentation, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, not misleading. For example, an advertisement presenting related performance on a portfolio-by-portfolio basis could be potentially misleading if it does not disclose the size of the portfolios and the basis on which the adviser selected the portfolios. The alternative for presenting related performance, also as proposed, is as a composite aggregation of all portfolios falling within stated criteria, which we discuss below. a. Related Portfolio Regarding presentations of related portfolios in advertisements, the final rule is similar to the proposal in that it does not identify or prescribe particular requirements for determining whether portfolios are ‘‘related’’ beyond whether there are ‘‘substantially similar’’ investment policies, objectives, and strategies as those of the services being offered in the advertisement. Some commenters also requested clarification that ‘‘related portfolio’’ does not include the performance results of the separately managed account or pooled investment vehicle being offered.641 We agree that the offered portfolio is not included in the definition of ‘‘related portfolio.’’ 642 One commenter requested that we permit advisers to present performance results of a private fund both with and without the effect of any side
pockets.643 Whether a side pocket should be considered part of a portfolio or a separate portfolio and/or a related portfolio subject to the final rule’s conditions for presenting related performance will be subject to the final rule’s conditions for the presentation of performance and the rule’s general prohibitions.644 A commenter also requested that we permit an adviser to exclude a separately managed account that has similar investment policies, objectives, and strategies to a private fund that the investment adviser is offering, but is customized to reflect a client’s investment objectives and desired restrictions, and has fees and expenses that may not be comparable to the private fund.645 Another commenter, however, noted that each adviser should determine for itself whether portfolios having client-specific constraints are ‘‘substantially similar.’’ 646 Whether a portfolio is a ‘‘related portfolio’’ under the rule requires a facts and circumstances analysis. An adviser may determine that a portfolio with material client constraints or other material differences, for example, does not have substantially similar investment policies, objectives, and strategies and should not be included as a related portfolio. On the other hand, different fees and expenses alone would not allow an adviser to exclude a portfolio that has a substantially similar investment policy, objective, and strategy as those of the services offered. Two commenters also requested that the rule permit an adviser that has advised multiple private funds over time to exclude earlier private funds that the adviser determines are no longer relevant to investors, even if these funds have substantially similar investment policies, objectives, and strategies (and are therefore related portfolios).647 They stated that the performance of prior funds may not be relevant because the successor fund is larger than previous funds and capable of different types of investments, and that there may have been changed market conditions and/or investment professional turnover. Under the final rule, if the relevant financial markets or investment advisory personnel have changed over time such that the investment policies, objectives, and strategies of an adviser’s earlier private funds are no longer substantially similar to those of the fund being marketed, the adviser would not be required to include the earlier private funds in its related performance. In a change from the proposal, the final rule refers to presentation of related performance as ‘‘a composite aggregation’’—rather than ‘‘one or more composite aggregations’’—‘‘of all portfolios within stated criteria.’’ 648 An adviser may use the same criteria to construct any composites to meet the GIPS standards in order to satisfy the ‘‘substantially similar’’ requirement of the final rule’s definition of ‘‘related portfolio.’’ 649 However, in response to a comment from the organization that developed and administers the GIPS standards, our
final rule clarifies that an adviser may only have one composite aggregation for each stated set of criteria. We agree with this commenter that the rule should not permit advisers to create more than one composite aggregation of all portfolios falling within a stated set of criteria.650 In addition, similar to the proposal, the final rule does not prescribe specific criteria to define the relevant portfolios but requires that once the criteria are established, all related portfolios meeting the criteria are included in the composite. As with the presentation of related performance on a portfolio-by-portfolio basis in an advertisement, any presentation as a composite is subject to the general prohibitions, including the prohibition on omitting material facts necessary to make the presentation, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, not misleading. For example, an advertisement presenting related performance in a composite would be false or misleading where the composite is represented as including all portfolios in the strategy being advertised but excludes some portfolios falling within the stated criteria or is otherwise manipulated by the adviser. We also believe that omitting the criteria the adviser used in defining the related portfolios and crafting the composite could result in an advertisement presenting related performance that is misleading. Finally, the final rule’s definition of ‘‘portfolio’’ includes a portfolio for the account of the investment adviser or its advisory affiliate. This is substantially the same as the proposed definition.651 The only commenter that addressed this aspect of ‘‘related performance’’ generally agreed with our proposed approach.652
5. Extracted Performance
The final rule prohibits an adviser from presenting extracted performance in an advertisement unless the advertisement provides, or offers to provide promptly, the performance

653Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(5).
654Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(6).
655See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter II. Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(5). 656See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; LSTA Comment Letter; Proskauer Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 657See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; LSTA Comment Letter. These commenters did not object to the proposed rule’s conditions for presenting extracted performance. 658See IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 659See IAA Comment Letter (stating that advisers that present composite performance that includes extracted performance would need to present the performance of each of the total portfolios from which the carve-out segments were extracted under the proposed rule). 660See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 661See CFA Institute Comment Letter. CFA Institute agreed that for advisers presenting segment returns, or attribution, of a total portfolio, the condition to present performance of the total portfolio would be relevant. 662See CFA Institute Comment Letter (requesting guidance on whether the proposed rule’s ‘‘extracted performance’’ covers attribution). 663This context should include any particular differences in performance results between the entire portfolio and the extract. It may include assumptions underlying the extracted performance if necessary to prevent the performance results from being misleading. We received no comments on the ‘‘or offer to provide’’ aspect of the proposal’s provision to permit an adviser to provide, or offer to promptly provide the performance results of the entire portfolio from which the extract was extracted (italics added). Therefore, we adopted this aspect of the proposed rule. 664The general prohibitions also will apply to any presentation of extracted performance. For example, we view it as misleading for an adviser to present extracted performance without disclosing that it represents a subset of a portfolio’s investments (an omission of a material fact). Similarly, we would view it as misleading to include or exclude performance results, or present performance time periods, in a manner that is not fair and balanced, and able to be substantiated in accordance with the general prohibitions. In addition, an extract would likely be false or misleading where it excludes investments that fall within the represented selection criteria. results of the total portfolio from which the performance was extracted.653 ‘‘Extracted performance’’ means ‘‘the performance results of a subset of investments extracted from a portfolio.’’ 654 We are adopting this provision substantially as proposed, though we are requiring the adviser provide, or offer to provide, the results of the ‘‘total portfolio,’’ instead of the results of ‘‘all investments in the portfolio,’’ at the request of a commenter that recommended we clarify an adviser does not have to highlight individual positions.655 Commenters supported permitting extracted performance in advertisements, although they differed on what constitutes extracted performance.656 Some
commenters agreed that an adviser’s extracted performance can provide useful information to investors, who often request such information to assist them in evaluating a particular investment adviser or investment strategy.657 They noted that this is especially true for new or modified investment strategies, or new investment vehicles using a new or modified investment strategy. However, two commenters requested clarification about the definition of extracted performance and objected to the proposed conditions.658 One questioned whether the proposed definition includes composites of performance extracted from multiple portfolios, stating that the proposed conditions would be onerous in this case.659 This commenter recommended eliminating the conditions and instead relying on the general prohibitions to ensure advertisements with extracted performance are fair and balanced and not misleading. The other stated that the final rule should distinguish between performance that is extracted from a single portfolio (e.g., such as segment returns), and a standalone strategy presented as a composite of extracts from multiple portfolios.660 This commenter stated that advisers typically present standalone composites and the final rule should permit them, subject to similar conditions as under the GIPS standards.661 This commenter further agreed with the proposed requirement to provide, or offer to provide promptly, the performance results of the entire portfolio along with the extract when extracted performance is not advertised as a standalone strategy. Like the proposed rule, our final rule’s provision for extracted performance addresses the performance results of a subset of investments extracted from a single portfolio. For example, an investment adviser seeking to manage a new portfolio of only fixed￾income investments may wish to advertise its performance results from managing fixed-income investments within a multi-strategy portfolio. If a prospective investor already has investments in fixed-income assets, it may want to use the extracted performance to consider the effect of an additional fixed-income investment on the prospective investor’s overall portfolio. The prospective investor may also use the presentation of extracted performance from several investment advisers as a means of comparing investment advisers’ management capabilities in that specific strategy. We continue to believe that extracted performance can provide important information to investors about performance actually achieved within a portfolio. It can also provide investors with information about performance attribution within a portfolio.662 Moreover, we expect that conditioning the presentation of extracted performance on presenting (or offering to provide promptly) the performance results of the entire portfolio from which the performance was extracted will prevent investment advisers from cherry-picking certain performance results and provide investors necessary context for
evaluating the extract.663 Requiring advisers to provide (or offer to provide promptly) this information mitigates the risk of extracted performance misleading investors. Furthermore, any differences between the performance of the entire portfolio and the extracted performance might be a basis for additional discussions between the investor and the adviser, which would assist the investor in deciding whether to hire or retain the adviser. On the other hand, performance that is extracted from a composite from multiple portfolios is not extracted performance as defined in the final rule because it is not a subset of investments extracted from a portfolio. We believe that such a performance presentation carries a greater risk of misleading investors than an extract from a single portfolio because an adviser could cherry-pick holdings from across the composite and deem those holdings part of a particular strategy. In addition, similar to hypothetical performance, this type of composite performance presentation may not reflect the holdings of any actual investor. As a result, the final rule does not prohibit an adviser from presenting a composite of extracts in an advertisement, including composite performance that complies with the GIPS standards, but this performance information is subject to the additional protections that apply to advertisements containing hypothetical performance, as discussed below. While these additional protections may result in additional burdens for advisers that typically present extracted performance from multiple portfolios as a composite, we believe that the investor protection gained from applying the hypothetical performance restrictions to the presentation of this type of performance, which reflects a hypothetical portfolio, justifies such burden.664 One commenter recommended that we provide advisers with the option to either disclose assumptions underlying extracted performance, or provide them upon request, stating that detailed information about the selection criteria and assumptions used by the adviser could be overwhelming for a retail

665See CFA Institute Comment Letter (discussing presentations of performance for standalone strategies). 666See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 667For example, it would be misleading to present extracted performance without allocating cash when the allocation of cash was part of the portfolio management for the subset of investments extracted from a portfolio, and such allocation would have materially reduced the extracted performance returns. 668We would not view the mere fact that an investor would be interested in high returns as satisfying the requirement that the hypothetical performance is relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of the intended audience. 669See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter; Comment Letter of Withers Bergman LLP (Feb. 10,
2020) (‘‘Withers Bergman Comment Letter’’); MMI
Comment Letter; NAPFA Comment Letter. 670See Mercer Comment Letter (stating that the restrictions imposed on hypothetical performance by the proposed general prohibitions would not be sufficient to prevent advisers from displaying hypothetical performance in a materially misleading manner). 671See, e.g., NASAA Comment Letter; Prof. Jacobson Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 672See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 673See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(1). The proposed rule included one-on-one communications in the definition of advertisement. While the proposed rule excluded responses to unsolicited requests from the definition of advertisement, the exclusion did not cover hypothetical performance even if such performance was included in a one-on-one communication. As a result, under our proposed rule, hypothetical performance would have been subject to the specific conditions of the proposed rule (subsection (c)). 674See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; IAA Comment Letter. audience.665 The final rule does not require an adviser to provide detailed information regarding the selection criteria and assumptions underlying extracted performance unless the absence of such disclosures, based on the facts and circumstances, would result in performance information that is misleading or otherwise violates one of the general prohibitions. As discussed above, an adviser should take into account the audience for the extracted performance in crafting disclosures. Finally, as proposed, the final rule does not prescribe any particular treatment for a cash allocation with respect to extracted performance. One commenter recommended that we require such an allocation when presenting extracted performance advertised as a standalone strategy.666 This commenter also stated that including an allocation of cash is not necessary when showing a segment of a strategy that is not used to advertise a standalone strategy. We believe that, depending on the facts and circumstances, presenting extracted performance without accounting for the allocation of cash could imply that the allocation of cash had no effect on the extracted performance and would be misleading.667 In other cases, however, allocating cash to extracted performance may not be appropriate, such as when cash allocation decisions were made separately from the management of the extracted investments and the extracted performance is not presented as a standalone strategy. We, therefore, believe that it is appropriate to provide advisers with flexibility here since the appropriateness of allocating cash will be based on the facts and circumstances. Regardless, we would view it as misleading under the final rule to present extracted performance in an advertisement without disclosing whether it reflects an allocation of the cash held by the entire portfolio and the effect of such cash allocation, or of the absence of such an allocation, on the results portrayed.
6. Hypothetical Performance
The final rule will prohibit an adviser from providing hypothetical performance in an advertisement, unless the adviser takes certain steps to address its potentially misleading nature. Largely as proposed, the final rule will condition the presentation of hypothetical performance in advertisements on the adviser adopting policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the hypothetical performance information is relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of the advertisement’s intended audience. We intend for advertisements including hypothetical performance information to only be distributed to investors who have access to the resources to independently analyze this information and who have the financial expertise to understand the risks and limitations of these types of presentations (referred to herein collectively as ‘‘investors who have the resources and financial expertise’’).668 An adviser also must provide additional information about the hypothetical performance that is tailored to the audience receiving the advertisement, such that the intended audience has sufficient information to understand the criteria, assumptions, risks, and limitations. While commenters requested additional flexibility with regard to some of the conditions, they generally supported our proposed treatment of hypothetical performance.669 However, one commenter stated that we should not allow the presentation of hypothetical performance in advertisements.670 We are adopting the hypothetical performance provisions of the rule largely as proposed because we believe that such presentations in advertisements pose a high risk of misleading investors since, in many cases, they may be readily optimized through hindsight. Moreover, the absence of an actual investor or, in some cases, actual money underlying hypothetical performance raises the risk of a misleading advertisement, because such performance does not reflect actual losses or other real-world consequences if an adviser makes a bad investment or takes on excessive risk. However, we understand that other information that may demonstrate the adviser’s investment process as well as hypothetical performance may be useful to prospective investors who have the resources and financial expertise. When subjected to this analysis, the information may allow an investor to evaluate an adviser’s investment process over a wide range of periods and market environments or form reasonable expectations about how the investment process might perform under different conditions. We believe the three conditions discussed below, as well as our changes to the definition of ‘‘hypothetical performance,’’ will make it more likely that the dissemination of advertisements containing hypothetical performance information will be limited to investors who have the resources and financial expertise to appropriately consider such information. Certain commenters suggested that we only allow advisers to present
hypothetical performance to Non-Retail Persons,671 while others advocated for a more nuanced approach (rather than categorical exclusions) that would allow the dissemination of hypothetical performance based on facts and circumstances.672 As noted above, the final rule will not include different provisions for Retail and Non-Retail Persons and we believe that the rule is sufficiently flexible to facilitate the application of the hypothetical performance conditions based on facts and circumstances. Like the proposed rule, the final rule applies to communications containing hypothetical performance that otherwise fall within the definition of ‘‘advertisement’’ because we believe that there is a significant risk that such performance could mislead investors.673 Some commenters stated that we should not impose the hypothetical performance conditions to one-on-one communications as such an approach would inhibit communications between an adviser and prospective or current investors.674 As discussed above, communications are excluded from the

