SEC Division of Investment Management staff letter: Cornish & Carey Commercial Inc. — SEC — US

..'.f. .

JUN 2./ 1996

....p .. Our Ref No. 96-105-CC
Cornish & Carey
RESPONSE OF THE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL Commercial, Inc.
DIVISION OF INVESTMNT MAAGEMENT File No. 132-3

Your letter of February 26, 1996 requests the staff's

concurrence that each employee investment limited partnership or

limited liability company ("Fund") established by Cornish & Carey

Commercial, Inc. ("Cornish & Careyll) may be considered a single

beneficial owner of the securities of an issuer relying on

Section 3(c) (1) (1I3(c) (1) Entity") of the Investment Company Act

of 1940 ("the Act"), under the circumstances described below.

You state that Cornish & Carey, a commercial real estate

broker, periodically is presented with opportunities to invest in 3 (c) (1) Entities, primarily venture capital funds operated in the Northern California area. You state that Cornish & Carey wants

to share these investment opportunities with management employees

as a way to encourage and reward long- term employment. To that end, Cornish & Carey proposes to establish a Fund each year for

the participation of its then-eligible employees.
1 The

Investment Committee of Cornish & Carey's Board of Directors will

make all investment decisions for each Fund. Employee

participants will have no discretion over the selection or

disposition of investments by the Funds. Each participant in a

Fund will share, pro rata, in proportion to the participant's

capital contribution', in all investments made by the Fund. You

state that each Fund will limit its investment to less than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of each 3 (c) (1) Entity. Depending on the level of capitalization, a Fund may invest in

one or more 3(c) (1) Entities.2
Section 3 (c) (1) excludes from the definition of investment
company any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than

short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than 100

persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of securities. Under Section 3 (c) (1) (A) , ownership by a compan~ is deemed to be beneficial ownership by

one person, unless the company owns 10% or more of the

outstanding voting securities of the issuer, and the value of the

company's investments in all 3 (c) (1) Entities exceeds 10% of its

1/ You state that all offers and sales of interests in each

Fund will be made pursuant to Rule 596 of Regulation D or

otherwise pursuant to Section 4 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933.

2/ It is anticipated that these Funds also will rely on Section

3(c)(1).
3/ The term "company" includes, in pertinent part, a

partnership and any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not. See Section 2 (a) (8) of the Act.

assets (the "attribution rule") . 4

Despite compliance with the express provisions of Section

3 (c) (1), however, Section 48 (a) of the Act gives the Commission

the authority to "look through" a transaction or a multi-tiered

structure if it is a sham or conduit formed or operated for no

purpose other than circumventing the requirements of'
Section
3(c) (1) or any other provision of the Act.s For example, for

purposes of counting beneficial owners, the staff will require

"integration" of ostensibly separate 3 (c) (1) Entities if it

appears that the separate offerings do not present investors with

materially different investment opportunities. 6 Similarly, when

an entity is managed as a device for facilitating individual

investment decisions instead of as a collective investment

vehicle, the staff will "look through" the entity and attribute

ownership directly to the underlying securityholders. 7

Al though you state that the Funds will be collective

investment vehicles formed for the purpose of rewarding long- term

employees and not for the purpose of circumventing any provision

of the Act, you seek the views of the staff because of a

representation recited in a numer of the prior staff no-action

letters addressing t~e application of the attribution rule to a

company investing in a 3 (c) (i) Entity. In several of these

4/ Specifically, the second 10% test of Section 3 (c) (1) (A)

provides that a company shall be considered a single beneficial

owner unless more than 10 percent of its assets are invested in

issuers that are, or, but for Section 3 (c) (1) (A) would be,

excluded under Section 3 (c) (1) .
5/ The staff has taken the position that Section 3.(c) (1) must

be read in conjunction with Section 48 (a). See generally Tyler

Capital Fund, L.P./South Market Capital ("Tyler Capital") (pub.

avail. Sept. 28, 1987); see also Railbox Company (pub. avail.

