Individual decision · SEC · 18 Feb 2015
The staff of the Division of Investment Management will not recommend enforcement action if AllianceBernstein Income Fund, Inc. omits a shareholder proposal from its proxy materials, provided the proponent does not revise the proposal within seven calendar days to request that the Board take steps necessary to liquidate, merge, or convert the Fund. The staff agreed with the Fund's arguments under Rules 14a-8(i)(2) and 14a-8(i)(6) that the original proposal would violate Maryland law and the Investment Company Act of 1940 by requiring unilateral Board action without stockholder approval. However, the staff declined to concur with the Fund's exclusion of the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(3), stating it could not assure the Fund that omitting portions of the supporting statement for being materially false or misleading would not result in enforcement action.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Rule 14a-8
February 18, 2015
Kathleen K. Clarke Seward & Kissel LLP 901 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20001
Re: AllianceBernstein Income Fund, Inc. – Omission of Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Karpus Management, Inc. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8
Dear Ms. Clarke:
In a letter dated December 17, 2014, on behalf of AllianceBernstein Income Fund, Inc., (the “Fund”) you requested confirmation from the staff of the Division of Investment Management that it would not recommend enforcement action to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) if a shareholder proposal and supporting statement (the “Proposal”) submitted by Karpus Management, Inc., (the “Proponent”) is omitted from the proxy materials for the Fund’s Annual Meeting of Stockholders, which is expected to take place on or about April 26, 2015. 1 The Proposal provides:
BE IT RESOLVED, the shareholders of the AllianceBernstein Income Fund (“ACG” or the “Fund”) request the Board of Directors promptly consider authorizing a self-tender offer for all outstanding common shares of the Fund at or close to net asset value (“NAV”). If more than 50% of the Fund’s outstanding common shares are tendered, the tender offer should be cancelled and the Fund should be liquidated, converted into an exchange-traded fund, or converted/merged into an open-end mutual fund.
You argue that the Proposal may be excluded: (1) pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, because the Proposal would, if implemented, require the Fund to violate state and federal law; (2) pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6), because the Fund does not have the power and authority to liquidate, merge or convert into an open-end or exchange-traded fund to implement the Proposal; and (3) pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3), because the Proposal contains materially false and misleading statements regarding the context in which the Proposal is made, including statements that impugn the integrity of the Fund’s directors through questioning their adherence to their fiduciary duties and makes charges concerning improper and illegal activity without factual foundation, contrary to Rule 14a-9.
There appears to be some basis for your view that the Proposal may be excluded under Rules 14a-8(i)(2) and 14a-8(i)(6). We note that, in the opinion of the Fund’s counsel, the Board lacks the authority to liquidate, merge, or convert the Fund into an open-end or exchange-traded fund and that implementation of these aspects of the Proposal would violate state law. It appears that this defect in the Proposal could be cured, however, if the Proposal were revised to state that the Board should take the steps necessary to liquidate, merge, or convert the Fund. Accordingly, unless the Proponent provides the Fund with a Proposal revised in this manner, within seven calendar days after receiving this letter, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if the Fund omits the Proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on Rules 14a-8(i)(2) and 14a-8(i)(6).
We are unable to concur in your view that the Fund may exclude the entire Proposal or portions of the supporting statement under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). We are unable to conclude that you have demonstrated objectively that the portions of the supporting statement you reference are materially false or misleading or impugn the character, integrity, or personal reputation of the Fund’s directors without factual foundation in violation of Rule 14a-9. Accordingly, we cannot assure the Fund that we would not recommend enforcement action if the Fund omits the Proposal or portions of the supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on Rule 14a-8(i)(3).
Attached is a description of the informal procedures the Division follows in responding to shareholder proposals. If you have any questions or comments concerning this matter, please call me at (202) 551-6907.
Sincerely,
/s/ Naseem Nixon
Naseem Nixon Senior Counsel Division of Investment Management
Attachment
cc: Brett D. Gardner Senior Corporate Governance Analyst Karpus Investment Management
DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
The Division of Investment Management believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division's staff considers the information furnished to it by an investment company in support of its intention to exclude the proposals from the investment company's proxy material, as well as any information furnished by the proponent's representative.
The staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Commission, including argument as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would be violative of the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversary procedure.
The determination reached by the staff in connection with a shareholder proposal submitted to the Division under Rule 14a-8 does not and cannot purport to “adjudicate” the merits of an investment company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court, such as a U.S. District Court, can decide whether an investment company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy material. Accordingly, a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement actions, does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of an investment company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the investment company in court, should the management omit the proposal from the investment company's proxy material.
1 We also received a letter from the Proponent dated December 23, 2014 .
Incoming Letter
The Incoming Letter and Response Letter is in Acrobat format.
SEWARD & KISSEL LLP
WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL:
901 K STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001
TELEPHONE: (202) 737-8833
FACSIMILE: (202) 737-5184
WWWSEWKIS.COM
VIA E-MAIL (shareholderproposals@sec.gov)
Office of Legal and Disclosure
Division of Investment Management
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
ONE BATTERY PARK PLAZA
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10004
TELEPHONE: (212) 574-1200
FACSIMILE: (212) 480-8421
Re: AllianceBemstein Income Fund, Inc. - Omission of Stockholder Proposal Submitted by Karpus Management, Inc. Ladies and Gentlemen:
We are counsel to AllianceBemstein Income Fund, Inc., a Maryland corporation registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the "1940 Act"), as a closed-end management investment company (the "Fund"), in connection with a proposal and supporting statement (the "Proposal") received by the Fund on October 23, 2014, from Karpus Management, Inc., d/b/a Karpus Investment Management ("Karpus" or the "Proponent"), for inclusion in the Fund's proxy materials (the "Proxy Materials") for its Annual Meeting of Stockholders in 2015 (the "2015 Annual Meeting"), pursuant to Rule 14a-8 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. We hereby respectfully request confirmation from the staff (the "Staff) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") that no enforcement action will be recommended if the Fund excludes the Proposal from the Proxy Materials. The Fund currently expects the 2015 Annual Meeting to take place on or about April 26, 2015, and it expects to file its Proxy Materials on or about March 7, 2015. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8G), the Fund, by separate letter, is contemporaneously advising the Proponent of the Fund's intention to omit the Proposal from the Proxy Materials. The Proposal, copied below, requests, in relevant part, that the Board of Directors of the Fund (the "Board") authorize a self-tender for 100% ofthe outstanding common shares of the Fund at or close to net asset value ("NAY") and that, if more than 50% ofthe Fund's outstanding common shares are tendered, the tender offer should be canceled and the Fund should be liquidated, converted into an exchange-traded fund, or converted/merged into an openend mutual fund. The Fund believes that the Proposal may be excluded:
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2), because it would, if implemented, require the
Fund to violate Maryland law and the 1940 Act;
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6), because the Fund does not have the power
and authority to liquidate, merge or convert into an open-end or exchange traded fund to implement the Proposal; and
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3), because the Proposal contains materially
false and misleading statements regarding the context in which the proposal is made, including statements that impugn the integrity of the Fund's directors through questioning their adherence to their fiduciary duties and make charges concerning improper and illegal activity without factual foundation, contrary to Rule 14a-9.