675See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i)(A) and (C). The conditions also will not apply if hypothetical performance is included in a regulatory notice. Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(1)(i)(B). 676 In connection with the marketing of private funds, the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act would also apply. 677See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(6)(iii). 678Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(8). 679See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(5). 680See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter. 681See section 208(d) of the Act. 682See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.5 (describing representative performance as including performance generated by models that adhered to the same investment strategy as that used by the adviser for actual clients). 683See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter. 684See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(8)(i). Model performance would include, among other things, the type of ‘‘model performance’’ described in the Clover Letter: Performance results generated by a ‘‘model’’ portfolio managed with the same investment philosophy used by the adviser for actual client accounts and ‘‘consist[ing] of the same securities’’ recommended by the adviser to its clients during the same time period, ‘‘with variances in specific client objectives being addressed via the asset allocation process (i.e., the relative weighting of stocks, bonds, and cash equivalents in each account).’’ See Clover Letter. The rule will treat this as hypothetical performance because, although the ‘‘model’’ consists of the same securities held by several portfolios, the asset allocation process would result in performance results that were not actually achieved by any portfolio. 685See Clover Letter. 686See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; IAA Comment Letter (discussing ‘‘other types of ‘model’ performance that do not reflect investment advice actually provided to clients’’). 687See proposed rule 206(4)–1(e)(5). 688See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II (suggesting that the Commission recognize that model portfolios are not limited to the type Continued scope of the final rule as long as they are provided in response to unsolicited investor requests; provided to a private fund investor in a one-on-one communication; or occur extemporaneously, live, and orally.675 While the final rule allows advisers to provide certain performance presentations in advertisements that would otherwise be considered hypothetical performance (i.e., interactive tools and educational materials), we believe there are adequate protections to address this risk in part because the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act would apply.676 We also made the following changes to the treatment of hypothetical performance advertising under the rule in response to commenters’ concerns:
(1) Added more flexibility to the policies and procedures requirement of the final rule to allow advisers to consider the likely financial situation and investment objectives of the intended audience; (2) added more flexibility to allow advisers to consider each of the three hypothetical performance conditions with respect to the intended audience of the advertisement (as opposed to the specific person receiving the advertisement containing hypothetical performance information); (3) broadened the requirement for advisers to provide sufficient information to all investors (and not only Retail Persons) to enable them to understand the risks and limitations of using hypothetical performance advertising, except for private fund investors; and (4) revised the definition of hypothetical performance by: (a) Broadening the types of model portfolios whose performance is considered hypothetical performance; (b) excluding the performance of proprietary portfolios and seed capital portfolios; (c) including data from prior periods (and not just ‘‘market data’’ as proposed) for certain backtested performance; and (d) excluding interactive analysis tools and predecessor performance. The final rule also makes clear that an adviser need not comply with certain conditions on the presentation of performance in advertisements, namely the requirements to present specific time periods, and the particular conditions applicable to presenting related or extracted performance.677 a. Types of Hypothetical Performance The final rule defines ‘‘hypothetical performance’’ as ‘‘performance results that were not actually achieved by any portfolio of the investment adviser’’ and explicitly includes, but is not limited to, model performance, backtested performance, and targeted or projected performance returns.678 The proposed definition of hypothetical performance would have included ‘‘performance results that were not actually achieved by any portfolio of any client of the investment adviser’’ (emphasis added).679 In response to one commenter’s concerns,680 we removed the ‘‘of any client’’ qualifier in order to clarify that the actual performance of the adviser’s proprietary portfolios and seed capital portfolios is not hypothetical performance. However, advisers should not invest a nominal amount of assets in a portfolio in an effort to avoid the ‘‘hypothetical performance’’ designation. Instead, to show that the results are those of an actual portfolio, an adviser must invest an amount of seed capital that is sufficient to demonstrate that the adviser is not attempting to do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly,681 or otherwise be able to demonstrate that the strategy is reasonably intended to be offered to investors. In a change from the proposal, we also narrowed the definition of hypothetical performance under the rule to exclude interactive analysis tools and predecessor performance. While we proposed to exclude certain financial tools from the hypothetical
performance provisions, below we clarify the treatment of such tools in response to commenters’ concerns. We excluded predecessor performance because we are adopting specific rule text on the presentation of predecessor performance. We discuss each type of hypothetical performance in the following sections. Model Performance. The proposal referred to, but did not define, ‘‘representative performance’’ and discussed model performance as a type of representative performance.682 In response to commenters’ concerns,683 we are no longer using the term ‘‘representative performance’’ and are treating all ‘‘model performance’’ as hypothetical performance.684 We did not intend to limit the definition of hypothetical performance to only performance generated by the models described in the Clover no-action letter. Rather, we proposed this definition to make clear that the rule would apply in the context of a common industry practice that has evolved around prior staff letters.685 But, as one commenter noted, the discussion of model portfolios in staff letters reflects only the specific circumstances of the adviser seeking a staff letter, and advisers currently employ model portfolios in a variety of circumstances.686 Instead of limiting the discussion of model portfolios to those managed alongside portfolios managed for actual investors,687 the final rule will broaden the definition. Model performance will include, but not be limited to, performance generated by the following types of models: (i) Those described in the Clover no-action letter where the adviser applies the same investment strategy to actual investor accounts, but where the adviser makes slight adjustments to the model (e.g., allocation and weighting) to accommodate different investor investment objectives; (ii) computer generated models; and (iii) those the adviser creates or purchases from model providers that are not used for actual investors. After considering comments, we believe it is appropriate for the final rule to accommodate the use of these variations while ensuring that advisers consider whether this information is relevant to the intended audience.688

discussed in the Clover Letter); IAA Comment Letter. 689See CFA Institute Comment Letter (stating that ‘‘paper portfolios’’ should be treated as hypothetical performance). 690See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; MMI Comment Letter. 691See, e.g., NYC Bar Comment Letter; NRS Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I (stating that ‘‘the Commission should modify the Proposed Advertising Rule to allow investment advisers to scale the scope of disclosures to the risk profile of the type of ‘hypothetical performance’ information.’’). 692See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; MMI Comment Letter (stating that model performance is not hypothetical because it ‘‘reflects actual performance of an investment strategy in real-time’’); IAA Comment Letter (stating that ‘‘[m]any advisers serve as model providers to wrap accounts and other advisers. Such model providers would not necessarily have the data on the actual performance of the accounts managed to their models, as they are not acting directly as advisers to the underlying accounts.’’); NYC Bar Comment Letter. 693See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.5.c.iv. 694See CFA Institute Comment Letter (stating that proposed definition of backtested performance would not include ‘‘strategies that take data from other portfolios managed by the Adviser or someone else and backtest an asset allocation strategy.’’). 695See, e.g., NYC Bar Comment Letter (stating ‘‘backtested returns are a conditional analysis of prior data’’ and advisers use this information to stress test investment methodologies that the advisers intend to use in the future); MMI Comment Letter (stating ‘‘backtested performance figures are not purely hypothetical, but rather reflect an analysis of actual investment performance based on certain assumptions’’ and that such illustrations ‘‘analyze historical data’’). One commenter supported treating model performance as hypothetical performance,689 while some commenters objected because model performance could reflect the actual performance of a strategy that is managed in real time.690 We understand that model portfolios can be (but are not always) managed alongside portfolios with investor or adviser assets and that many investors find model performance helpful. For instance, model performance may present a nuanced view of how an adviser would construct a portfolio without the impact of certain factors, such as the timing of cash flows or investor-specific restrictions, which may not be relevant to the particular investor. Model performance also can help an investor assess the adviser’s investment style for new strategies that have not yet been widely adopted (or adopted at all) by the adviser’s investors. However, we believe that model performance is appropriately treated as hypothetical performance because such performance was not achieved by the actual performance of a portfolio and could mislead investors. For example, advances in computer technologies have enabled an
adviser to generate hundreds or thousands of potential model portfolios in addition to the ones it actually offers or manages. An adviser that generates a large number of model portfolios has an incentive to advertise only the results of the highest performing models and ignore others. The adviser could run numerous variations of its investment strategy, select the most attractive results, and then present those results as evidence of how well the strategy would have performed under prior market conditions. Even in cases where an adviser generates only a single model portfolio, neither investor nor sufficient adviser assets are at risk, so the adviser can manage that portfolio in a significantly different manner than if such risk existed. For these reasons, we believe it is more likely for an investor to be misled where the investor does not have the resources to scrutinize such performance and the underlying assumptions used to generate model portfolio performance. We believe treating model performance as hypothetical performance under the rule guards against the investor protection concerns addressed above. Some commenters suggested that we consider more flexible treatment of model performance given that performance generated by certain types of model portfolios would be less likely to mislead investors.691 We believe that the conditions described below are sufficiently flexible to allow advisers to tailor their approach based on the intended audience of the advertisement and the type of hypothetical performance, including performance generated for different types of model portfolios. For example, if an adviser believes that model performance is less likely to mislead the intended audience, the adviser may decide that less￾stringent policies and procedures are required under the first condition, and that the required disclosures may differ and be more limited than those required for backtested performance. In contrast, if an adviser believes that model performance is highly likely to mislead a particular audience (e.g., it is difficult to provide disclosure that is sufficiently specific but also understandable), the adviser could adopt policies and procedures that eliminate the presentation of that type of model performance to this investor type in its advertisements or modify the presentation to satisfy the requirements of the final rule. An adviser would need to consider the intended audience of the advertisement and the type of hypothetical performance in order to satisfy the conditions. Commenters suggested that we consider the impact of this characterization of hypothetical performance on model providers to wrap fee accounts and advisers that provide models to other, end-user advisers for implementation.692 We understand that model providers may not have access to the actual performance data generated after the end-user adviser implements the model and that the performance data they have access to may reflect another adviser’s fees or
adjustments. Even if model providers had access to such actual performance data, we believe they would still be subject to the hypothetical performance provisions because the performance generated would be the performance of a portfolio managed by the end-user adviser, not the model provider. However, we believe that model providers would not have difficulty satisfying the three hypothetical performance provisions. For example, we anticipate the intended audience for model provider advertisements often will be end-user advisers or wrap fee program sponsors. Model providers therefore could adopt simple policies and procedures because the model provider reasonably believes that the intended audience is sophisticated and should have the analytical resources and tools necessary to interpret this type of hypothetical performance. The model provider could similarly satisfy the rule’s disclosure requirements for hypothetical performance based on the end-user’s profile since the model providers would know that the end-user adviser is a well￾informed investor with analytical tools at his/her disposal. Backtested Performance. As proposed, the final rule will treat backtested performance as a type of hypothetical performance. We proposed to include ‘‘[p]erformance that is backtested by the application of a strategy to market data from prior periods when the strategy was not actually used during those periods.’’ 693 One commenter supported broadening the types of backtested performance that would be subject to the hypothetical performance provisions.694 Other commenters said that we should not treat backtested performance as a type of hypothetical performance.695 We acknowledge that backtested performance may help investors understand how an investment strategy may have performed in the past if the strategy had existed or had been applied at that time. In addition, this type of

696See, e.g., David H. Bailey, Jonathan M. Borwein, Marcos Lo´pez de Prado, and Qiji Jim Zhu, Pseudo-Mathematics and Financial Charlatanism:
The Effects of Backtest Overfitting on Out-of￾Sample Performance, 61(5) Notices of the Am. Mathematical Society, 458, 466 (May 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2308659 (describing the potential to overfit an investment strategy so that it performs well in-sample (the simulation over the sample used in the design of the strategy) but performs poorly out-of-sample (the simulation over a sample not used in the design of the strategy)). 697See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 698See NRS Comment Letter. 699The final rule does not define ‘‘targeted return’’ or ‘‘projected return.’’ We believe that these terms have commonly understood meanings, and we do not intend to narrow or expand inadvertently the wide variety of returns that may be considered targets or projections. We generally would consider a target or projection to be any type of performance that an advertisement presents as results that could be achieved, are likely to be achieved, or may be achieved in the future by the investment adviser with respect to an investor. 700See, e.g., Wellington Comment Letter (agreeing that projected returns have a heightened ability to mislead investors, but stating that targeted returns can provide useful information about the risk profile of an investment strategy); Fidelity Comment Letter; MMI Comment Letter (stating that targeted returns ‘‘are performance goals that an adviser seeks to achieve with a particular strategy or product’’ while hypothetical returns ‘‘represent a projection of what returns will or could be based on a series of assumptions’’). 701See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter. 702See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter. 703 Id. performance information may demonstrate how the adviser adjusted its model to reflect new or changed data sources. While we understand the potential value of such data to investors, backtested performance information also has the potential to mislead investors. Because this performance is calculated after the end of the relevant period, it allows an adviser to claim credit for investment decisions that may have been optimized through hindsight, rather than on a forward-looking application of stated investment methods or criteria and with investment decisions made in real time and with actual financial risk. For example, an investment adviser is able to modify its investment strategy or choice of parameters and assumptions until it can generate attractive results and then present those as evidence of how its strategy would have performed in the past.696 We believe that backtested performance included in an advertisement is more likely to be misleading to the extent that the intended audience does not have the resources and financial expertise to assess the hypothetical performance presentation. The conditions that the final rule will impose on displays of hypothetical performance in advertisements are designed to ensure that advisers present backtested
performance in a manner that is appropriate for the advertisement’s intended audience. In response to a commenter’s suggestion,697 the final rule will apply to advertisements including presentations of performance that is backtested by the application of a strategy to data from prior time periods when the strategy was not actually used during those time periods, instead of applying only to application of the strategy to ‘‘market’’ data from a prior time period. Accordingly, the hypothetical performance provisions will apply to presentations of both market and non-market data in advertisements. This change will account for scenarios where an adviser could backtest performance based on non-market data (e.g., data from other portfolios managed by the adviser). We are otherwise adopting this provision as proposed. Another commenter asked that we address which disclosures must accompany specific displays of backtested performance.698 In the spirit of our principles-based approach, we decline to prescribe the exact disclosure language that should accompany displays of backtested performance in advertisements. Targets and Projections. As proposed, the final rule will treat presentations of targeted and projected returns in advertisements as presentations of hypothetical performance. Targeted returns reflect an investment adviser’s aspirational performance goals. Projected returns reflect an investment adviser’s performance estimate, which is often based on historical data and assumptions. Projected returns are commonly established through mathematical modeling.699 Most commenters that addressed this topic opposed the characterization of targeted returns as hypothetical performance on the grounds that targeted returns indicate expectations about how a product or strategy is intended to perform (e.g., how aggressively a strategy will be managed) as opposed to predictions of performance.700 Several of these commenters agreed that the Commission should continue to treat projected returns as hypothetical performance.701 Targets and projections could potentially be presented in such a manner to raise unrealistic expectations of an advertisement’s audience and thus be misleading, particularly if they use assumptions that are not reasonably achievable. For example, an advertisement may present unwarranted claims based on assumptions that are virtually impossible to occur, such as an assumption that three or four specific industries will experience decades of uninterrupted growth. We recognize, however, that there are some differences between targeted and projected returns. Targeted returns are aspirational and may be used as a benchmark or to describe an investment strategy or objective to measure the success of the strategy.702 Projected returns, on the other hand, use historical data and assumptions to predict a likely return.703 Therefore, targeted returns may not involve all (or any) of the assumptions and criteria applied to generate a projection. Still,
we do not believe that the difference between targeted and projected returns is always readily apparent to recipients of an advertisement. We believe that the presentation of targeted returns in such context could result in unrealistic expectations. We continue to believe, therefore, that the presentation of targets and projections in advertisements should be subject to the rule’s hypothetical performance conditions. The conditions we are adopting with respect to the use of hypothetical performance are principles-based, allowing the adviser to tailor the disclosure to the type of performance used in the advertisement. For example, in the case of an advertisement that presents targeted returns, which are generally aspirational in nature and not necessarily based on ‘‘criteria and assumptions,’’ to meet this disclosure requirement an adviser’s disclosure could state that criteria and assumptions were not used. We believe that providing hypothetical performance in advertisements only to those investors with the resources and financial expertise to assess targets or projections will help avoid scenarios where an investor might be misled into thinking that such performance is guaranteed. We recognize that some investors want to consider targeted returns and projected returns (along with these underlying assumptions) when evaluating investment products, strategies, and services. For example, based on our staff’s outreach and experience, we understand that financially sophisticated investors in particular may have specific return targets that they seek to achieve, and their planning processes may necessarily include reviewing and analyzing the targets advertised by investment advisers and the information