Oct. 29, 1984). Section 48 (a) generally makes it unlawful for

any person to do indirectly through another person or entity what

would be unlawful for the person to do directly.

6/ See,~, Shoreline Fund, L.P. (pub. avail. Apr. 11, 1994) ¡

Monument Capital Management, Inc. (pub. avail. July 12, 1990) ¡

PBT Covered Option Fund (pub. avail. Feb. 17, 1979); see also In

the Matter of Kenneth von Kohorn & VK Partnership Management,

Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 20907 (Admin. Proc. File

No. 3-8624) (Feb. 22, 1995).

7/ See PanAgora Group Trust (pub. avail. Apr. 29, 1994); WR

Investment Partners Diversified Strategies Fund, L.P. (Apr. 15,

1992) ¡ Tyler Capital, supra n.2¡ Six Pack (pub. avail. Nov. 13,

1989) .

letters, the requesting party represented, and in some cases the

staff conditioned relief on the representation, that the company

would not invest more than 40% of its committed capital in any

one 3 (c) (1) Entity. 8 You are unable to make this representation because the Funds may not have sufficient capital to diversify

their investments to this extent.

You maintain that this 40% of capital limit is not a

statutory requirement and should not be determinative of when to

"look through" a collective investment vehicle to which the

attribution rules of Section 3 (c) (1) (A) otherwise would not

apply, and that is neither structured nor operated for the

purpose of circumventing the 100-securityholder limit of Section

3 (c) (1). The staff agrees. When an issuer can make the 40%

representation, the staff generally has been able to conclude

with a degree of certainty that the structure was not created to

evade the Act and the staff thus has granted no-action relief. 9 Because the 40% test is not a statutory requirement, however,

failure to comply with it would not automatically place a private

investment company in violation of the Act. Rather, whether a

company that meets the express conditions of Section 3 (c) (1) will be considered to have violated Section 48 (a) will depend on an

analysis of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.

While the percentage of an issuer's assets invested in another

3 (c) (1) company is relevant to. this analysis, exceeding a

specified percentage level, by itself, is not determinative.10

We concur, therefore, that each Fund may be considered a single beneficial owner of a 3 (c) (1) Entity, provided that: 1) no Fund will invest in any 3 (c) (1) Entity to the extent that the attribution provisions of Section 3 (c) (1) (A) are triggered; and 8/ See Handy Place Investment Partnership (pub. avail. July 1989); see also Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (pub. avail. Apr. 23,19 , 1992); Knightsbridge Integrated Fund (pub. avail. May 20, 1988);

CM Communications Fund (pub. avail. Apr. 17, 1987).

9/ The staff continues to adhere to the positions taken in the

prior no-action letters, and issuers may continue to rely on

them.
10/ Compare Six Pack, supra n. 5; WR Investment Partners, supra

n.3 (staff looked through collective entities even though the

entities represented that they would abide by 40% capital limit,

when the collective entities facilitated individual investment

decisions); with MCKinsey & Co. (pub. 'avail. Feb. 23, 1989)

(staff granted no-action relief assuring that it would consider a

limited partnership established for employees as one beneficial

owner of 3 (c) (1) Entities even though the limited partnership did not represent that it would abide by the 40% capital limit).

2) no Fund or 3 (c) (1) Entity will be structured or operated for

the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the Act.

£L rr
Eileen M. Smiley

Senior Counsel

.... __ __....-"~..~.......~__~

. ,
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
650 PAGE MILL ROAD
PALO ALTO. CAIFORNIA 94304-1050 JOHN AROT WILSON

OF COUNSEL TELEPHONE .615-493-9300 FACSIMILE (15-493-6811

AfJ rt A- - l.O . .~
Offce of Chief Counsel . SETION '3 (C) cO .
Division of Investment Management RULE
Securities and Exchange Commssion PWLID G/J-I!rb 450 Fifth Street, N.W. AVAILABIIT Washington, D.C. 20549 Re: Cornish & Carey Commercial, Inc.