I. The Proposal
The Proposal reads, in full, as follows:
BE IT RESOLVED, the shareholders ofthe AllianceBernstein Income Fund ("ACG" or the "Fund") request the Board of Directors promptly consider authorizing a self-tender offer for all outstanding common shares of the Fund at or close to net asset value ("NAY"). If more than 50% ofthe Fund's outstanding common shares are tendered, the tender offer should be cancelled and the Fund should be liquidated, converted into an exchangetraded fund, or converted/merged into an open-end mutual fund. Supporting Statement Pursuant to the Fund's prospectus, in 2013 Karpus (as well as at least 10% of the Fund's outstanding shares) submitted a written request to have the Fund submit a proposal to Fund shareholders to convert the Fund from a closed-end to an open-end investment company. Against shareholders' best interests, our Board unanimously recommended shareholders vote against this proposal. At the close of last year's meeting on March 27,2014, this means that shareholders could've received an additional 10.83% or $0.90 for each share if the open-ending would've occurred. Because the discount of the Fund has remained virtually unchanged, shareholders could receive a similar amount (10.70% or $0.90) through the date we've submitted this proposal. Not only did the Board unanimously recommend against the openending proposal, but its "solution" to the Fund's discount was to ask shareholders to change the Fund's fundamental investment objectives. Shareholders responded strongly, and the measure did not pass. As we said at the time, if the Board was having difficulty managing the Fund's discount, we didn't believe the answer was to 2
ask shareholders to assume more risk in a search for yield.
Shareholders were right.
Presumably, the Fund included the original language in its prospectus because it saw the possibility for the Fund to trade a persistent discount. While the Fund has conducted open market share repurchases, the Fund's persistently wide discount to net asset value shows that the Board's actions have not proven effective. This is why we believe our proposal should be implemented and the Board should authorize a self-tender offer for the Fund's common shares at or close to net asset value. Should a majority of outstanding shares be tendered, this would indicate that shareholders do not support the Fund continuing in its closed-end format. The Fund and Board are likely to come up with a litany of arguments against our Proposal but the simple fact of the matter is that the Board has not been able to effectively manage the Fund's discount. Tell the Board that you want it to take more effective action to narrow the discount. Vote FOR Karpus' Proposal to tell the Board you want it to adhere to the spirit and intent of the prospectus' lifeboat provision to enhance shareholder value. (Emphasis original.)
II. The Proposal May Be Excluded Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) Because It Would, if
Implemented, Cause the Fund to Violate Maryland Law and the 1940 Act Rule 14a-8(i)(2) permits a company to omit a stockholder proposal that would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal or foreign law to which it is subject. The implementation of the Proposal would cause the Fund to violate Maryland law and the 1940 Act. The Proposal, in part, requests that the Board authorize a self-tender for 100% of the outstanding common shares of the Fund at or close to NAV and states that, if more than 50% of the Fund's outstanding common shares are tendered, the Fund should be liquidated, converted to an exchange-traded fund, or converted/merged into an open-end mutual fund. 1 For purposes of this letter, discussion of conversion to an open-end fund shall apply to the concept of conversion to an exchange-traded fund as well. It should be noted, however, that conversion to an exchange-traded fund would require steps in addition to those required for a conversion to an open-end fund. In addition, conversion to an open-end fund or an exchange-traded fund would have an adverse impact on portfolio management as discussed in the Proxy Statement (as defined below) at page 19. 3
A. The Proposal Would, iflmplemented, Violate Maryland Law The Proposal's first alternative should more than 50% of the Fund's common shares be tendered, as discussed above, is the liquidation of the Fund. A liquidation would necessarily involve the sale of all ofthe Fund's assets, which is governed by Section 3-105 and
Section 3-902 of the Maryland General Corporation Law (the "MGCL"). Customarily, a
liquidation also involves the dissolution of a corporation under Section 3-403 of the MGCL. While not acknowledged in the statements of the Proponent, both the sale of all the Fund's assets and the dissolution of the Fund with shares outstanding require both Board and stockholder approval under the MGCL. The Proposal's second and third alternatives should more than 50% ofthe Fund's common shares be tendered are conversion of the Fund into an exchange-traded fund or merging or converting the Fund into an open-end fund. However, the Proposal fails to specify how any of the "conversions" would be effected. The MGCL does not specifically provide for "conversion" of a closed-end fund into an open-end fund; rather, a "conversion" would require an amendment to the Fund's charter (the "Charter"i or a consolidation, merger, share exchange, a transfer or sale of assets or a conversion into another business entity. Under the MGCL, these actions would require the Board to consider and adopt a resolution setting forth the proposed transaction, declare the advisability of the transaction and direct that the proposed transaction be submitted for consideration at either an annual or special meeting of the stockholders. Then, pursuant to
Section 3-1 05( e) of the MGCL, with respect to consolidations and share exchanges, and Section