704Final rule 206(4)–1(e)(8)(iii).
705See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.5.c.iv. 706See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II (stating that ‘‘[i]n the retail setting it is common to use projections that are based on statistically valid methodologies (e.g., Monte Carlo simulations) to assist clients and investors in understanding whether the investment of their current assets will allow them to meet future goals’’); BlackRock Comment Letter (stating that the rule should provide a safe harbor from the hypothetical performance provisions for investment analysis tools that comply with FINRA rule 2214); IAA Comment Letter; T. Rowe Price Comment Letter. 707FINRA rule 2214 provides a limited exception from FINRA rule 2210’s prohibition on communications that predict or project performance. While FINRA rule 2210 applies differently to communications directed to retail versus institutional investors, our final rule does not have such a bifurcated approach. 708Under the final rule, general educational communications that rely on public information and do not reference specific advisory products or services offered by the adviser would not qualify as advertisements. See supra section II.A.2.a.v. Educational presentations of performance that reflect an allocation of assets by type or class, which we understand investment advisers may use to inform investors and to educate them about historical trends regarding asset classes would not be treated as advertisements and would not be subject to the rule’s conditions on the use of hypothetical performance. For example, the following would not be considered hypothetical performance under the final rule: A presentation of performance that illustrates how a portfolio allocated 60% to equities and 40% to bonds would have performed over the past 50 years as compared to a portfolio composed of 40% equities and 60% bonds. Our approach regarding educational presentations of performance would apply even if the investment adviser used one of the allocations in managing a strategy being advertised or illustrated such allocations by reference to relevant indices or other benchmarks. 709See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(8)(iv)(A)(4). Such disclosure could state, for example: ‘‘IMPORTANT:
The projections or other information generated by [name of investment analysis tool] regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results and are not guarantees of future results.’’ 710See section 206 of the Advisers Act. See also
section 17(a) of the Securities Act, section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act (and rule 10b–5 thereunder), and rule 206(4)–8 under the Advisers Act. 711See IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter (stating that ‘‘indexes created by the Adviser should be considered hypothetical performance when the Adviser backtests the index to see how it would have performed. Other than this case, we do not believe that benchmarks should be considered hypothetical performance.’’). 712See e.g., IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 713See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(8) (defining ‘‘hypothetical performance’’ as ‘‘performance results that were not actually achieved by any portfolio of the investment adviser’’). Although we would not expect an adviser to comply with the conditions applicable to hypothetical performance, we would expect the adviser to comply with the general prohibitions, for instance, by disclosing that the volatility of the index is materially different from that of the model or actual performance results with which the index is compared. Most of the other provisions of the rule would be irrelevant. For instance, although the conditions on the presentation of performance would apply, the requirement to show net performance would be underlying those targets. Specifically, an analysis of these targets or projections can inform an investor about an adviser’s risk tolerance when managing a particular strategy. We understand that information about an adviser’s targets or projections also can be useful to an investor when assessing how the adviser’s strategy fits within the investor’s overall portfolio, but advisers must consider the intended audience when making such presentations in advertisements. The rule will apply only to targeted or projected performance returns ‘‘with respect to any portfolio or to the investment advisory services with regard to securities offered in the advertisement.’’ 704 This means that projections of general market performance or economic conditions in an advertisement are not targeted or projected performance returns subject to the provision on presentation of hypothetical performance. We did not propose to exclude from the definition of ‘‘hypothetical performance’’ the performance generated by interactive analysis tools. However, in the proposal, we noted that FINRA permits investment analysis tools as a limited exception from FINRA’s general prohibition of projections of performance, subject to certain conditions and disclosures, and we requested comment on whether we should consider FINRA’s approach.705 Commenters generally supported an exclusion for such tools and for adopting FINRA’s approach.706 As a result, the final rule will exclude the performance generated by investment analysis tools from the definition of hypothetical performance and will import a definition of ‘‘investment analysis tool’’ from FINRA Rule 2214 with slight modifications.707 FINRA Rule 2214 defines an ‘‘investment analysis tool’’ as ‘‘an interactive technological tool that produces
simulations and statistical analyses that present the likelihood of various investment outcomes if certain investments are made or certain investment strategies or styles are undertaken, thereby serving as an additional resource to investors in the evaluation of the potential risks and returns of investment choices.’’ We will adopt this definition, but will require that a current or prospective investor must use the tool (i.e., input information into the tool or provide information to the adviser to input into the tool). Despite the fact that an investment analysis tool is often a computer￾generated model that does not reflect the results of an actual account, the rule will allow an adviser to present these tools in advertisements without complying with the conditions applicable to hypothetical performance.708 We do not view these tools as presenting the same investor risks that model portfolios do because they typically present information about various investment outcomes based on the investor’s situation and require the investor to interface directly with the tool. In providing an interactive analysis tool, an adviser should consider which disclosures are necessary in order to comply with the general prohibitions of the final marketing rule. For example, to comply with the first general prohibition, the adviser should neither imply nor state that the interactive tool, alone, can determine which securities to buy or sell. The final rule will allow advisers to use interactive analysis tools, provided that the investment adviser: (1) Provides a description of the criteria and methodology used, including the investment analysis tool’s limitations and key assumptions; (2) explains that the results may vary with each use and over time; (3) if applicable, describes the universe of investments considered in the analysis, explains how the tool determines which investments to select, discloses if the tool favors certain investments and, if so, explains the reason for the selectivity, and states that other investments not considered may have characteristics similar or superior to those being analyzed; and (4) discloses that the tool generates outcomes that are hypothetical in nature.709 The fact that an interactive tool uses the same underlying assumptions does not mean that outputs the tool generates are advertisements (because the adviser or investor inputs investor-specific information). We believe that there are adequate investor protection guardrails in place to allow advisers to provide interactive analysis tools.710 Commenters suggested that we clarify the treatment of broad market or index￾based performance data.711 We agree that the use of index-based data can be informative to investors as a benchmarking tool.712 For example, in a scenario where an actual portfolio tracks an index, information regarding the index’s performance can provide useful information regarding tracking error, sector allocation, and performance attribution. Accordingly,
we believe that an index used as a performance benchmark in an advertisement would not be hypothetical performance, unless it is presented as performance that could be achieved by a portfolio.713

inapplicable because there are no fees or expenses to deduct from an index. Index information that is provided for general educational purposes and not, for instance, as a comparison to the adviser’s performance presentation, would not be considered an advertisement. See supra section II.A.2.a.v. 714See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(6)(iii). 715See id. 716Final rule 206(4)–1(d)(6)(i). 717We have defined ‘‘retail money market fund’’ to mean ‘‘a money market fund that has policies and procedures reasonably designed to limit all beneficial owners of the fund to natural persons.’’ See 17 CFR 270.2a–7(a)(21); see also Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release No. IA–3879 (July 23, 2014) [79 FR 47736 (Aug. 14, 2014)], at nn.715–716 and accompanying text. 718See Consumer Federation Comment Letter. 719See, e.g., MMI Comment Letter (stating this condition would be difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy for an advertisement that would be disseminated to a large number of people); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Wellington Comment Letter. 720See Credit Suisse Comment Letter. 721See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 722See Comment Letter of Flexible Plan Investments, Ltd. on proposed advertising rule (Feb. 10, 2020) (‘‘Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter II’’) (noting that the relevancy requirement would be difficult to administer because ‘‘[i]t will be dependent on knowing in many cases the exact person to whom the use of (sic) hypothetical performance is being delivered.’’). b. Conditions on Presentation of Hypothetical Performance Largely as proposed, the final rule will prohibit the presentation of hypothetical performance in advertisements except under certain conditions designed to address the potential for hypothetical performance to mislead investors. First, the adviser must adopt and implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the hypothetical performance information is relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of the intended audience of the advertisement. Second, the adviser must provide sufficient information to enable the intended audience to understand the criteria used and assumptions made in calculating such hypothetical performance (the ‘‘criteria and assumptions’’). Third, the adviser must provide (or, if the intended audience is a private fund investor, provide, or offer to provide promptly) sufficient information to enable the intended audience to understand the risks and limitations of using hypothetical performance in making investment decisions (the ‘‘risk information’’).714 For purposes of this discussion, we refer to the criteria and assumptions and the risk information collectively as the ‘‘underlying information.’’ Finally, the final rule does not require an investment adviser to comply with several conditions applicable to the presentation of performance information in advertisements, specifically the requirement to present specific time periods, and the requirements
related to the presentation of related performance, and extracted performance.715 Policies and Procedures. In a modification from the proposal, under the first condition for displaying hypothetical performance information in advertisements, advisers must adopt and implement policies and procedures ‘‘reasonably designed to ensure that the hypothetical performance is relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives’’ of the intended audience.716 The proposed condition would have required a higher degree of certainty of the financial situation and investment objectives of the person to whom the advertisement is disseminated. Under the final rule, reasonably designed policies and procedures need not address each recipient’s particular circumstances; rather, the adviser must make a reasonable judgement about the likely investment objectives and financial situation of the advertisement’s intended audience. The final rule will not prescribe the ways in which an adviser may seek to satisfy the policies and procedures requirement, including how the adviser will establish that the policies and procedures are reasonably designed to ensure that the hypothetical performance is relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of the intended audience. We have previously used policies and procedures to establish a defined audience.717 We believe that this approach will provide investment advisers with the flexibility to develop policies and procedures that best suit their investor base and operations. While one commenter supported the proposed condition,718 several commenters suggested that we eliminate it because it is too subjective and difficult to implement.719 One commenter suggested that the condition not apply to institutional investors,720 while another commenter stated that the condition imposes a standard so high that an adviser could not satisfy the standard for retail investors.721 Another commenter suggested that we clarify that the proposed condition would not require an adviser to have knowledge of the specific individual circumstances or financial condition of each investor receiving hypothetical performance from the adviser.722 We continue to believe that this condition, as modified, will ensure that advisers provide advertisements containing relevant hypothetical performance to the appropriate audience without creating unnecessary compliance burdens. In response to commenters’ concerns, however, the final rule will specify that the policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to ensure that hypothetical performance is relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of the intended audience. We added the qualifier ‘‘likely’’ to clarify that an adviser is not required to know the actual financial situation or investment objectives of each investor that receives hypothetical performance. We also replaced the word ‘‘person’’ with ‘‘intended audience’’ to clarify that advisers can
comply with this condition, as well as the other conditions related to hypothetical performance, by grouping investors into categories or types, and to emphasize that an investor might not be a natural person. We believe that these changes will ease the compliance burdens commenters identified. This condition is designed to help ensure that an adviser provides advertisements containing hypothetical performance information only to those investors with the resources and financial expertise. Hypothetical performance may not be relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of and may be misleading for investors that do not have the resources and financial expertise. For example, analysis of hypothetical performance may require tools and/or other data to assess the impact of assumptions driving hypothetical performance, such as factor or other performance attribution, fee compounding, or the probability of various outcomes. Without being able to subject hypothetical performance to additional analysis, this information could tell an investor little about an investment adviser’s process or other information relevant to a decision to hire the adviser. Instead, providing hypothetical performance to an investor that does not have access to the resources and financial expertise needed to assess the hypothetical performance and underlying information could mislead the investor to believe something about the adviser’s experience or ability that is unwarranted. We believe that advisers generally would not be able to include hypothetical performance in advertisements directed to a mass audience or intended for general circulation. In that case, because the advertisement would be available to mass audiences, an adviser generally could not form any expectations about