Investment Company Actor 1940. as amended - Section 3( c)(I) Ladies and Gentlemen:
On behalf of our client, Cornsh & Carey Commercial Inc. ("Cornsh & Carey"), we seek assurance that the staf the Division of Investment Management of the Securities (the "Sta') of

and Exchange Commssion (the "Commssion") wi not recommend enforcement under the Cornsh & Gaey causes one or

more employee investment vehicles (the "Employee Funds") to purchase securities in investment

Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the "Act"), if

funds which rely on the exemption from the defition of "investment company" set forth in the Act ("3(c)(1) Entities"), as described below. In paricular, we request that

the Staf concur in our view that each Employee Fund should be considered a single beneficial

owner of the securities of any 3 (c)(1) Entity in which it invests, provided that it beneficially owns

Section 3(c)(1) of

less than ten percent (10%) of the outstading votig securities of such 3(c)(1) Entity. FACTS Cornsh & Carey is.the largest commercial rea estate broker operatig iI Nortern

mion. Cornsh & Carey currently has over 150 employees operating out offive offces in the area. From tie to tie, Cornh & Carey is presented with the opportnity to subscribe for interests in 3(c)(1) Entities, priy venture capita funds operating in the region. Cornsh & Carey desires to share such investment Calforna and has gross anual revenues in excess of $25

opportnities with members of its manag~ment team as a way to encourage and reward long-term

service to Cornsh & Carey. Therefore, Cornsh & Carey proposes to establish Employee Funds for the paricipation of its management personneL as described below. Only individuals who are "accredited investors" within the meaning of Rule 501(a) of

Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"), wil be allowed to 1:\PUBLIaGCH\O I 73734.04

WILSÇlN SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI

Offce of Chief Counsel

paricipate in the Employee Funds. The opportnity to paricipate in an Employee Fund wil be further restricted to management employees of Cornsh & Carey, whom Cornish & Carey believes are sophisticated in business and financial matters and capable of protecting their own interests 1 Almost all of the Cornsh & Carey with respect to investments in the Employee Funds.

management employees hold college degrees, and many hold graduate degrees as well. Such management employees typically have i 0 to 30 years of experience in the commercial real estate business or related real estate and finance activities. Such management employees typicaly are experienced in makg investment decisions, including decisions with respect to stock in public and private corporations, limited parnership interests, real estate, and other investments. It is expected that approximately 20 to 30 employees wil initially be eligible to participate in the Employee Funds, although such number may increase as the Cornsh & Carey organzation grows. Capital contributions from paricipants in an Employee Fund are expected to be in the range of$50,000 to $100,000, although larger or smaller contributions may be allowed in the discretion of the Executive Investment Commttee of Cornish & Carey's Board of Directors (the "Investment Commttee"), which wil manage the Employee Funds.

The Employee Funds will be structured as a series of limited parnerships or limited liability companes, with a new fund formed annually for the paricipation of Cornsh & Carey's then-current eligible employees. Alternatively, to minimize admistrative inconvenience and costs, the Employee Funds may be structured as a series of sub-accounts within a single lited

parnership or limted liabilty company. For purposes of this letter, any such sub-account is considered to be a separate Employee Fund. The Investment Commttee wil make al investment decisions for the Employee Funds. Employee paricipants in the Employee Funds, in their capacities as such, wil have no discretion over the selection or disposition of investments by the Employee Funds. Each paricipant in an Employee Fund will share pro rata, in proportion to such paricipant's capital contribution to the fund, in all investments made by that fund. Transfers of interests in the Employee Funds may be permitted under limited circumstances in the sole discretion of the Investment Commttee, and References in this letter to management employees are intended to include senior consultants who may be deemed independent contractors rather than employees for tax purposes (i.e., their income is reported on Form 1099 rather than Form W-2), but who meet the same eligibility criteria for participating in Employee Funds as the other management employees referred to herein.