3-902(e), with respect to conversions into other business entities, the stockholders would have to vote to approve the proposed transaction. If a "conversion" is accomplished by an amendment to the Charter, Section 2-604 of the MGCL would require the same statutory procedures-namely, board and stockholder approval. In each instance, the MGCL requires that the foregoing actions must be considered and approved by both the Board and the stockholders. Board approval alone is not sufficient. Accordingly, the Proposal, if implemented, would cause the Fund to violate Maryland law because it calls for the Board, after conducting the conditional tender offer, to unilaterally without the statutorily required stockholder vote- sell all of the assets of, or dissolve, the Fund; amend the Charter; convert the Fund into an exchange-traded fund or convert/merge the Fund into an open-end fund; or compel the Fund to engage in a share exchange. A supporting opinion of Venable LLP with respect to matters of Maryland law is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Exclusion of the Proposal on these grounds is consistent with prior Staff positions. The Staff has determined that a company may properly exclude a stockholder proposal recommending the board of directors to take an action that would result in the company violating state law. See Adams Express Company (January 26, 2011) ("Adams Express") (finding a proposal similar to the one in the Proposal- requesting that the board authorize a fund to conduct a self-tender offer for all outstanding shares at net asset value or within 1% thereof, and that if more than 50% of the outstanding shares are tendered, the offer should be cancelled and the fund should be liquidated or merged or converted into an open-end mutual fund- excludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2), noting that in the opinion ofthe fund's 2 A copy of the Charter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 4
counsel "the Board lack[ ed] authority to liquidate, merge, or convert the Fund and implementation of these aspects of the Proposal would violate state law"); Northrop Grumman Corporation (Feb. 29, 2008) ("Northrop") (a proposal recommending that the board adopt cumulative voting - an action requiring both board and subsequent stockholder approval - was excludable pursuant to, among others, Rule 14a-8(i)(2)); Xerox Corporation (Feb, 23,
2004) (permitting exclusion of a stockholder proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because it
recommended that the board amend the company's certificate of incorporation, which under state law could only be done "upon authorization thereof by the board of directors initially, followed by approval thereof by the shareholders"); and Burlington Resources Inc. (Feb. 7,
2003) ("Burlington") (holding a stockholder proposal- requesting that the board of directors
amend the certificate of incorporation to reinstate the rights of the stockholders to take action by written consent and to call special meetings- properly excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because, if implemented, it would cause the company to violate Delaware law). B. The Proposal Would, if Implemented, Violate the 1940 Act The unilateral Board action called for by the Proposal would also violate the 1940 Act. Section 5(a) ofthe 1940 Act divides management companies into closed-end funds and open-end funds. Under Section 5(a)(l), an open-end fund is defined as a "management company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the issuer."
Section 5(a)(2) provides that a closed-end fund is "any management company other than an
open-end company." Under Section 13(a) of the 1940 Act, a registered investment company may not change its subclassification under Section 5( a)(l) or (2) of the 1940 Act, unless authorized by a majority of its outstanding voting securities. Because the "conversion" of the Fund to an openend fund would necessarily involve a change in the Fund's subclassification, implementation of the Proposal by the Board, without shareholder approval, would violate the 1940 Act, and it thus may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2).
III. The Proposal May Be Excluded Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) Because the Fund Does
Not Have the Power and Authority to Liquidate, Merge or Convert Into an OpenEnd or Exchange Traded Fund to Implement the Proposal Rule 14a-8(i)(6) permits a company to exclude a stockholder proposal if the company "lacks the power or authority to implement" such proposal. The Fund believes that it does not have the power or authority to implement the Proposal. As discussed above, (1) the MGCL does not permit the Fund to implement the Proposal without a stockholder vote and (2) the 1940 Act prohibits the Fund from "converting" to an open-end fund unless authorized by a majority of its outstanding voting securities. Moreover, the Charter does not (and, under the MCGL, may not) vest in the Fund the power to unilaterally implement the Proposal. The stockholder voting provisions in the Charter are consistent with the approval requirements of the MGCL described above. In addition to Board approval, Article Seventh,
Section 4(b) of the Charter requires stockholder approval by the affirmative vote of at least twothirds of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter to convert the Fund from a closed-end
company to an open-end company. Accordingly, without both Board and stockholder approval, 5
the Fund does not have the power to implement the Proposal. A supporting opinion of Venable LLP with respect to matters of Maryland law is attached hereto as Exhibit A. As provided in Staff Legal Bulletin 14D (Nov. 7, 2008), "[i]f a proposal recommends, requests, or requires the board of directors to amend the company's charter, we may concur that there is some basis for the company to omit the proposal in reliance on rule 14a8(i)(l ), rule 14a-8(i)(2), or rule 14a-8(i)( 6) if ... applicable state law requires any such amendment to be initiated by the board and then approved by shareholders in order for the charter to be amended as a matter of law." The Staff has concurred in the exclusion of proposals that would require amending the company's certificate of incorporation under Rule 14a-8(i)(6). See, e.g., Advanced Photonix, Inc. (May 15, 2014) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal because "implementation of the proposal would cause [the company] to violate state law because the proposed bylaw would conflict with [the company's] certificate of incorporation."); CVS Caremark Corp. (Mar. 9, 2010) (same); Northrop Grumman Corp. (Mar. 10, 2008) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal that would have required either the adoption of a bylaw inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or a unilateral board amendment to the certificate of incorporation); Boeing Co. (Feb. 19, 2008) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal that would have required unilateral board amendment to the certificate of incorporation). The Staff has previously determined that a company may exclude a stockholder proposal where, as here, the board lacks the power and authority to implement it. See Adams Express, supra, (finding the proposal similar to the one in the Proposal as outlined above excludable under Rules 14a-8(i)(6) after noting that in the opinion ofthe fund's counsel "the Board lacks authority to liquidate, merge, or convert the Fund"); Northrop, supra, (finding the proposal excludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) because it was not within the power of the company or the board to adopt cumulative voting (a stockholder vote was required)); Burlington, supra, (holding the proposal excludable because it was beyond the board's power and authority to amend the certificate of incorporation).