723See rule 205–3(d)(1) under the Act. 724See section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act. 725See Ropes & Gray Comment Letter. 726Advisers may already be required to comply with similar provisions under other regulatory regimes that also require advisers to consider the recipient when disseminating communications. See, e.g., FINRA rule 2210(d)(1)(E) (‘‘Members must consider the nature of the audience to which the communication will be directed and must provide details and explanations appropriate to the audience.’’); Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS) for Firms (2020), Provision 1.A.11; GIPS Standards Handbook for Firms (Nov. 2020), Discussion of Provision 1.A.11. 727See CFA Institute Comment Letter (suggesting that ‘‘an [a]dviser could consider hypothetical performance to be relevant to the financial situation and investment objectives of the person if the person has expressed interest in the strategy or the [a]dviser has determined it is an appropriate strategy for the investor based on their (sic) investment needs’’). 728See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(6)(ii). We would consider any calculation information provided alongside the hypothetical performance to be a part of the advertisement and therefore subject to the books and records rule. See infra section II.I. 729See Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter
II. 730This obligation would be similar to an
adviser’s obligation to provide full and fair disclosure to its clients of all material facts relating to the advisory relationship and of conflicts of interest. See Fiduciary Interpretation, supra footnote 8888, at n.70 (stating that institutional clients, as compared to retail clients, generally have a greater capacity and more resources to analyze and understand complex conflicts and their ramifications). 731See, e.g., Withers Bergman Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; Resolute Comment Letter. 732See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.5.c.iv. their financial situation or investment objectives. The adviser’s past experiences with particular types of investors should lead the adviser to design reasonable policies and procedures that distinguish among investor types and whether hypothetical performance is relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of an audience composed of that type. Such policies and procedures could distinguish investor types on the basis of criteria, such as previous investments with the adviser, net worth or investing experience if that information is available to the adviser, certain regulatory defined categories (e.g., qualified purchasers or qualified clients), or whether the intended audience includes only natural persons or only institutions. An adviser could determine that certain hypothetical performance presentations are relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of certain types of investors based on routine requests from those types of investors in the past. For example, an adviser, based on its past experience, might be able to reasonably conclude that hypothetical performance would be relevant to investors who meet certain financial sophistication standards such as qualified client 723 or qualified purchaser.724 The adviser could explain in its policies and procedures why it believes that hypothetical performance is relevant for this intended audience. In addition, an adviser’s policies and procedures should address how the adviser’s dissemination of the advertisement would seek to be limited to that audience. As discussed above, hypothetical performance directed to mass audiences generally will not be able to meet this standard. One commenter expressed concerns that this condition would pose a compliance challenge for advisers to private funds because they do not have insight into potential investors, especially prior to the time when subscription documents are disseminated.725 Because an adviser’s policies and procedures should be informed by its prior experience with certain investor types, an adviser that plans to advise a private fund can develop policies and procedures that take into account its experience advising a prior private fund for which it raised money from investors. That experience might indicate that investors in the vehicle valued a particular type of hypothetical performance because, for example, the investors
used it to assess the adviser’s strategy and investment process. Similarly, an adviser could determine, based on its experience, that hypothetical performance is not relevant to the likely financial situation and investment objectives of certain investors and reflect such determination in its policies and procedures. New advisers that do not have prior client experiences to inform their determination of the intended audience can rely on other resources, including information they have gathered from potential investors (e.g., questionnaires, surveys, or conversations) and academic research, to help identify the intended audience in connection with the three hypothetical performance conditions.726 One commenter expressed concern that this condition would effectively restrict hypothetical performance only to a sub-set of investors with the financial and analytical resources to analyze such performance even if an investor outside of this sub-set specifically requested the information.727 As noted above, we believe that it is appropriate to apply the hypothetical performance conditions to communications that otherwise meet the definition of advertisement, even if they take place in one-on-one settings due to the potential for such information to mislead investors. However, advisers would still be able to provide investors with interactive financial analysis tools without subjecting those tools to the hypothetical performance conditions. Criteria and Assumptions. The second condition for the presentation of hypothetical performance will require the adviser to provide sufficient information to enable the intended audience to understand the criteria used and assumptions made in calculating the hypothetical performance.728 The rule does not prescribe any particular methodology or calculation for the different categories of hypothetical performance, just as it does not prescribe methodologies or calculations for actual performance. Instead, advisers must provide the information about criteria and assumptions so that the intended audience can understand how the hypothetical performance was calculated. We are adopting the second condition largely as proposed, except that we are replacing the phrase ‘‘such person’’ with ‘‘the intended audience’’ for consistency with the first condition, as discussed above. In addition, and in response to one commenter’s concerns,729 we are clarifying that the adviser is responsible for providing sufficient information as we agree that it would not be workable to require advisers to have a precise understanding of exactly what each investor needs in order to allow that investor to understand the calculations and assumptions underlying the hypothetical performance.730 Several commenters expressed concern that this condition would require advisers to disclose proprietary or confidential information 731 due to the statement in the proposal that this condition may require advisers to provide the ‘‘methodology used in calculating
and generating the hypothetical performance.’’ 732 To clarify, we do not expect advisers to disclose proprietary or confidential information to satisfy this condition. We expect that a general description of the methodology used would be sufficient information for an investor to understand how it was generated. Under the final rule, the condition will not require an adviser to provide information that would be necessary to allow the intended audience to replicate the performance (e.g., information that is confidential or proprietary). With

733See, e.g., NYC Bar Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter. 734See, e.g., NYC Bar Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter (stating that the requirements of the second condition are ‘‘consistent with market practice’’ but that advisers should not be required to state the likelihood that a given event would occur). 735See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(6)(iii). 736See CFA Institute Comment Letter; Withers Bergman Comment Letter. 737See Flexible Plan Investments Comment Letter II. 738See proposed rule 206(4)–1(c)(1)(v)(C) (requiring an adviser to ‘‘[p]rovide[ ] (or, if such person is a non-retail person, provide[ ] or offer[ ] to provide promptly) sufficient information to enable such person to understand the risks and limitations of using such hypothetical performance in making investment decisions.’’). 739See, e.g., Ropes & Gray Comment Letter; IAA Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter. 740See supra section II.B. 741See final rule 206(4)–1(a)(4). 742The term ‘‘predecessor performance’’ is defined in final rule 206(4)–1(e) and refers to all situations where an investment adviser presents investment performance achieved by a group of investments consisting of an account or a private fund that was not advised by the investment adviser at all times during the period shown. respect to assumptions, investment advisers should provide information that includes any assumptions on which the hypothetical performance rests— e.g., in the case of targeted or projected returns, the adviser’s view of the likelihood of a given event occurring. Commenters suggested that we not require advisers to disclose the extent to which hypothetical performance is based on the likelihood of an event occurring because this would require advisers to make speculative statements.733 Yet, commenters agreed that an adviser should disclose the assumptions it has made.734 It is our view that assumptions underlying hypothetical performance should be interpreted to include assumptions that future events will occur. We believe that hypothetical performance, by its nature, contains a speculative element; therefore, requiring advisers to disclose the assumptions that informed a model aligns with the types of restrictions we seek to place on performance presentation that have a high potential to mislead investors. We believe advisers should provide this information so that the intended audience is able to determine, in part, how much value to attribute to the hypothetical performance. Without information regarding criteria and assumptions, we believe that such performance would be misleading even to an investor with the resources and financial expertise to evaluate it. Risk Information. The final rule will require the adviser to provide—or, if the intended audience is a private fund investor, to provide, or offer to provide promptly—sufficient information to enable the intended audience to understand the risks and limitations of using the hypothetical performance in the advertisement in making investment
decisions.735 Commenters generally supported this condition.736 However, one commenter suggested that we add a reasonableness component in order to provide more flexibility, requiring advisers to provide reasonably sufficient information.737 We do not believe this change is necessary as we believe that advisers’ consideration of the intended audience will provide advisers with flexibility and alleviate some of the burdens imposed by these conditions. In a change from the proposal, we replaced ‘‘Non-Retail Person’’ with ‘‘an investor in a private fund’’ in order to align with broader changes to the rule (i.e., to dispense with the distinction between Retail and Non-Retail Persons).738 As explained above, we also replaced references to ‘‘such person’’ with ‘‘the intended audience.’’ After considering comments,739 the final rule will not require advisers to provide private fund investors with information on the risks and limitations of using the advertised hypothetical performance. Instead, advisers can merely offer to promptly provide such information. With respect to risks and limitations, investment advisers should provide information that would apply to both hypothetical performance generally and to the specific hypothetical performance presented—e.g., if applicable, that hypothetical performance reflects certain assumptions but that the adviser generated dozens of other, varying performance results applying different assumptions. Risk information should also include any known reasons why the hypothetical performance might differ from actual performance of a portfolio—e.g., that the hypothetical performance does not reflect cash flows into or out of the portfolio. This risk information will, in part, enable the intended audience to understand how much value to attribute to the hypothetical performance in deciding whether to hire or retain the investment adviser or invest in a private fund managed by the adviser. An adviser should tailor its risk information to its intended audience. In addition, any communication that is an advertisement under the first prong of the definition of advertisement, and that includes hypothetical performance, will be required to comply with the general prohibitions.740 As a result, the rule will prohibit advisers from presenting hypothetical performance in such advertisements in a materially misleading way. For example, we would view an advertisement as including an untrue statement of material fact if the advertised hypothetical performance reflected the application of rules, criteria, assumptions, or general methodologies that were materially different from those stated or applied in the underlying information of such hypothetical performance. Also, we would view it as materially misleading for an advertisement to present hypothetical performance that discusses any potential benefits resulting from the adviser’s methods of operation without providing fair and balanced discussion of any associated material risks or
material limitations associated with the potential benefits.741 Similarly, an adviser can meets its obligation with respect to an advertisement presenting hypothetical performance that includes an offer to promptly provide risk information to a private fund investor if the adviser makes reasonable efforts to promptly provide such information upon the investor’s request. F. Portability of Performance, Testimonials, Endorsements, Third￾Party Ratings, and Specific Investment Advice Among the performance results that an investment adviser may seek to advertise are those of groups of investments or accounts for which the adviser, its personnel, or its predecessor investment adviser firms have provided investment advice in the past as or at a different entity. In some cases, an investment adviser may seek to advertise the performance results of portfolios managed by the investment adviser before it was spun out from another adviser. Alternatively, an adviser may seek to advertise performance achieved by its investment personnel when they were employed by another investment adviser. This may occur, for example, when a portfolio management team leaves one advisory firm and joins another advisory firm or begins its own firm. Predecessor performance results may be directly relevant to an audience when the advertisement offers services to be provided by the personnel responsible for the predecessor performance, even when the personnel did not work for the adviser disseminating the advertisement (the ‘‘advertising adviser’’) during the period for which performance is being advertised.742 We believe that the presentation of predecessor performance can mislead

743See, e.g., Fiduciary Management Associates, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Feb. 2, 1984) (‘‘Fiduciary Management Letter’’). 744See, e.g., South State Bank, SEC Staff No￾Action Letter (May 8, 2018) (‘‘South State Bank Letter’’) (the staff stated that it would not recommend enforcement action based on representations designed to ensure advisory clients would not be misled if clients attributed the predecessor adviser’s performance to the advertising adviser, including, for example, that it would operate in the same manner and under the same brand name as the predecessor adviser). 745See Registration of Successors to Broker￾Dealers and Investment Advisers, Release No. IA– 1357 (Dec. 28, 1992) [58 FR 7–01 (Jan. 4, 1993)]. 746See proposed rule 206(4)–1(a) and (c). 747For the discussion that follows, see generally 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.6. 748See Horizon Asset Management, LLC, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Sept. 13, 1996) (‘‘Horizon Letter’’); Great Lakes Advisers, Inc., SEC Staff No￾Action Letter (Apr. 3, 1992) (‘‘Great Lakes Letter’’); Fiduciary Management Letter; South State Bank Letter. We requested comment on a number of the issues raised by predecessor performance. See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.6. 749See IAA Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter (supporting specific provisions on predecessor performance, but suggesting compliance with GIPS standards); Fried Frank Comment Letter (stating that the final rule should explicitly address predecessor performance and supporting a ‘‘principles-based, disclosure-driven approach’’ that has a similar framework as the proposed approach to hypothetical performance); Comment Letter of SIFMA (Supplemental) (June 5,
2020) (‘‘SIFMA Supplemental Comment Letter’’).
750See IAA Comment Letter; SIFMA Supplemental Comment Letter. 751See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(7)(iv); see also 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at sections II.A.5.c.ii and II.A.6. 752See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(7)(i). Our staff has applied a similar principle when considering the presentation of predecessor performance. See Horizon Letter (stating that the staff would not find a display of predecessor performance to be in and of itself misleading based on several representations, including that ‘‘the person or persons who manage accounts at the adviser were also those primarily responsible for achieving the prior performance results’’). investors, especially, for example, when: (i) The team that was primarily responsible for the predecessor performance is different from the team whose advisory services are being offered in the advertisement, (ii) an individual who played a significant part in achieving the predecessor performance is not a member of the advertising adviser’s investment team,743 (iii) the adviser that generated the performance underwent a restructuring, reorganization, or sale,744 or (iv) an advertising adviser does not clearly disclose that the performance was achieved at a different entity. We have previously identified characteristics of a restructuring, sale, or reorganization (collectively, ‘‘reorganization’’) that likely support a finding that an adviser’s business continued to exist where: There was a substantial and direct business nexus between the successor and predecessor advisers; the reorganization was not designed to eliminate substantial liabilities and/or spin off personnel; and, if applicable, the successor adviser assumed substantially all of the assets and liabilities of the predecessor adviser.745 Under the final rule, we would consider similar factors when analyzing the extent to which an advertising adviser must treat a predecessor adviser’s performance as predecessor performance. For example, we do not believe that a change of brand name, without additional differences between the advisory entity before and after the restructuring, would render its past performance as ‘‘predecessor performance.’’ Likewise, a mere change in the form of legal organization (e.g., from a corporation to limited liability company) or a change in ownership of the adviser would likely not raise the concerns described in this section. In the proposal, we considered whether applying the rule’s general prohibitions and the more specific performance advertising restrictions would sufficiently alleviate our concerns,746 or whether specific rule provisions would more appropriately address those concerns.747 For example, we questioned whether the untrue or misleading implication general prohibition would prevent the display of predecessor performance containing an untrue or misleading implication about a material fact relating to the advertising adviser. As another example, we stated that, depending on the circumstances, predecessor
performance results that exclude accounts managed in a substantially similar manner at the predecessor firm may be misleading and implicate the proposed general prohibitions in the rule. We stated that such presentations could result in the inclusion or exclusion of performance results in a manner that is neither accurate nor fair and balanced. Accordingly, we requested comment on whether the advertising rule should include additional provisions on the presentation of predecessor performance results, and we specifically asked about the approach our staff has taken in providing guidance on this issue under the current rule.748 Some commenters supported the addition of a provision on this topic, urging us to address predecessor performance in the final rule.749 Two commenters supported the approach our staff took in its no-action letters and suggested we adopt a rule that would draw from those requirements, with minor modifications.750 In light of these comments, we believe that placing explicit guardrails on displays of predecessor performance will increase investor protection, in addition to the general prohibitions. Moreover, we expect that clarifying our views on positions taken by our staff over the years will promote consistency of practices among advisory firms and thereby level the playing field. Investments advisers will be prohibited from displaying predecessor performance in an advertisement, unless the following requirements are satisfied:
(A) The person or persons who were primarily responsible for achieving the prior performance results manage accounts at the advertising adviser; (B) the accounts managed at the predecessor investment adviser are sufficiently similar to the accounts managed at the advertising adviser that the performance results would provide relevant information to investors; (C) all accounts that were managed in a substantially similar manner are advertised unless the exclusion of any such account would not result in materially higher performance and the exclusion of any account does not alter the presentation of any prescribed time periods; and (D) the advertisement clearly and prominently includes all relevant disclosures, including that the performance results were from accounts managed at another entity.751 In addition to applying these specific provisions, advisers should consider the extent to which other provisions of the advertising rule, such as the general prohibitions (including those pertaining to the fair and balanced presentation of information), apply to any display of predecessor performance. Primarily Responsible. In order to present predecessor performance in an advertisement, the person or persons who were primarily responsible for achieving the prior performance results while employed at the predecessor firm must manage accounts at the advertising adviser.752 We believe that the ‘‘primarily responsible’’ requirement will help place critical guardrails on the use of predecessor performance and will require advisers to focus on the role that the individual played in producing the performance (e.g., the extent of the person’s decision-making authority or influence). Advisers should consider the substantive responsibilities of those who are responsible for generating the performance at issue and, where more than one individual is primarily

