2002-08-08 | 02-20031Added · Updated
The proposed regulation requires research analysts at broker-dealers to include certifications in research reports stating that their views accurately reflect their personal opinions and disclosing whether their compensation is linked to specific recommendations. It mandates that broker-dealers maintain records of quarterly certifications regarding public appearances, including statements on the accuracy of views and compensation relationships. If an analyst cannot provide these certifications, the broker-dealer must disclose this inability in all research reports for 120 days and notify the examining authority. The proposal applies to broker-dealers and persons associated with them, covering both equity and debt securities.
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1 17 CFR 242.500 through 502.
2Full-service broker-dealers provide a wide range of services to clients, including investment banking, financial planning, and other financial services. 3See Exchange Act Section 3(a)(18). 4 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983). See also Securities Act Release No. 7606A (November 13, 1998), 63 FR 67174 (December 4, 1998). 5Sell-side analysts typically work for full-service broker-dealers that sell securities to the public and make recommendations on the securities they cover. Many of the more popular sell-side analysts work for prominent brokerage firms that also provide investment banking services for corporate clients—including companies whose securities the analysts cover. 6Analyzing the Analysts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the House Comm. on Financial Services (June 14 and July 31, 2001). 7See www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm. 8The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark: Enron and the Wall Street Analysts: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs (February 27, 2002). SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 17 CFR Part 242 [Release Nos. 33–8119; 34–46301; File No. S7–30–02] RIN 3235–AI60 Regulation Analyst Certification AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission. ACTION: Proposed rule. SUMMARY: The Commission is seeking public comment on proposed Regulation Analyst Certification. The proposed regulation would require that any research report disseminated by broker or dealer include certifications by the research analyst that the views expressed in the research report accurately reflect the analyst’s personal views, and whether the analyst received compensation or other payments in connection with his or her specific recommendations or views. A research analyst would also be required to provide certifications and disclosures in connection with public appearances. Although research analysts are often viewed by investors as experts and as important sources of information about the securities and companies they cover, many factors can create pressure on their independence and objectivity. By requiring these certifications and disclosures, the proposed regulation should promote the integrity of research reports and investor confidence in the recommendations contained in those reports. DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 23, 2002. ADDRESSES: To help us process and review your comments more efficiently, comments should be sent by one method only. Persons wishing to submit written comments should send three copies to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Washington, DC 20549–
0609. Comments also may be submitted
electronically at the following E-mail address: rule-comments@sec.gov. All comment letters should refer to File No. S7–30–02. Comments submitted by Email should include this file number in the subject line. Comment letters received will be available for public inspection and copying in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Washington, DC
20549. Electronically submitted
comment letters will be posted on the Commission’s Internet Web site (http:// www.sec.gov). The Commission does not edit personal, identifying information, such as names or e-mail addresses, from electronic submissions. Submit only the information you wish to make publicly available. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Brigagliano, Thomas Eidt, or Racquel Russell in the Office of Risk Management and Control, Division of Market Regulation, at (202) 942–0772. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We are proposing new Regulation Analyst Certification (‘‘Regulation AC’’) 1 under the Securities Act of 1933 (‘‘Securities Act’’) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Exchange Act’’).
I. Introduction
Research analysts study publiclytraded companies and make recommendations about the securities of those companies, often through the issuance of research reports. Analysts typically work for full-service brokerdealers 2 and, as such, are ‘‘persons associated with a broker or dealer.’’ 3 The Commission has stated that analysts, who ‘‘ferret out and analyze information,’’ play an important role in the securities markets.4 Research analysts at full-service brokerage firms, so called sell-side analysts, are often viewed by investors as experts and as important sources of information about the securities and the companies they cover.5 At the same time, however, many factors can create pressure on an analyst’s independence and objectivity. Among other things, investment banking relationships and certain compensation arrangements may adversely affect analyst objectivity and, as a result, the integrity of the views expressed in research reports and public appearances. Proposed Regulation AC seeks to address these concerns by requiring broker-dealers issuing research reports to include clear and prominent certifications by the research analysts that the research report accurately reflects the analyst’s personal views about the subject securities and issuers and whether the analyst received compensation for views or specific recommendations in the research report. The proposed regulation would also require the analyst to make quarterly certifications that the views expressed by the analyst in public appearances accurately reflected the analyst’s personal views and whether or not he or she received any related compensation for his or her views or recommendations. In so doing, the proposed regulation should promote the integrity of research reports and investor confidence in the research analyst’s recommendations contained in those reports.