IV. The Proposal May Be Excluded Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) Because It Contains
Materially False and Misleading Statements Regarding the Context in whicb the Proposal Is Made, Including Statements that Impugn the Integrity of tbe Fund's Directors and Make Cbarges Concerning Improper and Illegal Activity Without Factual Foundation, Contrary to Rule 14a-9. Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits the exclusion of a shareholder proposal if the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials. A. The Proposal Contains Materially False and Misleading Statements Regarding the Context in which the Proposal Is Made The Supporting Statement asserts that the Proposal is made in reaction to past proposals and board recommendations, but it imprecisely, and partly incorrectly, describes the circumstances to which it refers, and thus bases the Proposal upon materially false and misleading premises in violation of Rule 14a-9. 6
The Proposal refers to written requests submitted to the Fund in 2013 to have the Fund submit a proposal to the Fund's stockholders to convert the Fund from a closed-end to an open-end investment company at the 2014 Annual Meeting of Stockholders ("20 14 Annual Meeting"). In addition to materially mischaracterizing another proposal put before the 2014 Annual Meeting, repeatedly impugning the good faith and integrity of the Fund's directors, and failing to note that the open-ending proposal was rejected by stockholders at the 2014 Annual Meeting, the Proposal purports to evaluate the potential financial gain for stockholders if the open-ending proposal had been adopted. The Proposal states as follows: "At the close of last year's meeting on March 27, 2014, this means that shareholders could've received an additional 10.83% or $0.90 for each share ifthe open-ending would've occurred. Because the discount of the Fund has remained virtually unchanged, shareholders could receive a similar amount (10.70% or $0.90) through the date we've submitted this proposal". The quoted statements are materially false and misleading for a number of reasons. First, even if the Fund's stockholders had approved the open-ending proposal (instead of rejecting it) the open-ending could not have occurred immediately. As disclosed in the Fund's February 20, 2014 proxy statement (the "Proxy Statement") for the 2014 Annual Meeting, a number of steps would need to be taken before the Fund could convert to an open-end investment company, including filing a registration statement with the Commission, and the process was estimated to "take several months" after a vote to approve open-ending (see pages 15-16 of the Proxy Statement). In addition, stockholders would not receive any cash upon an open-ending unless they immediately redeemed their shares. The Proxy Statement disclosed (at
page 20) that "[t]ypically, temporary redemption fees are imposed in situations where large
redemptions are anticipated in connection with a closed-end fund's conversion to an open-end fund" and that if open-ending were approved, "the Board may determine to impose a fee of up to 2% of the NAV of the shares redeemed for a temporary period following the conversion." It is materially false and misleading for the Proposal to quantify the amount stockholders would have received upon open-ending if the open-ending proposal had been approved at the 2014 Annual Meeting, since the actual date of open-ending had the proposal passed would not have been the date of the meeting and any proceeds of redemption would have been reduced by the amount of a redemption fee. In addition, the Proposal's use of the terms "virtually unchanged" to describe the evolution of the discount of the Fund over a period of eight months is false and misleading. In fact the discount fluctuated materially over that period (11.94% or $1.08 per share on April21, 2014 and 9.99% or $0.84 per share on July 29, 2014), demonstrating that the "virtually unchanged" statement is materially false and misleading. In addition, the statement that shareholders could have received "10.70% or $0.90" for each share from March 27, 2014 through the date when the Proposal was submitted (October 23, 2014) is patently false. Indeed, the discount on July 29, 2014 was 9.99% or $0.84. This statement is also materially false and misleading in quantifying the results of open-ending on the date of the submission of the Proposal whereas for the reasons discussed above the implementation of the Proposal by the Fund would be impossible since such implementation would be in violation of the 1940 Act and Maryland state law. The Fund notes as well that the current discount is considerably lower than the figures in the Proposal (9.29% or $0.78 per share on December 1, 2014, for example). 7
In light of the foregoing the second and third paragraphs of the supporting statement are materially false and misleading. They would also appear to be irrelevant to a consideration of the subject matter of the Proposal, such that there is a strong likelihood that a reasonable stockholder would be uncertain as to the matter on which he or she is being asked to vote if such statements were to be included in the Fund's 2015 proxy statement. The Proposal also contains a materially false and misleading statement concerning a recommendation by the Board for the 2014 Annual Meeting. The fourth paragraph of the supporting statement includes the following statement: "Not only did the Board unanimously recommend against the open-ending proposal, but its "solution" to the Fund's discount was to ask shareholders to change the Fund's fundamental investment objectives." In fact the Board made no such request and the Proxy Statement did not contain any proposal to change the Fund's investment objective. It is materially false and misleading for the Proposal to suggest otherwise. Proposal Two for the 2014 Annual Meeting was a proposal to eliminate the Fund's fundamental investment policy requiring the Fund to invest, under normal circumstances, at least 65% of its total assets in obligations issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies or instrumentalities and repurchase agreements pertaining to U.S. government securities (see pages 13-15 ofthe Proxy Statement). As the Staff explained in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (Sep. 15, 2004), Rule 14a8(i)(3) permits the exclusion of all or part of a shareholder proposal or the supporting statement if, among other things, the company demonstrates objectively that a factual statement is materially false or misleading. The Staff has allowed the exclusion of an entire proposal that contains false and misleading statements where the false or misleading statement speaks to the proposal's fundamental premise. See State Street Corp. (Mar. 1, 2005) (after evaluating a registrant's objections to a proposal requesting shareholder action under a section of state law that was not applicable to the company - because the proposal by its terms invoked a statute that was not applicable to the company, the Staff concurred that the proposal was based upon a false premise that made it materially misleading to shareholders and, therefore, was excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3)). The Staffhas allowed exclusion ofportions of supporting statements containing potentially false and misleading statements. See INVESCO Global Health Science Fund (May 8, 1998) (proposal recommending (1) conversion to an open-end investment company, or (2) a merger with Invesco's existing open-end Health Sciences Fund, whose supporting statement specified the potential financial benefits of open-ending in a potentially false and misleading way. The Staff advised that portions of the supporting statement were excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3)). B. The