753Our staff applied a similar principle when considering investment teams or committees. See Great Lakes Letter, at n.4 (staff declined to take a no-action position where only one person from a three-person committee transferred from the predecessor adviser to the advertising adviser and where the other two individuals played a significant role stating that, ‘‘at a minimum, there would have to be a substantial identity of personnel among the predecessor’s and successor’s committees.’’); Horizon Letter (staff stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under rule 206(4)–1 where one individual was primarily responsible for achieving performance results at the predecessor firm and, upon joining the advertising adviser, would be a member of a three-person committee. The individual would still have final decision-making authority and the other committee members would only advise the sole decision￾maker.). 754Commenters generally supported applying guardrails to displays of predecessor performance based on existing staff no-action letters and industry best practices. See IAA Comment Letter (citing Horizon Letter, South State Bank Letter, Great Lakes Letter, Fiduciary Management Letter, and Conway Asset Management, Inc., SEC Staff No￾Action Letter (Jan. 27, 1989)); Fried Frank Comment Letter; SIFMA Supplemental Comment Letter. 755See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.6. (stating that it may be difficult to attach relative significance to the role played by each group member where an adviser selects portfolio securities by consensus or committee decision-making). See also Great Lakes Letter; Horizon Letter. Commenters generally supported the positon our staff has taken in no-action letters on predecessor performance where a committee makes investment decisions. See, e.g., IAA Comment Letter (suggesting that the final rule require that ‘‘substantially all of the investment decision-makers who manage accounts at the adviser are those primarily responsible for achieving the prior performance results’’). 756See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(7)(ii). Our staff applied a similar principle when considering whether displays of predecessor performance would be relevant to investors. See Horizon Letter (stating that the staff would not find a display of predecessor performance to be in and of itself misleading based on several representations, including that ‘‘the accounts managed at the predecessor entity are so similar to the accounts currently under management that the performance results would provide relevant information to prospective clients’’). 757See IAA Comment Letter (suggesting that the Commission require the accounts to be ‘‘sufficiently similar’’ instead of ‘‘so similar’’). 758See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(7)(iii). Our staff applied a similar principle when considering whether displays of predecessor performance would be relevant to investors. See Horizon Letter (stating that the staff would not find a display of predecessor
performance to be in and of itself misleading based on several representations, including that ‘‘all accounts that were managed in a substantially similar manner are advertised unless the exclusion of any such account would not result in materially higher performance’’); IAA Comment Letter (supporting this provision). 759See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(4); 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.5.c.ii, n.279. 760See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(15). Our staff has stated that it would not recommend enforcement action if advisers present predecessor performance where the adviser presents the composite performance of all of the predecessor firm’s accounts that had the same investment objectives and were managed using the same investment strategies that the adviser will manage at the new firm. See Horizon Letter. 761 In presenting such performance, advisers should also consider the general prohibitions and other performance advertising provisions of the final rule. 762See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(7)(iv). Our staff applied a similar principle when considering whether displays of predecessor performance would be relevant to investors. See Horizon Letter (stating that the staff would not find a display of predecessor performance to be in and of itself misleading based on several representations, including that ‘‘the advertisement includes all relevant disclosures, including that the performance results were from accounts managed at another entity.’’). Disclosures that are subject to a clear and prominent standard under final rule 206(4)–1 should be included within the advertisement. See supra footnote 286. 763See IAA Comment Letter (suggesting the addition of ‘‘including that the performance results were from accounts managed at another entity’’ to the rule text). 764See final rule 204–2(a)(16). See also Great Lakes Letter (stating that rule 204–2(a)(16) applies to a successor’s use of a predecessor’s performance data). responsible for making investment decisions, whether a substantial identity of the group responsible for achieving the prior performance have moved over to the advertising adviser. We anticipate that this principles-based approach will address scenarios where a committee makes the investment decisions and where a single person is responsible for investment decisions. Where a committee managed the group of investments at the predecessor firm, a committee comprising a substantial identity of the membership must manage the portfolios at the advertising adviser.753 A person or group of persons is ‘‘primarily responsible’’ for achieving prior performance results if the person makes or the group makes investment decisions.754 Where more than one person is involved in making investment decisions, advisers should consider the authority and influence that each person has in making investment decisions.755 Sufficiently similar accounts. Under the final rule, an advertising adviser may not present predecessor performance in an advertisement
unless the accounts managed at the predecessor and advertising advisers are ‘‘sufficiently similar’’ in order to ensure the investor receives relevant information.756 Prior staff letters took no-action positions with accounts that were ‘‘so similar’’ to the advertised accounts.757 We believe that the language in the final rule provides advisers appropriate flexibility in displaying predecessor performance and would not result in investor confusion. Managed in a substantially similar manner. Under the final rule, an investment adviser using predecessor performance in an advertisement will be required to display all accounts that were managed in a ‘‘substantially similar manner’’ at the predecessor adviser, unless excluding any account would not result in materially higher performance and the exclusion of any account does not alter the presentation of any applicable time periods required by the rule.758 This condition mirrors the related performance provisions of the final rule, which requires investment advisers to include all related portfolios and only permits an adviser to exclude a related portfolio if performance would not be materially higher and if the exclusion of any related portfolio does not alter the presentation of any applicable time periods required by the rule.759 Accounts that are managed in a substantially similar manner are those with substantially similar investment policies, objectives, and strategies.760 As a result, advisers can use the same approach for determining the scope of the accounts that are managed in a substantially similar manner as they use to determine which accounts are related portfolios for purposes of displaying related performance. An adviser that chooses to display predecessor performance information in an advertisement must consider the related performance requirements of the final rule. For example, if an adviser includes predecessor performance and the advertising adviser manages accounts that are related portfolios to those groups of investments depicted in the predecessor performance, then the advertising adviser must include these related portfolios in its performance display.761 Relevant disclosures. The final rule will require an adviser to clearly and prominently include all relevant disclosures and indicate that the performance results were from accounts managed at another entity.762 While what disclosures are ‘‘relevant’’ will depend on the facts and circumstances, we agree with a commenter’s suggestion that the fact that the performance was generated from accounts managed at another entity will always be relevant. Accordingly, the final rule will explicitly require this disclosure.763 Additionally, advisers should consider what disclosures would be appropriate to comply with the other provisions of the final rule, such as the general prohibitions. Our amendments to the books and records rule will require an adviser to retain records to support the performance presented.764 We believe that, in
order to avoid misleading presentations of predecessor

765Our staff took this approach in stating that it would not recommend enforcement action under
section 206 of the Advisers Act or the current
advertising rule if an advertising adviser presents performance results achieved at another firm based on several representations, including that the advertising adviser would keep the books and records of the predecessor firm that are necessary to substantiate the performance results in accordance with rule 204–2(a)(16). See Horizon Letter; see also Great Lakes Letter, at n.3 (stating that rule 204–2(a)(16) ‘‘applies also to a successor’s use of a predecessor’s performance data’’). We understand that investment advisers who consider this staff no-action letter currently keep copies of all advertisements containing performance data and all documents necessary to form the basis of those calculations. 766See final rule 206(4)–1(a)(2). 767See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; IAA Comment Letter (stating that an adviser should be permitted to substantiate performance using publicly available information and audit or verification statements); MarketCounsel Comment Letter (noting that the books and records of the predecessor firm are often unavailable due to contractual or privacy restrictions and suggesting that the Commission permit advertising advisers to recreate performance based on a sampling of client statements and/or display performance from a prior firm in a scenario where the advertising adviser has a copy of the advertisement and where the prior firm was subject to the books and records rule). 768See CFA Institute Comment Letter (stating that alternative books and records requirements should not be an option for predecessor performance because verification reports will not satisfy the books and records requirements in most cases, nor would performance information that has been subject to a financial statement audit). 769See infra section II.J. 770See, e.g., MassMutual Institutional Funds, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Sept. 28, 1995); Nicholas￾Applegate, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Aug. 6, 1996); Growth Stock Outlook Trust Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Apr. 15, 1986). 771See Dr. William Greene, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Feb. 3, 1997). 772See, e.g., Salomon Brothers Asset Management Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 23, 1999). See also, Jennison Associates LLC, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 6, 2000). 773See 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at section II.A.6. 774See proposed rule 206(4)–1(d). 775See, e.g., FPA Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 776See, e.g., SBIA Commenter Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 777See, e.g., Commonwealth Comment Letter. 778See, e.g., NSCP Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. performance, an adviser must have access to the books and records underlying the performance.765 We have applied this concept more generally under the final rule, which will also require that an adviser have a reasonable basis for believing that it will be able to substantiate (upon demand by the Commission) all material statements of fact contained in an advertisement.766 Certain commenters that addressed this
aspect of the proposal requested that we preserve flexibility for the types of records that support predecessor performance,767 while another commenter disagreed that flexibility was appropriate and suggested permitting predecessor performance only where the records required under rule 204–2 were available.768 Without supporting information, we are concerned about the accuracy of such performance displays and that such information could be misleading. We do not believe that an advertising adviser could recreate performance based on a sampling of investor statements and/or display performance from a prior firm because we are concerned that such an approach has a heightened risk of cherry picking performance. Allowing a sampling of information to support performance displays is inconsistent with our general approach to require advisers to display all applicable performance (e.g., related performance) to mitigate these cherry-picking concerns. Because the final rule addresses the portability of adviser performance, our staff will withdraw several no-action letters our staff has issued on this topic.769 However, other related letters will not be withdrawn in connection with this rulemaking since they address different activity than the activity covered by our final rule text on predecessor performance. Those letters address topics including an adviser’s use of performance generated by predecessor accounts (e.g., separate accounts or private funds) in RIC advertisements and filings 770 and the establishment of pools in order to generate performance track records.771 These letters generally address the use of performance from predecessor accounts (i.e., where the same adviser uses performance generated by one investment vehicle in an advertisement for another product) rather than performance of a predecessor advisory firm.772 Although we requested comment on the portability of testimonials, endorsements, third-party ratings, and specific investment advice,773 commenters did not address these topics. To the extent that testimonials, endorsements, third-party ratings, and specific investment advice contain performance from a predecessor firm, the general prohibitions apply to such testimonials, endorsements, and third￾party ratings. We do not believe we need to address their portability specifically as the general prohibitions, depending on the facts and circumstances, will have the effect of prohibiting advisers from presenting misleading information to investors by using outdated testimonials, endorsements, and third-party ratings. G. Review and Approval of Advertisements The final rule will not require investment advisers to review and approve their advertisements prior to dissemination, unlike the proposal. The proposed advertising rule would have required an adviser to have an advertisement reviewed and approved for consistency with the requirements of the proposed rule by a designated employee before disseminating the advertisement, except in
certain circumstances.774 We proposed this requirement because we believed it might reduce the likelihood of advisers violating the proposed rule. We believed it was important that investment advisers implement a process designed to promote compliance with the proposed rule’s requirements. We also proposed to require that advisers create and maintain a written record of the review and approval of the advertisement, which would have allowed our examination staff to better review adviser compliance with the rule. Many commenters opposed this requirement or suggested modifications to it. Commenters expressed concern that it would impose a significant compliance burden on advisers, especially smaller firms.775 Many commenters also argued that such a requirement would be duplicative of the compliance rule, pointing out that most advisers already have implemented policies and procedures to review advertisements for accuracy prior to dissemination.776 Other commenters stated that an inflexible review and approval requirement covering nearly all advertisements would impair an adviser’s ability to communicate timely with clients, resulting in poor client service or slow responses during periods of market volatility.777 Commenters claimed that the proposal, which did not exclude one-on-one communications from the definition of advertisement, would effectively require advisers to screen all communications to assess whether a communication would constitute an advertisement subject to the review and approval requirement, or met one of the requirement’s exceptions.778 Consequently, some of these commenters suggested that if we adopt this requirement, the final rule should expand the exceptions to include, for example, responses to questions that contain pre-approved template language, advertisements to Non-Retail