II. Proposed Rule
A. Reasons for Proposal During 1999, the Commission and Congress began to examine research analysts’ conflicts of interest in greater depth. The Commission was particularly concerned that many investors who rely on analysts’ recommendations may not know, among other things, that favorable research could be used as a component of the marketing of investment banking services provided by the analyst’s firm, and that analyst compensation may be based significantly on generating investment banking business. Beginning in the summer of 1999, Commission staff began a review of industry practices regarding disclosure of research analyst conflicts of interest. Commission staff conducted on-site examinations of full-service brokerdealers that focused on analysts’ financial interests in companies they cover, reporting structures (in particular whether analysts report to investment banking personnel) and analyst compensation arrangements. In June and July 2001, the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Financial Services held hearings on research analyst conflict of interest issues.6 In addition, also in July 2001, the staff of the Commission’s Office of Investor Education and Assistance issued an Investor Alert highlighting the numerous biases that may affect analyst recommendations.7 The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on analysts on February 27, 2002.8
9See www.sec.gov/news/press/2002–56.htm. 10See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45908 (May 10, 2002), 67 FR 34968 (May 16, 2002). 11We note that the recently-enacted SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 directs the Commission to conduct rulemaking, itself or through the SROs, to address a broad range of issues stemming from analysts conflicts. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107–204. The Commission voted to propose Regulation AC on July 24, 2002, before the passage of the Act. The Commission will, of course, abide by the directives of the Act as it continues to address analyst conflicts of interest issues, including with respect to the possible adoption of Regulation AC. 12The Commission notes that the term ‘‘compensation,’’ for the purposes of Regulation AC, would also include payments received from sources other than the research analyst’s employer, including issuers, underwriters, dealers, and other related persons. 13The Commission would expect that the required certifications be included on the front page of the research report, or that the front page would specify the page or pages on which each certification is found. 14 If an associated person of a broker-dealer publishes a research report, the broker-dealer would be required to make and keep the mandated records. On April 25, 2002, the Commission announced the commencement of a formal inquiry into market practices concerning research analysts and the personal conflicts that can arise from the relationship between research and investment banking.9 Further, on May 10, 2002, the Commission approved rule changes proposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers (‘‘NASD’’) and the New York Stock Exchange (‘‘NYSE’’) relating to research analyst conflicts of interest.10 The NASD and NYSE filed these rule changes with the Commission in February 2002. New NASD Rule 2711 and amended NYSE Rule 472 established standards governing member broker-dealer communications with the public to address research analyst conflicts of interest. Specifically, the rules contain, among other things:
15Regulation AC does not alter or effect any other existing obligation under the federal securities laws for research analysts or broker-dealers. 16For example, we note the term research analyst would not include an investment adviser, such as a mutual fund portfolio manager, who is not principally responsible for preparing research reports, even if the investment adviser is a registered person of a member. See Joint Memorandum of the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange. Discussion and Interpretation of Rules Governing Research Analysts and Research Reports (NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rules 351 and 472) at 3. and the reasons therefor. The brokerdealer must also disclose in all research reports for the next 120 days that the research analyst did not comply with the certification requirements specified in Rule 502 (a)(1) of proposed Regulation AC and the reasons therefor. It should be noted that the 120 day disclosure period prescribed in paragraph (a)(2) of proposed Rule 502, which is longer than a calendar quarter, runs from the time the analyst notifies the broker-dealer employer that he or she is unable to provide the written certifications specified in paragraph (a)(1). The broker-dealer must also promptly provide copies of statements that the analyst is unable to provide the certifications in connection with public appearances to its examining authority, designated pursuant to section 17(d) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17d–2 thereunder. Further, broker-dealers must keep and maintain these records pursuant to Rule 17a–4(b)(4). Proposed Regulation AC is intended to complement other rules governing conflicts of interest disclosure by research analysts, including NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2711. We note that SRO rules currently address an analyst who writes a research report that does not reflect his or her personal views, even if the analyst states that the