I:\PUBLIC\GCH\O 173734.04

WILS.oN SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI

Offce of Chief Counsel

wil be prohibited if not in compliance with the requirements of the Securities Act. Employee paricipants wil have no right to demand early withdrawal or distribution of their interests in the Employee Funds. Depending on the amount of capital contributed to a paricular Employee Fund and the size and number of investment opportunities that become available to that Employee Fund, such Employee Fund may be limited in its abilty to diversify and may invest in many, or as few as one, 3(c)(1) Entities. However, the Employee Funds are not designed to facilitate individual investment decisions of their paricipants with respect to the underlying investments in 3 ( c)( 1) Entities. With the exception of the first Employee Fund's initial investment, which Cornish & Carey has already identified, eligible paricipants generally wil not have knowledge, prior to makng their commtments to an Employee Fund, of the identity of the paricular 3(c)(1) Entities

in which such Employee Fund intends to invest. In fact, in most cases, not all investments for an Employee Fund wil have been identified by the Investment Commttee at the time of the fund's formation. In no event wil an Employee Fund's investment in a 3 ( c)( 1) Entity represent ten percent (10%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of such 3(c)(1) Entity. In order to assure parnership tax classification of the Employee Funds, Cornsh & Carey wil contribute at least 1% of the total capitalization of each Employee Fund. To increase the likelihood that each Employee Fund wil be capitalized suffciently to meet the minimum investment requirements of the 3 ( c)( 1) Entities in which it may be invited to paricipate, Cornsh & Carey may contribute up to 5% of the total capitalization of each Employee Fund. For purposes of this letter, it should be assumed that the value of all securities owned by Cornsh & Carey in the Employee Funds and other issuers described in Section 3(c)(1)(A) of the Act will be less than ten percent (10%) of the value of Cornsh & Carey's total assets. Like all other paricipants in an Employee Fund, Cornsh & Carey wil share pro rata in the . investments of the fund in proportion to its capital contribution. Cornish & Carey wil not receive a "caried interest" for managing an Employee Fund, nor wil it be paid a management fee. Cornish & Carey may be reimbursed for direct expenses incurred on behalf of an Employee Fund, such as accounting and legal expenses. Offers and sales of interests in the Employee Funds wil be made pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D or otherwise pursuant to Section 4(2) of the Securities Act. Prospective participants in the Employee Funds wil be advised by means of a detailed written offering memorandum of the ownership and management structure of the Employee Funds, the expected I:\PUBLIC\GCH\O i 73734.04

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
Offce of Chief Counsel
February 26, 1996 costs to be incurred by the Employee Funds, the fact that the investments made by the Employee Funds in the 3(c)(1) Entities, as well as the underlying investments made by the 3(c)(1) Entities, are expected to be risky and highly speculative, and other relevant information necessar for an eligible paricipant to make an informed investment decision. Because the Employee Funds wil have 100 or fewer beneficial owners of their respective outstanding securities within the meanng of Section 3( c )(1) of the Act, it is expected that the Employee Funds wil operate without registration under the Act. Cornsh & Carey believes that the Einployee Funds wil be a valuable benefit to the members of its management team. Whle all of the eligible participants wil be accredited, most of such individuals ordinarily would not have access to investment opportunities in the 3 ( c)( I) Entities in which the Employee Funds plan to invest due to the large minimum commtments typically required to paricipate in such 3(c)(1) Entities, often in the range of $250,000 to $1,000,000. By allowing eligible employees to pool their resources, the Employee Funds wil provide eligible employees access to these investment opportunities while minimizing the amount that any individual must put at risk in order to paricipate. The 3(c)(1) Entities in which the Employee Funds are expected to invest, including venture capital funds, carefully monitor the number of beneficial owners of their securities in order to come within the exemption from the registration requirements of the Act provided by Section 3 ( c)( 1). Therefore, an Employee Fund generally wil not be permtted to invest in a 3 (c)( 1) Entity unless it can assure the 3(c)(1) Entity that it wil be deemed to be a single beneficial owner of the 3(c)(1) Entity's securities. As a result, the value of the Employee Funds as a means to reward and retain key personnel is dependent upon a positive response to this no-action request. ANALYSIS
Section 3(c)(1) of the Act excludes from the definition of
investment company "(a)ny issuer whose outstanding securties (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not makng and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities." Section 3 (c)(l)(A) provides that beneficial ownership by a "company" generally is deemed to be beneficial ownership by one person. However, where the company owns ten percent (10%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer and the value of all securities owned by such company of all issuers which are or would, but for the exception set forth in Section 3(c)(1)(A), be excluded from the definition ofinvestrIent company solely by reason of Section 3 the value of the company's total (c)(1) exceeds ten percent (10%) of