Proposal May Be Excluded Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) Because It Contains Statements that Impugn the Integrity of the Fund's Directors and Make Charges Concerning Improper and Illegal Activity Without Factual Foundation, Contrary to Rule 14a-9 The Note to Rule 14a-9 gives as an example of material that may be misleading for purposes of Rule 14a-9: material that "directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning improper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without factual foundation." 8
The supporting statement in the Proposal contains a number of statements of the type contemplated by the Note to Rule 14a-9, two of which could be interpreted as defamatory in addition to being materially false and misleading. In the first paragraph, the Board's integrity and good faith are brought into question by an assertion that the Board acted against shareholders' best interests ("Against shareholders' best interests, our Board unanimously recommended shareholders vote against this proposal."). In the last paragraph of the supporting statement, there is an assertion that the Board has violated the spirit and intent of the Fund's charter provision (which was described in the prospectus) relating to open-ending votes, as stockholders are urged to: "tell the Board you want it to adhere to the spirit and intent of the prospectus's lifeboat provision to enhance shareholder value." These statements are unwarranted assertions of misconduct by the Fund's Directors that are neither accurate nor supportable. They impugn the integrity of the Directors by alleging breaches by the Directors of their fiduciary duty to stockholders and violations of the Fund's charter that are entirely without factual foundation. The mandate of the open-ending provision of the Fund's charter was followed by the Fund in connectionwith the 2014 Annual Meeting and the fact that the Proponent disagrees with the actions of the Board and is disappointed that the stockholders did not pass the open-ending proposal does not make the Board's actions, taken in good faith by the Fund's Directors after due deliberation, violations of their duties under the charter or applicable law. Rule 14a-9 prohibits the inclusion of such statements in the Fund's proxy statement because they impugn the integrity of the Directors, and accuse them of improper or illegal conduct with no factual foundation. The Staff has granted no-action relief in the past where a statement impugned the character, integrity or personal reputation of a company's directors and management without factual foundation. See Phoenix Gold International, Inc. (Nov. 21, 2000) (a proposal seeking to "give an opportunity to elect a truly independent director" was excludable under Rule 14a8(i)(3)); and ConocoPhilips (Mar. 13, 2012) (same regarding a proposal recommending an audit of the compliance controls for failing to prevent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations by the board chairman). See also Weyerhaeuser Co. (Jan. 21, 2003) (the statement: "Improving accountability of directors to shareholders is essential to improving integrity at Weyerhaeuser" was excludable based on Rule 14a-8(i)(3)); and CCBT Bancorp, Inc. (Apr. 20, 1999) (statement concerning the directors' alleged breach of fiduciary duty excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3)).
V. Request
While we recognize that the Staff, on occasion, will permit proponents to revise their proposals to correct errors that are "minor in nature and do not alter the substance of the proposal;" the Fund believes, for the reasons previously stated, that if the Proponent is allowed to revise its Proposal, the Staff would be permitting the alteration of the substance of the Proposal, in contradiction of the Staff's long-standing practice. See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF) (2004). Pursuant to Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (CF), Shareholder Proposals (November 7, 2008), Question C, we have submitted this letter and the related exhibits to the Commission via email to shareholderproposals@sec.gov. 9
December 1 7, 20 14
If you have any questions regarding this matter or require additional information, please contact the undersigned at (202) 737-8833. If the Staff does not agree with the conclusions set forth in this letter, we respectfully request the opportunity to confer with you before the determination of the Staffs final position. cc; Emilie D. Wrapp, Esq. Marshall C. Turner, Jr. Donald R. Crawshaw, Esq. Paul M. Miller, Esq. 10 Sincerely, Kathleen K. Clarke
Exhibit A
I i:.
VENABLE:LP 750 E. PRATT STREET SUITE 900 BALTIMORE, MD 21202 T 410.244.7400 F 410.244.7742 www.Venable.com AllianceBemstein Income Fund, Inc. 1345 A venue of the Americas New York, New York 10105 Re: AllianceBernstein Income Fund, Inc.- Omission of the Stockholder Proposal Submitted by Karpus Management, Inc. Ladies and Gentlemen:
We are Maryland counsel to AllianceBernstein Income Fund, Inc., a Maryland corporation (the "Fund"), in connection with certain matters of Maryland law arising out of a stockholder proposal (the "Proposal") submitted by Karpus Management, Inc. for inclusion in the Fund's proxy materials for the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Stockholders. We have been asked to consider whether (1) the Proposal, if implemented, would cause the Fund to violate Maryland law and (2) the Fund lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal. In connection with our representation of the Fund, and as a basis for the opinion hereinafter set forth, we have examined the charter (the "Charter") of the Fund, the Proposal and such matters of law as we have deemed necessary or appropriate to issue this opinion. 8878432vl The Proposal reads, in full, as follows:
BE IT RESOLVED, the shareholders of the AllianceBernstein Income Fund ("ACG" or the "Fund") request the Board of Directors promptly consider authorizing a self-tender offer for all outstanding common shares of the Fund at or close to net asset value ("NAV"). If more than 50% ofthe Fund's outstanding common shares are tendered, the tender offer should be cancelled and the Fund should be liquidated, converted into an exchangetraded fund, or converted/merged into an open-end mutual fund. ( . Supportmg Statement Pursuant to the Fund's prospectus, in 2013 Karpus (as well as at least 10% of the Fund's outstanding shares) submitted a written request to have the Fund submit a proposal to Fund shareholders to convert the Fund from a closed-end to an open-end investment company. Against shareholders' best interests, our Board unanimously recommended shareholders vote against this proposal. l ! j.