779See, e.g., MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I; MMI Comment Letter; ICE Comment Letter. 780See Compliance Program Adopting Release, supra footnote 371, at 74716. Rule 206(4)–7 makes it unlawful for an investment adviser to provide investment advice unless the adviser has adopted and implemented written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act and rules that the Commission has adopted under the Act, which will include final rule 206(4)–1 and its specific requirements. See rule 206(4)–7(a). Rule 206(4)–7 also requires investment advisers to review, no less than annually, the adequacy of the policies and procedures and the effectiveness of their implementation, and to designate who is responsible for administering the policies and procedures adopted under the rule. See id. at (b)–(c). 781See Compliance Program Adopting Release, supra footnote 371, at 74716. 782See Compliance Program Adopting Release, supra footnote 371, at 74716. If advisers indirectly market or solicit through third parties, they should consider how to tailor policies and procedures according to the risks posed by those third parties making statements that constitute advertisements under the rule. See supra section II.C.3. 783See, e.g., SBIA Comment Letter; SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I (stating that advisers’ compliances programs currently include upfront reviews of templates, spot-checking or sampling advertisements after dissemination, or a risk-based approach depending on the type of advertisement). 784See 15 U.S.C. 80b–4 (section 204 of the Investment Advisers Act) (providing the Commission with examination authority over ‘‘all records’’ of an investment adviser); see rule 204– 2(g)(2) (requiring prompt production of records); see rule 204–2(a)(17) (requiring investment advisers to make and keep records of their policies and procedures formulated pursuant to rule 206(4)–7). 785See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 80b–4 (section 204 of the Investment Advisers Act) (providing the Commission with examination authority); see also 17 CFR 275.204–2 (rule 204–2 under the Investment Advisers Act) (Commission books and records rules). 786See, e.g., Electronic Recordkeeping by Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Release No. IA–1945 (May 24, 2001) [66 FR 29224 (May 30, 2001)] (explaining that the ‘‘continuing accessibility and integrity of fund and adviser records are critical to the fulfillment of our oversight responsibilities,’’ and noting the Commission’s expectation that a fund or adviser would be permitted to delay furnishing electronically stored records for more than 24 hours only in ‘‘unusual circumstances.’’). 787See proposed rule 204–2(a)(11)(iii). 788Exempt reporting advisers (that are not also registering with any state securities authority) are not required to complete Item 5 of Part 1A. Accordingly, subsection L of Item 5 of Part 1A will not be required for such advisers. See, e.g., Instruction 3 to Form ADV: General Instructions (‘‘How is Form
ADV organized’’). Exempt reporting advisers will not be subject to the final rule. See supra footnote 21. 789See CFA Institute Comment Letter; NRS Comment Letter; NAPFA Comment Letter. 790See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 791See, e.g., JG Advisory Comment Letter; Pickard Djinis Comment Letter. 792See CFA Institute Comment Letter. 793See NRS Comment Letter (suggesting that Form ADV specifically request that an adviser disclose whether its advertisements include backtested performance or projected or targeted returns). 794See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 795See NRS Comment Letter. Persons, and interactive social media content.779 After considering these comments, we are not adopting the proposed internal review and approval requirement. Instead, we believe an adviser’s existing obligations under the compliance rule will allow an adviser to tailor its compliance program to its own advertising practices to prevent violations from occurring, detect violations that have occurred, and correct promptly any violations that have occurred.780 In adopting the compliance rule, the Commission stated that investment advisers should adopt policies and procedures that address ‘‘. . . the accuracy of disclosures made to investors, clients, and regulators, including account statements and advertisements.’’ 781 We believe for these compliance policies and procedures to be effective, they should include objective and testable means reasonably designed to prevent violations of the final rule in the advertisements the adviser disseminates. Advisers can establish such an objective and testable compliance policies and procedures through a variety of tools. For example, internal pre-review and approval of advertisements could serve as an effective component of an adviser’s compliance program. Other effective methods to prevent issues could include reviewing a sample of advertisements based on risk or pre-approving templates. Effective methods to detect and correct promptly violations and adjust practices to prevent future violations might include spot-checking advertisements and periodic reviews.782 Commenters confirmed our understanding that the internal policies and procedures of many advisers currently require some level of review for advertisements, although not pre￾review of every advertisement.783 Advisers should also consider the extent to which reasonably designed policies and procedures should involve training on the requirements and prohibitions of the advertising rule for any employee(s) involved in the creation, review, or dissemination of adviser advertisements. In addition, consistent with the Commission’s examination authority, upon request, advisers must promptly provide information about their compliance policies and procedures and any records that document implementation of those policies and procedures to us and our staff.784 The Commission’s ability to collect information in a timely fashion through its examination authority, and evaluate such
information for compliance with the Federal securities laws, is essential to our mission of protecting investors and our securities markets.785 Indeed, the prompt production of records to the Commission is central to our mission of protecting investors, and is imperative to an effective and efficient examination program.786 In connection with the proposed review and approval requirement, we also proposed to require investment advisers to maintain a copy of all written approvals of advertisements by designated employees.787 As we are not adopting the proposed pre-use approval requirement, we are also not adopting this associated recordkeeping requirement. H. Amendments to Form ADV We are adopting, largely as proposed, amendments to Item 5 of Form ADV
Part 1A to improve information
available to the Commission and the public about advisers’ marketing practices. Item 5 currently requires an adviser to provide information about its advisory business.788 We proposed to add a subsection L (‘‘Marketing Activities’’) to require information about an adviser’s use in its advertisements of performance results, testimonials, endorsements, third-party ratings, and references to its specific investment advice. Several commenters supported the proposed additions to Form ADV,789 while others questioned their usefulness.790 Some commenters suggested removing the question regarding whether an adviser’s performance results were verified, arguing that it could disadvantage smaller advisers or could provide investors with a false assurance of accuracy.791 Other commenters suggested that we include questions about an adviser’s use of other types of performance, such as predecessor performance,792 or specific types of hypothetical performance.793 One commenter opposed including questions regarding the amount or range of compensation paid for testimonials, endorsements, or third-party ratings, arguing that this could be commercially sensitive information.794 Others suggested technical improvements to the proposed section. For example, one commenter requested that we clarify how frequently advisers must update responses to Item 5.L.795 Another commenter requested that we define advertisement and other relevant terms

796See Pickard Djinis Comment Letter. 797See Instruction 4 to Form ADV: General Instructions (‘‘When am I required to update my Form ADV?’’). 798The question will exclude testimonials and endorsements given by certain affiliated persons of the adviser that satisfy rule 206(4)–1(b)(4)(ii). 799See JG Advisory Comment Letter; CFA Institute Comment Letter. 800This question will appear in Item 5.L(2), but had been proposed as Item 5.L(4). 801See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter I. 802See, e.g., CFA Institute Comment Letter; NRS Comment Letter. 803See supra section II.F. 804See final rule 204–2(a)(11)(i)(A). 805See final rule 204–2(a)(11)(i)(A)(1). 806See final rule 204–2(a)(11)(i)(A)(2). 807See final rule 204–2(a)(11)(i)(A) and (15)(i). 808See JG Advisory Comment Letter; NAPFA Comment Letter; FPA Comment Letter. 809See also NRS Comment Letter (stating that ‘‘most advisers have developed procedures requiring the retention of all written communications, so that individuals within the firm do not have the discretion to determine whether or not a particular communication is required under rule 204–2(a)(7).’’). As proposed, we are not changing the requirement that advisers keep a record of communications other than advertisements (e.g., notices, circulars, newspaper articles, investment letters, and bulletins) that the investment adviser disseminates, directly or indirectly, to ten or more persons. 810See JG Advisory Comment Letter. 811Final rule 204–2(e)(3)(i). This provision has not been amended from the current rule. 812See final rule 204–2(g)(2)(ii). This provision has not been amended from the current rule. 813See Amendments to the Timing Requirements for Filing Reports on Form N–PORT, Release No. of Item 5.L in the Form ADV Glossary.796 After considering the comments, we are adopting new subsection L to Item 5 of Form ADV with slight modifications to the ordering and content of the subsection versus the proposal. We are also amending the Form ADV Glossary to incorporate the final rule’s definitions for ‘‘advertisement,’’ ‘‘endorsement,’’ ‘‘hypothetical performance,’’ ‘‘testimonial,’’ ‘‘third-party rating,’’ and ‘‘predecessor performance.’’ Because new subsection L is included under Item 5 of Form ADV, advisers will be required to update responses to these questions in their annual updating amendment only.797 We continue to believe that this new information will be useful for staff in reviewing an adviser’s compliance with the final rule, including the restrictions and conditions on advisers’ use in advertisements of performance presentations and third-party statements. First, we are combining several proposed questions into Item 5.L(1), which will require an adviser to state whether any of its advertisements include performance results, a reference to specific investment advice, testimonials, endorsements, or third￾party ratings.798 Unlike under the proposal, this item will require an adviser to address separately whether its advertisements include
testimonials, endorsements, and third-party ratings. We believe that requiring advisers to address each separately will provide more specific and useful information to our staff regarding whether an adviser engages in these marketing practices. We are not including the proposed related question that would have asked whether the performance results in Item 5.L(1) were reviewed or verified, as proposed. We agree with commenters that ‘‘verification’’ may inappropriately suggest an assurance of accuracy to investors, and disadvantage smaller advisers that may not obtain third-party reviews of their performance results.799 As proposed, we are requiring an adviser to state whether the adviser pays or otherwise provides cash or non-cash compensation, directly or indirectly, in connection with the use of testimonials, endorsements, or third-party ratings.800 This question will only require ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses, and will not require additional information about the amount or range of compensation provided to avoid the disclosure of potentially sensitive information as suggested by one commenter.801 Third, unlike under our proposal, we are adding items requiring an adviser to state whether any of its advertisements include hypothetical performance and predecessor performance, respectively. We agree with commenters’ suggestions that this information could be useful for our staff preparing for examinations, especially considering that hypothetical performance can pose a heightened risk of misleading investors.802 Additionally, as explained above, the final rule specifically addresses when advisers can include predecessor performance in advertisements.803 Responses regarding predecessor performance will enable our examination staff to better assess compliance with this new provision of the rule.
I. Recordkeeping
We are adopting amendments to the books and records rule, largely as proposed, to reflect the final rule and to help further the Commission’s inspection and enforcement capabilities. Investment advisers must make and keep records of all advertisements they disseminate, and certain alternative methods for complying with this provision are available for oral advertisements, including oral testimonials and oral endorsements.804 If an adviser provides an advertisement orally, the adviser may, instead of recording and retaining the advertisement, retain a copy of any written or recorded materials used by the adviser in connection with the oral advertisement.805 If an adviser’s advertisement includes a compensated oral testimonial or endorsement, the adviser may, instead of recording and retaining the advertisement, make and keep a record of the disclosures provided to investors.806 Further, if an adviser’s disclosures with respect to a testimonial or endorsement are not included in the advertisement, then the adviser must retain copies of such disclosures provided to investors.807 Commenters generally disagreed with this expansion of the books and records rule, which currently only requires advisers to retain advertisements sent to ten or more persons. According to commenters, advisory firms of all sizes would face compliance challenges, especially smaller advisers, if required to maintain all advertisements.808 We believe, however, that this change is necessary to conform the books and records rule to the definition of advertisement and is designed to ensure advisers comply with the requirements in the final rule.809 Our decision to narrow the proposed definition of advertisement by excluding one-on-one communications from the first prong of the definition (other than most communications that include hypothetical performance) will lessen any burden imposed by the associated recordkeeping obligations. One commenter asked us to clarify that electronic mail (‘‘email’’) archives are an acceptable method of maintaining records of advertisements that are disseminated to investors, and we agree.810 The final rule does not prescribe or prohibit any particular method of maintaining records. Rather, it requires the adviser to maintain and preserve these records ‘‘in an easily accessible place for a period of not less than five years, the first two years in an appropriate office of the investment adviser, from the end of the fiscal year during which the investment adviser last published or otherwise disseminated, directly or indirectly, the . . . advertisement.’’ 811 We believe it would be permissible for an adviser to store records using email archives (including in cloud storage or with a third-party vendor), provided that the adviser can promptly produce records in accordance with the recordkeeping rule 812 and statements of the Commission.813

IC–33384 (Feb. 27, 2019) [84 FR 7980 (Mar. 6, 2019)] (interim final rule), at n.44. See also JG Advisory Comment Letter (suggesting that the Commission clarify that email archives are an acceptable method of recordkeeping in certain contexts). 814See current rule 204–2(a)(7)(iv). 815See final rule 204–2(a)(7)(iv). 816See current rule 204–2(a)(16). 817See final rule 204–2(a)(16). See also Recordkeeping by Investment Advisers, Release No. IA–1135 (Aug. 17, 1988) [53 FR 32033 (Aug. 23, 1988)] (describing as ‘‘supporting records’’ the documents necessary to form the basis for performance information in advertisements that are required under rule 204–2(a)(16)). 818See final rule 206(4)–1(d)(6), which will prohibit hypothetical performance in an advertisement except under certain conditions, including a requirement that the investment adviser provides (or offers to provide promptly to a recipient that is a private fund investor) sufficient information to enable the intended audience to understand the risks and limitations of using such hypothetical performance in making investment decisions. Any such supplemental information that is required by final rule 206(4)–1 to be a part of the advertisement is subject to the books and records rule. See final rule 204–2(a)(16). 819See proposed rule 204–2(a)(7)(iv). See also 2019 Proposing Release, supra footnote 7, at sections II.A.6. and II.C. (requesting comment about whether to amend the books and records rule to address the substantiation of performance results from a predecessor firm and whether the Commission should amend the rule to address specifically other provisions of the proposed advertising rule). 820See SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II. 821See supra section I.F. 822See final rule 204–2(a)(19). See also final rule 206(4)–1(d)(6) and (e)(10)(ii)(B). 823See proposed rule 204–2(a)(11)(iii). 824See, e.g., NRS Comment Letter. 825See final rule 204–2(a)(15)(ii). 826See final rule 206(4)–1(b)(2)(ii). 827Advisers are already required to retain the written agreement pursuant to current rule 204– 2(a)(10). The current recordkeeping rule requires advisers to retain originals of all written communications received and copies sent by the adviser relating to the performance or rate of return of any or all managed accounts or securities recommendations.814 As proposed, the final rule will amend the current rule to also require advisers to maintain written communications relating to the performance or rate of return of any portfolios (as defined in the final marketing rule).815 The current recordkeeping rule requires advisers to retain all accounts, books, internal working papers, and other documents necessary to form the basis for or demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of return of any or all managed accounts or securities recommendations in any advertisement.816 As proposed, the final rule will amend the current rule to also require advisers to maintain accounts, books, internal working papers, and
other documents necessary to form the basis for or demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of return of any portfolios (as defined in the final marketing rule).817 In addition, the supporting records of investment advisers that display hypothetical performance must include copies of all information provided or offered pursuant to the hypothetical performance provisions of the final rule.818 These changes are designed to help to facilitate the Commission’s inspection and enforcement capabilities. In a change from the proposal, the final rule will require advisers to maintain documentation of communications relating to predecessor performance.819 This change complements the predecessor performance provisions of the final rule and will help ensure that advertising advisers retain appropriate documentation to substantiate displays of predecessor performance. One commenter noted that advisers often have difficulty complying with the books and records requirements in connection with predecessor performance.820 For the reasons discussed above, we decline to provide additional flexibility.821 In a change from the proposal, we will require advisers to make and keep a record of who the ‘‘intended audience’’ is pursuant to the hypothetical performance and model fee provisions of the final marketing rule.822 Our examination staff may choose to review the adviser’s policies and procedures (for displaying hypothetical performance) against the records retained in connection with this new recordkeeping provision when determining whether the adviser satisfied the hypothetical performance policies and procedures condition. Also, we believe this additional requirement will assist our examination staff in confirming that advisers are appropriately considering the target audience when preparing and disseminating net performance and hypothetical performance. We proposed to require investment advisers to maintain a copy of all written approvals of advertisements by designated employees in order to track a corresponding proposed provision of the advertising rule relating to a review and approval process.823 Since we are not adopting the provision of the proposed advertising rule relating to review and approval, we are not adopting the corresponding proposed recordkeeping requirement. As discussed above, we are persuaded by commenters who asserted that an adviser’s own policies and procedures would provide an effective compliance mechanism.824 The combination of the current solicitation rule and current advertising rule into a single marketing rule resulted in additional changes to the books and records rule. We are adopting, as proposed, changes to the books and records rule in order to correspond to the marketing rule’s provisions that address testimonials and endorsements. The rule will require investment advisers to make and keep any communication or other document related to the investment adviser’s determination that it has a reasonable basis for
believing that a testimonial or endorsement complies with rule 206(4)– 1 and that a third-party rating complies with rule 206(4)–1(c)(1).825 We are not adopting amendments to the books and records rule that would specifically reference the adviser’s obligation to retain the written agreements with promoters 826 because such a provision would be duplicative of the current books and records rule.827 We did not receive any comments on the proposed amendments to the recordkeeping rule provisions that corresponded to the proposed amendments to the solicitation rule. For the reasons discussed in the proposal regarding amendments to the solicitation rule, we are retaining the current recordkeeping rule’s requirement for investment advisers to keep a record of the disclosures delivered to investors, which now apply to testimonials, endorsements, and third-party ratings. However, we are adjusting the wording to correspond to changes to the final marketing rule that permit either the investment adviser or the promoter to provide the disclosure. Further, in a change from the current solicitation rule, the final marketing rule will not require a promoter to provide an investor with the adviser’s brochure. Accordingly, as proposed, we will remove the corresponding books and records requirement as no longer relevant or necessary. As discussed above, in a change from the proposed amendments to the solicitation rule, the final rule contains a partial exemption (from the disclosure requirements associated with testimonials and endorsements in the final rule) for an adviser’s affiliated personnel. The amended recordkeeping rule will now contain a corresponding requirement for advisers that rely on the exemption to keep a record of the names of all affiliated personnel and document their affiliates’ status at the time the