report does not reflect his or her views. Thus, we do not see a need to allow for a negative certification concerning an analyst’s personal views. Should Regulation AC also provide an analyst a negative certification option that the views expressed in the research report do not accurately reflect his or her personal views? Similarly, given that SRO rules currently prohibit an analyst from receiving compensation for a specific investment banking transaction, is it necessary or desirable for Regulation AC to permit an analyst to disclose the receipt of compensation for a specific recommendation? The scope of proposed Regulation AC is broader than the scope of the current SRO rules in that the proposed regulation covers debt as well as equity securities. We believe that some of the same concerns regarding analyst conflicts also pertain to debt securities. Thus, we propose to coverer debt securities in the regulation. In addition, we understand that the SROs are considering expanding the coverage of their rules regarding analyst research reports to cover debt securities. Proposed Regulation AC
focuses on core issues of analysts’ integrity: their beliefs in their recommendations and the influence of compensation on their recommendations. It is important for an investor to know whether an analyst potentially is biased with respect to securities or issuers that are the subject of a research report. Further, in evaluating a research report, it is reasonable for an investor to want to know about an analyst’s compensation. We believe that proposed Regulation AC is reasonably designed to prevent acts and practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The proposed regulation does not preclude an analyst from providing services to his or her firm’s investment banking department within the requirements of governing SRO rules, and it does not prohibit analysts generally from receiving compensation for covering issuers or for preparing research reports. Rather, proposed Regulation AC focuses on disclosure where the analyst is compensated for making a specific recommendation or rating. The Commission also notes that the proposed regulation is intended to address analysts’ beliefs about their expressed views and recommendations, not the accuracy of the recommendations or opinions regarding securities discussed. Proposed Regulation AC also does not impose new liability. Even without proposed Regulation AC, analysts may be found to have violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws if they make baseless recommendations or recommendations that they disbelieve.15 Regulation AC is not intended to create duties under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. As a result, no private liability will arise from a broker, dealer, or associated person’s failure to make the required disclosure, or make, keep, and maintain required records.
III. General Request for Comment
We encourage any interested person to submit written comments on all aspects of the proposed regulation. In particular, we request comment on:
17 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
18 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11. 19Based on data provided by First Call, the staff of the Commission estimates that approximately 657,000 research reports were published in 2001. 20 519 is approximately 10% of the estimated 5,186 research analysts employed in the U.S., which is based on information provided by Nelson Information. 21OMB Control No. 3235–0279.
22Supra note 10. 23See NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472. to research analysts that recently were approved by the Commission.22 Therefore, the Commission estimates that the proposed regulation would result in a total annual time burden of approximately 11,296 hours [10,950 hours to comply with research report requirements + 346 hours to comply with public appearance requirements], and a total annual cost in dollars of approximately $1,372,464 [$1,330,425 to comply with the research report requirements + $42,039 to comply with the public appearance requirements].
C. Request for Comment
The Commission solicits comments in order to: (i) Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (ii) evaluate the accuracy of the Commission’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information; (iii) determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (iv) evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology. We also request comment on how many public appearance certifications would likely be submitted to brokerage firms per quarter, and how many of those statements would be required to be provided to the firm’s examining authority. Persons submitting comments on the collection of information requirements should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget, Attention:
Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and should also send a copy of their comments to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Washington, DC 20549– 0609, with reference to File No. S7–30–
02. Requests for materials submitted to
OMB by the Commission with regard to this collection of information should be in writing, refer to File No. S7–30–02, and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Records Management, Office of Filings and Information Services. OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collections of information between 30 and 60 days after publication. Consequently, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication.