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VENABLE:LP
December 17, 20 14
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At the close oflast year's meeting on March 27, 2014, this means that shareholders could've received an additional 10.83% or $0.90 for each share if the open-ending would've occurred. Because the discount of the Fund has remained virtually unchanged, shareholders could receive a similar amount (10.70% or $0.90) through the date we've submitted this proposal. Not only did the Board unanimously recommend against the openending proposal, but its "solution" to the Fund's discount was to ask shareholders to change the Fund's fundamental investment objectives. Shareholders responded strongly, and the measure did not pass. As we said at the time, if the Board was having difficulty managing the Fund's discount, we didn't believe the answer was to ask shareholders to assume more risk in a search for yield. Shareholders were right. Presumably, the Fund included the original language in its prospectus because it saw the possibility for the Fund to trade a persistent discount. While the Fund has conducted open market share repurchases, the Fund's persistently wide discount to net asset value shows that the Board's actions have not proven effective. This is why we believe our proposal should be implemented and the Board should authorize a self-tender offer for the Fund's common shares at or close to net asset value. Should a majority of outstanding shares be tendered, this would indicate that shareholders do not support the Fund continuing in its closed-end format. The Fund and Board are likely to come up with a litany of arguments against our Proposal but the simple fact of the matter is that the Board has not been able to effectively manage the Fund's discount. Tell the Board that you want it to take more effective action to narrow the discount. Vote FOR Karpus' Proposal to tell the Board you want it to adhere to the spirit and intent of the prospectus' lifeboat provision to enhance shareholder value. (Emphasis original.) I ;
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I. Violation of Law
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The Proposal requests, in relevant part, that the Board of Directors (the "Board") of the Fund authorize a self-tender for 100% ofthe outstanding shares of the Fund at or close to net asset value. If more than 50% of the Fund's outstanding shares are tendered, the tender offer should be cancelled, and (a) the Fund should be "liquidated" or (b) "converted" into an exchange-trade fund or "converted/merged" into an open-end mutual fund. The proposal provides that the Board alone has the authority to take these actions. As more fully discussed below, in the case of each of a liquidation, merger or conversion, the Board of Directors (the "Board") of the Fund is required, under the Maryland General Corporation Law (the "MGCL"), to approve the proposed action, declare it advisable and then submit it to the stockholders for consideration at an annual or special meeting and the stockholders are required to approve the action. In view of the board approval and stockholder voting requirements of the MGCL, the Board may not unilaterally liquidate the Fund or merge or convert the Fund to an open-end fund. If the Board were to unilaterally approve and carry out the liquidation or the merger or conversion of the Fund, the Fund would violate the MGCL. Thus, because the MGCL does not vest in a corporation the power to act in a manner inconsistent with law, the Fund lacks the power and authority under Maryland law to implement the Proposal. Liquidation To liquidate the Fund as contemplated by the Proposal, the Fund would be required to sell all of its assets, pay off its debts and obligations and make one or more cash distributions to its stockholders. The liquidation of the Fund involves the sale of all1 of the Fund's assets outside the ordinary course ofbusiness.2 Section 3-105(b) and (e) ofthe MGCL, respectively, provide that a Maryland corporation may transfer all or substantially all of its assets only if (1) the board approves the sale, declares the sale advisable and submits the proposed sale to the stockholders for consideration at an annual or special meeting and (2) the stockholders approve the proposed sale.3 Moreover, a liquidation customarily involves the statutory dissolution of a corporation. While the Proposal is unclear, if it is contemplated that the liquidation of the Fund would be followed by the dissolution of the Fund, such an action would be governed by Section 3-403 of the MGCL. As with a sale of assets, the dissolution of a Maryland corporation under 1 Section 1-lOl(cc) of the MGCL provides that '"transfer of assets' mean[s] to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise transfer all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation." 2 See MGCL Section 3-104(a)(l), which provides that a "[t]ransfer of assets by a corporation in the ordinary course of business actually conducted by it" does not require a stockholder vote or the filing of Articles of Transfer. 3 The requirements of Section 3-105 are subject to certain exceptions, not relevant for
the purposes of this opinion, including certain exceptions for open-end funds. 8878432vl
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Section 3-403 requires (1) the board of directors to approve the dissolution, declare the
dissolution advisable and direct that the proposed dissolution be submitted to the stockholders for consideration at an annual or special meeting and (2) the stockholders to approve the dissolution.4 Merger The merger of a Maryland corporation is governed by Section 3-105 ofthe MGCL. With respect to a merger into an open-end fund, as contemplated by the Proposal, the approvals required under Section 3-105 are the same as for a liquidation. Section 3-105 requires (1) the board of directors to approve the merger, declare the merger advisable and direct that the proposed merger be submitted to the stockholders for consideration at an annual or special meeting and (2) the stockholders to approve the merger. Conversion .. <I ! .· While the MGCL does not have specific provisions governing the "conversion" of a corporation from a closed-end format to an open-end format, a closed-end fund could become an open-end fund through a share exchange, consolidation, merger, transfer or sale of assets or a conversion into another business entity. 5 The same analysis applies to the "conversion" into an exchange-traded fund, which is a special type of open-end fund. Section 3-105 governs consolidations and share exchanges and Section 3-902 governs conversions into other business entities and, in this context, provide that these extraordinary transactions are subject to the same board approval and stockholder voting requirements as a liquidation or merger as described above. A closed-end fund could also become an open-end fund by amending its charter, inter alia, to make its shares redeemable at the option of the stockholders. Section 2-604 of the MGCL governs the type of charter amendments that would be necessary for the "conversion" of the Fund to an open-end fund that is a mutual fund or an exchange-traded fund. 6 Like the MGCL provisions governing liquidation, merger, consolidation, share exchange and dissolution,