828See final rule 204–2(a)(15)(iii). 829See final rule 204–2(a)(11)(ii). 830See, e.g., Blackrock Comment Letter; AIC Comment Letter. 831The order granting exemptive relief under rule 206(4)–3 is also terminated. See In the Matter of Blackrock, Investment Advisers Release Nos. 2971 (Jan. 4, 2010) [75 FR 1421 (Jan. 11, 2010)] (application) and 2988 (Feb. 26, 2010) (order) (stating that ‘‘the Applicant will rely on the Order only for so long as the Cash Solicitation Rule in effect as of the date of the Order is operative.’’). 832A list of the letters to be withdrawn will be available on the Commission’s website. 833 IAA Comment Letter; Mercer Comment Letter. 834See, e.g., SIFMA AMG Comment Letter II; Mercer Comment Letter; Stansberry Comment Letter. 835See also, Stansberry Comment Letter. 836See final rule 206(4)–1(e)(4). 837We believe that the need for this position will likely be temporary since the events covered by these letters, over time, will fall outside the ten-year lookback period for purposes of disqualification under the rule. 838See FPA Comment Letter; MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 839See MFA/AIMA Comment Letter I. 840See Form ADV General Instruction 4. 841 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. investment adviser disseminates the testimonial or endorsement.828 Finally, we are adopting, as proposed, the requirement that an adviser retain a copy of any questionnaire or survey used in the preparation of a third-party rating included or appearing in any advertisement.829 Commenters expressed concerns about not being able to obtain a copy of the questionnaire or survey.830 As discussed above, we recognize this concern and the rule will require an adviser to retain a copy of this material only in the event the adviser obtains a copy of the questionnaire or survey (i.e., an adviser would not be required to obtain a copy of the questionnaire or survey in order to comply with rule 206(4)–1 or rule 204–2). J. Existing Staff No-Action Letters Staff in the Division of Investment Management reviewed certain of our staff’s no-action letters that addresses the application of the advertising and solicitation rules to determine whether any such letters should be withdrawn in connection with the adoption of the marketing rule. Because we are rescinding the solicitation rule, the staff no-action letters that address that rule will be nullified.831 Additionally, pursuant to the staff’s review, the staff will be withdrawing the staff’s remaining no-action letters and other staff guidance, or portions thereof, as of the compliance date of the final rules.832 A few commenters supported this approach, suggesting that the final rule should either supersede or incorporate every letter.833 Other commenters requested that certain no-action letters not be withdrawn that were issued to solicitors who would otherwise be subject to the rule’s disqualification provisions.834 These commenters alternatively requested that the Commission grandfather such solicitation arrangements if these
letters are withdrawn. Based on the staff’s review, we understand that some solicitors may continue to conduct solicitation activity consistent with the conditions stated in certain of the solicitor disqualification letters identified below.835 The majority of these letters, however, pertain to events that occurred more than ten years prior to the effective date of the marketing rule and thus would not be disqualifying events under the marketing rule.836 The nullification of these solicitation disqualification letters will not have an impact on the relevant solicitor’s eligibility under the rule. For the minority of the solicitor disqualification letters that involve events that occurred within the rule’s ten-year lookback period, however, nullification of these letters could trigger disqualification under the marketing rule for that underlying event. To avoid this result, we understand that the staff will take a no￾action position with respect to the events in those letters to prevent those solicitors from being deemed disqualified under the marketing rule. This position is designed primarily to assist the phase-out of these letters as of the compliance date of the final rule.837 K. Transition Period and Compliance Date The final rule will provide an eighteen-month transition period between the effective date of the rule and the compliance date. While we had proposed a one-year transition period, two commenters requested a longer transition period to prepare for the new rule’s requirements.838 One of these commenters argued that a two-year transition period would be more appropriate given the compliance burden of implementing the proposed review and approval requirement.839 We did not adopt the proposed pre-review and approval requirement; nevertheless, we appreciate commenters’ concerns. Accordingly, the compliance date will be eighteen months following the effective date of the rules. Any advertisements disseminated on or after the compliance date by advisers registered or required to be registered with the Commission would be subject to the new marketing rule. The compliance date for the amended recordkeeping rule will also provide an eighteen-month transition date from the effective date of the rule. Advisers filing Form ADV after a similar eighteen￾month transition period from the effective date of the rule will be required to complete the amended form. Importantly, Form ADV does not require an adviser to update responses to Item 5 promptly by filing an other-than￾annual amendment, and if an adviser submits an other-than-annual amendment, the adviser is not required to update its response to Item 5 even if the response has become inaccurate.840 Therefore, each adviser is only responsible for filing an amended form that includes responses to the amended questions in Item 5 in its next annual updating amendment that is filed after the eighteen-month transition period.
L. Other Matters
Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act,841 the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has designated this rule a ‘‘major rule’’ as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2). If any of the provisions of these rules, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
III. Economic Analysis
A. Introduction
We are mindful of the costs imposed by, and the benefits obtained from, our rules. Whenever we engage in rulemaking and are required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, section 202(c) of the Advisers Act requires the Commission to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action would promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. The following analysis considers, in detail, the potential economic effects that may result from the final rule, including the benefits and costs to market participants as well as the broader implications of the final rule for efficiency, competition, and capital formation. Where possible, the Commission quantifies the likely economic effects of the final rule; however, the Commission is unable to quantify certain economic effects because it lacks the information necessary to provide estimates or ranges. In some cases, quantification is particularly challenging due to the number of assumptions that would be

required to forecast how investment advisers would respond to the new conditions of the final rule, and how those responses would in turn affect the broader market for investment advice and the investors’ participation in this market. Nevertheless, as described more fully below, the Commission is providing both a qualitative assessment and, where feasible, a quantified estimate of the economic effects. In large part, the scope of these costs and benefits is determined by the scope of the rule’s definition of advertisement. The final rule’s definition includes many of the types of communications subject to the current advertising rule. The final rule, however, will expressly apply the protections of the rule to investors in private funds, and advisers will now incur costs related to these communications, to the extent that their current practices differ from the final rule. In addition, the definition’s scope has been expanded to include communications made by promoters, including cash-compensated promoters, who were previously subject to the cash solicitation rule, and non-cash￾compensated promoters who were not. Some of these affected promoters whose communications will be newly defined as advertisements may also be registered broker-dealers whose communications may be subject to other regulatory requirements governing communications and advertisements, including those under the Exchange Act, the rules promulgated thereunder (including Regulation BI), and FINRA rules (including FINRA rule 2210). The final rule’s application to promoters that are registered broker-dealers relating to endorsements to private fund investors may create some overlap in regulation to the extent regulatory requirements under the Exchange Act and FINRA rules apply to their promotional activities. This may create burdens on these promoters to the extent their compliance with these other regulatory requirements does not fully satisfy the final rule. However, both the costs and benefits of the testimonial and endorsement requirements will be mitigated by the exclusions from the endorsement requirements that will apply to these registered broker-dealers. Other aspects of the final rule will also yield costs and benefits, such as the final rule’s general prohibitions on certain marketing practices. The impact of these changes are generally limited to the extent that communications are subject to similar restrictions under the current advertising rule, the current solicitation rule, and the general anti￾fraud provisions of the securities laws, and the extent to which the final rule’s prohibitions conform to current market practices. The impact is more pronounced with respect to communications newly subject to the definition of an advertisement and not previously subject to the solicitation rule—particularly to communications by solicitors who are not cash￾compensated. In addition, the rules and rescission of existing no-action letters may increase certainty because advisers
who choose to advertise will be able to follow the requirements of the final rules rather than various no-action letters, which could ultimately reduce compliance costs. Conversely, to the extent that the specificity of the rules prompts some advisers to devote greater resources to ensure compliance obligations under the final rules, the requirements of the rules may impose greater costs on such funds and advisers. Changes in costs of compliance for advisers ultimately could affect investors to the extent that any changes in costs would be passed down to them in the form of changed fund operating expenses or higher advisory fees. In addition, the rule will (i) permit investment advisers to use certain features in an advertisement, such as testimonials and endorsements, subject to certain conditions, such as disclosing information that would help investors evaluate the advertisement, and (ii) prohibit third-party ratings and investment adviser performance in advertisements unless they comply with certain conditions. The ability to use testimonials and endorsements will likely have a less pronounced impact on advisers that are currently complying with the solicitation rule because this aspect of the marketing rule is drawn from the current solicitation rule. The impact of restrictions in the marketing rule related to the use of performance advertising is likely similar on advisers currently subject to the advertising or solicitation rule because this aspect of the final rule permits certain activity that is not permissible under either current rule. If an adviser that is subject to the current advertising rule is implementing practices similar to those of the recipients of staff letters with respect to performance advertising, the impact of this new aspect of the final rule may be less pronounced for these advisers as compared to the impact on other advisers to the extent that there are some similarities between the final rule and the staff letters. The Commission is also adopting amendments to Form ADV that are designed to provide additional information regarding advisers’ marketing practices, and amendments to the Advisers Act books and records rule to correspond to the features of the marketing rule. The final rule reflects market developments since 1961 and 1979, when rules 206(4)–1 and 206(4)– 3, respectively, were adopted, as well as practices addressed in staff no-action letters. These market developments include advances in communication technology and marketing practices that did not exist at the time the rules were adopted and may fall outside of the scope of the current rules. B. Broad Economic Considerations While we discuss investment advisers’ many diverse marketing methods and practices in detail later, here we discuss the broad economic considerations that frame our economic analysis of the final rule and describe the relevant structural features of the market for investment advice and its relationship to marketing of advisory
services and private funds. Key to this framework is the problem that investors face when searching for an investment adviser; specifically the lack of information that investors may have about the ability and potential fit of an investment adviser for the investor’s preferences. By setting up this economic framework, we can see how the characteristics of the market for investment advice and its participants can influence the costs and benefits of the final rule and its impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. Information Usefulness The usefulness of the information in investment adviser advertisements is an important factor in determining how investors decide with which investment advisers to engage. For the purposes of the final rule, we use the term ‘‘ability’’ to refer to the usefulness of advice an investment adviser provides. The ‘‘potential fit’’ of an investment adviser refers to attributes that investors may have specific preferences for, such as communication style, investment style, or risk preference. For example, some investors would prefer an investment adviser that does not proactively provide advice or suggest investments, while others might prefer a more active communication and management style. While the effectiveness and usefulness of an investment adviser’s advertisements can have direct effects on the quality of the matches that investors make with investment advisers—in terms of both fit and better returns from the investment—there may be important indirect effects as well. If the final rule provides additional methods for investment advisers to

842See NASAA Comment Letter.
843Luis Rayo and Ilya Segal, Optimal Information Disclosure, 118 J. POL. ECON. 949 (2010); Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, 101 a.m. ECON. REV. 2590 (2011); Pak Hung Au and King King Li, Bayesian Persuasion and Reciprocity: Theory and Experiment, SSRN (June 5, 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3191203; Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein, On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1715 (2004) (‘‘Glazer’’). 844See id. for Segal and Rayo 2010, Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011, Au Li 2018. 845See Glazer, supra footnote 843. 846U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Study Regarding Financial Literacy Among Investors As Required by Section 917 of the Dodd￾Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Aug. 2012), available at https://www.sec.gov/ news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study￾part1.pdf. (‘‘Financial Literacy Study’’). 847See id. Although the report does not link American investors specifically to those who would become clients of SEC-registered investment advisers or investors in private funds, we believe that the study may be indicative of the level of financial literacy for prospective investors. 848The financial literacy studies in the Library of Congress Report (2011) fall into three categories, depending on the population or special topic under investigation. Most studies survey the general population. For example, the FINRA Investor Education Foundation’s 2009 National Financial Capability study, which was included in the Library of Congress Report, consisted of a national sample of 1488 respondents. Other research included in the report focus on particular subgroups, such as women, or specific age groups or minority groups. A third type of study deals specifically with investment fraud. These studies do not differentiate between qualified purchasers, knowledgeable employees, and other investors. Results from studies conducted on general populations may not apply to private fund investors. credibly and truthfully advertise their ability and potential fit with investors, investment advisers may have a greater marginal incentive to invest more in the quality of their services, because advisers would have additional methods to communicate their ability and potential fit through advertisements. Additionally, because investors might be able to better observe the relative qualities of competing investment advisers, the final rule may also enhance competition among investment advisers. In summary, to the extent that the final rule improves the effectiveness and usefulness of investment adviser advertisements, the final rule could also have a secondary effect of increasing competition among investment advisers, and encourage investment in the quality of services. Information Access Investors generally have access to a variety of sources of information on the ability and potential fit of an investment adviser. Advertisements, word of mouth referrals, and independent research are all ways in
which investors acquire information about investment advisers as they search for them. During this search, investors trade off the benefits of finding a better investment adviser (in terms of ability and potential fit) against the costs of searching for and obtaining information about one. If the cost of searching is too high, investors may contract with lower quality investment advisers on average, because they cannot spend the resources to conduct a search that would yield an investment adviser with higher ability or better fit, or they might not be able to evaluate the quality of the investment adviser they have found. Thus, higher search costs can result in inefficiencies because the same expected quality of match requires an investor to incur higher search costs. Similarly, for a fixed amount of spending on a search, an investor is less able to find information about investment advisers, and finds a lower expected quality of match. Marketing can potentially mitigate inefficiencies associated with the costs of searching for good products or suitable services. To the extent that marketing provides accurate and useful information to investors about investment advisers at little or no cost to investors, marketing can reduce the search costs that investors bear to acquire information and improve the ability of investors to identify high quality investment advisers. Investors have a variety of preferences regarding investment adviser characteristics such as investment strategies or communication styles. Marketing can help communicate information about an investment adviser’s ability, and that may aid an investor in selecting an investment adviser who is a good ‘‘fit’’ for the investor’s preferences. While marketing by or on behalf of investment advisers may reduce search costs for potential investors, investment advisers’ or promoters’ incentives may not necessarily be aligned with those of potential investors. Such a misalignment could undercut the potential gains to efficiency. For example, investment advisers have incentives to structure their advertisements to gain potential investors, regardless of whether their advertisements accurately reflect their ability and indicate whether they offer a potential fit with an investor’s preferences. One commenter suggested, for instance, that advisers may be incentivized to purchase positive testimonials or endorsements, or otherwise curate content.842 In addition, advertisements might make claims that are costly for investors to verify or are inherently unverifiable. For example, evaluating a claim that an investment adviser’s strategy generates ‘‘alpha’’ or returns in excess of priced risk factors generally requires information about the strategy’s returns and permitted holdings, as well as a model that attributes returns to risk factors. While some investors may have ready access to these resources or information, other investors may not. In some cases, an investor may be unable to assess the
plausibility of an investment adviser’s claims. An investment adviser might also state facts but omit the contextual details that an investor would need to properly evaluate these facts. Several economic models suggest that the ability to control or influence an investor’s access to information can hamper the investor’s ability to process information in an unbiased manner, even if the specific facts or information communicated to an investor are not false.843 For example, this type of control or influence on information can be as explicit as deletion or removal of unfavorable ratings or reviews,844 or as implicit as a reordering of the ratings or a suggestion of which ratings or reviews to read.845 Similarly, promoters may overstate the quality of the investment adviser they are promoting or their familiarity with the advisers’ services, or hide negative details that would have aided an investor when choosing an investment adviser or private fund, given promoters’ financial incentive to recommend the adviser to the investor. Information Evaluation There are considerable differences among investors and potential investors in their ability to process and evaluate information communicated by investment advisers. Many investors and prospective investors may lack the financial literacy needed to evaluate and interpret the types of financial information contained in investment adviser advertisements. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act required the Commission to study the financial literacy among retail investors, including methods and efforts that could increase financial literacy among investors.846 The Commission contracted with the Federal Research Division at the Library of Congress to conduct a review of the quantitative studies on the financial literacy of retail investors in the United States.847 According to the Library of Congress Report, studies show consistently that many American retail investors 848 lack important elements of financial literacy. For example, studies have found that many investors do not understand certain financial concepts, such as compound interest and inflation. Studies have also found that many investors do not understand other key