I:\PUBLIC\GCH\O 173734.04

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
Offce of Chief Counsel

assets at the time of its most recent acquisition of securities of the issuer, the company is deemed to be a "look through" entity and beneficial ownership of the issuer's securities is attributed to the holders of such company's outstanding securities (other than short-term paper). The purpose of Section 3 ( c)( 1) is to exempt from investment company regulation those entities in which there is no significant public interest makng such regulation appropriate. The 100-person limit is the bright line that has been established to demarcate public investment companes within the purview of the Act from private investment companes not within the purview of the Act. See "Protecting Investors: A Half-Century oflnvestment Company Regulation," SEC Staf Report 1504, Chapter 2, Section II (1992). The attribution rule of Section 3(c)(1)(A) is designed to ensure "that an investment company issuer cannot evade the requirements of the Act simply by using one or more other companes to purchase blocks of its securities and, in turn, sell those companes' securities to investors, i.e., to act a conduits for the distribution ofthe investment company's securities." H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1980). Because an Employee Fund is a "company" as such term is used in Section 3 (c)(l)(A) óf the Ace and because no Employee Fund wil be permtted to acquire ten percent (10%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of any 3(c)(1) Entity, the language of Section 3 (c)(l)(A) of the Act would require that beneficial ownership by an Employee Fund of securities of a 3 ( c)( 1 ) Entity be deemed to be beneficial ownership by one person, and not by each of the paricipants in the Employee Fund. However, we are aware of several instances in which the Staf has examned the paricular structure and operation of an investment vehicle to determne whether a "look through" to its beneficial owners should be required, notwithstanding literal satisfaction of the conditions of Section 3(c)(1)(A) for treating the investment vehicle as a single beneficial owner.
Section 48(a) of
the Act provides that "(i)t shal be unlawfl for any person, directly or indirectly, to cause to be done any act or thing through or by means of any other person which it would be unlawfl for such person to do under the provisions of this title or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder." The concern of the Staf ariculated in those cases where a "look through" was required, despite literal compliance with Section 3( c )(1 )(A), was whether or not the use of a multi-tier structure was simply a sham or conduit being used in violation of Section 48(a) to facilitate the individual investment decisions of a number of investors exceeding the 100-person 2 Section 2(a)(8) of the Act defies "company" as "a corporation, a parership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trst, a fud, or any organzed group of persons whether incorporated or not; or any

receiver, trstee in a case under Title 11 of the United States Code or simlar official or any liquidating agent for any of the foregoing, in his capacity as such." I:\PUBLIaGCH\O 173734.04