Section 2-604 requires (1) the board of directors to approve the proposed amendment, declare the
amendment advisable and direct that the proposed amendment be submitted to the stockholders 4 See MGCL Section 3-403. 5 As previously discussed, a sale or transfer of assets and a merger require both board and stockholder approval. 6 The MGCL does provide some exceptions to stockholder approval of charter amendment (e.g., change in the name of the corporation, changes in the name or other designation of a class or series of stock, changes to the par value of stock, change to the aggregate number of shares of stock of the corporation or of any class or series). None of these exceptions apply to the transactions described in the Proposal. 8878432vl
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I ! for consideration at an annual or special meeting and (2) the stockholders to approve the proposed charter amendment. The statutory framework of the MGCL for the approval of extraordinary actions has long been upheld by Maryland courts.7
II. Lack of Power or Authority
Section 2-103 of the MGCL sets forth the general powers of a Maryland
corporation. Section 2-103 does not specifically address liquidations, mergers or conversions. However, in addition to specific enumerated powers, Section 2-1 03(17) provides that a corporation may "[e]xercise generally the powers set forth in its charter and those granted by law." Section 2-103(18) states that a corporation may "[d]o every other Act not inconsistent with law which is appropriate to promote and attain the purposes set forth in the charter." (Emphasis added.) In other words, a corporation does not have the power to do what it is prohibited from doing by law or in its charter. As discussed above, under the MGCL it is impermissible for the Fund to liquidate or merge or convert into an open-end fund by unilateral Board action. The Charter has similar limitations on disenfranchising stockholders. The vote required under the MGCL for stockholders to approve a dissolution, charter amendment, merger, sale of all or substantially all of the assets, consolidation, share exchange or conversion is the affirmative vote of stockholders entitled to cast two-thirds of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter. 8 However, the MGCL permits a Maryland corporation to provide in its charter for the approval of these matters by a lesser percentage, but not less than a majority of all of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter, or a greater percentage.9 Article Seventh, Section 3 of the Charter generally provides for approval of these matters by a majority of the votes entitled to be cast, subject to certain exceptions, including the requirement in Article Seventh, Section 4(b) that the conversion of the Fund from a closed-end company to an open-end company, and any amendment to the Charter to effect such conversion, be approved by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter. 10 7 See In re May Oil Burner Corp., 38 F. Supp. 516, 519-20 (D. Md.l941); Downing Dev. Corp. v. Brazelton, 253 Md. 390, 395-96,252 A.2d 849, 852-53 (1969); Prince George's Country Club v. Edward R. Carr, Inc., 235 Md. 591, 596,202 A.2d 354,356 (1964). 8 See MGCL Section 2-604, Section 3-105, Section 3-403 and Section 3-902. 9 See MGCL Section 2-104(b)(4) and (5). 10 The "lifeboat provision" referred to in the Proposal's supporting statement is contained in Article Seventh, Section 4(a) of the Charter. While not applicable here, if the conditions of the lifeboat provision were met, a proposal to open-end the fund submitted in accordance with such provision would also require approval by the stockholders by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter. 8878432vl
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VENABLE:LP
December 1 7, 2014
While the MGCL allows flexibility on the percentage of votes required to approve a matter, the MGCL does not permit the actions described in the Proposal (liquidation, merger, conversion) without a stockholder vote. Unlike the Proposal itself, which needs to be approved by only a majority of votes cast, any of the actions ultimately contemplated by the Proposal require a vote of at least a majority, or two-thirds, depending upon the extraordinary action, of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter. Because the Proposal requests that the Board carry out these actions without a stockholder vote, the Proposal would cause the Fund to violate both the MGCL and the Charter. Because the implementation of the Proposal would cause the Fund to violate both the MGCL and its Charter, the Fund lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal. Based upon the foregoing analysis and subject to the limitations, assumptions and qualifications set forth herein, it is our opinion that ( 1) the Proposal would, if implemented, cause the Fund to violate Maryland law and (2) the Fund lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal. The foregoing opinion is limited to the MGCL, and judicial interpretations thereof, in effect on the date hereof and we do not express any opinion herein concerning any law other than the MGCL. Furthermore, the foregoing opinion is limited to the matters specifically set forth therein and no other opinion shall be inferred beyond the matters expressly stated. We assume no obligation to supplement this. opinion if any provision of the MGCL, or any judicial interpretation of any provision of the MGCL, changes after the date hereof. The opinion presented in this letter is solely for your use in connection with the Proposal and may not be relied upon by any other person or entity, or by you for any other purpose, without our prior written consent. However, we consent to inclusion of this opinion with a request by you to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") for concurrence by the Commission with your decision to exclude the Proposal from the proxy materials for your next annual meeting of stockholders. Very truly yours, 8878432vl