849See Financial Literacy Study, supra footnote 846. 850FINRA Investor Education Foundation, Investors in the United States (2016). 851Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy:
Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5 (2014). 852See Fiduciary Interpretation, supra footnote 88, at 6–7. 853See also section 17(a) of the Securities Act,
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b–5
thereunder, and rule 206(4)–8 under the Advisers Act. 854See ICAA letter, supra footnote 95. 855See Investment Adviser Association, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Dec. 2, 2005) (not recommending enforcement action if in determining whether a third-party rating is a testimonial, the adviser considers the criteria used by the third party when formulating the rating and the significance to the ratings formulation of criteria related to client evaluations of the adviser); DALBAR, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Mar. 24, 1998) (not recommending enforcement action if an adviser used references to third-party ratings that reflect client experiences, based on certain representations and certain disclosures made, both of which designed to ensure that the rating is developed in a fair and unbiased manner and that disclosures provide investors with sufficient context to make informed decisions). 856See, e.g., National Examination Risk Alert, Office of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations (Jan. 4, 2012). 857See Gallagher and Associates, Ltd., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 10, 1995) (where the staff reiterated its view that rule 206(4)–1 prohibits testimonials of any kind concerning the investment adviser); see also IM Guidance Update No. 2014– 04, at n.12 and accompanying text, in which staff partially withdrew its Gallagher position. 858See Interpretive Guidance on the Use of Company websites, Release No. IC–28351 (Aug. 1, 2008); see also Guidance on the Testimonial Rule and Social Media, IM Guidance Update No. 2014– 04, at n.19 and accompanying text. 859See, e.g., Cambiar Investors, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Aug. 28, 1997) (stating it would not recommend enforcement action when the adviser proposed to use partial client lists that do no more than identify certain clients of the adviser, the Commission staff stated its view that partial client lists would not be testimonials because they do not include statements of a client’s experience with, or endorsement of, an investment adviser); see also Denver Investment Advisors, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 30, 1993) (stating that partial client lists can be, but are not necessarily, considered false and misleading under 206(4)– 1(a)(5)). 860See New York Investors Group, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Sept. 7, 1982) (stating that in the staff’s view an unbiased third-party article concerning an adviser’s performance is not a testimonial unless the content includes a statement of a customer’s experience with or endorsement of the adviser). financial concepts, such as diversification or the differences between stocks and bonds, and are not fully aware of investment costs and their impact on investment returns.849 A 2016 FINRA survey found that 56 percent of respondents correctly answered less than half of a set of financial literacy questions, and yet 65 percent of respondents assessed their own knowledge about investing as high (between five and seven on a seven￾point scale).850 Moreover,
the general lack of financial literacy among some investors makes it difficult for those investors to evaluate claims about financial services made in advertisements, which increases the risk that such investors are unable to effectively use the information in advertisements to find an investment adviser that has high ability and is a good fit.851
C. Baseline

1. Market for Investment Advisers for
   the Advertising Rule a. Current Regulation The current rule 206(4)–1 imposes four broadly drawn limitations on the content of advertisements that are ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ published, circulated, or distributed by investment advisers. In addition to these specific prohibitions, the current rule prohibits any advertisement that contains any untrue statement of a material fact, or which is otherwise false or misleading. This prohibition operates more generally than the specific prohibitions to address advertisements that do not violate any of the specific prohibition but still may be fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative and, accordingly, may risk misleading investors. For purposes of the advertising rule, the Commission currently defines ‘‘advertisement’’ to be ‘‘any notice, circular, letter or written communication addressed to more than one person, or any notice or other announcement in any publication or by radio or television, which offers (1) any analysis, report, or publication concerning securities, or which is to be used in making any determination as to when to buy or sell any security, or which security to buy or sell, or (2) any graph, chart, formula, or other device to be used in making any determination as to when to buy or sell any security, or which security to buy or sell, or (3) any other investment advisory service with regard to securities.’’ Investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act, which is enforceable under the Act’s anti-fraud provisions in section 206.852 Section 206 of the Advisers Act prohibits misstatements or misleading omissions of material facts and other fraudulent acts and practices in connection with the conduct of an investment advisory business.853 b. Market Practice In addition to section 206 and rule 206(4)–1, investment advisers have considered staff no-action letters in their advertising practices. For example, the staff has issued no-action letters under rule 206(4)–1(b), stating that, in general, the staff would not view a written communication by an adviser to an existing client or investor about the performance of the securities in the investor’s account as an ‘‘offer’’ of investment advisory services but instead would view it as part of the adviser’s advisory services (unless the context in which the performance or past specific recommendations are provided suggests otherwise), and that the staff would not view communications by an adviser in response to an unsolicited request by an investor, prospective client, or consultant for specified information as an advertisement.854 The staff has also stated that it would not recommend enforcement action under section 206(4) and rule 206(4)–1 on issues relating to third-party ratings and testimonials. Specifically, the staff has stated that it would not recommend enforcement action if certain circumstances were present regarding the use of ratings or testimonials, such as: (i) References to independent third￾party ratings that are
   developed by relying significantly on client surveys or clients’ experiences more generally; 855 (ii) the use of ‘‘social plug-ins’’ such as the ‘‘like’’ feature on an investment adviser’s social media site; 856 and (iii) references regarding, for example, an adviser’s religious affiliation or moral character, trustworthiness, diligence or judgement, in addition to more typical testimonials that reference an adviser’s technical competence or performance track record.857 The Commission has also stated that an investment adviser should consider the application of rule 206(4)–1, including the prohibition on testimonials, before including hyperlinks to third-party websites on its website or in its electronic communications.858 For example, staff has stated that it would not recommend enforcement action, under certain circumstances, when an adviser provided: (i) Full and partial client lists; 859 and (ii) references to unbiased third-party articles concerning the investment adviser’s performance.860 Staff no-action letters have also stated that the staff would not recommend enforcement action under rule 206(4)–1 for references to specific investment advice in an advertisement, notwithstanding the rule’s general prohibition of the use of past specific recommendations. An adviser that acts consistently with a staff no-action letter may include past specific recommendations in an advertisement

861See, e.g., Scientific Market Analysis, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Mar. 24, 1976) (the staff would not recommend enforcement action when an investment adviser offers a list of past specific recommendations, provided that the adviser offers to provide the list free of charge); and Kurtz Capital Management, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Jan. 18,
1988) (the staff would not recommend enforcement
action relating to an adviser’s distribution of past specific recommendations contained in third-party reports, provided that the adviser sends only bona￾fide unbiased articles). 862See The TCW Letter (not recommending enforcement action based on certain representations such as presenting best and worst-performing holdings on the same page with equal prominence; disclosing that the holdings identified do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold or recommended for the adviser’s clients and that past performance does not guarantee future results; and maintaining certain records, including, for example, evidence supporting the selection criteria used and supporting data necessary to demonstrate the calculation of the chart or list’s contribution analysis). 863See Franklin Letter (not recommending enforcement action based on certain representations including that the adviser would disclose in the advertisement that the specific securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for advisory clients, and that the investor not assume that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable); see also supra footnote 204 (citing Clover Letter, Stalker Letter, and Eberstadt Letter regarding untrue or misleading implications). 864See, e.g., In the Matter of Van Kampen Investment Advisory Corp., Release No. IA–1819 (Sept. 8, 1999) (settled order); In the Matter of Seaboard Investment Advisers, Inc., Release No. IA–1431 (Aug. 3, 1994) (settled order). 865See, e.g., Clover Letter (not recommending enforcement action provided that certain disclosures about included performance results are made). Regarding mutual funds, our staff has stated that it would not recommend enforcement action if an advertisement included performance data from private accounts that are substantially similar in size and investment strategy to the fund in the fund’s prospectus or sales literature if the prospectuses or advertisements: (i) Disclose that the performance results are not those of the fund and should be considered a substitute for such performance; (ii) include the fund’s performance results if such results exist and; (iii) disclose all material differences between the institutional accounts and the fund. See Nicholas-Applegate Mutual Funds, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Aug. 6, 1996); GE Funds, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Feb. 7, 1997); ITT Hartford Mutual Funds, SEC Staff No￾Action Letter (Feb. 7, 1997). 866See Clover Letter (not recommending enforcement action provided that if an adviser compares performance to that of an index, it would disclose all material factors affecting the comparison) See also Investment Company Institute, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (May 5, 1988); Association for Investment Management and Research, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Dec. 18,
1996) (not recommending enforcement action
provided that gross performance results may be provided to clients so long as this information is presented on a one-on-one basis or alongside net performance with appropriate disclosure.) See Also Securities Industry Association, SEC Staff No￾Action Letter (Nov. 27, 1989) (not recommending enforcement action provided that an adviser that advertises historical net performance using a model fee makes certain disclosures). 867See Clover Letter (stating staff’s view that an adviser’s advertisement that suggests or makes claims about the potential for profit without also disclosing the possibility of loss may be misleading for purposes of rule 206(4)–1(a)(5)). 868See Horizon Letter; see also Great Lakes Letter (not recommending enforcement action if a successor adviser, composed of less than 100 percent of the predecessor’s committee, used the preceding performance information in their calculation when there was a substantial identification of personnel, and noting that without substantial identification of personnel in such a committee, use of the data would be misleading even with appropriate disclosure). 869See South State Bank Letter (the staff stated that it would not recommend enforcement action on representations including, for example, that the successor adviser would operate in the same manner and under the same brand name as the predecessor adviser). 870 Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS) for Firms (2020), Provision 1.A.11. (requiring the firm to ‘‘make every reasonable effort to provide a GIPS Composite Report to all Prospective Clients when they initially become Prospective Clients’’), and GIPS Standards Handbook for Firms (Nov. 2020), Discussion of Provision 1.A.11. (stating that ‘‘[i]t is up to the firm to establish policies and procedures for determining who is considered to be a prospective client. These include policies and procedures for determining when an interested party becomes a prospective client. An interested provided the recommendations were selected using performance-based or objective, non-performance-based criteria, and in either case, the adviser’s practices are consistent with a number of specific representations articulated in the no-action letters.861 For example, the staff stated that it would not recommend enforcement action if an adviser included in an advertisement a partial list of recommendations provided that, in general, the list: (i) Includes an equal number (at least five) of best and worst-performing holdings; (ii) takes into account consistently the weighting of each holding within the portfolio (or representative account) that contributed to the performance during the measurement period; (iii) is presented consistently from measurement period to measurement period; and (iv) discloses how to obtain the calculation methodology and an analysis showing every included holding’s contribution to the portfolio’s (or representative account’s) overall performance.862 The staff has also stated that it
would not recommend enforcement action if an adviser includes in an advertisement a partial list of recommendations selected using objective, non-performance-based criteria, provided that, in general: (i) The same selection criteria are used consistently from measurement period to measurement period; (ii) there is no discussion of the profits or losses (realized or unrealized) of any specific securities; and (iii) the adviser maintains certain records, including, for example, records that evidence a complete list of securities recommended by the adviser in the preceding year for the specific investment category covered by the advertisement and the criteria used to select the specific securities listed in the advertisement.863 Finally, the Commission has brought enforcement actions related to the presentation of performance results in advertisements. For example, we have alleged in settled enforcement actions that the performance information that certain advisers included in their advertisements failed to disclose all material facts, and thus created unwarranted implications or inferences.864 Our staff has also expressed its views as to the types of disclosures that would be necessary in order to make the presentation of certain performance information in advertisements not misleading.865 Our staff has taken the position that the failure to disclose how material market conditions, advisory fee expenses, brokerage commissions, and the reinvestment of dividends affect the performance results would be misleading.866 Our staff has also considered materially misleading the suggestion of potential profits without disclosure of the possibility of losses.867 Our staff has taken the position that prior performance results of accounts managed by a predecessor entity may be used so long as: (i) The person responsible for such results is still the adviser; (ii) the prior account and the present account are similar enough that the performance results would provide relevant information; (iii) all prior accounts that are being managed in a substantially similar fashion to the present account are being factored into the calculation; and (iv) the advertisement includes all relevant disclosures.868 More recently, our staff has taken the position that, based on certain representations, a surviving investment adviser following an internal restructuring may continue to use the performance track record of a predecessor advisory affiliate to the same extent as if the restructuring had not occurred.869 In addition, the Commission believes that many advisers currently prepare and present GIPS standard-compliant performance information, and also that many advisers currently prepare annual performance information for investors. The GIPS standards require advisers to provide certain reports to prospective clients at a specific time, and the standards provide guidance on how advisers can determine whether a potential investor qualifies as a ‘‘prospective client.’’ 870