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI

Offce of Chief Counsel
February 26, 1996

limit.
For example, in Six Pack (pub. avaiL. Nov. 13, 1989), each parner of an investment parnership had the ability to var his percentage paricipation on an investment-by-investment basis, subject to the unanmous approval of the other parners. The Staf took the position that under these circumstances, the investment parnership was not a common investment vehicle, but rather was a device for facilitating individual investment decisions. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Six Pack parnership at all times owned less than ten percent (10%) of the outstanding interests of any 3( c )(1) Entity, the Staf concluded that each parner should be counted as a separate beneficial owner under Section 3 (c)(1). Similarly, in Tyler Capital Fund, L.P./South Market Capital (pub. avaiL. Sept. 28, 1987), a separate sub-account was established for each new investment to be made by an investment parnership, and each paricipant in the

investment parnership was alowed to determne his level of paricipation in the sub-account afer being informed of the new investment opportunity. Again, the Staf took the position that, notwithstanding literal compliance with the requirements of Section 3(c)(1)(A), each paricipant in a sub-account should be treated as a separate beneficial owner of the 3(c)(1) Entity in which the sub-account invested. See also WR Investment Partners Diversified Strategies Fund, L.P. (pub. avaiL. Apr. 15, 1992), where it was proposed that the general parner of an investment parnership vary each limited parner1s percentage paricipation in investments made by the parnership after consulting with the limited parners regarding their individual investment objectives. Again, the staf declined to take a no-action position. In each of these cases, the investment vehicle in question was used to facilitate the individual investment decisions of its paricipants. Such abuse is not present in the case of the Cornish & Carey Employee Funds. Each paricipant in an Employee Fund wil share in al investments' made by the Employee Fund pro rata in proportion to the paricipant's total capital contribution, and no employee paricipant, in his capacity as such, will have discretion over the investment decisions made by the Cornsh & Carey Board of Directors. In contrast to the no-action letters cited above, the Staf has consistently taken the position that a "look through" to the beneficial owners of an investment vehicle is not necessar or appropriate where the investment vehicle in question meets the requirements of Section 3(c)(1)(A) for being treated as a single beneficial owner and is operated strictly as a common investment vehicle. For example, in Handy Place Investment Parnership (pub. avaiL. July 19, 1989), the Staf agreed that a parnership organzed to allow members of a law firm to pool their investment resources should not be treated as a "look through" entity under Section 3(c)(1) where the single-owner . attribution test of Section 3( c )(1 )(A) was satisfied, where each participant's contribution with respect to each underlying investment of the parnership was simply I:\PUBLIC\GCH\O 173734.04

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
Offce of Chief Counsel

proportionate to the paricipant's relative capital commtment to the partnership, where investment decisions were made by the managing parners of the partnership, and where the partnership's investment in anyone 3(c)(1) Entity did not constitute more than forty percent the commtted capital of the parnership. See also Merril Lynch & Co., Inc. (pub. avaiL. Apr. 23, 1992); Knghtsbridge Integrated Fund (pub. avaiL. May 20, 1988); and CMS Communications Fund, L.P. (pub. avaiL. Apr. 17, 1987). (40%) of

Depending on the amount of capital contributed to a paricular Employee Fund and the size and number of investment opportunities that become available to that Employee Fund, such Employee Fund may invest in several, or as few as one, 3(c)(1) Entities. Therefore, we canot assure the Staf that each Employee Fund wil limit its investment in any 3(c)(1) Entity to forty percent (40%) of the Employee Fund's total capital commtments, as was the case in certain of the no-action letters cited above. However, the forty percent (40%) limit, which has evolved out of the fact patterns of prior no-action requests, is simply one factor that the Staf has used to determne whether an investment vehicle has been formed solely for the purpose of investing in a particular 3(c)(1) Entity. It is not a statutory requirement, nor should it be determnative of whether a "look through" of an investment vehicle is required where there are other strong indicia that the investment vehicle is not being used to facilitate individual investment decisions. The fact that a bona fide common investment vehicle for employees was non-diversified did not prevent the Staffrom granting no-action relief in McKinsey and Company Incorporated (pub. avaiL. Feb. 23, 1989). Like Cornsh & Carey, McKinsey created a series of investment parnerships designed to