V. Costs and Benefits of the Proposed
Rule
The Commission is considering the costs and the benefits of proposed Regulation AC. The Commission encourages commenters to discuss any costs or benefits in addition to those discussed below. In particular, the Commission requests comment on any potential costs, as well as any potential benefits, resulting from the proposals for investors, issuers, broker-dealers, other securities industry professionals, SROs, or others. Commenters should provide analysis and data to support their views on the costs and benefits associated with the proposed amendments. A. Benefits We believe that investor confidence in the integrity of research has suffered because some investors may believe that research analyst objectivity has been compromised due to, among other things, analysts’ personal compensation and firms’ investment banking relationships with issuers that are the subjects of research reports. Requiring that research analysts certify that the views expressed in research reports reflect their personal views, and requiring disclosure of information regarding whether analyst compensation is related to the specific recommendations made, would help bolster investor confidence in the quality of research. This, in turn, should help bolster investor confidence in the securities markets. Proposed Regulation AC would require that broker-dealers include certifications in research reports regarding the accuracy of the views expressed in the research report. Firms would be required to include in their research reports certifications that the views expressed in the research report accurately reflect the analyst’s personal views regarding the subject securities or issuers and whether or not the analyst received compensation in connection with the reports. Many investors rely on the research reports and recommendations provided by their brokers. To the extent that the proposed regulations require disclosures that provide more transparency than provided by current regulation, these disclosures should provide investors with important information with which to determine the value of the research available to them. Proposed Regulation AC may result in an increase in the overall quality of the research available to the public because a broker-dealer would be in violation of the securities laws when issuing research reports unless the reports include the required certifications and disclosures. The proposed requirement that the research analyst principally responsible for preparing the research report personally certify that the views expressed in the report accurately reflect his or her personal views creates an incentive for analysts to examine, even more carefully, the basis and foundations for his or her recommendations in preparing research reports. Proposed Regulation AC may also result in an increase in the quality of research because of competitive reasons. Firms that publish research reports that do not contain certain analyst certifications will be in violation of
the proposed regulation, and firms whose research analysts’ compensation is related to the specific recommendations or views provided in research reports may lose some business to firms that are less conflicted. The proposed regulation is intended to enhance investor confidence in the integrity of the research available to them. We believe that by requiring research analysts to certify as to the accuracy of the views expressed in research reports, investor confidence in the securities markets should be enhanced, thereby leading to the benefit of more liquid and efficient markets. These benefits are difficult to quantify. B. Costs While the proposed regulation may lead to some additional costs for brokers or dealers, we believe that any costs should not be significant. The proposed certification and disclosure requirements would require research analysts to even more carefully consider the accuracy of the views expressed in research reports and public appearances, to consider their compensation arrangements, and then to make the required certifications and disclosures. In light of current requirements under SRO rules, the Commission estimates that, beyond the paperwork costs described above, any additional costs that would result from the required certifications and disclosures would be minimal. Moreover, with respect to the compensation certifications and disclosures that would be required by proposed Regulation AC, brokers and dealers are already required to make certain disclosures regarding research analyst compensation under SRO rules.23 Additionally, Exchange Act Rule 17a–3(a)(19) currently requires
24These subparagraphs of the rule may be redesignated as Rule 17a–3(a)(12)(ii) and Rule 17a– 3(a)(12)(iii), should the Commission adopt amendments proposed in October 2001. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44992 (October 26, 2001). 25Public Law 104–121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and as a note to 5 U.S.C. Section 601). 26 15 U.S.C. Section 78c(f). 27 15 U.S.C. Section 78w(a)(2). brokers or dealers to maintain a record of all agreements pertaining to the relationship between each associated person and the broker-dealer, including a summary of each associated person’s compensation arrangement or plan.24 Brokers or dealers should also already have in place procedures necessary to comply with many components of the proposed regulation due to existing obligations under SRO rules, although these procedures might require some minor modifications to conform with proposed Regulation AC. As noted previously, the Commission estimates that the annual paperwork costs in dollars of complying with the proposed regulation would be approximately $1,372,464.