Exhibit B
Received 01/30/2002 03:20PM in 15:16 on line [1] for FAXOPR * Pg 20/43 JAN-30-2002 15:17 P.20 !.SSMEW,l'S . ' . ' , .. ~· J.-v. . _0Vs mOVEDa::;ar AR'!'lGt~O~ORATION OF . '~CM ~VERNMENT ·INCOME POND~ lNC. ' . . FIRST: (l) The.name of the ineorporator is Donna L .. Schaeffer. I }\1 , . (lJ The incorporator's poet ottice addrel5:a is Wall .Street .Plaza, ··New York,- ·New Yo:r:k 10005. ' . ,,.. . ... ' ,,. . years of age·. (31 The iocorpor~tor is over eightsen ( 4) The i~~.OrpoJ;'i!t9,r. is forDing ·the corporation named in these ~ticl~~·of ·lneorporation under the general laws of the Sta:te of Maryland. .. .-... · SECONO; The name of ehe eor.poration (hereinaf~er called the "Cox-poration•·) is ACM Gover~Dient Income. Fund, Inc. THIRD:
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part of df:i;:eetqrs:r. ·ot.ficers· or:· al'npl~y~es of such firiil and/or
its p~J::e~ts ~ :· subsi:diaries or· af.filiates. and that officers of th~ CorP()r·~tio~ .:ft!.ay. h~"'~ ·~n,· ~e · Q~ ~ .bG!t.:ome d~J;ectors, o~fies, .. or .'eJ'!lPloy~es .q'f. .. ~uc;n,. f~rtn ;al)~/.or its .parents, $ubs id~aries ... o.~.· . .a.~.~ilias ;; : ~nd ·;neitl:ter. such .roa.na.qement or advory,, unda,rwring, di~tr~bi6n, o~·administration contracts no~ any,~ther cont~act· pr t(ansaction between.the corpor.ation. :an~. su~h·. fir~ ap.d/o-~ it~ :·p,ante ,., suJ::ud~ia.ries or .. aft,ilia;es shal.l be. ·ipvalid~ted· or: +n any .. way. affected thereby, nor sh~ll~.any: d~:re~to~·,Or:.of~.;ic:er of.· :the·· Corpora- t'ion b~· 1 i,able- :to t~e Corpo~ation ·or to any stockholder or e:redi tor tbereof or to any p~rs~m for ·any los·s incurrea by it or him under or by re~s~n: ~,f. Bl;l~h: cpfttrac~.' or tra;sac- t~on.,; . pr.o~.ided: t~t· nQ,t.~.i,nc;,~ . h'-~:i~ ."}6~.1:1· prot.e~~ ·any .d1;ec:tor. o.r .off.~9er. o;f' t"'e .. ,Corpo,ra~~9!ft··~qain_$t At:lY·liaJ;:lility .u t.h~ CP~P,O.ra.~.~o~: o~ ~o·. 'i -tr~. · ~ep~r.l ty· 1 holders: :to· :Which he ~~u.;td,., oth~.r.t~:ise .. ~ .. ~~b.j.ect .. ·by;··,re.aoo.n· .. o~ ~will fu~. mi~feaeance., ,bad. ~a.i.th, qro.ss neg,l.igence or, r;kles.s. disregard of. t.he duti,es .. 1ilvq,l"e~. ln .. t.ne i:9ndu'ct.: 'of .'tfis. :9ffice . .;' ·and· provided always. that. such .c'o.ntblct or t'rahsaC:tf'on shall. ha.ve been on teX:ms ·.that· .ware net· un£airt:" 'to. ·.~he corp,oratiOf.~t the time at. ~hie~ ~t .w·:· ent·e·~~d ·i.':lt~ • ..,: :. . . .. . · .: :. ·;. : ·. ·
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NINTH; : ( 1) : · Th& · Cor.Pora-t..ion resexves·· the right. to amend, . al'ter, chanqe. or' repe'a 1 a~y' proviston eontain~d in these Art:icles·of Incorporati.on .. or in :any ome~clment hereto in the l'llanner now or tu~reafter ·prescribed by th9 .l·aws of t.he state of Maryland, including l!lny··mnendtlent which alters the contract rtgh~s, ··• eapreaaly Stitt fort.h in .th.al!ie a:rticlee, of any out-standing atoek, · ~d all .rlghta conferred upon stockholders h•rein are grantedcsubjec::t to this· reservation. . . ., ' ' . ·• .. . . ·'. . • ...... r:·.' . . . . (2) · Hot~ithing section 1 of this Art) .. cl~· Nllrl'H or any o't~r .. pia_J:~~ · .~f thes.e Articl,es of Incorporation, ~ amen~nt.· to se ~ticle• ·of Incor- pora~j.on of . .:the CoJ:P?_ration: .•~a:J.:l' ~Cl, alte):', <?hange or repeal anY, of ··th~. -provi~ioJUii pf ·sec~joM 4 and: 5 of Article SEVENTH ·and th~• Article N!NTa unlee• th• a.e~daent ef~aeting ·~uch :n1;. : ~twee,n t~ . Corporat~q-~ .. a~~· a~l':: ~-a~~qna~ ... ~~u:.::iti~. ~-~-~nge. .. ,: ... . . . . . . Dated. I Ju~e.:. 11;. l·9a.7. :,. · r, "' • ' • ·~ , 1 • • .. "', . ~ . ~ ~ ... • ' '•I .,.• ~ I I , •• r ., J' \ • I \ I I •• • I• ', •• Ill ;,,•" ' ..~'t~.' alie:ration~,-.· ·C~jt,q~ or repeal &hall:-.~he ~t~J(~f· ·t:~t!f Co1"W,Jr~tipn. ._qther- W:i~e .r:eq~ii:'ed by ·law _Of!'' _any .. ~9
receive t.h-t aff.i~tive vo-te of seventy-five pe·rcent (75) of the outstandin; ,hare• of ·common Stock of the Corpora- tion. such aff:l:rliiltive vote aball be. ,in addition to the vo.t~ of th~. ·h~l.der~.- ·
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Received 01/30/2002 03:38PM in 06:34 on line [0] for FAXOPR * Pg 7/9 15:34 jcyv' ,,~ \ l ACM GOV2IU1MEN'l' :r:N:cOME FOND, .INc. . f/31/ / . a.fARTICLES OF 1\MllliDMEN'l'
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01/04/2007 11:53 FAX 202 737 5184 SEWARD KISSEL ACM INCOME FUND, INC.
ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT
(Changing its Name to
A!IianceBernstein Income Fund, Inc.)
ACM Income Fund, Inc., a Maryland corporation having its principal office in Maryland in Baltimore City, Maryland (hereinafter called the "Corporation"), certifies to the State Department of Assessments and Taxation of Maryland tl1at:
f4J 002
FIRST: The Charter of the Corporation is hereby amended by striking out Article SECOND and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
SECOND: The mune of the corporation (hereinafter called the "Corporation") is / AIHanceBernstein Income Fund, Inc. SECOND: The amendment to the Charter of the Corporation as herein set forth was approved by a majority of the entire Board of Directors of the Corporation. The Charter amendment is limited to changes expressly permitted by Section 2-605 of the Maryland General Corporation Law to be made without action by the stockholders of the Corporation. The CorporatiCJn is registered as a closed-end investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. TlllRD: This amendment to the Charter of the Corporation will be effective on January 26,2007, as permitted bv Section 2-6l.O.l of the Maryland General Corporation Law. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ACM Income Fund, Inc. has caused these Articles of Amendment to be executed in its name and on its behalf by Marc 0. Mayer, President of the Corporation, and witnessed by Emilie D. Wrapp, the Secretary of the Corporation, this 14th day of December, 2006. The undersigned President of the Corporation acknowledges these Articles of Amendment to be the corporate act of the Corporation and states that to the best of his Jmowledge, infonnation and belief, the matters and facts set forth in these Articles with respect to the authorization and approval ofthe amendment of the Corporation's Charter are true in all material respects, and that this statement is made under the penalties of perjury. CUST 10:0001900920 WORK ORDER:0001343958 DRTE:01-11-2007 09:17PM RMT. PRID:$197.00
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