allow key, accredited employees to pool their resources to gain access to investments in 3(c)(1) Entities which usually would not be offered to them as individual investors and which might be beyond their individual means. Although the McKinsey-no-action request disclosed that one or more of the McKinsey partnerships might invest exclusively in one 3(c)(1) Entity, the Staf agreed that each such parnership should be treated as a single beneficial owner for purposes of Section 3(c)(1) ofthe Act. We note that the McKisey parnerships, which had approximately 300 eligible paricipants, were the subject of an exemptive order as employees' securities companes, while the Cornish & Carey Employee Funds, which are expected to have 100 or fewer participants, wil rely on the exemption from registration under the Act provided by Section 3(c)(1). So long as a fund is not designed to circumvent the Act's provisions, whether the fund is

deemed to be a single beneficial owner of the securities of an entity in which it invests is a separate issue from the method by which the fund itself is exempt from registration under the Act. Therefore, based on the maner in which the Cornish & Carey Employee Funds wil be operated as collective investment vehicles, and notwithstanding the distinction between the McKinsey and Cornish & Carey methods of avoiding registration under the Act, we believe that the Cornish & Carey Employee Funds, like the McKinsey partnerships, should be treated as single beneficial I:\PUBLIaGCH\O 173 734.0

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
Offce of Chief Counsel

owners of the securities of3(c)(1) Entities in which they invest.

CONCLUSION
Because each Employee Fund wil be operated as a collective investment vehicle for eligible Cornsh & Carey employees as described above, and wil not be operated to facilitate individual investment decisions, we believe that the treatment of an Employee Fund as a single beneficial owner of the securities of any 3 ( c)( i) Entity in which it acquires less than ten percent (10%) of the outstanding voting securities is not only alowed by the language of Section 3(c)(1)(A) of the Act, but is also consistent with the no-action positions previously taken by the Staf Many of the 3(c)(1) Entities in which the Employee Funds may be invited to invest wil be unwiling to admit an Employee Fund as an investor unless the Employee Fund can assure the 3(c)(1) Entity that the Employee Fund is appropri~tely deemed to be a single beneficial owner of the 3 ( c)(1) Entity's securities for purposes of Section 3 ( c)(1) of the Act. We therefore respectfully request that the Staf concur in our view that, under the circumstances described in this letter, an Employee Fund wil be deemed to be the beneficial owner of the securities of any 3(c)(1) Entity in which it acquires less than ten percent (10%) of the outstanding voting securities, and that a "look through" to the Employee Fund's paricipants will not be required. Than you for your consideration of this request. Please direct any comments or questions on this matter to Lar Sonsini, Gai Husick or Brett Byers of this offce at (415) 493 9300. Sincerely, WISON SONSIN GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation I:\PUBLIC\GCH\O 173734.04

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
650 PAGE MILL ROAD
PALO ALTO. CALIFORNIA 94304-1050 JOHN ARNOT WILSON TELEPHONE 415-493-9300 FACSIMILE 415-493-6811 OF COUNSEL February 2 fl 1996 Offce of Chief Counsel U.S. Securities and Exchange Commssion 450 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20549 Re: Cornish & Carey Commercial, Inc.

Investment Company Act or 1940. as amended - Section 3(c)(1) Ladies and Gentlemen:
Enclosed please fid one original and seven copies of a no-action request on behalf of Cornsh & Carey Commercial, Inc. If you have any questions concernng this matter, please contact the undersigned, Lar Sonsin or Brett Byers of this offce at (415) 493-9300. In the event you are unable to grant a positive response to this request, we would be most appreciative if you would contact one of us to discuss such matter before issuing your response. Please date stamp and return the enclosed copy of this cover letter in the self-addressed stamped envelope provided. Sincerely, WISON SONSIN GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation ~~ Ga~usick :I:\PUBLIaGCO 174358.02