C. Request for Comments
As an aid in evaluating costs associated with proposed Regulation AC, the Commission requests the public’s views and any supporting information. We request comment on all aspects of this cost-benefit analysis, including identification of any additional costs or benefits of, or suggested alternatives to, the proposed regulation. Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and other factual support for their views to the extent possible.
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Certification
The Commission certifies, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the proposed regulation would not, if adopted, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The purpose of the proposed regulation is to increase analyst independence; further manage conflicts of interest; require increased disclosures to investors; and promote investor confidence in the integrity of research. By improving the quality of disclosure, the proposed regulation should enhance investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities markets. The requirements of the proposed regulation are closely related to information, procedures, and disclosures required by existing SRO rules, which apply to both large and small broker-dealers that publish or circulate research reports. The Division of Market Regulation estimates that the total burden in hours required to comply with proposed Regulation AC would, at most, be approximately two hours and two minutes per small firm. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that proposed regulation should not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
VII. Consideration of Impact on the
Economy
For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or ‘‘SBREFA,’’25 we must advise OMB as to whether the proposed regulation constitutes a ‘‘major’’ rule. Under SBREFA, a rule is considered ‘‘major’’ where, if adopted, it results or is likely to result in:
1See Order No. 2001, Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, III FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles ¶ 31,127 at 30,135–140 (April 25, 2002), reh’g pending (although contracts are not filed, detailed information about each transaction is reported to the Commission). Public appearance means any participation in a seminar, forum (including an interactive electronic forum), radio or television interview, or other public speaking activity in which a research analyst makes a specific recommendation or offers an opinion concerning a security or an issuer. Research analyst means any natural person who is principally responsible for the analysis of any security or issuer included in a research report. Research report means a written communication that includes an analysis of the securities of an issuer or issuers, provides information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision and includes a recommendation. § 242.501 Research reports. A broker or dealer, or any person associated with a broker or dealer, that publishes, circulates, or provides, directly or indirectly, a research report prepared by a research analyst shall include in that research report a clear and prominent certification by the research analyst containing the following statements:
(a) A statement attesting that the views expressed in the research report accurately reflect the research analyst’s personal views about any and all of the subject securities or issuers; and (b)(1) A statement attesting that no
part of the research analyst’s
compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the research analyst in the research report; or (2) A statement:
(i) Attesting that part or all of the research analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the research analyst in the research report; (ii) Identifying the source and amount of such compensation and the purpose therefor; and (iii) Further disclosing that the compensation could influence the recommendations or views expressed in the research report. § 242.502 Public appearances. (a) If a broker or dealer, or any person associated with a broker or dealer, publishes, circulates, or provides, directly or indirectly, a research report prepared by a research analyst, the broker or dealer must make a record within thirty days after each calendar quarter in which the research analyst has made a public appearance that includes a certification by the research analyst containing the following statements:
(1) A statement:
(i) Attesting that the views expressed by the research analyst in each public appearance accurately reflected the research analyst’s personal views at that time about any and all of the subject securities or issuers; and (ii) Attesting that no part of the research analyst’s compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the research analyst in any public appearance; or (2) A statement attesting that the research analyst is unable to provide the written certifications specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and the reasons therefor. The broker or dealer must also disclose in all research reports prepared by the research analyst for the next 120 days that the research analyst did not provide the certifications specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section and the reasons therefor.
(b) A broker or dealer shall promptly provide copies of all statements prepared pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section to its examining authority, designated pursuant to Section 17(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC 78q(d)) and § 240.17d–2 of this
chapter.
(c) A broker or dealer shall preserve the records specified in paragraph (a) of this section in accordance with § 240.17a–4(b)(4) of this chapter. By the Commission. Dated: August 2, 2002. Margaret H. McFarland, Deputy Secretary. [FR Doc. 02–20031 Filed 8–7–02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
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